Some Words of Advice for our Comrades in the Streets

Throughout the United States, revolt against police violence and the state has broken out in response to the callous murder of George Floyd at the hands of the police. To help contribute to this outbreak of militancy, we have published these words of advice on successful protest from Ahmed Nada, a veteran of the Egyptian protest movements in 2011, 2012, and 2013. 

Image credit: Horreya Press

Protests are chaotic: they often begin suddenly and with minimal prior organization with the embers of a spark few if any could’ve seen coming, an enraptured anger manifesting in people taking to the streets to vent their frustration. Occasionally, this can occur in the backdrop of a movement with a couple thousand followers on a social media platform with an event a few hundred promised to attend, of whom maybe tens did. None of that matters when the first fires are set, when the first rubber bullets are fired, or when the first police car plows through a protester: a protest becomes a war where the participants are naturally unequal, with organized police on one side, and the other only vaguely organized in the best of cases. I was involved in several protests, which ranged from completely unorganized, to planned months in advance – though in the heat of the moment, much of the organization becomes moot, forgotten, or miscommunicated. Such is the nature of attempting to create order where no hierarchy exists, between people who, by their existence within the protest, are not in the best position of their lives. The financially capable would not risk to protest unless their financial capabilities have been thoroughly eroded – protesters have very little left to lose, in most cases. These people, the forgotten, the downtrodden, the distraught, are confused, in some stage of shock, and enveloped in a cloud of tear gas. This exact moment, the moment where a protest’s reality crystallizes, where the romantic image of chanting in a manicured square flanked by boulevards lined with like-minded revolutionaries evaporates into a cloud of white gas best described as a liquid attempting to drown you where you stand, and gives way to the harsh reality of meaningful protest. This is the moment that will make or break a protest, because it is the moment when those who can’t bear it will leave, and those who can will rally behind the first person lucid enough to lead anyone to do anything, and they will often be the least prepared and most vocal.

I have lived this moment more times than I can remember, or care to remember. There is no romance in protest except for the people who never experience it, who have the fortune of reading about it later on, or who feel the misfortune of reading about its failure. My first real protest, the first where I saw someone die, I was twelve years old. I wouldn’t turn thirteen for another seven months, and I had no choice in the matter. I had no convictions, no revolutionary fervour, no ideals; I wasn’t swept up in the moment, a mud-faced child in a painting drawn by a Frenchman a hundred years later. I was in the streets because I was one of a handful of people in my building who weren’t retirees. I was given a broomhandle that was later upgraded to a machete and told to defend my area or risk being killed by the people who were firing bullets on the other side of town; whether they were ‘thugs’ or cops didn’t matter. I was twelve years old and it was fight or fight, because even if fighting meant death, flight meant death too. In a way, I was fortunate to have been that young; my later-diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder was treated earlier than most of the others, and I was able to internalize lessons more quickly, because I had no solid conception of how the world worked. This is what allowed me to begin to organize two years later, as one of the stewards of those more organized, less chaotic protests, aged two months away from fifteen. I have had the misfortune of witnessing protests from the perspective of a child swept up in them unwillingly, and the perspective of a teenage, bravado-filled organizer who believes everything is figured out until it isn’t. I write this not as an analysis, nor as a parable, but as an open letter to protesters, especially in America given the current circumstances. I stand in solidarity with the protesters in Minneapolis, Columbus, and any other cities who have had enough with constrained silence, and if anyone involved in those protests or future protests is reading this, I hope it can help you. My aim with this piece is that you come out of it with a better understanding of how protests work in the moment, lest you end up in one of them, or seek to organize one. If you remember nothing else, however, I hope you remember to send any children involved in the protest home. If you can’t attend a protest without bringing your child with you, then let staying home with your child be your praxis; children have no place in protests, for their sake.

It must be acknowledged that my experience is not fully applicable to Americans:  for one, Egypt’s urban planning is radically different. Furthermore, during the early 2010’s in a country held back technologically, protests, where the internet and all communications have been cut off, are a very different proposition to the interconnected – and easy to track – world of the present. With this, my first and foremost tip for you, the would-be protester, is to turn location services off on your phone prior to leaving your home, and turn your phone itself off before you set off toward the protest. You most likely don’t need to worry about being tracked; if your identity is known, the authorities have other ways of finding you. Turning off your phone is a benefit for your fellow protesters, because location services and WiFi connections, particularly municipal WiFi, are an excellent way of gauging how many protesters exist and where they exist. We got by without phones, we had to adapt, because the government shut down every communications network entirely, and one of the key methods of adaptation was using relays. A relay, in this case, is essentially a person tasked with maintaining a set – ballparked – distance from another relay. They can be organizers, ideally they are, but they can be anyone with a keen sense of where they are relative to others; tall people, rejoice, this is your praxis. A relay network allows organizers or torch-bearing leaders forged from the clouds of the scene I described to send and receive information, especially orders, without the need for any means of communication apart from a soon-to-be worn-out throat. For anyone wondering about social media or the like, forget that it exists during a protest. Social media is not the driver of nor the key to a revolution, it is at best useful for organizing beforehand and agreeing on a meeting point or coordinating with other organizers, but is of no use to you during a protest apart from as a distraction; that isn’t to discount the use of organizing with other protests, though that’s a bit down the line.

Organizers are your key source of communication, both with the other protesters – who throughout this process will be, at best, confused and anxious, and at worst rampaging with zeal – and with other organizers. If you see yourself as an organizer, or find yourself in a position of sudden power during a protest, your job is to watch for your protest’s problems from within and without: the police are not your only enemy. Your enemies are the police, anxiety, injuries, unstable troublemakers within your ranks, perverts who would rather grope other protesters, and hunger – I hope to address each of these. The easiest and most futile-feeling, time-consuming, and infuriating to deal with are the troublemakers. They will exist in every protest, even the most well-organized one, because opportunists are fostered by capitalism and indoctrinated from birth to seek their own benefit. They are unfortunate, but you need not humor them for the sake of numbers: kick them to the curb, leave them behind, and be alert for any more in your midst. Do so as early as possible, because time and stamina are not a luxury you can afford to squander. Harassers from within aren’t the only thorn in your side, however, because with the chaos of a protest will come injuries, whether inflicted by the cops, gravity, or the inertia of the horde. Ensure that anyone – anyone – with any – any – medical knowledge is designated as a medic and sent to anyone who needs medical attention. There are guides all over the internet for providing field aid, and their writers are more qualified than I will ever be, though I would caution against one tip they may give: avoid the temptation to clearly label medics. I have seen too many clearly-labeled medics get shot by snipers who have never existed, using rifles that were never obtained. Know your medics, make sure every organizer is aware of where medics are and where medics are needed, and if you have the fortune of a stable, secure central location to ferry the wounded to, ensure it is defended and secure. Non-medics who are strong enough to carry the wounded safely without inflicting further injuries should be made to do so; any help that isn’t counter-productive should be welcome. The main thing to remember if you are an organizer, relay, or medic is to avoid hesitation. I cannot stress this enough: things develop quickly during protests, and they will not be fun, nor will they be calm. Time is not a luxury you can waste.

Organizers’ most difficult job is the same as the riot police’s most difficult job: controlling the crowd. As a rule of thumb, if you can’t communicate it to a five year old through a game of telephone played in a warzone inside of an echoy aluminum barrel, you can’t communicate it to a crowd of protesters. Keep orders simple, sensible, and repetitive. When riot police haven’t arrived yet, have protesters fan out and space out your organizers. This allows you to claim more space and intimidate the police’s first responders. It can be tempting to maintain this shape, because it looks the most impressive on camera, but that is a reporter’s concern, not yours. When riot police arrive, tighten up. Every organizer should repeat this: tighten up, get closer, tighten up, get closer. Any stragglers will be enveloped by riot police as soon as they stray from the group. You must be keenly aware of how the police work, particularly riot police. There are several resources online as to how your local riot police operate, though they generally follow the same few tactics. You can listen to their scanners to get a read on what they’ll do, but note that they’re often aware that you can hear them. There are methods of listening to ‘secure’ channels on walkie-talkies that are as simple as hooking up a phone with a headphone jack to a pair of headphones and tuning AM and FM frequencies – usually the higher bands for AM, lower for FM – until you hear chatter. That said, some cops are aware of this too, and will call each other on phones instead. In that case, your only remaining methods would open you up to FBI interrogation, so I would suggest avoiding them entirely for the sake of your own safety.

Regardless of their statements of intent, most riot police begin by attempting to intimidate protesters. They will have their most heavily-armored officers at the front, and they will first stand in front of the protest in a line, portraying the same statement of intent that Roman Legionnaires would give to protesters two millennia ago: we are more organized than you, we have better equipment, and this isn’t our first rodeo. Some protesters will give in to the intimidation, whether by leaving the protest altogether – which will lead to their envelopment by the armored line to get arrested on the other side – or by charging at it head-first only to be enveloped by it and beaten. This is the second crucial moment of a protest: the arrival of the enemy. If you have the organization necessary to form into a line of protesters, do so. You have the numbers advantage, they don’t. By forming a line against theirs, by enveloping your wounded chargers into your own line to be treated, you send the police a statement of your own: we are organized, and where we lack in equipment, we make up for it in bodies. You don’t have to believe in this statement, yourself, nor do any of the other protesters; the cops will, and it will shake them. The officers at the front are often trained not to show when they’re shaken, but listen to the scanners and you’ll hear their will begin to break – they can’t leave by choice, and it’ll show if you press them hard enough. The staple weapons of riot police, the batons – electrified or otherwise – and the shields, are not the concern of most protesters; only the ones unfortunate enough to be at the edge will ever even see them. The weapon most protesters will feel, however, is tear gas. When the first canisters are fired, they will be aimed roughly into the middle of the crowd if the cops can see it, or downrange above the first line of protesters. When you see those silver canisters, throw them back at them if you can, or throw them as far away from the protest as you possibly can; instruct others to do the same if they can hear you. The easiest method I’m aware of to combat the effects of tear gas are to hold a rag up near – but not on – your face with a capful of Pepsi (not sponsored, I swear) poured onto it as evenly as possible. It should help you weather it; in the age of COVID, a surgical mask with a capful on it will also work, but make sure it doesn’t touch your face because it’s sticky and may restrict breathing.

The cops in armor may be the most intimidating, but they aren’t the most dangerous: the mounties are. Mounted cops have been a staple of riot control since the first revolution in recorded human history, and for good reason: they break through lines with the force of a several-tonne creature carrying an oft-padded, well-armed cop who can strike anyone who poses any semblance of a threat. They are the final boss of protests – until the army gets involved, that is – and they have the potential to derail any level of organization you’ve reached. The key to stopping them is not to attempt to stop them: make way for the cavalry, then surround them. The horse is confused, anxious, and erratic, and its rider can’t attack in every direction. Let the horse into the crowd, envelop it into the crowd, pull the mountie off the horse, and throw them back into the riot police’s face. Show the mounties mercy, because this will demoralize the police further, and will avoid radicalizing the cops into attacking more vigorously. The ‘mounties’ we faced in 2011 wielded swords and assault rifles, the ones you will face will have batons. You can and will survive them if you know how to mitigate their effects. When mounties appear, prepare the medics for the influx of injured. Replenish your lines, and as soon as you envelop the horse, strengthen your line against the riot police. As protesters, you must channel the Persian Immortals and use your numbers to portray invincibility, as cheesy as that sounds. The single most effective charge a mountie can perform is across a road median, because it is often elevated and grassy, where the horse has the inertia and landscape advantage against protesters. Roads with medians were originally conceived to prevent another Paris uprising, for just this reason. They are also more difficult to hold because they are wider. Wide boulevards are not the mark of a city built for opulence, they are the mark of a city prepared to face protesters with violence. You need to know your city and know your protest location(s).

Image credit: VetoGate

The most common tactic in a protest is to have one central protest in the heart of the city – a main square, a wide boulevard, a main avenue or thoroughfare – because that allows numbers to be portrayed in their most visible, most evident form. This is great for photo-ops, not so much for actual defensibility. The vast majority of American cities, especially ones built after Washington, DC, the first city where the United States Government consciously chose to build with protests in mind – wide boulevards, interconnected squares with huge empty greenspace, et cetera – are built to make a lasting protest as difficult as possible. Main roads, intersections, and squares have several wide roads leading toward them, few – if any – barriers already existing, and openings for police to pour in from on several sides. Police precincts will often be situated on main roads, both to ensure they are difficult to cut off, and to ensure they can reinforce police and rearm them easily. American cities, in fact most western cities, are built to be hostile to protests; the urban planning is inherently violent. Your worst nightmare in a protest is to end up where we ended up in 2011 at the beginning: surrounded on all sides. You have numbers, you will always have the numbers advantage, but numbers are meaningless when you’re surrounded, especially if you’re choked for supplies. The best and most difficult solution to this is to stage several protests, or fan your protests out to cover several squares/intersections, in order to project power over the streets in between. Cops are not dumb, they won’t risk getting surrounded themselves. If you control every square or intersection around a police precinct, that precinct has been, for all intents and purposes, neutralized. Maintaining several locations allows you to reinforce them and create a two-front battle if police attack from the side you already have protesters on elsewhere, and they are keenly aware of this, and will be denied that avenue of attack.

Minneapolis, credit: Google Maps

In order to maintain coordination between different protests, at least one organizer must risk being the point of communication. This is dangerous, though you need not deal with the same ferrying back and forth we had to do, because your communications are open – for now, at least. The organizers who communicate must stay in the know and up to date, but must stay far from the front line. Their identity must be protected at all costs, along with as many identities as you can protect. Don’t share photos that haven’t blurred identifying features – faces, clothing, et al – and don’t share names nor specific locations of organizers. As much as possible, limit communication with the outside world, especially for frivolous reasons. You can boast later, do not waste time. Time is not a resource you can afford to waste. It isn’t the only resource, however, and the next step once an area has been secured is to secure resources: food, water, medicine, contraceptives – yes, you’ll need those just in case – you will need all of the resources you can get. Don’t worry about being branded as ‘looters’, you will be branded as looting thugs either way. The main thing to remember is to avoid harming anyone in the process: the workers are on your side, and you are on theirs. We had the fortune of our comrades in a KFC right on Tahrir Square providing us with food, water, and Pepsi (not sponsored, it’s just more effective than Coke in my experience, sorry) for tear gas protection. We also had the fortune of pharmacists joining us. Should you not have these boons, stores aren’t that hard to raid for supplies. I would suggest avoiding causing too much damage, because corporate doesn’t have to fix it, some poor employee does; remember the human who has to deal with the fallout of your actions, and try to remind fellow protesters as much as you can. Once resources have been gathered, you need to construct barricades. SUVs, large, new-model pick-up trucks, these can be flipped onto their side with minimal effort from a half dozen people, and are very hard to move afterward. Vans can be used for heated sleeping spots, as can buses. Set up tents if you can, especially if you’re in an area with a nice enough climate. You will then deal with the next challenge: the first night.

The first night is the hardest. People will leave. People will have to stay up on nothing but caffeine (don’t drink all the Pepsi; not sponsored) to defend those who sleep. People will get horny, get fearful, or cry. It’s normal. Some people may play music, sing, or write. It will be incoherent, but the incoherence can be beautiful. The people who make it through the first night are easier to organize the next day. The night is also when you are most likely to get raided by the riot police. Organizers should sleep only in shifts, two or three hours at a time, and maintain relays as much as possible. If you have multiple protests going, coordinate to make sure no protest is fully asleep at any point. An integral part of the first night is to talk to the people who break down, because that may be their breaking point. If you are not yet fully surrounded and they can leave safely, they should be allowed to; a protest is not compulsory, and being allowed to leave is what personally radicalized me, among others. Do not forget your ideals for the sake of winning a battle; remind other organizers of that too. The first night will be ideologically challenging, because it is when you will first get to speak coherently to others, especially other organizers, and I guarantee you that you run the gamut of ideologies but share a common desperation and exasperation. I have fought alongside fellow communists, anarchists, liberals, conservatives – yes, they’re odd – and even Islamists. The alliance is tenuous, it has an expiration date, and it is uncomfortable for everyone involved, but you are better with them in the moment. Your protest is not a movement, even if it started as part of one. If your protest is successful, you will most likely be betrayed by one or all of the groups you have allied yourself to, willingly or otherwise. You will find yourself in the same ranks as people you despise, because you share a common desperation, or otherwise you wouldn’t be there. Break bread together and sleep under each other’s watch, because you are on the same side for now. You don’t need to make enemies, because you all have enemies outside the tent, van, or bus, and they won’t hesitate to break you.

Image credit: VetoGate

A major aspect to breaking you, especially long-term, or before you can ever hunker down, is the aforementioned urban planning. Highways were designed to encircle the city and enable the military to enter the city center as quickly as possible; destroying black communities was a bonus, and the tarmac, gas, and car companies were all too happy to fund it all. A highway is a death sentence. You can hold it for a time – focus on the ramps, they’re more manageable – but it will be your doom if left open, and if the army enters the fray. We were fortunate in 2011 and 2013, the army was on our side, but in 2012 it wasn’t, and that led to a rift within the army itself, but only after they plowed APCs through our lines and fired live rounds into us. You need the army, but if it’s not on your side, you have just met the final boss of a protest. Flee onto sidestreets, barricade them with tipped-over cars, use buildings to stage, sleep, and store supplies; barricade the doors and roof access, but keep an eye on rooftops – don’t stay on rooftops, they’re too open. You want to create scenarios where, as said before, you can encircle the police if they attempt to attack you from any side. Cities with grid plans were built to counteract this by providing no clear sidestreets, having several avenues of attack leading to the same areas, and having wide streets that are difficult to barricade. Cities like Minneapolis are especially problematic due to their pedestrian bridges, which provide easy alternate routes for police. The deck is stacked against you by the hostile planning of your city, more so than it was against us. Cairo is divided by a river, and bridges are choke points the police would rather not get stuck on, nor should you. The main streets leading into downtown Cairo have squares – roundabouts – where the narrow roads meet, which, if held, can protect Tahrir Square’s central location and force the police to attack from outside of the city center, in only a few manageable directions, particularly if the only highway leading into the heart of the city is controlled. If your city is not a grid, and you have characteristics similar to that, or better, then you only have everything else I’ve mentioned to worry about.

Cairo, credit: Google Maps

Apart from the logistics and chaos of protests, the hardest part is the purpose and impact of it all. While organizing beforehand is often a boon underestimated by the media and casual observers, you cannot organize the aftermath any more than you can organize the aftermath of a hurricane. Alliances will break whether you achieve your goal or the protest gets crushed, and each splinter of the alliance – and possibly within those once-allied factions – will face a different set of consequences and will have a different view of the events and their aftermath. There has never been and will never be a protest of more than a few thousand people with a consensus over the aftermath of it all because fundamentally, the only unifying factor you all had was being fed up and lacking much to lose. This is not to say that you can’t shape the aftermath, however, and this is where the real power of organization enters the fray: continual pressure. You will have failures, and you will have to learn from them. You will have successes snatched away from you by some of the groups you fought alongside; we had 2011 snatched away from us by the army, then by Islamists, both of whom sought to imprison us for our trouble. The key is not in dwelling on your failures, but using them to propel you forward. The single greatest weapon you have is frustration because a protest is the end result of a swelling mass of frustration. The worse it gets, the closer you get to a nationwide breaking point, but by the same token, the harder it gets to organize effectively. Our worst loss was not in 2011 when we had our revolution snatched from us, it was in 2012 when we organized a protest entirely from scratch, entirely made up of like-minded groups, only to have the army crush us in an instant. It was the worst loss because it had no lessons for us apart from one, which I will relay: you need armament on your side, and the greatest armament you can get is by splitting the army. This is easier said than done, but it is very worth it. Often, the army itself will begin to split when they’re forced to shoot their neighbors because they aren’t as drilled into murder as the police are; they aren’t built for suppression… usually.

The key to gaining support is not retweets, nor is it op-eds, nor is it sucking up to the media with peaceful protests that achieve nothing apart from spend the entire national surplus of frustration on futility: the key is continual pressure. We succeeded in 2011 and had it stolen from us, so we protested again in 2012 and got crushed, so we rode the momentum of the frustration to a protest involving one-third of the country’s population in 2013, and that cannot be ignored as easily as a couple million people crushed under an APC. You will have endless failure until you don’t, and that moment will be equal parts surreal and terrifying, because you have no control how any protest ends nor where it goes from there until you begin the next one, and that is true of your successes, more-so than your failures. Success breeds factions that seek to profit off of it, whether monetarily or through power dynamics, and you will have to contend with that. Build your ally base out of factions you know you can trust. Avoid allies of convenience outside of protests themselves, and maintain strong relationships with factions that can’t protest as easily as you can; the unions, the people working three jobs, the people on overtime graveyard shifts who can’t risk their credit rating falling any more than it has. These are your base, these are your allies when you succeed, and they are how you channel popular pressure into legitimate change, because you are a protester, you are illegitimate by your very nature, but you are the hammer of the legitimate. Protest until you succeed, counter-protest when – not if – your once-allies ride your successes for their own benefit, and above all, do not surrender for the sake of civility, legitimacy, nor platitudes of peace; your fallen comrades were given none of the leeway these concepts imply, and you should not grant your enemies this leeway either. Protesting is not an easy path, nor is it a bloodless one; the myth of the peaceful social media protest was created to give you false hope in pointless action. Remain steadfast in your opposition, maintain organizers who can harden with your failures and maintain stability with your successes, and don’t let up, for the sake of your human losses. Whether the protest fizzles out, is crushed, or achieves its goal, you are in a pantheon of a minority of humanity who risked everything for the sake of change, and that is the only romance you will ever need in a protest. Good luck, comrade.

Progress of the Storm: Collaboration with Revolutionary Left Radio

We are very happy to release this crossover episode with Breht O’Shea from Revolutionary Left Radio and Red Menace! Remi (@cosmoproletan), Parker (@centristmarxist), and Donald (@donaldp1917) have a wide-ranging discussion with Breht touching on current events, ecological Marxism, organizing, labor, electoral strategy, and more.

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The Need for Organizations that Organize

Ben Reynolds responds to Chris Koch’s The Need for Agitational Organizations.

In a recent article titled ‘The Need for Agitational Organization’ Chris Koch argues that the lackluster growth of revolutionary organizations can be attributed to their petite bourgeois class composition, fetishization of leadership, and ideological rigidity. Koch is right that the predominantly middle-class membership of most left-wing organizations, along with their white and male skew, is a serious obstacle to future growth.1 However, today’s fundamental barrier to positive change is not just an insufficient focus on agitation, but the lack of real knowledge of basic organizing techniques and effective campaign strategy. We have organizations that sell newspapers, call for demonstrations, conduct political education, create podcasts, and infight – we do not, on the main, have organizations that spend their time organizing.

What actually is “organizing?” Members of many leftist organizations would be hard-pressed to find leaders who could give a convincing answer to this question. Indeed, one would probably hear a laundry list of the sort of activities described above which, while important in one way or another, are not organizing. Organizing is the building of relationships with members of an oppressed class in order to create a structure that will enable the group to collectively fight for its interests. It is externally focused, oriented toward uncontacted individuals outside the group who need to be engaged in struggle. By contrast, most left-wing organizations spend their time mobilizing existing members and contacts to come to meetings, attend protests, donate resources, and so on. Because the membership of these groups is predominantly middle class, individuals who happen to join due to existing friendships and chance social connections also tend to be middle class, perpetuating social isolation.

There are a number of reasons that organizations tend to prefer to do pretty much everything except external organizing. First, deliberately trying to forge relationships with new people can be intimidating. It is much more comfortable to spend our time with the already-convinced and with our current friends – the social alienation created by today’s media technologies has exacerbated this problem. Second, organizing is difficult. It requires many hours of work over a relatively long period of time to canvass an area, build relationships with key individuals, and mobilize a community to take action. It is certainly easier to promote a demonstration on social media to the same group of people who show up to every protest.

However, the most important reason for the blockage is that many left-wing organizations have little-to-no knowledge of how to actually undertake an organizing campaign. This is a product of historical circumstances. The defeat of the radical movements of the mid-20th century severed the institutional transfer of knowledge from experienced activists to new members. Leaders of organizations like the Black Panthers were assassinated or imprisoned; student radicals were largely co-opted and reintegrated into capitalist society. Each new generation of activists has thus had to learn the practices and pitfalls of movement work largely blind, with minimal guidance from elders, and has engaged in the same patterns of activity: an influx reacting to an external challenge, symbolic protest action, media coverage and growth, impasse, stagnation, and decay. As burnt-out activists leave in the final stage, so too the knowledge of successes and failures departs from the movement.

Where there are pockets of knowledge about organizing strategy and techniques, the connection to left-wing groups is often insufficient. For example, there are relatively few linkages between organizers in unions that still effectively recruit new members – UNITE HERE and National Nurses United, for instance – and the revolutionary movement. The same can be said of the few nonprofits that focus on base organizing rather than ‘advocacy’ and lobbying. This is not a fatal limitation in and of itself. To overcome it, organizations need to systematically train new members (and, given the present state of things, existing members) on how to become effective organizers. They need to develop training programs, methods for experienced individuals to share skills, and processes of evaluation and self-criticism to allow effective techniques to spread. Most importantly, they must undertake campaigns that put these skills to use, allowing organizers to develop their abilities through practice while recruiting working-class leaders.

While this is not the place for a manual on external organizing, it is still important that we have a basic understanding of what an effective organizing campaign looks like. A campaign begins by identifying a group of people who are being exploited by a shared enemy – a company, landlord, police agency, etc. The organizers must map and canvass the area to understand its social groups, points of agreement, and potential schisms. They must also identify points where the community can exert strategic leverage by inflicting meaningful costs, in dollars, on the adversary, as in a labor strike, rent strike, or blockade. Finally, the organizers need to identify the organic leaders within the community who can help move their social groups to take action when necessary.

The organizers must develop relationships of trust with these leaders and other members of the community, listening to and understanding their problems and motivations. They must then use their understanding to help these individuals overcome their fear and decide to take action. The organizers and community leaders then mobilize a critical mass in the wider community to join the struggle, conduct a pressure campaign against the adversary, and force concessions. Through this process, trust between the organizers and community is created, the oppressed discover their strength, and effective working-class leaders are identified and tried by fire. In one such example, recent organizing by Stomp Out Slumlords in D.C. has led to rent strikes and the creation of a city-wide tenant union.

Chris Koch correctly stressed the importance of credibility, which could be more simply stated as a problem of trust. Working-class communities do not even know that most left-wing organizations exist but, if they did, they would still need to trust them to be willing to risk the real consequences of taking action. Agitation alone is not enough to create this trust. Standing on a soapbox and delivering stirring oratory is no substitute for the relationship building that has to take place before mass action is possible. Agitation, in this context, is more likely to happen over a beer or in someone’s living room than at a major demonstration – it is the part of the process where an organizer helps someone overcome their fear with the dual motivations of hope and anger.

Internal democracy, charismatic agitation, and ideological flexibility are all important – but they are mere window-dressing if an organization has no mass base. The truths of revolutionary socialism will find no purchase if there is no one to listen to them. And, to be frank, the movement needs to spend much more time listening to the problems and demands of the working class, and a bit less time preaching its chosen truths.

Workers like Alexander Shlyapnikov joined the RSDLP and later-Bolsheviks because they developed contacts with members who fought with them in their concrete struggles. Koch rightly emphasized that worker-leaders like Shlyapnikov were far more effective at convincing other workers to take action than socialist intellectuals. Workers in a UPS logistics center, for instance, are still far more likely to listen to their compatriots then some college student radical off the street. This is true of social groups in general – imagine your reaction if a Democratic Party operative tried to advise your local leftist group on the actions it should take. Again, the only way to overcome the social barriers between insiders and outsiders is to undertake a concerted effort to build relationships with insiders, face-to-face.

I believe we need an organization today that somewhat resembles the IWW of old: a big tent comprised of anarchists, communists, socialists, and other militants who unite first and foremost around practical organizing work aimed at engaging the oppressed in struggle and building the organized power of the working class. Unlike the old IWW, such an organization would also engage in campaigns beyond syndicalism, supporting the struggles of tenants, prisoners, the LGBTQ community, and so on. Whether existing organizations can adapt themselves to the task at hand, or whether such a new “people’s alliance” is required, remains to be seen. If the revolutionary movement does not root itself predominantly in the working class, it will fail, plain and simple. It is up to those of us who recognize this reality to side-step the more irrelevant debates within the movement and take up the serious work of creating a movement that organizes.

 

The Need for Agitational Organizations

Chris Koch argues that the current ailments of the modern left are a product of its class composition. To escape this predicament we must master the art of agitation. 

‘Demonstration at Battersea’ by Clive Branson (1939)

Last year, in the face of a crisis that is all too common among revolutionary organizations, the International Socialist Organization (ISO) dissolved. We are faced with a grim reality. Revolutionary socialist organizations have a long history of sexual assault, unwelcoming practices to oppressed minorities, significant sectarianism, voluntarism, and substitutionism. And while reformist groups like the Democratic Socialists of America have currently grown to more than 50,000 members, revolutionary socialist organizations have remained stagnant. We must strive to understand why this is.

What is wrong with our organizations? Numerous ideas have been put forward. Some argue that revolutionary socialist organizations are micro-sects that act as though they are vanguard parties. Others argue that they are propaganda circles with no need for democratic forms of organization. Different organizations have different organizing models, yet common problems persist. What we need to look for is a common cause. So, we must move up a level of abstraction. An organization does not exist independent of its membership. What we need to understand is the class character of the membership and, from this, the organization. Once we have answered this question we can determine what sort of party is needed.

When we look at revolutionary socialist organizations, we find that they tend to be comprised of petit-bourgeois, intelligentsia, students, and other middle-class elements (henceforth oversimplified to petit-bourgeois). As a result, our organizations tend to be whiter and more male than the working class. And because of this class composition, our organizations are tainted with petit-bourgeois ideology.

As Karl Marx put it in The German Ideology, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” Those whose social being is petit-bourgeois can have a corrupting influence on our organizations if they are not curbed by self-imposed vigilance or outside influences. As it stands, it is not surprising that shop-owners, professors, students, professionals, and middle managers import a cult of leadership and a semi-mystical view of knowledge. Our leadership is seen as indispensable, our party’s program and theory are seen as the secret key.

That leadership is seen as indispensable by Leninist groups is obvious. Members and former members of the ISO have pointed to the systematic abuse of members by the former leadership in the pages of Socialist Worker, while documents leaked by SCC Insight indicate that the same issues pervade Socialist Alternative. And yet, the leadership stays in power for long periods of time. Organizations spend their time training the future leaders of the as yet non-existent vanguard party, substituting this work for the class struggle. Training leaders is seen as more important than persuading the vanguard of the working class of the truths of revolutionary socialism. But what more can be expected of the class of small business-owners, managers, and professionals?

Moreover, petit-bourgeois thought, especially spread among students and the intelligentsia, is given to a semi-mystical approach to knowledge. It is they who are the keepers of the truths of revolutionary socialism, and those who disagree are to be beaten into submission. Nevermind that the most successful of previous organizations were not so wedded to their programs that they could not change or deal with dissent. The First International tried to weld Marxists, anarchists, and Chartists together. Lenin and Bukharin were able to have a sustained debate on the national question and never came to an agreement. Splits happened when serious and irreconcilable differences arose. The splits that created most of the modern Trotskyist organizations were as small as seeing the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers’ state or as bureaucratic collectivist or as state capitalist. And membership in most current organizations requires accepting a large number of fine points that are certainly debatable by sincere and knowledgeable revolutionary socialists.

Organizations are treated as if they hold sacred knowledge, whose role it is to train leaders to fight a future revolution or, at best, to convince workers of a very particular program. Their leaders are to be respected as the holders of the most esoteric, mystical knowledge who can guide the organization forward. All other programs are to be reviled and any potential member is to be indoctrinated into a vast web of precise knowledge. Individual theoretical work and education substitute for the class struggle. From this springs ineffective, undemocratic practices. When workers or oppressed peoples have a perspective that differs from the organization, they are ostracized. Their experiences are ignored. Agitation often takes the form of condescending education about the arcane particulars of theory. Is it any surprise that workers and other oppressed peoples do not feel welcome in our organizations?

Even our descriptions of the greatest triumph of the working class betray this petit-bourgeois corruption. The tale of the Russian Revolution is not told as the history of working-class triumph or as the struggle of revolutionary socialist organizations or even as the struggle of the Bolsheviks as a whole. Rather, it is told as the tale of great men of history. There was a spontaneous uprising in February, followed by chaos, followed by Lenin heroically rearming the party in April, followed by a setback from a premature action in July that Lenin wisely saw as premature, followed by Lenin and Trotsky brilliantly forming a united front with Kerensky against Kornilov, followed by Lenin and Trotsky (with the backing of the workers) leading an uprising, followed by Trotsky winning the Civil War singlehanded. It is disheartening to recall that the two works that best document working-class self-activity during the Russian Revolution—The Bolsheviks Come to Power and Red Petrograd—were not written by revolutionary socialists, but by liberal bourgeois historians. Where are our books telling the tale from the perspective of the people who actually changed history? Where is our emphasis on the role the working class played? All we have are petit-bourgeois romances of Lenin and Trotsky leading the workers as Napoleon led his armies.

This is not to diminish the importance of either effective leadership or theory. Rather, it is a cry for proper proportions. Leadership is needed; theory is essential. Lenin and Trotsky were important to the success of the Russian Revolution. But we must stand against distortion and emphasize the workers who went on strike, formed the soviets and factory committees, who turned the Bolsheviks into a mass party, pushed for a transfer of power to the soviets, and who fought and died for the possibility of a socialist future.

We see that our parties are corrupted by petit-bourgeois ideology leading to substitutionism and sectarianism. Now that we have a diagnosis, we must look for a cure. The most obvious solution would be to increase the number of workers in the organizations, thereby changing the class character of the organizations themselves. As more workers take leadership positions and the petit-bourgeois elements are relegated to the sidelines, our organizations will take on a different, more suitable form. And while I cannot prove this, it is probable that the ISO’s reorientation away from campus organizing, and towards workplace organizing and working-class radicalism, was the cause of the ISO’s shift from slate voting and the subsequent uprooting of the entrenched leadership. We need a wave of workers to wash out the muck.

The problem with the cure is the disease itself: our organizations are too petit-bourgeois to be welcoming to workers. Moreover, it is difficult for the petite bourgeoisie to persuade workers that an organization dominated by petit-bourgeois elements is the surest path to self-emancipation. I recall from my early and short-lived days in Seattle, a machinist during the Boeing machinist strike of 2008 who played a key role in organizing and leading the strike. He had a long-standing working relationship with revolutionary socialists. At no point did this man, a Ron Paul supporter whose influence among other machinists was incredible, want to join any revolutionary socialist organization. We need influential workers like him, but at no point could he be persuaded to join. Why should he listen to us? It’s not as though we were machinists or worked at Boeing.

This is not a new problem. Consider the experiences of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), of which the Bolsheviks were a faction. In his Lenin and the Revolutionary Party, Paul Le Blanc points out that even socialist workers often did not join the RSDLP until 1905, since, “workers harbored suspicions and resentments toward revolutionary students and intellectuals, whose class origins were so different from theirs.” The students and intellectuals had issues relating to workers, often behaving in patronizing and condescending ways. It was easy for workers to assume that revolution was a game for these petit-bourgeois socialists who had security derived from their status or parents and who were susceptible to changing their position as life became more comfortable.

It was the Russian Revolution of 1905 that saved the RSDLP from irrelevance. Yet even prior to that, they had far greater success in recruiting influential workers, like the Boeing machinist, than our organizations have ever dreamed of. Consider the case of the worker-Bolshevik Alexander Shlyapnikov.

Alexander Shlyapnikov

Shlyapnikov joined the RSDLP in 1901 at the age of sixteen, already a skilled metalworker and strike leader. His exposure to revolutionary literature in 1899 was swiftly followed by a series of strike actions in which he witnessed brutal state repression and, for his own participation, was blacklisted. His rising class consciousness came through exposure to revolutionary ideas through agitators and direct experience in the class struggle. He was a key figure among the Bolsheviks, more easily persuading other workers to join and curbing Lenin’s more petit-bourgeois attitudes. However, Shlyapnikov received his revolutionary materials from other workers, those who were in the same situation as him. We are still stuck in a paradox. To get workers to join we need workers in our ranks who can relate to other workers. To get out of this problem we must look past the cure and begin to take palliative measures.

Our organizations are too leadership-oriented, too focused on the minutiae of theory, too undemocratic to be welcoming to workers and other oppressed peoples. So, we must make every effort to change democratic centralism to democratic centralism.  Slate voting cannot be allowed. Branches need to be able to operate independently. Free and open discussion needs to be emphasized. “Freedom of discussion, unity of action” must be modified with branch-level freedom of interpretation. Theory and discussion should be encouraged, but unity of thought should be resisted. Any attempts to force a particular theoretical perspective on any member must be condemned by the membership as a whole. Membership requirements should not be based on too many particular points but on a broad agreement with the principles of revolutionary socialism, especially the self-emancipation of the working class. All of this is to be done in the name of making our organizations open to workers and oppressed peoples. These are broad generalizations and must be, as I cannot speak to every particular circumstance. It is up to the membership of the various branches of the various organizations to democratically discuss and apply these broad measures. It will be difficult and there will be missteps, but it is important for us to survive the pain until we can receive the cure.

A more specific measure can be directed towards the orientation of our organizations. Rather than placing our emphasis on training new leaders, we must place greater emphasis on agitation. As Lenin put it in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder:

While the first historical objective (that of winning over the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not have been reached without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second and immediate objective, which consists in being able to lead the masses to a new position ensuring the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, cannot be reached without the liquidation of Left doctrinairism, and without a full elimination of its errors.

As long as it was (and inasmuch as it still is) a question of winning the proletariat’s vanguard over to the side of communism, priority went and still goes to propaganda work… the mere repetition of the truths of “pure” communism… 

Lenin saves the development of leaders and leadership to the second historical task of revolutionary socialists. It is within the vanguard of workers that leaders will be found, not the petit-bourgeois members who first form the organization. And it is the vanguard of the workers organized together who will lead the masses in the class struggle. They will create a mass party through the common struggle of people who have a shared stake in the outcome. The emphasis prior to this is not one of leadership or building organizations, but of agitation.

Our organizations must become agitational organizations. After the bosses’ offensive and neoliberalism all but eliminated the vanguard of the working class, workers are beginning to radicalize again on many different lines. From Occupy Wall Street to Black Lives Matter, from No One is Illegal to Standing Rock, from the Women’s March to the Occupation of the Airports, from the Teachers’ Strike Wave to the air traffic controllers ending the government shutdown, workers and oppressed peoples are radicalizing. A vanguard is forming; we need trained agitators.

Agitators, while similar, differ from leaders and educators. The agitator differs from the leader not in organizational abilities, but in focus. A good agitator can help organize a rally or a strike but focuses on spreading the message in a persuasive manner. The agitator differs from the educator not in knowledge, but in method. A good agitator knows the theory but does not condescend to workers about what they already know. Rather, the agitator persuades them that it is in their best interests to unite with other workers in a revolutionary socialist organization. That is to say, an agitator must be trained in the art of persuasion, and in that we have been lacking.

There are a couple of exceptions to this general lack of effective agitation. As far as selling newspapers goes, revolutionary socialists have maintained a high standard. This has allowed us to make some meaningful connections with people who at least somewhat agree with our positions. We have also done a great job at engaging in agitation by the deed. That is, we have engaged in various struggles and demonstrated both effectiveness and a willingness to fight for a better future. These are both excellent forms of agitation and should continue, but they are limited. They do not agitate as far and wide as is needed.

Encouragingly, revolutionary socialists are producing podcasts that have the potential to reach workers and oppressed peoples across the world. Even though these podcasts require workers to already be inclined towards socialism, we need to help distribute work like this to maximize their reach. And yet, despite the fact that these podcasts have the potential to reach millions of workers, we cannot make that potential actual until the underlying problem is addressed.

We face a crisis of ethos. By this I mean we lack credibility, one of the key elements of persuasion. This is a consequence of the class character of our organizations. Why should a worker listen to one of the petite bourgeoisie? If our organizations are to swell with workers, we must develop credibility.

Our most common and important interactions with workers are on an interpersonal basis. We need to make sure that we are not acting as condescending educators or obnoxious harangers, but as persuasive agitators. Consider Trotsky, who was a successful agitator despite his petit-bourgeois background. In his letters, he pointed out the importance of listening to workers and oppressed peoples. We must learn to listen with care to gain credibility and build better relationships. Nothing is more important than this. Every agitator must know how to be an active listener. That is to say, agitators must be able to fully concentrate, maintain eye contact, react with genuine, appropriate sympathy, ask relevant questions, and build off of what is said. By doing this we can validate their experiences, draw revolutionary conclusions, and demonstrate the truth that we are subordinate to them, not the other way around.

Furthermore, we are often confronted with public speaking opportunities. At the end of a successful rally or in the midst of a strike or standing on a street corner we can be called on to speak (we are already willing to hawk newspapers on the streets like it’s the 1930s, we might as well try standing on ladders and bellowing out speeches). And what happens? Whatever ethos has been garnered through agitation by the deed dissipates during dispassionate speeches, read instead of delivered, that focus purely on appeals to reason. While we must always strive to have appropriate appeals to reason when we speak, so that our deductions are valid, our analogies are strong, and our inductions are probable if not certain, credibility is not garnered by reason alone. It is to education that pure reason belongs, and it is a petit-bourgeois mistake to think that we are educators. Education happens when a person joins or is thinking about joining the organization, but first they must be persuaded. And persuasion is the domain of the agitator.

To persuade, it is necessary to appeal to the emotions of the audience. To gain credibility, we must show that we understand the emotional stakes. We do this on occasion, but nowhere near often enough. We must try to arouse indignation against the bosses, the cops, and the capitalist system itself. We must try to arouse pity for and solidarity with other workers regardless of nationality, race, sex, or any other division that capitalism foists upon them. Such emotional appeals are necessary for oratory and for drawing revolutionary conclusions during discussions with workers. But this is not all.

Great oratory requires great delivery. We must move away from the calm and dull Noam Chomsky approach that prefers to bore, since that shows the seriousness of the listener. Rather, we must follow the likes of Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Mother Jones, Eugene Debs, Leon Trotsky, Big Bill Haywood, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who wore their emotions on their sleeves as they spoke. When fighting against exploitation and oppression, great passion is required. Our credibility grows if we can show our sincere commitment to the cause of workers and oppressed minorities. We must speak with fire and passion if we are to convince a large number of workers to join our organizations.

Moreover, our writing is often stilted and not fun to read. We are living in an era where the written word can be easily spread far and wide. Any one of us can start a blog to try to spread the truths of revolutionary socialism. Any one of us can make a professional-looking pamphlet to distribute, either through social media or in person, and reach more workers than could have been imagined mere decades ago. Imagine if the Communist Manifesto were written in the same academic, dull style that most revolutionary publications favor. Who would it have inspired? Who would read it today? Strong writing is still a necessary part of agitation, and one that we must start to do again.

This may all seem superficial. But the reality is that our problem is a superficial problem and its solution is a superficial one. The sad fact is that we should have been doing this from the beginning. The process will be slow. At first, we can expect a trickle, a few workers who are able to hear and reflect on the truths we express. Then, those workers, with their far greater ethos, can persuade the Alexander Shylpnikovs of the workplace to join, causing a wave that washes out the muck in the party. And as more and more radicalizing situations open more workers to the truths of revolutionary socialism, a flood of workers will turn our then-vanguard parties into mass parties, which will drown the capitalist system.

Taking Stock: Electoralism vs The Capitalist Arsenal

In Part Two of his analysis of strategy for the modern-day left Hank Beecher takes a look at three recent case studies and tries to draw conclusions on how the left can move forward. 

Rent strike in NYC, 1907

 In polemics for and against electoralism, leftists of various stripes invoke historic examples as proof that theirs is the more plausible road to power. They analyze the Russian and Finnish Revolutions of a century ago and Allende’s Chile of half a century ago. Less attention is given to contemporary events that might inform us of how different strategies fare as engines of social transformation in today’s United States. Marx himself maintained in his day that a peaceful means of attaining socialism might be possible in the United States and certain parts of Europe. How might today’s social landscape in the U.S inform the question of an electoral road?

In Part I, I expounded on the problems with electoralist arguments against non-electoral means of building class power outside the state. I looked at how the climate crisis must be centered in our analysis of present material conditions. The climate crisis is one far-reaching aspect of a general crisis in the reproduction of capitalist social and ecological relations. Here, I look at how the struggle for power is playing out in the fissures opening as capital cannibalizes its own foundation. I explore how electoral struggles fare in addressing various facets of these crises, particularly when reform threatens the profits and hegemony of the capitalist class. Each of these cases focuses on an aspect of the intensifying crisis of social reproduction, specifically, the disintegration of working-class housing and the unraveling of the climate, each exemplifying some aspect of left electoralism and how the capitalist class fought back. In two cases, the left was defeated despite winning the electoral battle. In the third, the socialists prevailed but benefited from a long history of class struggle. 

These cases illuminate important tools in the capitalist arsenal against significant reforms. More importantly, they show how the landscape of power and regional contours of class vary immensely in the U.S. Thus an electoral strategy that is appropriate in one setting might be a counterproductive dead-end in another. Crucially, the power struggles that shape these conditions happen largely (though not exclusively) outside the state and are conditioned by uneven patterns of capital accumulation and crisis. Socialists and the working class must adapt our repertoire of tactics accordingly. Ballots, bullets, and various forms of strikes can all play a role and the need for each varies with context. What remains constant is the necessity of drawing the masses into the struggle for a socialist future.

CASE 1: Seattle Head Tax

Strategy

This case is a paradigm of a socialist electoral strategy combined with mass, grassroots mobilization in the streets. It details an event in which socialists leveraged the position of the most prominent socialist third-party politician in any major U.S. city as well as a robust local activist culture. Thus the campaign was two-pronged: electoralism + activist mobilizing. The site of the struggle is the city of Seattle.

Context

Seattle is a locus of concentrated investment in real estate and tech, exemplifying the highest peaks in capitalism’s uneven contours of development. In recent years it has had the nation’s sharpest increases in living costs, fueling skyrocketing rates of homelessness and displacement. Waves of capital have washed away the old city, residents and all, and replaced it with sterile citadels of glass.

The struggle

In 2018 the Seattle City Council deliberated ways to mitigate the crisis facing the city’s burgeoning unsheltered and rent-burdened population. As housing has become increasingly commodified, the built environment has grown more and more hostile to the needs of working-class residents. This problem is ubiquitous beyond Seattle and is a paradigm example of capital cannibalizing its own base. 

To raise a fraction of the money needed to diffuse the struggle for housing, City Council considered a modest tax on the thinnest top layer of the city’s richest companies. Seattle is an extremely business-friendly city with a tax burden that falls almost entirely on the working class, leaving corporations and the wealthy relatively unscathed. The city began deliberating a so-called Head Tax, which would negligibly shift that tax burden toward the capitalist class. The most fierce advocate for the Head Tax was Seattle’s sole socialist council member, Kshama Sawant. The tax was backed by community groups, most labor unions, and the more progressive wing of city council. The battle in the streets was led by Socialist Alternative, the party to which Sawant belonged, DSA, and the socialist-adjacent NGO Transit Riders Union. Flyers, rallies, press conferences, and canvassing monopolized the activist agenda. Every City Council meeting was packed beyond capacity. The tax was billed as the “Amazon Tax”, playing on the general public discontent toward the city’s largest business, which had transformed the landscape into a playground for the rich. The outlook was promising.

Then big business rebelled. 

Amazon’s Capital Strike

Amazon owns or occupies nearly a quarter of the office space in Seattle and its growth plans are robust in the region. It is a major driver of real estate development and its building projects employ thousands of workers, particularly in the building trades. When lobbying city council failed to obstruct the Head Tax, Amazon pulled a capital strike and suspended construction projects downtown. Immediately, an enormous swath of the area’s living-wage, blue collar economy evaporated. Though the building trade unions had already opposed the Head Tax, the threat to the stable livelihoods of fellow workers gave other unions’ bureaucrats justification to flip sides and join the capitalist revolt. For organized labor, opposing socialists became a matter of solidarity with fellow union workers whose livelihoods were at risk. Socialism was reckless radicalism that endangered the working class.

The capital strike and consequent revolt of union bureaucrats was enough to force City Council to blink. They immediately scaled back the proposed tax, halving its effective rate, further restricting the number of companies to which it applied, and setting it to expire after five years. The business community still objected to the diluted bill and socialist activists unleashed one of the most pavement-pounding public outreach campaigns in living memory. Against the continued opposition of capitalists and a growing share of organized labor, this weakened bill passed and the left claimed victory. It seemed the formula had prevailed: electoralism + mass mobilization = socialist victory. Unfortunately, big business had other plans.

Hijacking democracy

Ballot initiatives and citizen referendums are considered one of the best examples of direct democratic control of the state apparatus. Ballots remove legislative power from the hands of politicians and allow citizens to generate and enact policy reforms directly. In theory, citizens and community groups can draft and enact legislation themselves by gathering a certain number of voter signatures and passing the bill via majority vote. In appearance, such mechanisms are the purest example of direct-democracy in the legislative functions of the state. However, even these channels can be hijacked by capital to bring other, less compliant factions of the state to heel. Precisely this turn of events occurred after socialists in Seattle had achieved an electoral victory on the Head Tax. 

After the Head Tax was passed by City Council, a coalition of businesses, led by Amazon and Starbucks, immediately drafted a citizen referendum, or a ballot, to repeal it. However, they did more; they also snuck in a rider that would repeal an uncontroversial levy that was being used to provide desperately-needed funds to Seattle schools. In essence, big business offered city council an ultimatum: repeal the Head Tax or we will repeal it ourselves, and we’ll take away education funding along with it.

The business coalition poured in money, luring in canvassers from out of state. In exchange for each signature on the repeal referendum, the coalition paid amounts dwarfing what canvassing firms usually offer. It was a gold rush for canvassers who flooded into Seattle streets and spread patent lies about the Head Tax. If the socialist mobilization to enact the Head Tax was unprecedented, the frenzy unleashed by big business, through the very channels designed to empower the masses, was jaw-dropping. Within days it appeared the coalition would have the signatures to repeal the reform (and defund Seattle schools for good measure). City Council succumbed, and repealed the reform they had enacted only days before. The vote was 7-2 in favor of repeal. Socialists and those struggling for housing were defeated

Amazon’s capital strike weakened the bill and damaged the perception of socialists amongst organized labor. Not content with suppressing their potential tax burden, big business thoroughly captured the ballot apparatus to force an intransigent city council into compliance. The fiasco placed workers and tenants on opposite sides of a pitched battle for the right to the city. It also turned much of the organized labor force against socialists. Indeed, shortly after the fiasco, my Teamster local launched its own political action committee to use membership dues on campaigns to wrest Seattle politics back away from “socialists and left-wing radicals that are out of touch with what working people need.” With the region’s socialist groups largely composed of high-earning activists rather than organizers embedded in the daily lives of the working class, this narrative has been difficult to counter.

Conclusion 

While the electoral socialist movement in Seattle has not been permanently defeated, and Kshama Sawant did go on to win re-election and revamp her “Tax Amazon” campaign, consider the tactics and scale of revolt against a tiny business tax. Suppose socialists in Seattle completely consolidate electoral power. As they attempt to exercise state power in more drastic ways to enact an anti-capitalist agenda, it’s hard to imagine why the capitalist class wouldn’t simply expand and escalate its arsenal, particularly in a city whose economic well-being is so dependent on a handful of tech giants. If the Head Tax fiasco has taught us anything, it’s that when socialists don’t build class power outside the state and win over workers to the cause, even our successes end in defeat.

Seattle City Council during the Head Tax controversy

CASE 2: The Practice Coup in the American West

This case study looks at the failed attempts by the Oregon legislature to enact a climate bill in 2019. It details a complex struggle with many players and complicating factors, but for our purpose we will focus on a conflict between two forces: 1) a left/progressive movement that has consolidated state power, bolstered by the relatively democratic nature of state institutions that encourage high levels of citizen participation, and 2) a right-wing minority squeezed out of government but bolstered by uniquely well-developed anti-government militias. Thus the conflicts can be articulated as a state thoroughly captured by reform-oriented progressives vs a reactionary social movement. The conflict resembles a situation of dual power except that in this arrangement, the state is the more progressive force, and the second power, the “state-within-a-state”, is thoroughly reactionary. The former enjoy democratic legitimacy and, outside a few strongholds, the latter is mostly fringe. The particular manifestation of the struggle was a relatively tepid attempt at slowing climate change and softening its sharp edges. In the end, reactionary dual power prevailed. 

Progressive capture of the state

Regarding the first of these features, Oregon has some of the most democratic voting laws in the U.S. The actual process is uniquely easy and participation in elections is among the highest in the nation. In recent years, this characteristic has helped reform-oriented progressives come to dominate the state’s elected posts at all levels. Democrats hold a supermajority in the state legislature and the governorship, with many of these officials being committed to environmental stewardship. Local officials have been eager to respond to public pressure and place themselves as the vanguard of a new movement using local zoning laws to obstruct interstate and international fossil fuel development. Because of these efforts, they have been among the nation’s most innovative and formidable opponents of the fossil fuel industry.

At the national level, Oregon has proven itself to stand solidly to the left of most other blue states. In 2016, its electorate overwhelmingly voted for insurgent Bernie Sanders against establishment-favorite Hillary Clinton. In addition to taking the entire state by double digits, Sanders won all but one of the state’s counties. Furthermore, one of Oregon’s Senators, Jeff Merkely, became the sole federal Senator to buck party consensus and back Sanders over Clinton. 

Clearly, the situation in Oregon does not amount to socialist capture of state power through elections, but the situation remains informative. The state approaches universal suffrage, is decidedly to the left of the national liberal establishment, and has multiple institutions of popular power such as ballot initiatives. It is nearly a best-case-scenario for those seeking an electoral route to socialism. And while these qualities hardly amount to a socialist government, the counter-revolution would be even more intense against a truly leftist consolidation of state power. 

The “counter-revolution”

On the flip side, the Republican Party in Oregon has found itself increasingly backed into a corner. Indeed, if electoral success is an indication of a political movement’s legitimacy, the right-wing of U.S. politics has been profoundly delegitimized in Oregon. Facing this dearth in political power, the more reactionary segment of Oregon’s ruling class has begun formally and openly allying with the region’s Patriot movement. The ongoing fusion of state Republicans with reactionary paramilitaries increasingly threatens the more progressive currents within the government. 

In fact, in much of the Pacific Northwest, the Republican relationship with the Patriot militia movement is less a fusion of two separate political entities and more simply the “inside” facet of a two-pronged “inside-outside” strategy. As geographer Phil Neel details, the Patriot movement sees “resistance forming first in the far hinterland, where local residents can be organized into self-reliant militias and local governments can be won over to their cause to create a rural base of power, parallel and opposed to that of the federal government. These are the core unifying features of the group”.1 Thus Patriot militias and some Pacific Northwest politicians are in many cases flip sides of the same coin. Neel describes the “inside-outside” approach as follows:

This strategy puts an equally strong emphasis on “inside” work via formal administrative channels (facilitated by entry into local government and the Republican Party) in a way that synthesizes well with the “outside” work they do in defunded timber country or along the U.S.–Mexican border, where they prepare and establish parallel structures of power. While filling in the holes left by underfunded law enforcement in [rural Oregon], for example, Patriot-affiliated politicians were also leading the opposition to new property tax measures that would have allowed the hiring of more deputies. This, of course, helps to widen the funding shortfall further, helping extra-state militias to step in and begin building their own power within the county. The Patriot parties thereby seek to extend and secure the economic conditions for their own expansion.2

This strategy works by building networks of mutual aid and support in rural communities blighted by disinvestment, the loss of public services, the decline of extractive industries, and ecological collapse. Neel explains,

In the midst of a far-right movement dominated by Internet threats, spectacular street brawls and run-of-the-mill white male terrorism, the Patriot groups stand out owing to their focus on self-reliance initiatives. Faced with devastating declines in government services, many have stepped in to provide basic social services and natural disaster training. This is particularly notable in rural counties in states like Oregon, where the combination of long-term collapse in timber revenue and dwindling federal subsidies has all but emptied the coffers of local governments.3

As Neel insists, these organizers are already responding to the unfolding crisis in capitalism’s most neglected hinterlands. This strategy of building power where the state and capital has receded resembles the dual power strategy of leftist organizations such as Black Rose/Rosa Negra and Cooperation Jackson. As fissures emerge in the terrain of uneven development, organizers fill the voids with structures of mutual aid and counter-power.

For instance, when the government of Oregon’s Josephine County became so underfunded that it couldn’t pay prison guards or cops, the Sheriff was forced to release prisoners and warn citizens that their lives were in their own hands. Neel explains that in this context, the Patriots offered “community preparedness” and “disaster response” courses. They helped form parallel governance structures such as community watches and full-blown militias. They volunteered for community service, painted houses, built a handicap playground, and constructed wheelchair ramps for elderly or infirm residents.

The main feature differentiating this approach from a true dual power strategy is that it does not seek to establish the hegemony of the dispossessed. As Neel says, “While often winning the hearts and minds of local residents, these new power structures are by no means services necessarily structured to benefit those most at risk” (30). Indeed, much of the movement’s publicity arises from defending mining companies and ranchers against accountability to the federal government. Hence the reactionary character of the movement.

Much of the Patriots’ growth also flows from its intervention in rural land struggles. As Neel explains, it is most active in areas where disinvestment has altered the form of exploitation faced by most working-class people. Instead of corporations extracting surpluses through wage labor, the state extracts rents through various land-use regimes run by hostile agencies. But the Patriots’ growth go beyond building a base by “serving the people and fighting the power” in rural communities.

The Patriot movement has had notable success running candidates as Republicans in Oregon as part of its “inside” strategy.  In recent years, Republican Party officials in Portland, Oregon have voted to formalize their relationship with militias by using them as security against left-wing protestors. In Eastern Washington, another militia movement aiming to create a white ethno-state encompassing parts of Washington, Idaho, and Oregon has fused with factions of the Republican Party (though by-and-large, the Patriot movement has taken pains to distance itself from explicit white-supremacy). Thus, in western regions of the country where electoral politics is increasingly dominated by mostly-urban liberals, reactionary politicians and paramilitaries are merging into a counter-revolutionary, anti-democratic alternative.  

The Oregon political scene represents almost a best-case scenario for an electoralist seeking to capture state power and usher in a new era of progressive reforms. On the other hand, the social landscape of the Pacific Northwest is prime for counter-revolution. This context conditioned the outcome of a 2019 cap-and-trade bill that aimed to reduce the damage companies operating in Oregon could do the climate. 

Climate action and the practice coup

The climate bill was drafted by a coalition including community groups and the state’s oldest farmworkers union. It was backed by all nine of Oregon’s federally recognized tribes, the state’s utilities, and some major companies including Nike. Governor Kate Brown incorporated it into her most recent electoral platform and campaigned heavily on promises to sign it into law. 

When the Democratic supermajority introduced the bill, it was widely expected to pass. Republicans, who tend to represent counties devastated by the decline in extractive industries (primarily timber, which accounts for most of Oregon’s carbon emissions) intensely oppose virtually any action on climate change. They lacked enough seats in the legislature to pose any challenge on the floor. In response to their near-absence of formal political power, their options were limited. They chose to jettison even a pretense of democratic procedure at all. The sequence of events unfolded as follows:

    1. All the state’s Republican lawmakers refused to show up to work, denying the legislature a quorum to hold a vote.
    2. The governor instructed the state police to apprehend the absentee Republicans and bring them to the courthouse so the vote could proceed.
    3. Republican lawmakers went into hiding and fled the state, issuing death threats against any officer who came to apprehend them.
    4. Militias publicly pledged support for the Republican lawmakers in self-imposed exile, offering to defend them against the state.
    5. Democratic leaders expressed their intent to hold a special legislative session to vote in the absence of a quorum. 
    6. The heavily-armed militias assemble at the capitol as a threat to legislators in order to prevent the special legislative session.
    7. Fearing violence at the hands of the militias, Democratic leadership canceled the session and told lawmakers to stay home for their own safety.
    8. Two Democratic lawmakers defected and came out against the bill in order to de-escalate, entice Republicans to return from self-imposed exile, and to move on to other legislative priorities. 

It was later revealed that lobbying efforts by Boeing likely also played a role in peeling off Democratic support for the bill. However, it wasn’t until the situation escalated that Boeing’s lobbying efforts succeeded, and the Democratic lawmakers’ express justification for defection was to bring Republicans back to the table. Indeed, the outcome was no doubt a victory for Republicans and their allied militias and a defeat of the more democratic aspects of Oregon’s government. Thus, the events can only be understood as the political defeat of 1) an elected, reformist government enjoying broad public legitimacy and a popular mandate, by 2) an anti-democratic government-in-exile backed by reactionary paramilitary forces. Though the personnel within the legislature did not change in this course of events, it became clear who calls the shots. Despite widespread electoral success, the left and the working class lost. 

Conclusion

The growth and increasing boldness of the militia movement in the Pacific Northwest, along with its increasing fusion with the politically-cornered Republican Party, maybe a lasting trend. The rise of Trump has accompanied a metastasis of this social movement that defies historical precedent. Furthermore, the movement is finding purchase in conflicts which are emerging as the crisis in eco-social reproduction intensifies. The Bundy standoff was fueled by conflict over land use regimes on ecologically degraded range, unable to support the scale of commercial ranching it once did. The Malheur Reserve standoff of 2016 occurred in a region economically devastated by the decline of extractive industries. The proto-coup at the Oregon Capitol was fueled by state action to mitigate the climate crisis. It’s no coincidence that authoritarian measures have emerged as bourgeois democracy proves itself unable to resolve these and similar crises. As these crises unravel, such conflicts can only increase, as will the boldness with which the most reactionary elements in the capitalist class respond. 

Indeed, the events surrounding the climate bill can be seen as the latest escalation in the militia movement’s path to relevancy in the American West, as a stage in something like a counter-revolutionary protracted people’s war. While the 2014 events in the Nevada desert represented a successful challenge to federal sovereignty over an entire swath of desert, in 2019 the militia movement served as the paramilitary arm of an illegitimate party, successfully hijacking the legislative processes of an entire state. If this does not qualify as some sort of proto-coup, it certainly qualifies as practice for a real one. 

It would certainly be wrong to conclude from these considerations that the folks of the rural West are irredeemably reactionary. Indeed, as Neel explains, 

If white ruralites were as inherently conservative as the average leftist would have us believe, they should be flooding into far-right organizations in unprecedented numbers, demanding a platform for their racial resentment. But the reality is that [the] far right has only been capable of attracting newcomers in rural areas in a spare few locations.4

Yet despite the geographical limitations of their success, the Patriots have had an outsized influence on the politics of crisis from these strongholds. If leftists were as systematically engaged in similar rural base-building, we could perhaps reclaim the countryside as a hotbed of working-class radicalism.

It would also be incorrect to conclude the rural hinterlands should occupy the bulk of leftist efforts as they have for the far-right. Rural America is gradually emptying out and becoming depopulated as economic opportunity moves to coastal cities and the exurbs. Not only does the countryside contain fewer people; it also contains fewer strategic chokepoints in processes of capital accumulation. However, the rural working-class also cannot be ignored and must be involved in any project of social transformation. Islands of municipal socialism adrift in a vast sea of reaction will not get us to a just society.

Members of the Oregon militia

CASE 3: New Yorkers’ One-Two Punch 

In 2019 socialists and progressives in New York delivered a one-two punch to the real estate state. First, New Yorkers defeated an enormous power grab by Amazon when the company sought to plant its second headquarters in western Queens, at great cost to the city and its working-class residents. This defeat was an enormous blow to real estate speculators who had been banking on the deal to inflate the value of their housing portfolios. Then, after a wave of progressive officials swept centrist Democrats and Republicans aside in the 2018 state election, the legislature passed an enormous expansion of statewide rent control. The real estate and landlord lobbies remain up in arms as they’ve watched future profits evaporate. Both of these victories, though not perfect, represent the defeat of entrenched corporate interests, costing capitalists enormous losses in profits and power. 

The electoral efforts of socialists played a central role. In many ways, these victories are a paradigm case of the electoralist strategy of taking state power through elections, while applying mass pressure from below to keep officials accountable. In other ways, however, these movements leaned heavily on past projects of building immense counter-power which, though mostly absorbed by now into the bourgeois status quo, still retain varying degrees of social, political, and economic power. Few, if any, major cities in the U.S. are so decisively shaped by a turbulent history of incessant, organized class struggle at every level of society. The result is a labyrinthine knot of intertwined political and social actors for which even the world’s most powerful company was ill-prepared.

Amazon HQ2

The fight in New York against Amazon HQ2 was a fight for the right to the city. It was a fight against gentrification and a struggle over who decides the fate of the neighborhood. Socialist elected officials played a very visible role. While the deal was secured by the Democratic old guard, particularly Mayor de Blasio and Governor Cuomo, it was vocally and vociferously opposed by professed socialist Congresswomen Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the federal legislature and Julia Salazar at the state level. Indeed, these two high-profile politicians helped galvanize and legitimize a broader movement against HQ2. More importantly, long-time establishment politicians read the tea leaves and came out against the deal as well. After socialists ousted career politicians in the upper echelons of the region’s Democratic establishment, corporate centrists took the cue. Queens career politicians Jimmy Van Bramer and Michael Gianaris were crucial in luring Amazon to Queens in the first place. However, after DSA became a force to be reckoned with in Queens politics, Van Bramer and Gianaris pulled an about-face, coming out as the foremost opponents of the HQ2 deal. These political dynamics were likely crucial in Amazon’s defeat. The new progressive coalition of electoral socialists, community activists, and politicians with their feet to the fire helped deliver Amazon perhaps its first major defeat ever. However, by the company’s own admission, the deciding factor was something else.

The landscape of social and political power in NYC is far more complex than Amazon was prepared for. Unions are central to these contours. New York City has the highest union density of any major city in the US. The history of unionism in New York, as elsewhere, is a combination of radicalism, cronyism, corporate cooptation, and rank-and-file reformism. Some unions began as real institutions of working-class power. Others were permeated with anti-communism and xenophobia from day one. The result is a mass of intertwined bureaucracies permeating nearly every facet of local politics. On one hand, unions bureaucrats often serve as extensions of the managerial class, enriching themselves by overseeing a brokered peace between workers and the corporate class. To the extent that many do advocate for workers, they do so as a de facto extension of the state, negotiating and enforcing better laws for workers under their jurisdiction.

On the other hand, some unions retain the shells of their radical histories and provide space for workers to organize and collaborate. For instance, a good-cause firing provision in a contract between a union and company does not in itself increase worker militancy on the floor, but it provides a legal shield that permits workers to take greater risks in their organizing. Union halls also provide physical spaces in which workers can mingle and develop social bonds. Shop stewards often act as important leaders in building struggle. It’s no surprise, therefore, that unionized workers still often organize and win power on the shop floor and beyond. While the vast majority of union bureaucracies have been incorporated into the ruling class’s mechanisms of worker control, they certainly complicate the landscape of power and provide opportunities for building rank-and-file militancy.

The role unions play in NYC politics, particularly in the fight against Amazon HQ2, reflect these dynamics. Many unions, particularly the building trades and service sector unions, strongly supported the deal. However, the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union (RWDSU) and the Teamsters adamantly opposed it. These unions proved to be perhaps the most central players in defeating the coalition of Amazon, Mayor de Blasio, and Governor Cuomo. Specifically, it was the union’s threat of organizing workers at Amazon’s most important logistic node in the city that slammed the door on the deal. 

Amazon has a documented history of anti-union tactics. When critics of the HQ2 deal pointed this out to Mayor de Blasio, he responded that New York City has a way of rubbing off on companies and that if they welcomed Amazon to the city, the company would change its ways. RWDSU called the bluff and announced an organizing drive at the company’s Staten Island warehouse, its most important footprint in the city. The union then publicly asked Amazon to agree to remain neutral and let its workers organize. The company refused. In public hearings, politicians opposed to the HQ2 deal reiterated the call for a neutrality agreement. Again, Amazon refused. There would be no union at Amazon, the company said, and that was final. The ongoing insistence by politicians, organized labor, and a few token workers ultimately proved to be more than Amazon could stomach. It backed out of the deal, the threat of unionization the most decisive factor in its retreat. The company, the governor, and the mayor were defeated by the threat of organized workers.

This account does not dismiss the importance of the electoral and activist coalitions that helped turn up the heat on Amazon. It aims simply to point out that more factors were at play. Crucial among these was the threat of organized workers and the knotted political and social contours formed by over a century of intense class struggle. Not every location has such a dense and intractable tangle of institutional and social power. However, it’s important not to divorce one side of the coin from the other. There is no doubt that the movement for workers’ power and the campaign by activists and politicians were synergistic and complementary. It seems unlikely either would have succeeded on its own. It’s also crucial to note that the vast majority of unions in New York City, and indeed in North America, are thoroughly co-opted by various sectors of bourgeois society and, though they may play a role in undermining corporate welfare deals, are possibly too compromised to play an immediate role in revolutionary transformation of society. 

The Battle for Rent Control

Rent control in New York has been characterized by a routine ebb-and-flow of tenant protections since the early 1900s. In the century spanning 1919 to 2019, rent control in the state swelled from nothing to its apex in the post-war period, before being chipped away by an unholy alliance of Republicans, centrist Democrats, developers, and landlords. By the early 2000s, the suite of rent control laws was virtual Swiss cheese, speckled with so many holes that landlords were spoiled for choice when it came to finding ways to deregulate their units and displace low-income renters. In 2018, the real estate industry appeared to be at the height of its power, with the city and state governments firmly in its iron grip. Then the tables turned. In a massive grassroots mobilization, community groups and leftist organizations hit the pavement, ushering in a “blue wave” to sweep the unholy alliance from power. Progressives and socialists took over the state legislature. For the first time in generations, comprehensive rent control appeared more than a pipe dream. Housing as a human right was back on the agenda. In 2019, the impossible happened: the real estate state was delivered a resounding defeat, as speculators and landlords saw future profits disintegrate before their eyes. If any contemporary event supports the electoralist thesis, this is it. 

However, we shouldn’t jump to conclusions too quickly. The most recent victory must be situated in the history of class struggle in the urban slums of New York and beyond. The oscillations of rent control directly mirror the historic contours of proletarian power. The 2019 victory amounted not to a leap forward for working-class renters, but rather to organizers clawing back victories won by radicals of a bygone era, reforms that eroded with the decline of class power in subsequent generations.

The first wave

Prior to New York’s first rent control law, immigrants and socialists had already been busy organizing tenant unions for years. The fight against landlords and real estate speculators was global in proportion, part and parcel of the international revolutionary ferment against capitalism. While Engels and many founding members of the Socialist International considered the housing problem to be an inevitable side effect of capitalism, radical socialists in urban centers viewed the fight against rents and evictions as a crucial terrain of revolutionary class struggle. As Mike Davis explains in Old Gods, New Enigmas, tenants from Petrograd and Berlin to Barcelona, from London to Glasgow, and from New York to Buenos Aires waged militant and persistent class war against landlords and real estate speculators for decades. These tenant movements were an extension of the broader specter of revolution and fused with radical labor unions and political parties. Rent strikes were common and increasingly vast. Davis explains,

the tenants’ movement in the Lower East Side was galvanized by the apartment shortage and rising rents that followed the construction of the Williamsburg Bridge in 1900, which displaced 17,000 residents. The socialist Daily Forward, the Yiddish- language newspaper of the Lower East Side, instigated the United Hebrew Trades, the Workman’s Circle, and the Socialist Party to organize a tenants’ movement that after a preliminary strike in 1904, regrouped under more strictly Socialist leadership for the ‘great rent war’ of 1907 in midst of a short but severe national recession. Jewish tenants in the Lower East Side, Harlem and Brownsville (a “Socialist stronghold”) hung red flags in their windows, battled police to prevent evictions, and mobbed the schleppers (movers). In the end, Robert Fogelson observes, “the strike fizzled out in January 1908,” but New York’s Socialist had learned important lessons: “The strikers would have to come not from one or two neighborhoods, but from dozens. They would have to include not just Jews, but Italians, Irish, Germans, and Poles – and even native-born New Yorkers.5

This movement, again, was simply the local manifestation of a wide-ranging assault against the capitalist class, a struggle spearheaded in many places by parties affiliated with the Socialist International. From Paris to Buenos Aires, tenants began to cohere as an important force against the more vicious advances of capital.

As World War I exacerbated crises of social reproduction, intensifying food and coal shortages in Europe and the U.S. Eastern Seaboard, urban struggles began to take on revolutionary dimensions. Crisis intensified class struggle. By 1919, socialists in New York had organized 25,000 tenants into the Greater New York Tenants League, which lead mass rent strikes at 500 buildings. As Davis details,

A massive rent war was fought out in a series of battles from 1917 to 1920 and spread across the East River from Harlem and the Lower East Side to Williamsburg and the south Bronx under the aegis of the Greater New York Tenants League. As news of the revolutions in Russia electrified New York’s tens of thousands of Socialist Party supporters, the “Bolsheviki rent strikes,” as landlords began to call them, sometimes took on the air of revolutionary rather merely reformist struggles.6

Around the same time, socialists were gaining a minority of seats in the New York legislature and introducing legislation for rent control. As Davis concludes, “Despite continuing repression of the Socialist Party followed by the infamous Palmer raids and the mass deportations of immigrant radicals, the stubborn movement ultimately prevailed, forcing the legislature in Albany to introduce rent controls in 1920 – a major and enduring working-class victory.” Rent control was such an affront to the capitalist status quo in New York that socialist politicians were forcefully purged from the state capitol, losing their seats in the legislature in something of a mini coup.

The movement to win the first rent control laws thus had at least three important local factors: 1) militant, socialist-led labor unions engaging in industrial action, 2) well-organized tenant unions engaging in mass collective action including rent strikes, and 3) socialist politicians pushing for rent control in the halls of power. 1) and 2) are clear examples of counter-power outside the state. All three, again, worked synergistically as catalysts for one another. Crucially, the movement was a local manifestation of a global revolt against capitalism, one that reached its zenith with the Russian Bolsheviks and sent the threat of revolution rippling across the world. 

The second wave

As the 20th Century continued, so did this dynamic between tenants, militant labor unions, and elected officials. In the 1930s, the movement was led by Jewish socialists in the Bronx and black communists in Harlem. Accelerated by new crises of social reproduction intensified by World War II, coalitions of leftist labor unions, militant tenant unions, and civil rights groups waged collective struggle in the streets, and left-wing politicians again won office and brought the fight to the capitol. After a full-fledged riot paralyzed large tracts of New York City, rent control became the only viable option to quell the passions of a well-organized and angry working class. Again, the synergy between counter-power outside the state and electoralism won the day.

Then came the erosion of class power. This synergy animating the working class began to collapse shortly after the civil rights movement. The fusion of militant labor unions and robust tenant associations that defined much of the first half of the 20th Century, particularly in New York City, is a perfect example of what Jane McAlevey calls “whole worker unionism”. It is a cornerstone of real working-class power. In essence, the worker exists not only in the workplace, but also in homes and neighborhoods. Accordingly, social reproduction is just as much a terrain of working-class struggle as is what occurs on the shop floor. But as the mid-Century subsided, unions largely took a turn towards brokering peace between workers and companies, trading class militancy for legal contractualism pertaining strictly to bread-and-butter issues in the workplace. 

As the labor movement purged itself of communists and leftists, union bureaucracies willingly transformed into institutions of bourgeois hegemony. Thus the movement for tenant power was severed from the very organizations that once fought for the whole working class in its multifaceted existence. Only the shells of independent class power remained. This provided an opening for the forces of real estate capital to chip away at the hard-won reforms. By the turn of the millennium, hundreds of thousands of units had been deregulated and rent control was in terminal crisis. 

The third wave

In 2019, these weakened rent control laws expired. The opportunity presented itself not only to renew but to strengthen tenant protections and close the loopholes that had been opened over the previous decades. In the years leading up to this moment, the Upstate-Downstate Housing Alliance emerged. It is a coalition of tenant associations, unions, unsheltered New Yorkers, and community groups. It incorporated many of the shells of independent class power that had been developed over the course of the 20th Century, as well as groups that had emerged during the Great Recession and the Occupy Wallstreet movement. The group drafted the platform that would ultimately become the bill that strengthened rent control. To support this bill, the Alliance mobilized masses of housing-insecure New Yorkers to hit the streets and take the fight to Albany. Subsequently, groups within the Alliance such as New York City DSA martialled unprecedented swarms of volunteer canvassers to knock on doors, register voters, discuss rent control, and encourage residents to vote for socialist and progressive candidates. Efforts paid off. Left-leaning candidates swept the state legislature. In June of 2019, the majority of the Alliance’s platform became a reality. 

Conclusion

It’s easy to conceive of these events as a vindication of the electoralist strategy. In many ways, they are. But three points stand out. First, socialists won the legal precedent for rent control, indeed the entire framework and the foundational laws themselves, through decades of building independent class power outside the state and strategically engaging in electoral politics. Indeed, the original victories were won in the context of a global revolt against capitalism, the crisis of World War I, and socialists posing a viable threat of revolution to the elites in New York. As the threat of revolution waned and independent class power subsided, the forces of capital were able to weaken the once robust suite of tenant protections. Yet the remaining spaces created by past struggle remained as a scaffolding upon which today’s organizers could stand. In short, the fighters of 2019 stood on the shoulders of the fighters of 1919. In 1919, the threat to capital was global and revolutionary. Indeed, the victories of 2019 mostly just reclaimed and reinstituted what radicals had already won and subsequent generations lost. However, this was no small feat and we must not understate the role of electoralism in regaining these protections, or the synergism between electoralism and non-state power in early 20th Century New York.

Furthermore, many facets of the 2019 Alliance itself grew partially from the shells of past institutions of class power and from new organizations forged in the political, social, and economic fallout since the Great Recession. This points to the resiliency of worker-led institutions even after half a century of bourgeois cooptation. It also highlights the importance of crisis as a catalyst for working-class militancy. 

Finally, the dynamic between independent class power and electoral success illuminates how muddled the debate about electoralism actually is. Electoralists typically do not advocate electoral engagement as a sole strategy. They usually also advocate for grassroots pressure from below to keep politicians accountable. The question arises, then, what the difference is between building this grassroots power from below and working toward dual power institutions of working-class power, ones capable of posing revolutionary threats in times of crisis. To invoke McAlevey again, part of the difference might be between mobilizing and organizing (though even organizing alone is not necessarily revolutionary). Mobilizing, in essence, means turning out activists to hold rallies. It means getting masses of bodies into strategic places for one-off events. It is ineffective in most contexts. Organizing, on the other hand, means building lasting organizations in which the working-class members themselves participate in collective action that exerts material force. The latter is where class power lies, though organizing in itself is not necessarily sufficient for socialist transformation. It must also take on radical aspirations. It’s not just that without militant organizations posing an existential threat to the capitalist class, revolution is impossible. It’s that without an organized working class that can viably make this threat, even reforms fails. In the long term, electoralism isn’t even enough for reformism. 

Rent Striker in 1970’s NYC

CONCLUSION

This survey is not meant to be an exhaustive account of conditions in the United States. Indeed, it’s intended to demonstrate the immensely varied political terrain that exists. Whereas it’s unlikely that New Yorkers need to worry about proto-fascist paramilitary forces any time in the foreseeable future (except perhaps the NYPD), this possibility is on the horizon in parts of the American West. Furthermore, a company town like Seattle, in which an enormous share of economic activity flows from a tiny handful of mega-corporations, capital strikes are a predictable response by the ruling class to reforms that threaten bourgeois power. Leftists must be prepared to counter this economic power with economic power of their own and deep roots in the working class. On the other hand, some places have a history of radicalism that is deeply embedded in the social fabric, a history that has etched out spaces in which the working class can fortify itself and organize for protracted struggle and bottom-up pressure. Where such spaces don’t exist, they must be forged by organizing the working class into independent organs of class confrontation. 

The capitalist arsenal must shape our strategies and inform what tools we use. This arsenal is, in turn, shaped by uneven patterns of development and geographies of capital accumulation. For instance, at sites of intense capital investment, a capital strike is a powerful weapon the bourgeoisie can wield against the state and working class. This fact should temper our temptation to rely heavily on electoral campaigns. On the other hand, in regions that have already been shaped by chronic disinvestment, a capital strike is not in the cards, but reactionary, paramilitary violence might be. For regions in which the extraction of rents is the predominant form of exploitation, rather than extraction of surplus through wage labor, anti-government and land-based struggles can be a plausible entry point into socialist politics. On the other hand, where private investment in labor-intensive industries (such as logistics) is crucial to local patterns of capital accumulation, organizing militant rank-and-file labor unions is a more appropriate strategy. Finally, in areas squeezed by both forms of exploitation, such as areas rapidly gentrifying from an influx of real estate capital, tenant and workplace organizing may be comparably appropriate. In sum, our strategy, and what tools we use, must take account of the capitalist arsenal and history of conflict in our locality. 

We might conceive of the tools in the socialist toolkit to be bullets, ballots, and strike actions (both rent strikes and labor strikes). Indeed, depending on geographies shaped by the uneven development of capital and the shifting contours of class struggle, different times and places call for different tools. Furthermore, anti-state, anti-boss, and anti-landlord struggles should all be taken as legitimate entry points into the struggle for socialism. The task, however, is always the same: to draw the masses into the struggle for social transformation, to win them over to the socialist vision for a just society, and to organize the working class into a material force capable of enacting that vision. While the most effective means of building proletarian agency will vary greatly from place to place, it’s unlikely that elections will anywhere be the dominant domain of socialist organizing, and where elections are appropriate, they must synergize with efforts to build independent working-class power outside the state. In all instances, organizing (as opposed to simply mobilizing) the masses into institutions of class struggle, and establishing proletarian hegemony within the movement, are crucial.

 

Taking Stock: Rifles and Reforms

In part one of a three-part article, Hank Beecher aims to complicate the narratives set out by the electoral left that deny the possibility of revolution. 

This piece is the first in a series that seeks to orient us on the most effective path to socialism. The question of how socialists should relate to elections, the state, and policy reforms has been a contested question for as long as the left has existed in the United States. A common framing of the debate presents two alternatives: to strive for policy reforms that usher in socialism piecemeal, or to build power outside of the state in preparation for a revolutionary break with capitalism. The former approach is often called electoralism. The latter, consisting of building up independent working-class power outside the state, is often framed as dual power. Electoralists and dual power advocates agree that we should learn from the past, but also that our strategy should be based upon current, 21st-century conditions. However, to the extent that the polemicists make claims concerning our contemporary situation, most rely on assumptions that feel intuitive but lack empirical justification.

If we are serious about developing an effective blueprint for social transformation, we must take stock of this moment in history. How do electoralist assumptions about our material conditions hold up to reality? For the most part, they don’t. The electoralist picture of our current moment lacks depth, nuance, and at times is simply wrong. Before exploring the faults in this picture, however, we must clarify the strategies at stake and the terms of the debate.

The Strategies

Generally speaking, electoralism on the left embraces the existing state as a plausible vehicle for socialist transformation. However, even some reform-oriented leftists do advocate for revolution; they just find that engaging in electoral politics is the best way to build the class power and political legitimacy socialists need to get there. Furthermore, others maintain that even winning major reforms requires building power outside the state to force the government to act on behalf of the working class. Thus the matrix of the reform/revolution and dual power/electoralism looks something like this:

Many, perhaps most, leftists maintain that we must engage in elections and build power outside of the state, but debate which of these should command the greatest share of the left’s resources. However, public engagement and resource-allocation on the left is still overwhelmingly electoral, and this trend shows no sign of changing. Thus the purpose of such electoral arguments is unclear if not to dissuade other socialists from occupying their time building dual power.

Examples of leftist electoral politics abound. Perhaps most prominent is DSA’s national campaigns for Bernie Sanders as President and Medicare for All as policy. Other examples include Justice Democrats politicians such Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, who have shifted the national dialogue to the left on the important issues of Palestinian liberation and US foreign policy. Additionally, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has been integral in mainstreaming the idea of the Green New Deal, a massive policy reform targeting climate change. These examples show how electoral engagement can help legitimize leftist ideas. 

What actually counts as dual power isn’t always clear. Ambiguities infect common usage. Lenin articulated three qualities that define dual power: (1) the source of the power is the direct initiative of the people from below, rather than some initiative by the state; (2) the disarming of military and police and direct arming of the people; and (3) the replacement of state officialdom with organs of direct popular power or radically accountable, recallable officials without any elite privileges. Few, if any, contemporary dual power endeavors encompass all three of these. Sophia Burns differentiates between two types of dual power. The first type is alternative institutions that seek to replace state governance or the capitalist mode of production in a given space (think community gardens replacing commodity food production on a small scale). The second are counter institutions that actively engage in class-confrontation with capitalists or the state (think a militant labor union fighting the boss). 

A further ambiguity is whether dual power must challenge both capitalism and the state; one institution might challenge state hegemony over a space, but not the mode of production in that space or vice versa. In his book Workers and Capital, Mario Tronti insists that the only concept of dual power that has any meaning is the power of workers within the labor process of commodity production itself, within the structured social relations of the factory. This understanding of class power is unapologetically reductionist. On the other hand, the Libertarian Socialist Caucus (LSC) in DSA explicitly rejects such workerist conceptions of class power, considering dual power to be a “strategy that builds liberated spaces and creates institutions grounded in direct democracy” to grow the new world “in the shell of the old.” This strategy is emergent, meaning dual power institutions embody the social relations with which we seek to replace capitalism, prefiguring a new society locally before and scaling up for an inevitable confrontation with the capitalist state.

For our purposes we will conceive of dual power as institutions outside the state in which the working class itself is empowered to act collectively, on its own behalf, to effect social transformation. Political independence from the capitalist class and its agents in government is non-negotiable. Rather than state representatives, legal advocates, or administrative bureaucracies, dual power congeals the workers into agents of their own liberation. “Workers” here is not to be understood in the narrow sense of those engaged in wage labor at the point of production, but as referring to all of those dispossessed by capital and left with nothing but their own labor power (and often not even that). This description suffices even if it doesn’t dispel all uncertainties associated with the term.

Examples of building dual power include efforts to organize tenant unions. Such unions fight displacement and improve living standards through mutual aid and collective action against abusive land owners. Organizations such as Los Angeles Tenants Union, Portland Tenants United, and the Philly Socialists organize tenants to build collective power against landlords and developers. These organizers have revitalized the rent strike, unleashing waves of mass struggle for control of the neighborhood. They have won major concessions from the ruling class and immediately improved the material wellbeing of many propertyless residents throughout the country. 

Other leftists oriented by the dual power approach have gotten jobs at key companies with the intent of agitating and organizing workers for power in the workplace. Called “salting”, this strategy harkens back to the radical days when communist organizers built the CIO, when the labor movement was at its height. These efforts are beginning to bear fruit, with committees of workers at Target stores and major e-commerce warehouses leading wildcat walkouts and marches on the boss to win immediate material gains and inspire similar efforts across the country.

Few, if any, polemicists advocate for abandoning class struggle outside the realm of electoral politics. Indeed, most assert the need for grassroots pressure from below, using mass mobilizations to hold elected officials accountable. It’s unclear whether this qualifies as dual power and, if so, where the electoral beef is with leftists who feel compelled to spend their efforts organizing tenant unions or salting unorganized workplaces. Perhaps we could make use of Jane McAlevey here, who distinguishes between mobilizing and organizing. 

Mobilizing refers to the model adopted by progressive social movements that depend on turning activists out in large numbers to protests. The goal is to pressure those in power to act on behalf of the working class. The more bodies at the rally, the better. Organizing, on the other hand, refers to the process of consolidating and solidifying relationships in the workplace and community, and strengthening bonds of solidarity. The goal is to empower the working class to challenge the power of capital through institutions of its own making. Mobilizing leaves current power structures intact but pressures the officialdom to represent working-class interests. Only organizing changes the underlying power dynamics animating society. Dual power, then, requires organizing institutions that challenge capitalist hegemony, not simply mobilizing an activist base.

By the characterization above, it’s hard to see what electoralists would oppose in the quest for dual power. One might be tempted to suppose that electoralists promote a mobilizing model of holding elected officials accountable through mass protests, activist culture, and the like. If this is not the case, it remains unclear what the actual disagreements are if not just a question of priority. What should the left spend its precious person-power and resources on? Electoral campaigns or building dual power? Unfortunately, the electoralist strategy rests on a faulty set of assumptions concerning the historic moment in which we operate.

SPD Poster: “Vote Red!”

The Electoralist Picture

While the dual power camp often invokes the Bolshevik Revolution as an example of the successful build-up and exercise of dual power, the electoral camp contends that our moment in history differs from that of the 1917 Russian Empire in important ways. First, in our current liberal democracy, elections are the way most people engage in politics and thus have the greatest legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. Insurrectionary politics only serve to isolate the left from the broader working class. We can call this the legitimacy argument since it proceeds from an assumption of electoral legitimacy. Secondly, unlike Imperial Russia, which was wracked by prolonged and disastrous engagement in World War 1, famine, and mass conscription, the United States is not embroiled in crisis on a scale that would shake the pillars of society and throw the whole system into doubt. We can call this the crisis argument because it proceeds from the presumed stability of our political-economic system, from the assumption that no significant crisis is on the horizon. Finally, electoralists argue that in modern democratic states, military might is too developed to be viably confronted. We can call this the firepower argument. But how does each of these claims hold up against the current state of affairs?

Legitimacy

As the default mode of civic engagement in much of the world, electoral politics seems obviously legitimate. However, on closer scrutiny this assumption falters. Not only does many of the working class people distrust electoral politics; they also view other, more militant forms of political agency as highly legitimate.

On a basic level, much of the working class is barred from participating in electoral politics, especially those with the most to gain from the overthrow of capitalism. For instance, those who would most benefit from criminal justice reform are barred from voting by felony conviction. Those terrorized by US foreign policy and border enforcement are excluded by citizenship requirements. The youth whose future is imperiled by the climate crisis are excluded on account of their age. But even amongst those who are eligible to participate in elections, most do not.

Of course, there are many reasons to abstain from voting that have nothing to do with whether one views it as legitimate. Apathy comes to mind. Many people may simply be content with the status quo. However, polls show that many American voters simply don’t trust our elections. For instance, 57% of non-white voters and half of women believe elections are unfair. These sentiments fluctuate and appear to reflect frustrations with the current party in power and displeasure with the latest election results. There’s a tendency for people to think elections are unfair when their party loses. This situation shows that for many people, loyalty to party outweighs loyalty to democracy. If perceptions of fairness can be taken as a measurement of legitimacy, then such findings undermine the assumption that the working class views electoral politics as legitimate. Indeed, most do not.

Elections aside, other forms of politics are viewed as highly legitimate by most Americans. Consider Red for Ed. Educators across the country have revived the labor movement by waging enormously successful, militant (and often illegal) wildcat strikes. It is hard to find a better example of mass, dual power politics in the United States. In repeated surveys, polls find that public support for the teacher strikes remains consistently high. Indeed, two-thirds of Americans support the strikes. Accordingly, more Americans support mass teacher strikes than consider our elections to be fair.

The legitimacy of militant collective action goes beyond support for strikes. Consider gun ownership. Roughly 40% of American adults own guns, about the same number as vote each presidential election cycle. Of those that own guns, 74% say the right to do so is essential to their freedom. Even among those who do not own guns, 35% agree on the importance of firearms to freedom. Thus the share of US adults with this view of gun ownership is higher than the share of US adults who participate in any given election. The right to bear arms is widely (though mistakenly) considered to have been meant as a hedge against tyrannical governments. Indeed, protection from tyranny is brought up time and again as a primary argument in favor of gun ownership, and not just on the right end of the political spectrum.

There is no doubt that the delineation of the right to bear arms in the United States is deeply infected with white supremacist motivations. However, the permanence of this feature of American identity, especially among rural communities, shows how for huge swaths of the working-class living in the United States, armed defense (and even insurrection) against tyranny is a profoundly legitimate right. Indeed, guns are just as widely viewed as a safeguard against tyranny as are elections. 

To some degree, the argument from legitimacy is a red herring. Legitimacy is a shifting landscape. Take the Civil Rights movement. Today, the Civil Rights Movement is overwhelmingly viewed as legitimate. Martin Luther King, Rosa Parks, the bus boycotts, sit-ins, Selma, and the March on Washington all occupy a special place in the pantheon of 20th Century US politics. In its day, however, most Americans opposed it. If public perceptions of legitimacy were its guiding principle, the movement likely would have never gotten off the ground. 

Jane McAlevey traces the efficacy of the Civil Rights movement to deep organizing by unions and churches. Both institutions were essential in uniting the black working class of the South into a movement capable of changing the status quo. Importantly, as Joseph Luders shows, the success of the Civil Rights movement hinged on its power to disrupt the ability of Southern capitalists to turn a profit. When the costs of disruption outweighed the costs of conceding to the movement, the movement won. In other words, it was not the legitimacy of the civil rights movement that swept away de jure segregation. It was the ability of a deeply-organized Black working class to disrupt the ability of the South to function as an engine of capital accumulation. Only decades later is the movement widely viewed as legitimate. 

Legitimacy is an important consideration for leftists. However, it is part of the task of leftists to shift the terrain of public perception of what constitutes legitimate forms of political agency and what formations are legitimate mantles of political power. The task is two-fold: to delegitimize the bourgeois state and to legitimize new formations of working-class power. To prioritize electoral politics over building a base of working-class power outside the state achieves the opposite. Instead, we must expand notions of political agency by showing that the workplace, the neighborhood, and the home are all political spaces and our power lies in our solidarity.

Crisis

The crisis argument is perhaps the most curious aspect of the electoral camp’s case against dual power. Polemicists on both sides of the debate seem unclear about what actually constitutes a revolutionary crisis. It is not merely a crisis in the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class. György Lukács, succinctly invoking Lenin, explains a revolutionary crisis thus:

[T]he actuality of the revolution also means that the fermentation of society – the collapse of the old framework – far from being limited to the proletariat, involves all classes. Did not Lenin, after all, say that the true indication of a revolutionary situation is ‘when “the lower classes” do not want the old way, and when “the upper classes” cannot carry on in the old way’? ‘The revolution is impossible without a complete national crisis (affecting both exploited and exploiters).’ The deeper the crisis, the better the prospects for the revolution.

Thus, while crisis certainly involves a subjective component, we are not concerned with a mere crisis of legitimacy. Crisis arises from the inability of the system to reproduce its status quo, not just for the working class, but also for the ruling elites. Such a crisis is already underway. If we strive to be empirical and adapt our strategy to the actual, material conditions of our particular moment in history, then we simply cannot dismiss the magnitude of climate change and global ecological crisis we face. It may be impossible to predict how society will respond to the looming crisis, but one fact is certain: a crisis unprecedented in magnitude and scope is absolutely on the horizon and advanced capitalist states have thus far, almost without exception, proven wholly unable to do anything to prevent or mitigate it. It poses a dire and unavoidable threat to the very way the economy functions and to countless processes of capital accumulation. To deny this claim one must be as hostile toward a scientific worldview as an obtuse politician throwing snowballs on the floors of Congress.

The consensus among relevant experts is approaching 100%. The conditions that have supported human civilization since its dawn have frayed and a future of business-as-usual is emphatically impossible. The cause is fundamental to the way our economic system functions. None of these are fringe leftist views.  Among scientists and experts of all stripes, those that reject this prognosis now form a vanishingly small superminority. 

No leftist outright denies the climate crisis. Most acknowledge it as proof of capitalism’s inherent unsustainability and identify it as one of the major problems for socialists to solve once taking power. Indeed, this is why DSA resolved to throw its weight behind the Green New Deal. This broad recognition of climate crisis as an issue, however, strangely does not lead to a recognition of crisis as a material condition that should dictate strategy. Crisis is the defining feature of our future. To deny this abandons our commitment to materialism. Failing to place this fact at the very center of our politics not only brings an incomplete picture of our conditions into political strategy; it fully redacts the present moment from our analysis. 

Climate change acts as a catalyst for latent social contradictions. It exacerbated class conflict and oppression in countless ways. Consider the illegal southern US border, which was drawn by conquest and has long fractured indigenous communities in the region. The authoritarian nature of white nationalism exists regardless of climate change, but the magnitude of its violence has wildly escalated as climate change uproots the rural working class in Central America, only to have them ripped from their loved ones and locked indefinitely in concentration camps at the border. Consider Puerto Rico, where climate-intensified hurricanes have wreaked havoc on the island, killing nearly 3,000 residents in 2017 and accelerating colonial oppression and plunder. Consider the tribal nations in the Pacific Northwest, who are being dispossessed of their remaining national territories as rising seas swallow their land. Climate crisis is class conflict on steroids and for much of the working class, eco-apartheid already exists.

Climate change blasts open new fronts for class struggle. The new normal for hurricane season stands out. The inundation of major built environments such as New Orleans, the Rockaways, and Houston were unprecedented for much of US history and sparked desperate battles for the right to the city. On the one hand, the storms unleashed new waves of capital accumulation in the form of shock-induced gentrification. Capitalists sought to leverage the destruction to privatize entire cities. On the other hand, communities organized for mutual aid and to fight off developers who circled the carnage like vultures. There are opposing paths of exit from every crisis.

Climate crisis is already a crucial driver of class struggle. To deny this excludes vast portions of the working class from our analysis. In such a chauvinist view, the working class only encompasses citizens enjoying enough national or racial privilege to be sheltered from the immense suffering already unleashed by an unraveling climate. Not only is crisis emphatically immanent, but vast portions of the most oppressed sections of the working class are already embroiled in it.

Firepower

The firepower argument is the most compelling line of reasoning from electoralists. In this view, modern capitalist states differ from those that have been toppled by dual power insurgency in at least three important ways. First, technologically-advanced modern militaries, particularly that of the US, are far more powerful than any other military in history. The logic of building dual power points ultimately to a confrontation with such forces, which no rabble of leftists could ever hope to win. 

Second, in successful past rebellions, revolutionaries have relied immensely on factions of the military turning against the state and joining the revolution. Indeed, these mutinous factions were a central aspect of dual power in the Russian Revolution. Defection was widespread because most enlisted soldiers were not in the military voluntarily; they were conscripted to fight for empire in World War I. Vast portions of the military were loyal to the Russian masses and working class from which they were conscripted. Indeed, many soldiers were Bolsheviks before they were drafted into the imperial war. These soldiers were crucial for organizing mutinies to turn the military against the state. Electoralists argue that the current situation could not be more different. The US eliminated conscription decades ago. Defection within the ranks is therefore highly unlikely; it seems safe to assume that most of today’s forces are loyal to the government they voluntarily serve. 

Third, there is a robust right-wing militia movement in the US that effectively serves as an extension of the most reactionary aspects of state power. Not only do leftists have to contend with the formal military; they must contend with these paramilitary forces.

Though a compelling advisory against insurrection in the immediate future, this argument is not an airtight case against prioritizing dual power. The reasons are three-fold. 

Diversity of Dual Power

First, there are important ways of building dual power that don’t entail armed insurrection. Power takes multiple forms, and firepower is only one of them. Control over production and social reproduction is another. For instance, building the social infrastructure to wage a mass strike is every bit as much a project of dual power as assembling an insurrectionary force. Additionally, while modern technology has exponentially enhanced the might of the military, it has magnified the power of certain sectors of the working class as well. Military power is produced and reproduced by labor. Skilled workers employed by companies such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) yield more structural power than perhaps any other collection of people ever. 

Consider the following: a mere two thousand AWS workers develop and maintain the tech infrastructure responsible for hosting over half of the internet. That content encompasses the Pentagon’s cyberinfrastructure. It also includes the online presence for countless businesses, some of the biggest oil and gas companies, entire nations, court systems, and stock markets. The share of the web-hosted by AWS is so great that there isn’t enough space on backup servers to absorb it all. Furthermore, Amazon tech workers develop and maintain an exploding share of global logistics networks, a sector crucial to transnational chains of capital valorization. There has never been a more concentrated bottleneck in global capital accumulation, nor one in which the skilled workers are more difficult to replace. Just as tech has empowered imperial militaries to unprecedented heights, so too has it endowed labor with might unknown to the revolutionaries of the past.

It’s true that the capitalist state may marshal its military to crush the prospect of a successful seizure of power through a mass strike. Indeed, there is precedent for the White House declaring certain industries essential to national security and sending in the troops to prevent work stoppages. However, such a reaction is also in the cards for an electoral rupture with capitalism. If military confrontation is the logical endpoint of dual power, then it’s also the logical endpoint of an electoral road to socialism. The electoralist may argue that at least in the electoral process, socialists establish legitimacy and thus the masses will rush to the defense of socialism as a defense of democracy. However, we have already established that, for instance, strikes are viewed as at least as legitimate as elections. Why, then, would the masses rush to the defense of a party that takes power through electoral means but not one that seizes power by successfully executing a mass strike? Thus the prospect of military reaction provides no reason to prioritize elections over dual power. Indeed, it provides reason to prioritize the latter.

Military Cohesiveness and Troop Loyalties

The electoral account over-assumes the degree to which military members are a monolithic, volunteer force dedicated to the cause of empire. Studies suggest that the primary motivation for most members to enlist is economic. Having the government pay for college tops the list. This phenomenon is often called an economic draft or economic conscription since many members join because they lack better prospects for financial security or social advancement. If most members also like being in the military or are committed to their work, the electoral argument would be stronger. However, this is not the case.

Once a recruit enlists, there is no turning back. A typical term of service for enlisted members is six years. Once enlisted, a servicemember cannot quit before that time is up. Members have the opportunity to renew at the end of their initial term, but few do. In 2011 the average length of service by enlisted members of the military was 6.7 years, only a few months longer than the typical minimum troops are typically required to serve. Given the attractive benefits and ability to retire young, why wouldn’t more troops choose to make a career in the military? As it turns out, most want out. In 2015, half of US troops reported feeling unhappy and pessimistic about their job. Nearly half also reported not feeling committed to or satisfied with their work. In light of these sentiments, our “volunteer force” turns out to be largely made up of folks who are in for the future economic benefits and would likely quit if they could. Furthermore, these high turnover rates mean hundreds of thousands of troops re-enter civil society every year, oftentimes struggling to adjust and feeling abandoned by the government they served. These dynamics suggest that we should view the high turnover as a routine, de facto mass defection of troops. 

Turning to the dynamics of loyalty within the US military, consider the following trends: 1) the membership of the US military is becoming increasingly politically polarized, to such a degree that many commentators are beginning to wonder if this polarization is a problem. 2) The military itself is becoming increasingly politicized with President Trump and the Republicans trying to paint themselves as the party of the armed forces. Consider what the latter point means for the hundreds of thousands of service members who do not align with the party of Trump. If the trend of polarization and politicization continues, then we can expect to see cracks widen in the cohesiveness of the membership’s alignments. The political identifications of specific groups within the military tend to reflect the politics of the broader communities from which they hail. Like in conscript armies, members of the US armed forces have affinities with their social groupings outside the military. Accordingly, in place of the electoralist image of the military as a monolithic volunteer force with unfaltering allegiance to empire, the reality is a mass of politically diverse and increasingly polarized service members, half of whom don’t actually want to be in the military and expressly lack commitment to the job. 

Yugoslav partisans in WWII

Civilian Firepower

In terms of firepower, the US differs from many other societies, past and present, in another important way. While it has a military of unprecedented strength, its masses are also uniquely well-armed. Consider the following trends. Even among minorities and oppressed groups, gun ownership is common. One in three Black American households have guns, as do one in five Hispanic households. A quarter of non-white men are armed. Twenty-two percent of women personally own a firearm. While it’s true that Republicans are the most likely to own guns, Independents are nearly as likely and make up a much larger share of the population. Millions of Democrats and self-identified liberals also bear arms. 

No doubt, there are disparities in the contours of gun ownership that we can’t ignore. The balance of firepower between white men and the rest of society certainly skews in favor of the former, and guns are relatively concentrated in the hands of political conservatives. Equally troubling, those making over $100,000 a year are almost twice as likely to own a gun as those making under $25,000 a year. However, rates of gun ownership are roughly similar at all income levels over $25,000. This fact indicates that, while the poorest Americans are the least likely to own guns, above a relatively low-income threshold, class is not a strong determinant in gun ownership. Thus, while many gun owners have a vested interest in the preservation of both capitalism and white supremacy, many do not. 

Much of the dynamics of gun ownership may reflect that rural America is both a conservative stronghold and where most gun owners reside. Changing the first of these factors, the political orientation of the rural working class, is a crucial task of the left regardless of considerations about firepower. The American countryside used to be a hotbed of left-wing militancy. Any ambitious socialist movement has the responsibility to make it so again. The alternative is to abandon the masses outside of coastal metropolises. Leftists must win over the working class wherever they reside, and the working class in much of the US is already well-armed. Thus the process of winning the masses to socialism outside of urban activist strongholds would itself help neutralize the imbalance in firepower. 

One of the more troubling aspects of civilian gun ownership is the far-right militia movement. In recent years, civilian militias have emerged victorious from standoffs against the government. While much of the movement does oppose state power, it is composed of some of the most reactionary elements acting in defense of capital, unrestricted private property rights, and racial privilege. However, far from showing some immutable quality of working class gun owners, the militia movement shows how armed civilians are capable of organizing to oppose the state. 

A striking example took place in 2014, when civilian militias amassed to face down federal, state, and county agents in southern Nevada. Rancher Cliven Bundy owed (and still owes) millions of dollars to the federal government. For decades, he has been grazing his cattle on federal lands while withholding grazing fees. After legal prosecution failed to compel him to pay, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) sent officials to round up and remove his cattle from federal range. In response, Bundy called on the militias. At least five paramilitaries assembled to back his personal claim to federal land in a face-off with government agents. In multiple press releases, Bundy expressed his refusal to accept the legitimacy of the federal government. In the end, the government forces backed down and cancelled its round-up, leaving Bundy to forcefully enclose public lands for his own commercial use. Five years later, he continues to use federal range as his own commercial asset and has not paid a dime. The militia movement successfully challenged the federal government and established sovereignty over a small chunk of the Southwest desert. 

The dynamics at play in the standoff share many similarities to a situation of dual power. Two opposing forces claimed legitimacy and sovereignty over a piece of territory. The militia movement can thus be seen as effectively building a “state within a state,” albeit a capitalist, proto-fascist state. No doubt, the federal government would not treat a socialist threat so kindly. 

The foregoing account shows that a vast build-up of civilian firepower already exists. Its most organized and disciplined formations have challenged the state and come out victorious on more than one occasion. Unfortunately, much of this movement should be considered a paramilitary extension of bourgeois power that supplements, not counters, the formal military. Most right-wing militias are characterized by jingoism and commitment to empire to a degree that many enlisted service members are not. However, even this account deserves nuance.

The militia movement itself has experienced defections and splits over the inclusion of racist ideologies in the movement. Much of it explicitly opposes racism and antisemitism. The overtly racist factions of the movement typically have to emphasize their anti-government sentiments and hide their racist elements in order to attract followers. Indeed, in today’s movement, the underlying ideological unity is anti-government more so than white nationalist. Much of the movement views itself as opposing state oppression. In fact, in the standoff in Nevada, it was a video of federal agents body slamming a woman in the Bundy family that brought so many members to the fight.

More importantly, the right-wing militia movement is only a very small fraction of the armed and trained citizenry. It has been able to grow in part by positioning itself as a conduit for disaffected veterans. There’s no reason the left can’t begin to do the same and grow an alternative pole of attraction for the hundred of thousands of service members leaving the military each year. This strategy, however, is incomplete. In addition to disarming reactionary and bourgeois elements in society, any strategy regarding firearms within the US must also prioritize the self-defense of the oppressed and internally colonized. In small ways, this is already occurring. We will return to this point in a later piece.

These considerations do not open up the possibility of armed insurrection against the government any time in the immediate future, but they do complicate the electoralist picture. First, some of the most promising and important types of dual power will come from organizing workers at the points of production and reproduction, not from simply picking up guns. Just as the military has been empowered by modern innovation, so have the workers who produce and maintain that technology. Secondly, the military is likely not a homogenous political force that would slaughter fellow Americans engaged in something like a mass strike. Indeed, we see increasing political polarization within the ranks and mass de facto defection every year. Third, much of the US working class is already armed and socialists are already charged with the task of winning them over. 

Conclusion

The electoralist picture obscures a great deal of nuance in the social, political, and historic landscape of the United States. It does so in ways that fundamentally undermine its case against dual power. First, it overstates the legitimacy in the bourgeois state and the parliamentary process in relation to other forms of political agency. It also mistakes the role legitimacy has historically played as an engine of social transformation.

Secondly, and most curiously, it fails to acknowledge the climate crisis as a crucial feature of the current moment. While leftists in general conceive of climate change as an issue, deep crisis defines the very real material conditions that should determine strategy. A left exit from this crisis thus must be a crucial framework for how we move forward. 

Finally, the dynamics of firepower indeed place great constraints on how we can effectively build dual power. They do not, however, foreclose the possibility. In the next part of this series, I will explore several examples of contemporary attempts to address crisis electorally, why these attempts have failed or succeeded, and how they should inform our approach to socialist transformation moving forward. 

For the Unity of Marxists with the Dispossessed: The Bolsheviks and the State, 1912-1917

 A reply by Medway Baker to Sophia Burns’  article For the Unity of Marxists, or the Unity of the Dispossessed?.    

In a previous article, Comrade Sophia Burns argued for the “unity of the dispossessed,” in opposition to the “unity of Marxists” proposed by Comrades Rosa Janis and Parker McQueeney. She correctly exposes the largely petit-bourgeois makeup of the contemporary left, critiques its culture of protest (which, as she notes, often does little to build up an organised revolutionary force, but rather “attract[s] dissident anger and channel[s] it harmlessly into the ground”), and identifies that Marxists must “gain experience with class struggle, gradually cultivate a base among the dispossessed, and eventually begin to develop the necessary forces to establish revolutionary sovereignty.” However, she goes too far in her identification of what constitutes collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Burns is correct that the goal of any Marxist minimum programme must be “not [to] join[] the official political realm but [to] creat[e] an entirely new one, an insurrectionary proletarian state”. But even as she advocates for the overthrow of the state and the establishment of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, she rejects key lessons of the Bolshevik experience, both before the establishment of “dual power” and after. When she insists on “not lobbying [the government], participating in its elections… or… protesting it”, Burns leaves to us only a single tactic: the formation of “struggle committees” for the fulfillment of the workers’ demands in their struggles against the bosses and the landlords. Presumably these “struggle committees” are to form the nucleus of the future workers’ state. 

This tactical orientation leaves something to be desired, even by Burns’ own admission. “Something more is needed,” she says. “I don’t know what it is. It’ll take a lot of experimentation and, likely, plenty of failures to figure it out.” This is a respectable position to hold, and she is on the right track. She correctly identifies the need for “mass organizations with communist leadership actively destabilizing the liberal order” and “developing the organizational capacity to govern.” As I have argued in the past, it is necessary to form a workers’ party with a revolutionary programme, which will train the proletariat in self-governance through the formation of counter-hegemonic, democratic proletarian civic institutions. These institutions, administered and staffed by the proletariat, must substitute the functions of the bourgeois state following the seizure of power. Burns is not hostile to party-building—indeed, she admits that it “will likely be necessary”—but her conception of this is not comprehensive. 

In How Do You Do Politics? Burns shows the beginnings of the path forward. Although I have some misgivings about her overall thesis, her tactical orientation of directly engaging with workers in the class struggle is correct. But what comes after? Where do we go once we’ve begun to build up this organic base among the workers? 

In accordance with Burns’ own advocacy of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, we will explore the ways in which the Bolsheviks built up their mass base among the proletariat. Contrary to Burns’ insistence that the revolutionary movement must boycott all engagement with the bourgeois state, I will argue that such engagement was crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October 1917. The Bolsheviks did not only engage in elections to the soviets—the “insurrectionary proletarian state”, as Burns puts it—but they also made demands of the Provisional Government, called for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and participated in bourgeois elections to the Constituent Assembly and the municipal Dumas. Even before the February Revolution, they participated in elections to the tsarist Duma, which was hardly representative and had no real legislative power. We will also examine the notion of “dual power” in the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary strategy in 1917, in order to provide context for these discussions. 

It is true that many attempts by modern-day Marxists to engage in elections are frankly opportunistic, and fail to advance the revolutionary cause. However, as this foray into Russian revolutionary history will reveal, boycotting elections (and other forms of engagement with the state) on principle would be a grave mistake. Although Cosmonaut has published examinations of communist electoral tactics in the past, this remains a very muddled issue for the left, and Burns’ needed intervention provides an opportunity to clarify how communists should orient ourselves vis-à-vis the state. For the moment, the Marxist left in most of the Global North remains too weak to engage in successful electoral tactics on any significant scale, but if we are to engage in party-building, we must be clear about what we plan to do with the party once it has been formed. It is impossible to formulate short-term tactics without a long-term strategy; hopefully, this examination of the Bolshevik strategy can help to inform Marxist revolutionary strategy today. 

Last session of the third Duma, October 15, 1911.

Before the Revolution: The Duma

The trial has unfolded a picture of revolutionary Social-Democracy taking advantage of parliamentarism, the like of which has not been witnessed in international Socialism. This example will, more than all speeches, appeal to the minds and hearts of the proletarian masses; it will, more than any arguments, repudiate the legalist-opportunists and anarchist phrase-mongers…. There was a Workers’ Party in Russia whose deputies neither shone with fine rhetoric, nor had “access” to the bourgeois intellectual drawing rooms, nor possessed the business-like efficiency of a ‘European’ lawyer and parliamentarian, but excelled in maintaining connections with the working masses, in ardent work among those masses, in carrying out the small, unpretentious, difficult, thankless and unusually dangerous functions of illegal propagandists and organisers…. The ‘Pravdist’ papers and the ‘Muranov type’ of work have brought about the unity of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia…. It is with this section that we must work. It is its unity that must be defended against social-chauvinism. It is along this road that the labour movement of Russia can develop towards social revolution.

— V. I. Lenin, 19151

The State Duma was hardly a democratic body. It had no true legislative power and absolutely no power over the executive. The Russian workers had little faith in it. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks chose to participate in the elections, even though they knew they would be totally unable to effect any kind of legislative change towards socialism in doing so. Today, in an age of polarisation between electoral opportunism and abstentionism, this may seem strange. If the Bolsheviks had no illusions in the State Duma, and they were committed to effecting revolutionary change, why would they waste their time with sham elections? 

Before answering this question, we should note that the Bolsheviks were not opposed a priori to a boycott of the Duma. In fact, Lenin proposed just this in 1905, when, in response to the great revolutionary upheaval that had taken hold of Russia, the Tsar’s government proposed the convocation of a Duma which would take on a merely advisory role. Nevertheless, Lenin was opposed to “mere passive abstention from voting,” insisting that a boycott of the elections must be an “active boycott”, which “should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth.”2 It is clear from this formulation that the active boycott tactic can only be applied under the conditions of a mass revolutionary upsurge, and requires the existence of a mass workers’ party. 

Lenin would elaborate on this theme two years later, reflecting on the experience of the 1905 revolution. This time, however, he argued against a boycott of the Duma—not on the basis that the Duma had become any more democratic than before, but on the basis that the situation was no longer conducive to an insurrection: 

The Social-Democrat who takes a Marxist stand draws his conclusions about the boycott not from the degree of reactionariness of one or another institution, but from the existence of those special conditions of struggle that, as the experience of the Russian revolution has now shown, make it possible to apply the specific method known as boycott.3

Further, 

All boycott is a struggle, not within the framework of a given institution, but against its emergence, or, to put it more broadly, against it becoming operative. Therefore, those who… opposed the boycott on the general grounds that it was necessary for a Marxist to make use of representative institutions, thereby only revealed absurd doctrinairism… Unquestionably, a Marxist should make use of representative institutions. Does that imply that a Marxist cannot, under certain conditions, stand for a struggle not within the framework of a given institution but against that institution being brought into existence? No, it does not, because this general argument applies only to those cases where there is no room for a struggle to prevent such an institution from coming into being. The boycott is a controversial question precisely because it is a question of whether there is room for a struggle to prevent the emergence of such institutions…. 

… [T]he boycott is a means of struggle aimed directly at overthrowing the old regime, or, at the worst, i.e., when the assault is not strong enough for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be unable to set up that institution, unable to make it operate. Consequently, to be successful the boycott requires a direct struggle against the old regime, an uprising against it and mass disobedience to it in a large number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the conditions for preparing an uprising). Boycott is a refusal to recognise the old regime, a refusal, of course, not in words, but in deeds, i.e., it is something that finds expression not only in cries or the slogans of organisations, but in a definite movement of the mass of the people, who systematically defy the laws of the old regime, systematically set up new institutions, which, though unlawful, actually exist, and so on and so forth. The connection between boycott and the broad revolutionary upswing is thus obvious: boycott is the most decisive means of struggle, which rejects not the form of organisation of the given institution, but its very existence. Boycott is a declaration of open war against the old regime, a direct attack upon it. Unless there is a broad revolutionary upswing, unless there is mass unrest which overflows, as it were, the bounds of the old legality, there can be no question of the boycott succeeding.4

In Lenin’s formulation, it is thus necessary to use the state institutions to the benefit of the revolutionary movement when opposing the state outright is impossible; to boycott these institutions, without having the ability to truly contest their legitimacy, is to spurn a potentially useful avenue of propaganda and revolutionary work. While it could be argued that this formulation is incorrect or no longer applicable, we must understand this context if we are to understand the Bolsheviks’ use of election campaigns and the Duma rostrum. 

With this in mind, we can return to the question of how participation in the Duma could benefit the revolutionary movement. The writings of Alexei Badayev, a factory worker and a Bolshevik deputy to the Duma from 1912 to 1914, offer a great deal of insight into this matter: 

The Fourth Duma was to follow in the footsteps of the Third. The electoral law remained the same, and therefore the majority in the new Duma was bound to be as Black Hundred as before. There was no doubt that the activities of the Fourth Duma would also be directed against the workers and that its legislation would be of no use either to the workers or the peasantry. 

In spite of these considerations the Social-Democratic Party decided to take an active part in the elections as it had done in those for the Second and Third Dumas. The experience of the preceding years had shown the great importance of an election campaign from the standpoint of agitation, and the important role played by Social-Democratic fractions in the Duma. Our fractions, while refusing to take part in the so-called ‘positive’ work of legislation, used the Duma rostrum for revolutionary agitation. The work of the Social-Democratic fractions outside the Duma was still more important; they were becoming the organising centres of Party work in Russia. Therefore our Party decided that active participation in the campaign was necessary.5

Indeed, the election campaign was a great opportunity for the elaboration of the party’s tactics and the development of the workers’ class-consciousness. Although the tsarist police did their utmost to prevent public meetings during the campaigns, debates in Pravda and Luch (the Mensheviks’ newspaper) were widely read by workers and served to clarify the programme of revolutionary social democracy. This helped set the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary platform (centred around the slogans of a democratic republic, an eight-hour workday, and the confiscation of the landlords’ estates, to which the rest of the minimum programme for workers’ power was to be linked) apart from the opportunistic and legalistic slogans of the Mensheviks (which failed to challenge the tsarist, feudal order in a revolutionary manner).6 The election campaign spurred the Bolsheviks to forge true programmatic unity and then helped them to win the proletariat to this programme. Throughout the campaign, the Bolsheviks and their supporters among the working class were subjected to considerable police repression, and while this disrupted a great deal of potentially valuable propaganda work, it also strengthened the solidarity of the workers. 

The most egregious example of such repression is perhaps the invalidation of the election results from 29 factories and mills throughout St. Petersburg, disqualifying their delegates from participating in the electoral college that would choose electors who would go on, along with the electors of the other classes of St. Petersburg, to select a deputy from among themselves.7 

The disqualification of the delegates triggered a militant reaction by the workers of St. Petersburg: more than 70,000 workers would go out on strike, including many of those whose delegates had not been disqualified. No economic demands were presented; the core of the strike was centered around the right to vote. The workers made a great show of unity and discipline and were able to win their demands: not only were new elections to be held, but many factories and mills which had previously been unable to participate in the elections were to be included.8 It was a great victory for the working class, which exemplifies the value of engaging in political struggles against the state, both through elections and in the streets. The electoral and street actions reinforced each other and pushed the class struggle beyond simple economistic demands to a question of state power. The crucial factor is the presentation of concrete demands on a class basis, demands that expose the fundamental opposition between the exploiters and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled. This type of engagement with the state is hardly comparable to the opportunistic election campaigns and liberal activist culture to which so much of the modern left is wedded. 

The election campaign was conducted upon a revolutionary, class basis, which united workers around the struggle for their political rights and the Bolshevik programme. The campaign forced the distinctions between the revolutionary Bolsheviks and the “legalist-opportunist” Mensheviks out into the open, for all the workers to see. It mobilised the forces of labour against the ruling class in a tangible way that clearly raised the workers’ class consciousness. Following the second round of elections, the workers voted to bind their delegates to a set of instructions drafted by the Bolsheviks, which laid out the role of the deputies as specifically revolutionary:

The Duma tribune is, under the present conditions, one of the best means for enlightening and organising the broad masses of the proletariat. 

It is for this very purpose that we are sending our deputy into the Duma, and we charge him and the whole Social-Democratic fraction of the Fourth Duma to make widely known our demands from the Duma tribune, and not to play at legislation in the State Duma…. 

We want to hear the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic fraction ring out loudly from the Duma tribune proclaiming the final goal of the proletariat…. We call upon the Social-Democratic- fraction of the Fourth Duma, in its work on the basis of the above slogans, to act in unity and with its ranks closed.

Let it gather its strength from constant contact with the broad masses. 

Let it march shoulder to shoulder with the political organisation of the working class of Russia.9

The Bolshevik deputies elected to the Duma held to this promise. “During my daily visits to the Pravda offices,” Badayev recalls, “I met the representatives of labour organisations and became acquainted with the moods of the workers. Workers came there from all the city districts and related what had taken place at factories and works, and how the legal and illegal organisations were functioning. Conversations and meetings with the representatives of the revolutionary workers supplied me with a vast amount of material for my future activity in the Duma.”10 

Once within the halls of Tauride Palace, where the Duma sat, the Social-Democratic fraction declared its irreconcilable opposition to the legislative work of the body from day one. They refused to participate in electing the chairman of the Duma, as “the chairman of such a Duma would systematically attack members of the Social-Democratic fraction, whenever the latter spoke from the Duma rostrum in defence of the interests of the masses…. You are welcome to choose a chairman acceptable to the majority; we shall use the rostrum in the interests of the people.”11 In Badayev’s words: 

… [W]e demonstrated, on the first day of the Fourth Duma, that there could be no question of ‘parliamentary’ work for us, that the working class only used the Duma for the greater consolidation and strengthening of the revolutionary struggle in the country. A similar attitude determined the nature of our relations with the Duma majority. No joint work, but a sustained struggle against the Rights, the Octobrists and the Cadets, and their exposure in the eyes of the workers; this was the task of the workers’ deputies in the Duma of the landlords and nobles.12

Another example of the mutual reinforcement of mass action and activities in the Duma came only a short while later. The metalworkers’ union—one of the most advanced workers’ organisations in Russia, with which the party had conducted a great deal of work—was subjected, like all Russian trade unions, to periodic suppressions, forcing it to refound itself under a new name each time. In late 1912, once again, the police shut down the union and worked to prevent its refoundation. In the process, both the police and the municipal government violated the 1906 law that accorded some meager protections to the unions. 

The Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of these illegal proceedings to register an interpellation. This process was always convoluted, and the government did all it could to limit speeches and debate. Nevertheless, the Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of whatever parts of the bureaucratic procedure they could. In particular, they were allowed to make speeches to argue for the urgency of a matter, which would have to be accepted in order for the interpellation to be made. Although the urgency of those matters raised by the Social-Democrats was consistently denied, the fraction frequently used these speeches to denounce the government and call for revolution. In this particular instance, on December 14, the interpellation was accompanied by a one-day strike of the St. Petersburg workers, who held public meetings to pass resolutions of protest against the suppression of the trade unions, and in support of the Social-Democratic fraction’s interpellation. 

What the Social-Democrats had planned as a one-day strike continued the next day, and expanded to include even more workers than the day before. Some of the “unreliable” workers were fired, and this only triggered a third day of strikes, demanding their reinstatement. The Social-Democratic fraction remained at the centre of workers’ struggles during these days. They remained in constant contact with the strikers, helped to coordinate funds and develop slogans, and served as negotiators with the authorities. The workers of the whole city supported, in words and in deeds, the plight of the dismissed workers, and the strike ultimately lasted over two weeks.13

By 1914, the Bolsheviks were a truly mass workers’ party, despite their conditions of illegality. But with the outbreak of the war, this work all came to an end. Patriotic sentiments were running high: pro-war demonstrators marched through the streets, praising the Tsar and beating passers-by who failed to meet the correct standards of nationalist fervour; workers’ organisations were suppressed, and patriotic onlookers aided the police in clashes with strikers and anti-war demonstrators.14

The Bolsheviks declared “War against War”15, and walked out of the Duma rather than participate in the vote for war credits. The Bolshevik deputies were soon arrested, in violation of their parliamentary immunity. The workers protested but were too weak to secure the freedom of the deputies. The party was crippled by the destruction of this centre of revolutionary work, along with the destruction of so many other organising centres. The proletariat won only a single victory in this regard: the government, fearing a backlash in the case that they were to execute the deputies, turned the case over from the military to the civilian courts. 16

Even this was an opportunity for propaganda among the workers, and the party and the deputies seized upon it. The trial was highly publicised by the Bolshevik press, and the deputies defended their revolutionary work with zeal. They insisted that the Russian workers would remember this repression of their chosen representatives, and foretold that they would “not remain long in exile but [would] soon return in triumph.”17 

And so, in 1917, they did. 

From the First Revolution to the Second: Dual Power

The deputies, alongside the rest of the Bolshevik party, returned from exile following the overthrow of the Tsar in February. The bourgeoisie had formed a Provisional Government; the workers and soldiers had formed the soviets. The former represented the bourgeois republic; the latter, the workers’ and peasants’ republic. Lenin described this situation using the term “dual power.” Let us examine what he meant by this, and what political conclusions he drew from this analysis. 

According to the old way of thinking, the rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be followed by the rule of the proletariat and the peasantry, by their dictatorship. 

In real life, however, things have already turned out differently; there has been an extremely original, novel and unprecedented interlacing of the one with the other. We have side by side, existing together, simultaneously, both the rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) and a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which is voluntarily ceding power to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily making itself an appendage of the bourgeoisie.

For it must not be forgotten that actually, in Petrograd, the power is in the hands of the workers and soldiers; the new government is not using and cannot use violence against them, because there is no police, no army standing apart from the people, no officialdom standing all-powerful above the people. 

… [F]reely elected soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies are freely joining the second, parallel government, and are freely supplementing, developing and completing it. And, just as freely, they are surrendering power to the bourgeoisie…18

It is important to note that “power” (vlast) refers specifically to the sovereign state authority. This is a key point: the existence of more than one vlast is necessarily a contradiction in terms because by definition there can only be one sovereign authority in a single state. “Dual power”, then, is a situation in which the narod (the workers and peasants, analogous to Burns’ use of “the dispossessed”) and the bourgeoisie each has an embryonic vlast, the former (the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies) being unwilling to establish a “firm vlast”, and the latter (the Provisional Government) being unable to establish one. In effect, then, there is no true vlast under these conditions. The necessary outcome of this situation is, therefore, the end of dual power, and the establishment of a firm vlast around a single class pole: either that of the bourgeoisie (in the form of the Provisional Government) or that of the narod (in the form of the soviets).19  Lenin summarised this situation thus: 

The bourgeoisie stands for the undivided power (vlast) of the bourgeoisie. 

The class-conscious workers stand for the undivided power (vlast) of the Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’, Peasants’, and Soldiers’ Deputies—for undivided power (vlast) made possible not by adventurist acts, but by clarifying proletarian minds, by emancipating them from the influence of the bourgeoisie20

We must ably, carefully, clear people’s minds and lead the proletariat and poor peasantry forward, away from ‘dual power’ towards the full power of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.21

Soviet power came into existence in February; October was merely the point at which it ceased to tolerate the Provisional Government, ending the period of “dual power.” To speak, then, of dual power as an aim of the revolutionary movement is to fundamentally misunderstand the lessons of October. In the Bolsheviks’ view, dual power was never an aim but an unexpected obstacle—an aberrant result of the peculiar conditions of the Russian Revolution—which was to be overcome. 

Even so, the Bolsheviks were not opposed to the convention of the Constituent Assembly; in fact, they often criticised the Provisional Government for delaying the elections to it. One of the first demands of the Bolsheviks following the February Revolution was “to convene a Constituent Assembly as speedily as possible” (alongside the establishment of the soviet vlast).22 Lenin noted upon his return to Russia, 

I attacked the Provisional Government for not having appointed an early date, or any date at all, for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and for confining itself to promises. I argued that without the Soviets  of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies the convocation of the Constituent Assembly is not guaranteed and its success is impossible.23

Even beyond this, the Bolsheviks participated in the municipal Duma elections in the summer of 1917, much in the same way they used the prewar Duma elections. In particular, they took advantage of the campaign to make a series of demands of the Provisional Government—demands which they knew the government could not meet. “Unless these demands are met,” Pravda proclaimed, “unless a fight is waged for these demands, not a single serious municipal reform and no democratization of municipal affairs is conceivable.”24 These demands were explicitly connected to the transfer of power to the narod. Although the municipal Dumas were not class organs—they did not represent the “insurrectionary state”—the election campaigns were used by the Bolsheviks to agitate for the takeover of the full vlast by the insurrectionary state, as well as to measure the balance of class forces.25 They heartily urged the workers and soldiers to vote, in such forceful terms as: “You, and you alone, comrades, will be to blame if you do not make full use of this right [to vote]…. [B]e capable now of battling for your interests by voting for our Party!”26 

Making demands of the Provisional Government was a key tactic of the Bolshevik party during the revolutionary period. Although in April there was a debate between Lenin and the other Bolsheviks over the issue of “kontrol”, that is, supervision of the Provisional Government by the Soviet, Lars Lih chalks this up to essentially a misunderstanding between Lenin and the Petrograd Bolsheviks, which was resolved by the end of April in a manner that satisfied both camps. The crux of the debate was over the role of kontrol in the revolution: while the moderate socialists proposed kontrol as a means of maintaining the vlast of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks proposed it as a means of exposing the Provisional Government as incapable of carrying out the revolution “to the end.”27 

This tactic of making demands, in order to expose the Provisional Government’s counterrevolutionary nature, was used to great effect throughout 1917. The Bolsheviks maintained in their propaganda that the Provisional Government, to the extent that it carried out revolutionary measures against tsarism, only did so under pressure from the workers and soldiers, and its ultimate counterrevolutionary nature would inevitably lead to a confrontation between revolutionary democracy (i.e. the narod) and the bourgeoisie. Hence, demands for a democratic republic, an end to the war, redistribution of the land, the publication and annulment of the secret treaties, etc. were not made under the pretense that the Provisional Government would or could carry these out. Stalin wrote in August: 

The Party declares that unless these demands are realized it will be impossible to save the revolution, which for half a year now has been stifling in the clutches of war and general disruption. 

The Party declares that the only possible way of securing these demands is to break with the capitalists, completely liquidate the bourgeois counter-revolution, and transfer power in the country to the revolutionary workers, peasants, and soldiers. 

That is the only means of saving the country and the revolution from collapse.28

This method must be clearly delineated from that of making demands in a way that obscures the necessity of taking power. Revolution is not a secondary concern in this type of propaganda, but placed front and centre. Demands are formulated specifically in connection with overthrowing the bourgeoisie: “All propaganda, agitation and the organisation of the millions must immediately be directed towards [transferring power to the soviets].”29

This way of making demands of the bourgeois state is far from the usual, liberal-democratic practice of lobbying. These demands, backed up by organising the proletariat through the Bolshevik type of electoral work and street actions, can be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of the revolution. It is true that none of these methods individually can accomplish revolution, but that goes just as much for organising workers in “struggle committees” as it does for electoral participation, making demands of the government, or participating in street protests. Ultimately, the Bolsheviks used all four of these tools to win the confidence of the dispossessed and take power in October. 

Bolshevik Central Committee on the eve of the revolution.

Conclusion

Burns is correct to call for Marxists to focus on organising the proletariat, and she is equally correct to identify erroneous, opportunistic and petit-bourgeois activist tendencies in the contemporary left. However, her solution falls short: her tactical inflexibility leads her to reject participation in elections or making demands of the bourgeois state out of hand—tactics which, as we have shown above, were crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October. 

Comrades Janis and McQueeney are correct to call for programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists, and they are correct to identify DSA as one possible avenue through which to fight for this unity. The task of Marxists in DSA is not only to organise the working class, but also to fight for a revolutionary programme, and to elaborate on the tactics that may assist organising efforts. While there is an influential opportunistic tendency in DSA that insists on tailing the Democratic Party (either temporarily or indefinitely), this is not the only possible electoral tactic. This opportunism must be fought against, in favour of a class-independent electoral tactic; one that, like the Bolsheviks’, serves to heighten the consciousness of the proletariat, to rally their numbers to the revolutionary programme, and above all to support DSA’s organising work. The specifics of this tactic must be left up to the revolutionary Marxists in DSA, who will need to deliberate among themselves, examine the objective conditions, and engage in debate with both opportunists and abstentionists in order to formulate a revolutionary orientation to bourgeois elections suitable to 21st-century American conditions. That said, the core of this tactic must consist of: 

    1. An immediate break with the Democratic Party and all other bourgeois parties, 
    2. Using electoral and parliamentary work above all to support the task of organising the proletariat, rather than for its own sake, and 
    3. Irreconcilable opposition to the American state, its military and police, and taking advantage of every opportunity to obstruct its functioning. 

It is possible that the best electoral tactic for the present moment is to temporarily refrain from electoral work in favour of organising the working class. It is also possible that the best electoral tactic will involve participation in elections at various levels of government in different degrees. A discussion of these details is well beyond the scope of this essay, but it is urgent that such discussions take place, that revolutionary Marxists in DSA begin to forge programmatic unity, and that the struggle is taken up against opportunist collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Comrade Burns asks us: “For the unity of Marxists, or the unity of the dispossessed?” This question, although thought-provoking in a necessary way, sets up a false dichotomy. For the Bolsheviks, there was never a question of one or the other. They saw the programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists as bringing about the unity of the dispossessed around the programme of revolution; and this unity of the dispossessed, in turn, empowered the party of revolution, transforming it from a circle of intellectuals into a potent weapon of the class struggle. The revolution was made possible, not by one or the other, but by both: the unity of Marxists with the dispossessed, the unity of the revolutionary programme with the workers’ movement. This is the lesson of the October Revolution; this is the lesson that we must remember, as the left vacillates between opportunism and impotency if we are to recreate a revolutionary movement, if we are to win power, if we are to achieve communism. 

For the Unity of Marxists, or the Unity of the Dispossessed?

Sophia Burns responds to DSA Convention: Fog and Storm and For the Unity of Marxists: Response to Fog and Storm. You can support her work here.

Up close, DSA Bread and Roses (the “centralizers”), DSA Build (the “decentralizers”), and Marxist Center look pretty different. What do a unified social-democratic faction, a loose opposition alliance, and an aspiring cadre party have in common?

Step a few feet back, though, and their distinctions lose significance, like the different-colored dots of an Impressionist painting blending into a coherent whole.

Class is everything. A libertarian professor of economics and a radical professor of women’s studies may hate each other, but they both make five times as much as the janitor who cleans up after them – and more importantly, they spend their lives in the same educated, affluent milieu.

Despite its egalitarian pretensions, the US political system is run by the middle class for the benefit of the ruling class. There is effectively no political culture outside of those classes (a very few isolated and localized examples notwithstanding). As Bernie Sanders said, poor people don’t vote, let alone protest or form political organizations. Of course, the dispossessed do resist their dispossession, all the time – but they do so outside of the political system (and usually, in limited and decentralized ways, everyday oppression and everyday resistance tending towards a socially-stable equilibrium).

US socialism is a fringe of the official political culture. Its class makeup reflects that. It is college-educated, affluent (or at least with affluent parents), and attuned to the concerns of middle-class professionals and students in general. Whether they’re door-knocking for Bernie, waving anti-imperialist placards for the cameras, or running brake-light clinics, it’s the same people from the same backgrounds mobilizing each other.

In other words – should they arrange themselves into a centralized electoral front, a federation of autonomous activist hubs, or an ideologically united party? Shouldn’t they first prove why they, as a subculture, matter in the first place? Normcore social democrats and social-reproduction-theory feminists both claim to represent the authentic working class. If that’s true, why do both sides seem to be made up mostly of journalists and humanities postdocs?

Where are the call-center workers? Where are the home health aides? Where are the McDonald’s fry cooks? Everyone talks about them, but when was the last time you saw one running an activist meeting? How many of the working poor have you ever seen at a leftist event – other than the venue staff?

Traditionally, Marxism draws a line between intellectuals (professionals, technicians, and all those whose specialized training and knowledge gives them a uniquely strong position in the labor market) and the proletariat (the truly dispossessed, the mass of workers and unemployed whose “unskilled” status makes their labor more-or-less interchangeable from capital’s point of view). The latter, not the former, carries the revolutionary seed, both because it owns no means of production (not even professional licenses and training!) and thus has no stake in preserving class distinctions and because the logistically-socialized, large-scale economy it operates makes it possible to raise everyone’s standard of living. Now, intellectuals can contribute to the great work of organizing the proletariat for power, but only by immersing themselves in its life. They must make their struggles their own.

These days, US leftism has lost that awareness. To hear any faction of DSA (or Marxist Center) talk, K12 teachers, college professors, and even professional athletes are proletarians. Instead of dedicating their lives to serving the masses, intellectual-class radicals would rather band together with each other and creatively redefine the proletariat to include themselves. But while they may fool each other, they can’t fool the larger social process of class struggle. In terms of their historical and economic context, all their factions are variations on the same theme as MoveOn, the National Organization for Women, and for that matter, Young Americans for Liberty. They’re all ideologically-defined middle-class protest movements.

Now, as an individual, there’s nothing morally wrong with being an intellectual. That’s my class background, and if you’re reading this there’s a better-than-even chance it’s yours too. Intellectuals can contribute plenty – they have administrative, research, fundraising, and bookkeeping skills (from higher education), extra time and energy (from middle-class jobs), and better physical health in general (from better healthcare access). If intellectuals go to the proletariat, immerse themselves in it, dedicate their lives to it, and help organize struggle committees in low-wage workplaces and slumlord-owned buildings, they can be a truly valuable part of the class struggle. And historically, red unions and communist parties have always attracted their fair share of radical-minded intellectuals. Many of them have brought social-scientific and historical knowledge that’s helped break the stability of the oppression-resistance equilibrium, opening up new space for class struggle.

However, the US’s actually-existing socialist groups are there for their own sake, not as supporting organizers for struggle committees. Their understanding of “mass” as “anyone who shows up to protests” (and “vanguard” as “anyone who agrees with this list of ideas”) help keep their concerns and membership middle-class and insular. So does their commitment to the US’s political process – and even the ones with the most revolutionary posturing are still committed to participating in that process, albeit via protest rather than lobbying. It comes out the same either way.

Revolution does not mean “sweeping social change” in some abstract sense. Sure, it involves deep and systemic changes, but those are an after-effect, not the thing itself. Revolution means overthrowing the government. It’s literal. Similarly, socialism doesn’t mean “Liz Warren’s policies but more so” (and flawed as my four-tendencies typology was, I stand by “government socialists” for those whose “socialism” means taking progressive Democrat ideas and extending them just a few degrees further than John Oliver). Socialism means the proletariat (not the liberal-democratic state) owns the economy and runs it according to a central plan, not an ad-hoc collection of welfare programs and “socially-conscious” nonprofits. Creating that will take a full-blown revolution, not a gradual build-up of legislative reforms, because the liberal-democratic political process will never allow socialism. It never has and it never will because it was designed from the get-go to make that impossible. It does that not by banning dissent but by giving it a venue to express itself and lobby the government (or protest it!), thereby taming it into a perpetual loyal opposition.

That’s why any socialism that’s bound to the political process is self-defeating in the end. However, class is thicker than ideology, so any movement based in the middle classes will always bend back towards the political process.

Inasmuch as it’s more than a buzzword, base-building contains a kernel of the right idea. Socialist intellectuals can engage with proletarian tenants and workers in a mutually-transformative process, accumulating experience one struggle committee at a time. That process can eventually rekindle the mass socialism that the US hasn’t had for generations. However, the thrust of that organizing must always be away from and against collaboration with the government. That means not lobbying it, participating in its elections, taking its money, or – and this is what almost no activist figures out – protesting it. Part of the normal function of a liberal-democratic government is to be periodically protested; why else do you think it’s in the Bill of Rights? Liberal states are stable in part because they work like lightning rods, attracting dissident anger and channeling it harmlessly into the ground.

Instead, the way forward is to steadily and patiently gain experience with class struggle, gradually cultivate a base among the dispossessed, and eventually begin to develop the necessary forces to establish revolutionary sovereignty: not joining the official political realm but creating an entirely new one, an insurrectionary proletarian state (“dual power” the way Lenin meant it).

I spent years in the middle-class, activist Left, including as an early Marxist Center organizer. I don’t write this to set myself up as embodying some kind of virtue that others lack; everything I’m critiquing here, I was doing myself two years ago. When I call it a dead end, I’m not talking from ignorance.

But I left. I changed the type of organizing I’m involved in and, more importantly, the constituency towards which I orient. I invite you to do the same. Would you rather spend the next ten years rehashing the same debates as the last ten with the same people from the same class background (voting or consensus? Smashing windows or holding banners? Democrat or Green?), while history continues to leave you behind?

The Military Question in the Framework of the Construction of the Communal State

Translation by Rudy Flores and Debs Bruno of a document from the Venezuelan Left on the question of the Communal State and Military organization. 

In general, the term “Military” is understood as everything that is related to the business of war. Consequently, Military is the qualifier that is coined for organizations, institutions, thoughts, theories, practices, customs, resources, equipment, goods, in short, everything that is related to the issue of war: the use of force or armed violence so that the opponent, adversary or enemy ends up behaving a certain way. Hence, the classic division between the Military and the Civil. In this order of ideas, the “Civil” is what initially is not Military. It is stated that initially, taking into account that the delimitation or border between the Military and the Civil is less and less precise or evident. For example, a car or vehicle conceived and built for civil use, whatever it’s brand or manufacturing origin, can perfectly adapt and be used consequently to execute a war action. Indeed, by providing it with an explosive charge and activating it by the means of a suitable device, it is possible to generate results similar to those produced by a military bomb dropped by a military aircraft. In this sense, the difference between the VBIED (civil) and the bomb dropped by the aircraft (military), lies in the fact that one vehicle moves on the ground and the other in the air.

In this sense, what is relevant is not the fact that goods or resources conceived and produced for Civil use, that is, for purposes other than war, are increasingly used in military or armed controversies. Such a situation has always been present in the development of human history. What is relevant and essentially decisive is that with the consolidation of the State as a tool of domination of a social class over the remaining classes that structure a given society, the “Military” ended up being relatively monopolized by it and, more concisely, by the class, group, elite or clique that governs it, since, in short, the military force organized as a constituent component of the State ends up acquiring the character of the State itself. In such a context, it becomes the main instrument of ensuring its domination as a social class over the rest of society.

In fact, all Monarchs claimed for themselves the capacity to have a PERMANENT ARMY and, subsequently, to designate their high commands, at the same time that they reserved for themselves the position of COMMANDER IN CHIEF. The Anti-absolutist or Anti-monarchist Social Movements inspired fundamentally by Liberal ideology fought for the suppression or delimitation of these monarchical prerogatives. With the triumph of Liberalism, therefore with the establishment of the STATE OF LAW as the universal model of the bourgeoisie for the political organization of the nation-society, the criterion of the necessity of the PERMANENT ARMY was consolidated in order to attend to all matters of the security and defense of the nation. In such a context, the PRINCIPLE OF CIVIL SUPREMACY was established, that is, that the planning, organization, financing and conducting of the Military resided in the sphere of the Civil.

Consequently, the bourgeoisie that managed to become hegemonic in their respective societies and subjected the military institutions to the aforementioned PRINCIPLE OF CIVIL SUPREMACY. Obviously this is only the case in the theoretical-normative plane, since in material reality such military bodies or apparatuses do not cease in their claim to enjoy absolute autonomy in all that is inherent to the security and defence of the nation, with the particularity that the limits of security and defence have also become diffuse and increasingly blurred.

In the singular case of Venezuela, it is not an exaggeration to affirm that the State military organization has managed to place itself in a position of notorious and indisputable supremacy in relation to the rest of the public and private institutions that currently exist in society. In this sense, the high commanders of the Bolivarian National Armed Force, as an armed body which is constitutionally responsible for guaranteeing the security and defense of the nation, product of the protagonism and supremacy that it has acquired at the expense of all the State civil institutions and, essentially, of the dismantling and deactivation of the Revolutionary Popular Movement, have practically managed to monopolize or hegemonize all the instances and organisms that make up the Venezuelan State and, subsequently, the activities that these carry out within the framework of the fulfillment of their ends.

For illustration purposes only, it is worth mentioning that today, under the direct or covert control of the high military hierarchy, are almost all activities related to the importation of food, medicines, domestic appliances, medical equipment, spare parts, and auto parts, liquors, etc.; the purchase and sale of fuel; The purchase and sale of material for the construction and manufacturing of housing; the presidencies of almost all public enterprises; almost all the directorates or management of administration and finance of public powers, ministries, public enterprises, governorates, mayors’ offices, etc.; the majority of private companies that have contracts with the State; the exploitation and commercialization of mining resources; in summary, the Venezuelan State and hence, the Venezuelan society are under the management of the high military command. This does not mean that it is the only group that benefits from government management as a whole, since bankers, importing bourgeoisie, insurance and securities brokers, owners of transnational companies, currency exchange offices, owners of television and radio plants, oil and other fuel trading companies, the high bureaucratic hierarchy of the State, etc., also enjoy full hands on the secret and stateless businesses that are carried out to the detriment of the assets of all the Venezuelan people.

Thus, the first lesson to be drawn from the constant conflict between the Military and the Civil throughout the history of humanity and, logically, the singularities that this struggle presents in our historical development as a society, is to understand that it is not enough for the Constitution and other laws of the Republic to establish legal norms that prohibit or limit the military institution as a whole. The dynamics that it unleashes in its daily work, as well as the logic that ultimately guides its development make such prohibitions or limits inefficient or ineffective, in short, that such normative devices end up being discursive proclamations that have no impact on reality, that is to say, that they end up being dead letters.

The center of the question is in what has been insisted in this series of articles related to the Communal State, that is to say, with the historical challenge that implies the design, construction and activation of a set of mechanisms or physical means that in the concrete historical reality prevent the high command of the PERMANENT AND PROFESSIONAL ARMY from becoming a group or factor that hegemonizes all the institutionality of the State and the life of society, which evidently requires questioning and overcoming the traditional and generally accepted Military approach of Liberal-bourgeois root, whose reasonings prevail even in organizations that proclaim themselves revolutionary and Marxist. In such a perspective, it is vital for the historical future of the Homeland to undertake a broad, energetic and intense process of Popular Education inspired by the most advanced currents of revolutionary thought on the question of the security and defense of the People, without this leading to the denial of the Nation, but as an obligatory distinction within the framework of the class struggle and with a view to the construction of the Communal State.

Thus, what is demanded by the reality that Venezuela is going through, which, logically, is not limited to guaranteeing the continuity of the management of the current governing elite, but obliges us to tackle everything that is necessary in order to build a worthy, decent, safe, productive, prosperous, independent, sovereign homeland, in short, a happy homeland, in other words, a Socialist Homeland, proposes to transcend the individual questioning of this or that high military official by virtue of his authoritarian, corrupt or treasonous practices to give way to a true BATTLE OF IDEAS around the Liberal-bourgeois ideology that sustains and orients the raison d’être and behavior of the military institution as a whole.

In this context, and having as a guiding objective the question of the construction of the Communal State, it is necessary to rethink what concerns the monopolization by the Permanent and Professional Army of everything that implies the security and defense of the people-society and, naturally, everything that this implies, that is to say, economy, politics, culture, etc. In other words, the security and defense of what Venezuela means concerns all Venezuelans, given that its future as a concrete historical reality will depend on the quality of the future that each and every one of the members of the people-society will have to face, therefore, the first point to be elucidated on the occasion of the construction of the Communal State is whether the exclusivity of the handling of the security and defense issue is preserved in the hands of the military institution or, on the contrary, it advances according to the conception of the PEOPLE IN ARMS, that is, of the autonomous preparation and organization for war of the oppressed and exploited classes and social sectors that are part of the Venezuelan nation-society, logically taking into account the ways in which this has been developed at the same time.

The simple fact is that until now there is no other way to repel armed aggression other than through the use of armed force. Vindicating the institution of the PEOPLE IN ARMS does not mean being militaristic and even categorically denies the need for the existence of a permanent and professional military corps, since what is discussed is not the professionalization and permanence of the corps as such, but in reality, assumes the monopoly of the direction of all matters related to the war, beyond what is established by the institutional legal order of the State.

It is reiterated that this is an essential and decisive aspect, especially if one considers the distinctive features of our historical process as a Republic, in which the following stand out, among others: The civil mandates in our republican history have been an exception, or in opposite sense, the military mandates have been the constant in our republican history. Military caudillismo has been the main factor in the conduction of the processes of struggle that have developed in it; the conformation of the Permanent and Professional Army goes back to the beginnings of the XX century, the period in which the centralization of the State is concretized and its capitalist-bourgeois character begins to manifest itself.

On the other hand, it is necessary to keep in mind the characteristic features of the dominant mentality in the Venezuelan State military force, which obviously has repercussions on its collective behavior: metaphysical and esoteric vision of life; full ignorance of the materialist conception of history, therefore, denial of the class struggle and abstract vindication of the notion of Nation; deification of the figure of Bolivar and a valuation of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Venezuelan people as events executed by individually considered heroes; demerit and underestimation of the civil, therefore, authoritarianism and arrogance in the face of everything that is not military; corporate spirit, consequently, they constitute themselves as a group with their own interests that leads them to separate themselves from the mission that corresponds to them as a State institution; uncritical obedience to superior orders; Mechanical distrust of any reflection, proposal or initiative that does not come from their natural commanders; conservation of secrecy in the administration and use of resources; acriticity; omission of accountability; Dogmatic discipline, in short, the mentality that prevails as a whole is one that is functional to the domination exercised by hegemonic capitalist groups through the Liberal-Bourgeois State currently prevailing in Venezuela, hence the idea that vertebrates the majority of the Permanent and Professional Army membership is that to the extent that they obediently and efficiently serve the governing classes and groups, they achieve at the end of their military careers a golden retirement product of what they have been irregularly accumulating throughout that.

Anyone can think that this is not the moment to exteriorize these reflections since they can contribute to weaken or demoralize the revolutionary forces that inside and outside the military institution face with patriotic firmness the imperialist aggression of which Venezuela is the object. It is based on the opposite consideration, that is to say, that to the extent that Venezuelans consciously assume that the question of the security and defense of the country is not an exclusive affair of the military and, consequently, openly fight in order to correct all the deviations present in the PERMANENT MILITARY BODY, in that same measure progress will be made in the deepening and strengthening of all that supposes the security and defense of the homeland. In the same way, to the extent that progress is made towards a new military organization that breaks with the monopoly that the Permanent Army exercises over the issues inherent to security and defense, to the same extent progress is made in the construction of a new type of State which, in our case, is the Communal State.

In this order of ideas, it is determining to bear in mind that the construction of the Communal State does not take place in a vacuum, that is to say, on the margin or outside of what is happening at present in Venezuela, hence it is mandatory to start from the concrete reality in which one lives, in this sense, it is vital to bear in mind the distinctive features of our historical process and the characteristic features of the Venezuelan military mentality, since they constitute inputs for the process of formulating a revolutionary strategy based on the building of the Socialist Homeland, especially in the field of Popular Education and the theoretical foundations of the new institutional legal order of the Republic.

Likewise, the complex, dynamic and delicate situation that we are going through is part of the current national situation, because of the intensification of the imperial offensive led by the US government. Therefore, it is within the framework of this decisive reality in which the construction of the Communal State will be hastened, because, it is reiterated, materially it cannot be built in a vacuum. This is why the Revolutionary Popular Movement, and especially the Communal and Peasant Movement, which has raised and promotes the project of concretizing the organization of the Communal State as part of the solutions to the chaos in which Venezuela lives, has before it a set of tasks related to the preparation and development of the People’s War, in the perspective of confronting and annihilating all the bourgeois political-military organizations that, being at the service of imperialism, seek to take back the homeland to the colonial situation, ignoring the fact that sovereignty was conquered by the Venezuelan people on the battlefields with weapons in their hands, and with them, and with the same heroic attitude, will know how to defend it in order to guarantee its perpetuity.

In this sense, arming the revolutionary masses as part of the development of the People’s War in the face of imperialist aggression, and as a strategy of anti-capitalist struggle, implies anticipating the establishment of the institution of the PEOPLE IN ARMS, which in turn represents the prefiguration of one of the structuring elements of the Communal State. This is why it is said that burying the internal bourgeoisie at the same time as initiating the internationalization of the People’s War against capital, especially that embodied in Yankee imperialism, means advancing by leaps and bounds in the process of building the Communal State.

FROM THE VENEZUELAN MOUNTAINS AND FIELDS

PRODUCE FOOD, TECHNOLOGY AND DIGNITY

LET’S KEEP PUSHING THE SUN

Debating Electoral Strategy in the Comintern, 1920: The Bulgarian Situation

Reviewing the debates over electoral strategy at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Donald Parkinson reviews the strategies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and their arguments against electoral abstentionism.

Painting by Boris Mikhailovich Kustodiev

The early Bulgarian Communist party is often forgotten, with little in the way of historiography. This is shocking considering that it was one of the only Comintern parties that could say it had a majority of working-class support and control over the union movement.1 It was founded from the left-wing of a Social-Democratic movement that was far more radical than the rest of the Second International. The Bulgarian Social-Democratic Workers Party opposed World War I and supported the Bolshevik revolution. Their most Marxist faction would split from the reformists and form their own party, mirroring the Bolsheviks’ split from the Mensheviks. Yet the Bulgarian Party did not take up the ultra-left position of abstention from elections; instead, they brilliantly combined electoral tactics and revolutionary strategy without sacrificing militancy or giving into a “law and order” perspective of constitutional loyalty. A popular argument today is that participation in elections inherently leads a party toward reformist politics. Yet the experience of the Bulgarian Communist Party stands in contradiction to this claim. This reason alone calls for more attention to the early Bulgarian Communist movement. 

Despite being essentially destroyed by a fascist coup in 1923 and only reemerging in the resistance to fascism during World War II, one can gather quite a bit of information on the party’s early years and mass success from the proceedings of the Second Congress of the Comintern, particularly where there is a sharp debate on electoral strategy.2  In this debate, the representative of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Nikolai Shablin, answers to the minority thesis presented by Bordiga against the notion of participation in parliament being mandatory for Comintern parties. This congress established the ‘21 conditions’ for membership in the Comintern, so the debate on the role of elections was intensified. The Bulgarian party played a key role in defending the Comintern majority theses put together by Bukharin, which called for participation in elections to agitate for revolution, a strategy of revolutionary parliamentarism. 

The minority theses put together by Bordiga for electoral abstention, or boycott, made a historicist argument about elections once being useful but now being outdated, based on the historical possibility of an imminent revolution. Bordiga concedes that “participation in elections and in parliamentary activity at a time when the thought of the conquest of power by the proletariat was still far distant and when there was not yet any question of direct preparations for the revolution and of the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat could offer great possibilities for propaganda, agitation and criticism,” but then goes on to argue that because the proletariat was now in a period of revolution, such tactics are a distraction from the central task of taking power (which cannot be done through parliament).3 From this, it followed that parliament should be abstained from. Essentially, the argument Bordiga presented is that electoral participation was historically useful to build up the forces of the proletariat in a non-revolutionary period but in a revolutionary period the aim was to discredit bourgeois democracy, which could only be seen as hypocritical if Communists didn’t boycott parliament. Bordiga added that:

Under these historical conditions, under which the revolutionary conquest of power by the proletariat has become the main problem of the movement, every political activity of the Party must be dedicated to this goal. It is necessary to break with the bourgeois lie once and for all, with the lie that tries to make people believe that every clash of the hostile parties, every struggle for the conquest of power, must be played out in the framework of the democratic mechanism, in election campaigns and parliamentary debates. It will not be possible to achieve this goal without renouncing completely the traditional method of calling on workers to participate in the elections, where they work side by side with the bourgeois class, without putting an end to the spectacle of the delegates of the proletariat appearing on the same parliamentary ground as its exploiters.4

This rejection of electoral tactics based on a broad historical abstraction such as “the era of revolutions” is contrary to the dynamic revolutionary strategy of Lenin, who correctly argued against such notions exemplified by Bordiga’s arguments in his Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Historically, on a grand scale, the era may have been one of revolution, but bourgeois parliaments were not discredited in the eyes of the proletariat, as reformists still maintained leadership of the labor movement. Thus the reformists had to be actively discredited through political struggle, not through empty measures such as boycotts but by directly agitating and fighting for communist politics in the halls of parliament. This also meant connecting parliamentary struggles with struggles outside parliament in factories and working-class communities. The delegitimation of bourgeois parliaments would be accomplished through active political struggle, not simply declaring the nature of the historical epoch. 

Another protest against electoral participation was given by a delegate from England, William Gallacher, who represented the Shop Stewards Movement. Gallacher would go as far to say that the Third International was opportunist for participating in elections and took a position further to the left than Bordiga, who still accepted the 21 Conditions of the Comintern despite his disagreements. While lacking the grand historical pronouncements of Bordiga’s arguments, Gallacher’s argument is essentially the same in its tactical conclusion: that electoral work is a distraction from more important work, that energy put into elections in any form offers few returns for its efforts and risks, and that this energy could instead be put into something that will truly challenge the state or more directly organize the working class. He argues that one who enters parliament can “…make speeches there and thus agitate. The result is, however, that the proletariat becomes accustomed to believing in the democratic institutions.” In the end, the argument is that of “democratic mystification”, that by voting in bourgeois elections and supporting workers’ candidates the worker puts faith in bourgeois institutions and is “softened” by the system, compelling them to refrain from radical action. This argument is similar to Georges Sorel’s critiques of electoral socialism and embrace of vitalist syndicalism, which undoubtedly captured a certain class impulse but was an openly anti-scientific and irrationalist theory that relied on a notion of myth to hold itself together. Either way these anti-electoral arguments found popularity in the Comintern due to the prominence of syndicalists entering the movement, with backgrounds similar to Gallacher’s, aiming to push the Comintern into making immediate war on capitalism.5  

Amadeo Bordiga

Shablin answered Bordiga and Gallacher’s critiques in an excellent polemic that offers insight into the tactics of the early Bulgarian Communists and their effective merging of “the ballot and the bullet”. Shablin immediately attacks Bordiga’s detached historicist theorizing with recognition of concrete political reality: 

“Even if the Theses Comrade Bordiga proposes to us proclaim a Marxist phraseology, it must be said that they have nothing in common with the really Marxist idea according to which the Communist Party must use every opportunity offered us by the bourgeoisie to come into contact with the oppressed masses and to help communist ideas to be victorious among them.” 6

Shablin recognizes that the conditions of revolutions are not simply created by epochs of history but by the strength of the proletariat organized as a political force. To accomplish this, Communists must fight for political hegemony in all spheres of civil society and actually win the masses to their politics. The electoral sphere is one of the most publicly visible and dominant spheres in civil society underdeveloped capitalism and therefore cannot be left purely to reactionaries and reformists. For Shablin, Bordiga’s theses represent the remnants of an antiquated, economist, and anti-political tendency in the labor movement that must be overcome. This tendency came from syndicalism—an anarchist school of the workers’ movement that the Comintern aimed to win support from. A challenge for the Comintern was not just overcoming the limits of Social-Democracy but also the anarchism and political indifference of syndicalism which also dominated the pre-war workers’ movement. 

In his rebuke to the promoters of electoral abstention, Shablin highlights the history of Bulgarian Social-Democracy. Both Bulgarian Social-Democracy and the Bolsheviks shared a record of intra-party factional struggle in which revolutionaries and revisionists, unable to reconcile, separated into distinct organizations. The starkest divide was developed between reformists who hoped to appeal to “all productive strata” (meaning a class alliance with the petty-bourgeois), and Orthodox Marxists aiming to build a class independent party. This divide led to the party split in 1903, with the “narrow socialists” vs the “broad socialists” representing the revolutionary wing and the reformist wing of the Bulgarian labor movement. The “narrow socialists” captured most of the local leadership and would go on to become the Communist Party. Unlike other sections of the Second International they opposed World War I. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia granted them the honor of being the pre-October Revolution faction of Social-Democracy closest to Bolshevism.7 For example, their opposition to imperialism was matched only by Lenin in the Zimmerwald Left, boycotting the Stockholm Conference in 1917 because it didn’t call for peace without annexations.8 This similarity with the Bolsheviks can be seen in their mixture of revolutionary intransigence and uncompromising anti-imperialism with tactical flexibility. Yet the Bulgarian party themselves were unaware of the Bolshevik/Menshevik conflict, taking more influence from the German party.9

Having split from the right wing, the left Social-Democrats of Bulgaria were able to mount an opposition to imperialism. Against the notion that the rise of imperialism and revolutionary circumstances make electoral tactics obsolete, Shablin explained how the Bulgarian Revolutionary Social-Democrats used parliament to fight against war, citing their reaction to the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and WWI: 

The Bulgarian Communist Party fought energetically against the Balkan War of 1912-13, and, when this war ended with a defeat and a deep-going economic crisis for the country, the influence of the Party in the masses had grown so far that in the elections for the legislative bodies in 1914 it won 45,000 votes and 11 seats in parliament on the basis of a strictly principled agitation. The parliamentary group protested violently on several occasions against the decision of the Bulgarian government to participate in the European war and voted each time demonstratively against war loans. With the help of pamphlets and illegal leaflets, through zealous agitation and propaganda, the Party carried out a violent struggle against the imperialist war once it had been declared, not only inside the country but also at the front.10

This strategy, though bringing about a great amount of oppression from the bourgeoisie, was essentially the opposite strategy of the majority of the Second International during WWI. It combined both the ballot and mass action in a revolutionary way, and despite the repression that followed this brave anti-imperialist strategy, when the CP formed and entered elections in 1919 it was resoundingly successful: 

This bitter struggle against the war, the complete bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie’s policy of conquest and the serious crisis caused by the war gave the Communist Party the opportunity to extend its field of work and its influence among the masses and to become the strongest political party in our country. In the parliamentary elections of 1919 the Communist Party received 120,000 votes and entered parliament with 47 Communist deputies. The social-patriots, the ‘socialists’, could only muster 34 representatives, although the Ministry of the Interior was in the hands of one of the leaders of this party, in the hands of the Bulgarian Noske of sad memory, Pastuchov.11

This was irrefutable proof that electoral struggle could indeed be used to further a revolutionary agenda, especially if a party is strong in its principles and has a real base among the working class. It also showed that by taking a strong anti-war stance, the Communists could gain credibility with the masses rather than conceding to chauvinism as their opponents to the right did. For the Bulgarian CP, electoral work and “mass action” were not counterposed but fed into each other. The party organized mass strikes and demonstrations, inspired by the Russian Revolution to increase the militancy of tactics. Yet this was not the end of electoral success for the Bulgarians. In 1920 their number of deputies rose to 50 even after parliament was dissolved and reformed by the government, while the reformists dropped down to 9 deputies. 

This mere electoral success terrified the bourgeois into more white terror but also showed that through electoral contestations that Communists could weaken the right wing of the labor movement that held back revolution. Communists in 1920 held a majority in parliament, so the bourgeois reacted by ejecting CP deputies. The bourgeoisie had to abandon any formality of democracy to maintain its class dictatorship in face of a parliament subverted by communists that held the backing of the masses. Shablin summarized the general strategy of the party as follows:

The Communist Party is carrying out an unrelenting struggle in parliament against the left as against the right bourgeois parties. It subjects all the government’s draft laws to strict criticism and uses every opportunity to develop its principled standpoint and its slogans. In this way the Communist Party exploits the parliamentary rostrum in order to develop its agitation on the broadest basis among the masses. It shows the toilers the necessity of fighting for workers’ and peasants’ soviets, destroys the authority of and belief in the importance of parliament, and calls on the masses to put the dictatorship of the proletariat in the place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.12

Against claims that participation in parliament would retain the stability of bourgeois democracy, the insurgent electoral strategy of the Bulgarian socialists and communists instead showed that through vigilant agitation in the halls of bourgeois power backed by a real mass movement, electoral action would break down the facade of bourgeois democracy by seeing the state resort to more dictatorial methods and creates “states of exception” in response to gains made by the working class through mechanisms of bourgeois democracy. As the Bulgarian CP “threw a wrench” into the normal “democratic” mechanisms for which the ruling class rules through the state, the bourgeois responded with white terror and dismantling of democratic structures themselves. This is what Marx called “the battle for democracy,” where the proletariat shows itself to be the class that represents the true “will of the people” while the bourgeois is revealed as a class of tyranny rather than democracy. The Bulgarian CP fought this battle, but to a degree to where a heavy price in human life was paid due to the repression of the propertied classes against a rising Communist movement. 

Against the argument that elections “divert energy” from direct actions or general base-building in proletarian communities, the Bulgarian CP showed how these processes could be synergistic and build each other up, not simply see electoral activities parasitic toward the on-the-ground organization of workers. This synergy is particularly described by Shablin in his speech regarding industrial actions, which at this time were seen as the true focus of organization by the “left” critics of electoral practice in many cases: 

“The Bulgarian Communist Party fights simultaneously in parliament and among the masses. The parliamentary group participated in the most energetic way in the great strike of the transport workers, which lasted 53 days from December 1919 until February 1920. For this revolutionary activity the Communist deputies were robbed of their legal protection by the government, and several deputies were arrested. Comrades Stefan Dimitrov, the representative from Dubnitza, and Temelke Nenkov, the representative from Pernik, were sentenced, the first to 12, the second to 5 years imprisonment, because they had opposed the state power arms in hand. Both comrades are today languishing in jail. A third Communist deputy, Comrade Kesta Ziporanov, is being prosecuted by the military authorities for high treason. The members of the Central Committee, three members of parliament, were prosecuted because in parliament and in the masses they carried out an energetic struggle against the government, which was supporting Russian counter-revolutionaries. They were provisionally released from custody on a bail of 300,000 Leu, which was guaranteed and paid  in the course of two days by the proletariat of Sofia. All the Communist members’ speeches in the chamber against the bourgeoisie are of such violence that they frequently end in a great scandal, and the government majority and the Communist group come to blows.”13 

These experiences, of course, did not prevent the rise of an anti-electoral faction in the party. 

In 1919 a faction arose demanding the boycott of parliament, perhaps in reaction to the repression of Communists deputies. This was a weak faction in the words of Shablin, and was unanimously rejected when it came to a vote at the party congress. Rather seeing soviets and participating in bourgeois elections as counterposed, the Communist Party of Bulgaria worked to form soviets while running in elections at all levels of government. This was similar to the tactics of the Bolshevik party in the days leading up to October, where the Bolshevik party worked to win a majority within the Soviets around the program while also running in bourgeois elections at all possible levels. This created a synergy between the campaigns of the party to form Soviets and electoral campaigns:

So far, in the councils in which it has possessed a majority, the Communist Party has fought for their autonomy; it calls on the workers and poorer peasants to support by mass action the budgets adopted by the Communist councils, by which the bourgeoisie is to be burdened with a progressive tax, which can be extended as far as the confiscation of their capital, and frees the working class from all taxes. Big sums can then be spent for public works, elementary schools, and other purposes that serve the interests solely of the working class and the poor, and the special interests of the minority of the bourgeoisie and of the capitalists go completely unheeded.14

This relationship saw the existence of Communists in the mass organizations of the proletariat that were counterposed to the bourgeois state as well as within the bourgeois state not contradictory but rather complementary. Winning majorities in the Soviets and demanding their authority be recognized from within the government saw a way to combine the actions of the proletariat “from below” with an electoral strategy that was “from above”, to use a flawed metaphor that is nonetheless common in the left. For the Bulgarian CP, the question of power was not the ballot box or insurrection, but rather a political struggle that combined the two as necessary. When describing the workers’ soviets of Bulgaria and their relation to the communist deputies, Shablin argues that the working class struggle to defend their gains or ‘communes’ is an educational process that will train the working class to take power. It is clear, given the level of state repression Shablin describes, that he sees the necessity and importance of working-class self-defense. 

In the next session on parliamentary strategy, Shablin continued to defend his position, this time the Swiss delegate Jakob Herzog joined in to represent the “minority” anti-electoral position. Herzog begins his argument by saying that participation in democratic institutions, by giving workers an ability to increase their standard of living, deadens the revolutionary spirit of the workers is the general cause for a pro-electoral communist trend. Russia is seen as capable of revolution not because of the Bolsheviks ability to agitate legally and illegally but because of the primitive nature of its democratic institutions, making the workers more desperate to revolt. This kind of muddled, catastrophist and economist thinking shows the level of theoretical sophistication that arguments against electoral participation had in the Comintern. Herzog then goes on to mock the Communist Party of Bulgaria itself and the idea it is a “model of revolutionary parliamentarism”, saying that he knows someone who saw the Bulgarian party itself and became anti-parliamentarian because of their disappointment.15 Shablin accuses Herzog of slander, saying that parties activities are well publicized and known to all.16 Either way, even if Herzog’s story is the truth, it is not an actual indictment of electoral tactics or the CP of Bulgaria, but simply the reflection of an individual. Herzog’s argument doesn’t carry the day regardless, with Bukharin successfully defeating the minority thesis proposed by Bordiga. The verdict of history on anti-electoral communism isn’t necessarily out yet either, but so far its track record in building long-lasting institutions of the working class is very poor. 

Within the Comintern’s Second Congress, the Bulgarian CP defended a line on electoral strategy close to that of the original pre-revolution Bolshevik party, while other parties argued for, essentially, syndicalist influenced notions of a party that would only put its energy into direct opposition to capitalism, the party essentially being a battalion of workers ready to go to war with capitalism. This was certainly how Bordiga saw the Italian CP when under his leadership: an organization formed during a period of international revolution to wage war on the bourgeois state. Yet this vision of the party was not able to win over the masses and can be seen as being at the root of much that was flawed with the Comintern. The notion of impending revolution may have made sense given the level of global catastrophe and class struggle, but a fatalistic understanding of this world revolution as an inevitable event that the party simply had to line up for led to a sort of strategic sterility in many of the Comintern parties, especially earlier on. What was lacking was a long term strategy for revolution, which saw revolution not as something that would outburst at any moment, triggering the mass strikes that would lead to a Soviet Republic, but a process of which the party builds up its forces in a protracted process with tactical flexibility but programmatic clarity. 

The Bulgarian CP, unlike the Bolshevik party, was not able to use their strategy to come to power. The party, despite its strength in combining electoral tactics with a revolutionary program, also had weaknesses. In 1923 a fascist coup took power in Bulgaria, triggering a spontaneous uprising. The Bulgarian CP refused to join in and take leadership, seeing the conflict as merely a squabble between two bourgeois factions. Yet spontaneous resistance without Communist leadership to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot defeat fascism. The result was that the uprising was defeated while the CP stood still. This was not an uncommon attitude in the Comintern in response to the rise of fascism, unfortunately, most famously repeated in Italy and Germany. Historian Julius Braunthal compares their attitude to that of the KPD during the Kapp putsch, where the reactionary officer caste attempted a coup and the Communist party stayed neutral to avoid ”defending capitalist democracy.”17 The Comintern Executive, particularly Zinoviev and Radek, was disgusted with this failure to take the lead in resisting the putsch and ordered the Bulgarian party to organize an uprising against the new government. While the leadership of the Party rejected this, the majority voted to follow the Comintern plan and overthrow the government to work towards a Soviet Republic. The result was a fiasco, where only “small isolated groups of Communist party members did take up arms, but only in scattered villages”.18 Zinoviev and Radek, on the other hand, had hoped the uprising would trigger a revolution in Romania and Yugoslavia, but they were blind to the actual on the ground situation in Bulgaria. Who was to blame? Was it the Comintern Executive for forcing an uprising on the party that it wasn’t prepared for, or the leadership of the Bulgarian CP for not supporting the initial mass uprising against fascism? Either way, such mistakes cannot be repeated, and mechanical uprisings engineered from abroad are unlikely to be a means success, as is refusing to take leadership in mass struggles against fascism. As for Comrade Shablin, he was murdered in 1925 by the Bulgarian police. 

While the experience of the Bulgarian CP can show the use of electoral tactics, it also shows the limitations of a purely electoral approach. This is not to say the Bulgarian CP had such an approach, but rather that their success was due to the aforementioned “synergy” between electoral and mass action as well as their willingness to engage militant self-defense against the violence that the bourgeois will unleash on any attempt to throw them out of power, even if these attempts are made through legal democratic means. The Bulgarian CP faced an immense amount of repression and was only able to survive as an organization by going into illegality after 1923. 

The insurgent electoral strategy of the Bulgarian CP and its predecessor Social-Democrats is far removed from the tepid reformism of much of the left, who promote an electoral strategy that tails the “left wing of the possible” and aims to compromise in every possible way, from the general notion that it is impossible to even work outside the democratic party with excuses being made for every capitulation made by a self-described social-democrats capitulation to the right. Yet on the other hand, due to the prominence of a reformist rather than insurgent electoral strategy, electoral tactics are dismissed altogether which sees the abandonment of a key weapon in the historical class struggle out of fear that such tactics can only lead to reformism. The experiences of the early Bulgarian Communist party during this period shows how electoral tactics can be a powerful tactic in the class struggle and help de-legitimate rather than legitimate the bourgeois system. The choice is not between voting and revolution, as some Maoists and anarchists like to put it. Rather, the choice is between engaging in all spheres of civil society possible where we can fight for our politics or simply leaving them as theatres for the bourgeois and their allies.