Materialist History or Critical History: A Reply to Jean Allen

Amelia Davenport responds to Jean Allen’s A Critical History of Management Thought, continuing the debate on scientific management. 

 

Before diving into the substance of this essay, I want to thank comrade Jean Allen for their contribution to the broader discussion on the role management science plays in the contemporary ordering of production and its potential (mis)application to socialist organizing. While there are points of disagreement between Comrade Allen and myself on historical facts, we share much more common ground than might be inferred from reading their essay. In fact, there is far more common ground between Comrade Allen and me politically than between myself and the Amelia Davenport their essay presents. 

To clear up some confusion, I do not support the application of Taylorism, as a framework that is articulated in the pages of Principles of Scientific Management, to either the process of production or to the socialist movement. I certainly do not believe in “uncritically applying it” or “applying it in its entirety,” No quotations are provided showing that I intended such a thing or supporting any of the claims made about my essay. The purpose of Stealing Fire was twofold: on the one hand, I sought to use Taylor as a lens to examine the pre-scientific forms of organization commonly employed on the left, but on the other hand, I turned Taylorism in on itself and expose the flawed and authoritarian character of Taylor’s original analysis. Taylorism was the name given to one of the early attempts to rationalize the labor process according to newly discovered laws of nature. In its original conception, it empowered a layer of engineers and experts who determined the best way to carry out labor tasks which eroded the power of shop floor managers, business owners, and skilled workers in favor of engineers. Instead of bosses issuing arbitrary orders and workers trying to meet them, roles and tasks were broken down into their simplest elements to maximize the potential output of machines. Stealing Fire is not a call for the adoption of classical scientific management theory but an immanent critique of it in the tradition Karl Marx critiqued David Ricardo and Adam Smith. 

Likewise, contrary to Comrade Allen’s claims, I do not present an abstract science of management that socialists can simply apply to any situation,  nor do I claim such a science exists. One of the most critical portions of Stealing Fire is its brief treatment of the theories of educator and philosopher John Dewey and the role practice plays in education. I emphasize learning by doing precisely because the science of organization is a practical science. What formulas I do present, like the IWW’s organizer ranking system, are tried and true methods formed out of the collective experience of the workers’ movement, not theories derived from a laboratory. The Industrial Workers of the World, through decades of experiment, developed a training system that educates its members in best practices for workplace organizing. I explore a small portion of that system which does not contain any secret tactics used for evaluating members of the target business because it is an excellent practical example of the socialist application of management science. 

To make their point about the nature of organizational science, comrade Allen cites Carl von Clausewitz’s approach to military science. Few thinkers on military issues are as cited as Clausewitz besides Sun Tzu, and his book On War, lays out important theoretical tools for understanding how war and other kinds of conflict work. Breaking from old traditions that tried to create perfect models of how war “should” work, Clausewitz applied social scientific methods drawn from History and critical philosophy. He started with the reality that war involves randomness and is unpredictable. 

Clausewitz, as a proto-complexity theorist, is rightly skeptical of abstract schemas that can be claimed to universally apply to military strategy. There is no textbook that can teach you war nor is there one that can teach you organizing. Here comrade Allen and I are in perfect agreement. However, Clausewitz, as singularly brilliant a mind as he was, was writing in a period before the development of the sciences that deal with exactly the sort of problems under discussion. It is also worth noting that the same objections Comrade Allen raises over the use of Taylor apply equally if not more so to Clausewitz. While Clausewitz maintained a much more flexible and dynamic vision of military strategy than his contemporaries, his vision was of a deeply authoritarian character and was inextricably linked to the ideological imperatives of the Prussian state. While Clausewitz rejected the subordination of strategy to the authority of political ministers, he also saw the army general as the singular Will for which the army is merely a body, with available autonomy of decision diminishing down the line of command until it is nonexistent at the level of the individual troop. If Taylorism was an ideological justification for an unequal society, what else could Clausewitz’s thought be? Clausewitz was an aristocratic apologist of the mass slaughter of workers for the aims of imperialist states. At least Taylor, for all his elitism, distributed authority in a collegiate fashion among managers so as to not rest in the monopolar figure of the field commander. 

Reductionist and specialized sciences which most of us are taught in primary school certainly do have trouble generating theories that can account for highly complex, probabilistic, and dynamic processes. But that does not mean that those areas are immune to the ever-widening grasp of science. Cybernetics, Tektology, Complexity Science, Operational Research, General Systems Theory, and other paradigms have been developed to deal precisely with the invariant properties of all organizations and chaotic environments. The results of these sciences are true whether or not they are employed for one set of class interests or another. However, the implications of their findings consistently show the superiority of socialist organizational principles like autonomy, solidarity, rational planning, democracy and collectivity. Second Order cybernetics, represented by Heinz von Foerster, Stafford Beer, Francisco Varela, and others, emphasizes the active role of the scientist/observer in constructing and shaping the system of their analysis.1 It is the insights of these sciences which necessarily entails the framework of constructive socialism. Constructive socialism is not a foreordained framework brought down from Mount Sinai, it is exactly the principle that comrade Allen supports: creating the kinds of organizations that will give the working class itself the experience it needs to take power rather than continuing the path of socialisms which depend on a caste of specialist “revolutionary scientists.” Nor does it replace scientific socialism outrightit extends it beyond the limitations of the past.

As with the principle of constructive socialism, Comrade Allen misunderstands the purpose and meaning behind the advocacy of Prometheanism in Stealing Fire. Prometheanism is an ethic, not a framework of analysis. While some eco-socialists wrongly attribute the term to a blind faith in technology, it is instead a statement of libertarian socialist values. That is to say, Prometheanism is openly declaring an allegiance to the cause of freedom, to the oppressed, to understanding the world, and to the martyred dead who can no longer speak for themselves. To be a Promethean is to be willing to bear an eternity of agony rather than bend the knee for a tyrant or choose comfort over justice. To be a Promethean is to turn the tools of the masters into weapons against them, to believe in the possibility of a better world where science can serve the people. It is to accept one’s responsibilities. I utterly reject any framing of Prometheanism as scientistic or rooted in a belief in the salvific power of technology. Such a set of values is not a product of study. No length of time as a comfortable trade union bureaucrat, leftist intellectual, or political canvasser will teach these values. They come from experience, but they’re an a priori commitment a revolutionary must make. There is no science of morality, nor logical proof of its validity. But that does not mean it is not necessary. Comrade Allen is under no obligation to accept the ethic I propose, and acceptance of it is obviously not a prerequisite for engaging in working-class struggle. 

Nevertheless it is necessary for members of the professional class to shed their immediate class interests in favor of their higher collective interests as members of the species. Prometheanism is an ethic which offers a way forward for the revolutionary movement as it tries to secure knowledge of the world. The Promethean ethic is best articulated by Stafford Beer in The Brain of the Firm:

But because science has indeed been largely sequestrated by the rich and powerful elements of society, science becomes an integral part of the target of protest for the artist. Each makes his own Guernica. My own view, which I set about propagating in these circles, is that science, like art, is part of the human heritage. Hence if science has been sequestrated, it must be wrenched back and used by the people whose heritage it is, not simply surrendered to oppressors who blatantly use it to fabricate tools of further oppression (whether bellicose or economic).2

The reception of my work as a defense of Taylorism, as supporting managers, or endorsing the mental/manual division of labor (alleged by commentators less serious than Comrade Allen) is alien to what is contained within it. One has to wonder if some critical voices read Stealing Fire at all. It is decidedly ironic when Leninists and academic leftists charge me with elitism or being anti-worker control given the historical role both groups have played in the workers’ movement. Leninists, and most particularly Trotskyists, have a very long history arguing against worker control. In fact, Trotsky proposed the full militarization of labor in the USSR during debates against the Workers’ Opposition, Bukharin and Lenin over the role of trade unions. My argument that the results of Taylorism, like objective time study and safety analysis, were used by the new industrial unions for the benefit of workers against management is simply a recognition that class struggle takes place even within changed productive terrain. Workers still have agency and are not helpless objects of Capital. 

Scientific managers themselves recognized the potential dual aspect of their work in the struggle of interests between labor and capital. In a debate hosted by the Taylor Society in 1917 over the use and misuse of time-studies, Navy production coordinator Frederick Coburn explained how the objective measurement of time could be used as a tool to argue against unreasonable managers and arbitrary demands: 

We have found out that by carrying along the time idea that we can say to the request for immediate completion of a job, “very well, if you want that job done by Wednesday noon, here are some other jobs that must be deferred,” naming the particular jobs, and how long they will be deferred. In the old days we were told to do the job, and were expected to get that job done… 3

Coburn went further and explained that the introduction of scientific management experts meant that because they could put the objective needs of production into language the accountants and directors of factories could understand the owners could no longer “grind the neck of the working man with an iron heel” simply out of ignorance or apathy. It does not mean exploitation stops, or that the interests of capital and labor are reconciled. But anyone who has ever worked for a wage knows that a large part of the hell of work is the ignorance, stupidity and capriciousness of managers. Objectifying the work relation removes some power from lower-level management and creates a basis for resisting arbitrary authority. A manager can only demand a worker violate their company’s own “one best way” guides with some risk to themselves. Even in a society without hierarchical labor relations there will be conflicts between different interests within production and having objective standards can only serve to smooth out unnecessary friction. 

Imputing motives of secret technocratic designs into my good faith treatment of Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management misses the point. By not studying or mastering the science of organization that bourgeois, authoritarian, and reactionary forms of management will re-assert themselves. These forms of organization are the social default which the general public has been conditioned into accepting. What most critics of Taylorism miss, and the reason why I made my initial contribution, is that what came before Taylorism was also bad and Taylorism emerged as a way to overcome the limits that pre-scientific capitalism had run into. These are limits that pre-scientific socialism will run into as well. When voluntarist and unscientific attempts at reorganizing the economy fail, technocratic methods of organization will be restored just like in the real history of actually existing socialism in power. The stakes are far too high to fall back on easy answers that confirm our pre-existing prejudices or allow us to write off large swaths of the accumulated knowledge of humanity. How can we defeat our enemies if we do not seriously study them? Our solutions will necessarily be far different from those presented by bourgeois theorists of management like Taylor, but we should deal with them honestly if we want to solve the problems of social and productive organization.

 As Doc Burton said in Steinbeck’s classic of proletarian literature, In Dubious Battle:

I want to see the whole pictureas nearly as I can. I don’t want to put on the blinders of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and limit my vision. If I used the term ‘good’ on a thing I’d lose my license to inspect it, because there might be bad in it.

Engaging in dispassionate analysis does not mean endorsing the object of analysis. 

The essay that follows is more than simply a critique of what I maintain are historical and theoretical errors on Comrade Allen’s part. It is an elaboration of an approach to history, science, and the organization of labor. It is also a defense of the materialist conception of history, developed by Karl Marx, as understood in light of contemporary advancements in our understanding of complexity and pre-modern society. The first section uses Comrade Allen’s reading of the historical development of management thought as a springboard to defend the materialist account of the role of ideology in production. The second section looks closely at the real history of scientific management in practice while exploring the nature of science and its role in society. While I hope that this essay can stand alone as a contribution to the discussion of these topics, I strongly recommend reading Jean’s essay, both for its own value and to see both sides of the debate. 

Critical History or Materialist History?

Turning now to Comrade Allen’s own contribution to the discussion of management theory, they begin with a critique of Morgan Witzel’s historicization of “management thought.” Allen sketches a compelling narrative, attempting a historical materialist lens, as to why business management thought was unable to emerge in tributary societies despite the presence of widespread commercial enterprise. However, while Comrade Allen begins by looking at the structural economic factors (the ruling class existing as a landed aristocracy whose wealth is extracted by tribute rather than commercial growth), they also fall into the idealist trap set out by Robin George Collingwood’s form of historiography. Where Collingwood avoids projecting contemporary ideas and mores backwards onto the people of the past, his methodology is focused on what people thought about themselves and their world.4 Though he rejected the label Idealism because of its association with axiomatic rationalists, Collingwood’s approach is idealist in character. It pays insufficient attention to the technical and material forces of production and the real process of organizing life. Collingwood rejects the scientific approach to history that seeks invariance, that is the common aspects of things that always hold true, and sought to contextualize history within the particular subjectivity of heterogeneous epochs.5 While this style of history can create excellent fodder for use by the authors of historical fiction, and may have explanatory power for the actions of great persons, focusing on the ruling ideas of an era obscures far more than it tells us. Using R.G. Collingwood’s style of analysis, Allen says:

Simply put, the class society of feudalism could not conceive of management thinking, either as a science/means of analysis or as a justifying force in society, because it already had a justification for the hierarchy that existed within it. Often this aristocratic ideology was incapable of ‘working’ either by any objective measure or even on its own terms, but without an alternative system and a different material base, this form of magical thinking hung vestigially over society, justifying all sorts of harm and oppression despite being debunked and demystified. For centuries humanity hung between a feudal society that created all manners of useless suffering and a new method of organization that could not be spoken of let alone analyzed. This is a state I think we can relate to, and feudal notions hung onto relevance until it was felled, not by one Revolution but three.

By why did aristocratic ideology “work”? And why did it stop working  In the above passage Comrade Allen answers the former question with a failure of imagination on the part of the whole of society and the latter with the bourgeois revolutions which broke the spell of aristocratic mystification. But if we want to understand management as a science, that is to say, a method of organizing the economic base, it’s precisely to the base we must look when examining its antecedents. 

What Comrade Allen misses is that pre-capitalist production lacked a complex technical division of labor. The kinds of management thinking which preceded business management were characterized by total cosmovisions which had a place for everything and put everything in its place. As Alexander Bogdanov shows in The Philosophy of Living Experience, for most of known history and for the vast majority of society, people organized themselves within authoritarian communes where strict adherence to the accumulated traditions passed down by ancestors was essential to maintaining stability. In this set-up every aspect of the world could be understood within a coherent framework where every aspect of life was imbued with sacred significance and every phenomena was caused by some kind of will.6 Whether this took the form of innate animistic spirits, gods, ghosts, or wood goblins varied depending on the particular evolution of the people in question. It is with the introduction of trade that the unity of life began to break down. When tools and techniques arrived from outside the received traditions of the community they took on a secular character while those less productive or useful ones that had emerged endogenously were often preserved in a ceremonial capacity. While the day-to-day farming of a community might use iron tools, ritual activity would be performed with bronze or copper implements in many neolithic communities. As communities became more interconnected, the domain of secularization expanded, and was reconciled with the sacred in a new hybrid social body: the state. Imposed from a level above the commune, the laws of the state blended the mundane character of the secular with the authoritarian understanding of causality brought forth from authoritarian communism. The King’s laws carried divine sanction and represented the will of the gods, god, or ancestors but they served to regulate practical affairs and an increasingly dynamic social intercourse. Now, appeals could be made to the abstract necessity of laws rather than to divine revelation or tradition. With the rise of the new tributary society, where a sovereign authority managed the interconnection of a multicellular social body, business was born. People entered productive relations with those they had never (or would never) meet and sought out a greater share of the social surplus generated by the synergy of social elements (Bogdanov, 2016).7 As archeological evidence shows, men like the Babylonian copper merchant Ea-nasir often did so at the expense of their countrymen.8

Enterprises in tributary societies could be managed by single individuals because the level of economic complexity was very small. Success was largely characterized by luck, personal initiative, cleverness, and a predatory instinct as Thorstein Veblen notes in The Theory of Business Enterprise. Farming methods changed little across lifetimes, consumer goods required enormous investment of labor power and skill, and individuals largely remained confined to their assigned social rank and even trade. While the peasants remained exploited and oppressed by their liege, the general conditions were highly stable and regular except when struck by external shocks like disease, invasion, and famine. Moreover, even in bureaucratic systems like those which emerged in China, the primary mode of economic organization, agricultural labor, was extremely decentralized which fostered an organic corporatism. The complex Mandarin bureaucracy emerged as a means of organizing a resilient meta-systemic infrastructure for the decentralized production units to be insulated from climactic and social changes that might otherwise cause famine and disorder. Rulers would centralize and decentralize the administrative structure based on the level of stability and balancing competing political factions (Cao, 2018).9

Ruling ideologies like Confucianism, Brahminism, and Roman Catholicism were not just post-facto rationalizations of aristocratic control; the peasants were not reading ruling class ideologists. Nor did the ruling class need a metaphysical sanction for their actions: humans are perfectly capable of acts of exploiting and controlling others for their own sake. Instead, these cosmovisions were the tools which organized social reality for the purpose of labor.  

While Rome did not produce much in the way of “business theory,” following their longstanding practice of appropriation from the Greeks, they did have robust theoretical frameworks governing conduct in the area. Not only did holy texts like Hesiod’s Works and Days, among others, contain advice on commercial activities (along with wise warnings regarding seductive women out to steal men’s granaries), but Aristotle wrote an entire book titled Oeconomica. While Aristotle condemns the act of making money for its own sake (what he calls “chrematistics”) he provides a clear overview of the principles which govern both household management and the management of commerce in his social context. Being situated in a culture which had extensive contacts with very different but similarly advanced civilizations like Persia and Egypt, Aristotle was able to take a somewhat objective view of the laws of economics which transcend those differences. What is crucial is that Aristotle in this book, like his others, was organizing and crystalizing the collective knowledge and techniques of his community into a coherent philosophy. This is the same role Confucius played in China. Medieval confucian scholar Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance, though focused on political management, shares much with the best of contemporary management theory from practical illustrations to deep insights in how to navigate a complex network of social relations to effectively discharge one’s duty.10 Morgan Witzel, who is the main object of Comrade Allen’s critique, denies this sort of thinking is “management thought” because it does not relate specifically to business, which Comrade Allen rightly criticizes. One of Comrade Allen’s strongest points is their discussion of the areas of unity between pre-capitalist management and capitalist management. Once the work of codifying a broad theory of management is finished, in a relatively stable society such as Rome, there is no objective imperative to develop a new cosmovision. This can be contrasted to the fractious Hellenic merchant states. Once Rome began to crumble, Roman Catholicism filled in the gap of the previously dominant cosmovision’s capacity to model and control reality. It is worth noting that while monarchs saw unruly subjects as children misled by their local liege, as Allen points out, those same subjects almost universally saw their sovereign as innately good and merely misled by wicked advisors. 

But while Comrade Allen emphasizes the differences between contemporary society’s conceptualization of management and antiquity’s, they fail to sufficiently explore the differences in antiquity itself. While it’s certainly true that Chinese aristocrats maintained strong conceptions of blood purity and innate ability, that was not necessarily true of the wider Chinese society and virtue was certainly not seen as wholly innate. In Confucianism, Mohism and many other prominent schools of thought, virtue, which was inextricably tied to social managerial functions, was actively cultivated and could be far better expressed by a hardworking peasant than a decadent noble.11 In Confucian thought in particular, hierarchy was justified on the basis of necessary ritual performance, not innate qualities of blood. The noble’s social role was to be an exemplary individual and actively exercise consummate conduct in every sphere of life.12 Failing this, it was a sacred duty of advisers and potentially even commoners to remonstrate and correct the errors of the rulers lest Heaven bring ruin to society as a whole. The justification for hierarchy in China was not a top-down sanction from God, but rather a proto-Darwinistic view with the role of Heaven as the final arbiter of viability. Each noble was both a decisionmaker and spiritual guide within a distributed hierarchy, but the vast majority of administration was exercised by a merit-based bureaucracy. The “Nine Ranks” of officials in China which Comrade Allen cites from Francis Fukuyama can only very loosely be considered based on descent. They were principally determined by administrative ability but the rank of one’s father did play a role.13 This was not about the innate quality of blood, but about the perceived moral and spiritual health of the private upbringing of the candidate. A good father will raise a good son. Of course this did limit class mobility, but it was a different way of organizing social economic reality than those employed contemporaneously in Europe. It is also worth noting that the “Nine Ranks” were fairly short lived and were replaced by an examination system long before capitalism took root. Different methods of determining merit were employed in China in different periods, but it was always founded on performance rather than property. Unlike in Europe, pre-modern Chinese society largely saw what you did (within your prescribed social role), rather than who you were, as what mattered ideologically. 

Most tributary societies from the Achaemenid Empire14, the Islamic Caliphate15, and even much of the Roman Empire, from Diocletian’s economic reforms until the rise of feudalism, were run principally by merit-based bureaucracies16, not the gentilshommes who directly ruled backwaters like Medieval France. Comrade Allen mistakes the existence of blood-based aristocratic systems, which were very widespread, with a universal social structure. Even India, with its caste system, was largely ruled through merit based and “individualist” managerial structures across many periods and in many regions. Whether in the Shaivist Tantrika principalities of Kashmir, the Maurya Empire of Chandragupta and Ashoka, or the Islamic Caliphate of Delhi, the Caste system was frequently overthrown or undermined as the political-economic order of the subcontinent remained in flux.17 The purpose of caste, like any other system of social classification was to structure the economic order as an active process. Today caste serves a different purpose: it is a means for opportunity hoarding. Well-off families utilize family and caste networks to better position themselves within the market economy.18 Caste persisted only insofar as it completely changed to fit the modern world. Buddhist, Jain and Islamic rulers maintained unequal systems without justifying themselves with caste, and, while they claimed spiritual authority supported their rule, differences between their regimes and those of the Brahmins can be found in how they structured the division of labor. Ashoka based his rule on freeholding farmers whom he awarded land based on right of tilling, while Islamic rulers introduced slavery to northern India.19 Spiritual texts which specified relations between the castes, toward free citizens or toward slaves were practical guides not ideological cover. 

The colonial slave societies in the Americas differ from the empires of antiquity, as they did need to develop an ideological sanction for their dehumanization and brutality towards kidnapped Africans. This is because the newly emerging economic order was incongruous with the feudal cosmovision of Christianity. Christianity emerged as the ideology of slaves already engaged in class struggle against their masters.20 It was cemented in feudalism as the naturalization of a corporate relationship between the individual and the universe mediated by the church and crown. While the Christian cosmovision provided ample excuse for genocide and conquest, built up by precedent in the expansion into the lands of European pagans and defense against Islamic conquests, it stood in glaring contradiction with the principle of slavery. Christian clerics initially sanctioned this depravity by claiming it served a tutalary role, by which the “savages” would become Christianized.21 But eventually the slavers would turn to theories of racial superiority, not only as a means of “justifying” their rule, but practically enacting it and organizing the production of society. “La Casta” became a social reality for countless people. The development of secular biological sciences went hand in hand with racist control over African and indigenous labor just as much as it did with gaining greater control over our relation to our own bodies for the sake of health and general social welfare.22 A microcosm of the essential unity of this historical process is the life of the father of gynecology, James Marion Sims, who performed heinous experiments on enslaved women for the benefit of their masters. We may call things like phrenology pseudosciences today, but they were merely replaced by new ways of organizing a racialized division of labor using science. Race-based theories of intelligence and genetics continue to receive active funding by both public and private institutions. Popular scientists like Steven Pinker aren’t just doing apologism for racismthey’re creating practical models to use for organizing a racist economy. 

What’s crucial here is that scientific socialists cannot take historical (or present) ideology as merely a reflection of the world that gives it sanction, nor as the driving force of human behavior divorced from the general social labor process. While ruling class ideology in our society does serve as a means to internalize control into the minds of subordinate people to avoid the necessity of deploying direct coercion, its primary function is to organize objective reality. The masses of Rome had no understanding of Aristotle or Plato but their ideas remained useful to the ruling class. Though they will have profound differences, societies that are organized around a common mode of production will share invariant properties in their cosmovisions. Feudal Japan and feudal France were worlds apart yet closer in many characteristic ways than either were to their neighbors the Chinese empire and Almohad Caliphate. This is necessary to understand why Taylorism developed. It was not a post hoc rationalization for the domination of workers by managers, but a framework for organizing society around large scale manufacturing. Taylorism is not the only possible way to organize large scale manufacture, as it is suited particularly to societies that maintain a social division of labor, but it will necessarily share invariant commonalities with a framework suited for the most egalitarian and emancipatory society which can be organized on this basis. 

The nature of contingency in history is a fraught topic. It is certainly true that given a slightly different confluence of events Fredrick Taylor may have never developed his theories of management. However, contra Comrade Allen, the laws of motion of society do entail certain necessary outcomes like the development of management thought. Comrade Allen says: 

The idea is that these movements occurred naturally, that the abolition of slavery or the extension of the franchise was a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically insufficient, and thus their dissolution was inevitable. Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted, the deconstruction of these orders requiring revolutionary action in their time.

While it is true that revolutionary rupture was necessary to break with the old mode of production, it seems unwise to cast aside historical materialism as readily as Comrade Allen is willing to do here. Revolutions being acts of organized agency in no way violates the fact we live in a deterministic universe. The authority of the laws of physics is not delimited by a border that begins at the edge of the human mind or society. That we cannot possibly create a comprehensive model of the universe that allows perfect predictions of what will happen, (the laws of information theory, mathematics and cybernetics show why in the form of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety) does not mean that our actions aren’t determined. The dissolution of slavery, noble privileges and the caste system being inevitable couldn’t possibly be predicted with absolute certainty. The ability to make an equivalently complex model necessary for the task would only be possible for a god of equal complexity to the universe. As we have already discussed, the ideologies Comrade Allen speaks of are regulatory models for the economy and they are part and parcel with it. They’re not something distinct from the dynamics of historical materialism. 

The Rise of the Technocrats

Management as a discipline emerged as a part of a much broader imperative that exists in bourgeois society: the specialization of knowledge. Comrade Allen acknowledges this phenomenon, referring to it as “siloing” but mistakenly argues that it is the result of a delusion or mistaken belief in the need for specialization:

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management’s origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace, that is a managerial class with a “view from the top” rather than a view from the workplace. And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absencethe absence of work and power from managementhas exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.

Instead, management takes as its focus the invented concept of the organization and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about. Authoritarianism in the workplace, which was so problematic in the 19th century, has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unexamined. Further syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford). This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

Before continuing the discussion of why Comrade Allen’s analysis of the atomization of work is flawed, it is worth noting that scientific managers, in particular the members of the Taylor Society, were very much concerned with the relations of power between management and labor. Beyond Frederick Taylor’s references to the conflict in Principles of Scientific Management itself, there are literally hundreds of essays and books written by Society members on the topic. Of particular note are C. Bertrand Thompson’s The Relation of Scientific Management to Labor, Man and His Affairs by Walter Polakov, and Work, Wages and Profits by Henry L. Gantt. While it is true that most practicing Scientific Managers were ideologically aligned with the rights of property, the majority who weren’t socialists were at the very least Progressive reformers within the pro-labor New Deal coalition.23 

Division, reduction, pulverization, and analysis of discrete phenomena works for the needs of capitalism. It’s not just a delusion brought about by a perverse desire for control. The modernist logic of mechanical causality, which is properly studied through increasingly narrow division into incommensurate fields, was a revolutionary and progressive assault on the authoritarian cosmovision of the tributary societies.24 Where once Mankind had a unified system of knowledge, the inexorable logic of the market smashed Platonic Reason’s great Tower of Babel with an invisible hand. In its place rose a thousand tongues for a thousand new sciences. Now, rather than knowledge being handed down from God to the people through the King, any free citizen, with sufficient resources, could unlock Nature’s mysteries. By simplifying the universe into the logical models of Newton, Descartes, and Kant, humans gained real mastery over their world in meaningful ways. As the accumulated experience of capitalist society grew, these cosmovisions were translated into the practical philosophies of men like James Watt, Joseph Marie Jacquard, and Charles Babbage. The steam engine, Jacquard loom, and analytical engine were physical instantiations of the real and objectively valid principles of the modernist organization of reality. But was this kind of philosophy, this science, limited to the study of dumb matter? Or to soulless automata like the animals of Darwin’s studies? “No!” said Auguste Comte and other early socialists like Henri de Saint-Simon and Robert Owen. The methods of science, brought forth by Francis Bacon, could be applied to the study of social systems and applied toward their perfection (Hansen, 1966). Management Thought, truly applied though not yet conscious of itself, begins with Owen, not Taylor. 

Robert Owen was a Welsh textile industrialist and social reformer born in 1771. By the end of the 18th century Owen went into a partnership and acquired ownership of the New Lanark mill as a successful entrepreneur.25 Owen is not often thought of as a “management thinker.” His proposals and social experiments took on a much wider scope than the scientific management of early pioneers (barring Lillian Gilbraith who applied the theories she and her husband developed for business with equal fervor to home-economics). But this was in part due to the context in which he worked. The spheres of social scientific study had not yet been fully differentiated. But it is also likely because of his socialist politics. Nobody doubts that Henry Ford, the pro-Nazi industrialist who revolutionized the assemblyline, was a management thinker. Yet Ford engaged in Utopian social planning himself; he created an experimental colony in the Brazilian jungle called Fordlandia and played an active role in designing the social life of the residents of Dearborn Michigan. An example of Owen’s management reforms was introducing a “silent monitor” system, in which supervisors would rate the work of an employee and display their status for all to see using a multi-colored cube placed above each workstation. Likewise he used tactics similar to labor organizers, and personnel managers, but for the purpose of winning workers to proposed technical changes, by identifying ‘champions’ among workers with social influence who he could win over as proxies to generate support.26 Owen’s utopian socialism, like that of Saint-Simon, was an attempt by the newly emergent technical intelligentsia to re-integrate society, ripped asunder by the economic laws of bourgeois production, on the basis of the conceptual framework this society had produced for the transformation of the world in its image.27 It was doomed to fail, and every community modeled on his precepts did fail, precisely because of the very thing that had given its representatives real power in the world: the social division of labor. Owen went on to become one of the founders of the British trade union movement, education reform movement, and the co-operative movement where his management theories found a more receptive audience than among his bourgeois peers and would have a more enduring impact than in the all-encompassing socialist colonies his more idealistic disciples would establish.28 It would take nearly 100 years for later researchers like Swedish-American mathematician Carl Barth, French mining engineer Henri Fayol, and Polish economist Karol Adamiecki, to transform the study of management into an institutionalized scientific discipline.

Robert Owen’s New Lenark.

Why did it take so long for management as a field of scientific analysis to emerge after Owen? Because the technical division of labor had not yet reached the degree of development where it was possible. In Owen’s day, science itself had only recently been separated from philosophy and the broad disciplines like biology, physics, chemistry, medicine, mathematics, economics, and so on were at the genesis of their heroic periods. Other fields like psychology, sociology, and computation were a faint dream. In production, there were the “mechanical arts” rather than discrete fields like mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, and civil engineering.29 So the idea of there not being a science specifically for management prior to the general intensification of disciplinization is hardly surprising. Management science has the same relationship to earlier forms of management practice that civil engineering has to the engineering of antiquity. 

Comrade Allen’s objection that management science is “unscientific” because it is ideological rests on the mistaken assumption that any science is non-ideological. One does not have to be a vulgar Marxist to see that actually existing scientific institutions are inextricably bound up with the power and interests of capitalism. Funding, institutional access, and prevailing courses of research are all heavily conditioned by the needs of both capitalism and imperialism. And even beyond this practical level, the struggle between foundational philosophies that underlie disciplines like physics are as fraught and intense as any between political ideologies. In the heroic age of physics there were sharp debates between the disciples of Viennese scientist-philosophers Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann on the existence of atoms and later Einstein’s theory of general relativity would be decried as “Jewish science” by rival physicists like Philipp Lenard. In mathematics, the debates between formalists like David Hilbert and intuitionists like Georg Cantor over whether mathematics represented true laws of reality or was merely a human construct for describing reality devolved into petty feuds and an intellectual battle to the deathuntil it was dissolved by Kurt Gödel’s development of incompleteness.30 And in biology, the struggle between the followers of Gregor Mendel and Ivan Michurin took a bloody turn under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. The problem with most accounts of the ideological nature of science is that they grossly oversimplify what is happening and still rely on the notion of a “pure science” beyond history that is then tainted by ideology on a practical level. This opens the door for non-scientist specialists of ideology to assert themselves as the real arbiters of truth over the scientists. Rather than demand the subordination of science to philosophy, or attempt to “free” science from ideology, the communist ought to insist that the scientist herself recognize the philosophical component, and non-neutrality, of her labor. That management science often pretends to be fully objective and neutral is not a special feature of it, and the answer is not to simply write it off because it has been used for power or because the confidence intervals of its predictions are too large. To the credit of the Taylorists, they were very open about the fact that their framework was a philosophy. This, I think, is the crux of our disagreement. Comrade Allen sees in management science a system of symbolic representation that contains falsehoods, which distinguishes it from “true” sciences that represent the world truthfully. But this kind of dualism misses the living process of science and scientists. It’s true that representation does occur within science, but it is a mechanism for gaining greater control. Science is the activity of scientists, not a commodity they produce. The lie of neutrality in science is a much deeper problem in modernity than can be laid at the feet of Taylor.  

More specifically, Comrade Allen makes the case that Fredrick Taylor was a pseudoscientist because of claims made by ex-management consultant and self-admitted grifter Matthew Stewart. Unfortunately, as appealing as Stewart’s narrative is for leftists who want to dismiss scientific management without engaging with the literature, it is highly misleading. One of the claims Stewart makes is that Taylor bilked Bethlehem Steel by charging far more in consulting fees than he generated in profits from moving pig iron more efficiently.31. However, this claim depends on ignoring the fact that Taylor spent very little of his time at Bethlehem Steel focusing on the application of scientific management to pig iron at all. His true work consisted of months of conducting scientific analysis on the steel manufacturing process and transforming the management structure internal to the factory.32 In fact, Taylor’s work in the pig iron fields was primarily an attempt to appease his employer Robert Linderman. In addition to his scientific work at Midvale Steel which set him on the course for developing his framework of scientific management, Fredrick Taylor had developed a new labor incentive structure called the “differential piece-rate” system. This system, described in Principles of Scientific Management, was what attracted Bethlehem Steel’s leadership to Taylor because it promised to encourage a considerable boost in productivity with little investment of capital. Linderman was impatient with Taylor’s slow and methodical approach to time and motion studies and needed rapid results.33 While the pig iron example features heavily in Principles of Scientific Management, it’s clearly intended as a hook to draw in potential clients who would otherwise not be interested in Taylor’s system due to their natural conservatism. Using the differential piece-rate as a bait and switch, Taylor could emphasize that scientific management is fundamentally a philosophy rather than a grab-bag of techniques, and thereby begin changes to the labor process the capitalist would have otherwise never consented to. Taylor never fully implemented the differential piece-rate system in Bethlehem’s pig iron fields, as he found it unnecessary to introduce a lower penalty wage below the standard.  

Turning to the claims of forgery, Stewart cites the work of Robert D. Wrege (although mischaracterizing his results), and alleges that the entire time and motion study conducted by Taylor on the pig iron operation was fabricated. But this is a result of undue extrapolation. According to Stewart, Taylor took a group of strapping workers, worked them as hard as he could without rest, and then arbitrarily decided to subtract 40% of this output to account for rest breaks. It would be comical if it were true. Taylor did not personally oversee the time and motion studies, nor did he come up with the ratio of rest to work ratio. Taylor hired a former colleague, James Gillespie, along with veteran Bethlehem foreman Hartley C. Wolle, to conduct the studies.34 From the fact that in their report Wolle and Gillespie do not provide an explanation for how they determined the 60/40 work to rest ratio, Stewart concludes that they simply made it up out of thin air. Further, the entire episode is alleged to have been a farce because very few people, excluding Henry Knoll (the real name of Schmidt) and the minority of highly able workers, were able to meet the “first rate” level of productivity which guaranteed high wages. Many workers had initially resisted transitioning to the new model because they feared a risk of losing wages if they failed to meet the productivity standards though their existing standard simply became the minimum rate.  As communists, it should be clear to us that any such incentive structure implemented by a capitalist firm will ultimately be in Capital’s favor, and by the metrics of business management (that is increasing the productivity of outlayed constant capital), the experiment was a wild success.  

Under scrutiny, the bleak narrative of workers driven to the bone under Taylor becomes murky. Workers who failed to meet productivity standards were almost all given otherless taxingpositions, provided they demonstrated effort.35 Similarly, part of how workers were won over to the new piece-rate system was by being offered to switch to lower intensity and higher-level work after reaching exhaustion by Gillespie and Wolle. The details of the significant work which was to define Taylor’s approach to labor in this episode, namely the “science of shoveling,” are sparse. His notes do describe creating a new kind of tool store room, figuring out optimal motions for shoveling, and there is independent corroboration of studies on shovel size. Moreover, contrary to the claims of Stewart, Taylor’s pig iron experiments were independently replicated multiple times, first by French physiologist Jules Amar and later, carefully documented on film, by Frank Gilbraith.  Reviewing the footage and research conducted by Gilbraith, it is clear that the general results of Taylor’s pig iron study are correct, within a standard 5% margin of error.36 It is also true that the version of events laid out in Principles of Scientific Management contain inaccuracies. Various events are smoothed over and differ from what historical documentation says actually happened under the direction of Gillespie and Wolle. But it is important to remember that the text is a recollection intended to give color to a boring topic, not a scientific paper itself and does not contain willful falsehoods in any areas that relate to the central argument. In fact, as the research of pro-Taylor scholars Jill Hough and Margaret White shows, Taylor likely deserves none of the credit, given the study was neither original (similar studies were well documented at the time) nor did it involve his personal intervention.37  Moreover, much of the text was not written by Taylor himself. The bulk of the manuscript, in particular its theoretical core, was penned by Taylor’s protege Morris Cooke.38 

Unlike Stewart, Taylor critic Chuck Wrege does provide illuminating insight into Taylor’s character, and willingness to bend the truth. Rather than demonstrating the invalidity of Scientific Management, Wrege sets out to deflate the myth of Frederick Taylor as a lone genius who revolutionized management. However, Wrege himself frequently bends the facts to paint Taylor in an even more salacious light than his unadmirable behavior creates on its own. This has allowed management gurus like Stewart, with less compunction than Taylor himself, to issue a blanket dismissal of scientific management in favor of their own “wisdom.” 

It is well accepted that Taylor’s experiments were remarkably successful according to several metrics. From the perspective of capital, Taylor improved productivity threefold at Bethlehem Steel. This greatly boosted Taylor’s credibility among capitalists. From the perspective of labor, the average worker received 60% more pay than before.39 While wages did go up, the increase in wages can in part be accounted for by the high turnover the new system created which cast off unproductive (and therefore low-paid) piece workers. Most of these workers were moved to other jobs within the company, though not all. While as socialists we decry the inhuman aspect created by the iron link between employment and subsistence, this high turnover is itself a success from the perspective of the scientific management philosophy, as it enabled a more rational allocation of laborers to the places they were most suited. In a socialist society where survival is not linked to the selling of labor-power, eliminating the need for labor hours would be a benefit, not a curse. Ironically, the turnover of labor was a specific concern of the owner Linderman and the Bethlehem Steel management and a source of friction with Taylor. The company owned the homes the workers lived in and robbed them through the company stores.40 By turning over unproductive labor and rationalizing production, Taylor was disrupting the quasi-feudal debt-bondage system Bethlehem Steel had set up.  

Taylor saw the factory as a machine for producing social wealth. The workers and managers were to both be molded into rationally perfected components, each playing their own specific part. This idea seems naturally revolting to those of us not indoctrinated into the ideologies which permeate engineering departments at universities. But it is hard to articulate exactly why in objective terms, leaving critics open to accusations of sentimentalism or moralism. Taylor is the ever-present foil for management theorists precisely so they can paint themselves as more able to factor in the “human element” of business.41 Even in his own day the great bulk of management publications pilloried his engineer’s mindset. But rather than such an impoverished view of productive life representing an engineering or scientific view, it was overcome already through management science in Taylor’s lifetime. 

It was not Taylor who implemented the overall system in Bethlehem as he was preoccupied defending his reforms to senior management and working on specific improvements to steel manufacture. Instead, the system was implemented by his protegee Henry Gantt.42 Taylor had successfully, and quite scientifically with the help of mathematician Carl Barth, optimized much of the machinery engineers were working on, created a planning office, and created his specialized system of “functional forement.” However, productivity had not improved, and machinists simply adjusted the speed of their work to maintain the same output as before. To overcome this, Gantt, with Taylor’s approval, introduced a new piece-rate system which greatly improved on Taylor’s model. Rather than punishing workers for failing to reach a minimum threshold, like in the original differential piece-rate system, Gantt preserved the existing wage and only introduced the higher rate for meeting a higher productivity threshold. In so doing, he avoided the risk of labor unrest. 

Gantt chart

The other key difference between Gantt’s system and Taylor’s model developed at Midvale is that the machinists at Bentham were actively included in the design and implementation of the labor process. Workers understandably resented being completely excluded from the intellectual aspect of their work and would often refuse to follow the instructions provided by managers, believing that they knew better. Gantt found a way around this: if workers disagreed with guidance on their instruction card they were encouraged to write feedback and return it. If they were more effective than the instructions the managers had laid out, the planning office would adjust the instructions going forward. If the worker’s ideas were less effective, the managers could demonstrate it and win the worker over to the more effective methods.43 What Gantt had discovered is that by treating the workers as more than mere implements of science and instead as vital parts of the planning apparatus he could leverage a greater social intelligence to the collective enterprise of production. These experiences were crucial for transforming Gantt politically from a liberal into a socialist. Scientific management, as a practical science, was not limited to Taylor’s personal authoritarian approach.

The key lesson of scientific management is that “management” itself acts as a fetter on the organization of production. This is something I am sure comrade Allen agrees with. The traditional business management holds back the engineers, eschewing techniques that would reduce waste, increase output, and generate social surplus because they challenge the direct material interests of the management class. Likewise, the engineer-managers themselves, by virtue of their monopolization of expertise, are structurally incapable of realizing efficient production. For all their knowledge of scientific principles, they cannot possibly hope to manage the complexity of the labor process, without effectively ceding decision-making control to the workers. By getting rid of rule-of-thumb and artisan methods in production through scientific analysis, the scientific engineer-managers set the terms for a dialogue between the abstract and the concrete in production rather than setting in stone a “one best way” like they believed. That the Taylorist view does not accord with modern scientific understandings of complexity implicates Taylorism exactly as much as it implicates the entirety of the Enlightenment scientific project. A true organizational science, which moves beyond the horizon of bourgeois reductionism, will overcome modernity and make itself of and for the masses. 

Beyond accusations of pseudoscience, Comrade Allen’s narrative of the development of scientific management rests on the myth that it was created as a tool for the bourgeoisie to discipline the rising working class. Given as support are a series of anecdotes that demonstrate a correlation in history between the rise of scientific management and the period of classical anarchism and social-democracy’s ascendance. Allen argues that the contradiction between Republicanism in the civil/political sphere and the authoritarianism of the workshop resulted in the birth of a movement that demanded an “applied republic” in the economic sphere. Scientific management is cast as an ideological tool to avoid such an outcome by tricking workers into demanding “better” management instead of democracy. 

Such a tidy narrative is as compelling as it is ahistorical. While it is true that there were forces that demanded democracy, demands that are certainly worthwhile, the French workers’ movement was not so straightforwardly “Republican” in political or economic thought. In fact, many, though not all, leaders of the General Confederation of Labor, the largest, most powerful and most radical union in French history at the time, explicitly disavowed all aspects of republicanism and democracy.44 They believed majoritarianism, procedural voting and universalist politics were inherently bourgeois. Instead they called for a decentralized aristocracy of labor which would mobilize the workers through charisma in direct corporate association and build a world with unmediated and direct relations of production. Some on the left held more favorable views of democracy than others, but all agreed that the only means for workers to achieve their aims was direct struggle. Likewise, within the political social-democratic parties there was no universal demand for a republic within the workplace though some social-democrat leaders like Karl Kautsky did make references to it. The chief demand of the political socialists and the right wing of syndicalism was social control of production. Economic democracy meant disciplining production to the political democracy of the republic. Within the CGT, the leaders most aligned with the Republican tradition like Léon Jouhaux took this line and advocated nationalization with a tripartite management scheme consisting of worker, consumer and public representatives.45 In fact, Jouhaux, along with both leftist and rightist CGT members came to enthusiastically embrace Taylorism, provided it was conducted by the union in the popular interest of efficiency rather than the employers to sweat workers harder.46 It was the right-wing current of the syndicalists which most strongly identified with the French Republican tradition’s notions of liberty and progress, along with the political Socialists, while revolutionary elements sought a break with what they viewed as a great scam by men like Robespierre.47 What French syndicalism and political socialism ultimately aimed for was a “full life” for the people, and it was this which the bourgeoisie denied them. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Democracy and Civilization were not themselves the aim; they were judged by how suited they were in providing satisfaction to the direct material needs of workers.  

If economic republicanism itself does not actually represent either a universal aim of the workers, it follows that it does not make any sense to juxtapose it to scientific management theory. Fredrick Taylor’s system, completely unmodified, is perfectly compatible with the democratic election of the leadership of an enterprise. It is even compatible with democratic deliberation and voting on policy. What it is not compatible with, and this is something incredibly valuable and often stands in opposition to democracy when each is taken to extreme, is autonomy. And while autonomy has long been a demand of the workers’ movement, it is not always a universal demand and takes on a different character depending on the perspective under which one applies it. The autonomy of a labor collective freely associating and jointly engaged in production is different than the autonomy of the petty bourgeois artisan who answers to no one but himself and his clients. And though Taylor himself opposed autonomy, many scientific managers did not. Taylor Society member Edward Filene for instance, by no means a radical like Marxist Taylor Society members Walter Polakov and Mary van Kleeck, was a pioneer and key promoter of credit unions and actively supported the transition of businesses into worker-owned cooperatives.48 His vision of “economic democracy,” at least in the 1930s, was not unlike the “applied republic,” yet he was committed to the principles of a movement that was supposedly a reaction against it. 

Conclusion 

Most people are not opposed to applying universal principles in the labor process if it makes their life easier. We only stand to benefit from techniques that reduce the arbitrary nature of the labor process. The scientific management proposed by Frederick Taylor is obviously incompatible with communism if taken on its own terms, but for many Marxist theorists like Lenin, it contained seeds of the future form of organization in spite of itself. Which is to say, Taylorism ideologically talks about scientific truths. As will be seen in the sequel to Stealing Fire From the Gods, the rational kernel within Taylorism, separable from its reactionary content, is labor analysis. This is the breaking down of the labor process into its elements so they can be understood and improved. While not sufficient on its own terms, labor analysis is a crucial tool for the design of any goal oriented process. Taylorism is already outdated in relation to capitalist production compared to schools like Operational Research and the Toyota Way, while capitalism long expired as a defensibly progressive economic system. But this does not mean it contains no lessons. Critics who might charge that using labor analysis does not require rehabilitating Taylor, the Taylor Society, or scientific management more broadly, miss the fact that any implementation will be conflated with Taylorism regardless of our rejection of Taylor and criticisms of his philosophy. Hopefully my forthcoming account of the development of scientific management in the early 20th century in the United States, France and the USSR will serve as inspiration for the kind of thought necessary to develop an organizational science of labor beyond management.

Though this essay takes a sharp tone and gives little ground to Jean’s analysis of the history and development of management thought, I do see it as an important contribution to the debate. Their critique of Morgan Witzel’s inconsistency, advocacy of workers’ freedom, and strident opposition to managerial hierarchy are welcome and needed interventions in our society and unfortunately in much of the left. Those of us on the left who want to win have to firmly reject commandist and authoritarian methods of organizing. Jean is absolutely right to see them as less efficient and resilient than forms of organization that leverage autonomous organization. Though the danger remains far more with personalist and charismatic forms of hierarchical organization than technocratic forms in the contemporary left, we shouldn’t simply trust experts to run our organizations for us either. As stated earlier, Jean and I are very close politically in terms of values and even immediate prescriptions, but that only makes the necessity of polemic greater. Being in the same political camp means we have a duty to one another to work together toward clarity. By critiquing Stealing Fire, Jean gave me the opportunity to elaborate and clear up misconceptions about my analysis, and I hope my critique of their essay will serve them equally well. 

Unlike Jean, at the risk of arrogance, I do have a vision of what kind of management will replace the authoritarian personal management of capitalism. I do not believe that we have to wait until a new framework spontaneously emerges from the political struggle of leftists. Of course a new management must emerge from practice, but the “collective mind” of humanity is much bigger than “the movement.” Within the real living history of management thought, and outside the sclerotic majority of business schools, there are repeated revolutions born out of necessity. The introduction of the assembly line, the October Revolution, World War 2, the countercultural revolution of the 1960s and other periods before and since represent moments where we can identify real science being done to re-conceptualize how humans can organize themselves economically. 

There is a spirit that Stafford Beer identifies in the final remarks of his book Brain of the Firm which flows through innovative schools of management thought up to the point they reach their limits.49 Frank and Lilian Gilbreth had it, as did the founders of Operational Research like Russell Ackoff and Heinz von Foerster. Others like Beer himself and Lenin had it too. In each case what is important is the process of scientific inquiry, commitment to a vision, and a way of being in the world. In Confucian terms, it is a kind of Ren or “consummate conduct.” In other words, becoming good at being human. In this, I think Jean and I are in full accord. The specific models and theories that are created to represent phenomena are not important for defining the new management. I fully agree with Jean that we can’t find some abstract scheme to apply to solving all our problems. I reject the worldview that sees science as a form of representation; science an action. I recognize that what will replace bourgeois management is the redevelopment of management as a collective science of performance. Fortunately, some of that work is being done right now by researchers like Raul Espejo and others advancing the Viable System Model, and we have a wealth of research from both Western and Soviet scientists of organization to draw on. The new organization of labor will be a philosophy of living practice.

Walter Polakov and the Hidden History of Socialist Scientific Management

 Walter Polakov had a combined passion for two seemingly contradictory ideas: scientific management and socialism. How did these two combine? Amelia Davenport interviews Diana Kelly, author of The Red Taylorist: The Life and Times of Walter Nicholas Polakov to bring light to this little known part of US history.

“Detroit Industry” by Diego Rivera

Walter Polakov (1879-1948) was a Russian-American Marxist, engineer, philosopher and scientific manager. Normally, the idea of a Marxist scientific manager would be appalling to both Marxists and the management studies community. Although scientific management was put into heavy use by the early Bolshevik government, it is usually written off as either a tragic necessity for industrialization or a prime example of the innate corruption of Leninism. For the part of management studies, the long-standing narrative that scientific management represented an inhumane anti-worker ideology which was supplanted by Elton Mayo’s benevolent “Human Relations” movement is near sacrosanct. But neither of these narratives can accommodate the much more complicated history of scientific management as a real current in history. While it is true that until shortly before his death Frederick Taylor himself opposed unions and always maintained a top-down approach to management practice, his views were by no means definitive of scientific management or even the Taylor Society founded in his honor. Many prominent members of the Taylor Society maintained socialist or otherwise anti-capitalist politics. After Taylor’s death the society even forged deep ties with organized labor. In fact, the Taylor Society openly endorsed strikes against employers who engaged in abusive practices. The Taylor Society played an important role within the International Labor Organization, UN agency tasked with promoting fair labor standards and the participation of organized labor in policymaking, and some of its alumni would even serve as staffers within militant labor unions in their struggles against the bosses. One such figure was Walter Polakov. Polakov spent much of his career as an advisor to the United Mine Workers in their most dynamic phase.

Within the pages of the Taylor Society’s bulletin, one can find spirited defenses of the Soviet Union, references to Rosa Luxemburg and August Bebel, and sharp denunciations of the capitalist system. By no means were all or even most Taylor Society members political or left-wing, but the culture of the movement was based around open debate and objective inquiry, not a sacred gospel. It’s this environment that allowed Polakov and his mentor Henry Gantt to advance notions that ran up against the prescriptions Taylor provided in Principles of Scientific Management. For instance, in Gantt’s Organizing for Work, worker participation in the development of new methods is highly encouraged and the notion of training workers to understand their work instead of simply acting as tools on behalf of management is strongly asserted. Although Gantt maintains a strict hierarchy of command within the rhythms of the active industrial production process, Polakov went much further in breaking with Taylorist orthodoxy. Polakov drew on his experience as an engineer and scientific manager of electric power production to rebuke Taylor’s inattention to the psychological and social needs of workers, his method of over-specialized administration, and his lack of inclusion of workers in the creative aspects of production. Polakov lays out his theories of organization in texts like Mastering Power Production, Man and His Affairs, and To Make Work Fascinating.

It is important to understand that Polakov’s socialist and pro-worker theories of organization were not in-spite of his scientific management, but rather an expression of it. Scientific management was a product of applying the principles of engineering to the production process as a whole. While engineering principles can be directed toward the maximization of output regardless of any other factors, it can also be directed toward the realization of other ends. For Polakov, this meant a borderline obsessive crusade against waste. Waste of time and waste of resources meant increased human toil and increased ecological destruction, which he saw as twin thefts from the workers. Taylor, on the other hand, saw idleness and inefficient labor methods as thefts from the general public of consumers and while employers saw them as a theft from their bottom line. Other Taylor Society members like African-American minister C. Bertrand Thompson argued for a more holistic accounting in texts like The Relation of Scientific Management to Labor. Where Human Relations smooths out contradictions between employers and workers, the Taylorists were consistently blunt and sober about them in their analyses, striving to give as-objective an account of the results of potential methods as possible. Knowledge of safe steel-milling methods and the rates of industrial accidents entailed by the use of particular coal mining techniques is as useful to organized labor as it is to employers.

The life of Walter Polakov, a man who dedicated his life to not only the cause of socialism but also practical improvements in the lives of workers, is criminally forgotten. In him, there was no contradiction between the broader goal of human emancipation and the day to day work of using science to make life better. Polakov spent much of his life tracked and harried by the FBI for his radical views and immigrant status, yet for his brilliance won himself a place at the table among the elite of American engineering. He would travel to the Soviet Union and apply his knowledge toward developing a more humane system of production than he found and return to the United States to fight for proletarians here.

Fortunately, the story of his life is no longer spread out among moldering archives thanks to the work of Diana Kelly. In The Red Taylorist, Kelly draws on a wealth of primary documents including FBI records to paint a compelling portrait of a man who persevered through hardship, persecution, and tragedy, while never wavering from his noble purpose. From his arrival in the United States as a bright-eyed engineer to his death as a penniless thrice-married divorce, the personal drama of Polakov’s life and the deep philosophical, political, and scientific problems are given excellent treatment. Below is an interview with Diana Kelly about her book, The Red Taylorist: The Life and Times of Walter Nicholas Polakov. I hope it will help shed light on Polakov’s significance to a new audience. 

Photograph of Polakov from January, 1 1921

 

Can you give some background about yourself and your academic work? 

First I was a schoolteacher – even in downtown New Zealand’s egalitarian welfare state, girls from poorish families couldn’t afford to go to University, but they could go into teaching (or nursing) and get paid for it.  I went to Teacher’s College and began teaching middle school (primary).  I came to Australia in 1968.  For the next fifteen years, I was a wife and parent, teacher, and part-time University student studying history.  Then I began tutoring at University and completed a Research Master’s degree in industrial relations in 1989.  In 2000 I completed my Ph.D. dissertation – A History of Academic Industrial Relations in Australia.  During the 1980s and 1990s, I researched, and coordinated, and lectured industrial relations (mainly undergraduate.  Then I had a few years in leadership/ management roles, Head of School, Acting Dean, Director of International Studies, before shifting back into the History Department.  I was also elected as Chair. Academic Senate a senior role I held for six years (the maximum term).  Then in 2015, I returned to a full-time academic role, researching in a range of fields and teaching undergraduate history. In that time I have seen numerous changes sweeping through our university (and many others), changes which are destroying many of the important aspects of academia, such as academic freedom and academic governance, by and for, academics.  My research has been rather eclectic – I have also written on the Australian steel industry, industrial relations, history of women, workplace bullying, and academic governance.  I am currently writing on employers and workplace health and safety, especially with regard to industrial manslaughter.  I would love to write more biographies because I believe biography can offer important insights not readily available in general histories.   

What was your biggest challenge in researching the life of Walter Polakov? What attracted you? 

I became interested in Polakov in the 1990s.  An august colleague, Chris Nyland, had been researching scientific management for some years, and had obtained full access to Bulletin of the Taylor Society (now easily attainable given the internet, but not so much in the early 1990s).  I was taken with the debates – the openness and collegiality (albeit, with undercurrents of personal tension!).  What was a defining moment for me was to find Polakov propounding his ideas couched in primitive Marxist terms.  I had seen signs of Progressivism in the debates but Polakov’s proclamations were something else, and, as a good ‘lefty’, I was hooked!  All those years I had administrative / leadership roles, I could not do much research writing, but I could collect material, and my interest never waned.

The biggest challenges were first, that searching for, collection of material and secondly getting anyone interested in the paradox of the socialist scientific management.  The great management historian, Daniel Wren, had written briefly of Polakov in 1980, and Nyland had mentioned him in some of his many works on scientific management, but there was very little available material.  So those 15-20 years of searching and collecting in likely and unlikely places was a major challenge – especially from the far-distant Antipodes!   Even when I had a basic story, many management history scholars were not interested because (a) it was about socialism and (b) it contradicted mainstream ideas that scientific management / Taylorism was unrelentingly bad for workers.  Questioning the hegemon is never easy! 

How would you define scientific management and to what extent do you consider it inherently anti-worker? Do you see any myths in management studies about this?

Scientific management is an ideology or set of principles about the use of people, equipment, and resources, at the workplace, industry, or nation.  Central to that ideology are the importance of the application of research and the sciences to understand, first, WHAT is happening.  That is very important – you cannot hope to manage scientifically if you do not understand what is being done.  Second, HOW can the workplace, industry, or nation be improved?  This requires measurement and investigation so that the scientific manager knows how to maximize equipment and resources and the working lives of workers.  Thirdly, continuing measuring and monitoring to ensure that the best outcomes continue to be achieved.   These principles stand in contrast to those who manage by whimsy, or “rule of thumb”, or simply on the basis of unquestioned managerial prerogative. 

For many scholars in management, sociology, and labor history, scientific management is about deskilling, control, and exploitation of workers.  I reject that strongly.  There is no doubt that the notions of investigation, research, measurement and monitoring can be used for ill, but that was definitely contrary to the views of the Taylor Society and even Taylor himself.    It is easy to pull out a few choice quotes from Taylor – but they are a-contextual and certainly not what Polakov and his fellow Taylor Society members thought.
Nevertheless less these remain the most immovable of myths outside of management history.  

Which Taylor Society members do you think are most understudied? 

Mary Van Kleeck (who made several trips to the Soviet Union and who was a union leader and a practical scholar, but was emphatic in her support of the Taylor Society.)

Henry Laurence Gantt (there is a thorough biography by Alford but it somewhat hagiographical, and skims over important aspects of Gantt’s life.)

Harlow Person (long-time director of the Taylor Society until it was taken over by the managerialists in the late 1930s)

Carl Barth (dour socialist mathematician whose advancements on slide rule technology were important for giving rigor to scientific management investigation) 

King Hathaway and Robert Wolf were interesting and I have always been fascinated by Robert Valentine and the respect he was accorded in the Taylor Society, given his role in the Hoxie Report, but he died shortly after he presented his paper on Efficiency and Consent to the Taylor Society.  

Why did some Taylor Society members turn against the market and the institution of private property? How did their views on worker autonomy and participation in management evolve?

The scientific managers gave what they saw as science, their greatest priority (research what is happening, what should happen, and how can we be sure it continues the best that can be done).  That did not begin with an overt rejection of the market.  Rather, it was simply that markets (and ‘financiers’) gave little value to science in management, to the best use of resources, equipment, and people.  I am not sure that all scientific managers agreed with Polakov (except perhaps Van Kleeck and Barth?) on the generalised disgust with the market and private property, and Polakov himself always owned property.   

Was there an orthodoxy in the Taylor Society, a plurality of views, or both?

Taylor Society debates (e.g. the one in the book over Drury’s paper, or another one mentioned over Valentine’s ‘Efficiency and Consent’ paper) suggest there was a plurality of ideas (political ideologies, social aspirations, values), but an unflinching commitment to science in management which of itself was an ideology.  

To what extent can Polakov’s concern with energy and resource efficiency be of interest to ecological or environmental politics today?

I would have liked to have spent more time on Polakov’s commitment to energy and resource efficiency.  Some of my readers have argued his greatest achievements were in raising issues of wastage of resource, and in these times with priority given to energy efficiency, Polakov’s insights and arguments offer valuable possibilities.  

What effect did The Red Scares have on Polakov’s ability to work as an engineer or scientific manager? Is there anything you think Polakov’s treatment by the FBI can teach socialist technical specialists today?

My own belief is that one reason Polakov focussed on his engineering/management consultancy work was precisely that he could see what happened to activists, especially activist Russians, 1000s of whom were arrested.  As well the so-called Red Ark that extradited many Russians, including Emma Goldman would also have influenced how he saw himself. 
It would be hard to guess what the FBI is looking for today.  The FBI under J Edgar Hoover was very focussed on socialists and communists because Hoover himself hated them.  This is evident in the treatment of socialists compared with some pretty horrendous fascists, white supremacists, and the like.  

Polakov returned from Russia after a relatively short tenure, how did his experiences there shape his views on socialism and political organization more broadly? How did he feel about Leninism and Bolshevik ideology?

We have no way of knowing how he felt – unless we had his papers which I am guessing were destroyed long ago.  In the book, I tried to project my own interpretation that he felt conflicted about the Soviet Union under Stalin.  He wanted communism to work – but he could see the flaws and had serious misgivings.  In some respects, his perspective was useful because he was there at the request of Vesankha.  It is likely he did not get the special tours of some contractors or visitor from USA. 

I am not sure re Bolshevism and Leninism.  Most of his ideals seemed to come straight from Marx – and from anti-revisionists with Luxemburg such as Bebel. 

What can Polakov’s experience helping to organize Soviet industry tell us about life in the USSR and this attempt to create socialism in the workplace? What was the relationship between Polakov and Soviet Taylorists like Alexei Gastev? 

Even under socialism, production needs management – and Polakov was the first to say so.  On the other hand, I cite times when he found the Russian managers problematic and resistant to change.  He circumvented the managers’ unhelpfulness by taking his questions/requirements to workers’ committees.  Polakov, who had been a practicing scientific manager for over twenty years when he came to the Soviet Union, was clearly more flexible and perhaps also more democratic than Gastev.  (This question deserves much further exploration!) 

Can you please explain what a Gantt chart is and why it was so revolutionary? How did its introduction to Russia by Polakov impact the organization of production?

A Gantt chart is simply a visual plan of a project from conception to conclusion, and what is expected of equipment, resources, workers, and managers.  In other words, the Gantt chart seeks to record ideal outcomes of all the variables of production, and then the actual outcomes as well.  By monitoring all the variables, it becomes clear where problems may be equipment or power, for example, and helps workers and their managers monitor effectiveness.  It was “revolutionary” because most production had previously been rule-of-thumb or ‘flying-by-the seat-of-your-pants’.  As well it offered transparency – again something that the hierarchical Them v Us American businesses had avoided. 

To be honest it would be hard to see almost any impact of Polakov’s work on production in the Soviet Union.  I understand some Russian colleagues have explored this.  I hope they can find archival material that would confirm or deny impact, but my guess is, sadly his sojourn in the USSR changed little.  On the other hand there is evidence of the Gantt Chart being discussed in the early 1920s – and in this respect, I believe it would have been based on a Polakov translation.  But no evidence yet, sadly.  

Can you explain what Technocracy Inc was and its relation to The New Machine? Would you consider the Technocracy movement elitist?

In the book I hedge around the possible links between the New Machine (19i6-1919) and the Technical Alliance (1919-1921) and then Technocracy Inc (1933 – 1930s).  Certainly Polakov seems to have been on the freinges of both TA and TI – he was cited several times as a lead author in their surveys.  On the other hand he never fully commited to the TA or TI.  I suspect Howard Scott had something to do with – he was one of those charismatic enthusiasts whose own knowledge may not have been as great as his enthusiasms – for Technocracy or the IWW, of which he was a member.  I understand from some writings that Scott tended to alienate  or overwhelm people.  Polakov certainly held Technocratic ideas but I think he was tempered by his socialism and his deep commitment to the scientific management practices of research into what’s happening and what’s needed and what can be done … (as well as the democratic rule of engineers!) 

What role did Polakov play in the United Mineworkers Union and how did he reconcile it with scientific management philosophy?

Polakov’s scientific management philosophy was as applicable to his work in the union as it was to his work as an engineering – management consultant.  That is I hope a major point of the book – that scientific management ideology is not about control and exploitation of workers, but rather using science to make work and production, the best outcome possible.  The reason that Polakov was raising safety and consultation and reasonable pay/ conditions from his earliest writings (and work as a manager), was that he saw these issues as centrally important as a means to achieve the best workplace environment for workers.  People are way too conditioned to think of management as a hierarchical “my-way-or-the-highway” process so that they cannot see that scientific management ideology could be equally at home in a union as in a factory.  

How did Polakov’s research into workplace safety help the union? What role did Polakov have in spearheading the development of Union Healthcare plans?

I believe Polakov’s role was significant in setting up the possibilities and furnishing the data for several really major health initiatives of UMW – I need to do more research still to make unequivocal claims.  

How did Polakov use the language of management and accounting to force management to take workers’ concerns seriously?

All the scientific managers knew just how to influence managers and executive managers – just explain ideas in ways that are important to them.  There is no point in telling a manager about how great a worker’s life will be with the scientific management initiatives because those managers are driven by priorities of output, return on investment, and next quarter’s profit.  So the scientific manager needs to talk to the plant/organisation/industry manager in terms that he (and they were almost always he) would understand and which would motivate him.  In the discussion of the Taylor Society debates in the book (p.41)  even the not-very-leftist Colonel Coburn argued that with scientific management “… we are finding some facts and we are putting those facts into such shape that the financial man and even the director can understand them”. In fact, the financiers who owned the plants could no longer “grind the neck of the working man with an iron heel” as a substitute for proper management. (Coburn in Drury, 1917 p. 8)  It was not that Coburn was a radical, but rather he could see how the ideology of scientific management could be framed to convince the financier or executive manager that fair working conditions were more effective.

Similarly, Polakov’s engineering monographs at UMW, and his paper to the employer-oriented National Safety Council sought to show employers how much the cost of accidents was a problem for employers.  All his books emphasized the same things – he was writing to convince managers and the public who might influence managers that his scientific management initiatives of improved consultation, work, and safety conditions were about benefiting business – even as hr slipped in semi-plagiarised bits from Capital Vol 1!! 

 

Ending the Eternal Present: A Historical Materialist Account of the 1970s

The 1970s were a time of turmoil and transition. Connor Harney gives a Marxist account of this pivotal decade.   

Stephen Spielberg’s Jaws (1975)

Nostalgia for the Past

As we enter a new decade that will inevitably wear the birthmarks of the last, it seems of utmost importance to reflect on the current trajectory of the left in the United States. There are many reasons to both lament the state of the left in the U.S. and to remain hopeful of its potential. While it is uncertain if the current popularity of socialism, the upswing in labor militancy across 2018 and 2019, and Bernie Sanders’ 2020 presidential run will provide a foundation for a lasting movement that will outlast the current electoral cycle, the seeds do seem to be there. At the same time, it is not enough to expect them to sprout on their own. The seeds of the emergent socialist movement must be tended to, and must be provided an environment where they can flourish. For us, this means that we must not limit our study to the fertile grounds of revolutionary history. It is not enough to just survey 1789, 1871, 1917, 1959, or 1968, and imagine that it is only those moments that can help plot the path forward. 

First of all, this approach often leads to a politically determined position that ignores the economic conditions of those moments, and second, it assumes that revolution is just around the corner—an understandably optimistic assumption that in the long term douses the flames of youthful militancy and burns out even the most committed. Even so, it is still wrong to outright dismiss the revolutionary potential of the moment the way that many on the social-democratic left often do. Socialists, communists, and others on the radical left should be at the same time prepared for both immediate insurrection and the slow process of movement building: be it by preparing the ground for a new working-class party or by rebuilding and forging new trade unions and other organizations of proletarian solidarity. In doing so, we can ensure that Santiago and Paris are not just burned to the ground over a repressed discontent with the status quo.  

Our frustration should be channeled towards rebuilding these cities in our own image out of the ashes. Many within the embryonic socialist left, especially within the “democratic socialists”, but also among the purportedly more radical trends like Marxist-Leninists or Trotskyists look to the period of the 1930s and 1940s to draw inspiration from. In particular, they look at the New Deal and welfare states constructed contemporaneously in Europe, and arguably the Soviet bloc as well, and focus on the social leveling and the higher standard of living for working people as an aspiration in a time of absurd levels of wealth inequality. The sentiment seems to be “if it worked then, it can work now.” But good Marxists should always be uneasy applying the traditions of the past whole cloth to the present. As Marx famously quipped in the Eighteenth Brumaire, “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please.”1 

The specific conditions that allowed radicals to push for reforms to the capitalist order are entirely different from those present at the current moment. When the pieces of legislation that made up the New Deal were passed, the left was at the peak of its strength and was acting in the context of a worldwide depression that grounded capitalist economies to a halt—alongside the memory of the October Revolution which still haunted the minds of the ruling class like a waking nightmare. Casting aside the question of whether a Green New Deal or Medicare for All is possible under current conditions, we should ask instead whether or not such reforms are enough? The answer to such a question is to be found not in the period of the New Deal or Great Society programs, but in the crises of the 1970s that created and forged the current moment. It was at this moment that the limits of those reforms were made clear. Not only was the dilemma of stagflation unthinkable from the standpoint of Keynesian orthodoxy, the doctrine’s salve no longer healed the wounds of the U.S. economy. 

In order to grapple with that period, we need to complicate the well-tread intellectual history of Hayek and Friedman that is so often trotted out in order to explain the rise of neoliberalism. As the story usually goes, by the 1980s, the conservative movement had succeeded in its long war to erode the social peace that made up the postwar consensus, and in the subsequent turmoil managed to implement its agenda of privatization and tax cuts proposed by Friedmanites. While part of this may be true, it is not the whole story. To this idealist conception of historical development, E.J. Hobsbawm once wrote that historians should remember that ideas “cannot for more than a moment be separated from the ways in which men get their living and their material environment [… because …] their relations with one another are expressed and formulated in language which implies concepts as soon as they open their mouths.”2  

Rather than assume that neoclassical economics created the current moment, the more important line of inquiry should be as follows: how did the crisis of the postwar pact between capital and labor and the Keynesian consensus produce the conditions that allowed previously marginal ideas to become hegemonic not only at the commanding heights of the economy, but even among the working class themselves? Written in May of this year for the Correspondent, Dutch historian Rutger Bregman’s article “The neoliberal era is ending. What comes next?” perfectly encapsulates such a view of the past. He correctly diagnoses the cracks in the facade of neoliberalism but does so starting from a faulty premise. Bregman takes the architects of neoliberal economic thinking at their own word, without accounting for the process by which their thinking went from marginal to common sense. He cites Milton Friedman’s view that in times of crisis, “ideas that are lying around” are picked up if the “proper groundwork” has “been laid.”3 But what groundwork? And why is it that certain ideas are picked up over others? Bregman claims that over the course of the crises of the 1970s “spread from think tanks to journalists and from journalists to politicians, infecting people like a virus.”4 He does not try to explain the crises, nor address why the old Keynesian medicine could not cure its patient any longer, but in his description of how neoliberal ideas became hegemonic we find our answer. For him, in society there is a battle of ideas over who can best explain the world, and to the victors goes the spoils of the material world, that is until their ideas no longer make sense. But hidden in his word is the class explanation for the ideas that get picked up. Think tanks, journalists, and politicians do not by and large represent the working class, particularly in the United States where there has never even been a labor party. Instead, the contest of ideas described here is largely between elements of the ruling class in an attempt to consolidate its own position in a time of crisis. 

Later in the piece, Bregman begins to wonder who will be the progenitors of the new economic ideology, suggesting the names of Thomas Piketty, Emanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman, or Marian Mazzucato. What these thinkers have in common is a desire to return to higher tax rates and more government regulation, believing that those policies could reverse high levels of income inequality and restore economic growth by putting more in the pockets of everyday people. Piketty is an interesting choice, as his first book Capital in the 21st Century was a lightning rod of admiration and controversy when it was released. In it he documents the trend toward higher inequality since the 1970s, offering politics as the solution to the problems of the economy. His latest book, Capital and Ideology is an attempt to bridge the gap between his prescriptions and how they might be practically realized. 

In a review of Capital and Ideology, liberal commentator and economist Paul Krugman claims the book can be described as “turning Marx on his head.”5 According to Krugman: 

In Marxian dogma, a society’s class structure is determined by underlying, impersonal forces, technology and the modes of production that technology dictates. Piketty, however, sees inequality as a social phenomenon, driven by human institutions. Institutional change, in turn, reflects the ideology that dominates society: ‘Inequality is neither economic nor technological; it is ideological and political.’6

For Piketty, the dominant ideology of a given time is created by ‘ruptures’ that can be used as “switch points” by a “few people” to “cause a lasting change in society’s trajectory.”7 A few people? Piketty himself perhaps? What Krugman misses in his explanation of Marxian orthodoxy, is that the relationship of the forces of production to society is not a one to one reflection. In fact, technology itself is shaped by the relations of production, which include within them the ideology necessary to reproduce society as is, and in the case of capitalism, its continued expansion. By turning Marx on his head in this way, we do not even get Hegel, who in his own way had a materialist conception of history. Instead, we get a view of a society unmoored from its material basis, one in which politics is merely a discursive exercise in figuring out the best way to do things, the cream of the intellectual crop will float to the top. 

To go back to Bregman, his theory of change very much aligns with that of Piketty: someone thinks of an idea and it gets put into practice. He claims “that the way we conceive of activism tends to forget the fact that we all need different roles.”8 Instead, he believes some tend to focus on the work of grassroots mobilization, others on that of high-profile leaders, while still others struggle over whether to protest or begin “the long march through the institutions.” Bregman argues that we must remember that this is not “how change works.” “All of these people,” from Occupy protesters to “lobbyists who set out for Davos,” have their roles.9 The message seems to be that only if people remember their place, then our society could see progress.  Leave it to the Pikettys and the Krugmans of the world to figure out the problems of the world, to bring the stone tablet solutions down from the mount, but it is for those in the street to spread the good word. From this conception, the question remains: After the long line of world-historic crises faced in only the first two decades of the 21st century, why do people reject the sermons of our new economic high priests? Partly, I think this can be attributed to people’s rightful perception that these thinkers themselves offer no real plan to deal with the present. Their role is to project the programs of the past to our current circumstances without dealing with the failings of the New Deal project in the first place: a shortcut for young people desperate to attend to the alienation of their own lives and the imminent climate crisis facing the planet.  

Source: CCC–Third Corps Area (PA, MD, VA, DC), Poultry Raising Project, Co. 2380, Jonesville, Virginia, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum.

From this inability or unwillingness to deal with the flaws in their own conceptions of the New Deal horizon we arrive at two faulty assumptions. Firstly, that if left unhindered by the machinations of the Right, those working today, the children and grandchildren of the greatest generation, would find themselves working the “three-hour shifts” or the “fifteen-hour work week” that Keynes famously predicted.10 Flowing from the first comes the second assumption: namely that the economic crises of the 1970s were entirely political in nature, be it the consequence of oil shocks or the lack of political will necessary to take the steps required toward full employment. The secret to the peaceful transition from capitalism had already been cracked—it was only a matter of putting in the right people to implement it. Setting aside the logical problem of a political strategy that requires no opposition to realize, both of these presuppositions fail to deal with the real political-economic problems of the Fordist era. From the widespread discontentment and alienation of a consumer society still predicated on the production of value and the increasing inability of the capitalist basis of society to cash the check of promised affluence for all those who toil. 

Nostalgia of the Past 

It was not only those living at the time that were unable to resolve these contradictions inherent to the postwar consensus. Even now, there are those who continue to either outright ignore the problems inherent to that political-economic arrangement. They do so, by either refusing to see that economic order as a problem at all, or at best, they are ignorant of its history. By doing so, they help to maintain the marginal position of the left by sustaining an unfounded nostalgia over a progressive program. 

This longing for a bygone era of increased possibility for a segment of the working class is not new to the twentieth-first century. It began as soon as the cracks in the old order were beginning to have ramifications in the daily lives of working people. It is no wonder then, that in the last few years Christopher Lasch has seen a resurgence in currency among some circles within the radical left. Lasch was a witness to the unraveling of social solidarity and the rise of a “culture of narcissism,” and understandably lamented the “logic of individualism” carried to “to the extreme of all against all,” in which “the pursuit of happiness” became “the dead-end of narcissistic preoccupation with the self.”11 As a historian and preeminent critic of society, he identified atomization as the ill that ailed Americans as the turbulent 1970s drew to close. This diagnosis brought Lasch to discover the solipsistic self-awareness that informed the condition of postmodernity. He writes in the Culture of Narcissism

Distancing soon becomes a routine in its own right. Awareness commenting on awareness creates an escalating cycle of self-consciousness that inhibits spontaneity. It intensifies the feeling of inauthenticity that rises in the first place out of resentment against the meaningless roles prescribed by modern industry. Self-created roles become as constraining as the social roles from which they are meant to provide ironic detachment.12 

Yet, his critique of this form of disassociation offers no way out of the endless spiral of the self he describes. Instead, what little solace Lasch does offer was a romanization of the past that ultimately led him to the dead end of fetishizing the patriarchal family.13 

Source: David Levine, 1991, Christopher Lasch, New York Review of Books.

Still, Lasch’s description of a society in decay is not without value for the left. Indeed, even his intuition that the history could offer a sense of hope for the future can be salvaged sans the rose-colored and romantic relationship to the past, for “a denial of the past, superficially progressive and optimistic, proves on closer analysis to embody the despair of a society that cannot face the future.”14 Andreas Killen, a historian obviously influenced by a Lasch’s unique brand of history infused with both a sociological and psychological analysis, has more recently characterized 1973 as a collective “nervous breakdown” from which the United States never recovered. Echoing the concern of forgetting the past, Killen writes that the inability to grapple with the malaise that infected the American psyche after the failure of 1968 exists even to the present. 

In a certain sense, he is correct. The revolution that the New Left envisioned never came to fruition, and without the power to transform the material basis of society in the United States, the concern became the realm of culture.15 Yet, what this analysis misses, is that the revolutionary moment was not simply reacting to the remaining vestiges of de jure racism and sexism. As the 1960s progressed it became clear that it was necessary to not only dismantle the juridical apparatus of oppression but also to remove the levers of exploitation that the capitalist left firmly engaged. What many did not foresee, however, was the drying up of the material conditions that had made mass politics possible in the first place.    

This inability to understand the contours of a changing political-economic constitution of late capitalism underpinned not just their moment, but also the current one. Killen contends, “the crises of the 1970s are not so easily buried; indeed they have emerged with new intensity in our time.”16 The historiography of the 1970s has grown immensely since Killen penned 1973 Nervous Breakdown in the first decade of the new millennium, and within the wider historiography of the United States the decade has gone from marginal to what Judith Stein called a “pivotal decade.” This essay seeks to flesh out a historical materialist analysis of the 1970s in order to add to the ongoing debate over the political-economic trajectory of the second half of the twentieth century, not to provide a roadmap to a socialism, but rather to point out the assumptions that led to the political cul-de-sacs informing left debates for more than half of a century—be it through imagining a return to the politics of the New Deal, or for the more radical left, a return to the Popular Front of the 1930s.

Past the Post-Industrial Society

The historian Jefferson Cowie, has argued for years that the New Deal was “the Great Exception” to the American national project. While there are components of his arguments that may be overstated, there is a truth to the overall content of his message.  These thirty golden years of American capitalism may have stoked a small, but long-standing spirit of egalitarianism in the United States. At the same time, it is ultimately a footnote in the larger national project, and yet, so much of the popular image of the country emerged from this moment. Even the political and cultural norms we observe now were shaped by this aberrational moment. Indeed, part of the inability with those living through the breakdown of New Deal order was the assumption that the good times were here to stay, that the pact between labor and capital would last forever, and that the perceived mutually-beneficial relationship would continue to produce mutual gains for all.  

Source: Feng Li, Workers assemble children’s bicycle wheels at a factory in Jiangsu, China, 2012, Getty Images.

In his introduction to Labor in the Twentieth Century, former labor secretary for the Ford administration and labor economist John T. Dunlop called the twentieth century “the worker’s century.” His misplaced but understandable optimism was part of the ideological fog that shrouded the postwar compact’s breakdown. Written in 1978, as the seams were really beginning to unravel around Keynesian orthodoxy, he could still say that any “reader of this volume must conclude that the twentieth century is likely to be known as the century of the worker or of the employee in advanced democratic societies,” and further that, “the first three-quarters of the century provide a desirable frame of reference to consider the course of development out to the year 2000.”17

While Dunlop and Galenson’s volume is billed as a comparative work, looking at the trajectories of a handful of advanced industrial economies, more often than not it falls prey to an analysis of Keynesianism in one country. That is, it bases itself on the assumption that redistributive welfare state and regulatory apparatus can rely on the industry of its own country to provide the material basis for those policies to operate. Only four years later, another set of labor economists wrote in their predictions for the future of the field that:

it is likely that the current awareness of the effects of world-wide competition, the interdependence of national economies, and the popularized comparisons of differences in national systems of industrials and management process will further spur in comparative and international industrial relations research.18

Clearly, the encroachment of the global on the national became something that could not be ignored even by those invested in maintaining the conventions of the old order. Or, to put in Marxist terms, if national economies are like giant cartels, they must compete with one another due to the coercive laws of competition, which in the long term to push them to increase the productivity of labor through either investment in more advanced techniques of production or the increased level of exploitation of labor through suppressing wages or increasing the working day. Such an impulse could not be contained as the United States’ global dominance eroded: a result of a shrinking advantage in productive capacity, which also underpinned its ability to maintain a stable international credit system. 

Part of this is what historian Judith Stein argues in her seminal work Pivotal Decade. Where she diverges from a certain Marxist reading of events is clear from her book’s subtitle: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies. For Stein, the political class’ inability to protect manufacturing in the United States was the downfall of America’s detour into social democracy. In her view, these jobs were not just any jobs, but productive labor that allowed a large portion of the working population to live “the good life.” The book’s final chapter deals with the current “age of inequality” born out of this failure to maintain the economic hegemony of the United States. In it she prescribes a revival of manufacturing.  According to Stein, “as long Americans use computers, wear clothes, drive autos, build with steel, play video games—in short, do everything,” there will be a need for someone to do the work, and for that reason, the explosion of debt-fueled consumption in the years following the crisis of the 1970s reflect a society in which “Americans consumed these items but did not make enough of them.”19

What Stein overlooks, is that manufacturing was not simply outsourced, it was also automated. Fewer workers are required to oversee the production of the coats, chairs, cars, and computers that are a part of daily life in the modern world. At the same time, her view also reduces hundreds of millions of people in the world to merely unproductive vagabonds leeching off the work of those doing those “making things.” 

Setting aside the first point of automation, the question of productive labor within the world economy is an important one. In the often ignored second volume of Capital, Marx discusses the importance of the work that goes into both maintaining and transporting commodities, which, if nothing else, is the work of the grocery clerk, the long-haul trucker, the fast-food worker, and the Amazon warehouse worker. He writes: 

Within every production process, the change of location of the object of labor and the means of labor and labor-power needed for this plays a major role; for instance, cotton that is moved from the carding shop into the spinning shed, coal lifted from the pit to the surface. The transfer of the finished product as a finished commodity from one separate place of production to another a certain distance away shows the same phenomenon, only on a larger scale. The transport of products from one place of production to another is followed by that of the finished products from the sphere of production to the sphere of consumption. The product is ready for consumption only when it has completed this movement.20

In other words, for the modern consumer to enjoy their Big Mac, watch Netflix, or read the newest novel by their favorite, labor is required to not only produce goods but to transport and maintain them. Crucial to this circulation of commodities across the country, and more broadly the globe, is physical infrastructure like roads, cellphone towers, and electrical lines—all of which are run or maintained by any army of workers who ensure their continuous movement. In concrete terms, as important as the papermill, the slaughterhouse, and the factory, are the warehouse, the freight companies, and the restaurant. While there may be a kernel of truth to Stein’s argument about a decline in productive work, what Stein’s work shows more than anything else is the limits to a strictly national labor movement and the attempt to reform capitalism within the borders of one country. The highly-centralized business unions within AFL-CIO proved outmoded against increasingly decentralized and international corporations. In a word, interdependence carried the day, and the old ways of organizing proved incapable of withstanding its onslaught.21

On the other side, there are many that have cheered on the decline in manufacturing in the United States, extolling the virtues of the so-called post-industrial society—a term popularized by sociologist Daniel Bell in his work The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society published in 1974. In the same year, Harry Braverman, metalworker and long-time editor of Monthly Review Press challenged this vision of the future, claiming in his agitational magnum-opus Labor and Monopoly Capital that such a view represented another in long line of “economic theories which assigned the most productive role to the particular form of labor that was most important or growing most rapidly at the time,” but in the last analysis, he suggests, each form of labor peacefully coexists “as recorded in balance sheets” of multinational corporations.22 Most importantly, rather than a decline in the application of Taylorism to the world of work, the rise of the service economy represented its universalization. As a truck team member at a major grocery chain, his description of “a revolution…now being prepared which will make of retail workers, by and large, something closer to factory operatives than anyone had every imagined possible,” is no longer one possible path of the historical development of the forces and relations of production, but rather a foregone conclusion, at least in that segment of the service economy.23

Braverman’s unique conception of deskilling flows from this notion of scientific management’s universal application. With the proliferation of white-collars jobs over blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, there is often the assumption that increased requirements of education and the more technology is applied to accomplish workers’ daily tasks on the job the more skilled the overall workforce, but what Braverman contends is: 

The more science is incorporated into the labor process, the less the worker understands of the process; the more sophisticated an intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and comprehensions of the machine the worker has. In other words, the more the worker needs to know in order to remain a human being at work, the less does he or she know.24

For example, ask someone whose job it is to stock the shelves at the local grocery store how what they are stocking gets to the store and how the store knows to order it, chances are the response will be a blank stare—not due to any lack of intelligence on the part of the worker—but rather, because of the complexity of daily life under the modern division of labor mediated by network technology. 

Such a state of affairs cannot help but help alienate the working class from one another. Not only do they become a cog in the giant machine of global capital, but they also can no longer imagine how their own movement has an effect on the other gears. While Braverman rightfully dismissed the sociologists and other academics whose sole focus was studying this alienation over the objective conditions of work experienced by workers over the course of their careers, their scholarship can help highlight how those conditions are then experienced on a psychological level. 

After years of successive strike waves, culminating in 1971 as the most active year for the labor movement since the militant heyday of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the Nixon administration commissioned a Special Task Force to create a report on “work in America” for then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot Richardson.25 From the report, the administration would catch a glimpse into the lives of working people in order to get them back to work, or so they thought. Unfortunately for them, the results pointed to no easy answer, or at least to none within the framework of the postwar compact. The only solutions gestured either out of capitalism or towards the past, before the 1935 passage of the Wagner Act, which laid the ground for both a new kind of labor struggle and eventually paved the way for a labor truce.  The report analyzes the problems of the “blue-collar blues,” “white-collar woes,” and the conflicts brought on by the increasing diversification of the workforce. According to the report, the blue-collar blues was not simply tied to traditional bread and butter issues like wages and benefits, but also to “[workers’] self-respect, a chance to perform well in his work, a chance for personal achievement and growth in competence, and a chance to contribute something personal and unique to his work.”26 This sort of alienation was not limited to blue-collar workers, but also was there for white-collar workers: 

The office today, where work is segmented and authoritarian, is often a factory. For a growing number of jobs, there is little to distinguish them but the color of the worker’s collar: computer keypunch operations and typing pools share much in common with the automobile assembly-line.27

Clearly, the unraveling of the New Deal was not simply a question of “diminishing expectations” in the face of economic decline, but its terms became increasingly untenable from the physical and psychological toll wrought by the spread of scientific management to each sector of the American economy. 

Bruce Springsteen captures this disillusionment with the old promise of the American dream in his song “Factory” from his 1978 album Darkness on the Edge of Town. In it, he describes the Faustian bargain faced by American workers as he sees his “daddy walking through the factory gates in the rain,” that “factory takes his hearing, factory gives him life.” To emphasize the truly one-sided nature of the deal, Springsteen sings that at the “end of the day, factory whistle cries/men walk through these gates with death in their eyes.”28 Like many working-class baby boomers, Springsteen had seen the way that the wear and tear of a lifetime of monotonous toil could wrack working people with an overwhelming sense of emptiness alongside the physical debilitation that often comes with manual labor. As the 1970s progressed into the 1980s, material decline faced by workers created a new reason for anxiety. In spite of this harrowing reality, it is important to highlight the problem of romanticizing the affluent society that came before our own neoliberal moment. Despite less precarity, there was still powerlessness felt in the face of the growing power of faceless multinationals to structure the daily lives of millions of people both in the workplace and the marketplace.

The Planning System and Monopoly Capitalism

This process by which the world became one colossal factory and market was experienced as deindustrialization in many advanced industrial economies. As the massive skyscrapers, factories, hospitals, schools, bridges, and feats of engineering, built by the hands of workers, decayed and fell into disrepair, there was little they could do. They may have made them, but they did not own them.  To offer the words of Marx in the Grundrisse: “the condition that the monstrous objective power which social labor itself erected opposite itself as one of its moments belongs not to the worker, but…to capital.”29 

Despite the monstrosity of a world increasingly alien to those who make their way in it, it should not be assumed that the great mass of people cannot overturn the existing order of things—that the monster cannot be slain. As the giants of the postwar era, like Ford, IBM, and General Electric began to dominate more and more aspects of everyday life, there came a tendency to view these monopoly monsters as invulnerable to the traditional foes of the individual firm within the capitalist system. Indicative of this perspective and informing much of the thinking on monopoly capital in the postwar was the work of economists like J.K. Galbraith, particularly in his work the New Industrial State first published in 1967. Here he attempts to illuminate the transformations of the capitalist system in the twentieth century, arguing that the conditions of free competition and exchange ceased to underpin the existing social relations within capitalism. Of course, from the standpoint of a critique of political economy, such relations never truly existed in the first place, except maybe in the utopian dreams of liberal partisans during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. As Marx wrote in the Manifesto, the bourgeoisie: 

drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade.30

They made a world in which naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation” replaced an exploitation “veiled by religious and political illusions,” but at the same time, this very exploitation “accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals.”31 Utopian dream indeed, but only for those lucky enough to find themselves outside the ranks of the proletarians whose muscle and blood built this wondrous new world. Eventually, free competition and exchange became a watchword, part of a new veil forged to cover the nightmares created for the mass of society in realizing their bourgeois dreams. A new mystification for a new age. 

Most important to understanding Galbraith’s contribution to political economy is an analysis of what he calls the “Planning System.” For him, the “Planning System” was a patchwork of the largest corporations in the U.S. economy, all working in concert to coordinate costs of production through a relationship to the state. In a certain way, Galbraith’s analysis aligns with conception of monopoly capital put forward by Marxists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in their work Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, released only a year before the New Industrial State. If the tendency of global capitalism before World War II had been toward regular crises, then the postwar period can only be described as infinitely more stable. Both works attempted to explain this relative stability against the behavior of the capitalist system over the previous century and the beginning of the twentieth—behavior that helped bring about not only nearly thirty years of near-constant warfare—but also two world-historic revolutions which attempted to break with the very system that brought such destruction and misery into the world. 

Source: Keith Ploeck, 2014, Mental Floss.

According to Galbraith, the “Planning System” arose out of the need to mitigate the uncertainty by ensuring continued profits alongside the rapid expansion of production. This growth was predicated on the application of increasingly complex technology. In turn, this meant a growing portion of a company’s capital had to be tied up in maintaining old and researching new technology. Part of this cost, as Baran and Sweezy also noted, was offset by state spending on both public research and government contracts, but ultimately, to ensure a return on these investments in technology, companies created massive advertising apparatuses that shaped the desires and wants of the consumer. Of course, such an operation could not be sustained without recourse to planning, and Galbraith believed that this forecasting replaced market mechanisms in determining what the cost of production and final price of commodities would be. While this “Planning System” may have stabilized capitalism to a degree, he worried that “we are becoming servants in thought and in action of the machine we have created to serve us.”32

On the one hand, Galbraith’s preoccupation with planning helped him see through the ideological mist of American society, where “the ban on the use of the word planning excluded reflection on the reality of planning.” However, his tendency to see planning as purely the necessary outgrowth of the size and level of technology of a particular firm tended to obscure the role of competition in determining the need for planning.33 While Galbraith acknowledged that technology was employed in order for firms to compete with one another—planning could, in the final analysis, eliminate a particular market altogether. This line of thinking brought him to two conclusions, the first that “size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of profits,” and second, that “the enemy of the market is not ideology but the engineer.”34

The idea that the growth and complexity of capitalist society created an antimony between engineers and other technical experts and market interests was not new. More than a quarter-century before, heterodox economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen came to a similar conclusion. But rather than decry the power of the engineer over production in industrial society, he welcomed it as a great mediator.35 This “general staff of industry” as he called them would settle the dispute between capital and labor for good. This was necessary for two reasons: first, the complexity of the industrial system (very similar to Galbraith’s planning system) meant that it could no longer be run by non-experts, and second, too large a community outside of capital and labor were dependent on that system to allow one side to work toward their vested interests alone. Veblen believed that engineers could continue running the industrial system in the interests of the community as a whole, rather than from their own narrow interests. In The Engineers and the Price System, he wrote that he believed that they would soon realize their ability to oversee society for the greater good. As the role of engineers and professional experts grew exponentially in society, they were “beginning to understand that commercial expediency has nothing better to contribute to the engineer’s work than so much lag, leak, and friction.”36 Further, “they are accordingly coming to understand that the whole fabric of credit and corporation finance is a tissue of make-believe.”37

But of course, fantasy has long driven civilizations to action, even the immaterial can have objective consequences. This is what Marx meant when there was a “phantom-like objectivity” to the value of a commodity.38 While the marks of the socially necessary labor time imbued in a commodity may not be readily apparent, that it has been worked by human hands is understood. Along with that understanding, is that of a whole host of corresponding social practices that allow such an abstract principle to order human affairs. At the same time, Veblen was correct to point out that technology applied to production was constrained by the relations of production, of the need to maintain private ownership, and the corresponding profit motive, but that tension exists does not mean that it will be worked out. Particularly, if there is no revolutionary rupture with the old order of things, which he believed not only unnecessary but an unwanted obstruction to the industrial system. For him, the success of the Bolsheviks was what had simultaneously made their situation so difficult. The fact that Russia was technologically backward meant that the: “Russian community is able, at a pinch, to draw its own livelihood from its own soil by its own work, without that instant and unremitting dependence on materials and wrought goods drawn from foreign ports and distant regions.”39

In the case of an advanced industrial society like the United States, such a revolution was undesirable for the inverse reason: dependence on the industrial system meant that disrupting its function would lead to widespread deprivation and misery. Instead, Veblen believed there would eventually be a bloodless coup by engineers, after capitalists “eliminate themselves, by letting go quite involuntarily” as “the industrial situation gets beyond their control.”40 In doing so, he underestimated the lengths that capital would go in holding on to their interests and just how complex industrial society would become. The increasingly complicated division of both mental and manual meant that even a vanguard of engineers and experts could not manage the whole system alone.  Eventually, this process would erode their relative independence from either the capitalist class or the working class by pulling them toward one pole or another.41

 Much like Veblen, in an ironic twist of fate, Galbraith the economist came to the position that economics no longer mattered. Rather, the conquest of political power by monopolies had, and would, determine the future of American society. By separating the political from the economic, rather than view them as two sides of the same co-determined coin, he assumed that one could continuously dominate the other, rather than engage with each other in a dialectical back and forth. This view that monopolies could disembed themselves from the dictates of the market has not gone anywhere. In fact, it was central to the argument of Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski’s popular book the People’s Republic of Walmart that made the rounds across a number of different left groups and tendencies. Phillips and Rozworski present a full-throated socialist defense of planning in the People’s Republic of Walmart, highlighting the prominence of firms like Walmart and Amazon, whose very success, they argue, is predicated on their tendency to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible through complex planning systems. 

The authors acknowledge that “the real world is often one of messy disequilibrium, of prices created by fiat rather than from the competitive ether,” but still “remains one where markets determine much of our economic, and thereby social life.” Unfortunately, their conception of firms as “islands of  tyranny” reinforces the notion that these massive companies can remove themselves from the sea of market competition.42  To put in Marxist terms, these firms are somehow able to ignore the law of value through their application of central planning. Much like Braverman’s critique of postindustrial society as overemphasizing the growth sector of the economy, a similar criticism can be leveled at Phillips and Rozworksi for focusing too much on the ascendant firms of the twenty-first century. Amazon and Walmart may be economic juggernauts now, but no one can know what the march of history has in store for them in the long term. When Galbraith wrote the New Industrial State in 1967, he seemed very certain of the futures of Ford and GM. The same cannot be said of either from 2020. This is not to suggest that socialists should not be concerned with central planning, but rather, that planning is not a magic bullet that makes the transition away from capitalism inevitable. 

Over a century ago, Lenin praised the scientific management of Taylor as a progressive force in capitalist society because of its tendency to bring order to the chaos of capitalist production. He believed that it would eventually lay the foundation for socialism through its rationalization of production and distribution within capitalism. According to Lenin, Taylorism had inadvertently helped prepare for “the time when the proletariat will take over all social production and appoint its own workers’ committees for the purpose of properly distributing and rationalizing all social labor,” and that the increasing centralization of industry on a large scale would “provide thousands of opportunities to cut by three-fourths the working time of the organized workers and make them four times better off than they are today.”43 If one looks at the universalization of Taylorism in the capitalist world and the experience of the Soviet Union, there is, at the very least, a question mark over the efficacy of taking on the methods of scientific management without a mind to the way they help structure relations of production. 

The same can be said about the claims of planning. While it may have had the effect of stabilizing individual capitals, or even large segments of capital, planning has not led to the stabilization of capital in general. In other words, to assume that the means to liberate ourselves from capital exist as tools to be grasped fully-formed from the capitalist system, be it either scientific management or central planning, is to an assume the inevitability of socialism, a false proposition that Rosa Luxemburg grasped more than a hundred years ago when she appealed to the imperative toward either socialism or barbarism.

Writing during the nightmarish upheaval of total war in Europe, Luxemburg reminded the proletariat movement of their latent potential, their role as agents in history to overturn the existing order. From the standpoint of the early twenty-first century, in a world wracked by imperialist proxy wars, climate catastrophe, and political-economic uncertainty, her words echo today as true they did then when she first wrote them in 1915.  In the face of this reality, “the only compensation for all the misery and all the shame would be if we learn from the war how the proletariat can seize mastery of its own destiny and escape the role of the lackey to the ruling classes.”44 

What Luxemburg so masterfully illustrates with her passionate reminder of human will in shaping the course of history, is what E.H. Carr gestures toward in his methodological book What is History? His book outlines a general methodology for the history discipline. In doing so, he takes aim at critics’ contentions that historical materialism posits an inevitable outcome to history. At the same time, he challenges a view of history as random happenstance. For Carr, “nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to have been different,” but at the same time, history is not completely “a chapter of accidents, a series of events determined by chance coincidences, attributable only to the most causal of causes.”45

Late Capitalism and the Law of Value

The discussion above may seem a digression from the larger analysis of the long 1970s. However, the faith that the economic question within capitalism had been solved by social democracy and that the road to peaceful transition had been charted, is what blinded many to the cracks in the postwar consensus—a belief not altogether different from that of the inevitable triumph of socialism. Today, a similar belief exists. For many, the idea that we could go back to the politics of the postwar consensus is not only feasible, but also desirable. This stems from a mistaken notion that the only thing that led to its breakdown was politics: if we can just get back to the right kind of politics, then we can make social democracy great again. 

Even as he criticized the power of the corporation and the state in the modern economy, Galbraith made such an argument about politics during the breakup of the postwar order. He wrote in the Introduction to the 3rd edition of the New Industrial State released in 1978, that by all accounts the “sharp recessions” of that decade were “by wide agreement…the result of a deliberate act of policy to arrest inflation,” with  “those holding most vehemently that inflation was still a natural phenomenon being those responsible for the policy.”46 While Marxist Economist and Historian Ernest Mandel would likely agree that nothing in political economy is inherently natural, this does not mean that human beings do not create systems that stand over them and cannot be controlled at will. Human beings certainly forged those bonds through the muck of ages, but that does not mean that their essence remains apparent as they become imbued with new meaning across time. This is of course what Marx meant when he employed the concept of commodity fetishism, that is to say social relations between people appear as relations between things. 

Mandel’s Late Capitalism is very much a response to this overly politically-determined view of history. He provides empirical evidence to support the notion contrary to thinkers like Galbraith, Baran, and Sweezy that Marx’s critique of political economy still stood as definitive in the era of monopoly capitalism. Even the title of his work was meant as a response to those who believed capitalist society had superseded the laws of motion of capital as described by Marx in the same way that an Einsteinian universe had eclipsed the Newtonian one early in the middle of the twentieth century. For Mandel, the question of whether late capitalism represented a new stage of capitalist development could be answered by asking whether “government regulation of the economy, or the ‘power of the monopolies,’ or both, ultimately or durably cancel the workings of the law value.”47 Indeed, if that question was answered in the affirmative, then any unstable holdovers from the old order such as “crises and recessions” could “no longer… due to the forces inherent in the system but merely to the subjective mistakes or inadequate knowledge of those who ‘guide the economy.’”48 

Source: Ernest Mandel Internet Archive.

By holding Marx’s critique of political economy as valid even in the age of monopoly capital, Mandel was able to see the postwar era for what it was: the calm before the storm of capitalist crisis. An interregnum, which could lead either towards continued domination or towards the liberation of the working class. Rather than take monopoly power as something eternal, Mandel looked at its long-term historical trajectory. First, by sticking to a Marxist conception of the economy that is consistent with the labor theory of value, his starting point of analysis is that the equalization of the rate of profit as it relates to the theory of the rate of profit to fall does not imply an equal division of profits among capitalists. Rather, because this rate is determined by the “total mass of capital set in by each autonomous firm,” those firms that employ the greatest amount technology or constant capital in the production process, are able to siphon surplus from those with a below-average level of productivity, despite a smaller footprint in terms of variable capital or labor power used in the course of production.49 However, while this does not imply an equal mass of profits, there is still the tendency to push and pull the rate of profit towards a social average on the level of individual firms. Effectively, this means that the role of the monopoly in late capitalism is to prevent as long as possible the equalization process from taking place by blocking the movement of capital from one branch to another. But as with any wall, there is always a ladder that can be climbed to reach the other side. 

For instance, Mandel argues that the short-term need of monopolies to bring non-monopolized sectors under their purview to control effective demand leads in the long term to an erosion of their monopoly power through an acceleration of the equalization of the rate of profit. In other words: 

The more this process advances, and the nearer the package of goods produced by monopolies comes to compromise the whole range of social production, the smaller monopoly surplus-profits will tend to become and the closer the monopoly rate of profit will have to adjust to the average rate of profit. The monopolies will thus increasingly be dragged into the maelstrom of the tendency for this average rate of profit to fall.50

At the same time, even if non-monopoly sectors of the economy remain independent of the monopoly ones, in times of downturn those sectors find themselves at a diminished capacity. Therefore, the monopoly sector is not furnished with the surplus-profits that protect them from the fall in the rate of profit. Not only do monopolies in the last analysis sow the seeds for their own demise vis-à-vis their need for continual growth, but also attempts to subvert this tendency in the long term, including those of the state, have the effect of intensifying these contradictions. 

Mandel identified at least three specific limitations to state intervention into the capitalist economy. First, the stimulation of demand through the printing of new money has the effect of lowering the rate of surplus-value i.e. the rate of profit, and in no way does it ensure productive investment–that is investment in the production of value leading to the accumulation of capital. Second, if the state invests any redistributed surplus-value towards productive investment of its own, it must ensure that those investments do not directly compete with already existing sectors of the economy. Finally, if state investments made from tax revenues are to be generative of new value, rather than a redistribution of existing surplus-value, they must not be from capital itself, but from the petty bourgeoisie and the working class’ general wage fund.51 Data from Emanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman’s recent book the Triumph of Injustice bears out this assumption. While their definition of what constitutes wealth and the question of how to address income inequality may be flawed, their collection of average effective tax rate data is a helpful illustration of the shifting tax burden that Mandel first theorized in 1972: 

Source: Emanuel Zaez and Gabriel Zucman, the Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019). Data and Appendix of Figures: https://taxjusticenow.org/#/appendix

This change in the composition of the tax base helps to create antagonistic relationships between the capitalists on the dole of the state and the petty bourgeoisie, as well as those segments of capital whose profit is not ensured through state subsidy. This explains the rise of the politics of the taxpayers revolt, which was and has been so central to building a base of support for the neoliberal turn.52 Mandel identifies this tension as a real limit to the support that the state can have for monopolies: the state cannot support monopolies if they endanger the capitalist system as a whole.53

Long Waves of Capitalist Development

The main point of Late Capitalism may have been to illustrate the continued validity of the Marxist research project in the face of its dismissal by critics on both the left and the right, but Mandel did not simply seek to explain the crisis of his moment. Instead, he sought to provide a long-term view of capitalist development, one that explained the tectonic shifts in the mode of production from one generation to the next, and most importantly, one that might clarify where the transition of his own time might lead. 

This longue durée approach to the historical development of capitalism is precisely why Mandel’s work seems so prescient in the light of the present. This perspective allowed Mandel to historicize his own moment as part of the larger development of capitalism as a global economic system counterposed to contemporaneous bourgeois economists, who held that golden age as a permanent stasis. Mandel accomplished this by adapting Soviet Economist Nikolai Kondratieff’s work on long waves of capitalist development, which posited that along with short-term business cycles there were longer-term ones that lasted for fifty years more or less. These long waves inevitably brought about a restructuring of the capitalist economy through a revolution in technology, or, to use another phrase, the development of the forces of production. In Mandel’s version, these long waves consisted of a period of twenty-five to thirty years, either expansionary or depressive in character. Despite the dichotomy of expansion and depression in Mandel’s long waves, the standard five to seven-year business cycle still operated.  For example, during depressive waves recoveries are not as robust as those that occur during expansive ones.

Mandel explains the breakdown of each kind of wave and its effect on the rate of profit as follows: “expansive waves are periods in which the forces counteracting the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline operate in a strong and synchronized way,” and “depressive long waves are periods in which the forces counteracting the tendency of the rate of profit to decline are fewer, weaker, and decisively less synchronized.54This connection to rate of profit, and thus to the levels of investment, helps explain another part of Mandel’s unique interpretation of the long waves in capitalist development. He posited that, unlike business cycles, expansionary waves were by no means automatically triggered by long depressive one. In this way, he was able to integrate Leon Trotsky’s criticism of Kondratieff into the way that he applied the concept. Trotsky critiqued Kondratieff’s long cycles for removing human agency from the development of new technology and ways of working, as well as, the role played by what might be termed exogenous or outside the economic base of society such as wars and revolutions to creating conditions for a new expansionary wave. 

Defending this interpretation and application of long waves to the history of capitalism against charges of eclecticism, Mandel argued that, often, the “creative destruction” needed to reinvigorate the level productive investments and trigger a new expansionary wave could actually require the physical destruction of fixed capital and of older technology, rather than just its market devaluation. Indeed, his retort, that: 

it is inevitable that new long wave of stagnating trend must succeed a long wave of expansionist trend, unless of course, one is ready to assume that capital has discovered the trick of eliminating for a quarter of a century (if not for longer) the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline.55

speaks to the room that exists for “heterodoxy” within the orthodox Marxist tradition. 

If nothing else, Marx continuously used the newest methods bestowed to him by the practitioners of classical political economy in critiquing them. To assume that he would not have continued to do the same had he had the opportunity to continue his project is to contradict the very nature of his work. Like Marx, Mandel’s use of long waves in no way betrays his commitment to critique of political economy, in that their abstraction is in no way opposed to the concrete. If anything it was Mandel’s critics who were idealistic in their criticism of his notion of exogenous triggers. 

Source: Leon Neal, 2017, Getty Images.

The 1970s as the End of an Era and the Foundation for the Neoliberal Turn

Another useful method inherited from Mandel’s adoption of the modified Kondratieff’s cycles, is the notion that these long waves could be conceptualized as unique historical moments. The postwar boom represents just one of many long expansionary waves, and the interwar years and the Great Depression represent an example of a long period of stagnation. Considering that the lectures that made up his book Long Waves were given in 1978, most of his theorization on the period of the collapse of the postwar order and the neoliberal turn remained mainly predictions based on existing evidence from the start of that wave and other speculations. Still, they do offer an insight not only into how this turn was experienced for Mandel as an individual, but also on some general assumptions and observations that can be subject to an empirical review of subsequent data. 

One point, in particular, seems terribly cogent, especially in the light of contemporary explanations of the neoliberal turn on the left. Mandel postulates that the shift from a certain Keynesian orthodoxy to a monetarist one at the level of national governments did not create neoliberalism, but rather, it was the political-economic crisis brought upon by the stagflation of the 1970s that made one set of ideas marginal and brought the other in vogue. Given the logic of capital and its need to restore the rate of profit, the welfare state could no longer offer the safety net it once had, and indeed it represented a barrier to further accumulation. This materialist explanation of the hegemony of the likes of Friedman and Hayek makes far more sense than the notion that somehow the strength of their ideas created a brand-new consensus by the 1980s. As Mandel writes, this “new economic wisdom” was by no means ‘scientific,’ despite claims to the contrary, but rather “corresponds to the immediate and long-term needs of the capitalist class.”56 Recent scholarship on the New York City financial crisis of 1975 that among other things, produced the now infamous headline “Ford to City: Drop Dead,” points to such a pragmatic and ad hoc adoption of new economic ideas in response to uncertain realities of the day.57

Source: New York Daily News, (1975), New York Daily News.

Fear City by Kim Phillips-Fein, tells the story of the response to the deep crisis of the city from above and below, but ultimately though, it was those who acted from above won the day. However, the idea that those crafting fiscal policy and managing the city’s budget were either contemporary Republican deficit hawks and their Third Way Democratic party handmaidens of austerity should be put to rest. Prior to the financial crisis, Phillips-Fein argues that New York City was a bastion of social democracy created by decades of militant working-class struggle. It could only have through such a crisis that those gains could have been unmade. Even those in seats of authority called to helm the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) and the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) saw themselves more in line with the liberalism of the Great Society than that of the Third Way. 

The MAC was a public-benefit corporation set up to financialize the city’s assets in the face of mounting debt and the EFCB was an institution set up to oversee the city’s spending. Both institutions exemplify how the financial crisis created two political-economic functions characteristic of the emergent neoliberal state: with one hand the state privatized its assets to make up for shrinking state coffers, and with the other, took away those services deemed unnecessary to the accumulation of capital in general. In the case of men like Felix Rohaytn who helped create the MAC, it would be their experience of saving the city from itself that would transform their thought, rather than their thought transforming the city. However, we should not assume that it was unavoidable that such a view would become the hegemonic one. Indeed, it took the mythologizing of the moment by politicians like New York Mayor Ed Koch for the notion that there was no alternative to austerity for the view to take hold. Koch did so by painting the crisis as a teachable moment that allowed the city to see the error of its ways and to move on “in a positive direction.”58

Aside from explaining the formation of the new dominant bourgeois ideology of late capitalism, Mandel also described the actions that would be necessary to restore the rate of profit during the depressive wave that began in 1973, signaled by the oil shocks of that year. He predicted that in order to lay the foundation for a restored rate of profit which would eventually give way from a stagnating wave to an expansionist one, there would need to be a disciplining of organized labor through the use of unemployment. This would simultaneously allow capital to increase the level of exploitation through a degradation of conditions and circumstances of work, the further concentration and centralization of capital, which would lead to reduced cost in means of production like equipment, raw materials, and energy—and most importantly “massive applications of new technological innovations” and “a new revolutionary acceleration of in the rate of turnover of capital.”59

Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployment Rate,” Series LNS14000000 (Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 26, 2020).
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Percent of Employed Members of unions,” Series LUU0204899600 (Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 3, 2020).

Taking up Mandel’s point about the necessity of unemployment to weaken labor organizations, it is no accident of history that from the mid-1970s forward the rate of unemployment never reached the consistent lows of the preceding periods, at least until the precipice of the current century. Nor does it appear to be a coincidence the same period saw a massive dip in levels of unionization as unemployment grew. While this development was by no means inevitable, and was most certainly did not come to pass without resistance, the necessary preconditions for the neoliberal subject were forged through this moment. There was “no alternative,” not because Reagan and Thatcher said so, but because attempts to move beyond the New Deal and the Great Society had become stalled and the material preconditions for the working class to fight in their own name were increasingly closed off from them. The experience of that process for working people and their institutions will be picked up below. 

Keeping in mind the fact that expansionary waves are not an unavoidable exit from a depressive one, Mandel highlights a certain point about the expansion of the world market that warrants close inspection. He argues that “one should not confuse an overall expansion in the world market at a rapid pace with an overall restructuring of the international division of labor.” That is, “employment at lower wages in certain countries is substituted for employment at higher wages in other countries,” and “equipment [being] shifted from one part of the world to another” at best leads to a marginal increase in effective demand through lowered operating costs, but this is not enough on its own to engender “a new long-term wave of accelerated growth.”60

Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” China (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” India (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” United States (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.

Neoliberalism as a political project is often spoken of as going hand in hand with globalization. In other words, in order to return to an era of fiercer capitalist competition, barriers to trade between nations needed to be overcome, either by trade agreement or military coup. Except, rather than completely transforming the international division of labor, for a time neoliberalism amounted to tinkering around its edges. Meaning that, what is thought of as the rapid development of countries like China and India did not occur as rapidly as is often assumed. It took decades to move from countries which provided raw materials to components of manufactured products to countries that finished goods themselves. It took years of reinvestment in themselves before their economies could stand on their own two feet. Looking at levels of foreign direct investment as an indicator of multi-national development of national economies, it seems clear that it took years before even the levels of investment in formerly colonized countries began to approach those of the dominant economic player of the twentieth century: The United States. Despite these changes, following decades of infrastructural neglect, catalyzed by the devaluation and privatization of the Great Recession, the U.S. once again became a haven for foreign investment in the 21st century. 

Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” China (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).
Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” India (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).
Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” United States (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).

This data on foreign direct investment taken alongside GDP growth makes clear that rather than completely transforming relations between the United States and the developing world, FDI reified the existing order of things. Of course, this does not mean that nothing changed between 1973 and 2008, but instead that it took the deepening of the long-term crisis of capitalism (more accurately described as malaise or stagnation) for this incremental process of capitalist realignment to achieve a qualitative shift from a quantitative one. 

The only thing that kept the machine of capital in motion was the industrialization of the developing world as a means of propping up advanced industrial economies. What this means is that despite the massive economic growth across the last 40 years, these developing economies were still relegated to junior partners of American and European firms due to the need to attract the investment needed to develop their productive forces in order to compete with the level of productivity of those companies. This means that they still played their historical role of furnishing raw materials and later cheap manufactured goods to advanced industrial economies, which in return provided capital goods, means of transport, and management methods. 

When all of this is taken into account, a picture emerges of a unique phenomenon: what might be called a stagnating expansionary wave. In a word, while there was a recovery from the prior lows, it never matched that of the previous cycles. This is where Mandel’s notion of non-self-sustaining cycles can be of some use. Without the massive “creative destruction” of worldwide warfare or a global catastrophe, and the continued application of Keynesian monetary policy without its commitment to demand stimulating fiscal policy, the conditions created could only partially restore the rate of profit following the crisis of the 1970s. This analysis fits with some recent scholarship of Kondratieff waves or K-waves, particularly those working within the world systems tradition. While three such practitioners: Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch, argue that the period from the 1970s forward is not out of line with the long-term historical trajectory of K-Wave cycles, they, at the very least, seem to see its effect on the core/periphery dynamics within the world market. 

They characterize the period from 1968/74 to 1984/91, or what they term Phase B of the Fourth K-Wave in the history of capitalism, as a moment in which: 

The Core was ‘attacked’ by the Periphery economically—first of all through a radical increase in oil and some other raw material prices. In the meantime, the West invested rather actively in the Periphery (especially, through loans to the developing countries).61

At the same time, the following period, or Phase A of the Fifth K-Wave (1984/91 to 2006/08), saw the centers of growth slowly shift from the traditional Core to the Periphery. In other words, economic development moved from the First to the Third World, from developed to the developing world. On a purely economic level, they assert that this period represents red in the ledger for the core and black for the periphery, which of course leaves out so many of the social realities that sustained these processes, but that problem has already been addressed by countless thinkers and needs not be relitigated here.62 What is important for the moment is their preoccupation with a mechanically-determined system change, in both the literal technological sense and an economic one, a framework for understanding long waves that both Trotsky and later Mandel criticized as removing human agency from the equation of world history. 

Staking a claim against those that see the period from the 1970s on as one of “decelerating scientific and technological progress,” they contend that the further development and generalization of new technology is a product of the need for the periphery to catch up to the level of development of the core.63 That is, the further accelerated development of the core over the periphery would risk a fracturing of an integrated world system, and to be charitable, they do account for the necessity of “structural changes in political and social spheres” for “promoting their synergy and wide implementation in the world of business.”64 However, from this perspective, it seems the capitalist and international state system bends to fit the needs of developing technology, rather than vice versa. If it is assumed that humanity has created a machine too big to control, then such a view makes sense. However, if we still believe that the technology we build and the economic system we live within is capable of being transformed through our own force of will, then it is imperative that such a view be rejected. 

Indeed, a general proliferation of advanced technology on a global scale, at least that imagined in their work, would require the transcendence of capitalism. As Mandel wrote in Late Capitalism, there are real limitations on the professionalization of the workforce and the automation of labor, as those movements tend to diminish the total amount of surplus-value being produced by reducing the number of workers employed by capital, at the same time that they transform the mental and manual separation of labor—a division that ensures discipline and hierarchy among the working class. To brush up against those limits is to go against the drive toward “self-preservation.”65

Grinin, Korotavev, and Tausch may not see the new economic order that rose from the ashes of the postwar compact during the 1970s as outside the ordinary pattern of long wave cycles. However, their own data does seem to point to a newly emergent pattern of development, one that vindicates the Mandelian notion of expansionary long waves as often contingent upon exogenous triggers to restore the rate of profit. On the surface, this seems to lend credence to the idea of stagnating expansionary waves outlined above, but it would take more than the work examined so far to legitimate these waves as a category of analysis.

Source: H. Armstrong Roberts, 1970s People In, Getty Images

The 1970s and the Failure of Capitalist Production

Marxian economist Andrew Kliman’s work on the rate of profit and the underlying causes of the Great Recession helps to bridge the gap between the work of Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch and Mandel. At the same time, it makes the existence of stagnating expansionary waves not only seem likely, but also the most probable explanation for the movement of capitalist development over the last half-century. This work, The Failure of Capitalist Production, is fairly straightforward in its line of argumentation. There is very little in the way of literary frills or flourishes that a historian might like to see in his attempt to correct what he calls the “conventional left account” of neoliberalism. Regardless of form, its content empirically validates what had only been examined previously through tangential bourgeois economic measure: the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Marxist economists like Mandel used measurements like GDP, CPI, and Industrial Capacity Usage as stand-ins for actually measuring the rate of profit, among other things, to grasp through darkness towards answers—to see beyond the form of appearance. For instance, a lag in GDP growth might point to a lag in new productive investment or low Industrial Capacity Usage might point to a lack of incentive to invest productively, but Kliman does something different with his book. Applying the temporal single-system interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s value theory, he uses the extensive U.S. economic data to measure fluctuations in the rate of profit.66

In doing so Kliman finds that, in contrast to what more traditional accounts have argued, the discipline of labor and the shift in advanced industrial economies away from manufacturing to service and finance did not produce an upswing in the rate of profit. Instead, he shows this to be on the whole a failed fix to increase productive investment, due to the unwillingness on the part of policymakers to unleash the destructive potential of an untethered capital upon the world. The fear of what a crisis as deep as the Great Depression would do to the system as a whole acted as a failsafe against a pure market fundamentalism. To unchain the latent extirpative force would be folly, as it represents an existential gambit on the part of capital on whether it would survive the destruction intact or if it would be felled by the gravediggers it might produce. 

Ultimately, this double-bind creates conditions in which “artificial government stimulus…produces unsustainable growth” that “threatens to make the next crisis worse when it comes,” and all for nothing, as “the economy will remain sluggish unless and until profitability is restored”—that is unless the character of production changes.67 From this perspective, what could be termed neoliberalism did not begin in the 1980s, but rather, was born out of the beginning of a “long period of relative stagnation” that began in the 1970s.68 The Reagan Revolution and Voodoo Economics were themselves a means of saving the system from itself without recourse to Pascal’s wager of pure creative destruction, and not the crucible of economic transformation themselves. 

Kliman pulls from two data sets to measure the rate or profit in the United States: the first, before tax-profits; and the second, what he describes as the “property-income” rate of profit. The second data in his estimation is closer to the spirit of Marx—in that it “counts as profit all of the output (net value added) of corporations that their employees do not receive,” including “money spent to make interest payments and transfer payments (fines, court settlements, gift contributions, and so on, to pay sales and property taxes, and other minor items.”69 Such an approximation of the Marixan rate of profit makes sense, when we consider that Marx wrote in the second volume of Capital that it is:“immaterial for the rent collector of a landlord or the porter at a bank that their labor does not add one iota of value of the rent, nor to gold pieces carried to another bank by the sackful.”  Rather, all that mattered was that they received a portion of value produced from the point of view of the total social production.70 Kliman demonstrates this historical decline in the rate of profit by applying various methods of control to both data sets in different ways. For instance, including inventories in the before-tax rate as a way to factor in the importance of turnover or adjusting for inflation, among other methods.71

All of this serves to illustrate the economic stagnation of the last fifty years, the collective process of kicking the can down the road on the part of the bourgeoisie and their representatives in the bourgeois state. Both wings of neoliberalism failed to address the problem of the falling rate of profit and instead papered over the contradiction with a series of stopgaps that have ultimately made capitalism more unstable, and not less. However, to just understand the economics and not the accompanying social realities are to do a disservice to the Marxist project. Knowing the problem, on the other hand, better shapes the line of inquiry into the historical experience of working people and how they have reacted to and shaped the unfolding of historical processes.

Working from Fordism to Neoliberalism

Before dissecting the economic basis of the emergent neoliberal era, this essay sought to illuminate the difficulty in which those writing at the time of breakdown of the postwar order had in seeing that the systems built through the crises of the 1930s and 1940s struggle under the strain of globalization.  For many, collapse appeared as a bump in the road, one that could simply be smoothed over. But as the expansionary wave of the postwar boom gave way to the stagnating depressive wave in the middle of the 1970s, the possibility of simply repaving the same road became untenable. The ability to maintain an adequate rate of profit and the truce between capital and labor became a pressing contradiction that had to be resolved one way or another. In the end, it was capital that won the battle over who would determine the future, but not without struggle. 

From the standpoint of the working class, how lopsided the bargain struck in the shadow of the Great Depression became increasingly clear. They had given up control over the workplace in favor of higher wages and better benefits. While the latter had served them well and brought generalized affluence unseen in American history, the importance of the former was clarified by the continuing deskilling of work through automation and an increasingly complex division of labor. At the same time, there had been those left out of the pact between labor and capital from its inception. For them, the promise of bread and butter unionism and the prospect of collective bargaining still held an appeal. From their fight to unionize, Marx’s contention that the relationship between economic base and the cultural superstructure are not a one to one relationship becomes clear. Even as the economic basis to organize was curbed, these workers fought for a dream deferred. They fought with the same militancy of their 1930s forebears, conjuring “the spirits of the past to their service.”72

Both this alienation of workers and their struggle for a seat at the bargaining highlight the difficulty in seeing beyond the present. More importantly, it highlights that it is not enough to simply have the right understanding of political economy. We must understand how this reality is experienced in the daily lives of the working class, not just at a higher level of abstraction.  What follows is an examination of working people in their own words, and how they understood the social relations they found themselves.

Source: Preston Stroup, “A workman adjusted a Ford Mustang at the final assembly line in a Detroit-area factory on Nov. 6, 1967”, Preston Stroup/Associated Press

Studs Terkel’s classic book Working stands as both a transhistorical and period-specific documentation of life on the job. While the social relations of labor under capitalism change over time, there will always be a fundamental sense of alienation that accompanies work for others until the capitalist mode of production is transcended. In contrast to the works of Bell and Braverman released in the same year, Working let American workers speak for themselves. They described their own social relations, rather than through the pretense of heady theory. A collection of interviews that includes insight from as wide-ranging occupations as assembly-line workers, truckers, waitresses, bank tellers, and salesman, the book reminds us that despite its romanticization, the postwar period itself produced highly alienating relations of production precisely because American society never went beyond the constraints of social-democracy. 

Phil Stallings, a spot welder at a Ford assembly plant in Chicago exemplifies the Fordist alienation. He describes the feeling of being trapped in three-foot area, pulling the trigger of his welding gun 10,240 times a day as creating an almost out of body experience: 

You dream, you think of things you’ve done. I drift back continuously to when I was a kid and what me and my brothers did. The things you love most are the things you drift back into.73

Not only did his work make Stallings have this sense of incorporeality, he felt alienated in the more traditional Marxist sense. The machines, or the product of social labor, were given better than he received on the job. Indeed, he believed “they’ll have more respect, give more attention to that machine,” and further “you get the feeling that the machine is better than you are,” and if he were breakdown for whatever reason, he would be “pushed over to the other side till another man takes my place,”—ultimately he felt that he was more disposable than the components that made up the tools of his trade.74

While Stallings was a younger man, the problem of capitalist alienation does not discriminate by age, Ned Williams, who worked on the line from 1946 until shortly before his interview with Terkel, expressed a similar feeling which was, however, manifested differently.  Williams says of his time on the line that he was constantly exhausted, “but I got a job to do. I had to do it. I had no time to think or daydream. I woulda quit.”75 Williams may not have dreamed of his childhood in the way his younger counterpart did, but he too lost himself in his work to the point that: 

Sometimes I felt like I was just a robot. You push a button and you go this way. You become a mechanical nut. You get a couple of beers and go to sleep at night. Maybe one, two o’clock in the morning, my wife is saying, ‘come on, come on, leave.’ I’m still workin’ that line.76

The degradation of work in this period was of course not limited to those working in factories, as Doc Pritchard, a room clerk at a hotel near Times Square, attests to. He explained that: 

I’ve had people to me just like I was some sort of dog, that I was a ditchdigger, let’s say. You figure a fellow who comes to work and he has to have a cleanly pressed suit and a white shirt and a tie on—plus he’s gotta have that big smile on his face—shouldn’t be talked in a manner that he’s something below somebody else. 

It affects me. It gives you that feeling: Oh hell, what’s the use? I’ve got to get out of this. Suddenly you look in the mirror and you find out you’re not twenty-one any more. You’re fifty-five. Many people have said to me, ‘why didn’t you get out of it long ago?” I never really had enough money to get out. I was stuck, more or less.77

While it may be obvious from these accounts that the social peace of the postwar era was predicated on a utopian vision of American society that did not exist. That consumer culture of the affluent society did not live up to the promise of a free society. Workers could purchase more for sure and there was certainly more leisure time, but at what cost? The president of UAW Local 685, which represented workers at Chrysler transmission plant in Kokomo, Indiana, spoke to that deal in an interview conducted in 1996. Of the life in a union ship in the ‘60s and 70s, he reminisced that “you knew something was going to come in the contract that improved either your economic status or your leisure time,” but that was not the whole bargain, the main light at the end of workers in that period was leaving the job for good, “on the first day they walked in there, everybody lived for that day they could walk out and retire.”78

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the ability to have the last chapter of life in the form of a comfortable retirement, or even the ability to have some sort of leisure time was materially a step forward for the working class of the advanced industrial countries, something that the erosion of those gains has laid bare. This progressive element of an ultimately conservative collective bargaining system would have been self-evident to those standing outside it even at the time.

Lane Windham’s recent work Knocking on Labor’s Door shows that even after what Cowie calls “the last days of the working class” in the 1970s, those outside of the labor-capital compact continued to try to wedge their foot in the door.79 And this was not just a timid knock, but a pounding on the door by an increasingly diverse working class traditionally left out in the cold by the postwar boom. Rather than looking at strike levels, she utilizes data on unionization drives both successful and not. Instead of decline, this National Labor Review Board data points to an increase in struggles to form unions throughout not just the 1970s, but also the Reagan eighties, particularly those in the emergent service sector. 

The reason is that in the American context, many of the necessities of daily life including healthcare and retirement were tied to employment in a way they were not elsewhere where more expansive social democratic safety nets had been created. In order for workers to assure access to these social goods, they required a union contract, something that as Windham illustrates, became increasingly difficult. This was accomplished through the dual process of, on the one hand, the rise of labor management consulting as a cottage industry to help employers sidestep existing laws, and on the other, the exponential growth in lobbying efforts that would make union organizing a more difficult process than it already was. This is an ongoing process that the recent Janus decision provides just the latest example of. Put simply, as new segments of the working class were opening the door to perceived prosperity, the door was slammed in their face. 

The continued militancy of the working class in the face of growing structural obstruction to organizing their workplaces certainly dilutes Cowie’s claim that the working class was made a force of cultural conservatism and irrelevant by the end of the 1970s. That said, the validity of his larger point about the fragility of the order built around the New Deal remains. As he concludes in his book’s final chapter: 

Whatever working-class identity might emerge from the postmodern, global age will have to be less rigid and less limiting than that of the postwar order, and far less wedded to the bargaining table as the sole expression of workplace power. It will have to be less about consumption and more about democracy, and as much about being blue collar as being green collar.  It will have to be more inclusive in conception, more experimental in form, more nimble in organization, and more kaleidoscopic in nature than previous incarnations.80  

While I must disagree with Cowie slightly (we cannot simply talk about simply creating a better working-class identity), the thrust of his statement is true. Any working-class movement must move beyond a trade union consciousness to a socialist one. This entails a commitment to democracy and environmentalism, and of course, a move beyond narrow chauvinism to embrace universal humanity.

Twilight of Neoliberalism: The End of the Eternal Present?

I began writing this essay in January, before the electoral coup against Bernie Sanders, before the coronavirus put the world on lockdown before we plummeted into a recession that may be on a scale not seen since the Great Depression, before American brownshirts marched armed through the streets unimpeded before nationwide uprisings began in response to the killing of George Floyd. Before, before, before. But very little of what has come to pass changes the facts of history laid out here. As the famous quote attributed to Lenin goes “there are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks when decades happen.”81 We are seeing the end of the “end of history.” What will come next is anyone’s guess.  But at the same time, it seems certain that the eternal present of neoliberalism is dead. The sense that we have seen it all is gone. However, the problems left to us by the old form remain. The stench of its rotting corpse has stultified us.  Leaving us to stare in horror as the body putrefies. Even as the left tries to find a way from subculture to the seats of power, it remains haunted by the neoliberal ghost of civility and procedure. 

Announcing the passing of another age, historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle performed an autopsy of the New Deal order just before the End of History. In their assessment, they wrote that while that order was “dead”:

the problems bedeviling that order from the early 1960s live on: class and racial antagonisms, the resentments of status and power, the corruptions and frustrations of engorged federal bureaucracies, the antipodes of authority and resistance, still occupy a central place in our nation’s political life.82

While the neoliberal response to those problems had the effect of further retrenching them, this was not the only possible future. Another was possible, one that would have represented the resolution of those contradictions in favor of the working class, rather than a regression that eroded the gains made by those that built the New Deal in the first place. However, that window closed as the organizations of the working class became either more marginal or a cornerstone partner in managing the affairs of capitalism. The window again appears to be cracked, will we choose to fling it open or seek to rebuild an idealized past that never existed? 

One thing remains clear: the crises of capital will continue until they are overcome. They will be overcome either through the transition to socialism or through a descent into barbarism. There really is no alternative. How we do so is to learn the lessons of the past. I posited earlier the question of whether a second shot at the New Deal was possible or even ideal. To which my response is a resounding no. Sure, it proved long-lasting in a juridical sense and a temporary boon for the living standards of the working class, but in the long view of history the New Deal was a misstep for the working class. It limited the horizon of struggle to what could be accomplished through law, rather than what could be gained through the further development of class warfare. 

Most importantly, it required the accumulation of capital on the national scale, and with that requirement of the continuous production of value by the working class—something that precludes the international character of socialism. In the long run, even the strongest social democratic reforms are eroded by coercive law of competition. Businesses that can no longer live with the expanded consumer participation of their workers and maintain a sufficient rate of profit will always choose their own interests over their workers. Just like they know their interests, we must learn ours. This is not to say that reform means nothing in the short term, but it should never be forgotten that revolution is the endgame. We need to widen the horizon of the possible and ensure that we begin to think not just beyond the limits of our present, but to those of our imagined past. Seeing beyond the crisis of the 1970s that gave way to the flattened history of the neoliberal era, it is possible to see a new world, but a world in which the contours are unknown and will likely remain undefined for the foreseeable future, that is, until we start to make it.

A Critical History of Management Thought

Can capitalist management thought provide solutions to the problems of the socialist movement? Jean Allen urges doubt and skepticism in this critical review of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought.

Alexander Samochwalow, “Textilfabrik” (1929)

Authors note 2020

This is the paper that made me a socialist. It’s odd to say that, seven years later, and especially odd to say that as someone who has for a long time advocated against the idea of finding communism at the end of a term paper.  But it was precisely this term paper, written in the dark hours in my shabby Arlington apartment, which pulls from a dozen books paged through on the bus and which ends with a weak call for workplace democracy, that broke the years of largely self-imposed conditioning and put me on the path I travel now. Realizing that our economy was run via undemocratic methods that did not work even by their own standards was something I could not turn back from.

So it is even odder to say that now, seven years, this piece has become relevant again. Recently a comrade of mine, Amelia Davenport, wrote an article in this journal that speaks to a project we are both involved in: the development, within the socialist left, of a science of organization. I agree with them that the organized left has gone for far too long with proto-scientific methods, accepting tautological nonsense or ideological statements in place of analysis of organizational conditions. Realizing this allows us to start along the path of materially analyzing some of the largest issues facing the left today. It is possible to build an organization which deals with the tradeoffs of democractic decision making and effectiveness, of autonomy and coherence, of responsibility to the part and responsibility to the whole, of inclusivity and clarity, in a way that is amenable to the majority of our comrades

But, in an odd way, my comrade wrote an article which this piece is a precise disputation of, despite its having been written seven years ago. While I agree that the development of an organizational science for the left is of absolute importance now that we have a left worthy of an organizational science, what my comrade goes too far in saying is that we can look to bourgeois management science and take it, in its entirety, and use it to our own ends.  That is, to my tastes, thoroughly inadequate as a response. While there are mistakes in this paper (regarding the historicity of F.W. Taylor’s examples), I hope that it shows that management science performs just as much, if not more, of a role as an ideological justification for the inequity of our society and of the lack of agency the working class has in our society. There is, certainly, a kernel of an argument in management that we can use, but when we look at the study of management in bourgeois societies it is not ever truly clear what aspects of it describe a real situation and the right answer, and what exists purely as magical thinking, the final analysis put out by a dying era and a dying economic system.

I am not making an aesthetic argument here, that to use the language or thoughts of management thinking will somehow inherently infect us with Evil.  Management thinking is by and large an organic ideology, and it has become so to the degree that it does not work even on the terms it sets for itself.  While the failure of the social sciences and particularly business sciences to analyze the world did not produce Trump or Brexit or Bolsonaro, their failure is yet another of the symptoms coming from the decline of a period of technocratic liberalism and the growing desire for a strongman, a decider who is not bothered by the desires of the masses or any desire to relate to them, who can make our discipline work through sheer force of will. But this failure was not a fall from grace, the groundwork was flawed from the very beginning and it is for precisely this reason we cannot take management science on its own terms and use it for ours.  It is not only not useful for our ends; it has failed on its own terms.

In the course of editing this work for republication to Cosmonaut I have mostly edited for style and to remove a graduate student’s penchant for unnecessary phrase-mongering. In doing so I have tried to keep its argument consistent with the article I wrote in 2013, with a final conclusion to discuss Davenport’s article and this piece, and analyze where we could find a middle ground between the two.

Authors note 2013

This paper began as a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought, a book that was assigned for a graduate course on Organizational & Management Theory. The work, which claims to be a summary of management thought from the beginning of civilization to the modern-day, had a large number of apparent flaws and ‘holes’ in its historical structure, but during my critique, I swiftly found that the issue was not the text itself, it was the flawed and ideological history that Management has built up around itself. As this realization dawned on me this paper moved from an attempt to ‘plug the holes’ of Witzel’s work (by presenting a discussion on the power structures of early capitalism which he glosses over) into a critique of modern management thought in general. Throughout this paper I attempted, to what degree I could, to present these ideas and my critique, sans jargon and in a self-explanatory way. I hope you enjoy.

Introduction

“How would you arrive at the factor of safety in a man?” Wilson asked

“By a process analogous to that by which we arrive at the same factor in a machine,” he replied.

“Who is to determine this for a man?” asked A.J. Cole, a union representative.

“Specialists,” replied Stimson.1

When a political proposition is made, its political nature is seen, critiqued, its power structures discussed. But if that proposition survives, if it lasts a century or for centuries, it is no longer a proposition. It becomes a social system, a system we are brought up in, a system we are taught within, a system we have a hard time thinking outside of. This is especially true of management thinking.

A hundred years after the Congressional hearing on Frederick W. Taylor’s methods, and after decades of depoliticization, management has come to be seen as a science, a fact of life. In the meanwhile, management academics try desperately to fix the disorganizing effects of management thinking. 2 What both the layman and the academic miss is that management thought is political and serves to hide and justify the power relationships which occur within the workplace. Within this essay, I will discuss the political dimension of management thought through a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought.

Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought is a task of amazing scope–an attempt to provide a survey of all management thought from the very beginning of civilization, showing that “since the birth of civilization, people have been writing and thinking about problems in management and how to solve them”.3 Despite Witzel’s goal there are significant holes in his narrative–several times he says with surprise that this or that major civilization “did not produce much in the way of notable work on business…[or] administration”.4 Such a finding is without a doubt ‘strange, even perverse’, but such major holes suggest a mistake, not so much in archival work as in historical perspective.5

History is more than looking back

R.G. Collingwood’s The Idea of History warns against thinking that the past is merely a backward extension of the present and thinking of writing history as a merely archival endeavor. Cut-and-paste history, as he calls it, is a school of thinking which attempts to understand the peoples and practices of the past without understanding the thinking of the past. He sees it as a critical misunderstanding of history–a method that turns the study of history into a series of technical problems: 

“a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian.  This is highly problematic because it reduced individual thoughts into a continuous mass, indeed the individual level is seen as an irrational element; through positivism “nothing is intelligible except the general”.6

Instead, he argues that thinking historically requires putting any event or reading within the context of the time and attempting to put oneself in the shoes of those one writes about.7 This requires understanding the way a different culture or time functions, and appreciating the way that the context of the modern-day presses itself on the study of history.

How does this relate to Witzel? Witzel writes very much in the context of his time, the modern era when business has largely taken over thinking about organizations and even military or governmental organizations use the language of business. The modern-day is a world where rapid technological changes necessitate constant thinking and rethinking of organizational principles.  It is a world where management and organizations are explicitly talked about, in books and articles that come out by the hundreds each year.  

Our context is very different from even the immediate past. Explicit thinking about business did not start until the 18th century, and explicit thinking about management started in the late 19th century. Much of the thinking about management and business before this was ’embedded’ within society: people thought about management or organizations via analogies to other things which were more familiar to them. Without accepting the embedded nature of management thinking–an acceptance which would recast management thought as an ideology rather than as a discipline–accessing the past’s implicit thinking about management would be difficult if not impossible. This explains the major gaps in Witzel’s work before Taylor.  

It also leads to a far more interesting question than why one university professor chose to write a history text in a certain way: what happened to change management thinking into an explicit discipline? People were able to manage massive organizations without a large corps of texts on management, and even as late as the 20th century there were many people who insisted that management could not be taught or explained to any satisfactory level.  What led to the change? 

This question–what events led to the emergence of management thought as a discipline rather than as a series of societal beliefs, is the key question of this essay.  To answer it, I will examine Witzel’s text, as it is above all else a perfect example of a traditional history of management, while also constructing an alternate explanation for the creation of management science. This essay will be organized into three sections corresponding to three eras of management thinking. Through the first section, which will follow the time when management was an implicit mode of thinking, I will discuss three civilizations which Witzel says ‘did not have much to say’ about management (Rome, Ancien Regime France, and Ming China) as well as others to attempt to explain the hole in his narrative. With the knowledge gained there, the second section–following the 19th century and the creation of an explicit field of management–will explain the reasons for management’s shift into the public light. And in the third section (going over the 20th and 21st centuries), I will return to discussing the holes in Witzel’s narrative and how the origins of management still affect it today.

Painting by Limbourg Brothers, 1385-1416

Family Manors: Management before 1789

Witzel’s choice to begin his discussion of management thinking at the very beginnings of human civilization is both a highly innovative choice while also opening space for problematic history. Many traditional histories of management have started with Taylor’s work or immediately earlier, and in doing so are able to talk about management science in the context of society relatively similar to ours rather than the massively different societies we saw centuries if not millennia ago.8

Witzel begins with the origin myths of several societies, describing how the very different origin myths of Greece, India, and China attribute the rise of civilization to some powerful leader and from this evidence states that these myths show that even ancient society expected things like competence from their rulers. From this Witzel begins to discuss the genre of ‘instructional texts’ given to rulers as the earliest origins of thinking about management.9 

But the rulers of ancient Egypt or China were substantially different from the modern-day manager. Witzel merely notes the similarities between the Maxims of Ptahhotep and modern self-help books without noting the massive differences in the societies they came out of.10 The Pharos of Egypt, Kings of Babylon and the Emperors of China had far more responsibilities than any one manager: they were managing whole societies and were responsible for the justice system, the military, the state’s finances and the weather. Similarly, the justifications of this management were substantially different, depending on a connection between the monarch and the divine being of the society. For all the self-centered middle managers who read the Art of War in order to get a leg up in petty office squabbles, these texts were not written for them. Not only were the monarchs of the classical era managing all of society, but they also represented all of society.

But this is only the beginning. Witzel argues later on that the Pre-Socratic Greeks and the Romans “did not produce much in the way of notable works on business…[or] public administration”.11 This is where an oversight becomes a glaring error. There is no way that the Romans could have run an empire spanning Europe, an Empire that was impeccably organized and won through the efforts of the most efficient and ruthless army of its time without a massive amount of thinking about management.12 But Witzel gives us a clue to his mistake. By linking business and public administration, he tells us that he is looking not for ‘management thought’ but for ‘business management thought’, the business of the Classical era very different from modern-day business.

Regardless of culture and society, business was almost always seen as a dirty job during the pre-Victorian era. The only legitimate form of wealth gained, regardless of whether one is discussing Republican Rome, Ancien Regime France, or Ming China, was wealth gained from land ownership. Indeed, merchants often gave up better profits in order to gain entry into the aristocratic class, a tendency which could be seen in societies as disparate as 18th century Paris.13 and 14th century China.14 Such a tendency tells us that wealth, the accumulation of wealth, and the very idea of business was not seen as particularly important.  

R.G. Collingwood noted a similar trend in his analysis of the ‘history of history’.  He found that history had always been used analogically, and was viewed as a peripheral way of looking at the central philosophical problem of the time.15 This central philosophical problem, be it mathematics in Greece, theology in Medieval times, or the discoveries of the hard sciences in the post-Enlightened age, completely changed the way that history was studied. The goals of Medieval history were the discovery of the nature of god16, and the discovery of man’s universal nature imparted by god17, notions which were taken for granted and rarely exposed to criticism. Thus the kinds of historical knowledge gained by the Medieval Christians were often not what we would call historical knowledge, but theological knowledge presenting itself as history, even if the Medieval scholar still called his field ‘history’. As such we can say that history was an explicit field that was predicated on implicit societal views.

Paul Chevigny, in his book on police violence, describes another implicit phenomenon. He argues that since policing is seen as a “low” occupation unworthy of academic study or thought, the way that most people think about everyday police work occurs analogically: we think about policing as a subset of the way we think about ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’, not as a topic in and of itself.18 Thus policing is an implicit field of study which is thought about analogically through the explicit notions we have about society. This distinction will become important as we discuss management’s emergence as an explicit field. Until then, I will leave it that management was an implicit field before the Industrial Revolution, a notion which Witzel discusses (“most earlier authors did not set out to write works on management”)19 but does not seem to appreciate.

While pre-Industrial society practiced ‘management’ daily, they thought about it analogically: since business was seen as a “low” skill, management thinking was almost entirely an implicit field of thought which came via analogies to more familiar and more important institutions: the family, politics, religion, or ethics. Wealth was something to be attained in order to gain stature and political power, and once that stature and power were gained, the new aristocrat immediately took on the anti-business concept of their peers.  Timothy Brook notes this trend throughout the Ming Dynasty: noting a plethora of nouveau riche aristocrats decrying the kind of practices that got them where they were and consistently attempting to hide the shameful, commercial, origins of their own wealth.20  

Even though business (and indeed the very idea of working to make money) 21 was seen as a ‘low study’, Witzel argues quite successfully that businesses expanded into worldwide ventures during the Medieval period, which led to thinking about specific necessities of management such as accounting.22 The Enlightenment’s project of questioning established norms also led to a large amount of thinking about economics and eventually business.23

This leads to a question: if firms (if they could be called that) were doing business on a global scale as far back as the 12th century and the individual branches of management (finance, accounting, administration) were in place around the same time24, why did it take until the late 19th century before a complete concept of management came forth?  Specifically, what changed to make businesses seem like a respectable element of analysis, and what changed that necessitated the creation of management thought?

Beyond the anti-business biases of pre-industrial society, aristocratic societies across the world developed an organic ideology that naturalized the idea of the inherent superiority of the aristocracy which came from their blood and breeding. This impeded the development of management thinking in two key ways. The first being that since ability was to some degree inborn, there was little to no need for teaching or even thinking about management. The second followed from the first: if the aristocracy was inherently capable, then the mercantile and working classes were therefore subhuman or otherwise incapable of agency, an ideology which meant that there was no need to develop a set of ideas based around specifically managing other individuals.  These two intellectual products of the feudal economy combined with an allegorical view towards businesses made the development of management thinking unnecessary. It took not one but three revolutions to shake this framework.

That aristocrats had inborn abilities was commonsensical to the people of the pre-Industrial era. Many of the patrician families of Rome claimed to be descended from Gods25, and both Ming China and Ancien Regime France had a concept of gentlemanliness (in French, gentilhomme and in Chinese junzi), an inborn concept which placed one irrevocably above his peers. Gentillesse was a characteristic that could only be provided through the blood: “the King might create a noble, but not even he could make a gentleman…[gentillesse could only be created] by deeds, heroic deeds, and by time.  Two generations usually sufficed”.26 The gentilhomme was a larger than life character, capable of more destructiveness and more greatness than any mortal could possibly grasp.  The junzi was a remarkably similar character, a person beneath only the sage (a saint-like figure) in societal placement. The junzi was literally translated to ‘lord’s son’, which keeps with the inherited nature of nobility. The junzi, moreover, was defined by his ability to see what the everyman could not: his virtue and knowledge of the classics led to transcendent accomplishments inconceivable to the ‘small-minded’.27   

Besides the gentleman’s construction as a sort of anti-business person (the French gentilhomme was a martial and artistic figure while the junzi was at heart an academic living isolated from the world), the conception of in-born gentlemanliness challenged management from another front.28 Witzel notes that as late as the 20th-century British business schools would not teach management, believing management to be an “aristocratic x-factor”, something which could not be taught.29 This gets to the heart of the problem: why think about management if the ability to lead was simply in the blood? Why not think about, instead, the blood?  Pre-industrial societies shared widespread horrors at the possibility of miscegenation, and the societal punishments involved in a gentilhomme family marrying a non-noble one were so strong that no such combination has been found.30 Love between the Indian castes and Chinese classes was viewed with similar anxiety.31 This anxiety (and the complicated categories of nobility and peasanthood constructed over the centuries in nearly all societies) indicate that people saw inborn abilities as being so much more powerful than thinking about management that “certain physical characteristics exemplifying nobility were intentionally sought out and bred”.32

This belief in the inborn abilities of the nobleman had another side to it: a disbelief in the ability of the poor to think or act for themselves. The Fronde, a civil war in 17th century France, began because the crown considered the nobility as responsible for the revolts of their peasants: “in seventeenth-century society, peasants and artisans were considered to be something like leashed animals, and when they revolted, the king, the bishops, and the nobility frequently blamed the nobles…for not keeping the peasantry in hand”.33 Because the peasants were considered to be ‘childlike’ and obviously followed their superior masters, revolts along the Seine valley (caused by food shortages and egregious taxes) were considered to be aristocratic plots rather than a reaction by individual actors.

A similar example of individuality being viewed as either an aberration or as the purposeful malice of the master can be seen in the American south.  During the 19th century, a pseudo-science was built around understanding the origins of slave revolts and runaways. The idea of Drapetomania, that is, the irrational want to run away from one’s masters, was prescribed as slaves reacting to masters “attempting to raise him to a level with himself”. That the position of the African slave is given as “the Deity’s will”34 is a common trend that occurs in readings from all over the world in the preindustrial era.

The belief in a hierarchy ordained by a divine being (or by the laws of science) permeated nearly all pre-Industrial cultures, manifesting in different ways in different societies. In India, it manifested as literal castes,35 in China in the ‘Nine Ranks’36, and in Europe as the Gentilesse/Noblesse/bourgeoisie/peasant distinction. This hierarchy created an interlocking set of beliefs which destroyed the need for management thinking. These beliefs in the supernatural and inborn powers of the nobility, the lower classes’ lack of agency, and the unimportance of business all combined into a feudal ideology that devalued the idea of social mobility, devalued the individual (excepting the aristocratic individual), and also devalued the unheroic task of running a business. Combined, they formed an organic ideology that allowed very little room outside of it. If nobility is inborn and nobility is only gained through ‘heroic’ acts, why care about running a business? If the peasants had little to no agency, why think about managing them? If social mobility is de facto impossible except through the state and the nobility, why invest one’s time in a business when a title is clearly so much more important?  

This set of questions explains Wiztel’s surprise in finding little to no development in management thinking in Chinese, French, or Roman cultures: they thought about management analogically, through metaphors to leadership (which they considered inborn) and the family. The workplace, the prime focus of management, was seen as merely another, inferior, aspect within the broader society. Furthermore, management rests on an a priori assumption of a relatively equal relationship between the boss and the worker. The worker could be fired, the worker could work poorly, the worker could leave but in management, the worker is assumed to have agency, an agency which did not exist either conceptually or in the reality of the latifundia workplace.  

The examples that Witzel finds of proto-management in the pre-Enlightenment era occurred in exceptional cases where upheaval destroyed the idea of inborn ability (Machiavelli’s Il Principe was written to the victor in an assumed coup, an event which occurred often in Italian city-states), or in the case of something considered far more important which management then adopted as its own (warfare). Simply put, the class society of feudalism could not conceive of management thinking, either as a science/means of analysis or as a justifying force in society, because it already had a justification for the hierarchy that existed within it. Often this aristocratic ideology was incapable of ‘working’ either by any objective measure or even on its own terms, but without an alternative system and a different material base, this form of magical thinking hung vestigially over society, justifying all sorts of harm and oppression despite being debunked and demystified. For centuries humanity hung between a feudal society that created all manners of useless suffering and a new method of organization that could not be spoken of let alone analyzed. This is a state I think we can relate to, and feudal notions hung onto relevance until it was felled, not by one Revolution but three.

The Republic In the Workshop: Management as Reaction

The general notion of history is as a march to the present. It is the mistake of every society to think that the zeitgeist of the present day came about as the result of a series of won compromises and that we are living in “the best of all possible worlds”. The typical view of American history takes this viewpoint: the Founding Fathers are not seen as revolutionaries in their time, promoting a radically different system than what had came before, but as conservative figures in our time, promoting the current system that we have. Each step in American history: the revolution, the extension of suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the new deal, the civil rights movement, etc, is seen as a step towards the present that could only have gone this way when in reality each event had an infinite number of possibilities. From the perspective of the contemporaries of Washington, Jackson, or Lincoln, it was not so obvious where the events of their lifetime would lead.

I say this because Witzel’s history of management is written in a similar fashion: management is depicted as a natural outgrowth of the world.37 which would have emerged in roughly the same form regardless of the thinking of Taylor or of the events of the 19th century.  Management was simply an answer to the organizational problem of factory life, which was merely waiting to be found by whoever picked it up. I will argue in this section that once management is put in its political context it becomes far less innocuous.

While the feudal ideology I described in the last section was collapsing in Europe over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, it was only the events of the late 18th century (the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) that finally broke the back of the aristocratic notion of inequality among the classes. It was the notion of equality, conceptualized and argued through many world civilizations but then given form by the bourgeois-republican governments of France, the United States, and Britain, that attacked both the notion of inborn ability by allowing any man to stand for office and the idea that the poor had no agency by allowing the poor to vote.  

The idea is that these movements occurred naturally, that the abolition of slavery or the extension of the franchise was a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically insufficient, and thus their dissolution was inevitable. Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted, the deconstruction of these orders requiring revolutionary action in their time. And even if we accept that slavery’s dissolution was inevitable, the way in which an event occurs and what exactly replaces it is just as important as the event of dissolution itself. 

Similarly, even if we take the eventual development of a field of scientifically minded management as a given, the kind of management thought that developed was just as important as the fact that a form of management thought emerged. Multiple strands of management thought grew at once in the late 19th century, and despite much of Taylor’s work being based on forgeries, Scientific management dominated all other forms of management in the early 20th century. This is because scientific management was about more than merely solving problems: it was an ideological response to the threat of socialist and democratic movements who sought to bring the logic of republicanism into the workplace.

Manifestations of this tension appeared throughout the Western world during the early 19th century. The rise of socialist and anarchist organizations, not to mention the development of unionism, all placed pressure on typical workplace relations. Their reasoning had its roots in the juxtaposition of liberty in the voting booth combined with autocracy in the working floor: “the consequence [of capitalistic relations] now is, that while the government is republican, society in its general features, is as regal as it is in England”.38 The pamphlets of the Workingmen’s Party (Workies) also featured a discussion of the similarities between chattel and wage slavery: 

“For he, in all countries is a slave, who must work more for another than that other must work for him…whether the sword of victory hew down the liberty of the captive…or whether the sword of want extort our consent, as it were, to a voluntary slavery, through a denial to us of the materials of nature…”39

Similar events occurred in France. After the 1830 July Revolution, French workers waited “for the introduction of the republic in the workshop”. The “applied republic”, that is, a democracy which was replicated within the workplace, was a common call from the July Monarchy through to the Third Republic. It was in France during the election of 1848 that the first divergence emerged between “a social republicanism, seeking direct application of republican principles in the economic sphere, and a republicanism that sought to restrict these principles to the political sphere”, with the purely political republicans winning.40

Despite the victories of capitalistic republicanism in the early 19th century, social democratic parties and movements continued to gain strength, with the German Social-Democratic party becoming the largest single party in the country.41 The French created a word, sinistrisme, to describe the situation of the 3rd Republic wherein the leftist parties of one generation would become the right of the next as increasingly socialistic parties appeared and took their place. The reason for the continued decay of the 19th-century rightist parties was their tendency to use traditionalistic (that is, reliant on the feudal ideology I explained in the last section) justifications for the injustices of society, and the reason that Taylorism was so successful was that it finally presented a new and comprehensive argument against republicanism in the workplace: by creating “one best way” for all workers the manager is able to make everyone better off.  

The argument that if the workers were only to sublimate their desire for agency gained via social movements and their relationships with each other into a desire for agency gained via the piece-rate system and their contract with their manager then everyone would be better off was able to convince social justice advocates such as Louis Brandeis, and leading many technocrats including Witzel to see anti-capitalist critiques as merely desires for better management.42 This shows the degree to which Tayloristic methods have survived within management: the wicked problem of workers asking for representation is changed into the technical problem of workers needing better managers. By viewing the problem of worker’s dissent and indeed the problem of autocratically managing another human being as a technical problem, Witzel is able to argue that the answer was “to make management more efficient and to restore harmony with the workers”.43 In effect, Witzel is able to erase the ideological aspect of both scientific management and the workers’ movements and to present a movement which disempowered workers as the restoration of harmony.

Taylor’s process was to watch a laborer at work, design a better way to do that job, and then to require each and every worker to work at that pace. This disempowered workers in several ways:  

    • It was yet another moment in an ongoing process of deskilling, turning autonomous workers into merely imperfect pseudo-automated machines without knowledge of their subject which could be used without the manager’s assent. 44 
    • It applied the division of labor hierarchically–all thinking to be done about the nature of the job and the task was to be done by management and the consultant (a division shown by consistent comparison of the manager to the ‘brain’ in organic metaphors of management and organizations.45  
    • By arguing that most firms were inefficient and that the “scientific” methods applied by experts were superior to rule of thumb methods, Taylor was implicitly denying the worker’s own experience and knowledge and alienated the worker from their ability to better the work-processes they engaged with on their own terms.

Taylorism and scientific management took its focus, the workplace, and transformed it conceptually from a part of society subject to society’s rules to an area of perpetual exemption, no longer shackled to the magical thinking of the where utter autocracy was allowed to rule under the rubric of efficiency. This allowed one to be simultaneously a democrat in general while being an autocrat in the workplace. The contradiction of capitalist republicanism, while not resolved, was now obfuscated.  

The Dismal Science and the Pathologies of Management

Economics has often been called the dismal science because the needs of ‘science’ requires a perfect seeming model which rests on many assumptions. This is just as true of management: after expressing all of its arguments through algebraic notation and even after constructing highly complicated models meant to create computer simulations, it still deals entirely with the most difficult of variables: unabstracted, individual, human beings, and under a highly mutable criterion: efficiency.46

The first issue of management is that any problem involving the interaction of human beings in the social sphere is a wicked problem, which was defined by C West Churchman as “a class of social system problems which are illformulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing”.47 The number of these problems which appear in the management of people represents an intractable issue to expressing micro-level workplaces formulaically, let alone utilizing those formulas towards any useful end. Wicked problems are highly contextual which interacts badly with scientific management’s claim of ‘one best way’s and universalism.  

The second problem of any scientific management is with the idea of efficiency. Deborah Stone, in her work Policy Paradox, notes that efficiency is an almost completely subjective measure, that is what is efficient for one actor may be inefficient for another.48 Management has simultaneously constructed efficiency as the manager’s efficiency, erasing the perspectives of the infinite other actors whose lives could be ‘more efficient’ at the sacrifice of the manager.  

It is fully possible to create a scientific discipline under these conditions: psychology, philosophy, and history all deal with these problems. However, management has not responded to the problems of unclear criterion and mutable variables by embracing critical methods. Instead, management has leaned harder on scientistic methods, methods that ape the aesthetics of the hard sciences without regard to the differences between studying the interactions of electrons and studying the interactions of people.49 Efficiency has been discussed as if it were an objective physically extant variable rather than a construction that was then reconstructed in a specific way. Over and over again the vacuous baubles of the org chart and process chart have been embraced, leading to expensive reorganizations which do nothing but redraw the chart. Indeed management’s continued embrace of scientistic discussion has led to an overfocus on the organization (which, like efficiency, is treated like an objective physically extant object rather than a construction) leading to a management thought which does not have much to say about work and people–supposedly the two subjects of the discipline.50 And despite all of this faux-scientism, management has become inundated by pseudo-academic gurus who pump out books that tell people that they can take charge in the workplace in X easy steps by the hundreds.51

All of these trends emerge from management’s original sin: that it did not emerge as a way to create knowledge. Instead it emerged in response to two needs: first, the need to create a coherent justification for authoritarianism in the workplace, and second, the anxiety of managers who want easy answers to their immensely difficult problems. Like history during the middle ages, management has become an explicit field based on implicit views that management itself helped create (the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace, the need for ‘objective’ analysis, the specific way that Taylor constructed efficiency). Because management stands on unquestioned concepts, the discipline has found itself riven with pathologies of its own making, finding itself breaking apart even within its own rules.

The pseudo-scientific methods of the gurus are an example of this. While they are decried by management scholars their methods are actually highly similar to Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management. During one of Taylor’s consultations, he asked 12 of the strongest men in a factory to simply ‘work harder’ and then guessed that under this level of work these men could haul 72 tons of steel (which he rounded to 75) instead of 42, and from this concluded that 75 tons of steel as the minimum amount of steel one could haul per day. This is not the seed of a scientific discipline.52

While scientific management has not succeeded in providing answers to the problems of the manager, it has succeeded in building a highly resilient ideology around itself, an ideology that has been based on the aping of scientific methods and the continued arguing of the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace. The result has been the successful depoliticization of Taylorism and the continuation of the ‘gospel of efficiency’ to the degree that people now talk of efficiency as if it were an objective measure. However, the trends which have emerged from management’s original sin have started to become highly problematic, not only for those on the outside of the discipline but for the discipline’s practitioners.

Disciplinization and the ‘silo effect’ is one of the pathologies which has emerged from management’s attempts to don scientific garb. While the splitting up of management into different sub-disciplines has as much to do with the m-form organization (a way of organizing firms wherein each task would have its own department/division, an organizational method which had its roots in the divisional structure of armed forces53 as it does with the academy, the silo effect, which is the complete separation of the management sub-disciplines into their own self contained worlds academically and creating fiefdoms within organizations, is one of management’s major pathologies. This phenomena has two aspects: the academic aspect (the silo effect which occurs in the academy) and the practical aspect (the silo effect that occurs in the workplace). I will explain each in turn.

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management’s origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace, that is a managerial class with a “view from the top” rather than a view from the workplace.54 And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absence – the absence of work and power from management – has exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.  

A look at an example of good organizing, the Valve company, shows why such a sub-disciplinary trend is necessary from a control mindset. In the Valve company, there are no formal control structures, everyone is allowed to move around, and because of this, everyone, from the accountants to the lawyers to the managerial executives, is asked to gain a degree of knowledge in programming, which is the company’s specialty (Valve 2012 39-40).55 Without a rigid command structure originating from an invented concept, Valve requires everyone to have a common language and thus asks for T-shaped people (that is, generalists who also have a specific capability) because commonly held knowledge allows for easier collaboration.56 This syncretic, ‘liberal arts’ viewpoint of management is exactly the opposite of mainstream management teaching and thinking, because management is not concerned with work.

Instead, management takes as its focus the invented concept of the organization and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about. Authoritarianism in the workplace, which was so problematic in the 19th century, has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unexamined.57 Further syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford).58 This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

And yet when management students come to the workplace they find that cooperation is rarely forthcoming. Because management has historically seen all of the things which grease the wheels of cooperation. such as talking and building social relationships within one’s job, as unnecessary and wasteful.59 Furthermore, when cooperation is modeled by management thinkers, it often looks little like what we would think of when we think of cooperation. Works like Bardach’s Developmental Dynamics: Interagency Collaboration as an Emergent Phenomenon places ‘acceptance of leadership’ as one of the key steps/goals of collaboration while simultaneously complaining of agencies which worry about “imperialistically minded agencies [which] might steal a march on them”.60  

This fear of collaboration leading to annexation emerges from management’s lack of focus on the work and on management’s competitive mindset. Because ‘the work’ is seen as comparatively unimportant compared to the need for control, collaboration must be done for some other goal besides merely getting things done. And because competition is seen as more important than cooperation, management often transforms cooperation into a competitive activity. One example is the imperialistic theories which Bardach uses wherein each step is a step towards control. In such an environment there is little reason to cooperate, leading to the silo effect within the workplace.  

But what is tragic about management is that despite the pathologies and its inability to provide technical solutions to wicked problems, its logic has become massively powerful within our body politic. The growing influence of management thinking over politics will be the focus of the next section.

Ever more dismal

While modern-day management has failed in many respects, its promise of technical solutions to wicked problems has made it hugely successful as an intellectual lens. We can see this because even while management academics try to find a new form of management, they wring their hands about the loss of control and the chaos brought by equality. Even Valve, a model of new management, asks ”So if every employee is autonomously making his or her own decisions, how is that not chaos?”.61

Management thinking, despite its flaws and pathologies, has moved out of the workplace to become a part of the contemporary zeitgeist. This has produced two strange juxtapositions. First, while the pre-Industrial world saw business only via analogies to more important institutions (the family, the church), in the modern-day business has become the sole operating lens through which other institutions are viewed. We see government, the arts, nonprofits and even families as analogous to businesses and thus reduce them to a specific kind of economic lens.  

Second, due to this domination, management, which was once used to defend authoritarianism in the workplace, has now become a way to argue for authoritarianism in the body politic. In our modern system, we are such advocates for democratic systems that we are willing to go to war to (supposedly) establish it in other countries while being unwilling to establish democracy in any substantial way domestically. We believe that man is worthy enough to weigh in on matters of national security, the country’s economic system, and even how one’s schools should be run, yet we do not believe that man can be trusted to have a say in the events that go on in their workplace.  The paradox of democratic capitalism which produced management has now been wholly obfuscated by it.

A perfect example of this is the discussion of the role of the president in our political system.  A massive series of worried articles have come out in the last 4 years saying that the job of the president “is to somehow get this dunderheaded Congress, which is mind-bendingly awful, to do the stuff he wants them to do. It’s called leadership”. This scarcely rises to the level of a statement. Through the last 20 years we have seen increasing demands for authoritarianism in the name of efficiency, in the name of the government ‘getting things done’, which are scarcely ever connected to a statement about what things the government ought to do. These vague requests emerge from the powerful yet meaningless demands of management thought and the way that they have mapped onto our politics. Just as management is absolutely sure of the need for an authoritarian manager while having vague answers for what a manager should do in any situation, in politics we know we need an authoritarian president so he can do something instead of listen to parliamentarians bicker over what to do, we just do not have an idea of what exactly we need that authoritarian president to do.

Similarly, so many policy arguments in the public sphere have been reduced to great man-ist arguments. The “Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics”, also known as the “Confidence Fairy Theory”–the idea that “the only thing limiting us [in foreign policy] is a lack of willpower” has been used by conservatives and liberals alike to attack non-managerial approaches to policy.62 Practically, the idea of ‘willpower’ and ‘confidence’ is so vacuous that the idea that it is used in foreign policy talks seriously is almost laughable.  But the ‘willpower’ argument is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in public policy just as scientific management is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in the workplace. In fact, things have devolved. We are so entranced by the power of authoritarian figures that our arguments are reminiscent of the faux psychologists who diagnosed slaves with drapetomania. The confidence argument has been used practically to argue that merely treating foreign rulers with respect–for instance, bowing to a foreign king weakens the confidence other countries have in our power and our will to use that power.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the supposed total victory of democracy over all the tyrants of the world, a new yearning for autocrats is being expressed everywhere, from the fringes of the left to mainstream neoconservatives to libertarianism. This autocratic argument is new: it is not the old feudalistic argument for a person who represents the father of the whole nation. It is instead expressed in the language of Taylor, and the desire to transform our messy and muddled political arguments into the idealized hierarchy envisioned by management. Phrases like “It is for the experts to present the situation in its complexity, and it is for the Master to simplify it to a point of decision” appear even from leftist sources.63 The idea that if only we were more courageous, willful, and authoritarian that we would be able to make the hard decisions easy, that within each wicked problem is a technical answer which we could find if only we had an authoritarian figure with enough willpower, steps from the faith we still have in the system of scientific management. We believe that, like fairies, the manager will only be able to provide us with easy answers if we believe in the system enough.

These emerging trends, which came out of scientific management to become far larger than the factory workplace it originated in, are hugely problematic: the belief in a society of simple and rational answers is so enmeshed that any of its failures are attributed to the failures of individuals. This belief is larger than management and the schisms within the management field: just as positivism is based on a very particular and superficial notion of the hard sciences64, our current management norms are based on a very superficial idea of modern management thinking.  

The line of thinking which I have been discussing is not directly connected to ‘the work’65 but rather to an idealized view of the way that workplaces should work. This is because this line of thinking has always been about control rather than results, and due to this the changes that have occurred within management academia have had little effect on management as it is practiced. In Witzel’s last chapter he does bemoan the disconnect between management and management academia, saying that “management thinking is now the province of the academic”.66This is not, strictly speaking, true: management fads and gurus have in many ways a broader audience than management academia. This is even more problematic than the possibility Witzel (rightly) presents, that management may be obsoleting itself by closing itself to the non-academic world.67 Management academia has a far better ability to turn management into a truly intellectually rigorous field in which the assumptions of management are questioned with the goal of creating more knowledge rather than upholding an ideological framework based on control than the guru cottage industry is. While this is not to say that management academia has served a progressive role, the willingness of management academia to specialize itself into obscurity is highly worrisome.

This gap desperately needs to be breached if management is to become a more rigorous field. But that is not enough. Larger participation in management by different parts of society,including workers, needs to occur both at the practical and academic levels in order to get management focused back on work and interpersonal relations. The larger problematic attitudes of society towards management need to be deconstructed at every level. Simply attacking them in the academy will not be enough. To some degree, the task is obvious. Addleson’s concept of ‘ubuntu’ (that is, connectedness with one’s group) and a more inclusive and democratic view of management is necessary in the context of knowledge work. But while being simple, the task is immensely difficult. Even if we accept that management’s replacement is inevitable, that scientific management gets replaced is not what matters. It is how it is replaced and what replaces it. And I have no answers with regards to that.

Conclusion: The Collective Mind

Much of this essay feels very dated as I write this in the spring of 2020. The dismissive attitude towards any kind of systemization, the confidence in workplace democracy as the only solution needed to these problems, the lauding of Valve of all things, all come off as the writings of a sharp if naive and new leftist writing a college paper in a very conservative institution. In this segment, I will speak to two elements which I was naive about (workplace democracy and the paper’s focus on ideology), before speaking to the ways this article applies to our current situation.

The naive excitement about Valve’s managerial model aged the worst of my concluding statements. The belief that a non-hierarchical corporation was a potential solution to the problems of management thought was not a conclusion I leaped to on behalf of my college, it was, at the time, an earnestly held belief. This belief was misplaced. A company who’s manual might as well be titled ‘ways to create a tyranny of structurelessness’ naturally moved to more hierarchical and frankly abusive management styles as the decade wore on (if, indeed, the original model ever truly existed in the first place).  Furthermore, the idea that workplace democracy would be able to maintain it’s democratic structures within a capitalist system is ludicrous. What we’ve often seen instead are groups that allow workers to enact the same workplace discipline on themselves that a manager normally gives, a discipline that does not just emerge from managing styles but from the needs of the market.

The argument I consistently made through the paper, that management should not be seen as an academic discipline but as a malfunctioning ideology, is one I would maintain. But there is a limitation to this. When I wrote this in 2013 I was in the midst of a painful rebellion from Obama era technocracy towards socialism, and this reaction still held marks of the idealism one can easily find in academia. In focusing on the cultural justifications each mode of production creates for itself I allowed myself to think that this justification was one of the main ‘pillars’ of a mode of production, and if it were only surpassed we would be able to surpass that mode. Such idealism is anathema to the way I think now.  

Feudalism was not primarily a series of ideological constructs but an economic system, and the same is true of management thought’s relationship to capitalist production. But there is a relationship between the superstructure and base, one where both are continually changing. The theme of a justificatory ideology slowly occluding the analytical elements which gave it vitality, leading to encroaching and, over time, fatal pathologies is one I have returned to again and again, with good reason. Management science was not conceived as a way to systematize the experience of workers into a theory of their work, but was rather created with the a priori need to justify autocratic workplace relations, a need which has over time overtaken the discipline’s ability to give knowledge about the subject for which it was created. This remains true whether the statements Taylor made were apocryphal and this brings me to discuss the recent article by my comrade Amelia Davenport.

Comrade Davenport is correct that the rule-by-thumb methods that organizers have developed over the last generation are insufficient to the task of running contemporary political organizations. She is also correct that what must replace that is a rigorous scientific method able to speak across contexts. At this point we part ways. While I cannot speak to Prometheanism, Constructive Socialism or our current ability to surpass scientific socialism (which all sounds nice but goes against my lifelong disinterest in abstractions), I do not think that Taylorism is the means by which we can reach a synthesis of theory and practice. We can see this in the lack of concrete examples in Comrade Davenport’s article. Taylorism confronted the complex problems of managing humans and solved this problem by treating people the same way one would treat machines, allowing engineering principles to be applied to the human body. Even if this narrowly worked within industrial production, it has only proven applicable to later methods of production in the most roundabout and analogical of ways and is not applicable to the variety of activities a political organization finds itself.  

There is another method that we can apply analogically to our situation, which I would argue is a better analogy: the method by which Clausewitz attempted to train officers. Clausewitz correctly stated that war is a simple affair, but that within war, the simplest things are the most complicated. From this, he separated the study of warfare into two forms, the first being the science of war, which consisted of the creation of fortifications, the organization of a barracks, the logistics of war. These are relatively easily taught and, regarding our situation, should be standardized and taught to members in as quick a manner as is feasible so as to keep technical skills from becoming a boundary to participation. The other half of the study of warfare, the art of warfare, was far more difficult as it consisted of one’s ability to make decisions with limited time, limited information, and a large amount of chance involved. This does not mean that it was impossible to become skilled in the art of warfare, but for a long time it was something which could be learned but which, it was suspected, could not be taught.

This did not mean that there were not universal truths in warfare which Clausewitz found in his studies: that defense was a stronger form than offense, albeit one which could not win a war on its own, that warfare has a tendency towards escalation, etc. But this did mean that teaching a capable officer was a different task than teaching a capable engineer. You cannot predict everything that will occur on a battlefield, and seeing things in a mechanistic way where all must do is choose the right course of action as given to you by theory is a sure way to create a disaster. What Clausewitz did, instead, was teach his officers to replicate the decisions of past generals in their heads, without bias towards whether they were ‘right or wrong’, and try to understand why these generals did what they did.  

This is the method we must use to train not just ourselves or those destined for leadership, but our whole organizations. The ability to critically analyze not just our actions but the actions of other groups is how we create nuanced and level headed organizers. But this is not something that can be standardized or mechanistically taught; it requires training one’s judgment, which is inherently a personalized process. This does not mean that it cannot be done.  It would require many of the same things that comrade Davenport lists, but it would also require:

    • The inclusion of a process of operational analysis including both analysis of our material conditions and criticism & self-criticism as often as possible, within group contexts and in writing.
    • The creation of clear lines of communication and information exchange, publishing what can be safely and feasibly publicized, including these operational analyses.
    • A focus on making as many decisions as is feasible democratically and including as many members as is feasible into the process of making decisions.
    • An acceptance that, on the one hand, these democratic decisions are binding, but similarly that the minority viewpoint in each vote is to be respected.

At this point, we need to ask, ‘what is the point of democracy?’. Often we counterpose a positively coded democracy with the autocracy that people experience constantly in their day to day lives. But given the absolute dearth of democratic institutions, if we consign ‘democracy’ to being just ‘good’, we are laying the foundations for democracy’s undermining in practice even if we affirm it in word. Throughout the left, democracy is seen as something ‘nice to do’ if inefficient, a vision of democracy which leads to it being lauded in word and cast aside in practice. In other organizations, formal democracy is seen as the most important decision-making tool, even if that formal democracy impedes on the ability of the organization to act or practically limits the ability of people to interact with the process. Almost everywhere in the left democracy is affirmed at the point of decision and then cast aside when people move to implementation. These can easily lead to a curmudgeonly opinion, which is only outwardly expressed within at the end of a political cycle: that democracy is simply a waste of time, that if it is such a good thing to sit in a meeting hall trading points or order or consensing until our faces turn blue just to decide on the time of an event, that it would be better if we dropped it in the name of efficiency.

I am a member of the Democratic Socialists of America. In left circles, the idea of democratic socialism is often hand-waved as being limited to a project of developing social-democracy in an Anglosphere that has not ever had that uninteresting experience. But through working in this organization for years, I have gained a far greater appreciation for the concept. When I am giving a speech, democratic socialism is about creating a world that is both social and democratic in a world which is utterly undemocratic and anti-social. But going further than that, it also speaks to the fact that as human beings living under capitalism we have not had the experience of working in an organization that is democratically operating towards social ends. The life of the average proletarian is one of being told what to do without being able to respond, towards ends which would likely never exist without a profit motive, without the ability to influence the situation around them let alone change what task they are working towards. Indeed, even at the other end, your average manager may have the ability to make decisions but is still unused to that decision being made collaboratively. We are not used to thinking about the organizations which we operate in, either because we have a one-way relationship with those organizations, or because at the top these organizations are reducible to a handful of people working on a handful of projects, and can be worked within in the same way as any group of competing cliques.  So when we are forced to interact with an organization, where not just us but the people around us all have a say in our decisions, we can be instinctively territorial, we can instinctively form into cliques, we can instinctively think not of the wellbeing of us as a collective but just of ourselves and our projects.

It is the task of all of us within the movement to build a collective mind, produced but not reducible to individuals, trained by but not reducible to our experiences, and we only build it by continually working in a democratic way. This means more than voting or reading consensus on something at the point of decision and then dropping democracy afterward. We need to operate democratically throughout every step of the process, from conceptualization to decision-making to implementation. This is not done out of some bleeding heart sentiment that it would be nice to do. We learn from doing, and the more democratic our processes are, the broader they are, the more people are included in that learning. When we make decisions and implement them in a democratic way, the whole group, not just a handful of staffers, organizers, or cadre, learns how to be more capable.  When we work democratically we all learn about ourselves, our projects, the organizations we work in, the society we live in. The more we work democratically the more capable we are at making new decisions collectively, the more nuanced those decisions become. 

Furthermore, we cannot put this off; we cannot wait for some moment to give us permission to flip the democracy switch. We will never be able to competently make collective decisions until we are asked to, until we try to, until we fail to. By making and learning from these decisions, we are able to better our organization’s ability to make future decisions. By fighting and losing in an internal vote and moving together regardless, we learn that our individual opinions are only important insofar as we work towards them, and strive to be better.  Each time we decide on an action together and implement it together in a broad and democratic way, we teach ourselves and our comrades that our decisions matter.  The dispersal of technical skills is an important aspect of this but it is the easiest one of the problems that face us. Dispersing democratic skills is far more pressing.

This is a problem that Scientific Management is unable to solve: it was never meant to build democratic organizations. Its conception of organizations can only be a top-down decision-making apparatus where a handful of people are given the ability to decide on behalf of their inferiors what work will be done and how that work will be done. It is categorically incapable of treating every element of a process as being guided by human beings possessed of agency because it ascribes humanity solely to the manager.  This does not mean it is unscientific, just as with drapetomania it was an attempt to scientifically process an utterly ideological defense of an authoritarian status quo. This is not some revision that was added later, some fall from grace which occurred after scientific management was co-opted by capital. Nor was it some ideologically neutral technology that the Soviet Union was able to use in a substantively different way than the capitalist world. All of the faults and the degeneration that has come later up to the wholesale acceptance of magical thinking regarding willpower stem from the original sin of management thinking: that it was conceived as a justification for class rule.

Scientific management’s inherent flaws do not mean that we cannot learn from it: nearly every theory has embedded presumptions and flaws. Nor does it mean that we cannot hope to create a scientific theory of organizations that work towards the ends of socialism. But we cannot merely declare such a theory, and any such declaration made out of cobbled together past theories will not stick, because such a theory needs to come wholly through us, through our collective decisions and the new perspectives on old questions that such experience gives us. Just as we can only reflect on our collective decisions by doing them, we can only theorize our experiences by reflecting on them. True systematization, the kind of synthesis of theory and practice comrade Davenport speaks to, is not something we can merely jump to. The movement as a whole needs to be developed, not towards Prometheanism or Constructive Socialism specifically but towards a better understanding of itself and the world around it. Perhaps this will move in the direction comrade Davenport points to, perhaps it will not. It is out of the hands of any one person.

As socialists, our ultimate aim should be for the creation of a more humane and democratic world. To steer us there are the human and hopefully democratic organizations we fight within. While we should strive to liberate our comrades from the prison of rule-by-thumb, we should embrace the humanity of the organizations we fight within. We should strive not just to simplify our methods in such a way that the human element of need be abstracted, but to embrace and empower our humanity. 

“Taylor’s System and Organization” by Nadezhda Krupskaya

Translation by Mark Alexandrovich, introduction by Renato Flores. 

Time motion study being performed in the central institute of labor, 1923

Nadezhda Krupskaya is unfairly remembered by the identity of her husband. A glance at her page in Marxists.org predominantly shows texts related to Lenin’s persona. One of her most detailed biographies is titled “Bride of the Revolution”. But as many women of the time who have been written out of history, she was a revolutionary in her own right, standing alongside Alexandra Kollontai or Inessa Armand. She was the chief Bolshevik cryptographer and served as secretary of Iskra for many years. She was hailed by Trotsky as being “in the center of all the organization work”. After the revolution, she contributed decisively to the revamping and democratization of the Soviet library system, always pushing for more campaigns that would increase literacy and general education.

Her persistent interest in education and organization was a result of her life story. Krupskaya was the daughter of a downwardly mobile noble family: her father was a radical army officer, who combated prosecution of Polish Jews and ended up ejected from the government service, and her mother Elizaveta came from a landless noble family. Nadezhda was provided a decent, albeit unsteady education. She was committed to radical politics early on in her life, starting off as a Tolstoyan. Tolstoyism emphasized “going to the people”, so Krupskaya became a teacher to educate Russian peasants and seasonally spend time working in the fields. However, she found it hard to penetrate the peasant mistrust for outsiders and realized this was a political dead end. 

Krupskaya became a Marxist when enmeshed in the radical circles of St. Petersburg. Marxism appealed to her because it provided a methodology for revolution, with its science substituting the failures of Tolstoyan mystique. After her “conversion”, Krupskaya worked as an instructor in the industrial suburbs of St. Petersburg between 1891 and 1896. The “Evening-Sunday school” was financed by a factory owner, and provided evening classes for his workers. Although she nominally taught just reading, writing and basic arithmetic, she would also teach additional illegal classes on leftist topics and helped grow the revolutionary movement. Her first-hand experience in the factories of St. Petersburg would inform her life-long interests, heavily influencing her views on the organization of production.

In this piece, Krupskaya looks at Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management and shows how they could be applied to the Soviet government. The early “collegiality”-based Soviet State was leading to inefficiencies all around, which produced a stagnant and unresponsive bureaucracy. Krupskaya believed that scientifically-driven organization would alleviate these organizational problems, and at the same time raise everyone’s consciousness of the work they were doing. She provided several prescriptions for the organization of production to achieve these goals, as well as a rationale for them.

Taylorism is a dirty word in leftism today. But as Krupskaya did, we have to understand that we should not hate technology itself. Technology is deployed by certain class interests. Krupskaya mentions that workers rightly hated Taylor because the scientific organization of production had been deployed to the advantage of the capitalists. But Krupskaya also believed that Taylorism could be a weapon wielded by the Soviet State so that it could be more responsive to workers’ needs. Taylorism could even be used by the workers themselves to increase productivity and work shorter hours.

Krupskaya was not alone in her support of a Soviet Taylorism. Gastev’s Central Institute of Labor wanted the full application of Taylor’s principles to production as the best way to organize the scarce resources available. Others opposed Taylorism, understanding that it came with insurmountable ideological baggage and would alienate workers from production. This old debate sees new spins played out today in the context of automation. And while there is no longer a Soviet state to organize scientifically, we can still use the principles of Taylorism in our political organizing as Amelia Davenport recently discussed in “Organizing for Power”.


Krupskaya, date unknown

Taylor’s system and organization – Krupskaya N.

The strange thing is that every communist knows that bureaucracy is an extremely negative thing, that it is ruining every living endeavor, that it is distorting all the measures, all the decrees, all the orders, but when the communist starts working in some commissariat or other Soviet institution, he will not have time to look back, as he will see himself half mired in such a hated bureaucratic swamp.

What’s the matter? Who is to blame here – evil saboteurs, old officials who broke into our commissariats, Soviet ladies?

No, the root of bureaucracy lies not in the evil will of one or another person, but in the absence of the ability to systematically and rationally organize the work.

Management is not an easy thing to do. It is a whole science. In order to properly organize the work of an institution, you need to know in detail the work itself, you need to know people, you need to have more perseverance, etc., etc.

We, Russians, have so far been little tempted in this science of management, but without studying it, without learning to manage, we will not move not only to communism, but even to socialism.

We can learn a lot from Taylor, and although he speaks mainly about the way the work is done at the plant, many of the organizational principles he preaches can, and should, be applied to Soviet work.

Here’s what Taylor himself writes about the application of the well-known organizational principles:

“There is no work that cannot be researched to the benefit of the study, to find out the units of time, to divide it into elements… It is also possible to study well, for example, the time of clerical work and to assign a daily lesson to it, despite the fact that at first it seems to be very diverse in nature” (F. Taylor, “Industrial Administration and Technology Organization”, pp. 148).

Already from this quote it is clear that one of the basic principles of F. Taylor considers the decomposition of the work into its elements and the division of labour based on this.

Let’s take the work of people’s commissariats. Undoubtedly, there is a well-known division of labor in them. There is a people’s commissariat, there is a board of commissariats, there are departments, departments are divided into subdivisions, there are secretaries, clerks, typists, reporters, etc. But this, after all, is the coarsest division. Very often there is no borderline between the cases under the jurisdiction of the commissioner, board, department. This is usually determined by somehow eyeballing. The functions of different subdivisions are not always precisely defined and delineated. There are also states. But in most cases, these “states” are very approximate. There is no precise definition of the functions of individual employees at all. Hence, the multiplicity of institutions follows. There are, say, 10 people in an institution, and their functions are not exactly distributed. Eight of them are misinterpreted, the other two are overwhelmed with work over and above measure. The work is moving badly. It seems to the head of the institution that there are not enough people, he takes another ten, but the work is going badly. Why? Because the work is not distributed properly, the employees do not know what to do and how to do it. The swelling of commissariats is a constantly observed fact. But does it work better?

The question of “collegiality and identity”, a question that has grown precisely because of the lack of division of labour, the lack of separation between the functions of the commissioner and the functions of the collegium, the lack of separation between the responsibilities of the collegium and those of the commissioner. A misunderstanding of this seemingly simple thing often leads to administrative fiction. Thus, during the period of discussion in the Council of People’s Commissars of the question of collegiality and identity, one absolutely monstrous project was presented in the Council of People’s Commissars. It proposed to destroy not only the board, but also the heads of departments and subdivisions, it was proposed to leave only the commissioner and technical officers, to whom the people’s commissar had to give direct tasks. This project revealed a complete lack of understanding of the need for a detailed and strict division of labour. The authors wanted to simplify the office, but overlooked one small detail: if there was only a commissioner and technical staff, the commissioner would have to give several thousand tasks to the staff every day. No commissioner can do that.

The division of labour in the factory is very thorough and far-reaching. There, no one will ever doubt the usefulness of such a division.

The division of labour in Soviet institutions is the most crude, and there is no detailed division of functions. It must be created. The responsibilities of each employee should be defined in the most precise way – from the commissioner to the last messenger.

The terms of reference of each employee must be formulated in writing. These responsibilities can be very complex and extensive, but the more important it is to formulate them as precisely as possible. Of course, this applies even more to all sorts of boards, presidiums, etc.

Then F. Taylor insists on an exact instruction, also in writing, indicating in detail how to perform a particular job.

Taylor means the factory enterprise, but this requirement applies to all commissariat work.

“Instructional cards can be used very widely and variedly. They play the same role in the art of management as in the technique of drawing and, like the latter, must change in size and shape to reflect the amount and variety of information it should provide. In some cases, the instruction may include a note written in pencil on a piece of paper that is sent directly to the worker in need of instructions; in other cases, it will contain many pages of typewriter text that have been properly corrected and stitched together and will be issued on the basis of control marks or other established procedures so that it can be used” (Ibid., p. 152).

Just think how much better the introduction of written instructions would be to set up a case in commissariats, how much would it reduce unnecessary conversations, how much accuracy would it bring to it, what would it be a reduction in unproductive waste of time.

Taylor insists on written instructions, reports, etc.

The written report is much more precise and, most importantly, it is recorded. The written form also facilitates control.

Separation of functions, introduction of a written instruction allow assigning less qualified people to one or another job. Taylor says that you can’t “take advantage of the work of a qualified worker where you can put a cheaper and less specialized person. No one would ever think about carrying a load on a trotter and put a draft horse where a small pony is enough. All the more so, a good craftsman should not be allowed to do the work that a laborer is good enough for” (Ibid., p. 30).

To put the right man on the right place”, as the English say, is the task of the administrator. Most commissariats have so-called accounting and distribution departments. These departments should have highly qualified employees who know in detail the work of their commissariat, its needs, who are able to correctly evaluate people, find out their experience, knowledge and so on. This is one of the most important jobs, on which the success of the entire institution depends. Is this understood enough by the commissariats? No. This is occupied by random people.

“No people”, you have to hear it all the time. That’s what bad administrators say. A skilled administrator can also use people with secondary qualifications if he or she is able to instruct them properly and distribute the work among them. There is no doubt,” Taylor writes, “that the average person works best when he or she or someone else is assigning him or her a certain lesson, and that the job must be done by him or her at a certain time. The lower the person’s mental and physical abilities, the shorter the lesson to be assigned” (Ibid., p. 60).

And Taylor gives instructions on how the work should be distributed:

“Every worker, good and mediocre, must learn a certain lesson every day. In no case should it be inaccurate or uncertain. The lesson should be carefully and clearly described and should not be easy…

“Each worker should have a full day’s lesson…

“In order to be able to schedule a lesson for the next day and determine how far the entire plant has moved in one day, workers must submit written information to the accounting department every day, with an exact indication of the work performed” (Ibid., p. 57).

A system of bonus pay is only possible with detailed work distribution and accounting.

In commissariats, the premium system is usually used completely incorrectly. Bonuses are not given for extra hours of work or for more work given out, but are given in the form of an additional salary. One thing that indicates this is that there is no proper distribution of business work in Soviet institutions.

Of course, only those who know the job very well, to the smallest detail, can distribute it correctly.

“The art of management is defined by us as the thorough knowledge of the work you want to give to workers and the ability to do it in the best and most economical way” (Ibid.)

It would seem that this is a matter of course, yet it is almost constantly ignored. Comrades are good administrators and, in general, good workers are constantly moving from one area of work to another: today he works in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, tomorrow in the theater department, the day after tomorrow in supply, then in Supreme Soviet of the National Economy or elsewhere. Before he has time to study a new field of work, he is transferred to a new field of work. It is clear that he cannot do what he could have done if he had worked in the same field for longer.

It is not enough to know people, to have general organizational skills – you need to know this area of work perfectly, only then you can distribute it correctly, instruct correctly, do accounting and supervise it.

Taylor’s control is particularly important. He suggests daily and even twice a day to quality control the work of workers, he insists on the most detailed written reporting, suggests not to be afraid of increasing the number of administrative personnel able to control the work. According to Taylor, the best thing would be if it were possible to organize a purely mechanical quality control (not for nothing, the control clocks are linked to the name of Taylor).

It’s vain to write laws if you don’t obey them. And Taylor understands that all the orders hang in the air, if they are not accompanied by a strictly carried out control.

Meanwhile, in terms of control in commissariats the situation is often very unfavorable.

The purpose of Taylor’s system is to increase the intensity of the worker’s work, to make his work more productive. Its goal is to change the slow pace of work to a faster pace and teach the worker to work without unnecessary breaks, cautiously and cherish every minute.

Of course, Taylor is the enemy of all the time-consuming conversations. He tries to replace oral reports with written ones. Where they are unavoidable, he tries to make them as concise as possible.

“The management system increasingly includes a principle that can be called the “principle of exceptions”. However, like many other elements of the art of governance, it is applied on an ad hoc basis and, for the most part, is not recognized as a principle to be disseminated everywhere. The usual, albeit sad, look is represented by the administrator of a large business, sitting at his desk in good faith in the midst of a sea of letters and reports, on each of which he considers it his duty to sign and initial. He thinks that, having passed through his hands this mass of details, he is quite aware of the whole case. The principle of exceptions represents the exact opposite of this. With him, the manager receives only brief, concise and necessarily comparative information, however, covering all the issues related to management. Even this summary, before it reaches the director, must be carefully reviewed by one of his assistants and must contain the latest data, both good and bad, in comparison with past average figures or with established norms; thus, this information in a few minutes gives him a complete picture of the course of affairs and leaves him free time to reflect on the more general issues of the management system and to study the qualities and suitability of the more responsible, subordinate and employees”. (Ibid., p. 105).

What business-like character would the work of commissariats take if the comrades working there would keep to the “principle of exceptions”?

Let’s sum it up. F. Taylor believes that it is necessary:

1) Decomposition of the work into its simplest elements;

2) the most detailed division of labour based on the study of the work and its decomposition into elements;

3) precise definition of the functions that fall on each employee;

4) definition of these functions in exact written form;

5) Appropriate selection of employees;

6) such distribution of work, so that each employee has as many jobs as he can perform during the day, working at the fastest pace;

7) Continuous instruction by more knowledgeable persons, if possible in writing;

8) systematic, properly organized control;

9) to facilitate its written reporting (as soon as possible);

10) Where possible, mechanization of controls.

“This is what everyone knows,” the reader will say.

But the point is not only to know, but to be able to apply. That’s the whole point.

“No system should be conducted ineptly,” notes Taylor.

Where do you learn to manage? “Unfortunately, there are no management schools, not even a single enterprise to inspect most of the management details that represent the best of their kind” (Ibid., p. 164).

That’s what Taylor says about industry in advanced countries.

Clearly, in Russia, we will not find any samples of the industry, not just of the industry, but of the administrative apparatuses. We need to lay new groundwork here. Through thoughtful attitude to business, taking into account all working conditions, it is necessary to systematically improve the health of Soviet institutions, to expel the shadow of bureaucracy from them. Bureaucracy is not in reporting, not in writing papers, not in distributing functions, in the office – bureaucracy is a negligent attitude to business, confusion and stupidity, inability to work, inability to check the work. You have to learn how to manage, you have to learn how to work. Of course, everything is not done in one go. “It takes time, a lot of time for a fundamental change of control… The change of management is connected with the change of notions, views and customs of many people, ingrained beliefs and prejudices. The latter can only be changed slowly and mainly through a series of subject lessons, each of which takes time, and through constant criticism and discussion. In deciding to apply this type of governance, the necessary steps for this introduction should be taken one by one as soon as possible. You need to be prepared to lose some of your valuable people who will not be able to adapt to the changes, as well as the angry protests of many old, reliable employees who will see nothing but nonsense and ruin in the innovations ahead. It is very important that, apart from the directors of the company, all those involved in management are given a broad and understandable explanation of the main goals that are being achieved and the means that will be applied.

Taylor, as an experienced administrator, understands that the success of the case depends not so much on the individual, but on the sincerity of the entire team.

Only this Taylor’s team limits itself to administrative employees. This is quite understandable. In general, Taylor’s system has not only positive aspects – increasing labor productivity through its scientific formulation, but also negative aspects: increasing labor intensity, and the wage system is built by Taylor so that this increase in intensity benefits not the worker, but the entrepreneur.

The workers understood that Taylor’s system was an excellent sweat squeezing system and fought against it. Since all the production was in the hands of capitalists, the workers were not interested in increasing labor productivity, not interested in the rise of industry. Now, under Soviet rule, when the exploitation of the labor force has been destroyed and when workers are interested to the extreme in the rise of the industry – a team that should consciously relate to the introduction of improving working methods – there should be a team of all the workers of the plant or factory. The capitalist could not rely on the collective of the workers he was exploiting, he relied on the collective of administrative employees who helped him to carry out this exploitation. Now the working collective itself has to apply the most appropriate methods of work. He only needs to be familiarized in theory and practice with these methods. This is production propaganda.

As far as the employees of Soviet institutions and people’s commissariats are concerned, it is necessary to familiarize them with the methods of labor productivity. This falls on the production cell of the collective of employees. But only by raising the level of consciousness of all employees, only by involving them in the work of increasing the productivity of commissariats – it is possible to actually improve the state of affairs and destroy not in words, but in practice, the dead bureaucracy.

 

Organizing for Power: Stealing Fire From the Gods

Amelia Davenport argues for leftist organizers to reclaim the ideas of Taylor’s Scientific Management, making a broader argument for the relevance of cybernetics, cultural revolution in the workers’ movement, and a Promethean vision of socialism. Listen to an interview with the author here

In my article “Where Does Power Come From?”, I discussed how the communist movement should relate to capitalist society. Though I touched on forms of organization suited to the class struggle such as red unions, cooperatives, tenants’ organizations and so on, I neglected discussing how to conduct the class struggle itself. Symptomatic of leftist theory is a tendency to look at the concrete situation, identify the problem, apply a Marxist (or other) analysis, and present a conclusion to the world. This tendency, however, represents a petty-bourgeois outlook where intellectuals present ideas that they expect workers to struggle toward on their own merits. It is a rationalistic method rather than a scientific approach to organizing. But, while abstract discussion has a role, organizing is a practical science. What is missing is how to get from here to there. While programmatic vision is important for giving direction to organizing,  it is impossible to realize your goals without systemic analysis. If you aren’t concretely building towards your goals, everything you say is hot air. 

To rectify my failure to bridge the gap between conditions and goals in “Where Does Power Come From,” I surveyed organizational theory. This included both works by major communist thinkers and bourgeois social scientists. Turning to classics like Mao’s On Practice, Bordiga’s The Democratic Principle, and Lenin’s What is to Be Done? was both illuminating and frustrating. These texts either present ready-made tactics or focus on abstract political questions. While they offered useful principles, they didn’t present a useful methodology for reaching new conclusions. On the other hand, when I turned to bourgeois social science, I found a decided lack of social analysis, but a wealth of systemic thought. Bourgeois theorists like Niklas Luhmann use logic and empirical research more advanced than the classics of the communist movement and show how to do the same, but fail to grapple with class contradictions. Even the socialist cybernetician Stafford Beer naively believed in the possibility of a peaceful democratic transition even after the military coup against the Allende government smashed his economic reforms in Chile to bits. Modern theorists of social organization are rarely, if ever, discussed by communists. The movement seems to favor focusing exclusively on a select canon that discovered the truth for all times and places. Leftists ignore almost anyone outside the canon except one theorist who they discuss with the most extreme bile and invective. He is Fredrick Winslow Taylor, father of task management, and one of the most reviled social scientists in the workers’ movement. Whether it is his identification with the Bolshevik government’s turn toward labor discipline or the belief that he is personally responsible for the fact you have to file TPS reports, there is no doubt that Taylor was Satan on furlough from Hell. As all leftists are contrarians, I studied the nature of Taylorism to see if it was of any use to our movement or if it was capitalist hogwash like many believe.

Taylorism and Scientific Management 

In Principles of Scientific Management, delivered to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Fredrick Winslow Taylor outlines the nature and methods of his revolutionary framework for the improvement of the world production system. But before he explores concrete steps and methods, Taylor articulates his intention and vision. Taylor wasn’t a socialist, but neither was he a fascist or unsympathetic to the conditions of workers. He wasn’t merely a stooge of capitalist class interests either; he was an ambivalent figure. His goals were threefold: 

1) “Maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with maximum prosperity for each employee.” 

2) Transforming work so that workers would no longer be either over-strained through exertion or wasting their own time 

3) Improving general labor productivity so that the standard of living of the average person might grow through price reduction. 

It was Taylor’s belief that by increasing the efficiency of firms, both employers and the workers would benefit. Firms could sell goods faster with a smaller expenditure of labor and equitably distribute the gains.

While Taylor largely saw trade unions as a fetter on industrial progress and representing narrow, selfish interests, he recognized that managers and capitalists abused their workers and exploited them. He believed that the introduction of scientific management would heal the contradiction in interests between labor and capital, rationalizing the labor process for the benefit of both. Like his enemies in the American Federation of Labor, Taylor believed that class conflict was reconcilable through the provision of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work.” However, he saw the act of “soldiering”, defined as worker resistance to giving full labor capacity to the capitalists, as the principal obstacle rather than under-incentivization through low wages. The three evils which Taylor cites as the cause of “soldiering” are: 

1) The fallacy that increasing the material output of labor will result in higher unemployment 

2) The defective systems of management which make it necessary for workers to work as little as possible to protect their own interests 

3) “Rule of thumb” methods which cause people to waste their efforts for little purpose. 

Taylor claims that there are two immediate reasons people “soldier.” First, there’s “systemic soldiering”, where workers collectively discipline one another to work slower so that there’s work for all. Second is the fact that employers set a fixed wage for a given quantity of labor time (or amount of goods that the capitalist thinks workers can produce in that amount of time in a piece-work system) largely based on past rates. This means the workers have an incentive to produce as little as possible in a given period so has to avoid working harder for no extra reward in the future. Taylor claims that the only recourse employers have in this scenario is the threat of unemployment which pits management and workers against each other. Conversely, while the “whip” of unemployment drives the workers, management remains “hands-off” and leaves the full responsibility of completing the work to the workers themselves. Management fails to educate workers in the best methods to conduct work with their expanded knowledge of the labor process. Managers also fail to understand the condition of the labor and thereby fail to direct it properly, furthering conflict. Instead, Taylor recommends management share in work equitably. Despite recognizing that antagonism between workers and employers exists, Taylor believes this antagonism is solvable.

To socialists, the notion that the contradiction between labor and capital is reconcilable by improving the lot of labor within capitalism is prima facie incorrect.  But must we toss out the entirety of Taylorism as a bourgeois scam? What about conditions where the contradiction between capital and labor is nonexistent, such as a socialist society where the cooperative commonwealth of toil reigns, or within the organizations of militants struggling to overthrow capitalism? 

Implementing Taylorist methods

Dispelling Myths

Scientific Management

Setting these questions aside for now, we will look at what scientific management is and what it is not. For Taylor, scientific management is emphatically not a set of techniques that an organization can adopt to improve efficiency and profit. Instead, scientific management is a philosophy of organization which when applied to different contexts and with different objectives necessarily requires different techniques. This isn’t unlike Marxism, which, as a scientific philosophy, requires a creative application and offers different strategies depending on the objective conditions. While in one context standardizing the motions used for say shoveling coal might both improve the output and decrease the strain on the body of the worker, in another context standardizing motions, like in detail painting, might produce the opposite effect. In particular, Taylor concerns himself with the misapplication of techniques creating dissatisfaction among workers. Issues could emerge from a lack of proper education on the benefits of a given techniques or through the introduction of harmful methods. Certain techniques may cause harm to workers without the use of other innovations that address these problems. Taylor claims that his philosophy can revolutionize production if applied properly.

Understanding scientific management’s role requires knowing what it replaced. Before Taylor, employers organized labor based on what Taylor calls “management by initiative and incentive.” Initiative is the “hard work, good-will, and ingenuity” of the workers. In trades where there is no systemic organization of labor, it is each worker who has in their possession the accumulated knowledge, built up over generations, for how to conduct the work. It is on the workers’ own individual initiative that they labor. Management’s role is motivating workers to use their knowledge and physical skill to complete the work. Even if a firm draws management from the ranks of the most skilled workers, they cannot hope to match the combined knowledge of their employees. Managers have three tools in this system: 

1) Positive incentives like the promise of promotions, raises, and better personal working conditions relative to other workers 

2) Negative incentives like the threat of firing or loss of pay 

3) The personal charisma of the manager and rapport they build with the workers.

If a firm doesn’t wish to pay beyond the average, it must surveil its workers so they tear into the work. A firm using this model relies on spies who hope for personal advancement. 

Now, what does scientific management philosophy itself consist of? Listening to some leftists, you’d think it was totalitarian-rational control over the bodies of workers to extract ever-increasing labor or a synonym for the increased domination of capital over the lives of workers. This couldn’t be further from the truth. In reality, one of Taylor’s goals was the education of workers so they can control and discipline their own actions. More than anything, scientific management is the systemic organization and rationalization of the tasks of labor so that they can be divided equitably according to ability. Rationalizing production also ensures laborers meet the needs of the productive process. There is a diverse array of elements that scientific managers must utilize in concert or else the system will fail to produce the desired results. In Taylor’s vision, the principal aspects of scientific management are:

1) The development of a true science (of the particular labor process);

2) The scientific selection of workers and the scientific education and development of the workers;

3) Intimate, friendly cooperation between management and the workers. 

Initiative and Incentive in Leftist Organizing

The “initiative and incentive” model of management is the standard method of leftist groups. “Organizers,” through their personal charisma and promise of winning immediate gains, incentivize people to use their initiative towards their campaigns. Group members receive general tasks and an expectation to complete them, either by themselves or with a few other people. It doesn’t matter whether it’s the top-down orders of the leadership or democratic vote by the group; activists are tacitly encouraged to take on an unsustainable load, leading to burnout. Organizers don’t teach activists to draw healthy boundaries between their own needs and what is reasonable to contribute. If they don’t burn out, activists drop out as they lose interest in work that comes to seem increasingly futile. Motivating activists in leftist organizations is a mixture of generating enthusiasm through charismatic interventions by leaders (whether they consider themselves leaders or not) or through peer pressure and guilt which organizers leverage to build commitment. The routine “cancellation” of leftists by activists and policing of cultural consumption are examples of mechanisms for disciplining activists to the will of organizers. While leaders may participate in the work directly, in vanguardist sects their role is to focus on developing theory and broad strategy. In the case of horizontal sects, organizers perform the same work as other rank-and-file members to the same results. How the socialist left can escape this trap will be further explored later in the text.

Can Labor Be Scientific?

To understand scientific management, these elements must be explained in turn. 

The development of a true science of labor is the cornerstone of the philosophy of scientific management. After “soldiering” by workers and management based on incentivization, the greatest object of scorn in Taylor’s mind is the “rule of thumb” method of organizing work. Most work before Taylorism was conducted based on “common sense” and received wisdom. But the distribution of this “wisdom” is uneven and varies based on the prejudices and experience of those retaining it. For instance, one restaurant might at the start of the day employ the chef to chop a particular vegetable, while another might employ a sous-chef to chop the vegetable as needed as a part of their varied tasks throughout the day. Neither restaurant knows the better method, nor if there might be a third option which could prove superior. To develop a science, a restaurant would test the different methods of preparation to see which wasted the least material and used the fewest net hours of labor to create a saleable product.  

In leftist organizing, rules of thumb constitute the predominant method used by semi-successful sects. More often though, leftists don’t even rise to the level of handmade or received philosophies on the subject and are either re-inventing the wheel or engaging in senseless activities. To illustrate, some communists believe that the creation and distribution of ironic memes constitute revolutionary activity or that taking on unpaid moderator positions for social media companies meaningfully contributes to the class struggle. 

What are some examples of rules of thumb that leftists employ? Today these examples manifest as the various tactics taken as articles of faith by organized leftist groups. Of particular note is the theory of the “vanguard party,” along with its necessary complement, “democratic centralism” (and sometimes the “mass line”). Many sects define themselves by tactics like newspaper sales, electoral campaigns, entryism into business unions, and so on. They take these tactics as articles of received wisdom from whichever communist saint they believe the “red thread” of revolutionary legitimacy passes through. Anarchists are by no means exempt from this. Their fetishes of decentralization, “grassroots” organization (something shared with many Trotskyist and Maoist sects), propaganda of the deed, syndicalism, direct service projects, and permaculture serve the same role. This doesn’t mean that any of these listed articles of faith are wrong. It is  possible that in different contexts each may be a necessary tactic or method. Through the application of social scientific analysis, we may discover that in one set of conditions the development of localized food systems is part and parcel of the socialist transformation of society. On the other hand, it may be the case that centralized agriculture is the best way to sustainably feed the masses while using as little land as possible. More important than any given conclusion is how we reach those conclusions, because it means that as conditions change, so too can the strategies the revolutionary movement uses to meet those conditions. 

After we tentatively settle these broad strategic questions, we must uproot rules of thumb within the application of strategy. Take the mass line. Instead of the Maoist slogan “from the masses, to the masses,” which a skilled organizer must interpret based on repeated trial and error, the mass line should incorporate real social psychology, systemic investigation, and quantitative analysis. Simply gathering demands of workers and reformulating them in the language of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is not scientific. Better would be breaking down the aspects of the mass line into its constituent parts and systematizing them. If made scientific, any worker could use the mass line, not just skilled organizers. An outline of a scientific mass line is: 1) the social inquiry; 2) finding winnable demands; and 3) organizing for the identified demands. Each of these three components themselves involve considerable work and analysis. To begin a social inquiry, an organizer must 1) identify and assess their constituency; 2) determine what questions they want to ask; and 3) determine how to reach the masses. Breaking down the other two sections will likewise be necessary. This will extend down to concrete tasks like canvassing a specific neighborhood or conducting a workers’ inquiry. It is by breaking things into their constituent parts that we can begin to understand a strategy and test methods and develop a true science of that particular type of organization. 

Taylor applied the scientific organization of labor at Bethlehem Steel. He started by developing an improved method of shoveling pig iron. This was an opportunity afforded by a rapid spike in demand for the product after years of a glut:

We found that this gang were loading on the average about 12 ½ long tons per man per day. We were surprised to find, after studying the matter, that a first-class pig-iron handler ought to handle between 47 and 48 long tons per day, instead of 12 ½ tons. This task seemed to us so very large that we were obliged to go over our work several times before we were absolutely sure that we were right. Once we were sure, however, that 47 tons was a proper day’s work for a first-class pig-iron handler, the task which faced us as managers under the modern scientific plan was clearly before us. It was our duty to see that the 80,000 tons of pig iron was loaded on to the cars at the rate of 47 tons per man per day, in place of 12 ½ tons, at which rate the work was then being done. And it was further our duty to see that this work was done without bringing on a strike among the men, without any quarrel with the men, and to see that the men were happier and better contented when loading at the new rate of 47 tons than they were when loading at the old rate of 12 ½ tons.

Before Taylor began working at Bethlehem Steel, he had discovered the scientific law governing high-strain labor. High-strain labor is the kind that involves lifting heavy objects or pushing for a continuous period. Taylor began this study to reconcile the interests of management, on whose side he stood, with the interests of the laborers. Management wanted a higher output and laborers wanted to not be overworked. Workers saw no real benefit to intensifying their labor, which Taylor recognized. He attempted to calculate a specific amount of horsepower a worker could exert in a day without damaging their body. But this was to no avail: despite finding much useful data in his experiments, Taylor and his team could find no rule that governed how hard someone could work in strenuous activity by themselves. So they brought in a mathematician named Carl G. Barth. Because of Barth’s mathematical knowledge, the team represented the data graphically and through curve charts. This allowed the engineers to identify the factors which determine the principle law of high-strain labor. Taylor says:

The law is confined to that class of work in which the limit of a man’s capacity is reached because he is tired out. It is the law of heavy laboring, corresponding to the work of the cart horse, rather than that of the trotter. Practically all such work consists of a heavy pull or a push on the man’s arms, that is, the man’s strength is exerted by either lifting or pushing something which he grasps in his hands. And the law is that for each given pull or push on the man’s arms it is possible for the workman to be under load for only a definite percentage of the day. For example, when pig iron is being handled (each pig weighing 92 pounds), a firstclass workman can only be under load 43 per cent. of the day. He must be entirely free from load during 57 per cent. of the day. And as the load becomes lighter, the percentage of the day under which the man can remain under load increases. So that, if the workman is handling a half-pig, weighing 46 pounds, he can then be under load 58 per cent. of the day, and only has to rest during 42 per cent. As the weight grows lighter the man can remain under load during a larger and larger percentage of the day, until finally a load is reached which he can carry in his hands all day long without being tired out. When that point has been arrived at this law ceases to be useful as a guide to a laborer’s endurance, and some other law must be found which indicates the man’s capacity for work.

When a laborer is carrying a piece of pig iron weighing 92 pounds in his hands, it tires him about as much to stand still under the load as it does to walk with it, since his arm muscles are under the same severe tension whether he is moving or not. A man, however, who stands still under a load is exerting no horse-power whatever, and this accounts for the fact that no constant relation could be traced in various kinds of heavy laboring work between the foot-pounds of energy exerted and the tiring effect of the work on the man. It will also be clear that in all work of this kind it is necessary for the arms of the workman to be completely free from load (that is, for the workman to rest) at frequent intervals. Throughout the time that the man is under a heavy load the tissues of his arm muscles are in process of degeneration, and frequent periods of rest are required in order that the blood may have a chance to restore these tissues to their normal condition.

It is in this way that Taylor and his associates scientifically organized the work of pig-iron handlers. This is not the only example he provides in Principles of Scientific Management; Taylor also discusses the application of the method to skilled work. At a manufacturer of machines, he set out to double the output using the same number of workers and machines as before. Despite the fact the foreman doubted the possibility, Taylor proved his claims through a demonstration on a machine selected by the foreman:

The machine selected by him fairly represented the work of the shop. It had been run for ten- or twelve-years past by a first-class mechanic who was more than equal in his ability to the average workmen in the establishment. In a shop of this sort, in which similar machines are made over and over again, the work is necessarily greatly subdivided, so that no one man works upon more than a comparatively small number of parts during the year. A careful record was therefore made, in the presence of both parties, of the time actually taken in finishing each of the parts which this man worked upon. The total time required by him to finish each piece, as well as the exact speeds and feeds which he took, were noted, and a record was kept of the time which he took in setting the work in the machine and removing it. After obtaining in this way a statement of what represented a fair average of the work done in the shop, we applied to this one machine the principles of scientific management.

By means of four quite elaborate slide-rules, which have been especially made for the purpose of determining the all-round capacity of metal-cutting machines, a careful analysis was made of every element of this machine in its relation to the work in hand. Its pulling power at its various speeds, its feeding capacity, and its proper speeds were determined by means of the slide-rules, and changes were then made in the countershaft and driving pulleys so as to run it at its proper speed. Tools, made of high-speed steel, and of the proper shapes, were properly dressed, treated, and ground. (It should be understood, however, that in this case the high-speed steel which had heretofore been in general use in the shop was also used in our demonstration.) A large special slide-rule was then made, by means of which the exact speeds and feeds were indicated at which each kind of work could be done in the shortest possible time in this particular lathe. After preparing in this way so that the workman should work according to the new method, one after another, pieces of work were finished in the lathe, corresponding to the work which had been done in our preliminary trials, and the gain in time made through running the machine according to scientific principles ranged from two and one-half times the speed in the slowest instance to nine times the speed in the highest.

But Taylor’s reforms involved more than changes to the machines. The principle aspect was the mental change scientific management produced in the workers. On the one hand, it required workers to endorse using scientifically selected hand motions, and on the other it needed a mental investment in the new system. Each worker received on average 35 percent greater wages but produced over double the amount of goods in the same time. This motivation to contribute a greater force of labor is as important as any technical improvements to the forces of production to scientific management. But also key is how  Taylor brought in unskilled laborers to work on the improved machines rather than the skilled workers previously employed. Elevating people from lower to higher work increased buy-in and expanded the labor pool available for this work and proletarianized the formerly skilled artisans. In this way, Taylorism has a dual character. Under capitalism, it increases the exploitation of labor by intensifying work while costing skilled tradesmen their jobs. But, Taylorism also makes work accessible to a broader array of workers while also growing real wages as a share of the increased productivity. It is not unlike how Marx observed that the concentration of the forces of production by capitalism itself both impoverished the working class but also creates the means by which the working class can achieve abundance. 

The Social Division of Labor 

It is important to ground ourselves in the real experiences of the working class with the technologies that govern our lives. Within an Amazon fulfillment center, the labor discipline imposed through intensified and semi-automated task-management creates conditions that are degrading and inhumane. Workers have every moment of their time monitored and directed towards only those activities which are necessary to fill orders. In real terms this means people driven to exhaustion and nervous collapse so that the firm can extract more money faster. It may appear that these technologies are the source of workplace oppression, enforcing incessant imperatives towards productivity. Yet behind this imperative towards productivity is the same logic of capital that existed before the introduction of these technologies.  Many on the Left have the mistaken belief that a return to less technically developed forms of labor would restore dignity. It’s a sad mistake. While they have more autonomy than fulfillment workers, capitalism drives in-home hospice nurses to the same level of desperation as Amazon workers. Hospice nurses, working out of a hospital in my own area, are reduced to pissing themselves to fulfill their unrealistic quotas. They simply don’t have time to take breaks in between patients. Even as these nurses are driven to such degrading lows on the clock, ever more necessary paperwork is shifted off the clock so that the hospital can extract more unpaid work. There are no electronic monitoring systems guiding workers there, and they don’t even work under a supervisor. Yet the same basic logic of capital accumulation creates almost identical subjective effects. Even though the nurses have employer-matched retirement savings, high wages, healthcare, and more autonomy, they are still brutally exploited within the labor process. Conversely, when the confluence of history combined task management with powerful labor unions during the postwar compromise, the technical division of labor became a source of workers’ empowerment. Unions could prevent managers from shifting unpaid work onto employees by contractually limiting them to only the specific work in their job description, the very descriptions that the Taylorist system created. Anti-union pundits cite this as an example of economic irrationality, but it meant more free time within the labor process and a general lower intensity of labor. This is why Marx, though sympathetic to their plight, spoke of the futility of the Luddites. They were militant artisans, followers of a mythic “King Ludd” who smashed the machines used to simplify and intensify their labor. Rather than a return to artisanal labor, Marx called for the overthrow of capitalism. Instead of smashing machines, the answer was a transfer of control over the instruments of labor to those who used them. 

While it contains an emancipatory current within it, Taylor’s thought also contains elements that serve to buttress bourgeois society against this current. These come to the fore in his views on the division of labor. Taylor claims that neither the de-skilled laborers who took over the work, nor the narrowly skilled laborers using the old methods, understand the science necessary to systematically improve their work due to their narrow specialization. He says:

It seems important to fully explain the reason why, with the aid of a slide-rule, and after having studied the art of cutting metals, it was possible for the scientifically equipped man, who had never before seen these particular jobs, and who had never worked on this machine, to do work from two and one-half to nine times as fast as it had been done before by a good mechanic who had spent his whole time for some ten to twelve years in doing this very work upon this particular machine. In a word, this was possible because the art of cutting metals involves a true science of no small magnitude, a science, in fact, so intricate that it is impossible for any machinist who is suited to running a lathe year in and year out either to understand it or to work according to its laws without the help of men who have made this their specialty. Men who are unfamiliar with machine-shop work are prone to look upon the manufacture of each piece as a special problem, independent of any other kind of machine-work. They are apt to think, for instance, that the problems connected with making the parts of an engine require the especial study, one may say almost the life study, of a set of engine-making mechanics, and that these problems are entirely different from those which would be met with in machining lathe or planer parts. In fact, however, a study of those elements which are peculiar either to engine parts or to lathe parts is trifling, compared with the great study of the art, or science, of cutting metals, upon a knowledge of which rests the ability to do really fast machine-work of all kinds.

The real problem is how to remove chips fast from a casting or a forging, and how to make the piece smooth and true in the shortest time, and it matters but little whether the piece being worked upon is part, say, of a marine engine, a printing-press, or an automobile. For this reason, the man with the slide-rule, familiar with the science of cutting metals, who had never before seen this particular work, was able completely to distance the skilled mechanic who had made the parts of this machine his specialty for years.

It is true that whenever intelligent and educated men find that the responsibility for making progress in any of the mechanic arts rests with them, instead of upon the workmen who are actually laboring at the trade, that they almost invariably start on the road which leads to the development of a science where, in the past, has existed mere traditional or rule-of-thumb knowledge. When men, whose education has given them the habit of generalizing and everywhere looking for laws, find themselves confronted with a multitude of problems, such as exist in every trade and which have a general similarity one to another, it is inevitable that they should try to gather these problems into certain logical groups, and then search for some general laws or rules to guide them in their solution. As has been pointed out, however, the underlying principles of the management of “initiative and incentive,” that is, the underlying philosophy of this management, necessarily leaves the solution of all of these problems in the hands of each individual workman, while the philosophy of scientific management places their solution in the hands of the management. The workman’s whole time is each day taken in actually doing the work with his hands, so that, even if he had the necessary education and habits of generalizing in his thought, he lacks the time and the opportunity for developing these laws, because the study of even a simple law involving say time study requires the cooperation of two men, the one doing the work while the other times him with a stop-watch. And even if the workman were to develop laws where before existed only rule-of-thumb knowledge, his personal interest would lead him almost inevitably to keep his discoveries secret, so that he could, by means of this special knowledge, personally do more work than other men and so obtain higher wages.

Under scientific management, on the other hand, it becomes the duty and also the pleasure of those who are engaged in the management not only to develop laws to replace rule of thumb, but also to teach impartially all of the workmen- who are under them the quickest ways of working. The useful results obtained from these laws are always so great that any company can well afford to pay for the time and the experiments needed to develop them. Thus under scientific management exact scientific knowledge and methods are everywhere, sooner or later, sure to replace rule of thumb, whereas under the old type of management working in accordance with scientific laws is an impossibility.

Taylor’s logic here is that it takes education in the general principles that govern something to understand it and create a particular science, that the average worker would not have this knowledge, and that even if they did, they could not deploy it while working full-time in their trade. For him, this means that it is necessary to employ scientists as managers for the supervision of labor. Though blinded by his petty-bourgeois class position, believing that only a certain class of men could do science, Taylor is grasping towards a truth essential to the foundation of the communist worldview. We must create universal and general science, and only with a holistic vision can we solve the problems of social organization. The narrow views of individual positions aren’t enough. Taylor’s objection to the educated machine-worker being able to apply science to his work dissolves when applying the labor-saving potential of increased productivity to the reduction of the workday. With a reduced workday, any given worker would have the free time to “take a stop-watch” to conduct time studies for figuring out better methods. Likewise, in the co-operative commonwealth, as workers collectively own production, so too do they directly benefit from the generalization of labor-saving techniques. The question isn’t whether or not time and motions are measured, it’s “who controls the time and motions?”

Taylor’s first step in introducing scientific management was to scientifically select the workers who would be most likely be able to handle the higher rate of pig-iron and had an industrious character. Taylor and his associates took each man for training, one at a time, because the object of scientific management is developing each person according to their ability rather than treating people as uniform cogs in a machine. They began by promising their first subject, Schmidt, an increase in pay in exchange for following their explicit instructions. As someone particularly motivated by money, Schmidt assented. Rather than try to convince and motivate him to increase his output to a level much higher than was normal, Taylor sought to show his subject in practice that he was capable of doing so and how to do it.

Schmidt started to work, and all day long, at regular intervals, was told by the man who stood over him with a watch, “Now pick up a pig and walk. Now sit down and rest. Now walk — now rest,” etc. He worked when he was told to work, and rested when he was told to rest, and at half-past five in the afternoon had his 47 ½ tons loaded on the car. And he practically never failed to work at this pace and do the task that was set him during the three years that the writer was at Bethlehem. And throughout this time he averaged a little more than $1.85 per day, whereas before he had never received over $1.15 per day, which was the ruling rate of wages at that time in Bethlehem. That is, he received 60 per cent. higher wages than were paid to other men who were not working on task work. One man after another was picked out and trained to handle pig iron at the rate of 47 ½ tons per day until all of the pig iron was handled at this rate, and the men were receiving 60 per cent more wages than other workmen around them.

Taylor believed that those best suited to arduous manual labor were also least suited to intellectually understanding the science of labor that they were enacting. He compares their minds to those of oxen. There is no doubt that Taylor, a man of the early 20th century, not unlike many Marxists at the time, subscribed to eugenicist and elitist views of human biology. Taylor, contra Marx, but in conformity with bourgeois and aristocratic theories of social organization, believed that individuals are meant to specialize within narrow trades that they are optimally suited for. He wasn’t merely a proponent of the technical division of labor; he was a proponent of the social division of labor. Though we can and should dispense with the eugenicist bias in Taylor’s own approach, it does not mean that scientific selection itself isn’t a necessary part of organizing any large-scale endeavor. People have different inclinations, different traits, and different areas in which they have developed themselves. One person might be stronger physically than another, or more gifted with languages. However, these differences are not the sole domain of genetics or other immutable factors, and they do not create an intractable hierarchy of capacity. While within one’s own organism one might have a lower ability to lift heavy objects than another, our society has developed countless methods of adaptation to render this difference superfluous. An ever-growing number of people use prosthetics and other forms of technology to enhance their natural capacities. Likewise, one might have a poor memory, but by maintaining a journal or notepad there’s no functional difference in outcomes compared to someone with an average memory when trying to recall a piece of information. Humans have always been cyborgs. It isn’t anything innate to a particular human organism that enables this, but rather collective intelligence and cooperation which gives rise to the overcoming of limitations. Likewise, jargon simplifies and eases the work for people with a sufficient background but excludes those without it. Many of the barriers to learning are artificial and socially established. According to Taylor, Schmidt could never understand why he should take regular breaks when he worked. He would naturally over-strain himself by laboring as hard as possible straight through. But this strains credulity. It seems more like a failure on the part of Taylor to adequately explain his science. Or maybe Taylor’s narrative is a post hoc justification for capital’s unwillingness to allow him to train men like Schmidt to run production by themselves. 

Art from Soviet science magazine Tekhnika Molodezhi

Class Leadership

For revolutionaries, the uneven distribution of skill is a challenge to overcome. The ability to conduct a meeting, do accounting, create propaganda, give a speech, take minutes, edit a publication, maintain a community garden, and so on are skills which it is necessary for as many members of the movement to possess as possible. Some people may have an inclination towards one area, but it is critical for organizers to move beyond their comfort zones and take on new expertise. Revolutionary organizations must not end up dependent on a few people. But just as much as up-skilling members, it means de-skilling the work. Simplifying meeting procedure, using QuickBooks, fundraising through Chuffed, employing automated graphic design templates on Canva, using an email marketing platform like MailChimp, and so on are examples of how we can streamline the necessary work of organization. 

But, while communists must discard Taylor’s commitment to an essentialist view of ability, individuals do have different attributes which make them suited for different kinds of work. Proven loyalty and soundness are as important as skill and inclination. Soundness is a function of how good someone’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness are. Taylor does not address this area because in capitalist firms the threat of termination and promise of financial promotion is enough to discipline most workers. Many tasks involve levels of responsibility that require a significant amount of trust. In revolutionary situations, peoples’ lives are in the hands of leaders and seasoned people are needed for those jobs. Likewise, not just anyone can serve as the public face of a campaign; considerations like public image and personal reliability become far more important in such situations. If it came out that the spokesperson for a tenant’s rights group had, unbeknownst to their comrades, threatened or assaulted their landlord, it could serve to discredit the entire organization in the eyes of the public. Just as important when it comes to soundness are roles involving financial responsibility. All too often in the movement have charismatic people wormed their way into positions of trust from which they can embezzle from or defraud their comrades for selfish aims. Louis C. Fraina is a famous example from the early movement in the US. Fraina helped found the Communist Party out of the left-wing of the Socialist Party. As an agent of the Communist International in Mexico, he embezzled considerable funds. Fraina was a gifted writer and speaker which fooled the far-off Comintern officials into trusting him despite the suspicions of the comrades he worked with. After being cleared of charges of being a spy for the US government, he stole between four and fourteen thousand dollars.1 Fraina quit the movement, claiming that factionalism and dogmatism drove him away. Even though Fraina was seen as too suspect and divisive to return to the American party, and clearly had factors pushing him away from unity with his comrades, the Comintern foolishly trusted him with an enormous sum of money. 

Soundness is a framework for scientific selection that allows us to attenuate (though not eliminate) the negative effects of personality and personal relationships in leadership. It’s through objective metrics without relying on the essentialization of traits that we can measure soundness. This is not to deny that there is a rational kernel to personality politics; collegiality is a factor in determining reliability. If someone is unable to work with others in a friendly or respectful manner, they can’t accomplish the goal of collective liberation. Likewise, there is a real basis for looking at ability when determining qualification for a job. Education and what innate gifts one brings to the table have a serious impact on one’s ability to accomplish a task. If you understand how to do double-entry bookkeeping, you can consistently do good accounting. If you have gifts in mathematics, you will be better able to adapt to situations where aids like computer software aren’t available. Regardless, it is important to keep three things in mind when discussing individual ability:

1) Any individual can be elevated to a higher level of competence through education. 

2) Many of the obstacles to functional ability are artificial. Society creates barriers through social dynamics like unnecessary formalization or insufficient clarity. 

3) Access can be expanded in any type of work; it’s just a matter of committing resources to do so. 

Action proves reliability. If someone shows they can handle smaller tasks with lower stakes, the movement can trust them with larger, complex tasks. But, failing to complete tasks isn’t an individual moral failing. Their comrades should apply themselves to solving the issue of reliability. We solve problems by identifying the concrete source of the issue and mitigating or solving it. When someone repeatedly fails to show up to actions because of parental responsibilities, providing childcare may be an appropriate solution. If a union committee member fails to do a one-on-one they signed up for out of nervousness, it is an opportunity to boost their morale and confidence. Increasing reliability has positive benefits for individuals just as much as for the group; it serves as a direct and immediate means to transformatively benefit those who participate in class struggle.

It is all well and good to talk about soundness in the abstract, but if we are to take anything positive from Taylorism it is the impetus toward quantifiable metrics and concrete rubrics. What does that look like in practice? The best example we have today is the ranking system promoted in the Industrial Workers of the World’s “Organizer Training 101.” In union campaigns, the fulcrum of the organizing effort is a select group of the most class conscious and reliable members of the shop. This group, referred to as the “committee,” conducts repeated and sustained analysis of the conditions of the shop to guide strategy. Most important for our purposes is the “assessment.” When a committee assesses someone in the shop, they assign them a rank between one and six. This rank is based on how committed to the union a worker is. The most committed people in the shop are 1s while the most hostile are 5s. 6s are those whose position the committee is ignorant of. Committee members don’t assess someone’s position on expressed sentiments alone, though they do take statements of sympathy or opposition into consideration. To be a 1, you have to both express sympathy and do concrete tasks for the union. Taking on tasks not only shows support beyond words, it builds commitment and creates a stake in the success of the union. Everyone in the committee must be a 1 and the committee should include as many of the 1s as is feasible once it begins to become more public. To be a 2 you need to have expressed support for the union and not have recently done any tasks to support it; it is possible to go down from a 1 to a 2 if you repeatedly fail to do your tasks or refuse to take any on. A 3 is someone who is at an intermediate level of alignment to the campaign and either has stated that they have no opinion or has given mixed opinions but has taken no action either way. A 4 is someone who has expressed negative views about the union, unions in general, or the actions of the committee but who has taken no concrete actions against the union. Organizers should never write off 4s, and through the course of a campaign, they can often become 1s. A 5 has taken concrete steps against the union or their coworkers. They might have snitched on someone, tried to talk a coworker out of supporting the union, or engaged in bigoted behavior. Sometimes 5s can be won over and the committee should make every effort to do so, but as long as they are 5s the committee needs to marginalize them within the shop. Quarantining the destructive behavior of 5s is critical. Every member of the committee should rank each member of the shop, including themselves. This helps mitigate biases and allows cross-comparison. Often one organizer will have different information than another or interpret the same information differently. This ranking system allows the organization to strategize with real data and figure out what actions to take to uplift their coworkers to a greater level of reliability. The IWW ranking system is just one example of how to quantify soundness in a simple, straightforward, and easy to implement manner.

If we use reliability as our metric for selection and seek to break down the social division of labor, it is necessary to build up reliability among all cadre and members of working-class organizations. And if reliability is a priority, how is it cultivated in practice? Here Taylor comes back into the picture. Within scientific management, the individual scientific education and training of workers is fundamental. This has three principal goals: 

1) To teach workers the means to conduct their work according to the methods developed through scientific analysis;

2) To demonstrate to workers why these new methods are superior to the old methods while avoiding industrial disruption due to insufficient support built up for the new system;

3) To continually ensure that workers can meet the challenges of production.

Basic to the framework of scientific management is treating each worker as an individual whose needs in the labor process are unique, not as an interchangeable cog. Training in scientific management takes three forms:

1) The elevation of a worker from the old rule-of-thumb methods to scientific methods; 

2) Functional supervision which breaks up the tasks of management into several roles;

3) Giving each worker detailed and specific instructions for the work they are to carry out each day on a card. 

By breaking down the work into clear and understandable instructions, people can immediately begin their assigned tasks and complete them with as little room for error as possible. People don’t generally want to have to figure out each necessary task for themselves every time they work. It is much more desirable to just know how you can contribute. These components are important for any organization that wants to ensure its members use their limited time as effectively as possible.

Building Our Communities

If the “management by initiative and incentive” so dominant on the left is ineffective, how do we motivate people to take on tasks? There are two methods to use in conjunction. The first is to identify and constitute a community of shared interests. Let’s use the example of a labor union. Labor unions root themselves in the shared interests of the workers against the bosses. Likewise, a tenants union grows from a shared interest against the landlords, a serve-the-people grocery project comes from the shared interest in ending the risk of hunger in one’s own community, and a cultural group is a function of a shared interest in edification and recreational enjoyment. There’s a real stake in the success of the project for the constituency. Such communities of interest do not emerge organically: organizers consciously build them. By default, most people are content to suffer whatever abuses their bosses and landlords heap on them because that’s what society taught them they should accept. It takes agitation and education to overcome this and bring people together into identifying with one another and their common cause.

 It is out of direct communities like unions, mutual aid societies, and cultural organizations that more abstract and general communities of interest grow. Insofar as it naturally exists in capitalism, the proletariat exists in a negative relationship to the means of production. It is defined by what it lacks, not what it has. There’s no organic identification with the broader working class to be found within it. What historically did organically emerge without intervention were narrow communities of interest like the craft unions. But these organizations exclusively served the interests of a small section of skilled laborers and pitted workers against each other. This is why Vladimir Lenin, Karl Kautsky and others held to the “merger formula.” This thesis says that socialist and class consciousness develops outside the workers’ movement.2 For merger theorists, it is the duty of Marxists to merge socialism with the workers’ movement. Lenin saw this socialist consciousness developing as an intellectual pole of attraction organized around a media outlet. This outlet would win workers over to the true analysis of the situation. He saw the role of the party as a group of professional militants who would carry out the socialist line. The party would win the masses to its line by winning the leadership of workers’ organizations. But is this really how you develop socialist consciousness? 

The history of failure evidenced by the Trotskyist and Marxist-Leninist movements seems to belie this notion. Socialist consciousness emerges through the development of concrete bonds in the class struggle. It develops through a shift in collective identity among broad sections of the population. If someone is to oppose the American empire in favor of the Co-operative Commonwealth, they have to come to identify as a socialist, as a worker, and as a member of humanity, not as an American, a Democrat, or a conservative. Socialism does not demand that one gives up all their other identities; you can still be a Christian, black, queer, an environmentalist, etc. But it does demand that the identities you hold, and the communities of interest they signify, are emancipating and do not oppress others. It is the task of communist militants to embed themselves in communities of interest. We must begin the process of congealing conscious organizations for the struggle to change conditions. It’s only by organizing within the class, not above and outside it, that building a socialist movement is possible. However, it is important to recognize that identification with socialism alone is not an end but only a means to an end. In “Red Vienna,” Amsterdam, Berlin, Milan, and Paris there have been widespread socialist cultures that failed to bring about the victory of the working class. In the absence of a science of revolution, the socialist movement cannot make revolution, but in the absence of a socialist movement, the science of revolution is a dead letter.

Up-skilling and De-skilling

This, therefore, poses the question: how do we develop a science of revolution within the socialist movement? By creating a culture of comradely co-operation. By default in our society there is a culture of authoritarianism and passivity where we expect other people to give direction to our lives and do our thinking for us. Even if an ideology is ostensibly democratic, anarchist, or revolutionary in content, the practices around it are often incredibly authoritarian. This is a reality that all socialist organizations confront. But by training up of new members, giving them structured tasks that help increase their confidence, and also treating them with the utmost respect, we can enculturate our organizations into a way of acting which prefigures the Co-operative Commonwealth to come. 

Respect, though, does not mean accepting any excuse for why someone hasn’t done a task; it means holding them accountable in a gentle but firm way. It means “pushing” people beyond their comfort zones. It means helping them address the things that stand in the way of realizing the goals that they believe in. Pushing, a tactic developed by unions to build solidarity, is the bedrock of creating a culture of comradely cooperation and it applies to leaders as much as rank-and-file members.

Likewise, up-skilling and education are processes that should happen constantly. By encouraging the full, well-rounded development of cadre, each member, rather than an isolated intellectual pole, can use their own faculties to reason and engage in communist politics. Up-skilling needs to recognize the interdependent nature of social labor in advanced economies. Rather than creating a movement of independent artisans who jealously guard their autonomy, communists can create a higher freedom for people to realize their goals through their willing subordination to functional discipline and the recognition of necessity.

On the Left, education almost universally takes the form of either reading classic texts in groups or having an intellectual lecture to a captive audience about the correct positions on abstract political theories. There are exceptions to this. Sometimes it takes the form of what amounts to liberal racial sensitivity training, re-framed with radical jargon. Other times a particularly enthusiastic undergraduate might ramble on about the ideas of postmodern philosophers. In fewer cases, parties or affinity groups put on practical skills-based training sessions. These might be about how to screen-print, legal rights, how to conduct a picket, security culture, and so on. In particular, the General Defense Committee of the Industrial Workers of the World provides workshops on these topics. Unfortunately, their reach is limited to the disparate, unorganized, activist community from which GDC membership is generally drawn. It is true that skills-based training in and of itself doesn’t have political content; someone can screen-print a shirt for any reason, whether it’s making money or helping a cause. However, there’s no reason that organizers must segregate political enculturation and education from skills-based training. If you are teaching people how to set up a blockade, the politics of why you use blockades is a necessary part of the training. Even with seemingly apolitical subjects like gardening, there are innumerable places where you can tie in political education. With gardening, this can take the form of talking about why capitalism creates food deserts, the unsustainable agricultural practices of major farmers (and the insufficiency of community gardens as an ultimate solution), the cultural chauvinism in the produce section of supermarkets, or the concrete politics of seed suppliers. There is no area of practical education that does not have aspects which can be politicized. That said, there is still a need for comprehensive analysis of the world and a need for engagement with abstract ideas like the economic contradictions of capitalism, the nature of the state, and so on. Yet, this education should highlight real-world examples and struggles as much as possible. It is after you have a foundation in the real meaning of class struggle that it makes sense to begin to explore higher theory, because you can relate it to the world rather than just other ideas you’ve read about.  

In scientific management, the principal method of educating people in new methods is not just lecturing at them or using abstract arguments. Instead, managers use object-lessons that allow the worker to see firsthand why the new methods are superior and draw their own conclusions. Feedback and explanations are used to supplement the practical education. Taylor says:

…The really great problem involved in a change from the management of “initiative and incentive” to scientific management consists in a complete revolution in the mental attitude and the habits of all of those engaged in the management, as well of the workmen. And this change can be brought about only gradually and through the presentation of many object-lessons to the workman, which, together with the teaching which he receives, thoroughly convince him of the superiority of the new over the old way of doing the work. This change in the mental attitude of the workman imperatively demands time. It is impossible to hurry it beyond a certain speed. The writer has over and over again warned those who contemplated making this change that it was a matter, even in a simple establishment, of from two to three years, and that in some cases it requires from four to five years.

The first few changes which affect the workmen should be made exceedingly slowly, and only one workman at a time should be dealt with at the start. Until this single man has been thoroughly convinced that a great gain has come to him from the new method, no further change should be made. Then one man after another should be tactfully changed over. After passing the point at which from one-fourth to one-third of the men in the employ of the company have been changed from the old to the new, very rapid progress can be made, because at about this time there is, generally, a complete revolution in the public opinion of the whole establishment and practically all of the workmen who are working under the old system become desirous to share in the benefits which they see have been received by those working under the new plan.

An object-lesson is showing the truth of something in practice instead of theory. Originally, object-lessons were a form of education which used a visual prop to teach a concept, but they have come to mean any sort of practical illustration.  For instance, when Taylor sought to introduce scientific management to the machine factory, his improvement of the output of the initial subject served as an object-lesson to the management. It proved to the foreman that his methods worked. Likewise, when Taylor introduced scientific management to pig-iron shoveling, it was having Schmidt work under the close direction of a supervisor that enabled him to see first-hand that he could do the higher rate of work just by using particular motions. For Taylor, these lessons are much stronger than theoretical discussion can be. They prove the truth of the efficacy of a method directly. Taylor believed each worker should be individually trained in this manner so that they personally develop buy-in to the methods. 

The work of philosopher and educator John Dewey validated Taylor’s theory. Dewey had seen generations of students pumped out by the academy who knew science, philosophy, economics and so on abstractly, but had no idea how to apply it to the real world. To solve this problem, he began with the premise that if someone cannot make use of information in finding solutions to problems, they don’t have a meaningful understanding. From this, he concluded that the best way to give someone real knowledge was to have them solve problems themselves, with any necessary information available.3 Testing his pedagogical theories at the University of Chicago Laboratory School, Dewey showed that learning by doing is more effective than simple theoretical instruction. Some educators inspired by his work took this to mean that completely unstructured education where students problem-solve themselves was ideal, but Dewey himself pushed back on this. In his framework, students need carefully crafted object-lessons that demonstrate the principle at stake and work under careful supervision from instructors who are ready to provide abstract knowledge as students need it. Unfortunately, capital appropriated Dewey’s research and reduced it from a theory of how to instill deeper knowledge into a method of imparting narrow skills. Capitalists promote models of “learning by doing” and technical education that leave out the abstract knowledge and comprehensive vision that is essential for making narrow technical knowledge useful beyond a specific application. This logic is the same one that Taylor himself used as a means to enforce the social division of labor. 

The final piece of scientific management is the system of “functional foremen.” Rather than relying on a single manager whose job it is to coordinate and motivate the workers, each area of competence is divided between several individuals whose job it is to direct the workers in their own area. By dividing up the tasks of management, Taylor was able to create a system where each part of the job of organizing labor is given someone’s full attention rather than it being left up to the motivation of the one-man manager or workers to get it done. 

Under functional management, the old-fashioned single foreman is superseded by eight different men, each one of whom has his own special duties. These men, acting as the agents for the planning department, are the expert teachers, who are at all times in the shop, helping and directing the workmen. Being each one chosen for his knowledge and personal skill in his specialty, they are able to not only tell the workman what he should do, but in case of necessity they do the work themselves in the presence of the workman, so as to show him not only the best but also the quickest methods.

 One of these teachers (called the inspector) sees to it that he understands the drawings and instructions for doing the work. He teaches him how to do work of the right quality; how to make it fine and exact where it should be fine, and rough and quick where accuracy is not required, — the one being just as important for success as the other. The second teacher (the gang boss) shows him how to set up the job in his machine, and teaches him to make all of his personal motions in the quickest and best way. The third (the speed boss) sees that the machine is run at the best speed and that the proper tool is used in the particular way which will enable the machine to finish its product in the shortest possible time. In addition to the assistance given by these teachers, the workman receives orders and help from four other men; from the “repair boss” as to the adjustment, cleanliness, and general care of his machine, belting, etc.; from the “time clerk,” as to everything relating to his pay and to proper written reports and returns; from the “route clerk,” as to the order in which he does his work and as to the movement of the work from one part of the shop to another; and, in case a workman gets into any trouble with any of his various bosses, the “disciplinarian” interviews him. 

Co-equal members of a collective can take these roles without recourse to the social division of labor. In place of a “disciplinarian” might be an arbiter, but otherwise if you are organizing work that is complex and at a large enough scale, it makes sense to break down roles and responsibility functionally. Leadership is a burden that we should spread around as much as possible to avoid burn-out and dependency on super-organizers. While Taylor would have one individual specialize in each type of functional management, by breaking management apart it actually makes rotating responsibility much easier.

Capitalism is the New Feudalism

Our society developed the technical system that governs capitalist production by and for the logic of capital accumulation. The way we design machines is not to empower workers, but to increase productivity. The tendency of development in both production and distribution have created conditions of dependency. These asymmetries are incompatible with an emancipated society. For instance, the move toward content-streaming and away from physical media has turned consumers of content into rent-payers dependent on a service provider. This initially presented itself as a centralization in the form of Netflix replacing local video distributors. However, a plethora of rival streaming services have emerged who divvy up the pool of consumption-rents into ever-smaller fiefdoms. Likewise, within production itself, the de-skilling of workers creates more dependency on capital than if they were merely denied the means of life without working. It was plausible that a skilled tradesman could escape bondage to a master under the pre-industrial manufacturing system. After saving enough to purchase physical means of production, a tradesman could open their own shop and even hire their own apprentices. But if an unskilled worker tried this, assuming the acquisition of sufficient money to buy physical means of production, they would lack the knowledge necessary to do anything but the same menial tasks they had been employed in before. To illustrate this point, we can look to Uber and Lyft, which have begun the process of proletarianizing taxi workers. While drivers for both firms are nominally “independent contractors” (a legal position hotly contested in the courts) and own their own physical means of production in the form of their car, they are dependent on the navigational and commercial technology of the app. Even if an Uber driver knows the city they work in well, it’s unlikely that their knowledge approaches the dense working-knowledge taxi drivers possess of the streets. Likewise, while taxi drivers are usually also dependent on a dispatch company, they can develop their own network of clients, while Uber drivers are in a more precarious position. Taxi services are a classic example of a protected craft. In some cities like New York, the government directly limits how many taxis can be on the street. They use a system of “medallions” which entitle the owner to provide taxi services. In other cities, heavy regulation and education requirements prevent easy access to outsiders. Ultimately, Uber and Lyft seek to replace their drivers with fleets of autonomous vehicles, but for now they are happy to shift the costs of business onto their proletarianized workforce’s physical means of production in the form of wear and tear.

Marx misidentified the source of the power imbalance between workers and capitalists as the legal ownership of the physical means of production. In his day, productive technology seemed to exclusively take the form of tools. If Marx were right, there should be no alienation within employee-owned enterprises beyond a certain level of externally imposed labor discipline forced by the market. This is the thesis of some reformist Marxists like Richard D. Wolff. Wolff claims that worker-owned enterprises would in themselves create a genuinely democratic society.4 But employee-owned companies, like the grocery chain Winco and the Chinese phone manufacturer Huawei, are only different from traditional capitalist firms in offering stock compensation and the same kind of indirect control shareholders exert over joint-stock companies. Even if, as Wolff proposes, you have formal democracy in management, under capitalism you are still dependent on technical experts to actually run the firm. In Yugoslavia, where the Communists created a system of “self-management,” it was still technical experts who directed production.

The source of Capital’s power is the monopolization of the technical knowledge to direct production and transmute the inputs of production, including the expended lifeforce of workers, into wealth. Is it any wonder that the biggest blows in the trade war between the US and China are in the form of the US denying Chinese technology companies access to intellectual property? Capital designs the physical means of production, be they apps, looms, grocery check-out kiosks, or anything else, with dependency in mind. The legal ownership of the physical means of production is a necessary moment in the alchemical process of capital accumulation. But ownership follows from the occulting of organizational and technical knowledge. This doesn’t mean that the denial of the necessities of life to workers, ownership of physical resources, and minority control of the physical means of production are unimportant. These are features of property-societies in general, like ancient slave empires. They are not unique to capitalism. It is after the development of class divisions that society established property. What traditional Marxist analysis calls “the law of value,” the emergent logic of capital accumulation through market competition, helps create conditions of alienation and exploitation within capitalist firms, but it cannot explain the full scope of economic oppression in bourgeois society. Significant portions of the economy have insulation from market forces. Both civil and military bureaucracies exhibit many of the same features as market enterprises even as they also face other pressures. Within capitalist firms, the logic of central planning predominates. There’s little data on how much of the economy is non-market corporate activity, but over 1/3 of US international trade is intra-firm.5 In The People’s Republic of Walmart, Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski argue that much of global capitalism is already a planned economy.

While the notion that this type of planning relates to genuine socialist relations, beyond generating useful mathematical tools, is suspect, it is important for considering how much of the hell of the firm is created by logics of domination beyond that of capitalism proper. Wage-labor is only a particular form of a tributary regime in both capitalist enterprises and public bureaucracies. With the transfer of power into the hands of the working class, we will abolish the tributary system of labor. However, while socialist society will inherit the existing physical apparatus of production, it must be altered according to the principles that will govern socialist society. When capitalism formally subsumed manufacture and feudal society under the logic of value, it still used the old craft methods. Capitalism came to really subsume production when it introduced the system of economic dependency characterized by asymmetrical knowledge hierarchies and the domination of individuals by machines. Socialist society too will formally subsume the capitalist methods of production, but only by introducing the principle of comradely cooperation will it begin the process of its own real subsumption by creating the general mastery of knowledge by the working class and designing machines whose telos is to serve the laborers running them.

Whose Science?

In most cases, mastery of different areas of knowledge requires the mastery of their particular jargon. Sociobiology, communications, psychology, economics, political science, anthropology, sociology, management theory, and so on each have their own ways of talking about identical phenomena. Each approach acts as a lens for talking about social reality and organizing it intellectually. This allows us to discuss different aspects of problems. But academics segregate themselves into closed discourses, creating an impediment to intelligibility between fields and accessibility for the uninitiated. Even in academic contexts where departments encourage multidisciplinary approaches, the volume of work that an individual theorist can synthesize is a hard limit on analysis. Unless they can break down jargon, or become world-renowned, the impact of their work will be confined to one or two fields. Each department represents centuries of the application of human brainpower toward understanding and organizing our world for the benefit of the species. Workers must master the knowledge they create and make it serve the whole people if we have any hope of achieving a meaningfully free society. Departmental specialization, with its accompanying requirement of many years of indoctrination, serves to perpetuate intellectuals as a class. It robs the masses of the knowledge that is their birthright. Most people today cobble together a worldview from anecdotes, random facts, and whatever “education” the bourgeois state feels is sufficient to ready them for entry into the workforce. The process of creating a unified world science is as much the systematization of knowledge for the broad masses as it is the unification of the disparate fields of the academy. To quote Alexander Bogdanov:

Until now, although scientific philosophy appears as the property of only a few people, it nonetheless reflects in reality a level of cultural development common to all humanity. The unreflective philosophy of laypeople rules over the masses, but it corresponds merely to scraps and fragments produced by the general labour of culture, merely to the lowest steps on the ladder of social development that have already been climbed. ‘The role of scientific philosophy in the practical struggle of life’, our author says, ‘is similar to the role of a military commander who has climbed to the top of a high mountain from which the disposition of the troops of both armies and possible routes are most visible and so finds the most suitable route’. I agree. The high mountain is formed from the entire gigantic sum of attainments achieved by humanity in its collective labour-experience. For an individual person, it is a long and difficult journey to the very peak, but everyone ought to know what can be seen from there. If one only takes bits and pieces of scientific philosophy and learns them without systematically connecting them with other parts of socially accumulated experience and without monitoring them by means of a variety of socially produced techniques, then what is obtained, for all that, is a poor and unreliable ‘homemade’ philosophy.

To systematize science, Bogdanov drew on Karl Marx and Richard Avenarius. Avenarius was a leading philosopher of science who, along with Ernst Mach, revolutionized epistemology. Bogdanov’s goal was to transcend the limitations of both dialectical materialism and positivism. What he created was a unified organizational science which he termed Tektology. This science was first denounced by dogmatic Hegelian philosophers like Abram Deborin and then struggled against by leading Bolshevik theorists.6 At first, the party leadership tolerated Tektology because many of the men instrumental in building the planned economy, like Vladimir Bazarov and Nikolai Valentinov, drew on it. Eventually, the Soviet authorities under Stalin ruthlessly suppressed it where under Lenin it had merely faced official censure. The regime systematically imprisoned or killed researchers and Bolsheviks who promoted Tektology in the first purges before the Trotskyists and others faced similar methods. Tektology faded from memory but the underlying principles were not lost.

As the technical needs of capitalist society in the West grew more intensive, a new school of thought emerged. Arising simultaneously in two places, it would revolutionize both STEM and the social sciences. In Austria and the German-speaking world, Ludwig von Bertalanffy plagiarized Bogdanov and developed the science in a technocratic direction to create General Systems Theory (GST),7 while in America, Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann developed cybernetics. The core features included treating systems in a non-reductionist way, using the same language to describe similar phenomena across disciplines, exploring the self-organization of systems, and focusing on the communication of information, among other things. For the uninitiated, non-reductionism is the principle that a system is greater than the sum of its parts and that their relationships are a component of the system. Cyberneticians and General Systems Theorists described the same observations of reality, but their political projects varied greatly. William Gray Walter, the inventor of the first autonomous robots and a major contributor to neuroscience, was a fellow traveler of the Communist Party.  After World War II he became an anarcho-communist. Norbert Wiener was a progressive anti-militarist and was sympathetic to unions. Wiener envisioned an economy one might call socialist, though quite different from the USSR, based on centrally-regulated autonomous work units organized much like a power grid.8 John von Neumann was a deeply anti-communist conservative militarist. Ludwig von Bertalanffy was a fascist who opportunistically committed his theories to the Nazi cause and fled Austria to avoid denazification.9 These theorists saw wildly different implications in their research for how to organize society while all contributing to the general advancement of collective knowledge. This is not unlike how a century before, many different political projects claimed the dialectical worldview developed by Hegel. On the left, you had Marx, Engels, and the Young Hegelians like Mikhail Bakunin, Bruno Bauer, and Ludwig Feuerbach; in the center, liberal philosophers like Benedetto Croce; and on the right,  right-Hegelians like Leopold von Henning who saw the End of History in the conservative Prussian state. Also drawing heavily on Hegel was the father of Italian Fascism, Giovanni Gentile. Every advance in science serves as the catalyst for further development of the political currents in society. What distinguishes the revolutionary and emancipationist currents from reactionary currents is their commitment to using the new insights in science for undermining social hierarchies and increasing material freedoms. But within each social current there is a tendency towards a kind of philosophical conservatism. Utopian socialists and anarchists, though critically, defended the Positivism of the early socialist and philosopher of science Auguste Comte against Marxist dialectical materialism. It allowed them to maintain an individualist view of how to further science.

In the same vein, conservative elements in command of the Soviet Union defended dialectical materialism against Tektology. These elements included Stalin’s “center” and the primary opposition to it. Trotsky and his “left” faction, were no less committed to the rule of the technical intelligentsia. They proposed to go so far as to “militarize” labor by introducing rank and extreme discipline into the factories to industrialize.10 Yevgeni Alekseyevich Preobrazhensky, the principal leader of the Left Opposition aside from Trotsky, believed in the forced collectivization of the peasants through grinding them into the dust by extracting a “tribute” from them and exploiting their surplus to fund the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union (the same essential policy Stalin unleashed more crudely after his rivals were dead or exiled).11 The Left Opposition mainly drew its support from the military and party intelligentsia while Stalin’s faction drew its support from the party bureaucracy, state factory managers  who owed to Stalin’s political machine their jobs, and initially the small peasants (with whom his regime would later engage in open warfare during the forced collectivization and subsequent famine). On the other hand, the International Communist Opposition, which Trotsky slandered as a “right” opposition, was less ideologically rigid. It attempted to merge the insights of Tektology with Dialectical Materialism. Bogdanov’s theories of equilibrium influenced Bukharin’s book Historical Materialism and his prison writings, though he still made use of dialectical materialist jargon.12 The “right” opposition represented the technical specialists, scientists, trade unionists, cooperatives, and to a lesser extent the petty bourgeoisie whom the market-socialist system of the New Economic Policy benefited. This meant that while they too had a vested interest in the social division of labor, their objective interests remained with the development of real science unlike the “Left” and “Center,” whose Manichaean ideologies served unproductive social layers. All three factions stood against Tektology in its pure form because a universal organizational science would have challenged the primacy of the social-organizing class. This “nomenklatura” used Hegelian jargon to create artificial barriers to participation in government.

Proletarians vs the Petty Bourgeoisie

The contradiction between the intelligentsia, skilled laborers, and organizing class on the one hand and the unskilled masses on the other is not specific to socialist society. It is one of the defining contradictions within capitalism. Back when it was a young organization and the vanguard of the revolutionary socialist movement, the Industrial Workers of the World identified this contradiction and made it the basis of their organizing. Exemplifying this insight in his pamphlet Proletarian and Petite Bourgeois, Austin Lewis, a prominent socialist and theorist of the Industrial Workers of the World, demonstrated that the working class is not a monolithic bloc. Instead, much of what we call the “working class” is actually petty-bourgeois in character. Before the rise of industrial capitalism, free artisans who individually owned their own means of production were the basis of the petty-bourgeoisie. These means of production often included tools, but the primary feature was a skill-monopoly which enabled them to directly produce goods or provide services to sell and support themselves.13 But as the wealth from colonial conquests poured in, concentrated manufacturing began. There emerged a system where capitalists purchased commodity-producing equipment that they hired “hands” to work, destroying the ability for independent artisans to compete with these mass-produced commodities. Back in Marx’s day it appeared that this tendency would inevitably result in the mass pauperization of the artisans. Eventually, they would diminish to the point of extinction. Rather than following this mechanistic logic, the petty bourgeoisie transformed itself. While it is true that there remains a layer of independent artisans today (capital’s great work of standardizing and centralizing the means of production cannot seem to overcome consumers’ thirst for authenticity), capital employs the overwhelming bulk of the petty bourgeoisie. Lewis shows that they adapted themselves by forming craft unions to create skill-monopolies. Their unions then negotiate to sell their specialized labor above the cost of simple labor-power. Craft unions are a form of petty-bourgeoisie organization suited for the age of collective, rather than individual, production.14 For instance, bricklayers, teachers, electricians (who straddle the line between the old and newer petty bourgeoisie), and nurses do not have the same relationship to the process of production, to capital, and to the public, as the day laborers, janitors, and certified nursing assistants who work alongside them. Even unionization on the part of unskilled labor does not change this relation. This is not a moral condemnation; these kinds of workers are essential to the reproduction of society and provide important services. But they do have a vested interest in maintaining their monopoly over their skills through forms of educational gatekeeping. This layer, in both its social-democratic and anarcho-syndicalist expressions, fetishizes autonomy and abhors the discipline necessary to achieve general freedom. In another IWW text titled The Advancing Proletariat, Abner Woodruff identifies this craft petty-bourgeois class basis as the reason for anarcho-syndicalists opposing the organizational centralization suited to proletarian methods.15 Though Taylor does not share these political concerns, he does address the spurious claims that scientific planning within the labor process strips people of freedom:

Now, when through all of this teaching and this minute instruction the work is apparently made so smooth and easy for the workman, the first impression is that this all tends to make him a mere automaton, a wooden man. As the workmen frequently say when they first come under this system, “Why, I am not allowed to think or move without some one interfering or doing it for me!” The same criticism and objection, however, can be raised against all other modern subdivision of labor. It does not follow, for example, that the modern surgeon is any more narrow or wooden a man than the early settler of this country. The frontiersman, however, had to be not only a surgeon, but also an architect, house-builder, lumberman, farmer, soldier, and doctor, and he had to settle his law cases with a gun. You would hardly say that the life of the modern surgeon is any more narrowing, or that he is more of a wooden man than the frontiersman. The many problems to be met and solved by the surgeon are Just as intricate and difficult and as developing and broadening in their way as were those of the frontiersman.

And it should be remembered that the training of the surgeon has been almost identical in type with the teaching and training which is given to the workman under scientific management. The surgeon, all through his early years, is under the closest supervision of more experienced men, who show him in the minutes” way how each element of his work is best done. They provide him with the finest implements, each one of which has been the subject of special study and development, and then insist upon his using each of these implements in the very best way. All of this teaching, however, in no way narrows him. On the contrary he is quickly given the very best knowledge of his predecessors; and, provided (as he is, right from the start) with standard implements and methods which represent the best knowledge of the world up to date, he is able to use his own originality and ingenuity to make real additions to the world’s knowledge, instead of reinventing things which are old. In a similar way the workman who is cooperating with his many teachers under scientific management has an opportunity to develop which is at least as good as and generally better than that which he had when the whole problem was “up to him’’ and he did his work entirely unaided.

If it were true that the workman would develop into a larger and finer man without all of this teaching, and without the help of the laws which have been formulated for doing his particular job, then it would follow that the young man who now comes to college to have the help of a teacher in mathematics, physics, chemistry, Latin, Greek, etc., would do better to study these things unaided and by himself. The only difference in the two cases is that students come to their teachers, while from the nature of the work done by the mechanic under scientific management, the teachers must go to him. What really happens is that, with the aid of the science which is invariably developed, and through the instructions from his teachers, each workman of a given intellectual capacity is enabled to do a much higher, more interesting, and finally more developing and more profitable kind of work than he was before able to do. The laborer who before was unable to do anything beyond, perhaps) shovelling and wheeling dirt from place to place, or carrying the work from one part of the shop to another, is in many cases taught to do the more elementary machinist’s work, accompanied by the agreeable surroundings and the interesting variety and higher wages which go with the machinist’s trade. The cheap machinist or helper, who before was able to run perhaps merely a drill press, is taught to do the more intricate and higher priced lathe and planer work, while the highly skilled and more intelligent machinists become functional foremen and teachers. And so on, right up the line.

It may seem that with scientific management there is not the same incentive for the workman to use his ingenuity in devising new and better methods of doing the work, as well as in improving his implements, that there is with the old type of management. It is true that with scientific management the workman is not allowed to use whatever implements and methods he sees fit in the daily practice of his work. Every encouragement, however, should be given him to suggest improvements, both in methods and in implements. And whenever a workman proposes an improvement, it should be the policy of the management to make a careful analysis of the new method, and if necessary conduct a series of experiments to determine accurately the relative merit of the new suggestion and of the old standard. And whenever the new method is found to be markedly superior to the old, it should be adopted as the standard for the whole establishment. The workman should be given the full credit for the improvement, and should be paid a cash premium as a reward for his ingenuity. In this way the true initiative of the workmen is better attained under scientific management than under the old individual plan.

One still might object to the idea that a surgeon is as complete a person as the frontiersman in Taylor’s analogy. The famous line Marx half-sarcastically penned in The German Ideology springs to mind: 

…in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.16

But this objection doesn’t hold up when you realize the surgeon may also be a master chef, a fisherman, a literary critic, and a meme page admin in their free time. Socially useful labor they engage in doesn’t have to define them. Returning to individualist forms of labor wouldn’t enable someone to develop fully or as they desire. Objective necessity, not individual inclination, determines their labor, and their labor relies on limited self-acquired knowledge and resources. The frontiersman has no choice but to spend their time building a cabin, hunting, drying meat, etc. if they want to survive. Conversely, in co-operative production, you can choose what kinds of work you want to perform to develop yourself. It is also worth considering how the “frontiersman” as a historical class only existed because of the mass genocide of (predominantly) communal indigenous societies to clear the land for their individualist lifestyle. Opposing individualist production does not mean that socialism will force everyone to accept co-operative labor. There are societies which have made room for hermits, holy men, yogis, witches, and outcasts who live largely self-sufficient lives on the fringes of civilization. Such space can exist within a co-operative commonwealth. But unlike the free artisan and his collective craft petty-bourgeois successor, the proletariat has no use for romantic visions of labor.   

The collective craft petty-bourgeoisie is not the only section of this class that has emerged in modern capitalism. A third form of the petty bourgeoisie also maintains its position through skill and the division of labor but does not rely on craft unions because their role is to direct the organization of labor process. Managers, engineers, accountants, financial analysts, computer programmers, and so on constitute this class. Unlike the artisan petty bourgeoise and craft petty bourgeoisie, the organizational petty bourgeoisie is wholly dependent on the existence of large-scale enterprise. Human resources agents, social workers, and database managers cannot meaningfully find employment outside of firms. Even if they are self-employed as consultants, they are dependent on the existence of large firms. These categories are not tidy; no economic category really is. What matters is that categories give us an insight into the structural relationships between things. Before the Russian Revolution, many “proletarians” spent much of the year as peasants working on family farms. The proletarians returned to the countryside as food became scarce during the Civil War.17 Some members of the organizing petty-bourgeoisie also partly fit into the artisan petty bourgeoisie. Organizational petty bourgeoisie make this transition when they attract the capital to run a start-up or take up a private practice. Doctors in particular blur this line because their primary role in hospitals is to use their knowledge to direct the labor of others, but they can also act as independent artisans selling a service to patients. Programmers too straddle this line because their work might be directed towards creating a saleable product, but it may just as easily be to design applications for improving the internal efficiency of a firm. Likewise, today many unskilled proletarians have “side hustles” where they earn an increased income doing artisanal work. These categories are relevant because they allow us to tease out how different layers of society have different interests.

Many sections of the artisanal and craft petty bourgeoisie bear the cost of business taxes and state regulations, like environmental protections, which tends to drive them towards conservative politics. They tend to have little need for policies like single-payer healthcare themselves because they either can afford premium plans or have them through union contracts. Artisans as a class are a reservoir of racism due to their personal competition with skilled immigrant labor. There are exceptions: those sections of the artisanal petty bourgeoisie who depend on public infrastructure and investment tend to be more liberal. So do those dependent on public funding like teachers. At one time the craft petty bourgeoisie and artisanal petty bourgeoisie were at the forefront of American radicalism with movements like the Farmer-Labor Party, the Non-Partisan League, the Greenback Party, the Populist Party, the Progressive Party and even the Socialist Party of America. Changes in America’s political economy led to a re-drawing of the class battle lines. Now the organizational petty bourgeoisie, instead of the craft and artisan petty bourgeoisie, benefits from liberal policies. They’re drawn to programs like student debt forgiveness, single-payer healthcare, ending the gender pay-gap, and the “green new deal.” Capital directly dominates them and they face less economic pressure from the state than the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. There are members of the organizational petty bourgeoisie who benefit more from income tax cuts or tariffs, but this layer’s interests tend toward liberalism. The craft and organizing petty bourgeoisie, respectively, are the voting bases of the Republican and Democratic parties. They both have interests opposed to the proletariat just as much as interests opposed to capital. All sections of the petty bourgeoisie are at constant risk of proletarianization as some big capitalist could automate their work, break their union, or introduce a new contracting system that disempowers them. Our movement has room for members of these layers, and we need their skills to construct the Co-operative Commonwealth, but only insofar as we win them to the proletarian camp. 

Poster by Alexei Gastev

Leninism vs the Cultural Revolution

It isn’t just the defenders of the capitalist system who valorize the system of intellectual monopoly. “Revolutionaries” across all tendency divisions weaponize their education to set themselves up as leaders over the movement. This takes two common forms: 

1) Professional intellectuals in various Leninist sects who browbeat naïve activists into uncritically adopting their views wholesale (creating a sort of mental dependency in the process). For example, in Socialist Alternative’s Seattle branch, an organizer drove multiple women to tears by ridiculing their deviations from Trotskyist orthodoxy. 

2) Authors in the anarchist book circuit who wage bitter fights against one another in the struggle to sell their postmodern, jargon-laden polemics against things everyone already knows are bad. An example here is the long struggle between the “post-work” anarchist Bob Black and the anarcho-syndicalist John Bekken. 

This trend is nothing new. In the struggles among the Russian Marxists, long before the October Revolution, two camps existed. Rather than Mensheviks vs Bolsheviks, whose leaders were on the same side in this struggle, there was a now-forgotten struggle between the philosophical intelligentsia and professional revolutionaries against a coalition of scientists and worker-militants. On one side were Lenin, the leading Bolshevik, and Plekhanov, the leading Menshevik, and on the other were Bogdanov and Bazarov, cofounder of the Bolshevik faction and an independent group, respectively. Others in the latter group included the Menshevik Pavel Yushkevich and the future Bolshevik Commissar of Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunacharsky. 

The first camp tried to transform Marxism into a means to preserve the intelligentsia; they thought it was necessary for intellectuals to lead the workers. This is the merger thesis that Lenin, Martov, and Plekhanov took from Kautsky. Though democratic in aim, it was elitist in content. Instead of seeing a merger between Marxism and the workers’ movement in the form of the working class mastering science, they saw it in the working-class movement merging with Marxist theory. This smuggles in a preserved role for a layer whose special task is to create that theory that the workers’ movement is to adopt.  Lenin and Plekhanov did have differences: Lenin wanted to have a tighter-knit group of militarized intellectuals while Plekhanov was comfortable with a looser, more traditional party. Where Lenin’s vanguard took on an air of bourgeois professionalism, a marketing firm with a sleek aesthetic, Plekhanov’s vanguard remained a debate circle for academics and their sympathizers based around a poorly circulated newspaper. Lenin represented the outlook of the newly forming organizational petty bourgeoisie, and Plekhanov represented the outlook of the artisanal petty bourgeoisie. Lenin and Plekhanov didn’t consciously or even uniformly represent these classes. Both of them were genuinely committed to proletarian emancipation on an ideological level and had radically democratic aspirations. But abstract ideas and concrete attitudes are two different things. In The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, Lenin lays out a vision in which the necessity of technical specialists, as a class, is assumed a priori. It’s merely a question of whether or not workers know accounting and have disciplinary control to prevent sabotage.18 He never questions the leading role of political coordinators except insofar as they are efficient at their jobs. The other camp wanted to break Marxism free from the holdovers of nineteenth-century philosophy. They wanted to modernize it in light of new scientific discoveries and abolish the division between intellectual and manual laborers. Like Lenin, Bogdanov wanted a disciplined and militarized organization, but he also wanted Bolshevism to be led by worker-intellectuals, not specialists in theory. Bogdanov believed that a cultural revolution that created new modes of thought, art, production, architecture, etc., was necessary to create the foundation for a socialist society and must be concurrent with the political revolution. Bazarov for his part subscribed to a stageist view of social evolution and believed that prior to socialism the productive forces must be very advanced. He saw the cultural revolution as more suited to Western capitalist countries and only applicable to Russia after the bourgeois-democratic revolution destroyed feudalism. Like the theorists of the classical IWW, Bazarov opposed anarchic visions of decentralization and saw the true interests of the proletariat in comradely cooperation united centrally.19 Both Bogdanov and Bazarov based their perspective on the viewpoint of the proletariat seeking power for itself, but Bogdanov was able to see the proletariat’s full potential. It didn’t have to wait on the bourgeoisie, even if, as Lenin and Plekhanov also believed, there were still bourgeois-democratic tasks to be completed. Critically, what Bogdanov brings to the table is that the merger between socialism and the working class is not the ideas of self-appointed revolutionaries being adopted by workers, but rather the skills and knowledge of the intellectuals becoming the property of the working class acting for itself. And if these skills and knowledge are to become the property of workers instead of specialists, they must be translated into common language instead of the language of specialists. A factory worker from the city of Kaluga named Nikifor Volonov had this to say:

Commonly, the most absurd hearsay about philosophy is widespread among us. The essence of it is that philosophy is a science of the select few, a science which mere mortals are not supposed to peek into. This hearsay is confirmed in countless attempts when workers take books of philosophy into their hands and run up against the kind of terminology that makes your eyes roll up into your head. I myself two years ago happened to run into a worker-philosopher. After a short conversation, I was convinced that he and ordinary workers could not understand one another, that his language was not the language of the people. It was an encrypted message to which only a few people have the key. Talking about philosophy in ordinary language is taken to mean not knowing good manners and even of not knowing philosophy at all, bringing to mind the saying ‘like a pig in a silk suit’. And this attitude, unfortunately is still maintained among some of our theorists. So, Plekhanov, in an argument with the Bogdanovites, writes, ‘when discussing philosophy with you, one has to speak in ordinary language’, and further, ‘when you need to translate this into the language of philosophy, you must turn to Hegel’. If this advice had been taken by the leadership of the Bogdanovites, who at that time were becoming familiar with the realm of philosophy, then we ordinary workers would not have had the chance to discuss philosophy. And even if one or another of us had succeeded in studying philosophy, how could a general trend have emerged to guide our common affairs? Could the language of philosophy be understood by the remaining comrades? It is necessary to do one of two things: either get rid of philosophy itself, or return the right to philosophical language back to the gentlemen-scholars and to study philosophy and give an account of it, ourselves, in completely understandable language.

The single most revolutionary act an intellectual in the socialist movement can do is to make scientific theory and philosophy more accessible to the masses. If the working class is to make revolution itself, as an expression of its own interests, then it needs the means to understand and organize the world that confronts it. The role of the revolutionary intellectual, insofar as they are revolutionary, is self-abolition. Under capitalism, this won’t result in the end of the social division of labor. This means that the working-class movement must fully embrace cultural revolution. Contrary to common wisdom, the theory of cultural revolution did not originate in China. It first arose when, like the Chinese Revolution, the Russian Revolution was faced with an incongruity between the old culture and the new kind of society that the masses intended to build. The Proletkult, an organization created by a mix of prominent Bolsheviks, artists, militant workers, and scientists, acted as a fulcrum for a new proletarian culture. Though Bogdanov was a leading theorist and member, others included Bolshevik heavyweights Nadezhda Krupskaya and Alexi Gastev. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik leaders Lenin and Trotsky took umbrage with the notion of a specifically proletarian culture. They thought the working class should take the patrimony of bourgeois and aristocratic culture for their own.20 Instead of the new forms of education, new architecture, new graphic arts, and so on, after a brief period of avant-garde exuberance, the Soviet government gave its patronage to realist and neo-classical art forms, adopted the Prussian model of education, and created a cultural edifice more suited to a nineteenth-century liberal bourgeois republic than a continent-spanning experiment in human emancipation. Proletkult leaders tried to organize a new approach to every aspect of life that would promote emancipation and break down the social division of labor, but this was at odds with a government whose power depended on a monopoly of organizational knowledge.

This same contradiction emerged in China during its much more famous and world-historic cultural revolution. Though it is unclear how much influence Bogdanov had on Mao, Mao does refer favorably to his economic works.21 Mao and Bogdanov differ in many ways including in how they saw the nature of proletarian culture. Mao retained the Leninist truth-monopoly of dialectical materialist philosophers and a commitment to political orthodoxy, but he did emphasize the role of the masses in driving socialist construction. Mao also recognized the perverse role the bureaucracy and experts played in achieving an egalitarian society, but, like Lenin, he seems to have believed that the solution was to discipline them to the democratic will of the people and to the theoretical specialists like himself. Mao encouraged the masses to replace the old ideas of capitalist society with the new ideas of socialist society. The new culture was determined in a top-down way. For instance, in the theater, only eight “model operas” were allowed, and Mao’s personal calligraphy style was promoted as a universal model.22

Bogdanov, however, saw the cultural revolution as a victory of a new approach to social organization over the old instead of new ideas over the old. He favored cultural freedom, and he rejected attempts to impose a single culture from above as inherently chauvinistic. During the Chinese cultural revolution, many ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims, Mongolians, Zhuang people, Koreans, and others faced extreme persecution.23 Where Mao set the Red Guards to smashing and clearing away the relics of the old society, including those of regional minorities, Bogdanov set himself to helping his fellow workers build a new way of living of their own while emphasizing a need to respect the cultural heritage of minorities. Where the Red Guards burned classical art, the Proletkult invented new textile patterns and furniture for the enjoyment of workers. But even with its Leninist and Han chauvinist deformations, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents a high watermark for the working-class struggle. The Chinese workers, of their own initiative, built the Shanghai Commune and themselves embarked on emancipatory social experiments like setting up factory committees to democratically run production and the massively expanded rural healthcare system with the renowned “Barefoot Doctors.” While similar forms have emerged in other revolutionary waves, none have existed on as large a scale as in China. Many of these initiatives had support from sections of the Communist Party, just as they had sharp opposition from other currents in it. Men like Liu Shaoqi, who had been staunch revolutionaries, transformed into members of the organizing class. Despite initially endorsing the revolutionary wave, Mao sided with the organizing class, and the People’s Liberation Army crushed the burgeoning socialist society.

A cultural revolution of the working-class movement is a continual process that must begin prior to the seizure of power by the class if something approaching the withering of the state is possible. Had the masses already possessed at least some of the tools of self-government, the balance of power between the organizing class and the proletariat might have been different. It will require the dictatorship of the proletariat to cement, but the cultural revolution cannot wait on the seizure of formal political power.  “Knowledge is power” is the bedrock of the socialist transformation of production. 

Towards a Second Titanomachy

Among the fearsome gods of antiquity, one alone stood with mankind: the Titan Prometheus, whose name means foresight, the father of our species. After helping Zeus secure the Olympian throne from his despotic father Kronos, Prometheus stole fire from his colleagues and gave it to mankind. His cosmic principles are that of self-mastery, reason, prophecy, and the creative potential of labor. These are the very principles that define us as humans. Zeus intended for humanity to live ignorant and brutish lives in fear of the cosmic order he ruled. Prometheus, the god of the workshop and mapper of the stars, taught us all the sciences and gave us tools so that through the sweat of our own brow we might earn our bread instead of suffering at the mercy of Olympus. As punishment for Prometheus, Zeus had the gods Bia and Kratos (Force and Strength) bind him to a rock and had him tortured. Meanwhile, Zeus inflicted Prometheus’ children, the humans, with all the miseries of the world. The sly Zeus offered them as a gift to Pandora, who unwittingly released them.  Each day an eagle came to consume Prometheus’ liver only for him to heal again each day. In ancient Greek philosophy the liver is the seat of emotion. From then on, forethought remained bound to kings and alienated from the passions of life. That eagle in our world is American empire, which serves to keep science docile and apart from the righteous fury earned by capital. As Stafford Beer said in his lecture series, Designing Freedom:

There are two things wrong with the role of science in our society. One is its use as a tool of power, wherever that is concentrated by economic forces. The other is its elite image. None of us wishes to be manipulated by power; and if science is the tool of power, to hell with it. None of us wishes to entrust our liberty to a man in a white laboratory coat, armed with a computer and a row of ball-point pens in his pocket, if he does not share in our humanity.

Compare Prometheus to Hephaestus. One is a scientist and noble rebel who stood against tyranny, and the other is the god of engineers and craftsmen who Ares, the god of war, cuckolds. Hephaestus creates wonders like self-propelled tripods, voice-controlled machines, and even artificial women, but he keeps them to the use of the gods and not humans. To quote Percy Shelley, “all spirits are enslaved which serve things of evil.” The choice is between fighting for the freedom of all or submitting to tyranny. The revolutionary scientist must be a Promethean and reject the path of Hephaestus. They must be willing to give up everything so that mankind might stand upright against those who would dominate it and lord over it. Tyrants must all be cast down, be they capitalists, technocrats, or warlords. Insofar as a communist ought to have faith, it is in the liberation of Prometheus from his chains and the toppling of the Olympian order. 

Marx and Engels called their systematic, knowledge-based vision of socialist theory “scientific socialism” because it took an understanding of the world, rather than ideal ends, as its basis. But if Marx’s thesis that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world, the point is to change it” is valid, then there is a need to transcend the reflective and abstract nature of scientific socialism. Theory and practice aren’t two separate poles united dialectically; they’re one continuous process. Theorizing is just one part of the labor process. Whether it is drafting blueprints for a machine or solving a malfunction, every stage of the labor process requires both manual and mental labor. Beyond “scientific socialism,” we need constructive socialism. Constructive socialism has a long provenance stretching back to thinkers like James Connolly and Eugene Debs. It calls for the positive creation of new working-class power and the nucleus of the new society now, without waiting for revolutionary rupture. To realize this aim, our movement should make use of any technology suitable to the task. Organizational forms like parties, unions, soviets, and affinity groups are nothing more than technologies with different applications. Strategies like the minimum-maximum program, transitional program, and mass line are likewise technologies. Even tactics like street protests, blockades, and electoral campaigns are just technologies when you peel back the layers of fetishization that leftists apply to them. Socialism itself can only be a social technology for the emancipation of humanity from domination by the wage-system. One could also call Constructive Socialism “Technological Socialism,” if the term did not imply a sort of naive techno-optimism and belief in the neutrality of technology. It proudly bears the label “Promethean” in the knowledge that the term is misapplied to the acolytes of Hephaestus. The seven components necessary to realize constructive socialism are: 

1) Cultural revolution;

2) The replacement of “management by initiative” with a community of shared interests and a culture of comradely cooperation;

3) The breakdown of the division of labor and the up-skilling of members of socialist organizations;

4) The combination of education and practical work to the highest degree possible;

5) The scientific selection and training of cadre;

6) A focus on organizing the unskilled sections of the working class and winning skilled labor to its camp rather than treating them as identical;

7) The development and advancement of a universal organizational science. 

In creating a constructive socialism, we need a universal organizational science which develops through the creation of better practices to reach the Co-operative Commonwealth. This is the great task of the communist movement today. Means cannot exist without consideration for the ends one seeks to bring about; if scientific management, critically transformed for use by socialists, is the means, then what kinds of ends will it realize? To see forward, we must look backwards. As above, so below. There are two key points in history we must examine:

1) The historical experience of the Soviet Union in implementing scientific management, as the first socialist society, which therefore stamped all subsequent with its experience.

2) The role that scientific management has played in the development of the economy of the United States.

Though an imperfect science, historical materialism is the best guide we have. As much as our context may change and new factors may create new possibilities, there are fundamental commonalities that stretch across time we can narrow in on. In the next essay in this series, this history will be explored.