Without a Party, We Have Nothing

Donald Parkinson responds to Taylor B’s Beginning’s of Politics: DSA and the Uprising, arguing that a workers’ party is necessary to advance an emancipatory politics. 

Communist Party rally in 1930s, NYC

The past eight months have been unlike any other. Political strife in the Democratic Primary had already been taking place when the Covid-19 pandemic brought about a massive health crisis coupled with economic dislocation that led to historic levels of unemployment. It was only a matter of time before mass unrest began, with the murder of George Floyd by the police state acting as the spark that set into motion months of protesting and rioting. In these months countless Americans had their first taste of collective political action. The intensity of the wave of struggles for many felt like a rupture with the past. Politics was no longer confined to the plaything of property owners and technocratic experts but something contested by the plebian masses in struggle. 

This feeling of a decisive break, of a new qualitative situation, is what leads Taylor B to declare the rise of democratic socialism through the Sanders campaign and the mass protests of Black Lives Matter as a “birth of politics”, a singular event that in its own processes of social mobilization create new possibilities for a future communist horizon. This feeling of a qualitative break leads him to see these events as singular, as heralding a new creative process that will break from all the old muck of the past and create new forms of organization. It is this approach that leads Taylor B to mistakenly declare that in this singular process we must instead declare our fidelity to the spontaneous energies of the event, to see where it goes and what it creates rather than trying to impose our own ideas upon it. And the most dangerous of those ideas is the notion of the workers’ party, which Taylor B declares to be a force of neutralization in the current conjuncture. 

What we find here is a logic of movementism and spontaneism where the energies unleashed by social movements and mass actions are seen organically leading to a higher form. This is essentially the argument of Rosa Luxemburg’s Mass Strike – that the workers’ movement in struggle will find the solutions to its problems and develop new forms of organization that can apply these solutions. The arguments were taken to a greater extreme by the council communists like Anton Pannekoek, who eventually rejected the party as a force of neutralization much like Taylor B does in Birth of Politics. As Mike Macnair has pointed out, these ideas have far more in common with the political approach of the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin than his main rivals of the time in the First International, Karl Marx and Engels.

The appeal of spontaneism and movementism is a common and popular reaction to the reality of countless sectarian Leninist groups who claim to be holders of the true wisdom of Marxism that will organize and lead the proletarian revolution. When the inability of these sects to consciously engineer a revolutionary movement from above into existence is clear, the appeal of a solution from below is seductive. The masses, uncorrupted by the sectarian dogmas of the failing left, will bring a new sense of energy and vision into play and overcome the forces of the old, bringing the new politics of the genuine social movement to the fore. The failure of the socialist sects to find a solution to the problems that socialists face today makes hope in the purity of social movements and their spontaneous motion almost common sense in the activist left. 

The problem with this approach is that it contradicts the very goal of communism itself. Communism, at least in part, can be understood as the conscious planning and democratic control of the producers of over society. Capitalism creates forms of domination and control that appear as impersonal forces of the market throwing us around according to the whims of profit. The anarchy of capitalism, or its lack of planning, means that our social and productive processes dominate us (the human species) as an arbitrary force, just as religious fetishizations dominate traditional religious communities as forces beyond their control. It is for this reason that the conscious planning of society in communism is not an incidental feature but a part of its very nature as a social system. 

The party, an instrument of conscious political vision, is counterposed to the spontaneous unconscious energies of the mass movements unleashed by the Bernie campaign and Black Lives Matter. It is no wonder that Taylor B sees Black Lives Matter as containing more potential despite its admitted domination by the petty-bourgeois; while Black Lives Matter is technically a non-profit foundation with its own organizational existence, it’s clear that the energy of the movement is in the uncontained moments of rebellion where street fighting against the cops. The amount of energy expressed by the masses in the street is nothing to write off, and it is easy to see why so much of the left invest more hope in these moments of unmediated attacks on the state than the sloganeerings of sects selling newspapers. In moments like this, it is tempting to say, as Taylor B does, that the masses in struggle are more politically advanced than the various leftist sectarians.

Yet if we understood communism to be a project of humanity talking conscious control of its own conditions of existence, then placing hope in the unconscious spontaneous energy of mass actions is not sufficient. Yes, we can find levels of organization emerge from the movements of the crowd, with the formation of assemblies, affinity groups, and even new nonprofits as initiatives from activists. It would be a mistake to deny the obvious creativity that arises from mass movements like the ones we saw this summer. Yet it would be an even bigger mistake to declare that this creativity can produce the organization and class consciousness needed to transform the existing class struggle into one that can transcend capitalism. 

If we accept that the conscious planning of social-productive processes to meet the needs of the human species is a defining quality of communism, then we should also be willing to apply this principle to communist politics. As partisans of communism who believe that we have a duty to fight for our ideas, it is necessary that we develop an analysis of our situation, determine what is needed to further advance the struggle for communism, develop a plan of action based on this analysis, and put it into practice. We look at the social forces that promulgated these dynamics, but it is necessary to also analyze how our situation fits in a broader historical struggle of the proletariat throughout history. We cannot develop an entirely new form of struggle or organization for any given conjuncture but instead look to our past for insight into how we can best act and develop a strategy that can help us spearhead the class war towards communism. After all, the current conjuncture isn’t something simply unfolding before our eyes as passive observers. We can analyze the situation and collectively act in ways informed by our analysis to influence its unfolding.

But who is this ‘we’ that I speak of? Is it whoever jumps into the crowd with a hope for liberation or a desire to break with the current order? Is it only other leftists? Other Marxists? To ask the strategic question of ‘what is to be done?’, there needs to be a collective ‘we’ that can act as a subject. Otherwise ‘we’ are simply acting as individuals, an affinity group in the streets, a nonprofit, or a temporary general assembly that will only last as long as people can stay in the streets. Questions like “should we focus on building unions or elections, should we oppose the war, should we form a coalition with this party, should we organize nation-wide demonstrations, should we form an armed struggle?” all only make sense when the ‘we’ in question is some kind of organized collectivity that already has unified around a certain goal. Otherwise one is simply shouting at the atomized masses hoping they will follow. 

The ‘party’ is simply this organized collectivity that allows a ‘we’ to form and act in a decisive way. This is to say nothing of what a party looks like, which I have said more about in other places. In this instance, I am focusing on and arguing on a more abstract philosophical level about why the party is necessary. This is not the imposition of an abstract historical model completely foreign to the conjuncture as Taylor B claims. The call for a party is instead a call for strategy and the capacity to put it into practice through forming a political subject, a ‘we’ that can pose and answer questions through collective action. 

I do not doubt that Taylor B accepts the need for strategy and an organized political subjectivity that can put it into practice. The problem is that he sees the current political sequence as a singularity that exists in a break with the past so radical that it will herald a completely novel form of political subjectivity, leaving us incapable of learning from the accumulated lessons of the past. There supposedly has been such a radical break in history that these accumulated lessons can only be the “traditions of generations weighing on us like living nightmares”. Arguments like this can be found everywhere, from ultra-left proponents of the immediate communization of society like the journal Endnotes to left-populists like Laclau and Mouffe. The old forms of worker identification and the corresponding forms of organization such as the party and union were expressions of a historically specific era that is long gone. Today we will see new forms of subjectivity and organizational forms, and those who raise the old forms of a bygone era are simply imposing a nostalgic past onto the present. Or so the argument typically goes. 

I like to call these types of arguments the ‘appeal to novelty’. The version of it that Taylor B cites is an essay by Sylvain Lazarus, “Lenin and the Party, 1902 – November 1917”. Its argument is worth summarizing before dissecting, as it gives us a sophisticated version of the ‘appeal to novelty’ argument. Lazarus begins by saying that the notion of ‘the party’ is the basis of politics in the 20th Century, which is an innovation marked by Lenin’s What Is To Be Done in rupture with the previous conception of politics which centered on the insurrection of the class, exemplified by the Paris Commune and the ideas of Marx. Lenin’s development of the thesis explicated in What Is To Be Done is seen as a break from Marx’s idea of the class as the revolutionary subject: 

In What Is to Be Done? Lenin broke with the thesis of Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto (1848) with regard to the spontaneous character of the appearance of  Communists within the modern proletariat. In contrast to the Marxist thesis that can be stated as “Where there are proletarians, there are Communists,” Lenin opposed spontaneous consciousness and Social Democratic (that is, revolutionary) consciousness and stretched this opposition to the limit.1

This break with Marx is said to comprise a new sequence, the discovery of a truth that marks an era which demonstrates this truth. Yet the sequence comes to an end in 1917, as ‘the party’ is now something that becomes intertwined with the state. Now one can only speak of the ‘state party’, a force of conservatism because of its ‘standing over society’. A new sequence begins, and the word becomes ‘revolution’ rather than ‘party’. What this means is unclear beyond the fact that a new form of politics that goes beyond the party. Rather than seeking state power, it seeks its “subversion, its transitory cessation”.2 In his rejection of a politics oriented around state power and the party, Lazarus goes so far as to say the signifier of ‘revolution’ should be rejected as it “is a nonpolitical, historicist notion, reducing the thought of politics, its condition of possibility, to that of an event character in exteriority, and placing this latter in a chain in which ‘party’ and ‘state’ also figure…rendered obsolete in 1968, as far as France is concerned.”3 

My first reaction to Lazarus’ argument here is that he’s making a claim that’s impossible to disprove because it’s impossible to prove. Looking at history and developing a periodization can be useful. That said, one has to ask whether they are imposing a periodization by coming up with a conclusion and then reading history backward to validate that conclusion. Historical narratives are supposed to be explanatory, and the only thing that Lazarus’ narrative explains is why he thinks we need to abandon all the past concepts of Marxist politics and come up with something completely novel.

Problems with method aside, the narrative Lazarus paints is simply not true. Lenin was not breaking with the political practice or conceptions of Marx and Engels in What Is To Be Done? and wasn’t making any kind of original argument. As Lars Lih has pointed out, What Is To Be Done? Is an impressive exercise in aggressive unoriginality. Lenin’s arguments about the need for class consciousness to be brought from without due to the inadequacy of economic struggles to develop into Social-Democratic politics on their own is simply an application of Karl Kautsky’s ‘merger formula’. The merger formula postulates that socialist intellectuals such as Marx and Engels developed their applications from a study of history and political economy, while the working class by necessity organized into a labor movement to collectively defend its conditions within capitalism. The socialist intellectuals, consciously dedicated partisans of political conviction, must merge their knowledge with the working-class movement by uniting to form a party dedicated to the cause of socialist revolution that is armed with a scientific theory of social change. Kautsky based this idea on the very life and work of Marx and Engels themselves, as he shows in his pamphlet The Historical Accomplishment of Karl Marx. By heralding Lenin’s theory of the party as a radical break from Marx, Lazarus falls into the trappings of Cold War historiography as well the myths that Leninist sects tell themselves about the “party of a new type”. 

What Lazarus is doing is projecting a radical break into history so as to justify that another radical break is necessary. Lenin (supposedly) broke with Marx’s view of the class as the subject of revolution with his view of the party in order to successfully seize power in October. Then the party became a source of conservatism through its merging with the state after October, meaning that if we are to truly be working in the spirit of Lenin then another break is necessary, this time with the party itself. Yet the break never really happened in the first place. Marx himself fought to form the workers’ party in his own time and struggled within it for programmatic clarity. His own life was an example of the merger formula in practice. Kautsky merely systematized it and Lenin applied it to Russian conditions.  

Lazarus’ periodization is essentially just an assertion of novelty to the expense of continuity, showing history as a series of sequences where each represents a clean break from the prior where a totally different type of politics is necessitated by history. What exactly changes in terms of socio-economic conditions to produce these sequences and necessitates the accompanying break in political frameworks is left to the imagination. Against this vision of history as pure novelty, we must instead see the continuity in history so as to better assimilate the accumulated past struggles of the proletariat and oppressed, building on the years of trial and error practice passed down to us by our forebearers to produce the institutions and knowledge that exist with us today. Lenin was not simply analyzing the immediate conjuncture he faced and drawing conclusions from its immanent tendencies to produce practice. He was applying knowledge and practices passed to him by years of prior political experience. 

Lenin was working with the tradition of Russian populism and its accumulated years of failure to produce a real social revolution against Czarism. Using a flawed strategy of terrorism and reliance on the spontaneous energies of the peasantry awakened by a minority of the intelligentsia, Lenin looked for solutions that at first weren’t obvious fits for his conditions. He saw one in the massive success of the German Social Democratic Party, which unified under a programme based on Marxism to build a party supported by millions of workers. The German Social Democratic movement itself existed in continuity with the traditions of Chartism, radical republicanism, and Germany’s own national history of labor struggle and peasant rebellion. All of these accumulated experiences of class struggle constitute the tradition of communist activity that not only Lenin was embedded in, but contemporary communists too, for better or worse. 

It is for this reason that I reject both Lazarus’ periodization and Taylor B’s use of it to argue that “we must proceed from a break to do politics under present conditions” just as “Marx broke with the utopian socialists. Lenin broke with Marx. The Cultural Revolution can be read as Mao’s break with Marxism-Leninism to free politics from the party-state.” By positing history as a sequence of decisive clean breaks rather than a flux of novelty and continuity it breaks us off from the past generations of class struggle, forcing the left to completely reinvent politics for every historical sequence we encounter. Any concrete situation in history is a completely unique conjuncture while also embedded in a web of determinations that are the product of generations of social practices all corresponding with humanity’s need to interface with nature. Situating ourselves in the conjuncture means looking through all of history at the accumulated lessons given to us by these social practices and building on them, throwing off the muck of the past that harms us while preserving those ideas and practices that correctly orient us, continuing the work of those before us. 

With this perspective, it is easy to see how it is not idealist to react to the current situation by pursuing the organization of a workers’ party. Those of us who engage in such pursuits continue the work of generations of partisans before us and carry with them their lessons and methods. To build on these methods and apply them to the conditions we face is not forcing something foreign and alien upon our current circumstances. These circumstances do not exist in a vacuum completely outside of a broader historical continuity. 

What is idealist is to assume a break in history where political actors will completely reinvent the old forms and subjectivities without building upon the historical traditions they are embedded in. We are more atomized and depoliticized than ever before, so it is easier to see ourselves as disembedded from the past and in a unique historical position where we must go back to the drawing board and completely reinvent politics in order to relate to our times. Yet this disembeddedness is an illusion, as is the accompanying notion that we can reinvent politics without regard for the traditions of the past.

Any attempt to reinvent politics in such a way will inevitably be pure improvisation. Any situation requires improvisation, a “concrete analysis of a concrete situation”. But improvisation in politics requires knowledge of our methods of struggle, a body of organizational and political knowledge that serves as a basis. When we disembed ourselves from the past and seek to reinvent our methods of struggle with every new phase of history (however these phases are defined) we end up losing this knowledge and having to purely improvise in the dark. And this improvisation will fall into the dominant thought patterns of bourgeois-liberal society. 

This is why Althusser spoke of the spontaneous ideology of scientists and it also makes sense to speak of the spontaneous ideology of activists.4 In seeking to achieve political goals, activists come upon limitations and dead ends, just as scientists come to across moments of crisis in their fields. The activist will seek to solve these problems and limitations within the ideological framework that is dominant in society, just as the scientist turns to idealist philosophy despite the realist and materialist nature of their practice. Today, when coming across the limitations of the current moment, activists will turn towards liberal and anarchist ideas unless a coherent alternative is posed. Rather than leading to an overcoming of the dominant framework, spontaneity tends to favor it. 

This is why Lenin spoke of the need to “combat spontaneity”. For Lenin, the role of the party was introducing a social-democratic consciousness that was not seen as possible through the accumulation of economic struggles alone. The fact that the accumulations of economic struggles would not lead to the spontaneous generation of social-democratic consciousness was what necessitated the party. Lenin saw that communist politics requires challenging the dominant worldview, and the party allowed this to be done in a conscious and systematic way.  This is the lesson of What Is To Be Done, and it should be seen as a lesson that is not particular to a certain phase of history as Lazarus would have it but rather universal to politics itself. The battle for hegemony must be a protracted and systematic struggle that pushes against the dominant ideas of society while putting forward a real alternative. 

My argument is not that we don’t need change and innovative ways of thinking and organizing, but simply that we don’t fix what isn’t broken. The party-form is not itself the agent of neutralization against emancipatory potentials that need to be broken with. Rather than being the cause of bureaucratism and other sources of revolutionary degeneration, the party is the precondition for solving these problems. There is a class struggle within the party itself, between the petty-bourgeois bureaucracy and the proletarians they represent. When Taylor B speaks of the party-form as the source of neutralization, it is the victory of this petty-bourgeois stratum that is actually the source of neutralization, not the essence of the party itself. By conducting the struggle to control party bureaucracy and democratize its organizations, the proletariat itself learns how to govern society as a class. 

Building the workers’ party allows us to constitute the proletariat into higher forms of political subjectivity by creating a collectivity that consciously and deliberately works to solve these problems. It allows us to actually become a force that can contest the class power of our enemies by out-organizing and out-strategizing them. To have any discussion about revolutionary strategy, develop an actionable plan, and put it into practice, a party is needed. Revolutionaries throughout history have realized this. Seeing the futility of endless street protests regardless of how militant, Huey Newton reacted to the challenges faced by struggling Black proletarians by helping form the Black Panther Party: 

The movement was cresting around the country. Brothers on the block in many northern cities were moving angrily in response to the problems that overwhelmed them. New York and other eastern cities had exploded in 1964, Watts went up in 1965, Cleveland in 1966, and in 1967 another long hot summer was approaching. But the brothers needed direction for their energies. The Party wanted no more spontaneous riots, because the outcome was always the same: the people might liberate their territories for a few short days or hours, but eventually the military force of the oppressor would wipe out their gains. Having neither the strength nor the organization, the people were powerless. In the final analysis, riots caused only more repression and the loss of brave men. Blacks bled and died in the riots and went to jail on petty or false charges. If the brothers could be organized into disciplined cadres, working in broadly based community programs, then the energy expended in riots could be directed toward permanent and positive changes.5

Newton’s words are incredibly prescient today, as months of street protests in the US come up against the reality of the left’s actual organizational powerlessness and incapacity to provide an alternative to the existing regime. Mass actions, riots, general strikes – these are not substitutes for having the organizational capacity to govern. Even if the latest wave of protest had brought the government down, the reality would have been the military enforcing a constitutionally legal transition to a replacement government, led by the same parties that were there before. 

Contrary to Taylor B, I believe that Marx did have a theory of politics. While it would take figures such as Engels, Bebel, Kautsky, and Lenin to systematize it, Marx ultimately believed that politics was about classes contesting, taking, and holding power. Communism relied on the proletariat taking power on an international scale, which required a protracted struggle where the proletariat organized itself as a class that could pose as an alternative to capitalist society. To do this, the proletariat had to form a party and learn to self-govern by organizing on the national and international scales and waging a political battle for radical democratic-republicanism and the socialization of production. 

Unlike the socialist sectarians of today and of his own time, Marx fought for a party that would be based on unity around a political program, not a specific theoretical creed or philosophical dogma. Marx fought for the unity of all principled revolutionaries around a strategy for the proletariat to constitute itself as a class and fight for political power, not for the purity of a micro-sect. Many are wary of the project of party-building today because of the toxic attitudes of sectarians who promote disunity, and one should not mistake my argument in favor of a workers’ party as an argument for a new sect. What is needed is the unity of Marxists within the existing left around a program of class independence and a strategy of building a party that will organize working-class communities and contest elections. Such unity will require a breakup of sectarian identities in favor of collaboration and mergers, and will not be easily won. Yet the development of arguments like those made by the comrades in Red Star DSA show a potential for such an initiative in the left. One thing is for sure – without a party, we have nothing. Because without a party, there is no ‘we’. 

Beginnings of Politics: DSA and the Uprising

Writing in August, Taylor B argues that we must look to new emancipatory forces arising in the current conjuncture instead of seeking to impose older forms of organization. We aim for this piece to be a jumping-off point for a broader debate about strategy and the party-form in our current historical moment. 

Back in August, DSA New York City’s Emerge caucus joined with DSA San Francisco’s Red Star caucus for a panel discussion on the workers’ party.1 The limits to this discussion were contained in the opening statement that contextualized the event: that in the wake of Bernie Sanders’ primary defeat and the Black Lives Matter national uprising, there is a need for an independent mass force for and of the working classes and that this force is necessarily a worker’s party. Here we see the problem: in reading the ensemble of forces that make up the current moment, Red Star and Emerge impose historical forms of organization on the conjuncture, rather than attempt to think emancipatory forms of organization through a concrete analysis.

I believe we lack a theory of politics that is adequate for our moment. To pose the problem quickly: the Marxist tradition contains a gap. It gives us critical tools to understand the capitalist mode of production, the insight that emancipation is immanent to the system through class struggle, and a concept of the transition to communism formulated by Marx as the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Marx does not tell us how to apply this emancipatory framework: this is the Marxist problem of politics that must be theorized under the conditions of the current moment, or conjuncture. 

Lenin understood this problem of politics. Like a great mountain climber, Lenin proved that the Marxist tradition could serve as the basis for the correct political practices to reach the emancipatory summit. But we are situated at the base of a new mountain. The interlocking and unfolding crises of our time–global industrial overcapacity, climate change, and ecological apocalypse, a global pandemic, mass unemployment, extrajudicial state violence and occupation of communities of color at home and abroad–present a singular set of challenges to which Lenin’s map does not correspond. We must study Lenin to understand his process of map-making, not to substitute the map of his mountain for ours. As Marxists, we cannot simply read and extract an emancipatory politics from Lenin that is appropriate to our moment. To do so would deny the particular historical developments of Lenin’s moment and our own.

We need a theory of politics that can account for the formation of the DSA and prescribe practices that move us closer to achieving universal emancipation. For this theory of politics to be valid, it must be able to account for political phenomena beyond the socialist organization. This practical theory is what I want to begin thinking about here. 

I propose to think of both the DSA and the current uprising as singular beginnings of emancipatory politics. As beginnings, these movements should be understood as necessarily incoherent attempts to discover the determinant, singular forms of emancipatory politics that emerge from the conjuncture. I see the process of discovery that is inherent to all beginnings of emancipatory politics as a struggle against an antagonistic force, which seeks to neutralize emancipatory forms.2 If an emancipatory politics can only proceed from our present conditions, then we are fortunate to live in the “exceptional circumstances” of a world-historic uprising. We must search for emancipatory forms in these circumstances through concrete analysis and political practice, rather than impose abstract and historical models.

Conditions of Beginnings

What constitutes a beginning of emancipatory politics? First, we can say that all beginnings occur in unique ways. They must always be thought in relation to the conjuncture, which is to say that beginnings must always be thought of in their singularity. Second, we can say that all emancipatory beginnings necessarily coincide with overcoming an antagonistic force of neutralization. Thus, emancipatory politics occur in sequences, with the end of the sequence succumbing to the forces of neutralization. To conceive of a beginning, we must first understand the conditions of neutralization within our conjuncture.

The end of the Black Power era illustrates a complex set of neutralizing forces. Given the complexity of this era, I must limit myself to two broad points: First, the Black protest movement of the 1950s and 60s was the end of the last emancipatory sequence in the US. Some forces that neutralized this movement, and specifically the Black Power moment, remain active forces of neutralization in our conjuncture. Second, the neutralization of emancipatory politics must be seen as a determinate force in the state’s transition to its neoliberal form. 

The forces that neutralized the Black Power era can be summarized in a very schematic way: First, an increase in federal social welfare programs under Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society. These programs not only provided assistance but unofficially doubled as a jobs program for college-educated Black workers. The result was a small but stable Black middle class from which a new political class emerged. Second, violent state repression and harassment through counterinsurgency programs like COINTELPRO that forced political radicals like the Black Panther Party to take a “pragmatic turn.”3 At its peak the Panthers were an organization of 5,000 members across 40 chapters. By the early 1970s, “50 members had been killed, 200 injured, and another 300 arrested.” Third, praise of the movement’s “political maturity” upon entering the political mainstream of electoral politics with an emphasis on “community control” through municipal elections.4 

It is clear that entering municipal government was not sufficient for addressing issues around “housing, jobs, public education, and health care amid shrinking tax revenue, cuts to federal spending, and growing hostility to welfare as an entitlement to the poor.5 And why is this? Because the moment the Black Power movement “matured” and a new class of political representatives began to enter the state, a crisis of capitalist accumulation was unfolding. This crisis of profitability began in the late 1960s through productive overcapacity in the global manufacturing sector.6 With profits no longer secure, the New Deal consensus broke down. Both production and the state itself required reorganization. Thus we see not only the deindustrialization of American cities through a shift to overseas production via distributed supply chains, but the formation of a disciplinary state of social insecurity to reinforce the system of wage labor amidst worsening employment opportunities in an era of deregulated capitalism.7 Through a “double regulation of the poor,” social welfare programs were gutted as police targeted street crime along the lines of class, race, and place. While Black mothers were disproportionately harmed by generalized welfare cuts, Black men in particular urban zones were swept into the rapidly expanding penal system.

I am well aware of the fact that the sketch I have provided is extremely schematic. But I feel this rough sketch does illustrate how the emancipatory politics of the Black Power era were neutralized. The result of this neutralization was a new class of Black politicians presiding over a restructured state of social insecurity that contributed to the death of Black people, among others.8 While all new emancipatory beginnings must break with and struggle against neutralizing forces, I believe this rough sketch gives us an idea of what elements require further study in our current moment.

The End of the Party

There is one element of neutralization we see during the end of the Black Power era that I want to pay particular attention to: the political party. The political party was not only a form through which emancipatory politics was integrated into the mainstream during this period, it was also a determining factor in both securing the necessary federal aid to build the Black middle class and coordinating the actions and policies of the repressive state apparatuses. Political parties are clearly an active force of neutralization in our conjuncture. It is for this reason that in the United States a beginning of emancipatory politics must break with the corporate, two-party system in particular and state organizations in general. 

For our purposes, we can note that the Democratic and Republican parties are barely parties in the bourgeois parliamentarian sense of the term. It would be more accurate to say they are networks of statist interest groups tangled in a complex set of pay-to-play schemes. Their control of the state is contingent on a particular set of interests taking a dominant position within these overlapping networks, but it is secured through the disorganization of working people. This disorganization is achieved at least in part through the successful neutralization of politics.9 As we have seen, one way in which this neutralization occurs is by absorbing representatives of emancipatory movements into its ranks. A head is created so it can be decapitated, thus killing the body.

We should also note that in addition to the corporate parties, the Black Panther Party was not only neutralized, but became a force of neutralization itself once it made its “pragmatic turn.” This is not a criticism of the Panthers; they clearly had no other option. The point I want to make is that the Panthers are just one example of a larger development in the twentieth century: the neutralization of the party-form itself.

As Sylvain Lazarus shows, the twentieth century saw “the notion of the party” become “central” to politics.10 This was inaugurated by Lenin, the theorist of the Bolshevik mode of politics, with his 1902 text What Is to Be Done?. For Lazarus, the notion of Marxism-Leninism obscures Lenin’s real break with Marx on the question of politics. The Bolshevik mode of politics that Lenin theorized was preceded by the “classist” mode of politics. The primary theorist of this mode was Marx, which had insurrection as its basis.11 The classist mode, or sequence, existed from the publication of the Communist Manifesto and ended with the Paris Commune in 1871. 

For Lazarus, the classist thesis is this: ‘Where there are proletarians, there are Communists.” Crucially, there is no theory of organization in Marx, nor is there a “real theory of political consciousness.” Instead, there is a “major and fundamental” theory of “historical consciousness and of consciousness as historical consciousness.” In other words, Marx’s “Communists” are made by history, rather than any organization.

Thus, Lenin breaks with Marx once he rejects this spontaneity. For Lenin, “the appearance of revolutionary militants” could not be a spontaneous occurrence, but just the opposite. For Lazarus, the “political core” of Lenin’s theory of politics is a “nonspontaneous consciousness” that is antagonistic to “the entire existing social and political order.” It is this nonspontaneous consciousness that is the heart of the party. The party is the “mechanism of realization of the conditions that will permit the emergence of a political consciousness.” For Lazarus, this is a critical development: “Lenin brings the foundation of modern politics in the fact that revolutionary politics is required to announce and practice the conditions of its existence.”

So through Lenin, we have the Bolshevik mode of politics, a politics of the revolutionary party. The sites of the Bolshevik mode of politics were the party and the soviet. This mode, or sequence, ended with the successful completion of the October Revolution. In other words, after the October Revolution, the party and the soviet were no longer active sites of emancipatory politics. This is because, upon the Bolsheviks taking power, the party and the soviets entered into a new relationship with each other and the state. The party fused with the state and subordinated the soviets to it. As Lazarus tells us: “From now on, ‘party’ would be assigned to power, to the state.” The party would now be:

an attribute of the state, or even its center. We enter the global era of state parties: Stalinism, Nazisim, parliamentarianism — multi-partyism being an interstate muti-partyism. At all events, parties exist only as state parties, which means that in the strict sense, these parties are not political organizations but state organizations.12

Thus, the success of the October Revolution coincided with the end of its political forms and the neutralization of its emancipatory sequence.

I believe we can see why I have equated overcoming the neutralization of politics with a break from the corporate two-party system. In the first place, a beginning of politics must proceed from a break to do politics under present conditions. Marx broke with the utopian socialists. Lenin broke with Marx. The Cultural Revolution can be read as Mao’s break with Marxism-Leninism to free politics from the party-state.13 Since we cannot know the forms of collective emancipation until we discover them within our conjuncture and put them into practice, we must begin by breaking with the neutralizing elements. For us, this means state organizations in general and the party-form in particular.

Beginnings of Politics

Over the last decade, there have been at least four beginnings: Occupy, Ferguson, the 2016 and 2020 defeats of Bernie Sanders Democratic primary campaigns, and the recent uprisings following the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others. Each of these beginnings have their own thrusts and limits: they are structured in their particularity. Now, this is not to say that these beginnings are antagonistic or incompatible with each other: they are all beginnings of emancipatory struggles.

Since the growth of DSA is closely associated with the Sanders campaigns, I will begin there. To this point, I do not believe we have a strong analysis of the 2020 Democratic primary. I will limit myself to a few comments to continue my larger argument.

First, the 2020 Democratic primary election can only be understood in reference to Trump’s presidency and the strength of the ruling class. Trump’s violation of norms and traditions marks a discontinuity and period of adjustment for the ruling class within the two-party system, rather than the state’s weakness or new forms of governance. While discontinuity has given the appearance of a political crisis, Trump has energized an otherwise rudderless GOP and created an ideal foil for a similarly bankrupt DNC. This is the positive side of Trump’s discontinuity. From this positive perspective, the Bush and Obama administrations were the end of a sequence that played out within the ruling class. In 2016, all of the most unpopular aspects and contradictions of this regime manifested in the candidacy of Hillary Clinton, who was unable to carry it forward. While Trump is a poor administrator of empire who may fail to adequately contain domestic and international crises, they do not originate with him.14

Second, far from the Trump administration constituting a new political crisis, it would seem that Trump’s presidency has functioned as the prevention of one. Trump’s mostly stylistic discontinuity with the previous regime is what makes it possible to even conceive of the DNC and GOP having any legitimacy whatsoever. Take the COVID-19 relief packages for example. The only relief the so-called “normal politicians” in Congress have provided is a one-time $1,200 check and a temporary $600 weekly boost to unemployment benefits. Trump has functioned as an incredible shield for the political establishment’s complete unwillingness or inability to respond to the pandemic.

Third, the false notion that Trump’s presidency constitutes a political crisis is the basis for Sanders’ 2020 defeat. As others have pointed out, it is with great irony that the most prominent activist for Medicare for All was defeated during a global pandemic. Sanders’ 2020 defeat was not orchestrated by an underhanded media and omnipotent DNC, though the media and DNC played their parts. The decisive force was the large turnout of Democratic primary voters who rallied to Joe Biden.  

Biden’s victory was the result of a mobilization to protect “American Democracy” from the singular danger of the Genius Fascist Russian Crook Moron President. Trump’s “singular danger” to institutions, the Constitution, and the whole “exceptional” American project was reinforced time and again by both liberals and conservatives despite the strong continuity between his administration and the previous ones. Even Sanders held this position as he tried to rally voters and nonvoters to his social-democratic program. Presumably, this is why he is ending his political career campaigning for the Democratic establishment.

So while it seems that voters were failing to identify and vote for their “material interests”–public healthcare, student debt relief, etc.–we can see they were in fact voting for a different set of material interests. Biden’s primary voters chose to remove a bug from the machine they depend on for material and symbolic satisfaction. Even though the machine runs on blood and oil and cannot deliver public goods or a better life for the next generation, these voters ultimately affirmed in an exemplary way that politics is not something we can afford. The crises were too dire to consider any semblance of change or social transformation. Their decision was to right the ship, rather than begin the process to build a new one.

The Sanders Beginning

Sanders’ 2016 and 2020 defeats created surges in DSA membership growth. DSA now claims more than 70,000 members across 300 chapters. I believe these moments of growth are evidence of a beginning of politics. This is to say that through the defeat of Sanders 2016 and 2020 insurgent campaigns, truths have been produced for people that have “punched holes” in existing knowledge.15 These truths have fundamentally corresponded with the idea that the two-party system is incapable of delivering desired political outcomes on its own, and that therefore political organization is necessary in some form beyond the given bourgeois forms.

There are three points I want to emphasize. First, the reason a beginning of emancipatory politics could occur in a presidential primary is that Sanders was an insurgent candidate. To vote for him was to agree that some form of political organization was needed beyond the DNC. This is epitomized by his call for “political revolution.” Second, the fact that Sanders has betrayed his revolution by actively campaigning for Biden does not mean the beginning is over. Extinguishing a match used to light a fire has no bearing on the fire. Third, the neutralization of Sanders in 2020 that has seen him become a neutralizing force is a repeat of 2016 when he was defeated and campaigned for Hillary Clinton. What this should indicate to us is that the struggle between emancipatory beginnings and their neutralization are dynamic. Beginnings of politics can only be understood in relation to the force of neutralization.

The movement for socialism in the US is dominated by the Sanders beginning. So much so that I believe the term “socialism” in its current popular usage is the name for the recognition that additional political forms are needed beyond bourgeois ones. As a “socialist organization,” it would seem that the DSA is one of these non-bourgeois political forms. To be more specific, the DSA is neither a bourgeois form or a proletarian form: it is a political form of the petty bourgeoisie. But the economic character of the DSA is not sufficient to explain the incoherence within the organization. 

As a beginning of politics, DSA’s coherence is necessarily blocked by the forces of neutralization. As I have indicated, this is because a beginning of politics is a struggle against the neutralization of politics. The struggle between this unevenly developed balance of forces is playing out in DSA within its membership between different defined and undefined tendencies. Ultimately, I believe this struggle can be located in a problem of interpretation that arises from the recognition of the need for additional and supplemental political forms in a capitalist society. Are the additional forms of political organization meant to supplement the existing two-party system as a pressure group or third party within the capitalist mode of production? Or should additional forms of political organization create an irreconcilable and radical opposition to the organizations of the US state and the capitalist mode of production? DSA is dominated by the former. 

Both the “run better Democrats” and “build a worker’s party” tendencies in DSA correspond with the forces of neutralization. Why? Because they attempt to employ historical forms of politics that are emancipatory dead-ends. Since these tendencies dominate DSA, even if they can oppose each other, it is clear the DSA is constituted through an extremely unbalanced development of emancipatory and neutralizing forces. At best these strategies will only continue to block the development of emancipatory forms and reproduce our incoherence; at worst they will be coherent in their neutralization. If we are going to advance the emancipatory struggle, we must continue to fight the forces of neutralization that are consistent with our beginning by discovering the new political forms and building radical institutions.

Given DSA’s close association with the revival of “socialism,” tendencies within DSA that advocate electoralism and building the worker’s party threaten to neutralize the revival of socialism itself by stamping out its emancipatory potential. We can already see the logic at work. The failure of socialism to constitute a radical politics will likely follow the logic of Joe Biden’s primary voters: the crises we face will be deemed too great to entertain de-emphasizing electoral work or abandoning the worker’s party. Collective emancipation will be something we cannot afford. We must turn to forms that cannot deliver emancipation because it is not clear what else we can do. Once again, the ship must be righted because there is “no alternative.”

Now I realize I appear to have entered a tired debate. This is the debate that puts electoral work on one side and mutual aid on the other and ends with one person quoting Lenin’s “Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder” on Twitter.16 Fortunately, my argument exists outside of this problematic. Why? Because this debate is completely abstract and idealist: it supposes that we can simply choose the arena we wish to fight in based on what is strategically expedient, rather than do politics in relation to the specific ensemble of determinate forces that make up the current moment. Worse, invoking texts like “Left-Wing Communism” supposes we can extract transhistorical “wisdom” from a text written in relation to its conjuncture and apply it to ours. We cannot do either of these things. We must begin with the goal of universal emancipation and construct a theory of politics from within the conjuncture that allows us to move toward it. This must include identifying and combating the forces of neutralization. This is what Marx did. This is what Lenin did. Their specific proposals must be understood in relation to their moment instead of being imported into ours.

To this point, I believe we have made positive steps toward a concrete analysis so we can get an idea of the correct way the movement for socialism must proceed. But we cannot say we have yet articulated a concrete basis. Why? Because we must recognize that our movement for socialism coincides with other beginnings: both the Ferguson uprising and this current uprising of world-historic proportions that has been sparked by the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others. As Marxists, we cannot hope to advance the emancipatory struggle in our moment without thinking through the Black Lives Matter beginning.

The Uprising 

The uprising is another singular beginning of politics. Between 15 and 26 million Americans have taken part in this uprising, making it possibly the largest protest movement in US history.17 We must note that the present uprising has not been led by any single mass organization, much less a Leninist party. We must try to understand the various forms of organizations that have been operative in this struggle, both formal and informal; we must also try to understand the uprising’s “spontaneity.” This will be essential if DSA is to make new connections and undertake organizing practices that deliver organizational forms that are appropriate to emancipatory politics. 

The uprising is a beginning of politics that must be understood in its singularity. What set off this beginning? Was it the video of George Floyd’s murder? Was it the one in 2,000 deaths of African Americans due to the COVID-19 pandemic? Was it the concentration of unemployment in communities of color that are forced to live in greater numbers in substandard housing? Was it the failure for meaningful reform following Trayvon Martin’s murder in 2012 and the Ferguson rebellion in 2014? I think we can say the event was the moment in which these realities fused in thought for people. This fusion, this rupture, led to the discovery that a past truth is still true: that in the US, Black lives largely do not matter. And it is this truth that has led a heterogeneous mix of people in Minneapolis and around the world to take to streets to combat it: to say that if life matters, Black lives must matter. 

It seems to me that Black Lives Matter is the name of an anti-racist movement against the police in particular, and the state in general. Like the socialist movement, reformist and radical tendencies have been produced within it. I should note that this simple opposition is not abstracted from the movement, but coincides with the necessary struggle between the neutralization and beginning of politics. On the one hand, Black lives will matter once police have the right amount of diversity, bias-training, and public oversight. On the other hand, Black lives will matter once the police are abolished and the carceral state is destroyed. Here we see additive and antagonistic demands coexisting as a beginning of politics.

The new demand to “defund the police” and reinvest in public goods seems to straddle the reformist and radical tendencies. This demand seems to best contain the struggle over the beginning and neutralization of politics. It can be read as both a transition to abolishing the police and a reformist move that says once the police are properly funded in relation to public goods they will finally be effective and worthwhile. Nevertheless, “defunding the police” is a reform of more radical character than requiring police to wear body cameras. It would seem the Black Lives Matter movement, from Ferguson to now, is both expanding its popularity and its radicality. I think this should be viewed as a positive development of a beginning even if it remains blocked by forces of neutralization.

Compared to the movement for socialism, it seems the Black Lives Matter movement is better positioned to resist the neutralization of politics. The development of this uprising seems to contain a more even development between the forces of politics and its neutralization. I believe the greater momentum behind the radical tendencies within the movement is due in part to the failure of reforms that emerged from Ferguson to resolve similar problems. This truth, that the police cannot be reformed, has been produced for more people through the failures to reform, thereby increasing the radical character across the whole movement. Given the movement for socialism’s primarily electoral character, it would seem that for some reform cannot yet be discounted since it has not elected a sufficient number of authentic socialists to political office to test this idea. But this is the same flawed logic we see in the reformist version of defunding the police. Both ideas in these beginnings suggest the state can be reformed once a magic number is reached: the number of socialists in government and the number of dollars going to police in municipal and state budgets.

While there is undoubtedly an economic dimension to the current uprising (mass unemployment is certainly a factor), the heterogeneous, multiracial mix of protestors does not adhere to a stable set of sociological categories or political consciousness. The forms of protest within the uprising, at first insurrectionary in character and then increasingly “peaceful,” have also shifted the longer the uprising has gone on. But this does not mean these elements have disappeared entirely. Different places are expressing their own time as they develop in their own way, with Minneapolis, Atlanta, Seattle, and Portland producing their own rhythms. I believe the key insight is this: The uprising is composed of contradictory situations that cut across different levels of the totality. Since the uprising has extended beyond US borders, with mass protests and demonstrations occurring around the world in solidarity and for their own particular reasons, it seems the totality is international in character.

Who are the people taking part in this uprising? I want to answer this question in a way that pushes back against Marxist “common sense.” I do not believe “the working-class” is an adequate category for the uprising. It would be more accurate to say that the uprising contains the working-class, petty bourgeoisie (with an emphasis on private and public salaried employees), and even bourgeois elements. This is reflected in the apparently not insignificant number of protestors who earn salaries of more than $150,000, and the support, if only nominally and cynically, by major multinational corporations. I do not think it is appropriate to say this particular beginning of politics is simply an early form of a general “class politics” that must be channeled and led by a worker’s party. We must address the moment in its singularity and resist any appeal to “Marxist” theory consistent with an abstract, Hegelian dialectic.18 I believe we must accept that the “spontaneous” and “unorganized” masses appear more radical than the largest socialist organization in the US, including many of its Marxist tendencies.

That being said, class antagonism is certainly present in the uprising. The problem is that this class antagonism seems to be expressed through a fusion of contradictory elements that take different forms of protest in different places. Marching and looting have occurred at different times of day by what appear to be different groups. Thus, the class antagonism is not reducible to a classical Marxist proletarian struggle, but appears in an overdetermined, anti-racist movement against the state that is particular to the moments of protest occurring in different places with their different rhythms. The complexity of the conjuncture shows we are in (yet another) “exceptional” circumstance.19

To make things more complicated, the class antagonism itself contains different tendencies due to the economic, political, and ideological relations of the classes involved.20 Let’s take the petty-bourgeois element as an example, which we should point out is also an element that has assumed a dominant role in the movement for socialism. As Nicos Poulantzas has made clear, the petty bourgeoisie is a complex class made of groupings of subgroupings.21 Crucially, it has no real ideological position of its own. Instead, the petty bourgeoisie creates a “sub-ensemble” of ideology by “twisting and adapting” bourgeois ideology to its “aspirations” of mobility while simultaneously borrowing in greater degree “from working-class ideology,” which it similarly “deflects and adapts” to its “own aspirations.”22 One result of this is the petty-bourgeois “status quo anti-capitalism” that takes a position “against ‘big money’ and ‘great fortunes’ and “aspires to ‘social justice,’ through State redistribution of income.”23 Since the petty bourgeoisie “fears proletarianization” and “upheaval,” the petty bourgeoisie

aspires to ‘participate’ in the ‘distribution’ of political power, without wanting a radical transformation of it…It aspires to be the ‘arbiter’ of society, because as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to become petty-bourgeois.24

I believe the socialist and Black Lives Matter movements must combat this dominant petty-bourgeois tendency. This tendency is a force of neutralization that seeks to simply alter the state and maintain class society: it is the same force of neutralization that emerged from the end of the Black protest movement in the late 1960s early 1970s. More importantly, this “status quo anti-capitalist” tendency is obscured if we reduce the Black Lives Matter movement, or the DSA for that matter, to “working class” politics.

We can see that we must take the Black Lives Matter movement in its own terms and think about it in its singular complexity. It is still unclear what lasting political forms the Black Lives Matter movement will adopt, if any. But if the beginning of politics coincides with a break from the two-party system in particular and state organizations in general then perhaps its amorphous, “spontaneous” character makes it more difficult to neutralize. This is to say that the beginning of politics the uprising expresses is more unknown and comes with greater uncertainty as it reaches across various groups and organizations and the many people who are returning to the streets and entering them for the first time.

Where Beginnings Meet

While I have discussed the Black Lives Matter and socialist movements separately to attend to their singular beginnings, it is clear these movements meet in various ways. I believe both movements must be open to the other if they are to make the break from their beginnings and constitute an emancipatory politics. 

Given that the Black Lives Matter movement has a more radical character, given that racism has proven time and again to be the stumbling block of previous movements for socialism and communism, the movement for socialism must embrace it in an emphatic way. While labor and tenant organizing, eviction defense, and unemployed councils are all great starting points for advancing emancipatory struggle, these abstract tactics must be thought through and alongside the organizations that compose the uprising and Black Lives Matter movement. Rather than turn to the historical dead-ends of the Democratic party and CPUSA, we must trust that appropriate emancipatory forms will emerge as we engage in the local, national, and international organizing that this moment makes possible.

The rally and demonstration around the ILWU’s Juneteenth work stoppage of seaports down the west coast is an excellent example of these two beginnings meeting. This demonstration brought many organizations together, including the DSA, the Party for Socialism and Liberation, and others. For the DSA in particular, this was an extremely rare coordinated action between the San Francisco and East Bay chapters. Thousands turned out for the morning rally at the Port of Oakland to hear speeches from the Black leadership of the majority Black ILWU Local 10, Danny Glover, and Angela Davis. We marched in the streets shouting the names of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor to Oscar Grant Plaza. We should note that “Oscar Grant Plaza” is this place’s unofficial name, and that this name began with Occupy Oakland.

What organizing projects put anti-racism at the center of our work to destroy the capitalist mode of production and the political and ideological relations it depends on? How might a commitment to anti-racism express itself in an organization that is majority white? How can relationships be formed and deepened with trade and tenant unions around this cause in addition to advancing their struggle for better working and living conditions? What resources can the DSA make available to assist local anti-racist organizations in an effort to build and potentially lead anti-racist coalitions? I believe we must pursue these questions together.

Before I close, I must admit that the Juneteenth event was not without tension. The morning ILWU rally began with a blessing from a Black preacher who stated that “Black lives matter” and that “all lives matter.” Following him, a member of the ILWU forcefully declared we would be having a “peaceful” protest; either the preacher or this ILWU member affirmed the importance of voting. Later, a member of ILWU leadership said that “good cops need to start checking bad cops.”

Now there were a few grumbles around me when these things were said. It is clear there are more contradictions present in our emancipatory beginnings than I have been able to attend to. But perhaps these statements were allowed to pass because the day was only beginning. Perhaps we all understood that this movement itself is only a beginning, and that as such, the patience to struggle is necessary.

Walter Polakov and the Hidden History of Socialist Scientific Management

 Walter Polakov had a combined passion for two seemingly contradictory ideas: scientific management and socialism. How did these two combine? Amelia Davenport interviews Diana Kelly, author of The Red Taylorist: The Life and Times of Walter Nicholas Polakov to bring light to this little known part of US history.

“Detroit Industry” by Diego Rivera

Walter Polakov (1879-1948) was a Russian-American Marxist, engineer, philosopher and scientific manager. Normally, the idea of a Marxist scientific manager would be appalling to both Marxists and the management studies community. Although scientific management was put into heavy use by the early Bolshevik government, it is usually written off as either a tragic necessity for industrialization or a prime example of the innate corruption of Leninism. For the part of management studies, the long-standing narrative that scientific management represented an inhumane anti-worker ideology which was supplanted by Elton Mayo’s benevolent “Human Relations” movement is near sacrosanct. But neither of these narratives can accommodate the much more complicated history of scientific management as a real current in history. While it is true that until shortly before his death Frederick Taylor himself opposed unions and always maintained a top-down approach to management practice, his views were by no means definitive of scientific management or even the Taylor Society founded in his honor. Many prominent members of the Taylor Society maintained socialist or otherwise anti-capitalist politics. After Taylor’s death the society even forged deep ties with organized labor. In fact, the Taylor Society openly endorsed strikes against employers who engaged in abusive practices. The Taylor Society played an important role within the International Labor Organization, UN agency tasked with promoting fair labor standards and the participation of organized labor in policymaking, and some of its alumni would even serve as staffers within militant labor unions in their struggles against the bosses. One such figure was Walter Polakov. Polakov spent much of his career as an advisor to the United Mine Workers in their most dynamic phase.

Within the pages of the Taylor Society’s bulletin, one can find spirited defenses of the Soviet Union, references to Rosa Luxemburg and August Bebel, and sharp denunciations of the capitalist system. By no means were all or even most Taylor Society members political or left-wing, but the culture of the movement was based around open debate and objective inquiry, not a sacred gospel. It’s this environment that allowed Polakov and his mentor Henry Gantt to advance notions that ran up against the prescriptions Taylor provided in Principles of Scientific Management. For instance, in Gantt’s Organizing for Work, worker participation in the development of new methods is highly encouraged and the notion of training workers to understand their work instead of simply acting as tools on behalf of management is strongly asserted. Although Gantt maintains a strict hierarchy of command within the rhythms of the active industrial production process, Polakov went much further in breaking with Taylorist orthodoxy. Polakov drew on his experience as an engineer and scientific manager of electric power production to rebuke Taylor’s inattention to the psychological and social needs of workers, his method of over-specialized administration, and his lack of inclusion of workers in the creative aspects of production. Polakov lays out his theories of organization in texts like Mastering Power Production, Man and His Affairs, and To Make Work Fascinating.

It is important to understand that Polakov’s socialist and pro-worker theories of organization were not in-spite of his scientific management, but rather an expression of it. Scientific management was a product of applying the principles of engineering to the production process as a whole. While engineering principles can be directed toward the maximization of output regardless of any other factors, it can also be directed toward the realization of other ends. For Polakov, this meant a borderline obsessive crusade against waste. Waste of time and waste of resources meant increased human toil and increased ecological destruction, which he saw as twin thefts from the workers. Taylor, on the other hand, saw idleness and inefficient labor methods as thefts from the general public of consumers and while employers saw them as a theft from their bottom line. Other Taylor Society members like African-American minister C. Bertrand Thompson argued for a more holistic accounting in texts like The Relation of Scientific Management to Labor. Where Human Relations smooths out contradictions between employers and workers, the Taylorists were consistently blunt and sober about them in their analyses, striving to give as-objective an account of the results of potential methods as possible. Knowledge of safe steel-milling methods and the rates of industrial accidents entailed by the use of particular coal mining techniques is as useful to organized labor as it is to employers.

The life of Walter Polakov, a man who dedicated his life to not only the cause of socialism but also practical improvements in the lives of workers, is criminally forgotten. In him, there was no contradiction between the broader goal of human emancipation and the day to day work of using science to make life better. Polakov spent much of his life tracked and harried by the FBI for his radical views and immigrant status, yet for his brilliance won himself a place at the table among the elite of American engineering. He would travel to the Soviet Union and apply his knowledge toward developing a more humane system of production than he found and return to the United States to fight for proletarians here.

Fortunately, the story of his life is no longer spread out among moldering archives thanks to the work of Diana Kelly. In The Red Taylorist, Kelly draws on a wealth of primary documents including FBI records to paint a compelling portrait of a man who persevered through hardship, persecution, and tragedy, while never wavering from his noble purpose. From his arrival in the United States as a bright-eyed engineer to his death as a penniless thrice-married divorce, the personal drama of Polakov’s life and the deep philosophical, political, and scientific problems are given excellent treatment. Below is an interview with Diana Kelly about her book, The Red Taylorist: The Life and Times of Walter Nicholas Polakov. I hope it will help shed light on Polakov’s significance to a new audience. 

Photograph of Polakov from January, 1 1921

 

Can you give some background about yourself and your academic work? 

First I was a schoolteacher – even in downtown New Zealand’s egalitarian welfare state, girls from poorish families couldn’t afford to go to University, but they could go into teaching (or nursing) and get paid for it.  I went to Teacher’s College and began teaching middle school (primary).  I came to Australia in 1968.  For the next fifteen years, I was a wife and parent, teacher, and part-time University student studying history.  Then I began tutoring at University and completed a Research Master’s degree in industrial relations in 1989.  In 2000 I completed my Ph.D. dissertation – A History of Academic Industrial Relations in Australia.  During the 1980s and 1990s, I researched, and coordinated, and lectured industrial relations (mainly undergraduate.  Then I had a few years in leadership/ management roles, Head of School, Acting Dean, Director of International Studies, before shifting back into the History Department.  I was also elected as Chair. Academic Senate a senior role I held for six years (the maximum term).  Then in 2015, I returned to a full-time academic role, researching in a range of fields and teaching undergraduate history. In that time I have seen numerous changes sweeping through our university (and many others), changes which are destroying many of the important aspects of academia, such as academic freedom and academic governance, by and for, academics.  My research has been rather eclectic – I have also written on the Australian steel industry, industrial relations, history of women, workplace bullying, and academic governance.  I am currently writing on employers and workplace health and safety, especially with regard to industrial manslaughter.  I would love to write more biographies because I believe biography can offer important insights not readily available in general histories.   

What was your biggest challenge in researching the life of Walter Polakov? What attracted you? 

I became interested in Polakov in the 1990s.  An august colleague, Chris Nyland, had been researching scientific management for some years, and had obtained full access to Bulletin of the Taylor Society (now easily attainable given the internet, but not so much in the early 1990s).  I was taken with the debates – the openness and collegiality (albeit, with undercurrents of personal tension!).  What was a defining moment for me was to find Polakov propounding his ideas couched in primitive Marxist terms.  I had seen signs of Progressivism in the debates but Polakov’s proclamations were something else, and, as a good ‘lefty’, I was hooked!  All those years I had administrative / leadership roles, I could not do much research writing, but I could collect material, and my interest never waned.

The biggest challenges were first, that searching for, collection of material and secondly getting anyone interested in the paradox of the socialist scientific management.  The great management historian, Daniel Wren, had written briefly of Polakov in 1980, and Nyland had mentioned him in some of his many works on scientific management, but there was very little available material.  So those 15-20 years of searching and collecting in likely and unlikely places was a major challenge – especially from the far-distant Antipodes!   Even when I had a basic story, many management history scholars were not interested because (a) it was about socialism and (b) it contradicted mainstream ideas that scientific management / Taylorism was unrelentingly bad for workers.  Questioning the hegemon is never easy! 

How would you define scientific management and to what extent do you consider it inherently anti-worker? Do you see any myths in management studies about this?

Scientific management is an ideology or set of principles about the use of people, equipment, and resources, at the workplace, industry, or nation.  Central to that ideology are the importance of the application of research and the sciences to understand, first, WHAT is happening.  That is very important – you cannot hope to manage scientifically if you do not understand what is being done.  Second, HOW can the workplace, industry, or nation be improved?  This requires measurement and investigation so that the scientific manager knows how to maximize equipment and resources and the working lives of workers.  Thirdly, continuing measuring and monitoring to ensure that the best outcomes continue to be achieved.   These principles stand in contrast to those who manage by whimsy, or “rule of thumb”, or simply on the basis of unquestioned managerial prerogative. 

For many scholars in management, sociology, and labor history, scientific management is about deskilling, control, and exploitation of workers.  I reject that strongly.  There is no doubt that the notions of investigation, research, measurement and monitoring can be used for ill, but that was definitely contrary to the views of the Taylor Society and even Taylor himself.    It is easy to pull out a few choice quotes from Taylor – but they are a-contextual and certainly not what Polakov and his fellow Taylor Society members thought.
Nevertheless less these remain the most immovable of myths outside of management history.  

Which Taylor Society members do you think are most understudied? 

Mary Van Kleeck (who made several trips to the Soviet Union and who was a union leader and a practical scholar, but was emphatic in her support of the Taylor Society.)

Henry Laurence Gantt (there is a thorough biography by Alford but it somewhat hagiographical, and skims over important aspects of Gantt’s life.)

Harlow Person (long-time director of the Taylor Society until it was taken over by the managerialists in the late 1930s)

Carl Barth (dour socialist mathematician whose advancements on slide rule technology were important for giving rigor to scientific management investigation) 

King Hathaway and Robert Wolf were interesting and I have always been fascinated by Robert Valentine and the respect he was accorded in the Taylor Society, given his role in the Hoxie Report, but he died shortly after he presented his paper on Efficiency and Consent to the Taylor Society.  

Why did some Taylor Society members turn against the market and the institution of private property? How did their views on worker autonomy and participation in management evolve?

The scientific managers gave what they saw as science, their greatest priority (research what is happening, what should happen, and how can we be sure it continues the best that can be done).  That did not begin with an overt rejection of the market.  Rather, it was simply that markets (and ‘financiers’) gave little value to science in management, to the best use of resources, equipment, and people.  I am not sure that all scientific managers agreed with Polakov (except perhaps Van Kleeck and Barth?) on the generalised disgust with the market and private property, and Polakov himself always owned property.   

Was there an orthodoxy in the Taylor Society, a plurality of views, or both?

Taylor Society debates (e.g. the one in the book over Drury’s paper, or another one mentioned over Valentine’s ‘Efficiency and Consent’ paper) suggest there was a plurality of ideas (political ideologies, social aspirations, values), but an unflinching commitment to science in management which of itself was an ideology.  

To what extent can Polakov’s concern with energy and resource efficiency be of interest to ecological or environmental politics today?

I would have liked to have spent more time on Polakov’s commitment to energy and resource efficiency.  Some of my readers have argued his greatest achievements were in raising issues of wastage of resource, and in these times with priority given to energy efficiency, Polakov’s insights and arguments offer valuable possibilities.  

What effect did The Red Scares have on Polakov’s ability to work as an engineer or scientific manager? Is there anything you think Polakov’s treatment by the FBI can teach socialist technical specialists today?

My own belief is that one reason Polakov focussed on his engineering/management consultancy work was precisely that he could see what happened to activists, especially activist Russians, 1000s of whom were arrested.  As well the so-called Red Ark that extradited many Russians, including Emma Goldman would also have influenced how he saw himself. 
It would be hard to guess what the FBI is looking for today.  The FBI under J Edgar Hoover was very focussed on socialists and communists because Hoover himself hated them.  This is evident in the treatment of socialists compared with some pretty horrendous fascists, white supremacists, and the like.  

Polakov returned from Russia after a relatively short tenure, how did his experiences there shape his views on socialism and political organization more broadly? How did he feel about Leninism and Bolshevik ideology?

We have no way of knowing how he felt – unless we had his papers which I am guessing were destroyed long ago.  In the book, I tried to project my own interpretation that he felt conflicted about the Soviet Union under Stalin.  He wanted communism to work – but he could see the flaws and had serious misgivings.  In some respects, his perspective was useful because he was there at the request of Vesankha.  It is likely he did not get the special tours of some contractors or visitor from USA. 

I am not sure re Bolshevism and Leninism.  Most of his ideals seemed to come straight from Marx – and from anti-revisionists with Luxemburg such as Bebel. 

What can Polakov’s experience helping to organize Soviet industry tell us about life in the USSR and this attempt to create socialism in the workplace? What was the relationship between Polakov and Soviet Taylorists like Alexei Gastev? 

Even under socialism, production needs management – and Polakov was the first to say so.  On the other hand, I cite times when he found the Russian managers problematic and resistant to change.  He circumvented the managers’ unhelpfulness by taking his questions/requirements to workers’ committees.  Polakov, who had been a practicing scientific manager for over twenty years when he came to the Soviet Union, was clearly more flexible and perhaps also more democratic than Gastev.  (This question deserves much further exploration!) 

Can you please explain what a Gantt chart is and why it was so revolutionary? How did its introduction to Russia by Polakov impact the organization of production?

A Gantt chart is simply a visual plan of a project from conception to conclusion, and what is expected of equipment, resources, workers, and managers.  In other words, the Gantt chart seeks to record ideal outcomes of all the variables of production, and then the actual outcomes as well.  By monitoring all the variables, it becomes clear where problems may be equipment or power, for example, and helps workers and their managers monitor effectiveness.  It was “revolutionary” because most production had previously been rule-of-thumb or ‘flying-by-the seat-of-your-pants’.  As well it offered transparency – again something that the hierarchical Them v Us American businesses had avoided. 

To be honest it would be hard to see almost any impact of Polakov’s work on production in the Soviet Union.  I understand some Russian colleagues have explored this.  I hope they can find archival material that would confirm or deny impact, but my guess is, sadly his sojourn in the USSR changed little.  On the other hand there is evidence of the Gantt Chart being discussed in the early 1920s – and in this respect, I believe it would have been based on a Polakov translation.  But no evidence yet, sadly.  

Can you explain what Technocracy Inc was and its relation to The New Machine? Would you consider the Technocracy movement elitist?

In the book I hedge around the possible links between the New Machine (19i6-1919) and the Technical Alliance (1919-1921) and then Technocracy Inc (1933 – 1930s).  Certainly Polakov seems to have been on the freinges of both TA and TI – he was cited several times as a lead author in their surveys.  On the other hand he never fully commited to the TA or TI.  I suspect Howard Scott had something to do with – he was one of those charismatic enthusiasts whose own knowledge may not have been as great as his enthusiasms – for Technocracy or the IWW, of which he was a member.  I understand from some writings that Scott tended to alienate  or overwhelm people.  Polakov certainly held Technocratic ideas but I think he was tempered by his socialism and his deep commitment to the scientific management practices of research into what’s happening and what’s needed and what can be done … (as well as the democratic rule of engineers!) 

What role did Polakov play in the United Mineworkers Union and how did he reconcile it with scientific management philosophy?

Polakov’s scientific management philosophy was as applicable to his work in the union as it was to his work as an engineering – management consultant.  That is I hope a major point of the book – that scientific management ideology is not about control and exploitation of workers, but rather using science to make work and production, the best outcome possible.  The reason that Polakov was raising safety and consultation and reasonable pay/ conditions from his earliest writings (and work as a manager), was that he saw these issues as centrally important as a means to achieve the best workplace environment for workers.  People are way too conditioned to think of management as a hierarchical “my-way-or-the-highway” process so that they cannot see that scientific management ideology could be equally at home in a union as in a factory.  

How did Polakov’s research into workplace safety help the union? What role did Polakov have in spearheading the development of Union Healthcare plans?

I believe Polakov’s role was significant in setting up the possibilities and furnishing the data for several really major health initiatives of UMW – I need to do more research still to make unequivocal claims.  

How did Polakov use the language of management and accounting to force management to take workers’ concerns seriously?

All the scientific managers knew just how to influence managers and executive managers – just explain ideas in ways that are important to them.  There is no point in telling a manager about how great a worker’s life will be with the scientific management initiatives because those managers are driven by priorities of output, return on investment, and next quarter’s profit.  So the scientific manager needs to talk to the plant/organisation/industry manager in terms that he (and they were almost always he) would understand and which would motivate him.  In the discussion of the Taylor Society debates in the book (p.41)  even the not-very-leftist Colonel Coburn argued that with scientific management “… we are finding some facts and we are putting those facts into such shape that the financial man and even the director can understand them”. In fact, the financiers who owned the plants could no longer “grind the neck of the working man with an iron heel” as a substitute for proper management. (Coburn in Drury, 1917 p. 8)  It was not that Coburn was a radical, but rather he could see how the ideology of scientific management could be framed to convince the financier or executive manager that fair working conditions were more effective.

Similarly, Polakov’s engineering monographs at UMW, and his paper to the employer-oriented National Safety Council sought to show employers how much the cost of accidents was a problem for employers.  All his books emphasized the same things – he was writing to convince managers and the public who might influence managers that his scientific management initiatives of improved consultation, work, and safety conditions were about benefiting business – even as hr slipped in semi-plagiarised bits from Capital Vol 1!! 

 

The Historic Accomplishment of Karl Marx by Karl Kautsky

Translation and introduction by Alexander Gallus. Buy a print copy here

Karl Kautsky lived and wrote in a world and time when the growing organizational strength of the proletariat seemed to point inevitably towards communist society. In 1908, at the time that Kautsky wrote The Historic Accomplishment of Karl Marx, German revolutionary Social-Democracy was at the height of its power, having in the year prior won almost a third of all votes in the German federal election; and by all accounts, so was Kautsky himself at 53 years of age. As the foremost theoretician of Social-Democracy, he would go on to write three of his most memorable and influential books within that and the following year. German Social-Democracy, as the country’s largest party, seemed inevitably poised to take power, not only in the dreams of its hundreds of thousands of dedicated Marxist members but in the nightmares and diaries of the ruling classes. The growing and entrenched socialist opposition parties in the more or less advanced industrial nations, including Germany and the 25 other parties that made up the Second International, were a living testament to the prophecy and promise of Marxism.

The demonstrative vigor and organizational strength of the working class at that moment can understandably appear to many today as a distant memory, like a dream that one struggles to remember. In the midst of a historic pandemic and global health crisis, and after decades of decline for the power of organized labor, millions of workers feel isolated and powerless to change the hazardous and cruel conditions of work forced upon them, not to speak of radically transforming society itself. Due to the impotent nature of our thoroughly debt-burdened capitalist economy and the developing economic depression, it appears unlikely that there will be relief anytime soon for most of the millions of Americans who have been laid off. But while the forced closure of most non-essential businesses, undertaken (far too late) in order to slow the spread of the coronavirus, has left an unprecedented number of Americans unemployed, countless workers in essential economic sectors have realized their ability and the desperate need to fight for better conditions of work. The crisis is so blatantly a disaster exacerbated by the greedy callousness of big business that many workers are now protesting and organizing to preserve their health, and indeed their lives.

In a time like this, there is a pressing need to articulate the idea that there is and ought to be more to the working class’s struggle than straightforward economic concessions won from employers. It is certainly true that the most direct and palpable struggle of the individual worker resisting exploitation in the hospital, factory, shipping and fulfillment center, or grocery store is the arena from which the most elementary class awareness springs. However, this most reliable and elementary class awareness attained by the millions through organizing in the economic struggle must be developed and brought to higher forms of awareness through agitation, education and other forms of organization. As Marxists, we believe that the short-sighted system of capitalism is governed by laws which in effect doom it to repeat the catastrophes of economic and social crisis, with the ensuing senseless human suffering, year after year, decade after decade. Only a historic “catastrophe” in the form of a consciously political-social revolution, the takeover of all levels of society by the proletariat, can win against the true catastrophes flung by capitalism against life itself.

With the fall of the USSR and actually-existing socialism, capitalism with its American militarism has engulfed the world in its cynical debt-fueled logic and threatens to fully incinerate it in more ways than one — economic collapse, climate change, disease, war, etc. Imperialism, the subjugation of the world’s weaker economies and peoples by the wealthier ones, is unfortunately (contrary to deep-rooted bourgeois and chauvinist sentiment) as powerful a world force as ever. Predatory business plans and loans to the third world, demanding steep interest payments, incessantly threaten to extinguish human development and the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings. When workers of the first world suffer with economic collapse, workers of the third world die. As a consequence of this unfolding global system, with nothing but negligent contempt for the human being, we have seen a resurgence of working-class resistance and rebellion that could be called historic in its size and tenacity. From the Andes mountains of Latin America to the Western Ghats of India, militant resistance of hundreds of millions of workers in the global south to the violations of their political rights and economic interests has rekindled the flames of class struggle many had thought extinguished. Within the “core” countries of Western Europe and North America, there are now also hopeful signs of a comeback of a militant and courageous working class.

In the wake of the turmoil of the Great Recession and perpetually rising inequality, Karl Marx became a figure that appeared not only on the radical left as an admirable or at least valuable thinker. To the extent that Marxism has so far made a comeback in western societies, the truth of the matter is that it has made it only on the outskirts of the organized working class; it has made it on the fringes of bourgeois academia, among isolated intellectuals, and has found attraction once more in a section of the petty-bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, the majority of organized union members in the United States are often seen on the radical left as undesirable targets of socialist agitation, education, and organization. While America’s union membership rate may still be at historic lows, levels almost not seen since before the Great Depression of the 1930s, income inequality has been perpetually on the rise while hazardous conditions of work are now being faced by many workers with few benefits. The economic and political future of this country is, by almost all accounts and commentaries, troublesome. If the left and a project for the liberation of humanity is to prevail over the bourgeois alternatives akin to one sort or another of exploitative authoritarianism or fascism, it will require a large and unprecedented effort certain of its scientific outlook.

Karl Kautsky’s summation and lessons in this book, vital not only to a historical understanding of Marxism but to the actual project of changing the world, give us an example of this outlook. Born to a German mother and Czech father in Prague, Kautsky went on to study in Vienna, where he became a member of the Social-Democratic Party. Moving to Zurich in 1880 during the time of the German Empire’s anti-socialist laws, Kautsky helped smuggle propaganda over the border and met Eduard Bernstein. Soon after becoming friends with Friedrich Engels and visiting him and Marx in England, Kautsky started the journal Die Neue Zeit in 1883. As the man whom Lenin called “the Pope of Marxism,” Kautsky rose to prominence when the German Social-Democratic Party asked him to draft the party’s groundbreaking Erfurt Program in 1891. It was this revolutionary and Marxist minimum–maximum program which demanded and upheld the loyalties of the broad spectrum of Social-Democratic Party members for decades.

It is something of an understatement to say that it is not enough to simply have faith that history is on our side and that the contradictions of capitalism will do our work for us. This is hopefully becoming more and more clear, not only because of the obvious fact that the working class needs to be prepared in a myriad ways to effectively govern, but because crises and upticks in labor militancy do not in fact equate by themselves to political unity of the class. Nor do unreachable demands by socialist radicals in the labor movement, through transitional demands or calls for an immediate general strike, help to develop a common goal for the class. Such demands and proposals to the working class are unfortunately attractive to many because of their expedient substitution for the patient work of Marxist agitation, education, and political organization. Beside their evidentiary historical unviability as means for the working class to actually win power (without the necessary prerequisites at the very least), calls for transitional demands and other such measures function as shortcuts and are more often than not excuses for a lack of willingness to enter into often unpopular contradiction with popular desires and impulses.

It is as well hard to fathom in what world the entrenched oppositional politics to be found throughout most of Karl Kautsky’s life can be used to justify a politics today which passes as “Kautskyist” while openly celebrating class collaboration and advancing the concept of winning “hegemony” within the existing bourgeois state. If anything, the biggest strength of Karl Kautsky’s thought lies in his oppositional strategy of patience, the commitment to the building of a mass party and the development of a communist program. For comrades today to, on the one hand, sing Kautsky’s praises and claim to “uphold” his legacy while on the other encouraging socialists to tail bourgeois campaigns and aspire to positions in bourgeois government is problematic to say the least. Surely what has been lacking so far has not been a rudimentary socialist sympathy among the people, of which there is plenty, even though organized labor has yet to benefit from this impressively growing sympathy.

America’s largest union, the AFL-CIO, currently has a reported annual revenue of $113 million. As released reports have shown, the presidency of Richard Trumpka has seen the union spend less than ten percent of its revenue on actual organizing last year. At the same time, millions upon millions of members’ dollars were spent on venal political contributions and lavish salaries for bureaucrats. If organized labor wants to reawaken from its slumber, it needs to reorient itself towards class struggle, and this means class unity. As Kautsky makes clear, it is socialist theory which is vital in building a mass conception and reality of class unity. Marxists today who reject industrial organizing and coordinated revolutionary activity within unions demonstrate narrow theoretical obsessions at best, or cynical treason to the fate and promise of our working people at worst. While there are still real differences among Marxists on issues that can and must not be glossed over, we should take steps towards being exemplars for the class that we must organize through developing a ready unity of action. Regardless of comrades’ abundant sectarian impulses or doubts, the fact remains that while Karl Marx was clear about politics being the highest expression of class struggle, he was equally explicit that communists should not see themselves as separate from the movements of proletarians.

In the United States, the long-standing decline of organized labor along with our increasingly corrupt politics has seen Democrats cater almost exclusively to the interests of capital at the cost of working-class voters and their objective interests. While the traditional two-party system of American politics has successfully branded itself as an insurmountable part of how politics here are done, there are many curious facets to this system which expose its vulnerability. American political parties function like ad hoc fundraising committees, formed by rival swarms of established politicians and public figures, and less so like traditional parties that charge dues to members, build up party infrastructure and have well-developed full-time organizational capacity.

The populist and social-democratic campaign of Bernie Sanders had twenty-three organizing offices in California (compared to Joe Biden’s three) and won that presidential primary state contest. Funded by an unprecedented number of overwhelmingly working-class donors giving small amounts, the campaign built up a sizable infrastructure. The question of course is this: what happens to all that energy, experience, and infrastructure now that Sanders has been elbowed out of the Democratic primary once again? This is a question we need to be ready to answer if we do not want the movement to lose out to feelings of defeat and despair. Even though the Sanders campaign unified and mobilized millions of people to fight for a society based on the working class’s principle of solidarity, there are only so many defeats and dead ends people will be able to tolerate without losing morale.

While voter turn-out among young and poor people in fact rose, albeit not as much as desired, there is a great deal of justified apathy towards voting in this country. Despite an undeniable resurgence of the working class as an actor in the electoral arena, widespread political corruption abounds, with thousands of polling stations in working-class and minority neighborhoods being closed, voters waiting in line for five or more hours to vote, voter purge lists getting rid of millions of cast ballots, mass cancellations of voters’ registrations, rigged computer voting systems, disputed vote counts, the caucus recount debacle in the Iowa Democratic Party, and so on. And this is not to mention the coordinated campaign by the corporate media and the Democratic establishment to stop the “socialist Sanders.” All these are examples of why there has been good reason for socialists to not share the unbounded electoral enthusiasm some comrades have had. As the Electoral Integrity Project from Harvard reported three years ago, out of the 28 states that had exit polling in the 2016 election, a whopping 25 of them had exit-poll differences outside of the margin of error from the final result in the primary, and 19 of them in the general election. Thus, according to the US government’s own standards for evaluating other countries’ electoral integrity, 89% of our primary and 68% of our general elections were fraudulent. Reports of voter suppression in, as well as exit poll data from the 2020 elections definitely suggest that this trend has increased. As the investigative reporter Greg Palast has put it, in the United States of America you have the right to vote, just not the right to have it counted.

All this is not to say that the political situation is hopeless; quite the contrary. Independent leftist media is steadily growing. Bernie Sanders and his campaign have helped to embolden millions of workers and borrowed admirably from the moral legacy of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. With the “democratic road to socialism” barred once more through blatantly undemocratic means, one can hope that campaigns of civil disobedience to fight for electoral and other reforms will eventually take root. This was, incidentally, one of Kautsky’s conceptions of what shape a proletarian revolution would take. But politics and democracy, however much the American ruling class would have us believe the contrary, are not simply played out on the electoral front. For revolutionary parties, electoral politics serves primarily as a tool of propaganda and an indicator of relative strength. While the Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Joe Biden nominally have widespread support, the status quo and decrepit system they champion is built on a marshy foundation; their support is a very superficial one, not based on a programmatic, close, and collaborative relationship between a committed mass membership and elected representatives of a party, but rather on the support of hypocritical individualists and those public figures that the corporate media tell us “matter.”

In opposition to this dreary morass of decadence and overwhelming corruption there must develop not only a movement that expresses the righteous anger of the untold billions of oppressed from all around the world, but a mass socialist party-movement. Besides organizing the working class, we should as well strive to inspire the diverse movements for justice with the certainty of scientific socialism and clarify the historical conditions under and for which humanity is struggling. Whereas some socialists today advocate for a third type of party that aims to govern effectively (over the bourgeois state), gaining trust from the working class is not done by electing esteemed senators, honorable judges of our own, nor by sowing further illusions in bourgeois politics, but by throwing off the cloak of bourgeois society, organizing and fighting side by side with the working class, shop floor by shop floor, community by community. We must be honest with the people whom we seek to bring into the movement for the future, honest and clear about our ultimate aims and the sacrifices entailed if we are to win the struggle against barbarism. The isolated struggles of all workers must become our own, and the struggle of humanity consciously become the cause of all workers. Most importantly, and most difficult for many, we must not bend or kowtow to reactionary attitudes we face in the working class, but face its diverse and sometimes hostile attitudes to socialism with an open mind, yet unshakeable faith in the righteousness of the cause of labor and in its ultimate triumph over ignorance and division. We have to struggle assuredly for the unity of the class, readying it for collective action and international solidarity.
In order for the working class to effectively build such solidarity, it cannot be restrained or corrupted by the always extant yellow or right-wing trade unionist bureaucrats, as it more often than not is. The working class’s most advanced leaders and organizers should, however, also not fall prey to shortcuts to winning the working class to its objective class interest: socialism. Nice-sounding slogans, radical demands, and demonstrative actions of activist “grassroots campaigns,” regardless of the amount of individual activist labor invested in them, historically do little to challenge the most common power relations within unions or actually advance the communist program within them. What is in fact effective and needed is the development of left programmatic unity and consequently a conscious and concerted effort by the left in large numbers to enter the labor movement, fight for the program in the working class, and attain the financial means to build a mass-media apparatus.

As Kautsky explains in an important explication of his Erfurt Program, it is the duty of Marxists not only to labor to bring about the political unity of socialism with the workers’ movement as outlined in The Historic Accomplishment of Karl Marx, but furthermore to advance the struggle for democratic rights in broader society and to “build a state within a state.” While he elaborates on the social democratic demand to replace the bourgeoisie’s standing armies with a people’s militia, it is true that Kautsky throughout does not explicitly point towards a violent confrontation between this rising socialist party-movement and the state; yet this does not make him less radical today. Kautsky’s strategy of patiently building a proletarian opposition and his revolutionary writings are of lasting importance because they are altogether much more resolute, congruent, and informed by a lucid wisdom than one usually sees on the left today. Under the conditions of “civilized” bourgeois democracy, it is clearly much more productive, far-sighted, and actually revolutionary to build a principled, civil, mass opposition — one that exploits all possible legal means to grow its power, which seeks to challenge bourgeois authority and culture in all corners of society — than it is to dream of theoretical communist utopias and spontaneous revolutions to bring them about. This political struggle to challenge bourgeois authority must not only be a challenge to the legitimacy of the institutions of capitalism and its servants, but a challenge for the legitimacy of our own democratic institutions and party, our state within the state. It goes without saying that if the narrow confines of bourgeois law continue to not only demonstrate their inability to address the growing injustices of capitalism, but actually enhance them and criminalize the inevitable and necessary proletarian rebellions against this order, a socialist adherence to strict legality will meet its limits.

The acutely predictable catastrophic possibilities of our world today, of an apparently unstoppable climate change spurring on the development of ever more diseases, a deep economic depression, and the collection of social crises that are on display in the “advanced” capitalist societies — from income inequality, corruption, racism, the brutal carceral state, to sexism and more — nonetheless hang like a dark, stifling cloud over the heads of all who possess even an ounce of critical thought. The collection of crises needing to be fixed will not disappear any time soon. It appears to many that we live in a time when the world is in fact rushing towards mass extinction and humanity is lost. Every once in a while, however, history’s unusual circumstances bring forward movements and individuals who redeem confidence in humanity’s ability to acclaim a better and more egalitarian future. To Kautsky, it is clear that Karl Marx was such an individual.

Sharing this previously untranslated work with the English-speaking world has, to the translator, much more purpose than just another simple academic exercise. The leftist “common wisdom” on Karl Kautsky is one that overlooks Kautsky’s insight and revolutionary work quite unanimously, to our detriment, as in part IV, the “Summary of German, French, and English Thought,” where Kautsky gives a glimpse of his opinion on what should be socialists’ attitude towards the armies of the bourgeoisie: sabotage. Quite in contrast to pacifism, he goes on to speak positively of the historical “combativeness” of the Parisians, who repeatedly won concessions from the ruling classes through armed insurrection. Without a doubt, Kautsky read and understood Marx’s lessons from the defeated Paris Commune and, despite the stranglehold of the German censors, must have understood the pinnacle of proletarian organization as necessarily being a centralized government and a fighting force, an army.

While the political situation in the United States was until recently far from one that could be described as a national or revolutionary crisis, the powers that be are not as short-sighted as they often appear. US intelligence services and the Pentagon, for instance, are very aware of the mortal danger that primarily climate change (with its induction of more disease, weather volatility, and indeed famine) can and might spell for US society and its state. If Kautsky was pointing out the French and German armies’ vulnerability to sabotage in 1908, what word would one use to characterize the armies of today? Endangered? Military scholars are more than concerned about the defenselessness of expensive modern armies in wars against relatively low budget combatants. The Houthis have claimed that their drone attacks against Saudi Arabia in 2019, which caused 5% of the world’s oil supply to fall for almost a month, amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for the Saudi royal family, damages caused by drones which likely only cost a few tens of thousands of dollars. The reliance on electricity by modern countries and armies for almost everything is the biggest vulnerability, as it is nearly impossible to adequately protect an electrical grid or store the amount of electricity necessary to power a nation with today’s batteries.

What is clear in these times is that if we want to save humanity from the depths of chaos and a total collapse of civilization, we have to strive for the most rigorous theory that can hold up against our urgent need for practice and build the seeds of a mass proletarian democracy in the shell of class society. Early German Social-Democracy, although it had organizational flaws of its own, stands as a prime example of building a mass Marxist opposition party and proletarian alternative culture. Whereas Kautsky tirelessly defended Marxist orthodoxy, his systematization of the doctrine and “orthodoxy” was not one which betrayed his own intellect nor denied freedom of debate; quite the opposite. Despite widespread accusations of dogmatism, fanaticism, and every other possible absurdity, orthodox Marxism found in its stride many fellow travelers and flourished. A wide variety of socialists regularly published their thoughts in Die Neue Zeit and were allowed to express theoretical challenges, from Austria’s Otto Bauer, Russia’s Alexander Bogdanov and Leon Trotsky, to even Kautsky’s rival Eduard Bernstein. In his own right, Kautsky possessed a lively intellectual interest and continuously analyzed new scientific findings and social developments through the lens of historical materialism.

Clearly recognizable throughout this work and others is the foundational influence of Kautsky’s thought and defense of Marxist orthodoxy against revisionism. Specific words, concepts, and idiosyncrasies that he formulated in his lifelong fight to clarify and defend Marxism breached through history into the future and were picked up by official Communism. The central use of his locutions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by a slew of subsequent Marxist tendencies must be seen in the light of the origins of Marxism as a developing mass phenomenon; without Karl Kautsky’s founding and editorship of the SPD’s legendary weekly Die Neue Zeit, it would be difficult to speculate on this phenomenon. As a number of historians such as Moira Donald and Lars Lih have demonstrated, Kautsky’s thought and tremendous work was vital in the formation of Marxism and the greatest Marxist revolution of human history as of yet: October 1917.

A Note on the Translation

Kautsky infamously reneged on the principles for which he had fought for decades and as laid out in his 1908 The Historic Accomplishment of Karl Marx. He noted in a foreword to the 1933 third edition, originally used to translate this piece, that it was “published unchanged, with only a few timely allusions.”

The translator has seen fit to restore to the original edition or remove certain, in our opinion, untimely allusions in a very few passages, mostly pertaining to the accuracy of dates or subtle remarks about the Bolshevik revolution.
When translating this piece, the word “Geist,” among others, was one which frequently posed a dilemma: both the words “intellect” and “spirit” are common translations. Kautsky’s frequent use of the word “Geist” when speaking of Marx leaves room open for interpretation. We the editors have often opted for using the words “intellect” and “intellectual.”

What is clear, however, is that Marx was a person not only of great thought but also of great feeling. Instead of being uncomfortable with the often-adulatory treatment of Marx as an individual, we should recognize that Marx was an outstandingly dedicated and talented fighter worthy of celebration. His theoretical and practical work undoubtedly changed how billions of people thought and changed history. We should find comfort that our tireless work for the communist future of humanity shall be recognized by future generations as well. There is no labor greater than that which gives without a thought of personal remuneration and knows its eventual yield to be measured in values far greater than dollars and cents.

Karl and Luise Kautsky.

The Historical Accomplishment of Karl Marx by Karl Kautsky 

On behalf of the Bremen Education Committee, I gave a lecture on Karl Marx in Bremen on the 17th of December last year. Comrades from Bremen who heard the lecture asked me to publish it in print, because it was suitable for correcting widespread misconceptions about what Marx had achieved and what Marxism means. I hereby comply with this request, but I do not limit myself to a mere rendition of the lecture. I have extended it several times for print, namely in its first part. What I am giving here is not a eulogy for Karl Marx. It would not suit the sensibility of the man whose motto was: follow your own path and let people talk. It would as well be tasteless at a time when his personal significance is recognized by the whole world. Rather, the point here is to make it easier to understand what Marx brought to the world. This is unfortunately not as well known as it is necessary in a period in which Marx is the subject of much debate, for and against. Some may discover while reading these pages that these thoughts, which have become a matter of course today, were developed through laborious work. But they will also find that ideas which are praised today as surprising new discoveries, through which “outdated” Marxism is supposed to be overcome or educated, basically represent nothing more than the revival of views and ways of thinking which were rampant before Marx, and which were worn down and overcome precisely by Marx, but which appear again and again before new generations for whom the past of our movement is foreign. Therefore, the present work is not only intended to be a study of party history, but also a contribution to decisions on current issues.

Friedenau, February 1908

K. Kautsky

I
Introduction

On the 14th of March, 1908, it will have been 25 years since Karl Marx died, and at the start of the same year it had been 60 years since The Communist Manifesto first appeared, in which his new doctrine found its first fulfilled expression. Those are long time spans for such a fast-paced period like ours, which changes its scientific and artistic views as quickly as its trends. Karl Marx still lives among us in full vigor, and he dominates the thought of our time more than ever, despite all crises of Marxism, despite all refutations and enlightened conquests from the podiums of bourgeois science.

This surprising and constantly growing influence would be a mystery were it not for Marx’s success in bringing to light the deepest roots of capitalist society. Having done that, then naturally, so long as that social form endures, new social discoveries of any weighty significance are not to be found beyond Marx, and hence the path he indicated remains much more theoretically and practically fruitful than any other. The powerful and enduring influence of Marx on modern thought would however also be unreasonable were it not for his endeavor to run past, in spirit and mind, the confines of the capitalist process of production. His recognition of capitalism’s intrinsic tendencies which point toward a higher social order prompted him to point out yet-distant goals. Through unfolding development, these goals become ever nearer and within reach of mankind, who grasps them with clarity to the same degree it becomes aware of its own greatness.

It is this unique combination of scientific depth and revolutionary daring that has led us to the fact that Karl Marx today, half a century after his death and almost three generations since his first appearance on the public stage, has greater influence today than when he was alive.

If one attempts to understand the nature of the historical achievement of this marvelous man, one can perhaps summarize it best by realizing the breadth of his work, combining biology with the humanities, merging English, French, and German philosophy, as well as the workers’ movement and socialism, in both theory and practice. That he succeeded without parallel in not only knowing these various fields of study, but in mastering them, made it possible for Karl Marx to accomplish the historic feat of having his character stamped on the late decades of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century.

II
Summary of Natural Science and the Humanities

The foundation for all of Karl Marx’s lasting success is his theoretical rigor. This we have to be most aware of. But it is this fact that presents itself as a challenge for a popular presentation [of Marxism]. We will hopefully overcome this dilemma in spite of limited intimations or clues. In any case, the points covered after this one will be easy to understand. The reader should not shy from plowing through the next few pages to get to these latter points.

The sciences are divided into two great categories: the natural sciences, which research the dynamics of living and non-living objects and the humanities, which are unjustly named such; only if the subject of study in humanities takes the form of one single individual is it given attention. The field of psychology, stemming from the humanities, operates solely with the methods of natural science without ever considering curing the spiritual illness plaguing humanity. The narrow application of natural science in this field unfortunately remains unrivaled.

What is called “the humanities” is in reality a social science, a science which analyzes man’s relation to his fellow men. Only certain relationships are eligible, however, and only some intellectual expressions in human society come into consideration and are examined by the humanities.

Within the humanities themselves two groups can be distinguished.: The first is those which study human society as such, or man as he exists en masse. These include: political economy, the study of the laws of the social economy under the rules of commodity production; ethnology, the study of social conditions in all their tribal diversity; and, finally, prehistory, the study of social conditions from that time before written witness.

The other group of the humanities comprises sciences which up to now have primarily emanated from the individual and dealt with the position and effect of the individual in and on society: history, jurisprudence, and ethics or morality.

This second group of humanities is ancient and has always had the greatest influence on human thought. The first group, on the other hand, developed at the time of Marx’s youth and had only just arrived at scientific methods. It remained restricted to specialists and had no influence on general thinking, which was influenced by the natural sciences and the humanities of the second group.

There was then a huge gap between the latter two types of sciences, which was revealed in contemporary worldviews.

Natural science had uncovered so many necessary, legitimate connections and laws in nature; that is, it had repeatedly tested the identification of cause with effect so that it thoroughly incorporated the assumption of general lawfulness in nature. It therefore completely banished from its practice the assumption of mysterious powers which mythically intervene in natural events at will. Modern man no longer seeks to make such powers favorable to himself through prayers and sacrifices, but only to recognize the lawful connections in nature in order to be able to achieve in it, through his intervention, those effects which he needs for his existence or comfort.

This is not the case in the humanities. These were still dominated by the assumption of the freedom of the human will, which was not subject to any such lawful necessity. The jurists and ethicists felt urged to hold on to this assumption, because otherwise they would lose the ground under their feet. If man is a product of circumstances, if his actions and will have the necessary effect of causes that do not depend on his own will, what should become of sin and punishment, of good and evil, of legal and moral condemnation?
The motive of that accusation was of course only a motive of “practical reason,” not logical reasoning from proof. These practical reasons were provided primarily by historical science, which was essentially based on nothing other than the collection of written documents from earlier times, in which the acts of some individuals, namely the rulers, were communicated either by themselves or by others. It seemed impossible to discover any inherent necessary laws behind these individual acts. In vain did scientific thinkers try to find such laws. They were, however, reluctant to accept that the general laws of nature should not apply to man’s actions.

Experience offered them enough material to show that the human mind was no exception in nature, that it always responded to certain causes with certain effects. However, as undeniable as this could be for the simpler activities which man has in common with animals, for his complicated activities, for social ideas and ideals, the natural scientists could not find the necessary causal connections. They could not fill this gap. They could claim that the human spirit was only a part of nature and within its necessary context, but they could not prove it sufficiently in all areas. Their materialistic monism remained incomplete and could not break with idealism and dualism.
Then Marx came and saw that the history, ideas, and ideals of man, and their successes and failures, are the result of class struggles. But he saw even more. Class antagonisms and class struggles had already been seen before him in history, but they had mostly appeared as the work of stupidity and malice on the one hand, of arrogance and enlightenment on the other; only Marx uncovered their necessary connection with economic conditions, the laws of which had been laid down by the laws of time. These economic conditions themselves, however, are again ultimately based on nature and the extent of man’s domination of nature, which emerges from the knowledge of its laws.

Only under certain social conditions is the driving force of history the class struggle; it is always ultimately the struggle against nature. No matter how peculiar human society may seem to the rest of nature, here and there we find the same kind of movement and development through the struggle of opposites that emerge again and again from nature itself: dialectical development.

Thus, social development was placed within the framework of natural development, the human spirit presented as a part of nature, even in its most complicated and supreme manifestations. The natural laws of social development were hence proven in all fields and the last ground taken away from philosophical idealism and dualism.

In this way, Marx not only completely revolutionized the science of history, but also filled the gap between the natural sciences and the humanities, established the unity of all human science, and thus made philosophy superfluous, insofar as philosophy, as a special wisdom outside and above the sciences, sought to establish a unified thought about the world process which could not previously be gained from the sciences.

It means a tremendous elevation of science, which Marx brought about with his conception of history; the entirety of human thought and understanding had to be fertilized in the most powerful way — but strangely, bourgeois science was completely hostile to it. Only in opposition to bourgeois science, as a special, proletarian science, could this new scientific conception prevail.
The opposition between bourgeois and proletarian science was mocked, as if there could be bourgeois and proletarian chemistry or mathematics! But the mockers only prove that they do not know what it is.

Marx’s discovery of the materialistic conception of history had two preconditions. One was a certain raising of scientific development, the other a revolutionary point of view.

The laws of historical development could only be recognized when the new humanities — political economy, economic history, then ethnology and prehistory — had reached a certain height. Only these sciences, from whose material the individual was excluded from the outset, and which were based on mass observations, could reveal the basic laws of social development and thus pave the way for the investigation of those trends which propel individuals to the surface appearance and who alone observe and record the conventional representation of history.

These new humanities developed first with the capitalist mode of production and its international trade, and could only really achieve significant gains when capital had come to rule; but soon the bourgeoisie had ceased to be a revolutionary class.

Only a revolutionary class, however, was able to accept the doctrine of class struggle. A class that wants to conquer power in society must also want the struggle for power; it will easily understand its necessity. A class which has power will regard every opposing struggle for it as an unwelcome disturbance and will reject any doctrine which demonstrates its necessity. It will appear all the more against it if the doctrine of class struggle is a doctrine of social development which, as a necessary conclusion of the present class struggle, sets forth the overthrow of the present masters of society.

But the teaching that people are the products of social conditions, to the extent that the members of a particular social form differ from the people of other social forms, is also not acceptable to a conservative class, because the only way to change people consequently then is to change society itself. As long as the bourgeoisie was revolutionary, it also paid homage to the view that people were the products of society, but unfortunately, at that time, the sciences with which the driving forces of social development could have been recognized were not yet sufficiently developed. The French materialists of the eighteenth century did not know the class struggle and did not pay attention to technical development. They knew that in order to change people one had to change society, but they did not know where the forces that would change society would come from. They saw it in the omnipotence of individual extraordinary men, especially schoolmasters. Beyond that, bourgeois materialism did not develop.

As soon as the bourgeoisie became conservative, it found the thought intolerable that it was the social conditions that were to blame for the particular grievances of their time and that they had to be changed. As far as it thinks scientifically, the bourgeoisie now seeks to prove that men are and must be as they are because of nature, that wanting to change society means nothing more than turning the natural order upside down. One must, however, have been educated very exclusively in natural science and have remained unaffected by the social conditions of our time in order to assert its necessary natural continuity for all time. The majority of the bourgeoisie no longer finds the courage even for this, seeking consolation by denying materialism and recognizing freedom of the will. It is not society that makes people, they assert, but rather people who make society according to their will. It is imperfect because they are. We must improve society not by social transformations, but by raising the individual higher, by instilling in them a higher morality. The better people will then surely produce a better society. In this way, ethics and the recognition of the freedom of the will become the favorite doctrine of today’s bourgeoisie. It is supposed to show the good will of the bourgeoisie to counteract social grievances and yet not commit it to any societal change, but on the contrary, to repel any such change.

From this perspective, the insights that can be gained from the basis of the unity of all the sciences, as developed by Marx, are inaccessible to anyone who stands on the ground of bourgeois society. Only those who are critical of the existing society can grasp these insights, that is, only those who stand on the ground of the proletariat. In this respect one can distinguish between proletarian and bourgeois science.

Of course, the contrast between the two is most pronounced in the humanities, while the contrast between feudal or Catholic and bourgeois science is most pronounced in the natural sciences. But man’s thinking always strives for uniformity, as the various fields of knowledge always influence each other, and therefore our social perceptions affect our entire conception of the world. Thus, the contrast between bourgeois and proletarian science is also reflected in the natural sciences.

This can already be seen in Greek philosophy, as shown, among other things, by an example from modern natural science which is closely related to our subject. I have already pointed out in another place that the bourgeoisie, as long as it was revolutionary, also assumed that natural development took place through catastrophes. Ever since it became conservative, it has not wanted to know anything about catastrophes in nature either. In its opinion, development is now taking place very slowly, exclusively by means of imperceptible changes. Catastrophes appear to it to be something abnormal, unnatural, only capable of disrupting natural development. And despite Darwin’s doctrine of the struggle for existence, bourgeois science does its utmost to make the concept of evolutionary development appear synonymous with that of a completely peaceful process.

For Marx, on the other hand, the class struggle was only a special form of nature’s general law of development, which is by no means peaceful. For him, development, as we have already noted, is “dialectical,” that is, the product of a struggle of opposites that necessarily occur. Every fight of irreconcilable opposites, however, must ultimately lead to the overcoming of one of the fighters: that is, to a catastrophe. The catastrophe can prepare itself very slowly; imperceptibly the strength of one fighter may grow, that of the other absolutely or proportionally diminish, until finally the collapse of one part becomes inevitable — that is, inevitable as a result of the fight and the increase of the strength of one part, not inevitable as an event that takes place by itself. Every day, at every turn, we encounter small catastrophes, both in nature and in society. Every death is a catastrophe. Every existing structure must eventually succumb to a supremacy of opposites. This applies not only to plants and animals, but also to whole societies, whole kingdoms, entire celestial bodies. For them, too, the progress of the general development process prepares temporary catastrophes through the gradual increase of resistance. No movement and no development without temporary catastrophes are possible. These form a necessary stage of development, since evolution is impossible without temporary revolutions.

By this conception, we also find the revolutionary bourgeois one overcome, which assumed that development takes place exclusively through catastrophes. The conservative bourgeois revolution thereafter [in contrast to the proletarian one] saw in catastrophe not the necessary point of passage of an often quite slow and imperceptible development process, but a disturbance and inhibition of this process.

We find another contrast between bourgeois and proletarian, or if we prefer, between conservative and revolutionary science, in the critique of knowledge: a revolutionary class that feels the power within itself to conquer society is not inclined to recognize any barrier to its scientific conquests and feels itself capable of solving all the problems of its time. A conservative class, on the other hand, instinctively shuns any progress not only in the political and social fields, but also in the scientific field, because it feels that any deeper knowledge can no longer be of much use to it, but can harm it infinitely. It is inclined to reduce confidence in science.

The naive confidence that still animated the revolutionary thinkers of the eighteenth century, as if they were carrying the solution to all world riddles in their pockets, as if they were speaking in the name of absolute reason, can no longer be shared even by the boldest revolutionary today. Today no one will want to deny anymore what, of course, already in the eighteenth century, and even in antiquity, some thinkers knew, namely that all our knowledge is relative; that it represents a relationship of man, of the self, to the rest of the world, and shows us only this relationship, not the world itself. So all knowledge is relative, conditioned, and limited; there are no absolute, eternal truths. But this means nothing other than that there is no conclusion to our knowledge, that the process of knowledge is an infinite, unlimited one, that it is foolish to present any knowledge as the ultimate conclusion of truth, but no less foolish to present any proposition as the ultimate limit of wisdom, beyond which we could never get.

Rather, we know that mankind has still succeeded in crossing every limit of its knowledge of which it became aware sooner or later, of course only to find further limits behind it of which it previously had no idea. We have not the least reason to shy away from any particular problem that we are able to recognize nor to let our hands sink into our laps and mumble resignedly: ignorabimus, we will never know anything about it. But this despondency characterizes modern bourgeois thinking. Instead of striving with all its might to broaden and deepen our knowledge, today it spends its noblest power on finding out certain limits that should be drawn from our knowledge forever and discrediting the certainty of scientific knowledge.

When the bourgeoisie was revolutionary, it avoided such tasks. For this despondency Marx never had anything to spare, much to the indignation of today’s bourgeois philosophy.

III
Marx and Engels

It was his revolutionary, proletarian standpoint that allowed an intellectual giant like Marx to establish the unity of all science. But when we speak of Marx, we must never forget that the same feat was achieved at the same time by an equal thinker, Friedrich Engels, and that without the intimate cooperation of the two, the new materialistic conception of history and the new historical or dialectical conception of the world could not have appeared so completely and comprehensively in one fell swoop.

Engels arrived at this view by other means than Marx. Marx was the son of a lawyer, first intended for a legal career, then for an academic one. He studied law, philosophy, and history, and only turned to economic studies when he bitterly felt a lack of economic knowledge.

He studied economics, revolutionary history, and socialism in Paris, and the great thinker Saint-Simon seems to have had a great influence on him. These studies then led him to the realization that it was not the law, nor the state, which makes society, but vice versa, that the society arising from the economic process makes the law, the state, according to its need.

Engels, on the other hand, was born the son of a factory owner, and it was not college but a lowlier secondary school that gave him the first foundations of his knowledge; there he learned to think scientifically. Then he became a practical businessman, ran economics practically and theoretically, in England, in Manchester, the center of English capitalism, where his father owned a factory. Familiar with Hegelian philosophy from Germany, he knew how to deepen the economic knowledge he had gained in England, and his gaze was directed above all to economic history. But nowhere in the forties of the nineteenth century was the proletarian class struggle so developed and its connection with capitalist development as clear as in England.

Thus, Engels arrived at the same time as Marx, yet in a different way, at the threshold of the same materialistic conception of history. One arrived at this via the old humanities, jurisprudence, ethics, and history, the other via the new economy, economic history, ethnologies, and the natural sciences. In the revolution, and in socialism, they met. The agreement of their ideas was what first brought them closer to each other when they came into personal contact in 1844 in Paris. But the convergence of ideas soon became a complete fusion in a higher unity, in which it is impossible to say what and how much one or the other contributed to it. It is true that Marx was the more important of the two, and no one acknowledged this more enviously, or joyfully, than Engels himself. Their thought, named Marxism, was also named after Marx. But Marx could never have achieved what he did without Engels, from whom he learnt a great deal, and of course vice versa.

Each of the two was lifted up by the interaction with the other and thus attained a breadth of vision and a universality that he could not have achieved on his own. Marx would have come to the materialistic conception of history even without Engels, Engels also without Marx, but their development would probably have been slower, going through more errors and failures. Marx was the deeper thinker, Engels the bolder. With Marx, the power of theoretical abstraction was more strongly developed, a gift for discovering the general in the confusing abundance of particular phenomena; with Engels, the gift of practical combination, the ability to produce a totality from individual characteristics. Marx’s critical faculty was more powerful, as was his self-criticism, which bridled the audacity of his thinking and urged it to cautious progress and constant examination of the ground, while Engels’s spirit was easily inspired and flew over the greatest difficulties by the proud joy of the tremendous insights it gained.

Among the many stimuli that Marx received from Engels, one above all has become significant. Marx was greatly elevated by overcoming the one-sided German way of thinking and by fertilizing German thinking with French thinking. Engels also made him familiar with the English spirit. It was only in this way that his thinking achieved the highest upswing possible under the given circumstances. Nothing is more erroneous than declaring Marxism to be a purely German product. It was international from its beginning.

IV
Summary of German, French, and English Thought

Three nations were the victors of modern culture in the nineteenth century. Only he who had filled himself with the spirit of all three, mastered the achievements of all three, was armed with all the achievements of his century; only he was able to achieve the greatest that could be achieved with the means of this century.

The combination of the thinking of these three nations into a higher unity, in which each of their one-sidedness was abolished, forms the starting point of the historical achievement of Marx and Engels.

England, as already mentioned, had developed capitalism further than any other country in the first half of the nineteenth century, mainly thanks to its geographical position, which in the eighteenth century enabled it to take considerable advantage of the colonial policy of conquest and plunder and bled to death those countries of mainland Europe without access to the Atlantic Ocean. Thanks to England’s insular position, it did not need to maintain a strong standing army; it could turn all its strength to fleets and gain naval supremacy without exhaustion. Its wealth of coal and iron then allowed it to use the wealth gained through colonial policy to develop a large capitalist industry which, by controlling the sea, reconquered the world market, which in turn could only be exploited for mass consumer goods by water before the development of the railway system.

Earlier than elsewhere, therefore, one could study capitalism and its tendencies in England, but also, as already mentioned, the proletarian class struggle that these tendencies evoked. Nowhere was the recognition of the laws of capitalist production, i.e. political economy, more advanced than in England, thanks to world trade, economic history, and ethnology. Better than anywhere else, one could see in England what the coming period contained in its lap. Yet also, thanks to the new humanities, one could now recognize the laws that dominated the social development of all time, and thus establish the unity of natural science and the humanities.

But England offered only the best material, not the best research methods.
It was precisely because capitalism developed earlier in England than elsewhere that the bourgeoisie came to rule society there, after feudalism had become politically, economically, and spiritually completely deprived and the bourgeoisie had achieved complete independence in every respect. The colonial policy itself, however, which facilitated capitalism, also gave new strength to the feudal lords.

In addition, for the reasons already mentioned, the standing army did not reach a strong development in England. This again prevented the emergence of a strong, central power of government. The bureaucracy remained weak, and the self-government of the ruling classes remained strong alongside it. This meant, however, that the class struggles were not centralized much and were often fragmented.

All this caused the spirit of compromise between old and new to permeate all life and thought. The thinkers and pioneers of the up-and-coming classes did not in principle turn against Christianity, the aristocracy, the monarchy; their parties did not set up any great programs. They did not seek to think their thoughts through to the end; they preferred to defend only certain individual measures which were practically necessary at the time instead of sweeping programs. Limitation and conservatism, overestimation of detail in politics and science, rejection of any aspirations to conquer a great horizon permeated all classes.

Meanwhile the situation in France was quite different. This country was economically much more backward, its capitalist industries dominated by luxury industries and the petty bourgeoisie. The tone was set by the petty bourgeoisie in its big cities like Paris, and such big cities, with half a million inhabitants or more, were few until the introduction of the railways, and they played a very different role than they do today. The armies could only be small before the advent of the railways, which enabled rapid mass transport. They were scattered throughout the country, not quick to assemble, their equipment not as defenseless to the masses as it is today. It was the Parisians in particular who had always distinguished themselves by their distinctive combativeness, long before the Great Revolution, by repeatedly wrestling concessions from the government in armed insurrection.

Before the introduction of compulsory schooling, the improvement of the postal system by railways and telegraphs, and the distribution of daily newspapers in the country, however, the intellectual superiority and influence of the metropolitan population over the rest of the country was tremendously great. At that time, social intercourse offered the masses of uneducated people the only opportunity to educate themselves, above all politically, but also artistically, even scientifically. How much greater was this possibility in the big city than in the country towns and villages! Everything that had spirit in France urged Paris to activate and develop it. Everything that was active in Paris was filled with a higher spirit.

And now this critical, cocky, audacious population saw an outrageous collapse of state power and of the ruling classes.

The same causes that inhibited economic development in France promoted the depletion of feudalism and the state. Colonial policy, in particular, cost the state infinite sacrifices, broke its military and financial strength, and accelerated the economic ruin especially of the peasants, but also of the aristocrats. State, nobility, church were politically, morally and, with the exception of the church, also financially bankrupt, but nevertheless knew how to assert their oppressive rule to the extreme, thanks to the violence which the government had centralized in their hands by the standing army and an extensive bureaucracy, and thanks to the complete abolition of any independent organization among the people.

This finally led to that colossal catastrophe which we know as the great French Revolution, in which at times the petty bourgeois and proletarians of Paris came to dominate all of France, to stand up to all of Europe. But even before that, the increasing sharp contrast between the needs of the masses, led by the liberal bourgeoisie, and those of the aristocrats and the clergy, protected by the power of the state, led to the most radical overthrow of all existing thought. War was declared against all traditional authority. Materialism and atheism, in England mere luxury hobbies of a degenerate nobility (which quickly disappeared with the victory of the bourgeoisie), became in France the way of thinking of the boldest reformers from the aspiring classes.

Nowhere else has the economic root of class antagonisms and class struggles become so evident as in England; nowhere else has it been so clear as in the France of the Great Revolution that all class struggle is a struggle for political power, that the task of every great political party is not limited to one reform or another, but must always bear in mind the conquest of political power, and that this conquest, when carried out by a class which has hitherto been subjugated, always entails a change in the entire social transmission. In the first half of the nineteenth century, economic thinking was most developed in England, while political thinking was most developed in France. While England was dominated by the spirit of compromise, France was dominated by radicalism; in England, the meticulous work of slow organizational development flourished; in France, it was the revolutionary passion which swept everything along with it.

The radical, bold action was preceded by radical, bold thinking which held nothing as sacred, which intrepidly and ruthlessly pursued every knowledge to its final consequences, thought every thought through to its end.
But as brilliant and enchanting as the results of this thought and action were, it also developed the errors of its merits. Full of impatience, it did not take the time to prepare them to reach their ultimate goals. Full of zeal to storm the fortress of the state with revolutionary élan, it failed to prepare the organizational ground for its siege. And the urge to advance to the final and supreme truths easily led to the most hasty conclusions from wholly inadequate foundations, replacing patient research with the pleasure of ingenious, spontaneous ideas. An addiction grew to mastering the infinite fullness of life through a few simple formulas and slogans. British sobriety was countered by a Gallic phrase-rush.

Yet the situation in Germany was different again.

There capitalism had developed far less than in France because it was almost completely cut off from the great road of world trade in Europe, the Atlantic Ocean, and therefore recovered only slowly from the horrific devastation of the Thirty Years’ War. Much more than France, Germany was a petty-bourgeois country, but at the same time was a country without a strong central state power. Fragmented into innumerable small states, it had no great capital; small states and small towns made its petty bourgeoisie limited, weak, and cowardly. The ultimate collapse of feudalism was not brought about by an uprising from within, but by an invasion from without. Not German citizens, but French soldiers swept it out of the most important parts of Germany.
The great successes of the rising bourgeoisie in England and France probably also excited the German bourgeoisie. But, to the determination of the most energetic and intelligent of its members, each of the territories conquered by the bourgeoisie of Western Europe remained closed. They could not establish and run large commercial and industrial enterprises, intervene in the fate of the state in parliaments and a powerful press, command fleets or armies. Reality was desolate for them; they had no choice but to turn away from reality in pure thought and to transfigure reality through art. Here they created great things; here the German people surpassed France and England. While they produced a Pitt, Fox and Burke, Mirabeau, Danton, Robespierre, Nelson and Napoleon, Germany produced a Schiller, Goethe, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.
Thinking became the noblest occupation of the great Germans, the idea became the ruler of the world for them, the revolution of thought the means to revolutionize the world. The more miserable and limited reality was, the more thought sought to rise above it, to overcome its barriers, to grasp the entire infinity.

While the English devised the best methods for the triumph of their fleets and industries, the French the best methods for the triumph of their armies and their insurrections, the Germans devised the best methods for the triumph of thought and research.

But this triumphal march, like the French and English, also had its disadvantages in its aftermath, both for theory and practice. The abandonment of reality produced an alienation from the world and an overestimation of the ideas to which life and strength were attributed, independent of the minds of the people who produced them and who had to realize them. One was content with being right in theory and failed to seek power in order to apply that theory. As deep as German philosophy was, as thorough as German science was, as rapturous as German idealism was, as glorious as its creations were, there was unspeakable practical impotence and complete renunciation of any striving for power concealed beneath it. The German ideals were far more illustrious than the French or even the English. But no step was taken to get closer to them. It was stated from the outset that the ideal was the unattainable.

Like English conservatism and the French radical phrase, the Germans’ inactive idealism continued for a long time. The industrial development of the great economy finally abolished it, even replacing it with military resolve. In the past, however, Germany found a counter-effect in the invasion of the French spirit after the revolution. Germany owes some of its greatest minds to the mixture of French revolutionary thinking with German philosophical methods — remember only Heinrich Heine and Ferdinand Lassalle.

But the result was even more powerful when this mixture was fertilized with English economic insight. We owe the achievement of Engels and Marx to this.
They recognized how economics and politics, detailed organizational work and revolutionary Sturm und Drang, complement each other, how detailed organizational work remains infertile without a great goal in which it finds its constant guideline and its encouragement, and how this goal floats in the air without preparation, which creates only the necessary power for its attainment. They also recognized, however, that such a goal must not be born of a mere revolutionary need, if it is to remain free of illusions and self-intoxication; if it is to be won by the most conscientious application of the methods of scientific research, it must always be in harmony with the total knowledge of mankind. They also recognized that the economy forms the basis of social development, that it contains the laws according to which this development necessarily takes place.

England offered them most of the actual economic material, the philosophy of Germany the best method of deriving from this material the goal of present social development; the revolution of France finally showed them most clearly how we have to gain power, namely political power, to achieve this goal.
Thus, they created modern scientific socialism by uniting into a higher unity all which is great and fruitful in English, French, and German thought.

V
The Merging of the Workers’ Movement and Socialism

The materialist conception of history in itself signified a new epoch. It marked the beginning of a new era of science, despite all the resistance of bourgeois scholarship; it defined a new epoch not only in the history of thought, but also in the history of the fight for social development, of politics in the broadest and highest sense of the word. For it was through it that the workers’ movement and socialism were united, thus giving the proletarian class struggle the most potent strength possible.

The workers’ movement and socialism are by no means inherently one. The workers’ movement is necessarily born as resistance against industrial capitalism wherever it occurs; it expropriates and subjugates the working masses, but also crowds and unites them in large enterprises and industrial cities. The most original form of the workers’ movement is the purely economic one, the struggle for wages and working hours, which at first merely takes the form of simple outbursts of despair, of repeatedly unprepared actions, but is soon transformed into higher forms by trade-union organization. Early on, the political struggle arose parallel to this. The bourgeoisie itself needed proletarian help in its struggles against feudalism and called for it. The workers soon learned to appreciate the importance of political freedom and political power for their own ends. In England and France in particular, universal suffrage early on became the object of the political aspirations of the proletarians and led to a proletarian party in England in the 1830s, that of the Chartists.

Socialism was already emerging, but by no means in the proletariat. It is certainly, however, like the labor movement, a product of capitalism; with the growth of capitalism, it arises from the urge to counter the misery that capitalist exploitation imposes on the working classes. Meanwhile, the proletariat’s self-defense in the form of the labor movement arises wherever a large working-class population gathers, while socialism requires deep insight into the nature of modern society. Every type of socialism is based on the realization that capitalist misery cannot be brought to an end on the ground of bourgeois society, that this misery is based on private ownership of the means of production and will only disappear with it. All socialist systems agree that they deviate from each other only in the ways in which they want to see private property abolished and in the ideas they have about the new social property to replace it.

As naïve as the expectations and proposals of the socialists might sometimes have been, the knowledge on which they were based presupposed a social knowledge that was still completely inaccessible to the proletariat in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Only a man who was able to stand on the ground of the proletariat, to view bourgeois society from its point of view, could come to socialist knowledge. But he could only be one who mastered the means of science, which at that time were still far more accessible to the bourgeois circles than they are today. As naturally and consequently as the workers’ movement develops from capitalist production, wherever it reaches a certain height, socialism in its development did not only have capitalism as a prerequisite, but also a confluence of extraordinarily rare circumstances. Everywhere socialism could at first only arise from a bourgeois milieu. In England, even until recently, socialism was propagated primarily by bourgeois elements.

This background appeared as a contradiction to Marx’s theory of class struggle, but it would only be such if the class of the bourgeoisie had ever adopted socialism somewhere, or if Marx had declared it impossible for individual non-proletarians to accept, for unique reasons, the standpoint of the proletariat.

Marx had always asserted that the only power capable of helping socialism to break through is the working class. In other words, the proletariat can only free itself by its own efforts. But this by no means implies that only proletarians can show it the way.

That socialism is nothing if it is not supported by a strong workers’ movement no longer needs proof today. The other side of this coin, that the workers’ movement can only unfold its full power if it has understood and accepted socialism, is not so clear today.

Socialism is not the product of an ethic outside of time and space or all class distinctions; it is basically nothing but the science of society from the point of view of the proletariat. But science does not merely serve to satisfy our desire for new things and knowledge of the unknown and the mysterious; it also has an economic purpose, that of sparing energy. It makes it possible for man to navigate reality more easily, to use his powers more expediently, to avoid any useless expenditure of energy, and thus to achieve at all times the maximum of what can be achieved under the given circumstances. At its starting point science directly and consciously serves such purposes of the economization of exertion. The more it develops and moves away from this point of departure, the more mediators come between the activity of its research and its eventual practical effect. But the connection between the two can only be obscured, not broken.

Similarly, the social science of the proletariat, socialism, serves to make possible the most efficient application of exertion and helps it to achieve its highest possible development. Naturally, it achieves this the more, the more perfected it is itself and the deeper its knowledge of reality is.

Socialist theory is by no means the fruitless gimmickry of some parlor scholars, but a very practical thing for the struggling proletariat.

Its main weapon is the concentration of its totality in vast, independent organizations, free from all bourgeois influences. It cannot achieve this without a socialist theory, alone capable of finding out the common proletarian interest among the colorful diversity of the various proletarian strata, and of sharply and permanently separating them altogether from the bourgeois world.

Incapable of this achievement is the naive labor movement, which is bare of any theory, and which rises of its own accord in the working classes against growing capitalism.

Let us examine, for example, the trade unions. They are professional associations that seek to protect the immediate interests of their members. But how different these interests are in the individual professions, how different they are with the seafarers than with the coal diggers, the cab drivers, or the typesetters! Without socialist theory, the individual proletarian professions are not able to recognize the commonality of their interests, are foreign to each other, sometimes even hostile to each other.

Since the trade union only represents the interests of its members, it does not easily stand in opposition to the entire bourgeois world, but initially only to the capitalists of its profession. Besides these capitalists, however, there is now a whole row of bourgeois elements which draw their existence either directly or indirectly from the exploitation of proletarians, who are therefore interested in maintaining the bourgeois social order and who will oppose any attempt to put an end to proletarian exploitation. Whether the spinner of Manchester earns 2 or 2.5 shillings a day, whether he worked 10 or 12 hours a day, a big landowner, a banker, a newspaper owner, or a lawyer would be completely indifferent if they did not own spinning shares. They might have an interest in making certain concessions to the trade unionists in order to win political favors from them. Thus, where trade unions were not enlightened by a socialist theory, they were given the opportunity to serve purposes that were nothing less than “proletarian.”

But even worse could happen and, moreover, did happen. Not all proletarian strata are able to seize trade-union organization. In the proletariat there is a difference between organized and unorganized workers. Where they are filled with socialist thinking, they become the most militant parts of the proletariat, the protagonists of its entirety. Where the organized workers lack this thinking, they become all too easily aristocrats who not only lose all interest in the unorganized workers, but often even oppose them, hindering their organization in order to monopolize its advantages. But the unorganized workers are incapable of any struggle, any ascent, without the help of the organized ones. The more they rise, the more they fall into misery without their support. Thus, the trade union movement, despite all the strengthening of individual strata, can even bring about a direct weakening of the entire proletariat if it is not filled with a socialist spirit.

Yet even the political organization of the proletariat cannot develop its full power without this spirit. This is clearly testified to by the first labor party in England, Chartism, born in 1835. This movement contained very far-reaching and far-sighted elements, but in its entirety it did not pursue a specific socialist program, but only individual, practical, easily attainable goals, above all universal suffrage, which of course was not to be an end in itself, but a means to an end; but for the total mass of the Chartists this again consisted only of individual economic demands, above all the ten-hour normal working day.

This first had the disadvantage that the party did not become an unadulterated class party. The general right to vote was also of interest to the petty bourgeoisie.

To some it might seem an advantage for the petty bourgeoisie to join the workers’ party as such. But this only makes it more numerous, not stronger. The proletariat has its own interests and its own methods of struggle, which differ from those of all other classes. It is constrained by unity with the others and cannot develop its full power. We Social-Democrats welcome individual petty bourgeois and peasants if they want to join us; but only when they stand on proletarian ground, when they have proletarian feeling. Our socialist program ensures that only such petty-bourgeois and smallholder elements come to us. The Chartists lacked such a program, and so their electoral struggle was joined by numerous petty-bourgeois elements who had as little sympathy as they had inclination for the proletarian interests and methods of struggle. The natural consequence was thriving internal conflict within Chartism, which weakened it greatly.

The defeat of the 1848 revolution then put an end to all political workers’ movement for a decade. When the European proletariat stirred up again, the struggle for universal suffrage began anew in the English working class. One could now expect a resurgence of Chartism. But there the English bourgeoisie led a masterstroke. It split the English proletariat, granted the organized workers the right to vote, detached them from the masses of the rest of the proletariat, and thus prevented the resurgence of Chartism. It did not possess a comprehensive program beyond the general right vote. As soon as this demand was met in a way that satisfied the militant sections of the working class, the ground for it had disappeared. It was not until the end of the century, when the English were struggling to crawl behind the workers of the European mainland, that they started to found an independent workers’ party again. But they have long failed to grasp the practical significance of socialism for the full development of the proletariat’s power and have refused to accept a program for their party because it could only be a socialist one! They waited until the logic of the facts forced it upon them.

Everywhere today the conditions are already given for the necessary unification of workers’ movement and socialism. They were missing in the first decades of the nineteenth century.

At that time the workers were so defeated by the first onslaught of capitalism that they could hardly resist it. It was rare enough that they defended themselves, albeit in a primitive way. They lacked all possibilities for deeper societal studies.

The bourgeois socialists therefore saw in the misery spread by capitalism only one side, the oppressive one, not the other, the inciting one and the one spurring on the revolutionary rise of the proletariat. They believed there was only one factor capable of enforcing the liberation of the proletariat: bourgeois goodwill. They judged the bourgeoisie from their own position, believing that they could find in it enough good fellow-men to be able to carry out socialist measures.

Their socialist propaganda was also initially well received by the bourgeois philanthropists. On average, the bourgeois are not inhuman. The misery touches them, and as far as they do not profit from it, they would like to help. Meanwhile, as the suffering proletarian is viewed favorably, the fighting one is viewed harshly. They feel that he shakes at the root of their existence. The begging proletariat enjoys their sympathies, the demanding one drives them to outrage and wild enmity. So, the socialists found it very unpleasant that the labor movement threatened to rob them of the factor on which they relied most: the sympathies of the “well-meaning bourgeoisie” for the dispossessed.

The lower their confidence in the proletariat, which at the time generally still formed a very low mass, and the more clearly they recognized the inadequacy of the naïve labor movement, the more they saw a disturbing element in the labor movement. Thus, they often came to turn against the workers’ movement, proving, for example, how useless the unions were by simply trying to raise wages rather than fight the wage system itself, the root of all evil.

Gradually, however, a reversal was taking place. In the forties, the labor movement was ready to produce a series of highly gifted minds who seized socialism and recognized in it the proletarian science of society. These workers already knew from their own experience that they could not count on the philanthropy of the bourgeoisie. They recognized that the proletariat had to free itself. In addition, bourgeois socialists realized that the generosity of the bourgeoisie could not be relied upon. Admittedly, they did not gain confidence in the proletariat. The movement appeared to them only as a destructive force that threatened all culture. They believed that only bourgeois intelligentsia could build a socialist society, but saw the driving force behind it no longer in compassion for the tolerating but in fear of the storming proletariat. They already recognized its tremendous power and understood that the labor movement necessarily emerged from the capitalist mode of production, that it would grow more and more within that mode of production. They hoped that the fear of the growing labor movement would cause the intelligent bourgeoisie to take away its dangerousness through socialist measures.

This was a tremendous advance, but the union of socialism and the workers’ movement could still not spring from this latter view. Despite the genius of some of them, the socialist workers lacked the comprehensive knowledge needed to establish a new, higher theory of socialism in which it was organically linked to the labor movement. They could only adopt the old bourgeois socialism, utopianism, and adapt it to their needs.
The proletarian socialists who were most far-reaching were those who followed Chartism or the French Revolution. In particular, the latter gained great importance in the history of socialism. The Great Revolution had clearly shown the importance that the conquest of state power can have for the liberation of a class. In this revolution, however, thanks to strange circumstances, a powerful political organization, the Jacobin Club, had also managed to dominate all of Paris and all of France through a reign of terror by the petty bourgeoisie, who were then strongly displaced by proletarian elements. Even during the revolution itself, Babeuf had already drawn the consequences of this in a purely proletarian sense and tried, by a conspiracy, to conquer state power for a communist organization and make it subservient.
The memory of this had never died in the French workers. The conquest of state power early became the means for the proletarian socialists to gain the strength to carry out socialism. But given the weakness and immaturity of the proletariat, they knew of no other way to conquer state power than the coup d’état of a number of conspirators to unleash the revolution. Blanqui is best known among the representatives of this thought in France. Weitling represented similar ideas in Germany.

Other socialists also took up the French Revolution. But the coup appeared to them to be a less than suitable means of overthrowing the rule of capital. Neither did the direction just mentioned count on the strength of the workers’ movement. It helped itself by overlooking the extent to which the petty bourgeoisie was based on the same basis of private ownership of the means of production as capital, by believing that the proletarians could carry out their confrontation with the capitalists without being disturbed by the petty bourgeoisie, the “people,” even with its assistance. One needed only the republic and universal suffrage to induce the power of the state to socialist measures.

This superstition of some republicans, whose most distinguished representative was Louis Blanc, found a counterpart in Germany in the monarchical superstition of social kingship, as cherished by a few professors and other ideologues, such as Rodbertus.

This monarchical state socialism was always only a quirk, here and there also a demagogic phrase. It has never gained serious practical significance. However, this was not the case with the directions represented by Blanqui and Louis Blanc. They gained the strength to rule Paris in the days of the February Revolution of 1848.

In the person of Proudhon they acquired a tremendous critic. He doubted the proletariat, the state, and the revolution. He recognized well that the proletariat must free itself, but he also saw that if it fought for its liberation, it must also take up the struggle with the state and for state power, for even the purely economic struggle depended on the state power, as the workers at the time felt at every turn the lack of any freedom to associate. Since Proudhon now regarded the struggle for state power as hopeless, he advised the proletariat to refrain from any struggle in its emancipatory efforts and to apply only the means of peaceful organization, such as exchange banks, insurance funds, and similar institutions. He had just as little sympathy for trade unions as he had for politics.

Thus, the workers’ movement and socialism, and all attempts to bring the two into a closer relationship, formed a chaos of the most diverse currents in the decade in which Marx and Engels formed their point of view and method. Each current had discovered a piece of what was right, yet none was willing to form them into a totality, with each sooner or later having to end in failure.
What these directions were unable to do was achieved by the materialistic conception of history, which thus, in addition to its great significance for science, gained no less significance for the actual development of society. It facilitated the revolution of one and the other.

Like the socialists of their time, Marx and Engels also recognized that the workers’ movement appears inadequate when it is contrasted with socialism and one asks: what is the more appropriate means with which to provide the proletariat with a secure existence and abolition of all exploitation? The workers’ movement (trade unions, the struggle for the right to vote, etc.), or socialism? But they also realized that this question was completely wrong. Socialism, the secure existence of the proletariat, and the abolition of all exploitation are synonymous. The question is only this: how does the proletariat get to socialism? And there the doctrine of class struggle answered: through the labor movement.

It may not be able to provide the proletariat with a secure existence and the abolition of all exploitation, but it is the indispensable means not only to save the individual proletarians from sinking into misery, but also to give the whole class ever greater power — intellectual, economic, and political power, power that is always growing, even if at the same time the exploitation of the proletariat is increasing. The labor movement must be measured not according to its significance for restricting exploitation, but according to its significance for increasing the power of the proletariat. Not from Blanquist conspiracy, but also not from the state socialism of Louis Blanc or Rodbertus, nor from the peaceful organizations of Proudhon, but only from the class struggle, which has to last for decades, even generations, does the strength arise which can and must seize the state in the form of the democratic republic and finally bring about the breakthrough of socialism in it. To lead the economic and political class struggle, to cultivate its detailed work zealously, but also to fill it with the thoughts of a far-sighted socialism, to thereby unite the organizations and activities of the proletariat uniformly and harmoniously into a tremendous whole that swells more and more irresistibly — according to Marx and Engels, this is the task of everyone who, whether he is a proletarian or not, takes the standpoint of the proletariat and wants to liberate it.

The growth of the power of the proletariat itself, however, is in the last analysis based on the displacement of the pre-capitalist, petty-bourgeois modes of production by the capitalist one, which increases the number of proletarians, concentrates them, increases their indispensability for the whole of society, but at the same time also creates in increasingly concentrated capital the preconditions for the social organization of production, which no longer is arbitrarily invented by the utopians but develops from capitalist reality.

Through this train of thought, Marx and Engels have created the foundation on which social democracy rises, the foundation on which the struggling proletariat of the entire world, from which it began its glorious triumphal march, is increasingly based.

This achievement was hardly possible as long as socialism did not have its own science, independent of bourgeois science. The socialists before Marx and Engels were mostly very familiar with the science of political economy, but they adopted it uncritically in the form in which it had been created by bourgeois thinkers, and differed from them only in that they drew other, proletarian conclusions from it.

It was only Marx who undertook a completely independent study of the capitalist mode of production, who showed how much deeper and clearer it can be when viewed from the proletarian point of view, rather than from the bourgeois point of view. For the proletarian standpoint stands outside and above it, not in it. Only he who regards capitalism as a temporary form makes it possible to fully grasp its particular historical peculiarity.
This feat was performed by Marx in his work Capital (1867), after he had already presented his new socialist point of view with Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848).

Thus, the proletarian struggle for emancipation had received a scientific basis of a magnitude and strength which no revolutionary class before it had possessed. But of course, no one had yet been given such a gigantic task as the modern proletariat; it had to rethink the whole world that capitalism had thrown out of its seams. Fortunately, it is not Hamlet, it does not greet this task with woe. From its immense size it draws immense confidence and strength.

VI
Summary of Theory and Practice

We have now looked at the most important achievements Marx made in his association with Engels. But the picture of their work would remain incomplete if we did not point to another aspect which characterizes it to an outstanding degree: the link between theory and practice.

To bourgeois thought, of course, this seems to be another patch on the shining shield of its scientific greatness, before which even bourgeois scholarship must bend, albeit reluctantly, grumbling and without understanding. If they had been mere theorists, parlor scholars who were content to discuss their theories in a language incomprehensible to ordinary people and in inaccessible folios, this could have gone further. But the fact that their science was born out of struggle and again serves the struggle, the struggle against the existing order, has robbed them of their impartiality and clouded their honesty.

This miserable view can only imagine a fighter as a lawyer, whose knowledge should serve nothing but to give him arguments to refute the other party. It has no idea that no one has a greater need for truth than a true fighter in a terrible fight, in which he has only the prospect of surviving if he recognizes his situation, tools, and his prospects in full clarity. The judges who interpret the laws of the state can be deceived by the tricks of a sophist who dominates legal science. The necessary laws of nature, on the other hand, can only be recognized, not duped nor bribed.

A fighter who takes this point of view will only draw from the fierceness of the fight an increased urge for undisguised truth; but also the urge not to keep the truth for oneself, but to communicate it to one’s comrades-in-arms.

Thus Engels also writes of the time period between 1845 and 1848, within which he and Marx had won their new scientific results, that they had no intention at all of whispering these results “in thick books exclusively to the ‘learned’ world.” Rather, they immediately contacted proletarian organizations in order to propagate their point of view and the tactics corresponding to it. In this way they succeeded in winning over one of the most important of the then-revolutionary proletarian associations, the international “Communist League,” for their principles, which were then expressed a few weeks before the February Revolution of 1848 in The Communist Manifesto, which was to become the “guide” of the proletarian movement of all countries.
The revolution called on Marx and Engels from Brussels, where they were staying, first in Paris, then in Germany, where they were for some time completely absorbed in revolutionary practice.

The decline of the revolution forced them from 1850 on, much against their will, to devote themselves entirely to theory. But when the workers’ movement revived in the early 1860s, Marx — for Engels was initially hindered by private circumstances — was immediately again able to intervene with full force in the practical movement. He did this in the International Workingmen’s Association, founded in 1864, which was soon to become a spectre for the whole of bourgeois Europe.

The laughable police mindset, with which even bourgeois democracy suspects every proletarian movement, made the International appear as a tremendous conspiracy society which had as its sole task the organization of riots and coups. In reality, it pursued its aims in full publicity: that of uniting all the proletarian forces into joint but also into independent action, detached from bourgeois politics and bourgeois thought, with the aim of expropriating capital, of the proletariat conquering all the political and economic means of power of the possessing classes. The most important and decisive step is the conquest of political power, but the economic emancipation of the working classes is the ultimate goal “to which every political movement must submit as a mere aid.”

Marx considers organization to be the most noble tool of the proletarian development of power.

“The proletarians possess an element of success,” he said in the inaugural address, “their numbers. But this only becomes significant if it is united by an organization and led toward a conscious goal.”

Without a goal, no organization. The common goal alone can unite the different individuals into a common organization. On the other hand, the diversity of goals is as divisive as the unity of goals is unifying.

Precisely because of the importance of organization for the proletariat, everything depends on the kind of goal that is set for it. This goal is of the greatest practical importance. Nothing is more impractical than the apparently realist view that the movement is everything and the goal nothing. Is organization then also nothing and the unorganized movement everything?
Even before Marx, socialists had set goals for the proletariat. But these had only caused sectarianism, divided the proletarians, since each of these socialists put the main emphasis on the particular way of solving the social problem they had invented. So many solutions, so many sects.

Marx gave no particular solution. He resisted all the challenges of becoming “positive,” of setting out in detail the measures by which the proletariat should be emancipated. In the International, he valued in organization only the general goal that every proletarian should make his own the economic liberation of his class; and the path he showed to that end was one that every proletarian already demonstrated in his class instinct: the economic and political class struggle.

Above all, it was the trade-union form of organization that Marx propagated in the International; it appeared to be the form most likely to permanently unite large masses. He also saw the cadres of the workers’ party existing in the trade unions.

No less eagerly did he pursue their imbuement with the spirit of class struggle — and their development to understand the conditions under which the expropriation of the capitalist class and the liberation of the proletariat was possible — than he pursued the expansion of trade-union organization itself.

He had to overcome great resistance, especially among the most advanced workers, who were still filled with the spirit of the old socialists and looked down on the unions with disdain because they did not challenge the wage system. They saw this as a departure from the right path, which they saw in the establishment of organizations in which the wage system was to be directly overcome, such as productive cooperatives. If, nevertheless, trade-union organization on the continent of Europe has made rapid progress since the second half of the 1860s, it owes it above all to the International and to the influence that Marx exerted on it and through it.

But the trade unions for Marx were not ends in themselves, but only a means to the end of class struggle against the capitalist order. He resisted those trade union leaders who tried to make the unions averse to this purpose — whether for limited personal or trade-union reasons — with the most vigorous resistance, as with the English trade-union officials who began to cheat with the liberals.

As indulgent and tolerant Marx was towards the proletarian masses, he was exceedingly strict towards those who acted as their leaders. This was primarily true of their theorists.

Into the proletarian organization, Marx warmly welcomed every proletarian who came with the honest intention of joining in the class struggle, no matter what views the entrant otherwise paid homage to, what theoretical motivations drove him, what arguments he used; no matter whether he was an atheist or a good Christian, whether Proudhonian, Blanquist, Weitlingian, or Lassallean, whether he understood the value of theory or considered it completely superfluous, etc.

Of course, he was not indifferent as to whether he was dealing with clear-thinking or confused workers. He considered it an important task to enlighten them, but he would have thought it wrong to repel workers and keep them away from the organization because their thought was confused. He placed full trust in the power of class antagonism and the logic of class struggle, which had to put every proletarian on the right path once he had joined an organization that served a real proletarian class struggle.

But he behaved differently toward people who came to the proletariat as teachers when they spread views that were likely to disrupt the power and unity of this class struggle. Against such elements he knew no tolerance. As a relentless critic, he confronted them, even if their intentions were the best; their work seemed to him in any case ruinous — that is, if it produced results at all and did not prove to be a mere waste of energy.

Thanks to this, Marx has always been one of the most hated men; most hated not only by the bourgeoisie, which feared in him its most dangerous enemy, but also by all the sectarians, inventors, educated councils of confusion, and similar elements in the socialist camp, who, the more painfully they felt his criticism, became the more outraged by his “intolerance,” his “authoritarianism,” his “papacy,” his “heretical courts.”

With the adoption of his views, we Marxists have also inherited this position, and we are proud of it. Only those who feel they are weak complain about the “intolerance” of a purely literary critique. Nobody is criticized more harshly, maliciously, than Marx and Marxism. But so far, no Marxist has thought of singing a sad song about the intolerance of our literary opponents. We are too sure of our cause for that.

What does not leave us indifferent, on the other hand, is the displeasure that the proletarian masses sometimes express about the literary feuds fought out between Marxism and its critics. This displeasure expresses a very justified need: the need for unity in the class struggle, for the combination of all proletarian elements into a great independent mass, the fear of divisions that could weaken the proletariat.

The workers know very well what strength they draw from their unity; it stands above theoretical clarity, and they curse theoretical discussions when they threaten to lead to divisions. Rightly so, for the pursuit of theoretical clarity would achieve the opposite of what it is supposed to achieve if it weakened rather than strengthened the proletarian class struggle.

A Marxist who would continue a theoretical disagreement to the point of splitting a proletarian fighting organization would not, however, be acting as a Marxist, in the sense of the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, for which every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programs.

Marx and Engels have already set out their view of the Marxist position within proletarian organizations in The Communist Manifesto in the section entitled “Proletarians and Communists.” The communists were then about the same as what are now called Marxists. It says:

“What is the relationship between the communists and the proletariat?

The communists do not form a separate party to the other workers’ parties.

They have no interests separate from the interests of the entire proletariat.

They do not establish special principles according to which they want to model the proletarian movement.

The communists differ from the other proletarian parties only in that, on the one hand, they emphasize and assert the common interests of the entire proletariat, which are independent of nationality, in the various national struggles of the proletarians [i.e. limited to the individual states] and, on the other hand, they always represent the interests of the entire movement during the various stages of development through which the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie passes.

The communists are thus practically the most decisive, ever-expanding part of the workers’ parties of all countries; theoretically, they have the insight into the conditions, the course, and the general results of the proletarian movement ahead of the rest of the mass of the proletariat.

The next purpose of the communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of bourgeois rule, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical propositions of the communists are by no means based on ideas, on principles invented or discovered by this or that do-gooder. They are only general expressions of the actual conditions of an existing class struggle, of a historical movement going on under our eyes.”

In the time since this was written, many things have changed so that these sentences can no longer be applied to every letter. In 1848 there were still no large, unified workers’ parties with comprehensive socialist programs, and alongside Marxist theory there were many other, much more widespread socialist theories.

Today, among the struggling proletariat united in mass parties, only one socialist theory is still alive: the Marxist theory. Not all members of the workers’ parties are Marxists; even less are all educated Marxists. But those among them who do not recognize Marxist theory have no theory at all. Either they deny the necessity of every theory and every program, or they brew a universal socialism together with a few Marxist chunks from pieces of the pre-Marxist ways of thinking that we have just come to know and that have not yet completely disappeared, which has the advantage that you can omit from it everything that doesn’t fit into your agenda at the moment, and take everything into it that seems usable at the moment, which is far more convenient than consistent Marxism, but fails completely where theory becomes most important. It is enough for the usual purposes of popular agitation, but it fails when it comes to finding one’s way in reality in the face of new, unexpected phenomena. Precisely because of its flexibility and softness, one cannot make a building out of it that defies all storms. But it also cannot form a roadmap which guides the seeker, since it is entirely determined by the personal momentary needs of his bearers.

Today Marxism must no longer assert itself in the proletariat against other socialist views. Its critics no longer oppose it with other theories, but only with doubts about the necessity of either theory at all or a consistent theory. There are only words, phrases like those of “dogmatism,” “orthodoxy,” and the like, not closed new systems, which are held against it in the proletarian movement.

For us Marxists today, however, this is just one more reason to report on any attempt to form a special Marxist sect within the workers’ movement that is detached from the other strata of the fighting proletariat. Like Marx, we see it as our task to unite the entire proletariat into one fighting organism. Within this organism, however, it will always be our goal to remain “the most practical, decisive, and ever-advancing part” that “has the insight into the conditions, the course, and the general results of the proletarian movement ahead of the rest of the mass of the proletariat” — that is, we will always strive to achieve the highest level of practical energy and theoretical knowledge that can be achieved with the given means. Only in this, in the superiority of our achievements, which the superiority of the Marxist standpoint enables us to achieve, do we want to occupy a special position in the overall organism of the proletariat organized as a class party, which, incidentally, wherever unconscious Marxism already fulfills it, is more and more pushed into its tracks by the logic of the facts.

But hardly a Marxist or Marxist group has ever caused a split because of purely theoretical differences. Where divisions occurred, they were always caused by practical, tactical, or organizational differences, not theoretical differences, and theory simply became the scapegoat onto whom all committed sins were laid.

For instance, the struggle by a part of the French socialists against an alleged Marxist intolerance is, when viewed in the light of day, only a struggle by a couple of literary critics and parliamentarians who are outraged by proletarian discipline. They demand discipline only for the great masses, but not for such enlightened beings as themselves. The defenders of proletarian discipline have always been the Marxists, and they have shown themselves to be dutiful students of their master.

Marx has not only theoretically shown the way in which the proletariat is most likely to achieve its high goal, he also made practical progress along this path. Through his work in the International he has become exemplary for all our practical activity.

Not only as a thinker, but also as a role model should we celebrate Marx, or rather, what is more, in his sense, study him. We draw no less wealth from the history of his personal effectiveness than from his theoretical discussions.
And he became exemplary in his work not only through his knowledge, his superior intellect, but also through his boldness, his tirelessness, which was paired with the greatest kindness and selflessness, and the most unshakable equanimity.

Whoever wants to learn of his boldness, read of his trial in Cologne on February 9, 1849, in which he was charged for his call to armed resistance and in which he explained the necessity of a new revolution. His goodness and selflessness is testified to by the active concern which he, even when living in the greatest misery, showed for his comrades, whom he always thought of rather than himself, after the collapse of the revolution of 1848, and after the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871. His whole life was finally an unbroken chain of tests which only a man whose tirelessness and unshakeability far exceeding the usual measure could have stood up to.

Beginning with his work in the Rheinische Zeitung (1842), he was rushed from country to country until the revolution of 1848 promised him the beginning of a victorious revolution. By its fall, he saw himself thrown back into political and personal misery, which seemed all the more hopeless, since in exile, on the one hand, bourgeois democracy boycotted him, and on the other hand, a part of the communists themselves fought him because he was not revolutionary enough for them, despite the fact that many of his faithful comrades were buried in Prussian fortresses for many years. Then finally came a glimmer of hope, the International, but after a few years it vanished again by the fall of the Paris Commune, soon followed by the dissolution of the International and inner turmoil. It had fulfilled its task brilliantly, but it was precisely because of this that the proletarian movements of the individual countries had become more independent. The more it grew, the more the International needed a more elastic form of organization that would give the individual national organizations more leeway. At the same time, however, when this became most necessary, the English trade union leaders who wanted to join the liberals felt constrained by the tendencies of class struggle, while in the romantic countries Bakuninist anarchism rebelled against the participation of the workers in politics, phenomena which urged the General Council of the International to exercise its centralist powers most sharply at the time when the federalism of the organization became more necessary than ever. It was this contradiction that failed the proud ship whose steering wheel Karl Marx had in his hands.

This became a bitter disappointment for Marx. Of course, then came the brilliant rise of German social democracy and the strengthening of the revolutionary movement in Russia. In turn, the Anti-Socialist Law put an end to this brilliant rise, and Russian terrorism also reached its peak in 1881. From then on it went rapidly downhill.

Thus, Marx’s political activity was an unbroken chain of failures and disappointments, and no less his scientific activity. His life’s work, Capital, for which he had great expectations, apparently remained unnoticed and ineffective. Even in his own party, it was little understood until the early eighties.

Marx died on the threshold of that time when the fruits of what he had sowed during the most furious storms and sunless, gloomy times would finally ripen. He died when the time came that the proletarian movement seized the whole of Europe and everywhere filled it with its spirit, placed itself on its foundations, and thus began a period of victorious growth of the proletariat; and this growth does so brilliantly stand out from the time when Marx fought for his ideas in the class as a lonely, little-understood, but much-hated fighter against a world of enemies.

As discouraging, indeed downright bleak, this situation would have become for any ordinary man, Marx never let it rob him of his cheerful equanimity, never of his proud confidence. He so surpassed his fellow men, so far overlooked them, that he saw clearly the land of promise which the great mass of his fellow men was not able to foresee. It was his scientific greatness, the depth of his theory from which he drew the best strength of his character, in which his steadfastness and his confidence were rooted, which kept him free from all fluctuations and attitudes, from that unsteady feeling of exuberance which rejoices sky-high today and tomorrow is saddened to death.

From this source we must also draw. Then we can be sure that, in the great and difficult struggles of our days, we will stand at the ready and develop the utmost strength of which we are capable. Then we may expect to reach our goal sooner than would otherwise be possible. The banner of the liberation of the proletariat, and thus of all mankind — which Marx has unfolded, which he carried forward for more than a lifetime, in a constant onslaught, never tiring, never despairing — will be victoriously planted on the ruins of the capitalist stronghold by the fighters he has taught.

 

Popular Radicalism in the 1930s: The Forgotten History of the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill

Chris Wright details the popular campaign for the Communist authored Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill, a moment in US labor history that is overshadowed by Roosevelt’s more conservative New Deal programs. 

Historiography on the Great Depression in the U.S. evinces a lacuna. Despite all the scholarship on political radicalism in this period, especially the activities of the Communist Party, one of the most remarkable manifestations of such radicalism has tended to be ignored: the bill that was introduced in Congress in 1934, ’35, and ’36, the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill (called the Workers’ Social Insurance Bill in its 1936 version). This bill, originally authored by the Communist Party, was noteworthy in two respects: it was both very radical and very popular. In brief, it provided unemployment insurance for workers and farmers (regardless of age, sex, race, or political affiliation) that was to be equal to average local wages but no less than $10 per week, plus $3 for each dependent; people compelled to work part-time (because of inability to find full-time jobs) were to receive the difference between their earnings and the average local full-time wages. Commissions directly elected by members of workers’ and farmers’ organizations were to administer the system; social insurance would be given to the sick and elderly, and maternity benefits would be paid eight weeks before and eight weeks after birth; and the system would be financed by unappropriated funds in the Treasury and by taxes on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporate incomes above $5,000 a year. In its 1936 form, it was particularly generous: it included insurance for widows, mothers, and the self-employed, appropriated $5 billion for the year 1936, established a Workers’ Social Insurance Commission to administer the system, and elaborated in much more detail than earlier iterations on how the system would be financed and managed. 

Despite, or rather because of, its radicalism, the Workers’ Bill attracted broad support across the country. To quote its advocates, by early 1935 it had been endorsed by “more than 2,400 locals [eventually about 3,500], and the regular conventions of five International and six State bodies of the American Federation of Labor; practically every known unemployed organization; thousands of railroad and other independent local and central bodies, fraternal lodges, veterans’, farmers’, Negro, youth, women’s and church groups…[and] municipal and county governmental bodies in seventy cities, towns and counties,” in addition to millions of individual citizens who signed postcards and petitions in support of it.1 All this support was not enough to get the bill passed in Congress, although in 1935 it was reported on favorably by the House Labor Committee. In fact, its provisions were so terrifying to the business class that it never had a chance of becoming law. What is interesting, however, is the momentum that developed behind it, despite what amounted to a virtual conspiracy of silence from the press and extreme hostility from conservative congressmen, business constituencies, and the Roosevelt administration.

Given the political and social significance of the Workers’ Bill, it is unclear why historians have largely ignored it. In a book called Voices of Protest (published in 1983), Alan Brinkley does not devote a single sentence to it. Neither does Robert McElvaine in his standard history, The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941 (1984). David Kennedy devotes half a sentence to it in volume one of his 2004 history of the Depression and World War II, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945. Likewise, neither Ira Katznelson nor Jefferson Cowie mention it in their recent popular books, respectively Fear Itself (2013) and The Great Exception (2016). One reason for the neglect may be that the mainstream press tended to ignore it at the time, instead giving far more attention to the less radical—but also, arguably, less popular—Townsend Plan, an emphasis that historians have followed. In any case, in this article, I intend to rectify the historiographical oversight by telling the story of the Workers’ Bill—from the perspective of the popular enthusiasm it inspired—and arguing for its importance.

The history of the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill (in its various forms) began in the summer of 1930, when the Communist Party proposed its first iteration—an incredible $25 per week to the unemployed and $5 for each dependent—and immediately proceeded to agitate on its behalf. The reception that the unemployed gave this campaign suggests, contrary to what historians have sometimes argued, that it did not take long at all for a large proportion of the Depression’s victims to reject the voluntarist ideology of the 1920s and the Hoover administration in favor of massive government intervention in society for the purpose of income redistribution. By late summer of 1930, in the very early stages of the Depression, the Daily Worker was already reporting mass petition signings and continual demonstrations for the bill in scores of cities.2

In these early months, much of the agitation for the proposed bill was being done by the Unemployed Councils. We should recall that the Councils were being organized already in January and February 1930 and that urban areas of the country were in ferment a mere three or four months after the stock market crash of October 1929. Almost every day the Daily Worker reported mass meetings and marches on city halls in cities from Buffalo to Chicago to Chattanooga and beyond, by the spring spreading even to the Deep South. In the next few years the mass protests, including hunger marches, “eviction riots,” collective thefts, bootlegging, relief demonstrations, occupation of legislative chambers, etc., would surge from coast to coast; “hardly a day passed,” the historian Albert Prago writes, “without some major demonstration taking place in some town, city, or state capital.” As historians such as Roy Rosenzweig and Randi Storch have argued, at the forefront of much of this turbulence were the Communist Unemployed Councils.3

Even in February and March 1930, before the CP had officially proposed the Workers’ Bill, enormous demonstrations in cities nationwide featured the demand for “Work or Wages,” meaning either give us work or give us relief at full wage-rates. This demand already anticipated the Workers’ Bill, and within months evolved into the even more radical provisions of that bill. As the Unemployed Councils grew in the early 1930s, so did awareness of and support for the Communist bill. 

The pace of actions died down a bit in the fall of 1930 but picked up again in December and January, in preparation for February 10, 1931, when 150 delegates elected from around the country were going to present the bill and its hundreds of thousands of signatures to Congress. Requests for signature lists flooded into the New York office of the National Campaign Committee for Unemployment Insurance from not only the large industrial centers but even towns and farms in the South and West, and Alaska. Metalworkers in Chicago Heights got involved in the campaign; railroad workers and section hands in Reno, Nevada signed petitions; letters like the following were sent to the Daily Worker:

Let me know what I can do to help carry forward the fight for unemployment insurance? This is the greatest need at this hour. I am the only reader of the Daily Worker here in Ashby, Minn., and am one of four Communist votes cast here in the elections. I am a woman of 60 years, living on land; I pass out all my Daily Workers to neighbors and am getting new subscribers. Will help all I can to get signatures for the bill.4

Countless united front conferences of workers’ organizations took place in cities around the country, for instance Gary, Indiana, where the keynote of one conference was sounded by an African-American steelworker and veteran of World War I who said, in part, “It’s no use going way over to France to fight. We can demand things here just as good as we can there, fight here just as good as there, and if need be, die here just as good as there… Let’s fight for ourselves, right here, now.” They fought in Charlotte, North Carolina; Ambridge, Pennsylvania; Wheeling, West Virginia; Minneapolis, Grand Rapids, and San Antonio; Hartford, Buffalo, and San Francisco. City hunger marches were so numerous in these months that the Daily Worker could not keep track of them. The Workers’ Bill, of course, was not the only or even the most pressing issue addressed by all these actions, but it did figure prominently among their demands. On the big day, February 10, demonstrations and state hunger marches occurred in at least 63 cities as the delegation in Washington, D.C. interrupted a session in the House and was forcibly ejected by police. In St. Paul, Minnesota, a certain type of action that was already becoming rather common: demonstrators broke through police lines around the state capitol and occupied the legislative chambers, announcing that they would not leave until the legislature had acted on their demands for relief and unemployment insurance.5

In short, arguably even before churches, charities, and benefit societies had conclusively demonstrated their inability to meet the economic crisis, well over a million people nationwide were demanding that the federal government become in effect a radically social democratic welfare state. In general, the statist orientation that Lizabeth Cohen discusses in Making a New Deal, which often was an extremely collectivist orientation (as embodied, e.g., in the Workers’ Bill), did not have to wait for Roosevelt and the New Deal to act as midwives, as Cohen and other historians seem to suggest. It emerged organically on the grassroots level, stimulated both by radical groups and by suffering people’s sense that society, with all its abundant resources possessed ultimately by the federal government, had to do something to end the epidemic of unjust suffering. Roosevelt and the New Deal were products of the country’s growing collectivism more than they were causes of it. And for many millions of Americans, they never went far enough.

Support for the Workers’ Bill grew during the next few years, with the help of continued demonstrations, petitions, postcard campaigns, and the efforts of radical unionists to enlist union members’ support. Hunger marchers in many states demanded that legislatures pass state versions of the bill. To take one example, Illinois saw at least four such marches to Springfield between 1931 and 1933, at the culmination of which a delegate delivered a speech before the legislature requesting enactment of the bill. The two national hunger marches Communists organized in December 1931 and 1932 gave publicity to the bill; on February 4, 1932, which the Communist Party had dubbed National Unemployment Insurance Day, hundreds of thousands of people around the country demonstrated for it. Petitions garnered thousands of signatures: in Chicago, for instance, during just three weeks in March 1932, over 30,000 people—in factories, AFL locals, public shelters, and neighborhoods—signed the bill, in preparation for May 2, when 200 workers “from all important industries from every section of America” were again going to present the petitions to Congress. Across the country, 1933 saw the organizing of numerous conferences of unemployed groups to coordinate the campaign for unemployment insurance and to prepare for the CP’s National Convention Against Unemployment in February 1934.6

Meanwhile, workers were waging their own battles in their unions, trying to get members, unions, and federations on record as supporting national unemployment insurance, preferably in the form of the Workers’ Bill. By late 1930, despite the opposition of the AFL (which was committed to the anti-government principle of voluntarism), many constituent organizations had called for legislation, including eight state federations of labor, the central labor bodies of nine cities, and the American Federation of Teachers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the ILGWU, the United Textile Workers, the United Hebrew Trades, and a number of other Internationals. Public pressure continued to mount in 1931, as 52 bills for unemployment insurance were introduced (unsuccessfully) in state legislatures. But at the 1931 AFL convention, the leadership was still able to smother the growing demand that the Federation change its voluntarist position. A rank-and-file movement, therefore, was organized in January 1932, when Carpenters Local 2717 in New York City called a conference of AFL unions. Representatives of 19 locals passed a resolution to appoint a committee—the AFL Trade Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance and Relief (AFLTU Committee)—that would gauge sentiment and build support among unions for the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill. In part because of its activities—and despite its being viciously persecuted by the national office as Communist—by the spring of 1934 over 2,000 locals and many central bodies had joined in its endorsement of the Communist-authored bill that Representative Ernest Lundeen had just introduced in Congress.7

The head of the AFLTU Committee was Louis Weinstock, a Communist member of the Painters’ Union in New York City. To advocate for the Workers’ Bill, which became the Lundeen Bill in 1934, he conducted a national tour that year, in each city contacting unionists who helped him organize meetings that hundreds of workers attended. Some cities had their own local AFL Committee for Unemployment Insurance, while in others Weinstock helped create one (or several). In reports to the Communist Party, he made some telling observations about the left-wing militancy of the local unions he encountered, as contrasted with the conservatism of the Internationals to which they belonged. For example, while some locals insisted that unemployed members should be able to remain in good standing even if they could not pay dues, Internationals were more likely to want to purge their out-of-work members. In many cities, building trades unions followed the practice of the Unemployed Councils in electing small relief committees to take members to a charity office and demand more relief. They often even united with the Councils in these activities, a tendency that, from the perspective of higher union officials, was growing to “alarming proportions” all over the country. Internationals, on the other hand, usually followed the conservative AFL line in its absolute rejection of cooperation with Communists, to the point that members who participated in Unemployed Council demonstrations risked being expelled from the union. In a case in Minneapolis, for instance, a local refused to accept the decision of its International that one of its members be expelled for having taken part in a Communist demonstration. The International replied that unless the union expelled her, it would have its charter revoked.8

But already by 1932, sentiment in favor of unemployment insurance had swept the large majority of rank-and-file unionists, in addition, of course, to the long-term unemployed whether unionized or not. Members were radicalizing, growing friendlier with Communists in their disgust at the inaction of union leaders. To quote Mauritz Hallgren, a keen observer of the labor movement,

although in the early years of the crisis they had tended to drift away from the unions, [jobless members] were in 1932 taking an increasingly active part in union affairs. The fear was expressed that in some organizations the unemployed might even come into control of the bureaucratic machinery. That they exercised a tremendous influence over local unions and city and state central bodies was seen from the avalanche of radical demands that poured in upon the quarterly meeting of the Federation’s executive council at Atlantic City in July [1932]. The rank-and-file workers, whether unemployed or not, were no longer to be put off with windy promises of action…9

After the powerful United Mine Workers endorsed the principle of government action at its convention in early 1932—which followed endorsements in 1931 by the Teamsters, the International Association of Machinists, the Molders’ Union, and many others—the AFL’s executive council saw the writing on the wall. It could prevaricate and postpone no longer; it had to accept, and propose at the next national convention, a version of compulsory unemployment insurance, thereby accepting the idea of government “interference” in the affairs of organized labor. But it certainly did not endorse the Workers’ Bill, or even the principle of federal action; instead, at the 1932 convention in November, the executive council recommended that the AFL endorse the idea of state unemployment insurance. Many of the delegates present considered this proposal too conservative, but nevertheless the convention approved it by an “overwhelming margin.” Not content with this victory, the AFLTU Committee continued its activism in the following years.10

As stated a moment ago, the growing support for the Workers’ Bill finally managed to get it introduced in Congress in early 1934, when Ernest Lundeen of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party sponsored it in the House (as H.R. 7598). While it fared even worse in this session of Congress than it was to fare in 1935, its presence at the federal level increased the momentum of its popularity among the working class. In Chicago, for example, leaders of the conservative local Federation of Labor began to have less success than in previous years preventing unions from endorsing it, as locals of the Railway Conductors, Railway Clerks, Machinists, Painters, Metal Polishers, School Custodians, Women’s Upholsterers, Granite Cutters, Millinery Workers, and many other unions sent delegates to a Communist-sponsored unemployment insurance conference in the summer of 1934. In July, representatives of 43,000 workers who were organized in fraternal and benevolent societies (specifically, in the Federation of Fraternal Organizations in Struggle for Unemployment Insurance) attended a hearing before the Chicago City Council to demand that that body support the bill; committees also visited aldermen in their wards to demand the same. In September, at another conference in Chicago, delegates from the National Unemployed Leagues, the Illinois Workers Alliance, the Eastern Federation of Unemployed and Emergency Workers Union, the Wisconsin Federation of Unemployed Leagues, and the Fort Wayne Unemployed League—in the aggregate claiming a membership of 750,000—endorsed the measure. Similar conferences occurred in other regions of the country.11 

In January 1934, another organization had been founded that was to play an important role in lending academic respectability to the bill: the Inter-Professional Association for Social Insurance (IPA). While not officially affiliated with the Communist Party, it had close ties to leading Party members and coordinated its campaign for passage of the Lundeen Bill with organizations of the Left. Within a year it had dozens of chapters and organizing committees around the country, made up of both individual professionals and representatives of groups—nurses, physicians, actors, teachers, engineers, architects, authors, etc. The distinguished social worker Mary Van Kleeck of the Russell Sage Foundation led an army of her colleagues in supporting the bill and, in some cases, proselytizing for it in the press and before Congress. Economists and lawyers associated with the IPA testified to the economic soundness and constitutionality of the measure, especially in 1935, when Lundeen reintroduced it as H.R. 2827. Left-wing professionals considered it vastly superior to the Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934 and 1935—what became the Social Security Act—a professor at Smith College, for example, damning the latter as “a proposal to set up little privileged groups in the sea of misery who would be content to sit on their small islands and watch the others drown.” The Lundeen Bill (or Workers’ Bill) was certainly not without flaws, including its vagueness and, arguably, the financial burden it would impose on the country, but evidently, its Communist-style radicalism was so appreciated that even experts in their field were willing to overlook its defects.12 

Significantly, it was in fact far more extensive than the Soviet Union’s measures for unemployment and social insurance. While the Lundeen Bill provided (among other things) for unemployment benefits for an unlimited period of time equal to 100 percent of wages—or much more, since an unskilled laborer with a wife and four children who might be lucky to get $16 a week would get $25 if unemployed!13—in Soviet Russia only about 35 percent of the customary wage was paid, and that for a limited time. Moreover, the various forms of insurance that H.R. 2827 would establish (unemployment, old age, maternity, disability, and industrial injury) were to be administered by councils of workers and their representatives, thus embodying a “workers’ democracy” that the Soviet system only lived up to on paper. In effect, then, the millions of Americans who advocated the measure desired a system that was, in some respects, more authentically communist/socialist than the Soviet one.14

A few days after Lundeen reintroduced his bill on January 3, 1935, the National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance was held in Washington, D.C., at the Washington Auditorium. Organized by the CP and its many allies, the congress comprised almost 3,000 delegates who had come by truck, jalopy, rail, box car, and on foot from every region of the country and forty states. To quote one historian, “cowboys from Colorado and Wyoming, black sharecroppers from Alabama, Texas oil hands, Florida housewives, skilled and unskilled workers, employed and unemployed” in the dead of winter made the pilgrimage to the nation’s seat of power, guided by visions of an egalitarian society, conscious that in their aggregate they directly represented millions and indirectly represented well over half the country. Unions of all types—professional, AFL-affiliated, independent; fraternal organizations and political groups; farm organizations and shop delegates; women’s groups, church groups, veterans’ groups, and unemployed groups—hundreds of such organizations, in an anticipation of the Popular Front, managed to overcome the congenital sectarianism of the Left and call as one for unprecedented social democracy. A few of the scores of lesser-known unemployed groups that were represented included the Chinese Unemployed Alliance, the Farmer Labor Union, the Italian Unemployed Groups, the Relief Workers League, the United Mine Workers Unemployment Council, the Workers Union of the World, the Right-To-Live Club, and the Dancers Emergency Association. The National Urban League, which endorsed the bill, also sent delegates.15

The legendary socialist and feminist Mother Bloor, who addressed the congress, pithily summed up its significance to a reporter from the Washington Post: “‘The congress is a success. It’s proved a big crowd of people can break down barriers of race, social position, political opinions, and convictions for a common cause. Why, there are white people and yellow people and black people out there.’ She nodded toward the mass meeting going on in the auditorium. ‘There are Communists and Socialists and Republicans. There’s even some Democrats.’” At the Congressional hearings on H.R. 2827, the chairman of the congress stated, not implausibly, that it had “formed the broadest and most representative congress of the American people ever held in the United States.”16

The Congressional hearings themselves were noteworthy. While the executive secretary of the IPA may have exaggerated when he wrote, “The record of the hearings on H.R. 2827 is one of the most challenging ever placed before the Congress of the United States and probably the most unique document ever to appear in the Congressional Record,” that judgment is understandable. Eighty witnesses testified: industrial workers, farmers, veterans, professional workers, African-Americans, women, the foreign-born, and youth. “Probably never in American history,” an editor of the Nation wrote, “have the underprivileged had a better opportunity to present their case before Congress.” The aggregate of the testimonies amounted to a systematic indictment of American capitalism and the New Deal, and an impassioned defense of the radical alternative under consideration. Witness after witness described the harrowing suffering that they and the thousands they represented (in each case) were enduring, and condemned the Wagner-Lewis bill as a sham. From the representative of the American Youth Congress, which encompassed over two million people, to the representative of the United Council of Working-Class Women, which had 10,000 members, each testimony fleshed out the eminently “class-conscious” point of view of the people back home who had “gather[ed] up nickels and pennies which they [could] poorly spare” in order to send someone to plead their case before Congress. Most of the Congressmen on the Labor subcommittee they were addressing were strikingly sympathetic.17

For example, when Herbert Benjamin, one of the leaders of the CP, had this to say on press coverage (or the lack thereof) of the Lundeen Bill—

So much has been said in the last few weeks about the Townsend plan [for old-age pensions]. I have discussed this question with a number of Members [of Congress], and they tell me that, outside of California, they received not a single postcard on the Townsend plan, but they received thousands of cards from all over the United States on the Lundeen Bill, asking for the enactment of this bill. Yet the newspapers, by reason of the fact that they really fear this measure and do not fear the Townsend plan, knowing that the Townsend plan can be a very good red herring to draw attention away from social insurance, have given publicity to the Townsend plan, and have yet avoided very studiously any attention to the workers’ unemployment and social-insurance measure—

the chairman of the subcommittee, Matthew Dunn, interrupted to say,

I want to substantiate the statement you just made about the Townsend bill and about this bill. Now, I represent the Thirty-fourth District in Pennsylvania, which is a very large district. May I say that I do not believe I have received over a half dozen letters to support the Townsend bill; however, I have received quite a number of letters and cards from the State of California. In addition to that, I have received many letters and cards from all over the country asking me to give my utmost support in behalf of the Lundeen bill, H.R. 2827.18

Incidentally, Benjamin’s complaint about press coverage was justified. Overwhelming press attention was devoted to the much less radical—and less economically sound—Townsend Plan, while virtually no coverage was granted the Lundeen Bill except during and after the subcommittee’s hearings, and even then it was mostly local papers that covered it. According to the executive secretary of the IPA, “forty-three news releases to all the news agencies and newspapers of the major cities during the course of two weeks [i.e., during the hearings] were, with few exceptions, suppressed, although in those outlying districts where organization has made the demands of the workers more articulate, some papers carried workers’ testimony as front page news.”19 As mentioned earlier, historians have followed newspapers’ lead by tending to ignore the Lundeen Bill and focus on the Townsend Plan, in some cases condescendingly interpreting the popularity of the latter’s provisions as evidence of the credulousness and simple-mindedness of the American public.20 This emphasis is unfortunate in that (1) it was the press that was significantly responsible for propagating the Townsend Plan (presumably to divert attention from the Lundeen Bill), and (2) the supposedly simple-minded public had the organizational sophistication and political savvy to build momentum behind a more reasonable bill premised on both the reality and the valorization of class conflict, not only without help from the press but despite active hostility from nearly all sectors of power—the press, the AFL, the Roosevelt administration, reactionary Southern landowners and politicians, and big business in general. Under such conditions, for example, organizers’ ability to get over five million signatures on their petitions was no mean achievement.21

Admittedly, compared to the number of signatures they likely could have collected had they possessed more resources, five million is not terribly impressive. In the spring of 1935, the New York Post conducted a poll of its readers after printing the contents of the Lundeen, the Townsend, and the Wagner-Lewis bills. Out of 1,391 votes cast, 1,209 readers supported the first, 157 the second, 14 the third, and 7 none of them. Of the 1,073 respondents who were employed, 957 supported the Lundeen Bill, 100 the Townsend Bill, 7 the Wagner-Lewis Bill, and 5 none. It would not be outlandish to infer from these findings that, had they known of the contents of the bills, a majority of working-class (and perhaps even many middle-class) Americans would have preferred Lundeen’s Communist-written one. This is also suggested by the enormous number of letters congressmen received on the measure, such as this one sent to Lundeen:

The reason I am writing you is that we Farmers [and] Industrial workers feel that you are the only Congressman and Representative that is working for our interest. We have analyzed the Wagner-Lewis Bill [and] also [the] Townsend Bill. But the Lundeen H.R. (2827) is the only bill that means anything for our class… The people all over the country are [waking] up to the facts that the two old Political Parties are owned soul, mind [and] body by the Capitalist Class.22

Feeling the pressure of this mass support, both the subcommittee and the House Labor Committee voted in favor of H.R. 2827 that spring, making it the first unemployment insurance plan in U.S. history to be recommended by a committee. It had no chance in the House, though. The Rules Committee refused to send it to the floor, although it allowed Lundeen to propose it as an amendment to the Social Security Bill (as a substitute for the unemployment insurance provisions in that bill). It was defeated in April by a vote of 204 to 52.23

As far as its advocates were concerned, the fight was not over. Throughout the spring and summer of 1935, the flood of endorsements did not stop. The first national convention of rank-and-file social workers endorsed it in February; the Progressive Miners of America followed, along with scores of local unions and such ethnic societies as the Italian-American Democratic Organization of New York (with 235,000 members) and the Slovak-American Political Federation of Youngstown, Ohio. Virtually identical state versions of H.R. 2827 were, or already had been, introduced in the legislatures of California, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and other states. Conferences of unions and fraternal organizations were called in a number of states, including the Deep South, to plan further campaigns for the Workers’ Bill. That year’s May Day was one of the largest in American history, “monster demonstrations” (to quote the New York Times) of tens of thousands taking place in New York City, for example; and in many cities, included among the marchers were united fronts of church groups, workers clubs, fraternal lodges, and Communist and Socialist groups parading under banners demanding the passage of H.R. 2827. While the majority of AFL unions never endorsed the bill, perhaps because William Green and the executive council were exerting intense pressure on them not to do so, it is probable that most of the rank and file supported it.24 

In January 1936, Ernest Lundeen and Republican Senator of North Dakota Lynn Frazier introduced in their respective houses of Congress a more sophisticated version of the bill, which the Inter-Professional Association had written. Again it was endorsed by unions, labor councils, and other institutions, including the 1936 convention of the EPIC movement in California. The National Joint Action Committee for Genuine Social Insurance, which had grown out of the 1935 Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, coordinated a nationwide campaign. In New York, “flying squads” from the Fraternal Federation for Social Insurance visited lodges and fraternal organizations throughout the city (e.g., Knights of Pythias, Woodmen of the World, Workmen’s Circle, etc.) to secure their support. In Philadelphia, Baltimore, and several other cities, united-front conferences and committees were organized to campaign for the bill. The hearings before the Senate Labor Committee in April resembled the hearings on H.R. 2827, with academics, social workers, unionists, and farmers testifying as to the inadequacy of the recently passed Social Security Act and the necessity of the Frazier-Lundeen Bill. A representative of the National Committee on Rural Social Planning spoke for millions of agricultural workers, sharecroppers, tenants, and small owners when he opined that this bill was “the only one which is likely to check the fascist terror now riding the fields” in the South (directed against the Southern Tenant Farmers Union).25

The fascist terror continued unchecked, however, for the bill did not even make it out of committee. After its dismal fate in 1936, it was never introduced again.

From a certain perspective, one might say that the Workers’ Bill, in its radicalism and collectivism, departed from traditions of “Americanism,” whatever that word is taken to mean. From another perspective, however, we might see the bill as something like the apotheosis of radical collectivist strains that for many decades had been embedded in American popular culture. The class solidarity it embodied in its frontal attack on fundamental institutions of capitalism—private appropriation of wealth, determination of wages by the market, maintenance of an insecure army of the unemployed—has perhaps just as much claim to the title of “Americanism” as anything else, for U.S history abounds with the solidarity of the wealthy and the solidarity of the poor. It so happens that with regard to the Workers’ Bill, as on so many other occasions, the solidarity of the wealthy triumphed—because, as always, of the greater resources at the disposal of the wealthy.

In any event, it should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the Workers’ Bill deserves more attention from historians than it has received, not only as an intrinsically interesting phenomenon but also because its popularity suggests that “ordinary Americans” in the Depression years were a good deal more radical than historiography has tended to assume. If a significant proportion of Americans favored the Workers’ Bill, to that extent they must have been quite dissatisfied by the comparative conservatism of the Roosevelt administration. 

On one hand, there is much truth to Jefferson Cowie’s argument, for example, in The Great Exception, that the comparative radicalism of the New Deal moment in American political history was a result of very specific and contingent circumstances, such as the damming of the flood of immigration to the U.S. in the early 1920s. Whether people would have expressed so much support for the explicitly class-conscious Workers’ Bill in the absence of these circumstances is an open question. It is quite possible that the “labor aristocracy” of white men in particular would have shunned such a bill in the 1920s or earlier, given its premise of cross-racial and cross-ethnic class solidarity. Nor is it very likely that by the late 1940s, in a political environment of increasing conservatism, an ever-more-economically-secure working class would have expressed the same enthusiasm for the Lundeen Bill that it did during the 1930s, when radical horizons opened up and a new world briefly seemed possible.

On the other hand, I can detect no significant differences in support for the bill between races, genders, or regions of the country: women and men, white and Black, industrial worker and sharecropper, Northerner and Southerner signed petitions, attended rallies, and organized meetings to advocate for a legislative measure they saw as a final guarantee of economic security. Its promise to radically disrupt the American political economy was no bar to their advocacy; indeed, it is more apt to say that such disruption is precisely what attracted them to the measure.

The near-universality of working-class support is suggested by an unusual incident in March 1936, which may serve as a coda to the story of the Workers’ Bill. In order to advertise its liberal position on freedom of speech, CBS invited Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, to speak for fifteen minutes (at 10:45 p.m.) on a national radio broadcast, with the understanding that he would be answered the following night by zealous anti-Communist Congressman Hamilton Fish. Browder seized the opportunity for a national spotlight and appealed to “the majority of the toiling people” to establish a national Farmer-Labor Party that would be affiliated with the Communist Party, though it “would not yet take up the full program of socialism, for which many are not yet prepared.” He even declared that Communists’ ultimate aim was to remake the U.S. “along the lines of the highly successful Soviet Union”: once they had the support of a majority of Americans, he said, “we will put that program into effect with the same firmness, the same determination, with which Washington and the founding fathers carried through the revolution that established our country, with the same thoroughness with which Lincoln abolished chattel slavery.”26

Reactions to Browder’s talk were revealing: according to both CBS and the Daily Worker, they were almost uniformly positive. CBS immediately received several hundred responses praising Browder’s talk, and the Daily Worker, whose New York address Browder had mentioned on the air, received thousands of letters. The following are representative:

Chattanooga, Tennessee: “If you could have listened to the people I know who listened to you, you would have learned that your speech did much to make them realize the importance of forming a Farmer-Labor Party. I am sure that the 15 minutes into which you put so much that is vitally important to the American people was time used to great advantage. Many people are thanking you, I know.”

Evanston, Illinois: “Just listened to your speech tonight and I think it was the truest talk I ever heard on the radio. Mr. Browder, would it not be a good thing if you would have an opportunity to talk to the people of the U.S.A. at least once a week, for 30 to 60 minutes? Let’s hear from you some more, Mr. Browder.”

Springfield, Pennsylvania: “I listened to your most interesting speech recently on the radio. I would be much pleased to receive your articles on Communism. Although I am an American Legion member I believe you are at least sincere in your teachings.”

Bricelyn, Minnesota: “Your speech came in fine and it was music to the ears of another unemployed for four years. Please send me full and complete data on your movement and send a few extra copies if you will, as I have some very interested friends—plenty of them eager to join up, as is yours truly.”

Harrold, South Dakota: “Thank you for the fine talk over the air tonight. It was good common sense and we were glad you had a chance to talk over the air and glad to hear someone who had nerve enough to speak against capitalism.”

Sparkes, Nebraska: “Would you send me 50 copies of your speech over the radio last night? I would like to give them to some of my neighbors who are all farmers.”

Arena, New York: “Although I am a young Republican (but good American citizen) I enjoyed listening to your radio speech last evening. I believe you told the truth in a convincing manner and I failed to see where you said anything dangerous to the welfare of the American people.”

Julesburg, Colorado: “Heard your talk… It was great. Would like a copy of same, also other dope on your party. It is due time we take a hand in things or there will be no United States left in a few more years. Will be looking forward for this dope and also your address.”27

In general, the main themes of the letters were questions like, “Where can I learn more about the Communist Party?”, “How can I join your Party?”, and “Where is your nearest headquarters?” Some people sent money in the hope that it would facilitate more broadcasts. The editors of the Daily Worker plaintively asked their readers, “Isn’t it time we overhauled our old horse-and-buggy methods of recruiting? While we are recruiting by ones and twos, aren’t we overlooking hundreds?” One can only imagine how many millions of people in far-flung regions would have flocked to the Communist banner had Browder and William Z. Foster been permitted the national radio audience that Huey Long and the wildly popular “radio priest” Father Coughlin were. 

But such is the history of workers and the unemployed in the U.S.: elite efforts to suppress the political agenda and the voices of the downtrodden have all too often succeeded, thereby wiping out the memory of popular struggles. Indeed, to the extent that anti-statism and “individualism” have reigned in American political culture (as Cowie, among many others, emphasizes), it is largely because opposing tendencies and traditions have been actively suppressed, even violently crushed. But if we can resurrect such stories as that of the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill, they may prove of use in our own time of troubles, as new struggles against political oppression are born.

Justice of the Inca by Tristan Marof

Translation and Introduction by Renato Flores.

Tristan Marof was the pseudonym of Bolivian revolutionary Gustavo Adolfo Navarro. Navarro was born in Sucre in 1898. He took an early interest in politics: in 1920 he joined the socialist wing of the broad-tent “Partido Republicano” (PR) that was composed of republicans and socialists who were opposed to the ruling liberals. The PR would come to power following a coup d’etat in the same year of 1920, and as a reward for his services during the coup, Navarro obtained a job as French consul and moved across the ocean. During his stay in France, he would become more radicalized, and produced the two influential oeuvres he is best known for: El Ingenuo Continente and his shorter La Justicia del Inca, to which the fragments translated below pertain. In both of these works, he makes the case for an explicitly American communism, which was based on the traditional indigenous practices of that continent, especially that of the Inca. 

These works lay out a program for a socialist transition that would bypass the capitalist stage, opposing the dominant conception at the time. Marof realized that any attempt to build capitalism in Bolivia would entail the building of a neo-colonial economy, and would end up with Bolivians forever chained to US capital. He proposed that socialism could be built directly, by nationalizing the Bolivian mines and by returning the land to the existing Indian communities, hence his slogan “Las minas al Estado y la Tierra al pueblo”. In the fragments below, Marof claims that there is no land more fertile than America, and within it no country better than Bolivia to proceed to communism, due to the existing Incaic culture. Indeed, the Incas are believed to have a tightly and centrally planned state that redistributed resources across its empire through a palace economy and leveraged collective work through institutions such as the mita. While Marof may over-romanticize the past, it is clear that the palatial economy of the Incas provided much more welfare to the people of the Tawantisuyu than the post-Colombian period ever would. As Steve Stern details in Peru’s Indian People and the Challenge of the Spanish Conquest, the new European arrivants would corrupt the system, and force the inhabitants to work to death in the mines, forever destroying this paradise. Indeed, between the fragments below we can find the repented confession of a Spaniard who realized they had corrupted excellent people.  

Just after the 1920 coup, the PR would split into its more moderate “authentic” and more radical “socialist” factions. These were not radical enough for Marof, and on his return to his homeland he would found a new party of explicitly Marxist socialism. The late 1920s had brought a turn to the right of the government, and Marof, about to be elected to parliament, would be exiled after an accusation of plotting to install communism. His exile through Latin America would lead him to constant strife with fellow communists, especially over the nature of the post-revolutionary Mexican state, and over Trotsky’s exile. A particular figure of importance that Marof would meet and share ideas with was Mariategui. Indeed, it is said that the Mariategui’s ideas of indigenism originated, or at least were very shaped, by his meeting with Marof, as La Justicia del Inca is prior to Mariátegui’s seminal Siete Ensayos, even if it cannot be denied that Mariategui took a way deeper study of his own present conditions. During his exile, Marof would found the “Tupac Amaru ” group, with an express focus on Marxism and Pacifism against the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. Tupac Amaru would then later merge with other forces into the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR). This is hardly surprising, as Marof’s ideas rhymed well with the Trotskyist opposition to the crude stageism espoused by the “Official” Commmunist Party tied to the Comintern. 

The POR would play a large role in the Bolivian revolutionary period between the 1954 Bolivian revolution and the 1964 coup by Barrientos that put an end to it. This period was an extremely radical transformation that is even more forgotten than the Mexican revolutionary period of 1910-20 and merits an essay of its own. During this period, Marof slowly blends out of history, producing mainly scholarly work and taking a second line seat to other more protagonists like Guillermo Lora and Juan Lechin. He eventually passed away in 1967. 

The fragments we translate below compromise three parts of a longer work. They show not only his commitment to an indigeneous (and sometimes overromantized) strain of communism, but also the seriousness of his political thought. He understood what it took others to find out: that neo-colonial countries need not start up a capitalism of their own because they would never be able to break out of dependency. Marof also discusses the role of planning in the Incaic palatial economy, how surplus should be allocated, and dissects the concepts and duties of freedom for those living in a communist society. In the wake of another radical period of Bolivian society where indigeneity is taking a front role, we present the text below to bring attention to a thinker that is almost unknown. His ideas written down almost a hundred years ago influenced many, and prefigure debates on communist freedom and communist virtue which are still important today. 

Marof (bottom row, second from the right) poses with José Carlos Mariátegui (left of Marof) in Lima, 1928.

Ama Sua Ama Llulla Ama Kella1

During the period of Inca domination, the people of what is today called Bolivia undoubtedly enjoyed greater benefits than what the republican regime gives them today. In that happy and distant time, politics was not known, and consequently there were no personalistic and bloodthirsty factions that destroyed each other. Life was calm, simple, laborious, and it went on singing eclogues with no other aspiration than that of the happiness of the community through labor.

The Incas – great statesmen whose wisdom to govern peoples has never been sufficiently praised and has instead been forgotten with a regrettable injustice both by the Spaniards and by the children of Spaniards – ruled their people in such a way that every inhabitant had his life and his future assured. It is after the arrival of the conquerors and during the long years of colonialism and of those named republicans, that the inhabitants became involved in a series of problems and concerns that until today cannot be solved, and which will only be solved the day that we return to the land and give each inhabitant their economic independence. That is, together with giving land, we give them the idea of ​​organized and community labor.

Without a doubt, a people cannot be formed without first establishing the material bases on which the other branches of society must float. To have willed making a simple and hardworking people who did not know the value of money, – and who until today do not give it their full appreciation, – who ignore individualistic gestures, which represent a special race that is accustomed to these exercises for centuries, I say, to have wanted to make this Indian people of America into Europeans, and to have given them all the habits of Europeans, has been the great mistake of politicians for a hundred years.

The civilization of the Incas, which understood the race and psychology of its inhabitants, did not hand over the organization to the whim of an individual, nor did it allow the disruption of the system. Judicious and authoritative organizers were in charge of regulating everything. From the time an individual was born, his bread and his future were assured. People of conscience made each inhabitant know their duties by gently accustoming them to honest and simple labor. These organizers, who were not individualists, had a passion and interest for the whole which is not seen or equaled to this day.

This civilization was in fact not only far-sighted but was also fraternal and had high moral standards. Its code is simple and eloquent. With three words the whole gospel has already been said. Any modern society should be proud to own it. When they said: “ama llulla, ama sua, ama kella”, they meant it and they practiced it.

A civilization that did not make literature about morality and that punished the lazy, the dishonest and the thieves with severe penalties is a surprising example in history. The spirit marvels to know that everything could be excused to a man except him being lazy. The ancients said all other vices spring from laziness and they were right. This is why the Incas recommended to their governors that they always keep their subjects busy with useful work for the benefit of the spirit and the body. You have to admire them without reservation in this. They legislated and organized labor in such a way that in their Empire neither misery nor the pain of hunger was known. Nor did they neglect the health of the soul, because if historians paint the Incas as tough, fair, and impassive, they were also describing them as poets. The Empire was permeated with poetry and art. When you talk to a Quichua, they dramatize everything, and even work is a romantic note for them. Their sweetness and affability are proverbial.

When we remember in this present time that it was just a few centuries away, or that large silhouettes are evoked by living chronicles in silver nights, the hand unintentionally approaches the visor, the imagination is elevated and a deep respect piously takes hold of us. It is necessary to return to the source, and to convince our conscience that the happiness of our people is found on this land just one step away from us. Let us organize the last descendants of the Inca, let us return to the fraternity, give each inhabitant land and bread, and make fun of all the democratic charlatans of the globe. 

The Communist Idea

The honestly communist idea is not new in America. Centuries ago, the Incas practiced it with the best of success and formed a happy people that swam in abundance. The laws that existed were rigid, severe, and just. No one could complain of misery without unjustly sinning. Everything was wonderfully planned and financially regulated. The good years served as reserves for the bad ones. The harvest was scrupulously distributed and the Inca state revolved around a system of harmony.

Mr. Rouma in his interesting work, “L’Empire des Incas”, observes that, far from diminishing the rigidity of the system over time, it strengthened and acquired new vigor. And is that no member of the community lived discontent. They all ate freely and were happy. Crime was unknown, and a tutelary shadow of refined honesty hung over the empire. There was only one misdemeanor: laziness.

The Incas wanted to realize their ideal throughout America and they would have done so without the disputes of Huáscar and Atahuallpa, and the arrival of the Spanish. Already their famous empire before the conquest extended to near what is now Colombia and to the south and east, it crossed the provinces of Santiago del Estero, Córdoba and Tucuman.

These magnificent Incas, so wise and meticulous about the general welfare, truly constitute the only civilization that America has known, and it is never possible to equal them in virtue and prudence. Today, four centuries after them, and in the middle of the Republican period, we find ourselves disoriented and stagnant. But this does not mean that another more vigorous and modern communism cannot sprout from the ruins of the Empire and revive the ashes of the old Quichuas, because neither the wind nor the conquest with all its cruelties have been able to extinguish them or to destroy the most sober and intelligent race of America.

When one reads the chronicles of those fantastic times, one is amazed that the human species had reached such an advanced degree of economic and moral perfection. Without wanting to, enthusiasm sprouts and the hands tremble along with the heart. They were not brutal warlords, nor did they breed disorder and adventure. Prudent and thoughtful they were interested before the little glory or the plume that puffs up the luck of all. Optimistic philosophers only believed in the earth and loved it dearly, while their thoughts went to the methodical organization of a group, of a hundred, of the last of the community. Practical men knew that man lives on bread before anything else, and their efforts were to solve this problem that was not difficult in a fertile and lavish land like a mother. The rest, the ideas of art, astronomy, poetry, etc. They sprang from the sweetness of the race and the magnificence of nature. And those who made poetry and art were solid and capable heads whose natural and advantageous inclination was maintained by the State.

All the Inca aspiration, both for prestige and for good government, strives to give the State all its potency. In a simplistic time, that sovereign State was constituted by the Inca. The state was the owner of the land, animals, pastures, gold, silver, precious stones. The Inca jealously distributes all these products, and guarantees the economic existence of the Empire, managing it by means of rigorous accounting. Everything comes to his knowledge. He knows how many inhabitants a region has, how many are born in a year, how many have died. A special caste of functionaries brings him up to date with the most minute details.

The historian does not have much to tell about the Incas’ warrior deeds, but instead of the great acts of administration. Their very conquests have no other purpose than to spread the economic well-being among the barbarian tribes. Their captains wage war without the idea of ​​robbery and pillage. The act of conquest is secondary. When they wage war they organize the loser instead of taking advantage. Nor do they subjugate and enslave him. They forgive the prisoners and dress them all at the Inca’s expense. They let the conquered peoples be governed by their former captains while hinting at Inca methods. The historian Luis Paz tells us, in his history of Upper Peru, that when the Incas conquered the Araucanians, after much bloody and hard fighting, they found them in such a state of misery and barbarism that the Inca could not contain himself from crying. The inhabitants could not but count to ten, they lived naked and they supported themselves by hunting and fishing. The Inca immediately ordered that the prisoners be given clothing and the people instructed in agriculture. As it is understood, this way of governing surrounded them with great admiration throughout the continent, which in practice was translated into the adherence to the Empire of vast settlements. For their part, the Incas developed a very skillful policy that earned them sympathy. They did not go against the religious sentiments of the subject or adhering tribes. On the contrary, they honored them. In Cuzco, the capital of the Empire, pompous tribute was paid to all religions. This example of wisdom and kindness immediately contributed to the fusion of all peoples. In the long run, the only thought would be that of the dominant religion of the Sun, and the Inca mold did nothing more than translating the triumph of communist politics.

Their discipline was so solid and so unshakable that the Spaniards, not being able to destroy it, took advantage of it, but not with an altruistic purpose like that of the Incas but with that of favoring their greed and their insatiable appetite for gold. That is why the Empire fell, the jealous centurions (ilacatas) were replaced by new men who from the beginning abused all privileges. Instead of the simple priests of the sun, the old cross that was already discredited and inglorious in the West was imposed by blood and fire on the altars. But even today the spirit of the Quichua through the centuries remains standing. The Republic, with all its lyricism and its proclamations, has not conquered their heart. And in short, this republic is nothing but the happy creation of some doctors for whom twenty percent of the population is killed by the knife on the day of an electoral farce. The original race remains inexorable and far from the supposed democratic conquests, waiting for the return of its old formulas and its great morality destroyed by the lust of the conquerors.2 But wanting to implant communism in the Inca form is still a bitter dream at the present time. Times have changed, Western civilization with its inventions, its machines, its greed and its sordidness, although we refuse to believe, also lives among us. On the other hand, democracy, although falsely interpreted, separates us from the road. Owners of republican life are in fact the petty-bourgeoisie – natural enemies of the indigenous – who made the liberating revolution and fortunately followed Bolívar. But for this caste, any economic reform in the sense of equalizing the social and economic conditions of the indigenous native would be a contradiction in terms. And the truth is that the indigenous people have the right to this reform because they constitute in certain republics of America up to eighty percent of the population, they work hard and yet they live in slavery and misery. This is why heroic remedies are imposed.

As long as there are fierce semi-enlightened governments that, in short, think that economic freedom is reduced to lyrical discourse and the opportune madrigal, theoretical and material demagogues, who have solved the problem of the republic by taking the most succulent slices for themselves, this matter is lost. From when Castell came with an Argentine expedition, until today, a sentimental cry is being made for the equality and education of the Indian. President Morales, self-titled protector of the indigenous class, and other presidents, have had the naivety or the bad faith to try to improve their sad condition with decrees that are either not fulfilled, or that are impossible due to the poverty of the national treasury. So what must be done is to discard the political phenomenon and abandon it to the bourgeoisie. What does a plebiscite matter to the indigenous people! The proletarian class must simply demand its economic equality. Everything that is done in this regard is honest and fair. The American continent is the continent made for socialism, where it must bear its best fruits. The land, the environment, the common origin, the lack of lineage and fatal prejudices, predict it. Here they came to our land, naked Europeans without shoes, to eat our bread. Everyone should know that the only privilege in the new world is honesty and the only crime is laziness; that not even those born with talent can boast of this privilege which cannot be bought but which nature distributes for the good and social improvement.

However, it is not difficult to liquidate prejudices, nonsense and vested interests, in good harmony. The feisty and formidable spirit of the new continent cannot sit idly by waiting for material evolution. The spirit and coexistence must precipitate the socialist era without having any illusions that a prior development of capitalism is necessary. And here I want to stop for two minutes. The development of capitalism in the new states will only lead them to deliver them bound hands and feet to the Yankees. As our societies progress, the lack of a national capital, the lack of private initiative, and the fierce cries for foreign capital as an urgent need, will only result in these capitals coming, raising their arms and concluding by destroying their sovereignty. That is why I maintain that the American Revolution should not wait for capitalist flourishing but rather trap the national capital at every point and harmoniously seek its own development at the same time as its power.

The capital of America is the mines, the oil, the thousands of arms, the intelligence put at the service of the State. The rest does not lend itself more than to silly legends of sovereignty, when deep down all the countries of America, considered from the European point of view, are no more than colonial, without any political personality.

Social organization

A great organized community is the great dream of today’s new men. A community where men shake hands with men in wide loyal gestures, where everyone speaks to each other in a brotherly manner and without double-mindedness, where associates cater and work without being taxed by Europe or the United States.

This test can and must be done in Bolivia. No nation in America is as vigorous, as rich in wealth, and has the communist past as this one. And it will lose nothing in the experience of returning to the old and happy life that was diverted by the conquest. Many centuries before, these provinces were administered by the Incas with the best of successes. The Collasuyo was magnificent for their plans, and the communist idea and realization triumphed centuries ago in America. All the tests were done, the town was organized into families, into centuries and into large agricultural communities under the watchful eye of the central axis. The people thus organized never protested the regime to which they were subjected, on the contrary, the adherents grew, and the forward-looking communism gave its most opposing fruits. The small and large details, family life, fellowship, travel, traveler inns, temples to the Sun, art and science, everything was planned and regulated. Following Mr. Rouma in his commendable brochure “L’Empire des Incas et son communisme autocratique”, these latter words to satisfy the Belgian liberals. In addition to that, M. Rouma, married to a wealthy and rentier woman, finds it a bit dangerous to use inordinate praise for the Incas without naturally objecting to the communist system. That is why the subtitle is significant. The reader knows what it is about. A perfect but autocratic communism. In any case, the good connoisseur will understand, when Mr. Roma, satisfying his thirst for a scholar, gets to write this paragraph: “It cannot be denied that an administration that ends up radically suppressing poverty and hunger, which reduces crimes and offenses to a minimum that no modern civilized nation has ever reached, that makes order and security reign, that ensures impartial justice, that ignores the existence of social parasitism of the lazy, the badly rich, the speculators, etc. constitutes a unique phenomenon in the world and deserves our most complete admiration”.3 After saying this and obeying his petit-bourgeois nature, very enthusiastic about liberal principles and privileges – a chalet and athenaeum liberal- he adds that, nevertheless, this beautiful civilization was equal to a mechanism moved by a central axis where the individual or freedom did not exist. How many nations that live in disorder and anarchy would not wish to be moved by a single central mechanism that watches over, organizes and brings happiness! The enormous British Empire whose manifest organization and seriousness never denied, is it not perhaps a great modern mechanism? Have the disciplined German people not tried to conquer the world? Are not the Romans a great piece of history? Let us leave freedom to weak, disorganized nations that are eaten up by an unhappy philosophy.

The Quichuas, great statesmen, understood that this rigorous state mechanism was precisely what guaranteed them abundance and peace, because without this order in their life and that prudence in their actions, they would have returned to the primitive source where crime and violence. misery was frequent.4

Freedom in fact and in practice was better understood than today. The Quichua, after fulfilling his obligations, a travail pas trop penible, adds M. Rouma, could rest or distract his spirit. The field was eternally green and joyous and wherever it went there was always an open door and a friendly and brotherly hand. The current civilization with all its machines and inventions has not brought us, on the one hand, that comfort at a very expensive price, and on the other, the werewolf, the wolf of bail and industry, who has a thirst for vileness and insatiable blackness. This singular man, who for the law, civilization, and justice wages fierce wars and kills each other. Who in homage to freedom assassinates defenseless races and distributes the oil fields and mines; who has divided today’s society into two definite classes that hate each other. Famous western civilization! I have traveled all the states of Europe and have lived for several years in one of the most industrialized countries, in Great Britain, and I have seen with my own eyes, the long lines of workers dressed in rags, some without shoes, black from coal, and exhausted from work, sleep under a canvas tent and fed by just a loaf of bread and a cup of tea. In this powerful country, I have seen how the workers live by sharing one room between eight, with no hygiene, without bedding, without fire in winter, in the most appalling misery. And even worse things I have witnessed in that industrial country of lords and slaves.5

Wanting to overthrow Inca communism with the infallible argument that liberals or millionaire democrats claim, is not understanding what brotherhood means when it is practiced from the heart, giving it all its reality and its value. Men can easily get used to being very free on the condition that they live by hunting and fishing. But when freedom is widely proclaimed, those same bourgeois democrats call it anarchic and persecute it. The people of the city must remember, even though they may want to avoid it, that they have to eat and dress, and for these pressing needs it is necessary to work hard without all their effort being rewarded and without having any security in the future. For this, it is better to live within a regime that organizes production and wealth. Freedom at the present time is reduced to practically nothing. A beautiful poetic plot! Freedom within the current period of civilization is a privilege of the chosen, of capitalists, of profiteers who, thanks to their cunning and talent, placed at the service of the strongest or of crime, enjoy it as an unlimited inheritance. These will be the only ones who can dream on the côte d’azur, Mr. Rouma! As for the millions of workers, they hardly have the freedom to take the tram that will take them to the factory and to glimpse the delights of nature through an eighth-floor window. The famous English liberty, after the war, has been reduced to letting the pipe smoke everywhere! … When the poor English go to the countryside, they only have a path to walk. On the right and left, large insulting and aggressive signs against poverty warn that anyone who dares to step foot on private property will be prosecuted and persecuted. The shade of the trees, the air we breathe, the pheasants, also constitute private property …

If freedom were a palpable, tangible fact and something man could conquer forever, if it were possible to return to the primitive and human state, without laws, without police, without modesty or honor, man as absolute owner of his life and his actions without knowing what is a crime – since there are no laws there would be no crimes – and if above all, it were very easy to live on fruit trees, hunting and fishing, I would be in love with freedom, just as was Jack London, the great American writer. But like all this, it was nothing more than a dream of Rousseau, a theoretical and wonderful dream that had the virtue of enthralling the men of the last century and even some today, backwards thinking for convenience, and certain politicians who exploit it wonderfully for their electoral purposes. I am in favor of organizing society within a more human and just realistic sense, using all forces, whether they come from man or nature. This is what the Incas did more than five centuries ago and they had the greatest of successes, and this is what we must do at the present time. To return to the same communism with the advantages of modern advances, with the perfected machine that saves time and leaves the spirit free for another kind of speculation, is not a literary rambling or a fantasy in a country full of resources of all kinds that only audacious hands and convinced workers await. The dangerous thing is to live without a compass or to disorderly imitate civilizations that have another origin and unforgettable prejudices. In fact, in Europe, revolutions and things take centuries. Small details cost rivers of blood because it is the natural homeland of selfishness. Civilization of iron and blood! In our America, man is more daring, more courageous and more selfless. Things go on impatiently, spurred on by an insatiable thirst for improvement. There is a desire for improvement that has not been sufficiently understood. Then, people fraternize easily and forget grudges and hatreds. Our direct way is to go toward a purely American communism with its own manners and tendencies. We have two things in front of our eyes that assure us success: the fertile land ready for every trial and the industrial improvement that we freely collect from the Western civilization. Then we will not lack prudence, talent and justice, to make good use of the machines and serve us in the interest of all.

Ending the Eternal Present: A Historical Materialist Account of the 1970s

The 1970s were a time of turmoil and transition. Connor Harney gives a Marxist account of this pivotal decade.   

Stephen Spielberg’s Jaws (1975)

Nostalgia for the Past

As we enter a new decade that will inevitably wear the birthmarks of the last, it seems of utmost importance to reflect on the current trajectory of the left in the United States. There are many reasons to both lament the state of the left in the U.S. and to remain hopeful of its potential. While it is uncertain if the current popularity of socialism, the upswing in labor militancy across 2018 and 2019, and Bernie Sanders’ 2020 presidential run will provide a foundation for a lasting movement that will outlast the current electoral cycle, the seeds do seem to be there. At the same time, it is not enough to expect them to sprout on their own. The seeds of the emergent socialist movement must be tended to, and must be provided an environment where they can flourish. For us, this means that we must not limit our study to the fertile grounds of revolutionary history. It is not enough to just survey 1789, 1871, 1917, 1959, or 1968, and imagine that it is only those moments that can help plot the path forward. 

First of all, this approach often leads to a politically determined position that ignores the economic conditions of those moments, and second, it assumes that revolution is just around the corner—an understandably optimistic assumption that in the long term douses the flames of youthful militancy and burns out even the most committed. Even so, it is still wrong to outright dismiss the revolutionary potential of the moment the way that many on the social-democratic left often do. Socialists, communists, and others on the radical left should be at the same time prepared for both immediate insurrection and the slow process of movement building: be it by preparing the ground for a new working-class party or by rebuilding and forging new trade unions and other organizations of proletarian solidarity. In doing so, we can ensure that Santiago and Paris are not just burned to the ground over a repressed discontent with the status quo.  

Our frustration should be channeled towards rebuilding these cities in our own image out of the ashes. Many within the embryonic socialist left, especially within the “democratic socialists”, but also among the purportedly more radical trends like Marxist-Leninists or Trotskyists look to the period of the 1930s and 1940s to draw inspiration from. In particular, they look at the New Deal and welfare states constructed contemporaneously in Europe, and arguably the Soviet bloc as well, and focus on the social leveling and the higher standard of living for working people as an aspiration in a time of absurd levels of wealth inequality. The sentiment seems to be “if it worked then, it can work now.” But good Marxists should always be uneasy applying the traditions of the past whole cloth to the present. As Marx famously quipped in the Eighteenth Brumaire, “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please.”1 

The specific conditions that allowed radicals to push for reforms to the capitalist order are entirely different from those present at the current moment. When the pieces of legislation that made up the New Deal were passed, the left was at the peak of its strength and was acting in the context of a worldwide depression that grounded capitalist economies to a halt—alongside the memory of the October Revolution which still haunted the minds of the ruling class like a waking nightmare. Casting aside the question of whether a Green New Deal or Medicare for All is possible under current conditions, we should ask instead whether or not such reforms are enough? The answer to such a question is to be found not in the period of the New Deal or Great Society programs, but in the crises of the 1970s that created and forged the current moment. It was at this moment that the limits of those reforms were made clear. Not only was the dilemma of stagflation unthinkable from the standpoint of Keynesian orthodoxy, the doctrine’s salve no longer healed the wounds of the U.S. economy. 

In order to grapple with that period, we need to complicate the well-tread intellectual history of Hayek and Friedman that is so often trotted out in order to explain the rise of neoliberalism. As the story usually goes, by the 1980s, the conservative movement had succeeded in its long war to erode the social peace that made up the postwar consensus, and in the subsequent turmoil managed to implement its agenda of privatization and tax cuts proposed by Friedmanites. While part of this may be true, it is not the whole story. To this idealist conception of historical development, E.J. Hobsbawm once wrote that historians should remember that ideas “cannot for more than a moment be separated from the ways in which men get their living and their material environment [… because …] their relations with one another are expressed and formulated in language which implies concepts as soon as they open their mouths.”2  

Rather than assume that neoclassical economics created the current moment, the more important line of inquiry should be as follows: how did the crisis of the postwar pact between capital and labor and the Keynesian consensus produce the conditions that allowed previously marginal ideas to become hegemonic not only at the commanding heights of the economy, but even among the working class themselves? Written in May of this year for the Correspondent, Dutch historian Rutger Bregman’s article “The neoliberal era is ending. What comes next?” perfectly encapsulates such a view of the past. He correctly diagnoses the cracks in the facade of neoliberalism but does so starting from a faulty premise. Bregman takes the architects of neoliberal economic thinking at their own word, without accounting for the process by which their thinking went from marginal to common sense. He cites Milton Friedman’s view that in times of crisis, “ideas that are lying around” are picked up if the “proper groundwork” has “been laid.”3 But what groundwork? And why is it that certain ideas are picked up over others? Bregman claims that over the course of the crises of the 1970s “spread from think tanks to journalists and from journalists to politicians, infecting people like a virus.”4 He does not try to explain the crises, nor address why the old Keynesian medicine could not cure its patient any longer, but in his description of how neoliberal ideas became hegemonic we find our answer. For him, in society there is a battle of ideas over who can best explain the world, and to the victors goes the spoils of the material world, that is until their ideas no longer make sense. But hidden in his word is the class explanation for the ideas that get picked up. Think tanks, journalists, and politicians do not by and large represent the working class, particularly in the United States where there has never even been a labor party. Instead, the contest of ideas described here is largely between elements of the ruling class in an attempt to consolidate its own position in a time of crisis. 

Later in the piece, Bregman begins to wonder who will be the progenitors of the new economic ideology, suggesting the names of Thomas Piketty, Emanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman, or Marian Mazzucato. What these thinkers have in common is a desire to return to higher tax rates and more government regulation, believing that those policies could reverse high levels of income inequality and restore economic growth by putting more in the pockets of everyday people. Piketty is an interesting choice, as his first book Capital in the 21st Century was a lightning rod of admiration and controversy when it was released. In it he documents the trend toward higher inequality since the 1970s, offering politics as the solution to the problems of the economy. His latest book, Capital and Ideology is an attempt to bridge the gap between his prescriptions and how they might be practically realized. 

In a review of Capital and Ideology, liberal commentator and economist Paul Krugman claims the book can be described as “turning Marx on his head.”5 According to Krugman: 

In Marxian dogma, a society’s class structure is determined by underlying, impersonal forces, technology and the modes of production that technology dictates. Piketty, however, sees inequality as a social phenomenon, driven by human institutions. Institutional change, in turn, reflects the ideology that dominates society: ‘Inequality is neither economic nor technological; it is ideological and political.’6

For Piketty, the dominant ideology of a given time is created by ‘ruptures’ that can be used as “switch points” by a “few people” to “cause a lasting change in society’s trajectory.”7 A few people? Piketty himself perhaps? What Krugman misses in his explanation of Marxian orthodoxy, is that the relationship of the forces of production to society is not a one to one reflection. In fact, technology itself is shaped by the relations of production, which include within them the ideology necessary to reproduce society as is, and in the case of capitalism, its continued expansion. By turning Marx on his head in this way, we do not even get Hegel, who in his own way had a materialist conception of history. Instead, we get a view of a society unmoored from its material basis, one in which politics is merely a discursive exercise in figuring out the best way to do things, the cream of the intellectual crop will float to the top. 

To go back to Bregman, his theory of change very much aligns with that of Piketty: someone thinks of an idea and it gets put into practice. He claims “that the way we conceive of activism tends to forget the fact that we all need different roles.”8 Instead, he believes some tend to focus on the work of grassroots mobilization, others on that of high-profile leaders, while still others struggle over whether to protest or begin “the long march through the institutions.” Bregman argues that we must remember that this is not “how change works.” “All of these people,” from Occupy protesters to “lobbyists who set out for Davos,” have their roles.9 The message seems to be that only if people remember their place, then our society could see progress.  Leave it to the Pikettys and the Krugmans of the world to figure out the problems of the world, to bring the stone tablet solutions down from the mount, but it is for those in the street to spread the good word. From this conception, the question remains: After the long line of world-historic crises faced in only the first two decades of the 21st century, why do people reject the sermons of our new economic high priests? Partly, I think this can be attributed to people’s rightful perception that these thinkers themselves offer no real plan to deal with the present. Their role is to project the programs of the past to our current circumstances without dealing with the failings of the New Deal project in the first place: a shortcut for young people desperate to attend to the alienation of their own lives and the imminent climate crisis facing the planet.  

Source: CCC–Third Corps Area (PA, MD, VA, DC), Poultry Raising Project, Co. 2380, Jonesville, Virginia, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum.

From this inability or unwillingness to deal with the flaws in their own conceptions of the New Deal horizon we arrive at two faulty assumptions. Firstly, that if left unhindered by the machinations of the Right, those working today, the children and grandchildren of the greatest generation, would find themselves working the “three-hour shifts” or the “fifteen-hour work week” that Keynes famously predicted.10 Flowing from the first comes the second assumption: namely that the economic crises of the 1970s were entirely political in nature, be it the consequence of oil shocks or the lack of political will necessary to take the steps required toward full employment. The secret to the peaceful transition from capitalism had already been cracked—it was only a matter of putting in the right people to implement it. Setting aside the logical problem of a political strategy that requires no opposition to realize, both of these presuppositions fail to deal with the real political-economic problems of the Fordist era. From the widespread discontentment and alienation of a consumer society still predicated on the production of value and the increasing inability of the capitalist basis of society to cash the check of promised affluence for all those who toil. 

Nostalgia of the Past 

It was not only those living at the time that were unable to resolve these contradictions inherent to the postwar consensus. Even now, there are those who continue to either outright ignore the problems inherent to that political-economic arrangement. They do so, by either refusing to see that economic order as a problem at all, or at best, they are ignorant of its history. By doing so, they help to maintain the marginal position of the left by sustaining an unfounded nostalgia over a progressive program. 

This longing for a bygone era of increased possibility for a segment of the working class is not new to the twentieth-first century. It began as soon as the cracks in the old order were beginning to have ramifications in the daily lives of working people. It is no wonder then, that in the last few years Christopher Lasch has seen a resurgence in currency among some circles within the radical left. Lasch was a witness to the unraveling of social solidarity and the rise of a “culture of narcissism,” and understandably lamented the “logic of individualism” carried to “to the extreme of all against all,” in which “the pursuit of happiness” became “the dead-end of narcissistic preoccupation with the self.”11 As a historian and preeminent critic of society, he identified atomization as the ill that ailed Americans as the turbulent 1970s drew to close. This diagnosis brought Lasch to discover the solipsistic self-awareness that informed the condition of postmodernity. He writes in the Culture of Narcissism

Distancing soon becomes a routine in its own right. Awareness commenting on awareness creates an escalating cycle of self-consciousness that inhibits spontaneity. It intensifies the feeling of inauthenticity that rises in the first place out of resentment against the meaningless roles prescribed by modern industry. Self-created roles become as constraining as the social roles from which they are meant to provide ironic detachment.12 

Yet, his critique of this form of disassociation offers no way out of the endless spiral of the self he describes. Instead, what little solace Lasch does offer was a romanization of the past that ultimately led him to the dead end of fetishizing the patriarchal family.13 

Source: David Levine, 1991, Christopher Lasch, New York Review of Books.

Still, Lasch’s description of a society in decay is not without value for the left. Indeed, even his intuition that the history could offer a sense of hope for the future can be salvaged sans the rose-colored and romantic relationship to the past, for “a denial of the past, superficially progressive and optimistic, proves on closer analysis to embody the despair of a society that cannot face the future.”14 Andreas Killen, a historian obviously influenced by a Lasch’s unique brand of history infused with both a sociological and psychological analysis, has more recently characterized 1973 as a collective “nervous breakdown” from which the United States never recovered. Echoing the concern of forgetting the past, Killen writes that the inability to grapple with the malaise that infected the American psyche after the failure of 1968 exists even to the present. 

In a certain sense, he is correct. The revolution that the New Left envisioned never came to fruition, and without the power to transform the material basis of society in the United States, the concern became the realm of culture.15 Yet, what this analysis misses, is that the revolutionary moment was not simply reacting to the remaining vestiges of de jure racism and sexism. As the 1960s progressed it became clear that it was necessary to not only dismantle the juridical apparatus of oppression but also to remove the levers of exploitation that the capitalist left firmly engaged. What many did not foresee, however, was the drying up of the material conditions that had made mass politics possible in the first place.    

This inability to understand the contours of a changing political-economic constitution of late capitalism underpinned not just their moment, but also the current one. Killen contends, “the crises of the 1970s are not so easily buried; indeed they have emerged with new intensity in our time.”16 The historiography of the 1970s has grown immensely since Killen penned 1973 Nervous Breakdown in the first decade of the new millennium, and within the wider historiography of the United States the decade has gone from marginal to what Judith Stein called a “pivotal decade.” This essay seeks to flesh out a historical materialist analysis of the 1970s in order to add to the ongoing debate over the political-economic trajectory of the second half of the twentieth century, not to provide a roadmap to a socialism, but rather to point out the assumptions that led to the political cul-de-sacs informing left debates for more than half of a century—be it through imagining a return to the politics of the New Deal, or for the more radical left, a return to the Popular Front of the 1930s.

Past the Post-Industrial Society

The historian Jefferson Cowie, has argued for years that the New Deal was “the Great Exception” to the American national project. While there are components of his arguments that may be overstated, there is a truth to the overall content of his message.  These thirty golden years of American capitalism may have stoked a small, but long-standing spirit of egalitarianism in the United States. At the same time, it is ultimately a footnote in the larger national project, and yet, so much of the popular image of the country emerged from this moment. Even the political and cultural norms we observe now were shaped by this aberrational moment. Indeed, part of the inability with those living through the breakdown of New Deal order was the assumption that the good times were here to stay, that the pact between labor and capital would last forever, and that the perceived mutually-beneficial relationship would continue to produce mutual gains for all.  

Source: Feng Li, Workers assemble children’s bicycle wheels at a factory in Jiangsu, China, 2012, Getty Images.

In his introduction to Labor in the Twentieth Century, former labor secretary for the Ford administration and labor economist John T. Dunlop called the twentieth century “the worker’s century.” His misplaced but understandable optimism was part of the ideological fog that shrouded the postwar compact’s breakdown. Written in 1978, as the seams were really beginning to unravel around Keynesian orthodoxy, he could still say that any “reader of this volume must conclude that the twentieth century is likely to be known as the century of the worker or of the employee in advanced democratic societies,” and further that, “the first three-quarters of the century provide a desirable frame of reference to consider the course of development out to the year 2000.”17

While Dunlop and Galenson’s volume is billed as a comparative work, looking at the trajectories of a handful of advanced industrial economies, more often than not it falls prey to an analysis of Keynesianism in one country. That is, it bases itself on the assumption that redistributive welfare state and regulatory apparatus can rely on the industry of its own country to provide the material basis for those policies to operate. Only four years later, another set of labor economists wrote in their predictions for the future of the field that:

it is likely that the current awareness of the effects of world-wide competition, the interdependence of national economies, and the popularized comparisons of differences in national systems of industrials and management process will further spur in comparative and international industrial relations research.18

Clearly, the encroachment of the global on the national became something that could not be ignored even by those invested in maintaining the conventions of the old order. Or, to put in Marxist terms, if national economies are like giant cartels, they must compete with one another due to the coercive laws of competition, which in the long term to push them to increase the productivity of labor through either investment in more advanced techniques of production or the increased level of exploitation of labor through suppressing wages or increasing the working day. Such an impulse could not be contained as the United States’ global dominance eroded: a result of a shrinking advantage in productive capacity, which also underpinned its ability to maintain a stable international credit system. 

Part of this is what historian Judith Stein argues in her seminal work Pivotal Decade. Where she diverges from a certain Marxist reading of events is clear from her book’s subtitle: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies. For Stein, the political class’ inability to protect manufacturing in the United States was the downfall of America’s detour into social democracy. In her view, these jobs were not just any jobs, but productive labor that allowed a large portion of the working population to live “the good life.” The book’s final chapter deals with the current “age of inequality” born out of this failure to maintain the economic hegemony of the United States. In it she prescribes a revival of manufacturing.  According to Stein, “as long Americans use computers, wear clothes, drive autos, build with steel, play video games—in short, do everything,” there will be a need for someone to do the work, and for that reason, the explosion of debt-fueled consumption in the years following the crisis of the 1970s reflect a society in which “Americans consumed these items but did not make enough of them.”19

What Stein overlooks, is that manufacturing was not simply outsourced, it was also automated. Fewer workers are required to oversee the production of the coats, chairs, cars, and computers that are a part of daily life in the modern world. At the same time, her view also reduces hundreds of millions of people in the world to merely unproductive vagabonds leeching off the work of those doing those “making things.” 

Setting aside the first point of automation, the question of productive labor within the world economy is an important one. In the often ignored second volume of Capital, Marx discusses the importance of the work that goes into both maintaining and transporting commodities, which, if nothing else, is the work of the grocery clerk, the long-haul trucker, the fast-food worker, and the Amazon warehouse worker. He writes: 

Within every production process, the change of location of the object of labor and the means of labor and labor-power needed for this plays a major role; for instance, cotton that is moved from the carding shop into the spinning shed, coal lifted from the pit to the surface. The transfer of the finished product as a finished commodity from one separate place of production to another a certain distance away shows the same phenomenon, only on a larger scale. The transport of products from one place of production to another is followed by that of the finished products from the sphere of production to the sphere of consumption. The product is ready for consumption only when it has completed this movement.20

In other words, for the modern consumer to enjoy their Big Mac, watch Netflix, or read the newest novel by their favorite, labor is required to not only produce goods but to transport and maintain them. Crucial to this circulation of commodities across the country, and more broadly the globe, is physical infrastructure like roads, cellphone towers, and electrical lines—all of which are run or maintained by any army of workers who ensure their continuous movement. In concrete terms, as important as the papermill, the slaughterhouse, and the factory, are the warehouse, the freight companies, and the restaurant. While there may be a kernel of truth to Stein’s argument about a decline in productive work, what Stein’s work shows more than anything else is the limits to a strictly national labor movement and the attempt to reform capitalism within the borders of one country. The highly-centralized business unions within AFL-CIO proved outmoded against increasingly decentralized and international corporations. In a word, interdependence carried the day, and the old ways of organizing proved incapable of withstanding its onslaught.21

On the other side, there are many that have cheered on the decline in manufacturing in the United States, extolling the virtues of the so-called post-industrial society—a term popularized by sociologist Daniel Bell in his work The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society published in 1974. In the same year, Harry Braverman, metalworker and long-time editor of Monthly Review Press challenged this vision of the future, claiming in his agitational magnum-opus Labor and Monopoly Capital that such a view represented another in long line of “economic theories which assigned the most productive role to the particular form of labor that was most important or growing most rapidly at the time,” but in the last analysis, he suggests, each form of labor peacefully coexists “as recorded in balance sheets” of multinational corporations.22 Most importantly, rather than a decline in the application of Taylorism to the world of work, the rise of the service economy represented its universalization. As a truck team member at a major grocery chain, his description of “a revolution…now being prepared which will make of retail workers, by and large, something closer to factory operatives than anyone had every imagined possible,” is no longer one possible path of the historical development of the forces and relations of production, but rather a foregone conclusion, at least in that segment of the service economy.23

Braverman’s unique conception of deskilling flows from this notion of scientific management’s universal application. With the proliferation of white-collars jobs over blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, there is often the assumption that increased requirements of education and the more technology is applied to accomplish workers’ daily tasks on the job the more skilled the overall workforce, but what Braverman contends is: 

The more science is incorporated into the labor process, the less the worker understands of the process; the more sophisticated an intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and comprehensions of the machine the worker has. In other words, the more the worker needs to know in order to remain a human being at work, the less does he or she know.24

For example, ask someone whose job it is to stock the shelves at the local grocery store how what they are stocking gets to the store and how the store knows to order it, chances are the response will be a blank stare—not due to any lack of intelligence on the part of the worker—but rather, because of the complexity of daily life under the modern division of labor mediated by network technology. 

Such a state of affairs cannot help but help alienate the working class from one another. Not only do they become a cog in the giant machine of global capital, but they also can no longer imagine how their own movement has an effect on the other gears. While Braverman rightfully dismissed the sociologists and other academics whose sole focus was studying this alienation over the objective conditions of work experienced by workers over the course of their careers, their scholarship can help highlight how those conditions are then experienced on a psychological level. 

After years of successive strike waves, culminating in 1971 as the most active year for the labor movement since the militant heyday of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the Nixon administration commissioned a Special Task Force to create a report on “work in America” for then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot Richardson.25 From the report, the administration would catch a glimpse into the lives of working people in order to get them back to work, or so they thought. Unfortunately for them, the results pointed to no easy answer, or at least to none within the framework of the postwar compact. The only solutions gestured either out of capitalism or towards the past, before the 1935 passage of the Wagner Act, which laid the ground for both a new kind of labor struggle and eventually paved the way for a labor truce.  The report analyzes the problems of the “blue-collar blues,” “white-collar woes,” and the conflicts brought on by the increasing diversification of the workforce. According to the report, the blue-collar blues was not simply tied to traditional bread and butter issues like wages and benefits, but also to “[workers’] self-respect, a chance to perform well in his work, a chance for personal achievement and growth in competence, and a chance to contribute something personal and unique to his work.”26 This sort of alienation was not limited to blue-collar workers, but also was there for white-collar workers: 

The office today, where work is segmented and authoritarian, is often a factory. For a growing number of jobs, there is little to distinguish them but the color of the worker’s collar: computer keypunch operations and typing pools share much in common with the automobile assembly-line.27

Clearly, the unraveling of the New Deal was not simply a question of “diminishing expectations” in the face of economic decline, but its terms became increasingly untenable from the physical and psychological toll wrought by the spread of scientific management to each sector of the American economy. 

Bruce Springsteen captures this disillusionment with the old promise of the American dream in his song “Factory” from his 1978 album Darkness on the Edge of Town. In it, he describes the Faustian bargain faced by American workers as he sees his “daddy walking through the factory gates in the rain,” that “factory takes his hearing, factory gives him life.” To emphasize the truly one-sided nature of the deal, Springsteen sings that at the “end of the day, factory whistle cries/men walk through these gates with death in their eyes.”28 Like many working-class baby boomers, Springsteen had seen the way that the wear and tear of a lifetime of monotonous toil could wrack working people with an overwhelming sense of emptiness alongside the physical debilitation that often comes with manual labor. As the 1970s progressed into the 1980s, material decline faced by workers created a new reason for anxiety. In spite of this harrowing reality, it is important to highlight the problem of romanticizing the affluent society that came before our own neoliberal moment. Despite less precarity, there was still powerlessness felt in the face of the growing power of faceless multinationals to structure the daily lives of millions of people both in the workplace and the marketplace.

The Planning System and Monopoly Capitalism

This process by which the world became one colossal factory and market was experienced as deindustrialization in many advanced industrial economies. As the massive skyscrapers, factories, hospitals, schools, bridges, and feats of engineering, built by the hands of workers, decayed and fell into disrepair, there was little they could do. They may have made them, but they did not own them.  To offer the words of Marx in the Grundrisse: “the condition that the monstrous objective power which social labor itself erected opposite itself as one of its moments belongs not to the worker, but…to capital.”29 

Despite the monstrosity of a world increasingly alien to those who make their way in it, it should not be assumed that the great mass of people cannot overturn the existing order of things—that the monster cannot be slain. As the giants of the postwar era, like Ford, IBM, and General Electric began to dominate more and more aspects of everyday life, there came a tendency to view these monopoly monsters as invulnerable to the traditional foes of the individual firm within the capitalist system. Indicative of this perspective and informing much of the thinking on monopoly capital in the postwar was the work of economists like J.K. Galbraith, particularly in his work the New Industrial State first published in 1967. Here he attempts to illuminate the transformations of the capitalist system in the twentieth century, arguing that the conditions of free competition and exchange ceased to underpin the existing social relations within capitalism. Of course, from the standpoint of a critique of political economy, such relations never truly existed in the first place, except maybe in the utopian dreams of liberal partisans during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. As Marx wrote in the Manifesto, the bourgeoisie: 

drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade.30

They made a world in which naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation” replaced an exploitation “veiled by religious and political illusions,” but at the same time, this very exploitation “accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals.”31 Utopian dream indeed, but only for those lucky enough to find themselves outside the ranks of the proletarians whose muscle and blood built this wondrous new world. Eventually, free competition and exchange became a watchword, part of a new veil forged to cover the nightmares created for the mass of society in realizing their bourgeois dreams. A new mystification for a new age. 

Most important to understanding Galbraith’s contribution to political economy is an analysis of what he calls the “Planning System.” For him, the “Planning System” was a patchwork of the largest corporations in the U.S. economy, all working in concert to coordinate costs of production through a relationship to the state. In a certain way, Galbraith’s analysis aligns with conception of monopoly capital put forward by Marxists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in their work Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, released only a year before the New Industrial State. If the tendency of global capitalism before World War II had been toward regular crises, then the postwar period can only be described as infinitely more stable. Both works attempted to explain this relative stability against the behavior of the capitalist system over the previous century and the beginning of the twentieth—behavior that helped bring about not only nearly thirty years of near-constant warfare—but also two world-historic revolutions which attempted to break with the very system that brought such destruction and misery into the world. 

Source: Keith Ploeck, 2014, Mental Floss.

According to Galbraith, the “Planning System” arose out of the need to mitigate the uncertainty by ensuring continued profits alongside the rapid expansion of production. This growth was predicated on the application of increasingly complex technology. In turn, this meant a growing portion of a company’s capital had to be tied up in maintaining old and researching new technology. Part of this cost, as Baran and Sweezy also noted, was offset by state spending on both public research and government contracts, but ultimately, to ensure a return on these investments in technology, companies created massive advertising apparatuses that shaped the desires and wants of the consumer. Of course, such an operation could not be sustained without recourse to planning, and Galbraith believed that this forecasting replaced market mechanisms in determining what the cost of production and final price of commodities would be. While this “Planning System” may have stabilized capitalism to a degree, he worried that “we are becoming servants in thought and in action of the machine we have created to serve us.”32

On the one hand, Galbraith’s preoccupation with planning helped him see through the ideological mist of American society, where “the ban on the use of the word planning excluded reflection on the reality of planning.” However, his tendency to see planning as purely the necessary outgrowth of the size and level of technology of a particular firm tended to obscure the role of competition in determining the need for planning.33 While Galbraith acknowledged that technology was employed in order for firms to compete with one another—planning could, in the final analysis, eliminate a particular market altogether. This line of thinking brought him to two conclusions, the first that “size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of profits,” and second, that “the enemy of the market is not ideology but the engineer.”34

The idea that the growth and complexity of capitalist society created an antimony between engineers and other technical experts and market interests was not new. More than a quarter-century before, heterodox economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen came to a similar conclusion. But rather than decry the power of the engineer over production in industrial society, he welcomed it as a great mediator.35 This “general staff of industry” as he called them would settle the dispute between capital and labor for good. This was necessary for two reasons: first, the complexity of the industrial system (very similar to Galbraith’s planning system) meant that it could no longer be run by non-experts, and second, too large a community outside of capital and labor were dependent on that system to allow one side to work toward their vested interests alone. Veblen believed that engineers could continue running the industrial system in the interests of the community as a whole, rather than from their own narrow interests. In The Engineers and the Price System, he wrote that he believed that they would soon realize their ability to oversee society for the greater good. As the role of engineers and professional experts grew exponentially in society, they were “beginning to understand that commercial expediency has nothing better to contribute to the engineer’s work than so much lag, leak, and friction.”36 Further, “they are accordingly coming to understand that the whole fabric of credit and corporation finance is a tissue of make-believe.”37

But of course, fantasy has long driven civilizations to action, even the immaterial can have objective consequences. This is what Marx meant when there was a “phantom-like objectivity” to the value of a commodity.38 While the marks of the socially necessary labor time imbued in a commodity may not be readily apparent, that it has been worked by human hands is understood. Along with that understanding, is that of a whole host of corresponding social practices that allow such an abstract principle to order human affairs. At the same time, Veblen was correct to point out that technology applied to production was constrained by the relations of production, of the need to maintain private ownership, and the corresponding profit motive, but that tension exists does not mean that it will be worked out. Particularly, if there is no revolutionary rupture with the old order of things, which he believed not only unnecessary but an unwanted obstruction to the industrial system. For him, the success of the Bolsheviks was what had simultaneously made their situation so difficult. The fact that Russia was technologically backward meant that the: “Russian community is able, at a pinch, to draw its own livelihood from its own soil by its own work, without that instant and unremitting dependence on materials and wrought goods drawn from foreign ports and distant regions.”39

In the case of an advanced industrial society like the United States, such a revolution was undesirable for the inverse reason: dependence on the industrial system meant that disrupting its function would lead to widespread deprivation and misery. Instead, Veblen believed there would eventually be a bloodless coup by engineers, after capitalists “eliminate themselves, by letting go quite involuntarily” as “the industrial situation gets beyond their control.”40 In doing so, he underestimated the lengths that capital would go in holding on to their interests and just how complex industrial society would become. The increasingly complicated division of both mental and manual meant that even a vanguard of engineers and experts could not manage the whole system alone.  Eventually, this process would erode their relative independence from either the capitalist class or the working class by pulling them toward one pole or another.41

 Much like Veblen, in an ironic twist of fate, Galbraith the economist came to the position that economics no longer mattered. Rather, the conquest of political power by monopolies had, and would, determine the future of American society. By separating the political from the economic, rather than view them as two sides of the same co-determined coin, he assumed that one could continuously dominate the other, rather than engage with each other in a dialectical back and forth. This view that monopolies could disembed themselves from the dictates of the market has not gone anywhere. In fact, it was central to the argument of Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski’s popular book the People’s Republic of Walmart that made the rounds across a number of different left groups and tendencies. Phillips and Rozworski present a full-throated socialist defense of planning in the People’s Republic of Walmart, highlighting the prominence of firms like Walmart and Amazon, whose very success, they argue, is predicated on their tendency to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible through complex planning systems. 

The authors acknowledge that “the real world is often one of messy disequilibrium, of prices created by fiat rather than from the competitive ether,” but still “remains one where markets determine much of our economic, and thereby social life.” Unfortunately, their conception of firms as “islands of  tyranny” reinforces the notion that these massive companies can remove themselves from the sea of market competition.42  To put in Marxist terms, these firms are somehow able to ignore the law of value through their application of central planning. Much like Braverman’s critique of postindustrial society as overemphasizing the growth sector of the economy, a similar criticism can be leveled at Phillips and Rozworksi for focusing too much on the ascendant firms of the twenty-first century. Amazon and Walmart may be economic juggernauts now, but no one can know what the march of history has in store for them in the long term. When Galbraith wrote the New Industrial State in 1967, he seemed very certain of the futures of Ford and GM. The same cannot be said of either from 2020. This is not to suggest that socialists should not be concerned with central planning, but rather, that planning is not a magic bullet that makes the transition away from capitalism inevitable. 

Over a century ago, Lenin praised the scientific management of Taylor as a progressive force in capitalist society because of its tendency to bring order to the chaos of capitalist production. He believed that it would eventually lay the foundation for socialism through its rationalization of production and distribution within capitalism. According to Lenin, Taylorism had inadvertently helped prepare for “the time when the proletariat will take over all social production and appoint its own workers’ committees for the purpose of properly distributing and rationalizing all social labor,” and that the increasing centralization of industry on a large scale would “provide thousands of opportunities to cut by three-fourths the working time of the organized workers and make them four times better off than they are today.”43 If one looks at the universalization of Taylorism in the capitalist world and the experience of the Soviet Union, there is, at the very least, a question mark over the efficacy of taking on the methods of scientific management without a mind to the way they help structure relations of production. 

The same can be said about the claims of planning. While it may have had the effect of stabilizing individual capitals, or even large segments of capital, planning has not led to the stabilization of capital in general. In other words, to assume that the means to liberate ourselves from capital exist as tools to be grasped fully-formed from the capitalist system, be it either scientific management or central planning, is to an assume the inevitability of socialism, a false proposition that Rosa Luxemburg grasped more than a hundred years ago when she appealed to the imperative toward either socialism or barbarism.

Writing during the nightmarish upheaval of total war in Europe, Luxemburg reminded the proletariat movement of their latent potential, their role as agents in history to overturn the existing order. From the standpoint of the early twenty-first century, in a world wracked by imperialist proxy wars, climate catastrophe, and political-economic uncertainty, her words echo today as true they did then when she first wrote them in 1915.  In the face of this reality, “the only compensation for all the misery and all the shame would be if we learn from the war how the proletariat can seize mastery of its own destiny and escape the role of the lackey to the ruling classes.”44 

What Luxemburg so masterfully illustrates with her passionate reminder of human will in shaping the course of history, is what E.H. Carr gestures toward in his methodological book What is History? His book outlines a general methodology for the history discipline. In doing so, he takes aim at critics’ contentions that historical materialism posits an inevitable outcome to history. At the same time, he challenges a view of history as random happenstance. For Carr, “nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to have been different,” but at the same time, history is not completely “a chapter of accidents, a series of events determined by chance coincidences, attributable only to the most causal of causes.”45

Late Capitalism and the Law of Value

The discussion above may seem a digression from the larger analysis of the long 1970s. However, the faith that the economic question within capitalism had been solved by social democracy and that the road to peaceful transition had been charted, is what blinded many to the cracks in the postwar consensus—a belief not altogether different from that of the inevitable triumph of socialism. Today, a similar belief exists. For many, the idea that we could go back to the politics of the postwar consensus is not only feasible, but also desirable. This stems from a mistaken notion that the only thing that led to its breakdown was politics: if we can just get back to the right kind of politics, then we can make social democracy great again. 

Even as he criticized the power of the corporation and the state in the modern economy, Galbraith made such an argument about politics during the breakup of the postwar order. He wrote in the Introduction to the 3rd edition of the New Industrial State released in 1978, that by all accounts the “sharp recessions” of that decade were “by wide agreement…the result of a deliberate act of policy to arrest inflation,” with  “those holding most vehemently that inflation was still a natural phenomenon being those responsible for the policy.”46 While Marxist Economist and Historian Ernest Mandel would likely agree that nothing in political economy is inherently natural, this does not mean that human beings do not create systems that stand over them and cannot be controlled at will. Human beings certainly forged those bonds through the muck of ages, but that does not mean that their essence remains apparent as they become imbued with new meaning across time. This is of course what Marx meant when he employed the concept of commodity fetishism, that is to say social relations between people appear as relations between things. 

Mandel’s Late Capitalism is very much a response to this overly politically-determined view of history. He provides empirical evidence to support the notion contrary to thinkers like Galbraith, Baran, and Sweezy that Marx’s critique of political economy still stood as definitive in the era of monopoly capitalism. Even the title of his work was meant as a response to those who believed capitalist society had superseded the laws of motion of capital as described by Marx in the same way that an Einsteinian universe had eclipsed the Newtonian one early in the middle of the twentieth century. For Mandel, the question of whether late capitalism represented a new stage of capitalist development could be answered by asking whether “government regulation of the economy, or the ‘power of the monopolies,’ or both, ultimately or durably cancel the workings of the law value.”47 Indeed, if that question was answered in the affirmative, then any unstable holdovers from the old order such as “crises and recessions” could “no longer… due to the forces inherent in the system but merely to the subjective mistakes or inadequate knowledge of those who ‘guide the economy.’”48 

Source: Ernest Mandel Internet Archive.

By holding Marx’s critique of political economy as valid even in the age of monopoly capital, Mandel was able to see the postwar era for what it was: the calm before the storm of capitalist crisis. An interregnum, which could lead either towards continued domination or towards the liberation of the working class. Rather than take monopoly power as something eternal, Mandel looked at its long-term historical trajectory. First, by sticking to a Marxist conception of the economy that is consistent with the labor theory of value, his starting point of analysis is that the equalization of the rate of profit as it relates to the theory of the rate of profit to fall does not imply an equal division of profits among capitalists. Rather, because this rate is determined by the “total mass of capital set in by each autonomous firm,” those firms that employ the greatest amount technology or constant capital in the production process, are able to siphon surplus from those with a below-average level of productivity, despite a smaller footprint in terms of variable capital or labor power used in the course of production.49 However, while this does not imply an equal mass of profits, there is still the tendency to push and pull the rate of profit towards a social average on the level of individual firms. Effectively, this means that the role of the monopoly in late capitalism is to prevent as long as possible the equalization process from taking place by blocking the movement of capital from one branch to another. But as with any wall, there is always a ladder that can be climbed to reach the other side. 

For instance, Mandel argues that the short-term need of monopolies to bring non-monopolized sectors under their purview to control effective demand leads in the long term to an erosion of their monopoly power through an acceleration of the equalization of the rate of profit. In other words: 

The more this process advances, and the nearer the package of goods produced by monopolies comes to compromise the whole range of social production, the smaller monopoly surplus-profits will tend to become and the closer the monopoly rate of profit will have to adjust to the average rate of profit. The monopolies will thus increasingly be dragged into the maelstrom of the tendency for this average rate of profit to fall.50

At the same time, even if non-monopoly sectors of the economy remain independent of the monopoly ones, in times of downturn those sectors find themselves at a diminished capacity. Therefore, the monopoly sector is not furnished with the surplus-profits that protect them from the fall in the rate of profit. Not only do monopolies in the last analysis sow the seeds for their own demise vis-à-vis their need for continual growth, but also attempts to subvert this tendency in the long term, including those of the state, have the effect of intensifying these contradictions. 

Mandel identified at least three specific limitations to state intervention into the capitalist economy. First, the stimulation of demand through the printing of new money has the effect of lowering the rate of surplus-value i.e. the rate of profit, and in no way does it ensure productive investment–that is investment in the production of value leading to the accumulation of capital. Second, if the state invests any redistributed surplus-value towards productive investment of its own, it must ensure that those investments do not directly compete with already existing sectors of the economy. Finally, if state investments made from tax revenues are to be generative of new value, rather than a redistribution of existing surplus-value, they must not be from capital itself, but from the petty bourgeoisie and the working class’ general wage fund.51 Data from Emanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman’s recent book the Triumph of Injustice bears out this assumption. While their definition of what constitutes wealth and the question of how to address income inequality may be flawed, their collection of average effective tax rate data is a helpful illustration of the shifting tax burden that Mandel first theorized in 1972: 

Source: Emanuel Zaez and Gabriel Zucman, the Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019). Data and Appendix of Figures: https://taxjusticenow.org/#/appendix

This change in the composition of the tax base helps to create antagonistic relationships between the capitalists on the dole of the state and the petty bourgeoisie, as well as those segments of capital whose profit is not ensured through state subsidy. This explains the rise of the politics of the taxpayers revolt, which was and has been so central to building a base of support for the neoliberal turn.52 Mandel identifies this tension as a real limit to the support that the state can have for monopolies: the state cannot support monopolies if they endanger the capitalist system as a whole.53

Long Waves of Capitalist Development

The main point of Late Capitalism may have been to illustrate the continued validity of the Marxist research project in the face of its dismissal by critics on both the left and the right, but Mandel did not simply seek to explain the crisis of his moment. Instead, he sought to provide a long-term view of capitalist development, one that explained the tectonic shifts in the mode of production from one generation to the next, and most importantly, one that might clarify where the transition of his own time might lead. 

This longue durée approach to the historical development of capitalism is precisely why Mandel’s work seems so prescient in the light of the present. This perspective allowed Mandel to historicize his own moment as part of the larger development of capitalism as a global economic system counterposed to contemporaneous bourgeois economists, who held that golden age as a permanent stasis. Mandel accomplished this by adapting Soviet Economist Nikolai Kondratieff’s work on long waves of capitalist development, which posited that along with short-term business cycles there were longer-term ones that lasted for fifty years more or less. These long waves inevitably brought about a restructuring of the capitalist economy through a revolution in technology, or, to use another phrase, the development of the forces of production. In Mandel’s version, these long waves consisted of a period of twenty-five to thirty years, either expansionary or depressive in character. Despite the dichotomy of expansion and depression in Mandel’s long waves, the standard five to seven-year business cycle still operated.  For example, during depressive waves recoveries are not as robust as those that occur during expansive ones.

Mandel explains the breakdown of each kind of wave and its effect on the rate of profit as follows: “expansive waves are periods in which the forces counteracting the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline operate in a strong and synchronized way,” and “depressive long waves are periods in which the forces counteracting the tendency of the rate of profit to decline are fewer, weaker, and decisively less synchronized.54This connection to rate of profit, and thus to the levels of investment, helps explain another part of Mandel’s unique interpretation of the long waves in capitalist development. He posited that, unlike business cycles, expansionary waves were by no means automatically triggered by long depressive one. In this way, he was able to integrate Leon Trotsky’s criticism of Kondratieff into the way that he applied the concept. Trotsky critiqued Kondratieff’s long cycles for removing human agency from the development of new technology and ways of working, as well as, the role played by what might be termed exogenous or outside the economic base of society such as wars and revolutions to creating conditions for a new expansionary wave. 

Defending this interpretation and application of long waves to the history of capitalism against charges of eclecticism, Mandel argued that, often, the “creative destruction” needed to reinvigorate the level productive investments and trigger a new expansionary wave could actually require the physical destruction of fixed capital and of older technology, rather than just its market devaluation. Indeed, his retort, that: 

it is inevitable that new long wave of stagnating trend must succeed a long wave of expansionist trend, unless of course, one is ready to assume that capital has discovered the trick of eliminating for a quarter of a century (if not for longer) the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline.55

speaks to the room that exists for “heterodoxy” within the orthodox Marxist tradition. 

If nothing else, Marx continuously used the newest methods bestowed to him by the practitioners of classical political economy in critiquing them. To assume that he would not have continued to do the same had he had the opportunity to continue his project is to contradict the very nature of his work. Like Marx, Mandel’s use of long waves in no way betrays his commitment to critique of political economy, in that their abstraction is in no way opposed to the concrete. If anything it was Mandel’s critics who were idealistic in their criticism of his notion of exogenous triggers. 

Source: Leon Neal, 2017, Getty Images.

The 1970s as the End of an Era and the Foundation for the Neoliberal Turn

Another useful method inherited from Mandel’s adoption of the modified Kondratieff’s cycles, is the notion that these long waves could be conceptualized as unique historical moments. The postwar boom represents just one of many long expansionary waves, and the interwar years and the Great Depression represent an example of a long period of stagnation. Considering that the lectures that made up his book Long Waves were given in 1978, most of his theorization on the period of the collapse of the postwar order and the neoliberal turn remained mainly predictions based on existing evidence from the start of that wave and other speculations. Still, they do offer an insight not only into how this turn was experienced for Mandel as an individual, but also on some general assumptions and observations that can be subject to an empirical review of subsequent data. 

One point, in particular, seems terribly cogent, especially in the light of contemporary explanations of the neoliberal turn on the left. Mandel postulates that the shift from a certain Keynesian orthodoxy to a monetarist one at the level of national governments did not create neoliberalism, but rather, it was the political-economic crisis brought upon by the stagflation of the 1970s that made one set of ideas marginal and brought the other in vogue. Given the logic of capital and its need to restore the rate of profit, the welfare state could no longer offer the safety net it once had, and indeed it represented a barrier to further accumulation. This materialist explanation of the hegemony of the likes of Friedman and Hayek makes far more sense than the notion that somehow the strength of their ideas created a brand-new consensus by the 1980s. As Mandel writes, this “new economic wisdom” was by no means ‘scientific,’ despite claims to the contrary, but rather “corresponds to the immediate and long-term needs of the capitalist class.”56 Recent scholarship on the New York City financial crisis of 1975 that among other things, produced the now infamous headline “Ford to City: Drop Dead,” points to such a pragmatic and ad hoc adoption of new economic ideas in response to uncertain realities of the day.57

Source: New York Daily News, (1975), New York Daily News.

Fear City by Kim Phillips-Fein, tells the story of the response to the deep crisis of the city from above and below, but ultimately though, it was those who acted from above won the day. However, the idea that those crafting fiscal policy and managing the city’s budget were either contemporary Republican deficit hawks and their Third Way Democratic party handmaidens of austerity should be put to rest. Prior to the financial crisis, Phillips-Fein argues that New York City was a bastion of social democracy created by decades of militant working-class struggle. It could only have through such a crisis that those gains could have been unmade. Even those in seats of authority called to helm the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) and the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) saw themselves more in line with the liberalism of the Great Society than that of the Third Way. 

The MAC was a public-benefit corporation set up to financialize the city’s assets in the face of mounting debt and the EFCB was an institution set up to oversee the city’s spending. Both institutions exemplify how the financial crisis created two political-economic functions characteristic of the emergent neoliberal state: with one hand the state privatized its assets to make up for shrinking state coffers, and with the other, took away those services deemed unnecessary to the accumulation of capital in general. In the case of men like Felix Rohaytn who helped create the MAC, it would be their experience of saving the city from itself that would transform their thought, rather than their thought transforming the city. However, we should not assume that it was unavoidable that such a view would become the hegemonic one. Indeed, it took the mythologizing of the moment by politicians like New York Mayor Ed Koch for the notion that there was no alternative to austerity for the view to take hold. Koch did so by painting the crisis as a teachable moment that allowed the city to see the error of its ways and to move on “in a positive direction.”58

Aside from explaining the formation of the new dominant bourgeois ideology of late capitalism, Mandel also described the actions that would be necessary to restore the rate of profit during the depressive wave that began in 1973, signaled by the oil shocks of that year. He predicted that in order to lay the foundation for a restored rate of profit which would eventually give way from a stagnating wave to an expansionist one, there would need to be a disciplining of organized labor through the use of unemployment. This would simultaneously allow capital to increase the level of exploitation through a degradation of conditions and circumstances of work, the further concentration and centralization of capital, which would lead to reduced cost in means of production like equipment, raw materials, and energy—and most importantly “massive applications of new technological innovations” and “a new revolutionary acceleration of in the rate of turnover of capital.”59

Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployment Rate,” Series LNS14000000 (Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 26, 2020).
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Percent of Employed Members of unions,” Series LUU0204899600 (Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 3, 2020).

Taking up Mandel’s point about the necessity of unemployment to weaken labor organizations, it is no accident of history that from the mid-1970s forward the rate of unemployment never reached the consistent lows of the preceding periods, at least until the precipice of the current century. Nor does it appear to be a coincidence the same period saw a massive dip in levels of unionization as unemployment grew. While this development was by no means inevitable, and was most certainly did not come to pass without resistance, the necessary preconditions for the neoliberal subject were forged through this moment. There was “no alternative,” not because Reagan and Thatcher said so, but because attempts to move beyond the New Deal and the Great Society had become stalled and the material preconditions for the working class to fight in their own name were increasingly closed off from them. The experience of that process for working people and their institutions will be picked up below. 

Keeping in mind the fact that expansionary waves are not an unavoidable exit from a depressive one, Mandel highlights a certain point about the expansion of the world market that warrants close inspection. He argues that “one should not confuse an overall expansion in the world market at a rapid pace with an overall restructuring of the international division of labor.” That is, “employment at lower wages in certain countries is substituted for employment at higher wages in other countries,” and “equipment [being] shifted from one part of the world to another” at best leads to a marginal increase in effective demand through lowered operating costs, but this is not enough on its own to engender “a new long-term wave of accelerated growth.”60

Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” China (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” India (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual,” United States (Geneva, Switzerland: March 4, 2020) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.

Neoliberalism as a political project is often spoken of as going hand in hand with globalization. In other words, in order to return to an era of fiercer capitalist competition, barriers to trade between nations needed to be overcome, either by trade agreement or military coup. Except, rather than completely transforming the international division of labor, for a time neoliberalism amounted to tinkering around its edges. Meaning that, what is thought of as the rapid development of countries like China and India did not occur as rapidly as is often assumed. It took decades to move from countries which provided raw materials to components of manufactured products to countries that finished goods themselves. It took years of reinvestment in themselves before their economies could stand on their own two feet. Looking at levels of foreign direct investment as an indicator of multi-national development of national economies, it seems clear that it took years before even the levels of investment in formerly colonized countries began to approach those of the dominant economic player of the twentieth century: The United States. Despite these changes, following decades of infrastructural neglect, catalyzed by the devaluation and privatization of the Great Recession, the U.S. once again became a haven for foreign investment in the 21st century. 

Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” China (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).
Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” India (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).
Source: World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” United States (Washington DC: March 4, 2020).

This data on foreign direct investment taken alongside GDP growth makes clear that rather than completely transforming relations between the United States and the developing world, FDI reified the existing order of things. Of course, this does not mean that nothing changed between 1973 and 2008, but instead that it took the deepening of the long-term crisis of capitalism (more accurately described as malaise or stagnation) for this incremental process of capitalist realignment to achieve a qualitative shift from a quantitative one. 

The only thing that kept the machine of capital in motion was the industrialization of the developing world as a means of propping up advanced industrial economies. What this means is that despite the massive economic growth across the last 40 years, these developing economies were still relegated to junior partners of American and European firms due to the need to attract the investment needed to develop their productive forces in order to compete with the level of productivity of those companies. This means that they still played their historical role of furnishing raw materials and later cheap manufactured goods to advanced industrial economies, which in return provided capital goods, means of transport, and management methods. 

When all of this is taken into account, a picture emerges of a unique phenomenon: what might be called a stagnating expansionary wave. In a word, while there was a recovery from the prior lows, it never matched that of the previous cycles. This is where Mandel’s notion of non-self-sustaining cycles can be of some use. Without the massive “creative destruction” of worldwide warfare or a global catastrophe, and the continued application of Keynesian monetary policy without its commitment to demand stimulating fiscal policy, the conditions created could only partially restore the rate of profit following the crisis of the 1970s. This analysis fits with some recent scholarship of Kondratieff waves or K-waves, particularly those working within the world systems tradition. While three such practitioners: Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch, argue that the period from the 1970s forward is not out of line with the long-term historical trajectory of K-Wave cycles, they, at the very least, seem to see its effect on the core/periphery dynamics within the world market. 

They characterize the period from 1968/74 to 1984/91, or what they term Phase B of the Fourth K-Wave in the history of capitalism, as a moment in which: 

The Core was ‘attacked’ by the Periphery economically—first of all through a radical increase in oil and some other raw material prices. In the meantime, the West invested rather actively in the Periphery (especially, through loans to the developing countries).61

At the same time, the following period, or Phase A of the Fifth K-Wave (1984/91 to 2006/08), saw the centers of growth slowly shift from the traditional Core to the Periphery. In other words, economic development moved from the First to the Third World, from developed to the developing world. On a purely economic level, they assert that this period represents red in the ledger for the core and black for the periphery, which of course leaves out so many of the social realities that sustained these processes, but that problem has already been addressed by countless thinkers and needs not be relitigated here.62 What is important for the moment is their preoccupation with a mechanically-determined system change, in both the literal technological sense and an economic one, a framework for understanding long waves that both Trotsky and later Mandel criticized as removing human agency from the equation of world history. 

Staking a claim against those that see the period from the 1970s on as one of “decelerating scientific and technological progress,” they contend that the further development and generalization of new technology is a product of the need for the periphery to catch up to the level of development of the core.63 That is, the further accelerated development of the core over the periphery would risk a fracturing of an integrated world system, and to be charitable, they do account for the necessity of “structural changes in political and social spheres” for “promoting their synergy and wide implementation in the world of business.”64 However, from this perspective, it seems the capitalist and international state system bends to fit the needs of developing technology, rather than vice versa. If it is assumed that humanity has created a machine too big to control, then such a view makes sense. However, if we still believe that the technology we build and the economic system we live within is capable of being transformed through our own force of will, then it is imperative that such a view be rejected. 

Indeed, a general proliferation of advanced technology on a global scale, at least that imagined in their work, would require the transcendence of capitalism. As Mandel wrote in Late Capitalism, there are real limitations on the professionalization of the workforce and the automation of labor, as those movements tend to diminish the total amount of surplus-value being produced by reducing the number of workers employed by capital, at the same time that they transform the mental and manual separation of labor—a division that ensures discipline and hierarchy among the working class. To brush up against those limits is to go against the drive toward “self-preservation.”65

Grinin, Korotavev, and Tausch may not see the new economic order that rose from the ashes of the postwar compact during the 1970s as outside the ordinary pattern of long wave cycles. However, their own data does seem to point to a newly emergent pattern of development, one that vindicates the Mandelian notion of expansionary long waves as often contingent upon exogenous triggers to restore the rate of profit. On the surface, this seems to lend credence to the idea of stagnating expansionary waves outlined above, but it would take more than the work examined so far to legitimate these waves as a category of analysis.

Source: H. Armstrong Roberts, 1970s People In, Getty Images

The 1970s and the Failure of Capitalist Production

Marxian economist Andrew Kliman’s work on the rate of profit and the underlying causes of the Great Recession helps to bridge the gap between the work of Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch and Mandel. At the same time, it makes the existence of stagnating expansionary waves not only seem likely, but also the most probable explanation for the movement of capitalist development over the last half-century. This work, The Failure of Capitalist Production, is fairly straightforward in its line of argumentation. There is very little in the way of literary frills or flourishes that a historian might like to see in his attempt to correct what he calls the “conventional left account” of neoliberalism. Regardless of form, its content empirically validates what had only been examined previously through tangential bourgeois economic measure: the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Marxist economists like Mandel used measurements like GDP, CPI, and Industrial Capacity Usage as stand-ins for actually measuring the rate of profit, among other things, to grasp through darkness towards answers—to see beyond the form of appearance. For instance, a lag in GDP growth might point to a lag in new productive investment or low Industrial Capacity Usage might point to a lack of incentive to invest productively, but Kliman does something different with his book. Applying the temporal single-system interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s value theory, he uses the extensive U.S. economic data to measure fluctuations in the rate of profit.66

In doing so Kliman finds that, in contrast to what more traditional accounts have argued, the discipline of labor and the shift in advanced industrial economies away from manufacturing to service and finance did not produce an upswing in the rate of profit. Instead, he shows this to be on the whole a failed fix to increase productive investment, due to the unwillingness on the part of policymakers to unleash the destructive potential of an untethered capital upon the world. The fear of what a crisis as deep as the Great Depression would do to the system as a whole acted as a failsafe against a pure market fundamentalism. To unchain the latent extirpative force would be folly, as it represents an existential gambit on the part of capital on whether it would survive the destruction intact or if it would be felled by the gravediggers it might produce. 

Ultimately, this double-bind creates conditions in which “artificial government stimulus…produces unsustainable growth” that “threatens to make the next crisis worse when it comes,” and all for nothing, as “the economy will remain sluggish unless and until profitability is restored”—that is unless the character of production changes.67 From this perspective, what could be termed neoliberalism did not begin in the 1980s, but rather, was born out of the beginning of a “long period of relative stagnation” that began in the 1970s.68 The Reagan Revolution and Voodoo Economics were themselves a means of saving the system from itself without recourse to Pascal’s wager of pure creative destruction, and not the crucible of economic transformation themselves. 

Kliman pulls from two data sets to measure the rate or profit in the United States: the first, before tax-profits; and the second, what he describes as the “property-income” rate of profit. The second data in his estimation is closer to the spirit of Marx—in that it “counts as profit all of the output (net value added) of corporations that their employees do not receive,” including “money spent to make interest payments and transfer payments (fines, court settlements, gift contributions, and so on, to pay sales and property taxes, and other minor items.”69 Such an approximation of the Marixan rate of profit makes sense, when we consider that Marx wrote in the second volume of Capital that it is:“immaterial for the rent collector of a landlord or the porter at a bank that their labor does not add one iota of value of the rent, nor to gold pieces carried to another bank by the sackful.”  Rather, all that mattered was that they received a portion of value produced from the point of view of the total social production.70 Kliman demonstrates this historical decline in the rate of profit by applying various methods of control to both data sets in different ways. For instance, including inventories in the before-tax rate as a way to factor in the importance of turnover or adjusting for inflation, among other methods.71

All of this serves to illustrate the economic stagnation of the last fifty years, the collective process of kicking the can down the road on the part of the bourgeoisie and their representatives in the bourgeois state. Both wings of neoliberalism failed to address the problem of the falling rate of profit and instead papered over the contradiction with a series of stopgaps that have ultimately made capitalism more unstable, and not less. However, to just understand the economics and not the accompanying social realities are to do a disservice to the Marxist project. Knowing the problem, on the other hand, better shapes the line of inquiry into the historical experience of working people and how they have reacted to and shaped the unfolding of historical processes.

Working from Fordism to Neoliberalism

Before dissecting the economic basis of the emergent neoliberal era, this essay sought to illuminate the difficulty in which those writing at the time of breakdown of the postwar order had in seeing that the systems built through the crises of the 1930s and 1940s struggle under the strain of globalization.  For many, collapse appeared as a bump in the road, one that could simply be smoothed over. But as the expansionary wave of the postwar boom gave way to the stagnating depressive wave in the middle of the 1970s, the possibility of simply repaving the same road became untenable. The ability to maintain an adequate rate of profit and the truce between capital and labor became a pressing contradiction that had to be resolved one way or another. In the end, it was capital that won the battle over who would determine the future, but not without struggle. 

From the standpoint of the working class, how lopsided the bargain struck in the shadow of the Great Depression became increasingly clear. They had given up control over the workplace in favor of higher wages and better benefits. While the latter had served them well and brought generalized affluence unseen in American history, the importance of the former was clarified by the continuing deskilling of work through automation and an increasingly complex division of labor. At the same time, there had been those left out of the pact between labor and capital from its inception. For them, the promise of bread and butter unionism and the prospect of collective bargaining still held an appeal. From their fight to unionize, Marx’s contention that the relationship between economic base and the cultural superstructure are not a one to one relationship becomes clear. Even as the economic basis to organize was curbed, these workers fought for a dream deferred. They fought with the same militancy of their 1930s forebears, conjuring “the spirits of the past to their service.”72

Both this alienation of workers and their struggle for a seat at the bargaining highlight the difficulty in seeing beyond the present. More importantly, it highlights that it is not enough to simply have the right understanding of political economy. We must understand how this reality is experienced in the daily lives of the working class, not just at a higher level of abstraction.  What follows is an examination of working people in their own words, and how they understood the social relations they found themselves.

Source: Preston Stroup, “A workman adjusted a Ford Mustang at the final assembly line in a Detroit-area factory on Nov. 6, 1967”, Preston Stroup/Associated Press

Studs Terkel’s classic book Working stands as both a transhistorical and period-specific documentation of life on the job. While the social relations of labor under capitalism change over time, there will always be a fundamental sense of alienation that accompanies work for others until the capitalist mode of production is transcended. In contrast to the works of Bell and Braverman released in the same year, Working let American workers speak for themselves. They described their own social relations, rather than through the pretense of heady theory. A collection of interviews that includes insight from as wide-ranging occupations as assembly-line workers, truckers, waitresses, bank tellers, and salesman, the book reminds us that despite its romanticization, the postwar period itself produced highly alienating relations of production precisely because American society never went beyond the constraints of social-democracy. 

Phil Stallings, a spot welder at a Ford assembly plant in Chicago exemplifies the Fordist alienation. He describes the feeling of being trapped in three-foot area, pulling the trigger of his welding gun 10,240 times a day as creating an almost out of body experience: 

You dream, you think of things you’ve done. I drift back continuously to when I was a kid and what me and my brothers did. The things you love most are the things you drift back into.73

Not only did his work make Stallings have this sense of incorporeality, he felt alienated in the more traditional Marxist sense. The machines, or the product of social labor, were given better than he received on the job. Indeed, he believed “they’ll have more respect, give more attention to that machine,” and further “you get the feeling that the machine is better than you are,” and if he were breakdown for whatever reason, he would be “pushed over to the other side till another man takes my place,”—ultimately he felt that he was more disposable than the components that made up the tools of his trade.74

While Stallings was a younger man, the problem of capitalist alienation does not discriminate by age, Ned Williams, who worked on the line from 1946 until shortly before his interview with Terkel, expressed a similar feeling which was, however, manifested differently.  Williams says of his time on the line that he was constantly exhausted, “but I got a job to do. I had to do it. I had no time to think or daydream. I woulda quit.”75 Williams may not have dreamed of his childhood in the way his younger counterpart did, but he too lost himself in his work to the point that: 

Sometimes I felt like I was just a robot. You push a button and you go this way. You become a mechanical nut. You get a couple of beers and go to sleep at night. Maybe one, two o’clock in the morning, my wife is saying, ‘come on, come on, leave.’ I’m still workin’ that line.76

The degradation of work in this period was of course not limited to those working in factories, as Doc Pritchard, a room clerk at a hotel near Times Square, attests to. He explained that: 

I’ve had people to me just like I was some sort of dog, that I was a ditchdigger, let’s say. You figure a fellow who comes to work and he has to have a cleanly pressed suit and a white shirt and a tie on—plus he’s gotta have that big smile on his face—shouldn’t be talked in a manner that he’s something below somebody else. 

It affects me. It gives you that feeling: Oh hell, what’s the use? I’ve got to get out of this. Suddenly you look in the mirror and you find out you’re not twenty-one any more. You’re fifty-five. Many people have said to me, ‘why didn’t you get out of it long ago?” I never really had enough money to get out. I was stuck, more or less.77

While it may be obvious from these accounts that the social peace of the postwar era was predicated on a utopian vision of American society that did not exist. That consumer culture of the affluent society did not live up to the promise of a free society. Workers could purchase more for sure and there was certainly more leisure time, but at what cost? The president of UAW Local 685, which represented workers at Chrysler transmission plant in Kokomo, Indiana, spoke to that deal in an interview conducted in 1996. Of the life in a union ship in the ‘60s and 70s, he reminisced that “you knew something was going to come in the contract that improved either your economic status or your leisure time,” but that was not the whole bargain, the main light at the end of workers in that period was leaving the job for good, “on the first day they walked in there, everybody lived for that day they could walk out and retire.”78

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the ability to have the last chapter of life in the form of a comfortable retirement, or even the ability to have some sort of leisure time was materially a step forward for the working class of the advanced industrial countries, something that the erosion of those gains has laid bare. This progressive element of an ultimately conservative collective bargaining system would have been self-evident to those standing outside it even at the time.

Lane Windham’s recent work Knocking on Labor’s Door shows that even after what Cowie calls “the last days of the working class” in the 1970s, those outside of the labor-capital compact continued to try to wedge their foot in the door.79 And this was not just a timid knock, but a pounding on the door by an increasingly diverse working class traditionally left out in the cold by the postwar boom. Rather than looking at strike levels, she utilizes data on unionization drives both successful and not. Instead of decline, this National Labor Review Board data points to an increase in struggles to form unions throughout not just the 1970s, but also the Reagan eighties, particularly those in the emergent service sector. 

The reason is that in the American context, many of the necessities of daily life including healthcare and retirement were tied to employment in a way they were not elsewhere where more expansive social democratic safety nets had been created. In order for workers to assure access to these social goods, they required a union contract, something that as Windham illustrates, became increasingly difficult. This was accomplished through the dual process of, on the one hand, the rise of labor management consulting as a cottage industry to help employers sidestep existing laws, and on the other, the exponential growth in lobbying efforts that would make union organizing a more difficult process than it already was. This is an ongoing process that the recent Janus decision provides just the latest example of. Put simply, as new segments of the working class were opening the door to perceived prosperity, the door was slammed in their face. 

The continued militancy of the working class in the face of growing structural obstruction to organizing their workplaces certainly dilutes Cowie’s claim that the working class was made a force of cultural conservatism and irrelevant by the end of the 1970s. That said, the validity of his larger point about the fragility of the order built around the New Deal remains. As he concludes in his book’s final chapter: 

Whatever working-class identity might emerge from the postmodern, global age will have to be less rigid and less limiting than that of the postwar order, and far less wedded to the bargaining table as the sole expression of workplace power. It will have to be less about consumption and more about democracy, and as much about being blue collar as being green collar.  It will have to be more inclusive in conception, more experimental in form, more nimble in organization, and more kaleidoscopic in nature than previous incarnations.80  

While I must disagree with Cowie slightly (we cannot simply talk about simply creating a better working-class identity), the thrust of his statement is true. Any working-class movement must move beyond a trade union consciousness to a socialist one. This entails a commitment to democracy and environmentalism, and of course, a move beyond narrow chauvinism to embrace universal humanity.

Twilight of Neoliberalism: The End of the Eternal Present?

I began writing this essay in January, before the electoral coup against Bernie Sanders, before the coronavirus put the world on lockdown before we plummeted into a recession that may be on a scale not seen since the Great Depression, before American brownshirts marched armed through the streets unimpeded before nationwide uprisings began in response to the killing of George Floyd. Before, before, before. But very little of what has come to pass changes the facts of history laid out here. As the famous quote attributed to Lenin goes “there are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks when decades happen.”81 We are seeing the end of the “end of history.” What will come next is anyone’s guess.  But at the same time, it seems certain that the eternal present of neoliberalism is dead. The sense that we have seen it all is gone. However, the problems left to us by the old form remain. The stench of its rotting corpse has stultified us.  Leaving us to stare in horror as the body putrefies. Even as the left tries to find a way from subculture to the seats of power, it remains haunted by the neoliberal ghost of civility and procedure. 

Announcing the passing of another age, historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle performed an autopsy of the New Deal order just before the End of History. In their assessment, they wrote that while that order was “dead”:

the problems bedeviling that order from the early 1960s live on: class and racial antagonisms, the resentments of status and power, the corruptions and frustrations of engorged federal bureaucracies, the antipodes of authority and resistance, still occupy a central place in our nation’s political life.82

While the neoliberal response to those problems had the effect of further retrenching them, this was not the only possible future. Another was possible, one that would have represented the resolution of those contradictions in favor of the working class, rather than a regression that eroded the gains made by those that built the New Deal in the first place. However, that window closed as the organizations of the working class became either more marginal or a cornerstone partner in managing the affairs of capitalism. The window again appears to be cracked, will we choose to fling it open or seek to rebuild an idealized past that never existed? 

One thing remains clear: the crises of capital will continue until they are overcome. They will be overcome either through the transition to socialism or through a descent into barbarism. There really is no alternative. How we do so is to learn the lessons of the past. I posited earlier the question of whether a second shot at the New Deal was possible or even ideal. To which my response is a resounding no. Sure, it proved long-lasting in a juridical sense and a temporary boon for the living standards of the working class, but in the long view of history the New Deal was a misstep for the working class. It limited the horizon of struggle to what could be accomplished through law, rather than what could be gained through the further development of class warfare. 

Most importantly, it required the accumulation of capital on the national scale, and with that requirement of the continuous production of value by the working class—something that precludes the international character of socialism. In the long run, even the strongest social democratic reforms are eroded by coercive law of competition. Businesses that can no longer live with the expanded consumer participation of their workers and maintain a sufficient rate of profit will always choose their own interests over their workers. Just like they know their interests, we must learn ours. This is not to say that reform means nothing in the short term, but it should never be forgotten that revolution is the endgame. We need to widen the horizon of the possible and ensure that we begin to think not just beyond the limits of our present, but to those of our imagined past. Seeing beyond the crisis of the 1970s that gave way to the flattened history of the neoliberal era, it is possible to see a new world, but a world in which the contours are unknown and will likely remain undefined for the foreseeable future, that is, until we start to make it.

Worse than Dead: A Critical Response to McKenzie Wark

James W reviews McKenzie Wark’s Capital is Dead. 

Nearly a year has passed since the publication of McKenzie Wark’s short book Capital is Dead: Is This Something Worse? More than half of that time has been spent in the midst of an unprecedented global crisis which has impacted the course of history in ways that cannot yet be fully understood. Simultaneous mass uprisings against racism and police brutality have brought the brutality of the state into stark relief against the transparent unwillingness of the ruling class to deploy its financial resources to mitigate the effect of the pandemic on the public. The novelty of our present historical circumstances are worthy of radical investigation, and the hypothesis of Wark’s book certainly aspires to such radicalism. Caught between algorithmic policing and contact tracing, the time is ripe for rethinking what “information” really means to communists. Unfortunately, the rhetorical content of the book is a stubborn refusal to actually say anything radical. Capital is Dead spends its most of its pages trying to justify its own existence by attacking any dialectical method which might seek to venture onto Wark’s terra sancta, the realms of science and technology in the purely empirical sense which she chooses to conceive them. Seen in retrospect, Wark’s thesis (that we have actually been living through a new and brutal mode of post-capitalist production for quite some time) appears to have been dead on arrival. However, if we proceed from an immanent critique of Wark’s postivistic treatment of information theory, we can recover the critical Marxist insight that a radical understanding of the present can make the past itself seem brand new.     

It is disappointing then that in the months immediately following the book’s release, responses to Capital is Dead mostly took the book at its word and agreed to the terms set out by Wark’s “thought experiment.” Engagement with the book purely on its own terms, however, inevitably produced little more than golf-clapping affirmation from a critical theory industry more interested in asking questions than seeking out answers. If the book were as radical as the title would have us believe, one would have expected more responses like the scathing anonymous polemic published in Homintern, which excoriates the book as a self-serving exercise in critical theorizing in which Wark makes “Marx a poet, technology a feeling, class a job, and herself a joke.” The review is funny, concise, and devastatingly accurate, but it still grants (albeit minimally) that Wark’s attempt to “turn techno-positivism into a critical instrument is, taken alone, the start of something promising.” On the contrary, it is precisely Wark’s positivist epistemology which pulls the rug out from under anything radical she might have had to say. Only once we approach contact tracing and social media surveillance from a Marxist direction can we situate them in a radical theory of information, liberated from the confines imposed, ironically, by the false radicalism of Capital is Dead

Accordingly, we must see Capital is Dead as a proposed solution to a proposed problem. As of the late 20th century, the global system of production and exchange has relied on information science and data harvesting in ways that seem to bear very little immediate resemblance to the capitalism which Marx originally described. Wark argues that this state of affairs demands a response, and to the limited extent she believes such responses exist, she finds them woefully insufficient because of two assumptions that supposedly result from a religious and ahistorical fidelity to Marx’s original analysis. The first is what we will loosely call the diachronic assumption that capitalism must necessarily last until communism. The second assumption is the dialectical assumption that there is a gap between the “essence” and the “appearance” of a given mode of productionthat the way capitalism looks could be different from the way capitalism is. Combined, the result is an inability to think of capital as historically contingent: although the present mode of production appears to be something other than capitalism, it must still be capitalism, because it is not communism. Wark sums up the problem-solution structure of Capital is Dead herself: “how then can a concept of capitalism be returned to its histories? By abandoning the duality of its essence and appearance.”1

Capital is Dead identifies these two related assumptions as the main theoretical shortcomings for the critical theorists who’ve gotten “stuck trying to explain all emerging phenomena as if they were always expressions of the same eternal essence of Capital.”2 These “academic” Marxists have been reduced to merely chronicling capitalism’s development through a diverse set of appearances, such as “disaster, cognitive, semio, neuro, late, biopolitical, neoliberal, or postfordist capitalism, to name just a few options.”3 Wark might be amused to know that, as of July 2020, “Pandemic Capitalism” is in fact already the title of several articles and at least one forthcoming book. In light of the radical changes to our lives recently, it is easy to understand where Wark is coming from when she asks the reader if “the capitalism that we have all agreed that we live in, has […] become too familiar, too cozy, too roomy an idea?”4 Wark’s corrective, however, has far-ranging theoretical implications which demand careful consideration.

Anti-Anti-Duhring

The dialectical assumption which Wark first proposes to jettison is in fact very deeply rooted in what she calls the “received ideas and legacy language”5 of orthodox readings of Marx. Wark’s critique of this assumption relies heavily on the heterodox Marxism of Louis Althusser, who uses the terms “expressive causality” or “expressive totality” to criticize those theories of history which proceed from an opposition between “phenomenon and essence.”6 In a general sense, theories of expressive causality take each superstructural phenomena to be only expressions of the same essential economic base or mode of production. As a consequence, each superstructural element, being each at once identical to that social totality yet superficially non-identical to each other element, must logically be a false appearance. Althusser radically broke with this theory of causality, and Wark follows him by reading theories of expressive causality as theories of eternal capitalism: “The essence of Capital is eternal. It goes on forever, and everything is an expression of its essence. Capital is the essence expressed everywhere, and its expression is tending to become ever more total.”7

Wark does not simply take Althusser as the only point of departure for her analysis, however. For her, Althusser’s thought is in a certain sense still too dogmatic and genteel: he does not go far enough in his anti-dialectical approach to Marxism. Even though “political and cultural superstructures were not mere appearances,” to Althusser, he still saw them as relegated to “the reproduction of the essential economic form of capitalism.”8 His inability to take the final steps towards empiricism is for Wark symptomatic of his insistence on Marxism as a “philosophical method” for which philosophy is the “sovereign form of knowledge.”9 If it cannot be contradicted by the vulgar empiricism of day-to-day experience, Althusserian Marxism is just as dogmatic as the “Hegelian” Marxism it criticizes, insistent on the diachronic assumption instead of the dialectical one. For Wark’s Althusserians, there isn’t an ontological gap between the appearance and the essence of capitalism, but there is a sort of epistemic one, bridgeable only by a privileged form of abstract knowledge.

Therefore, Wark suggests that theories of adjective-capitalisms are actually also based on the structuralism of Louis Althusser to the extent that his analysis decenters the relations and forces of production. Althusser conceives of the social totality as a structure in which each element (economy, culture, government, etc) has a relatively horizontal relation to the others, with the economic dimension only taking precedence in the last instance. In Wark’s account, Althusser’s Marxism “was like catnip to academic Marxists looking for ways to fit into conventional academic disciplines, because it allowed for three distinct objects of study: the economic, the political, and the ideological (or cultural.)”10 Each element gains just enough autonomy from the economic “base” to allow endless “Marxist” analyses of cultural life without anyone having to question the historical assumption that we still persist in a capitalist mode of production.

The net result is a prevailing belief among university professors and theorists that an essential capitalism must persist despite apparently bearing little resemblance to the steam-hammer and spinning-jenny of Marx’s time. As a corrective, Wark proposes a new approach that proceeds by “describing relations of exploitation and domination in the present, starting with the emerging features, and work back and out and up from that.”11 Such a project, the construction of a new theory of history, however, is preempted by Wark’s theoretical commitment to empiricism: where Althusser seems to have erred by privileging philosophy as a sovereign form of knowledge, Wark attempts a corrective by privileging all forms and fields of specialist scientific knowledge. 

Zombie Positivism

Capital is Dead is founded on this shaky theoretical premise: there must always be some element of science and technology which can “only be known through the collaborative production of a critical theory sharing the experiences of many fields,”12 and is therefore impossible to fully theorize and incorporate into the “essence” (base) or “appearance” (superstructure) of this or that mode of production. Such an empirically available residue is definitionally excluded from expressive totalities. However, it must also lie beyond the Althusserian social totality as well to the extent it is not available to purely philosophical inquiry and remains the subject of only the more particular fields of knowledge.

In setting out to defend Capital’s continued “function as a historical concept,”13 Wark first intentionally forfeits the most readily available theoretical means for thinking the technological or scientific in the context of any totality (either structural or dialectical.) Totalizing theories, Wark argues, cannot ever fully accommodate the results of the empirical sciences: “where the relations of production can be understood theoretically, the forces of production cannot. They don’t lend themselves to an abstract, conceptual overview by a master thinker within a genteel high theory.”14 The totality is, by its definition, not empirically available to the individual observer, encompassing more than they could ever hope to measure, and as such appears to be beyond the horizon of Wark’s Marxism.

When Wark heavily qualifies her book as only a “minimally plausible”15 thought experiment aimed at re-historicizing capitalism against belief in the “eternal essence of Capital,” her idea of history must be necessarily limited insofar as it excludes the privileged results of scientific inquiry regarding technology, nature, or the inorganic world writ large. At the very same time, her idea of history must also exclude elements of the classical dialectical formulation to the extent that such constructions rely theoretically on expressive causalities (and therefore rejecting any dialectical relationship between base and superstructure and, consequently, most non-Althusserian theories of totality). 

We end up with a bit of a bait-and-switch. What started as a thought experiment becomes instead an everything-must-go reimagining of Marxism as a method for organizing scientific inquiry, which requires starting over entirely from only the most basic empirical precepts. Wark states that Capital is Dead attempts to “think a materialist history in a really quite “orthodox” way,”16 but that is not what happens. We end up with a superficially Althusserian concept of non-dialectical history for which the stages of production are more of a heuristic for organizing the various relations and forces of productions as we observe them in daily life, but lack a sovereign form of knowledge that can order them or relate them all to each other. 

But are these concessions even necessary for her thought experiment? One can certainly entertain the possibility of non-capitalist, non-communist futures without discarding the dialectical content of Marxist thinking. The “common ruin of the contending classes”17 is a theoretically permissible outcome of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. She even gestures in this direction herself in Chapter 4, suggesting that neither capitalism or socialism survived the Cold War, and from their mutual ruin emerged a new mode of production. With that in mind, the attack on dialectical materialism seems more so aimed at pre-empting any other readings of the significance of information to production. In reality, Marxists actually are free to develop a new total history into which a new mode of production could be incorporated (were such a thing justified). That said, such a history would have to be fully theorized in ways which Wark would resist. 

Vectoralism, or Something Worse?

Having clarified Wark’s theoretical commitments, we are now safe to temporarily grant Wark’s premise. She has in fact cleared the way to introduce new terminology and class relations to see how they fit the data, even if she insisted on first sandblasting every other possible option. In her proposed schematic, the emerging locus of class domination is control of the vector, a threefold object18 encompassing (1) data itself, (2) the computational and telecommunications infrastructure used to interpret and transmit that data and (3) the actual path or direction that (1) follows through (2). For Wark, the vector is related to but entirely distinct from capital as Marx understood it: the vector is “the material means for assembling so-called big data and realizing its predictive potential.”19 Ownership of the vector, then, becomes the means of realizing surplus value for the new ruling class. 

Wark posits the existence of this new “vectoralist class,” a sort of neo-bourgeoisie which owns the vectors, alongside the new “hacker class”, a class that primarily produces the novel data for which the vector is the sole means of realizing value. Distinct from the proletariat, who were tasked with “having to make the same thing, over and over,”20 the hacker class must produce the “new” information for the vector. By Wark’s new definition, hacking is often unpaid work: the vectoralist class is able to squeeze value from the information collected passively from hackers via FitBit and Alexa in much the same way as they squeeze it from the brands, patents, and programs which hackers are tasked with producing during their paid workdays.

For its part, Capital is Dead does convincingly argue that the realization of value in the imperial core increasingly relies on control of supply chains, logistical data and intellectual property. Such a thing scarcely needed to actually be argued, though. The problem for Wark’s conclusion is that despite her attempt to “conceptualize the problem synchronically,”21 her theory for the production and control of information, novelty, and networks can only function in the context of this single proposed mode of post-capitalist production. 

If the relations of production can only be theorized on the basis of empirically available forces of production, which cannot themselves be theorized, we have a very serious theoretical problem for trying to think about capitalism, feudalism, or really anything other than vectoralism. We can conceive of a theory of capitalism which is derived purely from empirical results, and we can also think of a theory of feudalism which is derived purely from empirical results, but to relate these theories in anything resembling a totality would also necessarily entail theoretically relating the empirical results of “semi-autonomous” fields of study to one another, which Capital is Dead forbids. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson proposes a corrective to Althusser’s social totality, emphasizing that “the notion of ‘semi-autonomy’ necessarily has to relate as much as it separates. Otherwise, the levels will simply become autonomous tout court, and break into the reified space of the bourgeois disciplines.”22

That’s exactly what happens to Wark’s analysis when she cuts Althusser’s “sovereign knowledge” lifeline, and then she presents it as a good thing. The full autonomy of the sciences rapidly metastasizes to the full autonomy of the historical stages of production, and consequently previous or future historical stages are no longer available to Wark’s methods except insofar as they remain available for empirical study in the present. Synchronic modes of production only can exist as either unlabeled bones of extinct species or as crashed spaceships from the distant future, but Wark does not have a way to tell which is which without breaking her own rules, which she does often. When she concedes that “many of the world’s peoples are not even workers but still peasants who are being turned into tenant farmers by the theft of their common land by a landlord class […] much of the world is also a giant sweatshop,” she engages in a Marxist analysis that is built with the theoretical tools that she supposedly rejects. For that reason, her analysis of “older class antagonisms” can only be to simply add “a new layer on top.”23 

Such shortcomings are inevitable because a meaningfully synchronic view must see classes and modes of production as more than categories for empirical data points. We can only see them as emerging or disappearing if they’re indexed by historical time. Historical time requires a totality; not even necessarily a dialectical totality, but a totality all the same. Althusser says as much in his treatment of the topic, arguing for the construction of a “Marxist concept of historical time on the bases of a Marxist conception of the social totality.”24 It is not possible for Wark to situate the vectoral mode of production within an Althusserian social totality, being derived from empirical principles to which a sovereign form of philosophical knowledge would not have actual access. However, it is also not possible for her to situate her the vectoral mode of production within a traditionally dialectical totality because such a theoretical construction would, to a greater or lesser extent, require an expressive causality which is also forbidden by the premise of Wark’s thought experiment.  

Rather than pushing us to “think synchronically about a matrix of antagonistic classes that includes emerging ones,”25 as she intended, we are instead forced into a theoretical position which is itself antichronic. In order to say anything about history, Wark asks that we first assume it to be arranged in a certain way, which is exactly the diachronic mistake we were trying to correct. Capitalism becomes what is trapped in our museums26 and vectoralism is what we live in now. Feudalism can only be something that came before capitalism on the road to vectoralism. If our academic Marxists can only conceive of capitalism as the pre-history of a future communism, then Wark is only able to theorize past modes of production to the extent that they might be mere pre-histories to her hypothetical vectoralism. As for communism, well, “Communism is dead.”27 

Data and the Darstellung

Capital is Dead presents itself as being all about getting down and dirty on the cutting edge of technology. It is an appeal to Marxist readers to re-center the forces of production and get started working with them hands-on. However, we have to do it in the way that Wark wants and come to the conclusions that she’s already decided on. Otherwise, we risk becoming like those scary Soviet dogmatists who tried to figure out how “Marxism could be interpreted as having been compatible with modern physics even before it existed.”28 Wark doesn’t want us to think about Marxist theories of technology and nature which would attempt to extend the totality to the non-human, the geological, the more purely scientific. Such a move would require entertaining the possibility of Marxism as an explanatory worldview which, if perhaps not capable of making direct ontological claims, would at least be able to make descriptive claims about the ways the sciences actually work in class society without fear of treading on their toes. When Mckenzie Wark admits that “climate science has to be addressed as being, for better or worse, a science of the totality”29 one is forced to wonder why the same concession is not extended to Marxism.   

In his corrective to Althusser, Fredric Jameson offers a version of History-as-totality, providing a Marxist framework which can both respect and incorporate the results of the sciences. To differentiate fields of inquiry at all, to see physics, computer science, climatology, biology or information science as distinct domains, would require the assumption of a prior totality within which and from which they could be seen as autonomous. Jameson proposes that the value of Althusser’s criticism is only recovered if one sees “difference as a relational concept, rather than as the mere inert inventory of unrelated diversity.”30 Both structural and expressive totality are reliant on a form of mediation that relates either its semi-autonomous parts or its false appearances (respectively) by either difference or identity (respectively.) Mediation establishes “initial identity, against which then (but only then) local identification or differentiation can be registered.”31 

So let us instead chart such a path: neither adjective-capitalism nor vectoralist production, but a vision of History as the horizon onto which no metaphysical categories can be forced, not even “man” or “machine” or “nature.” It is this horizon to which Marxist theories of totality always aspire but always fall short: in his commentary on The Political Unconscious, William C. Dowling explains that “to think the totality is thus to see in a sudden flash of insight that an adequate notion of society includes even the notion of an external universe, that society must always function as the whole that includes all things, the perimeter beyond which nothing else can exist.”32 We should, for better or worse, try to think the totality all over again. 

To see development of the productive process in a truly synchronic sense would then be to trace its contours against the entire backdrop of History, which remains the “absent cause” for the diachronic differentiation of the various social forms. When Wark describes information as “a relation between novelty and repetition, noise and order” which can be extracted and valorized “even from free labor,”33 she is pointing to a model of enclosure and control that cannot and should not be confined to the present but must instead be radically projected backwards and forwards. We may even need to see information not as a new form of commodity but instead, perhaps at first only speculatively, begin to see the commodity form as an older and less general expression of the principles of the information sciences as we now understand them. 

In that direction, we should follow Wark when she hints at the strange “ontological properties”34 of information. If it is too random, it is indecipherable static. If it is entirely predictable, it is redundant and conveys nothing new to the recipient.35 When Wark limits Marxism to a mere empirical method for analyzing the specifics of this or that mode of production, she misses that information could itself be productively conceived as a unity of opposites, containing the very “sameness” and “difference” that supposedly divides the hacker from the proletarian. If one unbinds the contradictory nature of information through the whole of history, one can begin to see the individuation of the rationalized proletarian or the enclosure of previously undifferentiated Commons into numbered plots of land as a production of the difference necessary for the production of sameness in the universally exchangeable commodity form. Primitive accumulation and capital accumulation become legible in terms of information. What’s more, one can identify such processes of division and individuation as accelerating at all scales, from the individual to the international, in tandem with the overproduction of commodities and the decline of the rate of profit.

Encounters With Necessity

French philosopher Cecile Malaspina presents a dialectical account of information that fearlessly bridges the gaps between statistical physics, information theory, critical theory and thermodynamics in ways that point towards the big-picture approach Marxists should take to the sciences. In unfolding information, Malaspina finds the components that not only make it work but also which bring it into conversation with the theories of History we have been concerned with. For instance, to be intelligible, a unit of information relies on an “a priori restriction on the ‘freedom of choice’ in the message”36 in the form of redundancy. It necessarily must contain information which the recipient already has about language and structure and is therefore not free to choose. “Redundancy is the part of a message that imposes a constraint,”37 writes Malaspina, and “without redundancy, the pure novelty of information would be absolutely incomprehensible and equivalent with noise.”38 The structure is redundant because it is certain; the message is novel because it is uncertain. For Malaspina, information is the “progressive unfolding of this relation between certainty and uncertainty.”39

These dialectical notions of “constraint” and “uncertainty” slide naturally into Jameson’s notion of History as the totality. He concludes the first chapter of The Political Unconscious by definining such a History to be “the experience of Necessity,” where Necessity is the “the operation of objective limits.”40 One cannot help but hear something of a pessimistic rhyme with Malaspina: Necessity is the part of History that imposes a constraint, that part of History which exerts non-local causality on subjects when it “refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis.”41 Necessity is the container and History is its shape, nowhere immanently present yet everywhere making itself known through its effects. 

In this sense, the “history of class struggles” is also a History of information warfare, where the ever-present but uncertain potentiality of Communism must always be precluded by Necessitywhat Malaspina identifies as that which “cannot not be, or cannot be otherwise.”42 It marks the degree to which the future is predicted in advance, the degree to which it is certain. Freedom of choice is eliminated in the structure of redundancies which are constantly made more complex to ensnare each new avenue of collective possibility. Though this fractionalisation and individuation occurs at every level of society, the city in particular is the site of a dramatic expansion of surveillance under the guise of “contact tracing.” Writing for Failed Architecture, Kevin Rogan identifies the “impenetrable system of rational control” that so-called “smart cities” would impose on collective spaces in the name of stopping the spread of the coronavirus as not itself new in principle“The first factories were spaces under surveillance, as were colonial holdings, and the tactic was absolutely essential in maintaining slavery at every stage, from ship’s hold to plantation.” What is actually new is the degree to which “every facet of life has been made quantifiable in order to make this all possible.” The (re-)rationalization of the individual becomes the predicate for the (re-)rationalization of the city, and both are subject to new re-divisions as necessary.      

Perhaps that’s part of the reason for Wark’s fidelity to empiricism. She very clearly identifies liberatory potential in the hacker class’ capacity to produce novelty and difference. Extending the notion of information and its component parts of sameness and difference through a totalizing History would mean dealing with the uncomfortable truth that producing the “new” is not only not unique to hackers but also has often been the task of the ascendant ruling classes at the moment of their victory. Building the new Republic meant not only beheading Louis XVI but also heading off that possibility for a deeper collective liberation which has accompanied the poor, the unemployed, the landless and the marginalized since the fall from primitive communism. The Herbertists were beheaded, too. 

For all its apparent pessimism that this might not be capitalism anymore but Something Worse, Wark’s arc of history still bends towards a future defined by the liberation of information from the constraints of the vector by the hacker class. When Wark declares “Communism is dead” it is because she herself actually misunderstands Communism as a telos. But Communism isn’t just in the future, it’s also our past. At every juncture of the historical process the impetus for collective liberation has been present, always existing as a potentialitysomething that could happenfrom slave revolts to Peasant Wars to Reconstruction. Wark is right to see the predictive power of big data as a threat: prediction means the pre-emption of the possibility that things could be otherwise, the death of a potentiality.  

When we understand capital as “dead labor,” we can begin to see it in the terms of History and Necessity. Dead labor is labor that no longer has the capacity to be other than what it is—it is now crystallized in the form of capital by Necessity. Capital is, in its most basic terms, the time the oppressed classes could’ve spent doing something else but were instead forced to work for the benefit of the ruling classes. It is in this way that the increasingly perfect knowledge of the ruling class about our locations and trajectories is a sort of enclosure of the future itself, turning it into capital by analogy with dead labor—our time which can no longer be spent otherwise. It is in these terms that capital itself is also continuous with pre-capitalist systems of control. The processes of enclosure which created capital are themselves paradoxically legible in terms of capital via our expanded concept of information.

From our 21st century perspective we can see that capital isn’t dead, it’s actually much worse. It has built an informational time machine and has headed back to the first divisions of labor so that it could become what it was always going to be. Maybe in this sense, it really is eternal: caught in a loop of constant re-enclosure and re-division to chop up our potentialities and wall them off into so many individual subjects or labor markets until the environmental bottom falls out. But, to quote Jameson, again: “History is what hurts.”43 As long as the ruling classes perpetually try to force us back into the meat grinder of primitive accumulation for another go-round, we can know for sure that we are still alive, History hasn’t stopped, and other futures are still open to us if we aren’t afraid to theorize them. 

 

The FARC: Between Past and Future

Today we have an interview with Yanis Iqbal, a student and freelance writer from Aligarh, India, who has written many articles on the topic of the subaltern under neoliberalism and the topic of imperialism in Latin America and Colombia.

 

Q: Hello Yanis, first of all to get us started we have this question. Why are you interested in studying the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and Latin America?

A: I’m a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, in India 

I’m interested in studying FARC because of two reasons: Firstly, the contemporary situation in Colombia necessitates that we reanalyze the status of the FARC Guerillas in the country. Currently, violence against social leaders, environmental leaders and even Afro-Colombians has intensified. Colombian armed forces have killed indigenous peoples, journalists, part of the environmentalist Group for the Liberation of Mother Earth, and two other environmentalists have been killed. One of them was the president of the community action board of a village. And these killings belong to a systematic framework where social leaders, environmentalists, are being assassinated. 185 social leaders and human rights defenders have been assassinated in 2020 and more than 30 ex-FARC guerillas have been murdered in the same year. And under Ivan Duque, the killing of social leaders has intensified. Since Duque’s election to power in 2018, more than 500 social leaders and more than 80 ex-FARC guerillas have been killed. Within this general picture of violence we can analyze how FARC guerillas consist of more than narcoterrorism which is what the corporate MSM portrays them as in many countries. And their history is actually composed of forging hegemony. The analysis of FARC in the present-day concrete conditions is that FARC was more than a group of bandits.

The second reason is that the FARC organization has operated in the age of neoliberalism where the peripheries of global imperialism where the peripheries have suffered intensified exploitation. In neoliberalism, there has been a drastic decline of the left in the current stage and a complete dominance of capitalism. Existing in this new liberal era where analysis such as Francis Fukuyama has already declared the end of history. FARC has resolutely opposed the mechanisms of exploitation and pillage and has provided the left with a glimpse of what a materialistic optimism can look like. Whereas many leftists have chosen to satisfy themselves with measly electoral gains and have revered in meek reformism, FARC has continued with the supposedly Leninist thesis of smashing the state apparatus, thus proving to the world that a thorough revolution and a complete negation of capitalist conditions are still possible.

Q: How do you think the FARC compares to other groups like the Maoists in India & the Philippines? They seem to have similarities in the way they hold territory and operate?

A: Yes, their strategy is similar to other organizations. For this comparison, we can analyze the political philosophy of FARC. FARC does not have a foco theory, and they have followed the theory of PPW. While outlining this foco theory, Che had said that while conditions for revolution cannot be created by guerilla activity, the praxis of the guerilla group is both the cause of material conditions and the creation of material conditions. While he did believe that some structural conditions were necessary for guerilla activity, he wrongly deemphasized the work of preparatory social work giving a thrust to armed struggle. Che thought that a bond was created between the guerrilla and the people through the armed struggle itself, contradicting this claim FARC has maintained a model where power is accumulated by the establishment of broad support over long periods of time. It has undertaken careful and particular revolutionary work in the form of social welfare for instance, and this is a prerequisite for a socially embedded force. FARC’s organizational work has therefore involved the building of an alternative state within the state and establishing broad support. The local armed action has disrupted the state and has provided them with opportunities to emerge. And the state has not been able to deal with this disruption except with increased violence. FARC works by demoralizing the military with constant blows and delegitimizing the state by showing its inability to provide even a minimum welfare.

Q: One of the things that pop up is the big role of women in the FARC.

A: Women in the FARC have played an important role and the relationship of women in the FARC guerillas has been a bit ambiguous. 50% of members are female with 30-35% of the commanders also being female. The percentage of women in the Colombian government is 10%, with municipal levels being 5%. Only 2% of [Army] soldiers are female. In this sense, the FARC has involved a lot of women in its organizational activity and has involved them in their combat activity. This is a good sign, the high percentage can be explained by the fact that women see in FARC an organization that fights for their interest and can contribute to solving their problems. 

While the work as a member of the FARC is dangerous, women’s membership in this group offers protection from daily violence. FARC even has created a zero-tolerance policy in regard [to sexual violence] with the punishment being up to death. This is an extreme policy but it has offered them protection and protects them against sexual violence both from their comrades and other groups.

Their membership also permits them actual freedom. While relationships must be approved by a commander both begin and end, permission is rarely withheld. To avoid a situation that could risk a woman’s allegiance to the cause, contraception is mandatory and pregnancy means the child must be either aborted or sent away. This can often lead to traumatic experiences and abortion was often one of the main causes of female desertion. Repeated abortion has repeatedly disillusioned female fighters and caused them to abandon the fact. 

Q: What do you think of the change in FARC through the peace talks? How do you think this reflects on the philosophy of FARC?

A: The political effects of FARC’s demobilization have been huge on the subaltern classes in Colombia. The intense relationship between the internalization of the relations of oppression which inhibited the ability to antagonize the dominant classes and the potential to rebellion that indicates characteristics of autonomous initiative. With the demobilization of the FARC, I believe that the tense relationship has shifted to the internalization of the relationships of domination. When the FARC was engaged in armed struggle, it was totally opposed to the Colombian state and operated as an external actor opposed to this instrument of oppression. The relationship of antagonism was one of the few cases where an external actor attempted to undermine the external mechanisms of the Colombian state. This means that the political subject was completely and critically defined in relationship to the state, and the experience of subordination subjectively heightened by the FARC guerillas in relation to the state.

With demobilization, the guerillas have entered in a relationship with the state and have ceased being external actors. They are now struggling in and against the state as they are integrated into the state apparatus and participate legally in the political process. Consequently, this has meant a re-subalternization of the people who have experienced the de-intensification of the antagonism from rebellion to resistance. Resistance is the constitutive political action of subaltern subjects. The act of subjective emergence is the movement from passivity to action, from subjection to politicization. Nonetheless, it expresses a relationship of subordination as it cannot attempt to breach the regulation limits of the relationships of domination that establishes their concrete boundaries. The subaltern instantiates resistance and ultimately resistance is not merely a reaction but merely aims on a proactive level to modify its totality, negotiating the terms where the relationship of authority and obedience is exercised. Resistance does not reject the relationships of domination, since domination is permitted to continue. Resistance establishes a balance that allows for a permanent renegotiation where the subaltern classes forge a specific political subjectivity.

Colombian Army soldier inspecting handed over weapons handed over from FARC.

In contrast, [armed] rebellion questions the structures of domination by establishing life at the edges of this structure with the intention of ultimately subverting these structures. Rebellion tries to provoke a crisis of domination. With demobilization, FARC has entered a phase of resistance as the guerillas have been incorporated into the structures of dominance and are renegotiating their position within the system to actualize their situation. 

Q: How did this group of 50 peasants grow up to be the FARC, such a large organization?

A: There are many factors that can explain the ballooning or strengthening of the FARC guerillas. They grew from a small force to a large organization through a strategy of socially embedded guerilla warfare wherein they listened to the practical necessities of the poor people and worked with them, helping the revolutionary culmination of class contradictions. Firstly, the guerillas were grounded in a highly unequal rural political economy in which the majority of the rural people are agricultural laborers or precarious owners of extremely small crop farms facing constant displacement by rich actants. Displacement in Colombia is a large-scale phenomena and it is estimated that displaced farmers were forced to abandon more than 10 million hectares of land. 

In addition to small-scale subsistence farmers, coca farmers present another section of oppressed people who are strengthening the FARC organization. Sometimes small scale farmers are forced to cultivate coca by a nexus of drug traffickers and paramilitaries. When paramilitaries arrive at a certain region they make it clear that those who wish to remain living must cultivate. FARC, by combatting paramilitary violence and instituting social welfare projects was able to gain a foothold in rural regions of Colombia. 

Take an example, in Putumayo for example FARC’s daily activities have made them social actors which could intervene in the civic strikes, help the peasants and magnify the impact of the marches by organizing the campesinos to stay mobilized months at a time. By lending support to the movement, FARC helped strengthen the movements’ negotiating capacity to manipulate the state. On top of providing logistical support, FARC guerillas have also been combatting political violence and essentially stabilizing the life of the movement. Instead of drug use, the FARC have regulated the coca trade for the benefit of growth. They control the majority of the coca growing territory and that’s for a reason. If they didn’t have that control, the paramilitaries would come into the coca growing territories laying waste to the peasants. They are a bigger threat. Paramilitaries do not care if they have to kill to steal the product. FARC therefore utilizes a passive mobile warfare strategy and Marxist-Leninist ideological unity, to resist the onslaught of paramilitaries and narcos, and guarantee a minimum level of income to coca growers. 

This combative capacity to resist para institutional violence was developed at the 7th conference of the guerilla movement, where FARC declared itself as a people’s army. And this also helped it consolidate itself and grow into a large organization since this now meant that the party would no longer wait and ambush the enemy but surround it. This was the transition of the guerillas from a defensive organization to a revolutionary offensive movement geared towards more offensive military operations and protecting the oppressed people. 

Talking about social welfare projects. 50% of the taxes from coca-based production has been invested in infrastructure projects. This is done regularly. Besides regulating the coca trade, they incentivize the growers to plant food crops to attain a certain level of food security. Through these small strategies, FARC has attained hegemony and has consolidated itself.

Q: How important do you think is the FARC’s ideological unity as compared to the role of its standing army and the broad coalition of movements it represents?

A: FARC’s ideological unity and military strength can’t be analytically separated out into two separate components. Both these elements have cohesively combined to produce a “politico-military” unity. While military capacity ensured that the FARC was able to materially provide existential support to various oppressed social sectors, ideological unity sowed the seeds of revolution in that existential support and helped in the political symbolization of FARC’s military offensive. Here, we can observe a dialectical unity between FARC’s ideology and its combative strength. If the guerrillas had only given security to the masses without any revolutionary education, a stasis would have been produced where the people passively relied on some armed actors for protection from paramilitaries and multinational companies. But instead of doing that, FARC lubricated existential security with ideology and thus, politically mobilized the people. Now, we can say that FARC’s organizational-operational activities consisted of the material construction of counter-hegemonic de facto governments and the carrying out of activities such as obstruction of roads, attacks against infrastructure, extortion and kidnapping, sabotage, ambushes, control of mobility corridors, and generation of resources. Through these activities, the guerrillas subjectively translated the discontent with the objectively oppressive conditions into a dialectically grounded revolutionary optimism. This revolutionary optimism stemmed from the institution of ideologically-informed small material-economic changes that brought superstructural changes in the consciousness of the masses, convincing them of the materially grounded possibility of radically re-configuring the existing social relations of production. Looking at your question from this conceptual prism, one can say that FARC’s ideological unity and military capacity exist in a dialectical balance to mobilize the various social sectors.

Q: Which factors do you think have contributed to FARC’s failure to break down the military in Colombia and disarm the Colombian state’s armed forces?

A: FARC has not been able to weaken the military because of the military campaigns waged by the state and the imperialists. Through Plan Colombia, implemented in 2000, the privatization of violence and the installation of asymmetrical warfare took place. Through this, security companies operated on Colombian soil using specialized violence to defeat the guerillas. The military magnitude of these private companies is indicated by the fact that in 2005, for example, there were 2000 private military contractors on Colombian soil.

Second, the system of asymmetric warfare with new military modalities has also hurt FARC. This was designed by the USA, who integrated the operations and provided advice to implement the process.  These changes have allowed for the military to be at a tactical advantage. Through this army modernization, the Colombian state was able to kill three important leaders of FARC and this did a lot of damage. Martin Dempsey, a US army general, had said in 2012 that the US would send to Colombia brigade commanders with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq to train and work with the Colombian Police and Army combat units, to be deployed in areas controlled by the rebels. These brigade commanders were already existing commando units for counter-intel missions. These aggressive military campaigns reduced the FARC guerillas by 50%. And paramilitaries have quickened the military defeat of the FARC by establishing the everyday-ness of violence. Through a network of microaggressions they have created an omnipotent atmosphere of perpetual violence. Despite the demobilization of paramilitaries in 2006, various organizations continued to exist, destabilizing and weakening the military structure of FARC. 

Q: But Plan Colombia has only been there for the last 20 years. As a principle the armies in Latin America have tended to be reactionary. There have not been many leftists groups which have won the support of the army. It’s not just about Colombia or Plan Colombia, right?

A: Right, armies cannot take the side of the people because they are part of the instruments of violence of the state.

Q: But in other places, armies have been disrupted by revolutionary movements. 

A: I think it is hard to explain this, but I can give an example. In Bolivia the army supported a coup even if they earlier supported the government of Evo [Morales]. Now they lend their support to US puppets, and this seems to be a historical tradition in Latin America, but I don’t really know the factors which can explain it. 

Q: It seems to me that ever since the demobilization of FARC, the Colombian left has found much more support in urban areas again; as in the election of 2018, that saw Gustavo Petro come second in the presidential election, a leftist ex-guerilla from Humane Colombia. How do you think the future of the left in Colombia looks?

A: To explain the future of the left in Colombia we have to first look at the concrete conditions which have been implemented by the peace agreement, which are going to consolidate leftist politics in Colombia. The peace agreement can be seen as a passive revolution, functioning as a ruling class counter-movement that has marked important but limited changes, and has acted as an antidote to FARC’s revolution from below and the significant pressure from the subaltern classes. So after the peace agreement, neoliberalism has intensified in the form of the productivity increase in the extractive sector such as coal, emeralds, and other resources. And foreign direct investment has also increased by 25%, another important factor. This indicates that neoliberalism is consolidating in this post peace period. And these conditions are going to be conducive factors for the left. As the objective conditions exacerbate, the political potentialities for the left are going to consolidate. And as the ongoing realization of which peace has been achieved dawns on the Colombian masses, class struggle is set to intensify and the political prospects of the left will likely improve. 

During the peace process, the leftist political fraction had supported the need for replacing neoliberalism and installing an integrated rural program. As the crisis exacerbates, more people will identify with the revolutionary demands of leftist politicians. These politicians can exploit the deep disaffection of the coca growers with state-sponsored military offensives and intimidation in the coca producing regions. Whereas leftists try to cater for a regulated program with lesser crop distribution and comprehensive rural development, the current government’s overtly militaristic tactics are not a solution. Comprehending this contrast between those two approaches, coca growers are bound to lend support for the leftists as the state’s repressive tactics to achieve coca eradication are tied to large military operations.  

Despite the good political possibilities for the left, there still are two major problems. Colombia’s history of violence where the carefully constructed hegemony of electoral leftists has been sapped by the violence enacted by the ruling class. For instance, in the 1980s the FARC had agreed a ceasefire with the Betanzos regime. And many of its militaries had opted for electoral politics by forming a mass electoral party called the Patriotic Union. The Patriotic Union had substantial electoral support with 21 elected representatives in parliament. But before, during, and after scoring these substantial wins in local and state and national elections, the military squads murdered three of these elected candidates. Over 500 legal electoral activists were killed and the FARC was forced to return to arms because of the Colombian regimes’ mass terrorism. Between 1985 and 2000 many peasant leaders, human rights activists, and other figures have been assassinated. This historical precedent suggests that in the current conjuncture, where oppressive objective conditions are amplifying, the peace process has been torn apart. Leftist political candidates are being murdered by state-sanctioned violence, and the recurrence of targeted violence in 2019-20 are possible political breaks to electoral politics. 

Q: Just this week there was another massacre where many people were killed. This is a recurring theme. Staying on the topic of the 2016 peace agreement… The demobilized FARC soldiers are complaining in interviews that farmers in Colombia still have no land, even if the 2016 peace agreement promised it. There is still no land reform and farmers still suffer under the minority, 1% of landowners who own most land.  What do you think of FARC’s agreement in general? Is the faith in the electoral process or a civic solution naive or justified as a solution to paramilitary terror?

A: Colombia is entangled in the web of capitalism. Because of its very specific conditions and the entire arrangement of imperialism, paramilitarism has been economically admitted into this integrated system of capital accumulation and functions as a structural condition and not a temporary condition. Paramilitary activities are below the political realm of rising ideology or the military realm constituted by the national armed forces and the appropriation of land. Paramilitaries function in the structure by securing a suitable investment climate by not only combatting the guerillas but by displacing rural residents and providing security for companies that take over these lands, and attacking labor unions that fight against neoliberal policies and fight privatization. In a nutshell, paramilitaries serve to clear the ground of anything subversive that would fight the advance of capital or oppose neoliberal policies. Those who believe in a civic solution to the paramilitary terror have to ask themselves the following question: is the judiciary or any state apparatus going to intervene to stop paramilitarism and curtail the process of capital accumulation that is highly important to Colombia’s ruling classes with Colombia’s vast resources? 

Moreover, there is already a history of people like Uribe having strong differences between what is said and what is done regarding paramilitarism in the ground reality. For example, paramilitarism was outlawed in 1989, but in the 1990s there was a boom in paramilitary activities. Taking cognizance from these facts, and stating that there have been paramilitary pressure from below on social movements, a civic solution to violence would find it hard to survive on the basis of that pressure.

Q: Do you think the recent proliferation of Unions has to do with FARC using its money to prop them up?

A: The proliferation of trade unions is unrelated to the FARC because FARC does not have the requisite financial resources to fund different groups. Under the peace accord, the FARC’s funds had to be declared and surrendered to the government to be used to compensate the millions of victims of the 60-year conflict. In the peace agreement, there were subsections called the “Strategy for the effective implementation of the administrative expropriation of illicitly acquired assets” and the section 3.1.1.3 “Provision of information” of the “Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive  Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying down of Arms” which required the FARC to give up its financial resources. All this happened while the FARC-EP remained in the Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation (TLZNs) in the process of laying down arms. So, now the FARC does not have sufficient monetary clout to financially influence trade unions. 

Q: To sum up… how does this link to your other interest of the neoliberal ethos? I guess if you don’t take up arms again the only thing really left for you is to become a neoliberal subject.

A: In the current period, we have neoliberalism as a social structure of accumulation, and have started a process of subjectification in which new subjectivities have been created. I would highlight four changes, or elements to this structure: they are radical abstraction, entrepreneurship of self, growth imperatives and effect management. Firstly, radical abstraction is the extraction of individuals from their economic conditions, this results in the elimination of local languages and struggles, and the imposition of dominant cultures which facilitate the growth of consumptive environments. So along with the loss of regional struggles and anti-accumulation struggles, radical abstraction also causes precarious existence abstracted from material conditions. You are told that you can do anything, and you can build anything, and this increases the impact of structural conditions on you.

Second is the entrepreneurship of self, which is the individualization of the subject. In this, the individual sees themselves as a portfolio of investment. Third is the growth imperative, which encapsulates the urge to seek new investments and diversify risks. And the growth imperative is an integral element in neoliberalism because it itself is the perpetuation of capital accumulation and the constant search to devise new ways to maximize profits. The last is effect management, which is a method that neoliberalism uses to manage culture. In this effect management, positive effects are over-highlighted to obscure what Gramsci calls “the pessimism of the intellect”, and prevent people from understanding structural conditions exercising a downwards impact on them. And qualitative effects also decorate the self by energizing them to go about taking risks of aspirational desires. 

Q: If you encourage people to take more risks wouldn’t that backfire and cause them to join a guerilla?

A: That’s a possible cause of action, but there’s also the structure. They take the risks from a predetermined repertoire, and guerilla activities are out of this repertoire. 

 

US Constitution: Hiding in Plain Sight

Daniel Lazare writes on the US Constitution, its inherent contradictions, and why socialists should oppose it. 

1982 poster by Soviet artist Evgeny Kazhdan

In order to theorize the United States, socialists must theorize the US Constitution.

By “theorize,” we mean a theoretical analysis not of certain parts, but of the phenomenon as a whole. Rather than focusing exclusively on racism, sexism, and the like, as leftists are wont to do, this means coming to grips with “USA-ness” itself – why it arose, what it means, how it managed to conquer much of North America in a matter of decades, and why it has played such an outsized role in world history ever since. 

The same goes for the US Constitution. Law reviews and poli-sci journals overflow with articles about this or that clause or theory of interpretation. But attempts to grapple with the Constitution in its entirety are rare. Why did eighteenth-century patriots attach so much importance to a written document? Why has it proved so durable? Why do increasingly undemocratic features such as a lifetime Supreme Court or a Senate based on equal state representation draw so little attention? To be sure, articles about the Electoral College have grown common since Republicans used it to steal the presidency in December 2000. But once it becomes clear that reform is impossible within current constitutional confines – which is indeed the case – everyone goes back to sleep. 

So what are we to make of a plan of government that seemingly “disappears” its own shortcomings? Is it simply that Americans are too busy or lazy to care? Or is passive acceptance part of a social contract that is more contradictory and ambiguous than people realize?

What, moreover, does this have to do with socialism? Is Marxism above such local concerns when it comes to the international capitalist crisis? Or, given capitalism’s multi-dimensional quality (which is to say the fact that it is not just an economic system but a political and social one as well), shouldn’t Marxists recognize that the US constitutional crisis is part and parcel of the larger capitalist breakdown and that it is impossible to understand one without the other?

The answer is obvious. Capitalism is concrete. It arises out of real institutions and real societies. We can’t understand it as a whole unless we understand its various components as a whole and determine how they figure in the larger process.

Is the Constitution rational?

The logical place to start is with the document itself. The Constitution (which originally consisted of just 4,300 words but has since grown to around 7,500) consists of a Preamble, seven articles, plus twenty-seven amendments. Article I deals with Congress, II with the presidency, III with the federal judiciary, IV with the states, V with the amending process, while VI contains the all-important supremacy clause declaring that, once adopted, the document “shall be the supreme law of the land.” Article VII, finally, outlines how the ratification process is to proceed.

Since the Constitution says it’s the law of the land, and since law must be rational, the implication is that the document as a whole must be rational as well, meaning that the various pieces must hang together in a logical manner that makes sense. Every legal textbook and every last judicial decision assumes this to be the case; indeed, it would be hard to imagine a society basing itself on laws that it frankly admits are nonsense.

But how do we know this is the case? The Preamble, for instance, seems to advance a straight-forward theory of popular sovereignty in which “we the people” can do whatever they want “in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,” and so forth. Article VII drives the point home even more forcefully since it is clearly at odds with the Articles of Confederation, the plan of government approved by all thirteen states in 1781 and still the law of the land when the framers gathered in Philadelphia six years later. The reason it’s at odds is simple: where the Articles of Confederation stipulate that any constitutional change must be approved by all thirteen states (“…nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made … unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state”), Article VII’s “establishment clause” says that the new constitutional alteration will be considered valid when ratified by just nine.

Since this was contrary to the Articles of Confederation, this means that the Constitution was illegal at the time it was drafted, a problem it promptly rectified via the miracle of self-legalization. It’s like telling a cop who’s pulled you over for speeding not to bother writing a ticket because you’ve just changed the law in your favor. But what would be absurd for an individual is the opposite for a sovereign people as a whole. Just as “we the people” can make any law they want in order to improve their circumstances, they’re free to disregard any existing law for the same reason.

To paraphrase Richard Nixon: if the people do it, that means it’s legal. This is the definition of popular sovereignty— people are over the law rather than under it and hence legally unbounded when it comes to their own self-advancement. So the Preamble states in combination with Article VII. But the rest of the Constitution goes on to say something very different. Article I establishes a complex legislative process whose purpose is clearly to limit the people’s decision-making abilities. Article II establishes an equally roundabout way of electing presidents. Article III says that federal judges may “hold their offices during good behavior,” which effectively means for life even if the people want to remove them mid-stream.

How can a supposedly sovereign people submit to restrictions on their own power? Finally, there is the amending clause set forth in Article V, which imposes the most astonishing restriction of all. It says that the people cannot change so much as a comma without the approval of two-thirds of each house of Congress plus three-fourths of the states. Back when there were just thirteen states, this meant that four states representing as little as ten percent of the population could veto any constitutional reform sought by the other ninety percent. Today, it means that thirteen states representing as little as 4.4 percent can veto any reform sought by the other 95.6. 

What is even more remarkable is that Article V goes on to lay out two instances in which the people’s power disappears entirely. The first says that “no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article,” which deal with the slave trade. The second says that “no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”Even if every last American agreed that the slave trade should be abolished immediately, in other words, the Constitution says they couldn’t do so for a full twenty years after ratification. Even if the overwhelming majority agreed that a Senate based on equal state representation was intolerable affront to democracy, the Constitution says they can’t alter it in the slightest without the unanimous agreement of all fifty states, which effectively makes it impossible. It thus renders the people powerless as well – not for twenty years but for as long as the Constitution remains in effect. 

How can the Constitution declare the people to be simultaneously omnipotent and impotent? This would appear to be the very definition of incoherence. The rightwing Federalist Society claims to believe in “natural law, the idea of law as founded upon reason and logic and not merely the ipse dixit [unproven assertion] of a given power.”1 But if the Constitution is not founded on reason, as it clearly isn’t, then isn’t this a case of seeing logic where it doesn’t exist?

Of course, it’s not just the Federalist Society but the ruling class in general, who feel this way. All schools of constitutional analysis claim to interpret the Constitution in meaningful ways. Hence, all assume that a kernel of meaning lies at the core. But since we know that the opposite is true, that liberal society can be described as a gigantic conspiracy aimed at pulling the wool over the people’s eyes regarding the essential meaninglessness of their founding document. The result is a classic blind spot concerning a flaw that bourgeois society cannot allow itself to see so that it may continue to function.

Such contradictions are hardly limited to the US. To the contrary, liberal society in general rests on such blind spots. Classic English liberalism, for example, prides itself on the rule of law, political moderation, slow and steady reform, and so forth. “I hear you’ve had a revolution,” Harry Truman remarked to Britain’s George VI following Labor’s sweeping victory in the 1945 parliamentary elections. “Oh no,” the king replied, “we don’t have those here.” Revolutions were for lesser people like the Russians or French, not for a civilized nation like the Brits. Yet, British moderation is in fact a product of a century of turmoil beginning with the English Civil War in 1642 and ending with the Battle of Culloden, the result of an attempted takeover by the vanquished Stuart dynasty, in 1746. England had to go through the fire before Victorian legalism could be achieved. It had to be immoderate in order to become moderate and then forget that it had ever been immoderate at all. 

The US Constitution accomplishes the same trick in virtually the same breath. First, it invokes popular sovereignty but then cancels it, so that “we the people” can submit to a rule of law beyond democratic control – and all in the name of democracy no less. It performs the operation so neatly that bourgeois legal scholars forget that popular sovereignty existed in the first place.

So is this our theory of the US Constitution, i.e. that of a self-denying system of government whose purpose is to blind the people to its own contradictions? One that declares the people to be sovereign in theory while denying it in fact? The answer is not quite. First, we’ve got to examine what purpose this blind spot serves.

Political playing field or instrument of class rule?

E.P. Thompson closed his 1975 study, Whigs and Hunters, an examination of eighteenth-century politics and law, with a swipe at a “highly schematic Marxism” that holds that “the rule of law is only another mask for the rule of a class” and that therefore “[t]he revolutionary can have no interest in law, unless as a phenomenon of ruling-class power and hypocrisy; it should be his aim simply to overthrow it.” Against this sort of “structural reductionism,” Thompson argued in favor of a more supple mode of analysis:

…in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the law had been less an instrument of class power than a central arena of conflict. In the course of conflict, the law itself had been changed; inherited by the eighteenth-century gentry, this changed law was, literally, central to their whole purchase upon power and upon the means of life.… What had been devised by men of property as a defense against arbitrary power could be turned into service as an apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the apologia was serviceable up to a point: for these “propertyless” … comprised multitudes of men and women who themselves enjoyed, in fact, petty property rights or agrarian use-rights whose definition was inconceivable without the forms of law.2

Rather than merely imposing class rule, law achieved hegemony by laying out a political playing field with room for everyone to take part. While obviously benefitting the high and mighty, it offered a measure of protection for the “petty property rights or agrarian use-rights” of those below. The poor thus ended up trusting in the law as well, thereby rendering its hegemony all the more complete. The situation was much the same in British North America, where, if anything, everyone had more of a stake since property was more widespread – not counting slaves and Native Americans, that is. Consequently, New England wound up even more legalistic than Old England back home.

Since travel was difficult from north to south, politico-legal arenas of conflict tended to unfold within colonial lines. The War of Independence changed this by drawing the ex-colonies into a common polity, while the Constitution fairly revolutionized it by deepening political integration in general. Moreover, it continually turned up the heat by trying to accomplish several tasks at once: create a powerful central government while ensuring states’ rights, establish an unprecedented level of national democracy while entrenching slavery even further than the British, etc. The elaborate compromises that the framers carved out in 1787 ended up both infuriating and enlivening all sides, which is why the entire structure exploded in civil war just 74 years later.

 While the Constitution summoned up and cancelled popular sovereignty in practically the same breath, it offered a consolation prize in the form of a powerful new politico-legal system in which eighty percent of the population could take part. The new politics were vast and dramatic, especially once slavery emerged as a major point of contention with the Missouri Compromise in 1820. The people were still not sovereign in the strict sense, but they were politically alive in a way they never had been before. In France, the people created constitution after constitution after 1789. In America, the Constitution created the people by taking scattered seaboard communities and molding them into something approaching a unified polity. 

Structuring politics

But not only did the Constitution create a new politico-legal arena, it shaped it.

Of the 85 Federalist Papers written by Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay from October 1787 to May 1788, the most frequently cited is the tenth, with good reason. In it, Madison takes aim at the “factious spirit” that he says is forever the bane of stable government and comes up with both a diagnosis and a cure.

First the diagnosis: “From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.” 

Hence, it not only different degrees of property that lead to conflict, but different kinds of – “[a] landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,” as the Tenth Federalist puts it. “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation,” Madison adds, “and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.” So how can we make sure that all these interests and factions behave themselves for the good of larger society?

Reading between the lines, it is evident what Madison is up to. Not only is he concerned about struggles between rich and poor, but between different economic sectors, slave-owning planters on one hand and bankers, merchants, and incipient manufacturers on the other. Since he feels it would be unjust to allow one sector to violate another, his concern is how to keep them separate but equal.

Hence his cure: Madison admits that in the rough and tumble of daily politics, the task is not easy. Ordinarily, he says,

…the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures … are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. 

What Madison understands as bullying seems inevitable, but Madison hoped to prevent it via the miracle of complexity, i.e. the division of the polity into so many sub-units and sub-sub-units that political movements will wind up dashing themselves upon the rocks. As the Tenth Federalist notes:

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state. 

And, of course, the wickedest and most improper project of all would be the abolition of slavery since it would strike at the Southern landed interest’s very existence. Therefore, the goal was to scatter and confuse the abolitionists. This was the purpose of non-sovereign sovereignty: to prevent the movement from spreading from state to state and thus coming together as a mighty whole. 

This explains both the success and failure of the Civil War. Despite Madison’s efforts, abolitionism succeeded in crossing some state lines. But it didn’t succeed in crossing the Mason-Dixon Line thanks to various pro-slavery provisions that the Constitution had put in place: states’ rights; a three-fifths clause in Article I providing slaveholding states with as many twenty-five extra seats in the House of Representatives and twenty-five extra votes in the Electoral College; a southern-controlled Supreme Court that ruled in Dred Scott that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”; a Senate in which slaveholding states were guaranteed parity, and, finally, an amending clause that gave the South an unchallengeable veto over any and all constitutional changes.

Since the Constitution rendered slavery secure within its southern redoubt, the only way around the problem was to suspend the Constitution and launch a revolutionary war aimed ultimately at expropriating the plantocracy. Even though they would never admit it, this is precisely what northern politicians set out to do.

 But once “normal” politics resumed after Appomattox, northern politicians restored the Constitution in full since it had established the only politico-legal arena of struggle they had ever known. Rather than venture deeper into revolutionary waters, they opted almost instinctively to stick with the existing framework. To be sure, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments abolished slavery and federalized citizenship in 1865-70, which is why Popular Frontists like the historian Eric Foner extoll the supposedly radical changes they wrought. But, in fact, such reforms rapidly disappeared within the constitutional morass. Former slaves sank into neo-slavery while the notion that they “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect” once again became the law of the land throughout the old Confederacy. Roughly one American in fifty had died, yet the only thing the Civil War accomplished was to eliminate southern secession as a political threat.

Such are the results of democratic self-nullification. 

The circularity of American politics

The ups and downs of the socialist movement that emerged after the Civil War are too numerous to cover in this essay. But it suffices to say that the Constitution “over-determined” its failure by scattering the movement’s energies and preventing it from coming together in a single mighty mass.3 It did so by entrenching racism, (one of the SP’s best-selling pamphlets was a broadside against the “ni*ger equality” that bosses sought to impose by forcing whites to work side by side with blacks)4, and fairly mandating massive repression. Officials called in the state or federal troops to break some five hundred strikes between 1877 and 1903, cementing US labor history as the bloodiest and most violent of any industrial nation outside of czarist Russia.5

The constitutional recrystallization of the post-Civil period resulted in a curious paradox: class unity at the top and disaggregation below. In 1902, the leader of a group of anthracite coal-mine owners declared: “…the rights and interests of the laboring men will be protected and cared for – not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of this country.” Sociologist Michael Mann observes: “…no other national capitalist class behaved with quite such righteous solidarity.” Yet workers, split along racial, ethnic, religious, and geographical lines, did the opposite. Socialism requires “a sense of totality,” Mann adds, yet it was precisely a totalizing working-class perspective that the Madisonian constitution was designed to prevent.6

Which brings us to Islam. A footnote that Frederick Engels included in an essay he wrote about the history of religion in 1894 turns out to be oddly relevant to America’s current plight:

Islam is a religion adapted to Orientals, especially Arabs, i.e. on one hand to townsmen engaged in trade and industry, on the other to nomadic Bedouins. Therein lies, however, the embryo of a periodically recurring collision. The townspeople grow rich, luxurious and lax in the observation of the “law.” The Bedouins, poor and hence of strict morals, contemplate with envy and covetousness these riches and pleasures. Then they unite under a prophet, a Mahdi, to chastise the apostates and restore the observation of the ritual and the true faith and to appropriate in recompense the treasures of the renegades. In a hundred years they are naturally in the same position as the renegades were: a new purge of the faith is required, a new Mahdi arises and the game starts again from the beginning. This is what happened from the conquest campaigns of the African Almoravids and Almohads in Spain to the last Mahdi of Khartoum who so successfully thwarted the English. It happened in the same way or similarly with the risings in Persia and other Mohammedan countries. All these movements are clothed in religion but they have their source in economic causes; and yet, even when they are victorious, they allow the old economic conditions to persist untouched. So the old situation remains unchanged and the collision recurs periodically.7

Engels had apparently read the fourteenth-century Moroccan polymath Ibn Khaldun and was therefore familiar with his famous thesis about the three-generation lifespan of Muslim dynasties. What makes the passage relevant is that both systems, modern America and medieval Islam, unfold under a static body of law, the Constitution on one hand, and shariah on the other. Since the law is assumed to be perfect and unchanging, all problems must be the result of laxity in its observance. The solution, therefore, is to restore the law in all its ancient purity. 

This was the message of medieval Muslim reformers like the Almoravids and Almohads, as Engels points out, and, curiously enough, it is the message of American reformers today.

At the height of Watergate, for instance, the black Texas Democrat Barbara Jordan declared in ringing tones: “My faith in the Constitution is whole; it is complete; it is total, and I am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the Constitution.” The solution to Nixon’s misdeeds was to put the Constitution back on the pedestal where it belonged. A liberal New York Democrat named Elizabeth Holtzman excoriated Nixon for never stopping to ask himself, “What does the Constitution say? What are the limits of my power? What does the oath of office require of me? What is the right thing to do?” If he had read the Constitution, he would know the answer. Nearly half a century later, Nancy Pelosi denounced Donald Trump in the same ringing tones for “undermining a system, the beautiful, exquisite, brilliant, genius of the Constitution, the separation of powers, by granting to himself the powers of a monarch, which is exactly what Benjamin Franklin said we didn’t have.”8

The problem is always the same, and so the answer must be the same as well. When presidents go rogue, the faithful must draw them back to what ancient prophets like Benjamin Franklin said were their proper constitutional limits. If the Constitution says it it must be right because, after all, the Constitution is the Constitution. But, then, the Qur’an is also the Qur’an, so does that make it right as well? Here is what Ibn Khaldun said about Islam’s founding document: 

The Qur’an … is in itself the claimed revelation. It is itself the wondrous miracle. It is its own proof. It requires no outside proof, as do the other wonders wrought in connection with revelations. It is the clearest proof that can be, because it unites in itself both the proof and what is to be proved. … All this indicates that the Qur’ân is alone among the divine books, in that our Prophet received it directly in the words and phrases in which it appears. … Inimitability is restricted to the Qur’an.9

So is the Constitution, that wondrous miracle that is its own proof, inimitable as well? According to liberal politicians such as Jordan, Pelosi et al., the answer is yes.

Towards a theory of the Constitution 

The upshot is a political system as arid and unchanging as the constitutional structure that controls it. Which is what Madison wanted to accomplish, i.e. to sterilize politics so that the plantation system could continue ad infinitum. 

The result is a society that is unable to grow and hence address a growing list of problems in a constructive and meaningful way. This is not to say there haven’t been bursts of reform. There have, obviously, but it’s invariably a case of one step forward and two steps back. Reconstruction led to Jim Crow and the unbridled corporate dictatorship of the 1880s and 90s. The mixed bag of reforms that comprised the Progressive Era led to the violent suppression of the Wobblies, grim wartime repression under Woodrow Wilson, the Palmer Raids, and Prohibition. The black revolution of the 1950s and 60s gave way to a growing “southernization” marked by the growth of pro-gun and anti-abortion movements and a sophisticated effort aimed at rolling back civil rights. This was observed the British journalist Godfrey Hodgson in 2004: “One of the surprise developments of the last thirty years has been that, where it was once assumed that the South would become more like the rest of the country, in politics and in many aspects of culture, the rest of the country has come to resemble the South.”10

Obviously, popular prejudice is a factor. But it’s an effect rather than a cause, given a slave constitution subject to no more but the most cursory reforms. Take the three-fifths clause that gave southern slaveholders twenty-five extra congressional seats and electoral votes. One might imagine that the abolition of slavery would have done away with such abuses. But with the termination of Reconstruction in 1877, the opposite was the case as black individuals now counted as “five-fifths” of a person for purposes of congressional apportionment— even though they couldn’t vote. Racism wound up expanding all the more, not despite the Constitution, but because of it. The seniority system rewarded racism by allowing the one-party South to expand its tentacles throughout Congress while the Electoral College and the Senate multiplied the power of agrarian states that were less populous and less developed, thus undermining democracy as well.

Despite the civil-rights reforms of the 1950s and 60s, the situation today is largely unchanged. In fact, in many ways, it is worse. Equal state representation, for instance, allows the majority of the population living in just ten states to be outvoted four-to-one in the Senate by the minority living in the other forty. Sixty years ago, the implications were neutral, at least in terms of race, since the top ten actually had fewer minorities than the nation as a whole. Today the situation is reversed with the top ten most populous states home to twenty percent more minorities. The result is a growing premium for whites in places like Montana, the Dakotas, New Hampshire, and Vermont and a growing disadvantage for minorities in places like California, Texas, and New York.

This is why America is racist – not because of some disease that Americans can’t kick, but because of a slave-era constitution that is beyond their control. Meanwhile, the filibuster allows senators from 21 states, like Montana, the Dakotas, etc., to veto any and all bills while the Electoral College gives voters in lily-white Wyoming more than twice as much clout in presidential elections as voters in a “minority-majority” giant like California.11 

Not only does the Constitution prevent the people from tackling the problem of racial inequality, but it also prevents them from advancing on other fronts as well – environmental protection, labor, women’s rights, and so forth. Corporations adore the Constitution because by sterilizing democracy, it gives them a free hand to plunder society as they wish. The working masses are paying a growing price for a constitution that prevents them from taking society in hand and making it work for the benefit of the overwhelming majority. 

Towards a theory of constitution breakdown

If the Constitution’s structure has remained static over the centuries why is it breaking down now? Why has Congress been gridlocked since the 1990s, why has the Electoral College overridden the popular vote in two out of the last five presidential elections, why do Supreme Court nominations generate such bitter fights on Capitol Hill, and why is everyone filled with trepidation over what November will bring – whether the vote count will be honest, whether Trump will leave the White House peacefully if he’s defeated, whether there will be fighting in the streets, etc.? There’s more than a whiff of Weimar in the air. But why now as opposed to, say, the 1950s?

The answer has to do with the larger arc of capitalist development. Les trentes glorieuses, the golden age of postwar capitalism, was a time when seemingly everything worked. In Washington, three white men, two Texans and a Kansan– Dwight Eisenhower, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson – essentially ran the government. Although some leftists feared that Joe McCarthy represented a fascist resurgence, what’s striking now is how neatly Eisenhower was able to nip the threat in the bud. Ike handpicked lawyer Joe Welch to confront the senator at the Army-McCarthy hearings, and the patrician Welch was careful to rehearse his famous line – “Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?” – beforehand.12 In the end, McCarthy was denied his beer-hall putsch and collapsed just a few months after the Senate voted overwhelmingly to condemn his behavior.

So the center held – and what’s more, it continued to hold even during the tumult of the 1960s. Indeed, Watergate marked a high-point of constitutional reverence in 1974. In that moment Alexander Cockburn couldn’t resist poking fun at American piety, as a columnist at the old Village Voice:

On the word front, the sky is still dark with clichés coming home to roost. The nightmare of Watergate is slowly receding, the long national trauma is over, the country’s profound need for rest has been appeased, a catharsis has taken place, a curtain is falling on a tragedy almost Greek in its dimensions, agony is giving way to peace, the nation’s wounds are being healed, the healing has begun, the Constitution has worked, the system has worked, pretty well everything you’ve ever heard of has worked, except the economy.13

The economy had ceased working thanks to the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the unraveling of the great postwar boom, this meant that the Constitution would soon stop working as well. Although Republicans went along with Watergate, temperatures quickly started to rise. The 1980s saw the Iran-contra scandal in which a lieutenant colonel named Oliver North denounced Congress like a two-bit Latin American putschist, with legislators too intimidated to say anything in return. House Speaker Newt Gingrich declared war on the Clinton administration with his 1994 “Contract with America” and then tried to use the Monica Lewinsky affair to drive him out of office in 1998. November 2000 saw the “Brooks Brothers Riot” in which Republican thugs tried to disrupt the vote count in Miami in order to steal the election for George W. Bush.14 Republicans tried to use “Birthergate” and “Benghazi-gate” to sabotage another Democratic administration after Obama won office in 2008. Then, as if to prove that subversion was not a one-way street, Democrats tried to overthrow Trump via a no-less-bogus pseudo-scandal known as Russiagate.

Russiagate deserves a book in itself. Although liberals will no doubt cry out in protest, it plainly amounted to an attempted coup d’état by Democrats, the corporate media, and the intelligence agencies, all of whom were up in arms over Trump’s confused ramblings about a rapprochement with Russia and who therefore pushed the theory that he was a Kremlin agent. It was a paranoid fantasy cooked up by unrepentant cold warriors like Hillary Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, and Robert Mueller. But beneath it lay a crisis of imperialism that had been building for years, a crisis of capitalism, and a deepening constitutional breakdown. It was the interaction of all three that made the situation so explosive.

As the Marxist economist Michael Roberts has noted, capitalism has been in the grips of a crisis caused by declining profitability since the late 1960s. The 1970s, the decade of de-industrialization and rocketing energy prices, saw a long sickening plunge in corporate profits, while the neoliberal “reforms” of the 1980s saw a brief uptick. With the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the dot-com bust in 2001, capitalism resumed its downward course. It plunged again in 2007-08 and, thanks to Covid-19, has now gone crashing through the floor.15

Each downward plunge caused the mood in Washington to turn nastier and nastier while convincing disgruntled whites in the hinterlands that the cost of empire is not worth the blood that they had to shed. Deteriorating social conditions among rural whites sparked the anger that provided Trump with his margin of victory in 2016. American society was coming apart at the seams because the constitutional structure was disintegrating with astonishing speed. 

The Declaration of Independence, America’s original founding document, says with regard to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” After nearly a century and a half, Americans have arrived right back where they started, i.e. with a government that is undermining their safety and happiness at every turn and which they therefore must replace, not in part but in toto. They can’t do so with eighteenth-century methods— only those of the twenty-first, which is to say with revolutionary socialism.

But that’s a subject for another essay.