Organizing for Power: Stealing Fire From the Gods

Amelia Davenport argues for leftist organizers to reclaim the ideas of Taylor’s Scientific Management, making a broader argument for the relevance of cybernetics, cultural revolution in the workers’ movement, and a Promethean vision of socialism. Listen to an interview with the author here

In my article “Where Does Power Come From?”, I discussed how the communist movement should relate to capitalist society. Though I touched on forms of organization suited to the class struggle such as red unions, cooperatives, tenants’ organizations and so on, I neglected discussing how to conduct the class struggle itself. Symptomatic of leftist theory is a tendency to look at the concrete situation, identify the problem, apply a Marxist (or other) analysis, and present a conclusion to the world. This tendency, however, represents a petty-bourgeois outlook where intellectuals present ideas that they expect workers to struggle toward on their own merits. It is a rationalistic method rather than a scientific approach to organizing. But, while abstract discussion has a role, organizing is a practical science. What is missing is how to get from here to there. While programmatic vision is important for giving direction to organizing,  it is impossible to realize your goals without systemic analysis. If you aren’t concretely building towards your goals, everything you say is hot air. 

To rectify my failure to bridge the gap between conditions and goals in “Where Does Power Come From,” I surveyed organizational theory. This included both works by major communist thinkers and bourgeois social scientists. Turning to classics like Mao’s On Practice, Bordiga’s The Democratic Principle, and Lenin’s What is to Be Done? was both illuminating and frustrating. These texts either present ready-made tactics or focus on abstract political questions. While they offered useful principles, they didn’t present a useful methodology for reaching new conclusions. On the other hand, when I turned to bourgeois social science, I found a decided lack of social analysis, but a wealth of systemic thought. Bourgeois theorists like Niklas Luhmann use logic and empirical research more advanced than the classics of the communist movement and show how to do the same, but fail to grapple with class contradictions. Even the socialist cybernetician Stafford Beer naively believed in the possibility of a peaceful democratic transition even after the military coup against the Allende government smashed his economic reforms in Chile to bits. Modern theorists of social organization are rarely, if ever, discussed by communists. The movement seems to favor focusing exclusively on a select canon that discovered the truth for all times and places. Leftists ignore almost anyone outside the canon except one theorist who they discuss with the most extreme bile and invective. He is Fredrick Winslow Taylor, father of task management, and one of the most reviled social scientists in the workers’ movement. Whether it is his identification with the Bolshevik government’s turn toward labor discipline or the belief that he is personally responsible for the fact you have to file TPS reports, there is no doubt that Taylor was Satan on furlough from Hell. As all leftists are contrarians, I studied the nature of Taylorism to see if it was of any use to our movement or if it was capitalist hogwash like many believe.

Taylorism and Scientific Management 

In Principles of Scientific Management, delivered to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Fredrick Winslow Taylor outlines the nature and methods of his revolutionary framework for the improvement of the world production system. But before he explores concrete steps and methods, Taylor articulates his intention and vision. Taylor wasn’t a socialist, but neither was he a fascist or unsympathetic to the conditions of workers. He wasn’t merely a stooge of capitalist class interests either; he was an ambivalent figure. His goals were threefold: 

1) “Maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with maximum prosperity for each employee.” 

2) Transforming work so that workers would no longer be either over-strained through exertion or wasting their own time 

3) Improving general labor productivity so that the standard of living of the average person might grow through price reduction. 

It was Taylor’s belief that by increasing the efficiency of firms, both employers and the workers would benefit. Firms could sell goods faster with a smaller expenditure of labor and equitably distribute the gains.

While Taylor largely saw trade unions as a fetter on industrial progress and representing narrow, selfish interests, he recognized that managers and capitalists abused their workers and exploited them. He believed that the introduction of scientific management would heal the contradiction in interests between labor and capital, rationalizing the labor process for the benefit of both. Like his enemies in the American Federation of Labor, Taylor believed that class conflict was reconcilable through the provision of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work.” However, he saw the act of “soldiering”, defined as worker resistance to giving full labor capacity to the capitalists, as the principal obstacle rather than under-incentivization through low wages. The three evils which Taylor cites as the cause of “soldiering” are: 

1) The fallacy that increasing the material output of labor will result in higher unemployment 

2) The defective systems of management which make it necessary for workers to work as little as possible to protect their own interests 

3) “Rule of thumb” methods which cause people to waste their efforts for little purpose. 

Taylor claims that there are two immediate reasons people “soldier.” First, there’s “systemic soldiering”, where workers collectively discipline one another to work slower so that there’s work for all. Second is the fact that employers set a fixed wage for a given quantity of labor time (or amount of goods that the capitalist thinks workers can produce in that amount of time in a piece-work system) largely based on past rates. This means the workers have an incentive to produce as little as possible in a given period so has to avoid working harder for no extra reward in the future. Taylor claims that the only recourse employers have in this scenario is the threat of unemployment which pits management and workers against each other. Conversely, while the “whip” of unemployment drives the workers, management remains “hands-off” and leaves the full responsibility of completing the work to the workers themselves. Management fails to educate workers in the best methods to conduct work with their expanded knowledge of the labor process. Managers also fail to understand the condition of the labor and thereby fail to direct it properly, furthering conflict. Instead, Taylor recommends management share in work equitably. Despite recognizing that antagonism between workers and employers exists, Taylor believes this antagonism is solvable.

To socialists, the notion that the contradiction between labor and capital is reconcilable by improving the lot of labor within capitalism is prima facie incorrect.  But must we toss out the entirety of Taylorism as a bourgeois scam? What about conditions where the contradiction between capital and labor is nonexistent, such as a socialist society where the cooperative commonwealth of toil reigns, or within the organizations of militants struggling to overthrow capitalism? 

Implementing Taylorist methods

Dispelling Myths

Scientific Management

Setting these questions aside for now, we will look at what scientific management is and what it is not. For Taylor, scientific management is emphatically not a set of techniques that an organization can adopt to improve efficiency and profit. Instead, scientific management is a philosophy of organization which when applied to different contexts and with different objectives necessarily requires different techniques. This isn’t unlike Marxism, which, as a scientific philosophy, requires a creative application and offers different strategies depending on the objective conditions. While in one context standardizing the motions used for say shoveling coal might both improve the output and decrease the strain on the body of the worker, in another context standardizing motions, like in detail painting, might produce the opposite effect. In particular, Taylor concerns himself with the misapplication of techniques creating dissatisfaction among workers. Issues could emerge from a lack of proper education on the benefits of a given techniques or through the introduction of harmful methods. Certain techniques may cause harm to workers without the use of other innovations that address these problems. Taylor claims that his philosophy can revolutionize production if applied properly.

Understanding scientific management’s role requires knowing what it replaced. Before Taylor, employers organized labor based on what Taylor calls “management by initiative and incentive.” Initiative is the “hard work, good-will, and ingenuity” of the workers. In trades where there is no systemic organization of labor, it is each worker who has in their possession the accumulated knowledge, built up over generations, for how to conduct the work. It is on the workers’ own individual initiative that they labor. Management’s role is motivating workers to use their knowledge and physical skill to complete the work. Even if a firm draws management from the ranks of the most skilled workers, they cannot hope to match the combined knowledge of their employees. Managers have three tools in this system: 

1) Positive incentives like the promise of promotions, raises, and better personal working conditions relative to other workers 

2) Negative incentives like the threat of firing or loss of pay 

3) The personal charisma of the manager and rapport they build with the workers.

If a firm doesn’t wish to pay beyond the average, it must surveil its workers so they tear into the work. A firm using this model relies on spies who hope for personal advancement. 

Now, what does scientific management philosophy itself consist of? Listening to some leftists, you’d think it was totalitarian-rational control over the bodies of workers to extract ever-increasing labor or a synonym for the increased domination of capital over the lives of workers. This couldn’t be further from the truth. In reality, one of Taylor’s goals was the education of workers so they can control and discipline their own actions. More than anything, scientific management is the systemic organization and rationalization of the tasks of labor so that they can be divided equitably according to ability. Rationalizing production also ensures laborers meet the needs of the productive process. There is a diverse array of elements that scientific managers must utilize in concert or else the system will fail to produce the desired results. In Taylor’s vision, the principal aspects of scientific management are:

1) The development of a true science (of the particular labor process);

2) The scientific selection of workers and the scientific education and development of the workers;

3) Intimate, friendly cooperation between management and the workers. 

Initiative and Incentive in Leftist Organizing

The “initiative and incentive” model of management is the standard method of leftist groups. “Organizers,” through their personal charisma and promise of winning immediate gains, incentivize people to use their initiative towards their campaigns. Group members receive general tasks and an expectation to complete them, either by themselves or with a few other people. It doesn’t matter whether it’s the top-down orders of the leadership or democratic vote by the group; activists are tacitly encouraged to take on an unsustainable load, leading to burnout. Organizers don’t teach activists to draw healthy boundaries between their own needs and what is reasonable to contribute. If they don’t burn out, activists drop out as they lose interest in work that comes to seem increasingly futile. Motivating activists in leftist organizations is a mixture of generating enthusiasm through charismatic interventions by leaders (whether they consider themselves leaders or not) or through peer pressure and guilt which organizers leverage to build commitment. The routine “cancellation” of leftists by activists and policing of cultural consumption are examples of mechanisms for disciplining activists to the will of organizers. While leaders may participate in the work directly, in vanguardist sects their role is to focus on developing theory and broad strategy. In the case of horizontal sects, organizers perform the same work as other rank-and-file members to the same results. How the socialist left can escape this trap will be further explored later in the text.

Can Labor Be Scientific?

To understand scientific management, these elements must be explained in turn. 

The development of a true science of labor is the cornerstone of the philosophy of scientific management. After “soldiering” by workers and management based on incentivization, the greatest object of scorn in Taylor’s mind is the “rule of thumb” method of organizing work. Most work before Taylorism was conducted based on “common sense” and received wisdom. But the distribution of this “wisdom” is uneven and varies based on the prejudices and experience of those retaining it. For instance, one restaurant might at the start of the day employ the chef to chop a particular vegetable, while another might employ a sous-chef to chop the vegetable as needed as a part of their varied tasks throughout the day. Neither restaurant knows the better method, nor if there might be a third option which could prove superior. To develop a science, a restaurant would test the different methods of preparation to see which wasted the least material and used the fewest net hours of labor to create a saleable product.  

In leftist organizing, rules of thumb constitute the predominant method used by semi-successful sects. More often though, leftists don’t even rise to the level of handmade or received philosophies on the subject and are either re-inventing the wheel or engaging in senseless activities. To illustrate, some communists believe that the creation and distribution of ironic memes constitute revolutionary activity or that taking on unpaid moderator positions for social media companies meaningfully contributes to the class struggle. 

What are some examples of rules of thumb that leftists employ? Today these examples manifest as the various tactics taken as articles of faith by organized leftist groups. Of particular note is the theory of the “vanguard party,” along with its necessary complement, “democratic centralism” (and sometimes the “mass line”). Many sects define themselves by tactics like newspaper sales, electoral campaigns, entryism into business unions, and so on. They take these tactics as articles of received wisdom from whichever communist saint they believe the “red thread” of revolutionary legitimacy passes through. Anarchists are by no means exempt from this. Their fetishes of decentralization, “grassroots” organization (something shared with many Trotskyist and Maoist sects), propaganda of the deed, syndicalism, direct service projects, and permaculture serve the same role. This doesn’t mean that any of these listed articles of faith are wrong. It is  possible that in different contexts each may be a necessary tactic or method. Through the application of social scientific analysis, we may discover that in one set of conditions the development of localized food systems is part and parcel of the socialist transformation of society. On the other hand, it may be the case that centralized agriculture is the best way to sustainably feed the masses while using as little land as possible. More important than any given conclusion is how we reach those conclusions, because it means that as conditions change, so too can the strategies the revolutionary movement uses to meet those conditions. 

After we tentatively settle these broad strategic questions, we must uproot rules of thumb within the application of strategy. Take the mass line. Instead of the Maoist slogan “from the masses, to the masses,” which a skilled organizer must interpret based on repeated trial and error, the mass line should incorporate real social psychology, systemic investigation, and quantitative analysis. Simply gathering demands of workers and reformulating them in the language of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is not scientific. Better would be breaking down the aspects of the mass line into its constituent parts and systematizing them. If made scientific, any worker could use the mass line, not just skilled organizers. An outline of a scientific mass line is: 1) the social inquiry; 2) finding winnable demands; and 3) organizing for the identified demands. Each of these three components themselves involve considerable work and analysis. To begin a social inquiry, an organizer must 1) identify and assess their constituency; 2) determine what questions they want to ask; and 3) determine how to reach the masses. Breaking down the other two sections will likewise be necessary. This will extend down to concrete tasks like canvassing a specific neighborhood or conducting a workers’ inquiry. It is by breaking things into their constituent parts that we can begin to understand a strategy and test methods and develop a true science of that particular type of organization. 

Taylor applied the scientific organization of labor at Bethlehem Steel. He started by developing an improved method of shoveling pig iron. This was an opportunity afforded by a rapid spike in demand for the product after years of a glut:

We found that this gang were loading on the average about 12 ½ long tons per man per day. We were surprised to find, after studying the matter, that a first-class pig-iron handler ought to handle between 47 and 48 long tons per day, instead of 12 ½ tons. This task seemed to us so very large that we were obliged to go over our work several times before we were absolutely sure that we were right. Once we were sure, however, that 47 tons was a proper day’s work for a first-class pig-iron handler, the task which faced us as managers under the modern scientific plan was clearly before us. It was our duty to see that the 80,000 tons of pig iron was loaded on to the cars at the rate of 47 tons per man per day, in place of 12 ½ tons, at which rate the work was then being done. And it was further our duty to see that this work was done without bringing on a strike among the men, without any quarrel with the men, and to see that the men were happier and better contented when loading at the new rate of 47 tons than they were when loading at the old rate of 12 ½ tons.

Before Taylor began working at Bethlehem Steel, he had discovered the scientific law governing high-strain labor. High-strain labor is the kind that involves lifting heavy objects or pushing for a continuous period. Taylor began this study to reconcile the interests of management, on whose side he stood, with the interests of the laborers. Management wanted a higher output and laborers wanted to not be overworked. Workers saw no real benefit to intensifying their labor, which Taylor recognized. He attempted to calculate a specific amount of horsepower a worker could exert in a day without damaging their body. But this was to no avail: despite finding much useful data in his experiments, Taylor and his team could find no rule that governed how hard someone could work in strenuous activity by themselves. So they brought in a mathematician named Carl G. Barth. Because of Barth’s mathematical knowledge, the team represented the data graphically and through curve charts. This allowed the engineers to identify the factors which determine the principle law of high-strain labor. Taylor says:

The law is confined to that class of work in which the limit of a man’s capacity is reached because he is tired out. It is the law of heavy laboring, corresponding to the work of the cart horse, rather than that of the trotter. Practically all such work consists of a heavy pull or a push on the man’s arms, that is, the man’s strength is exerted by either lifting or pushing something which he grasps in his hands. And the law is that for each given pull or push on the man’s arms it is possible for the workman to be under load for only a definite percentage of the day. For example, when pig iron is being handled (each pig weighing 92 pounds), a firstclass workman can only be under load 43 per cent. of the day. He must be entirely free from load during 57 per cent. of the day. And as the load becomes lighter, the percentage of the day under which the man can remain under load increases. So that, if the workman is handling a half-pig, weighing 46 pounds, he can then be under load 58 per cent. of the day, and only has to rest during 42 per cent. As the weight grows lighter the man can remain under load during a larger and larger percentage of the day, until finally a load is reached which he can carry in his hands all day long without being tired out. When that point has been arrived at this law ceases to be useful as a guide to a laborer’s endurance, and some other law must be found which indicates the man’s capacity for work.

When a laborer is carrying a piece of pig iron weighing 92 pounds in his hands, it tires him about as much to stand still under the load as it does to walk with it, since his arm muscles are under the same severe tension whether he is moving or not. A man, however, who stands still under a load is exerting no horse-power whatever, and this accounts for the fact that no constant relation could be traced in various kinds of heavy laboring work between the foot-pounds of energy exerted and the tiring effect of the work on the man. It will also be clear that in all work of this kind it is necessary for the arms of the workman to be completely free from load (that is, for the workman to rest) at frequent intervals. Throughout the time that the man is under a heavy load the tissues of his arm muscles are in process of degeneration, and frequent periods of rest are required in order that the blood may have a chance to restore these tissues to their normal condition.

It is in this way that Taylor and his associates scientifically organized the work of pig-iron handlers. This is not the only example he provides in Principles of Scientific Management; Taylor also discusses the application of the method to skilled work. At a manufacturer of machines, he set out to double the output using the same number of workers and machines as before. Despite the fact the foreman doubted the possibility, Taylor proved his claims through a demonstration on a machine selected by the foreman:

The machine selected by him fairly represented the work of the shop. It had been run for ten- or twelve-years past by a first-class mechanic who was more than equal in his ability to the average workmen in the establishment. In a shop of this sort, in which similar machines are made over and over again, the work is necessarily greatly subdivided, so that no one man works upon more than a comparatively small number of parts during the year. A careful record was therefore made, in the presence of both parties, of the time actually taken in finishing each of the parts which this man worked upon. The total time required by him to finish each piece, as well as the exact speeds and feeds which he took, were noted, and a record was kept of the time which he took in setting the work in the machine and removing it. After obtaining in this way a statement of what represented a fair average of the work done in the shop, we applied to this one machine the principles of scientific management.

By means of four quite elaborate slide-rules, which have been especially made for the purpose of determining the all-round capacity of metal-cutting machines, a careful analysis was made of every element of this machine in its relation to the work in hand. Its pulling power at its various speeds, its feeding capacity, and its proper speeds were determined by means of the slide-rules, and changes were then made in the countershaft and driving pulleys so as to run it at its proper speed. Tools, made of high-speed steel, and of the proper shapes, were properly dressed, treated, and ground. (It should be understood, however, that in this case the high-speed steel which had heretofore been in general use in the shop was also used in our demonstration.) A large special slide-rule was then made, by means of which the exact speeds and feeds were indicated at which each kind of work could be done in the shortest possible time in this particular lathe. After preparing in this way so that the workman should work according to the new method, one after another, pieces of work were finished in the lathe, corresponding to the work which had been done in our preliminary trials, and the gain in time made through running the machine according to scientific principles ranged from two and one-half times the speed in the slowest instance to nine times the speed in the highest.

But Taylor’s reforms involved more than changes to the machines. The principle aspect was the mental change scientific management produced in the workers. On the one hand, it required workers to endorse using scientifically selected hand motions, and on the other it needed a mental investment in the new system. Each worker received on average 35 percent greater wages but produced over double the amount of goods in the same time. This motivation to contribute a greater force of labor is as important as any technical improvements to the forces of production to scientific management. But also key is how  Taylor brought in unskilled laborers to work on the improved machines rather than the skilled workers previously employed. Elevating people from lower to higher work increased buy-in and expanded the labor pool available for this work and proletarianized the formerly skilled artisans. In this way, Taylorism has a dual character. Under capitalism, it increases the exploitation of labor by intensifying work while costing skilled tradesmen their jobs. But, Taylorism also makes work accessible to a broader array of workers while also growing real wages as a share of the increased productivity. It is not unlike how Marx observed that the concentration of the forces of production by capitalism itself both impoverished the working class but also creates the means by which the working class can achieve abundance. 

The Social Division of Labor 

It is important to ground ourselves in the real experiences of the working class with the technologies that govern our lives. Within an Amazon fulfillment center, the labor discipline imposed through intensified and semi-automated task-management creates conditions that are degrading and inhumane. Workers have every moment of their time monitored and directed towards only those activities which are necessary to fill orders. In real terms this means people driven to exhaustion and nervous collapse so that the firm can extract more money faster. It may appear that these technologies are the source of workplace oppression, enforcing incessant imperatives towards productivity. Yet behind this imperative towards productivity is the same logic of capital that existed before the introduction of these technologies.  Many on the Left have the mistaken belief that a return to less technically developed forms of labor would restore dignity. It’s a sad mistake. While they have more autonomy than fulfillment workers, capitalism drives in-home hospice nurses to the same level of desperation as Amazon workers. Hospice nurses, working out of a hospital in my own area, are reduced to pissing themselves to fulfill their unrealistic quotas. They simply don’t have time to take breaks in between patients. Even as these nurses are driven to such degrading lows on the clock, ever more necessary paperwork is shifted off the clock so that the hospital can extract more unpaid work. There are no electronic monitoring systems guiding workers there, and they don’t even work under a supervisor. Yet the same basic logic of capital accumulation creates almost identical subjective effects. Even though the nurses have employer-matched retirement savings, high wages, healthcare, and more autonomy, they are still brutally exploited within the labor process. Conversely, when the confluence of history combined task management with powerful labor unions during the postwar compromise, the technical division of labor became a source of workers’ empowerment. Unions could prevent managers from shifting unpaid work onto employees by contractually limiting them to only the specific work in their job description, the very descriptions that the Taylorist system created. Anti-union pundits cite this as an example of economic irrationality, but it meant more free time within the labor process and a general lower intensity of labor. This is why Marx, though sympathetic to their plight, spoke of the futility of the Luddites. They were militant artisans, followers of a mythic “King Ludd” who smashed the machines used to simplify and intensify their labor. Rather than a return to artisanal labor, Marx called for the overthrow of capitalism. Instead of smashing machines, the answer was a transfer of control over the instruments of labor to those who used them. 

While it contains an emancipatory current within it, Taylor’s thought also contains elements that serve to buttress bourgeois society against this current. These come to the fore in his views on the division of labor. Taylor claims that neither the de-skilled laborers who took over the work, nor the narrowly skilled laborers using the old methods, understand the science necessary to systematically improve their work due to their narrow specialization. He says:

It seems important to fully explain the reason why, with the aid of a slide-rule, and after having studied the art of cutting metals, it was possible for the scientifically equipped man, who had never before seen these particular jobs, and who had never worked on this machine, to do work from two and one-half to nine times as fast as it had been done before by a good mechanic who had spent his whole time for some ten to twelve years in doing this very work upon this particular machine. In a word, this was possible because the art of cutting metals involves a true science of no small magnitude, a science, in fact, so intricate that it is impossible for any machinist who is suited to running a lathe year in and year out either to understand it or to work according to its laws without the help of men who have made this their specialty. Men who are unfamiliar with machine-shop work are prone to look upon the manufacture of each piece as a special problem, independent of any other kind of machine-work. They are apt to think, for instance, that the problems connected with making the parts of an engine require the especial study, one may say almost the life study, of a set of engine-making mechanics, and that these problems are entirely different from those which would be met with in machining lathe or planer parts. In fact, however, a study of those elements which are peculiar either to engine parts or to lathe parts is trifling, compared with the great study of the art, or science, of cutting metals, upon a knowledge of which rests the ability to do really fast machine-work of all kinds.

The real problem is how to remove chips fast from a casting or a forging, and how to make the piece smooth and true in the shortest time, and it matters but little whether the piece being worked upon is part, say, of a marine engine, a printing-press, or an automobile. For this reason, the man with the slide-rule, familiar with the science of cutting metals, who had never before seen this particular work, was able completely to distance the skilled mechanic who had made the parts of this machine his specialty for years.

It is true that whenever intelligent and educated men find that the responsibility for making progress in any of the mechanic arts rests with them, instead of upon the workmen who are actually laboring at the trade, that they almost invariably start on the road which leads to the development of a science where, in the past, has existed mere traditional or rule-of-thumb knowledge. When men, whose education has given them the habit of generalizing and everywhere looking for laws, find themselves confronted with a multitude of problems, such as exist in every trade and which have a general similarity one to another, it is inevitable that they should try to gather these problems into certain logical groups, and then search for some general laws or rules to guide them in their solution. As has been pointed out, however, the underlying principles of the management of “initiative and incentive,” that is, the underlying philosophy of this management, necessarily leaves the solution of all of these problems in the hands of each individual workman, while the philosophy of scientific management places their solution in the hands of the management. The workman’s whole time is each day taken in actually doing the work with his hands, so that, even if he had the necessary education and habits of generalizing in his thought, he lacks the time and the opportunity for developing these laws, because the study of even a simple law involving say time study requires the cooperation of two men, the one doing the work while the other times him with a stop-watch. And even if the workman were to develop laws where before existed only rule-of-thumb knowledge, his personal interest would lead him almost inevitably to keep his discoveries secret, so that he could, by means of this special knowledge, personally do more work than other men and so obtain higher wages.

Under scientific management, on the other hand, it becomes the duty and also the pleasure of those who are engaged in the management not only to develop laws to replace rule of thumb, but also to teach impartially all of the workmen- who are under them the quickest ways of working. The useful results obtained from these laws are always so great that any company can well afford to pay for the time and the experiments needed to develop them. Thus under scientific management exact scientific knowledge and methods are everywhere, sooner or later, sure to replace rule of thumb, whereas under the old type of management working in accordance with scientific laws is an impossibility.

Taylor’s logic here is that it takes education in the general principles that govern something to understand it and create a particular science, that the average worker would not have this knowledge, and that even if they did, they could not deploy it while working full-time in their trade. For him, this means that it is necessary to employ scientists as managers for the supervision of labor. Though blinded by his petty-bourgeois class position, believing that only a certain class of men could do science, Taylor is grasping towards a truth essential to the foundation of the communist worldview. We must create universal and general science, and only with a holistic vision can we solve the problems of social organization. The narrow views of individual positions aren’t enough. Taylor’s objection to the educated machine-worker being able to apply science to his work dissolves when applying the labor-saving potential of increased productivity to the reduction of the workday. With a reduced workday, any given worker would have the free time to “take a stop-watch” to conduct time studies for figuring out better methods. Likewise, in the co-operative commonwealth, as workers collectively own production, so too do they directly benefit from the generalization of labor-saving techniques. The question isn’t whether or not time and motions are measured, it’s “who controls the time and motions?”

Taylor’s first step in introducing scientific management was to scientifically select the workers who would be most likely be able to handle the higher rate of pig-iron and had an industrious character. Taylor and his associates took each man for training, one at a time, because the object of scientific management is developing each person according to their ability rather than treating people as uniform cogs in a machine. They began by promising their first subject, Schmidt, an increase in pay in exchange for following their explicit instructions. As someone particularly motivated by money, Schmidt assented. Rather than try to convince and motivate him to increase his output to a level much higher than was normal, Taylor sought to show his subject in practice that he was capable of doing so and how to do it.

Schmidt started to work, and all day long, at regular intervals, was told by the man who stood over him with a watch, “Now pick up a pig and walk. Now sit down and rest. Now walk — now rest,” etc. He worked when he was told to work, and rested when he was told to rest, and at half-past five in the afternoon had his 47 ½ tons loaded on the car. And he practically never failed to work at this pace and do the task that was set him during the three years that the writer was at Bethlehem. And throughout this time he averaged a little more than $1.85 per day, whereas before he had never received over $1.15 per day, which was the ruling rate of wages at that time in Bethlehem. That is, he received 60 per cent. higher wages than were paid to other men who were not working on task work. One man after another was picked out and trained to handle pig iron at the rate of 47 ½ tons per day until all of the pig iron was handled at this rate, and the men were receiving 60 per cent more wages than other workmen around them.

Taylor believed that those best suited to arduous manual labor were also least suited to intellectually understanding the science of labor that they were enacting. He compares their minds to those of oxen. There is no doubt that Taylor, a man of the early 20th century, not unlike many Marxists at the time, subscribed to eugenicist and elitist views of human biology. Taylor, contra Marx, but in conformity with bourgeois and aristocratic theories of social organization, believed that individuals are meant to specialize within narrow trades that they are optimally suited for. He wasn’t merely a proponent of the technical division of labor; he was a proponent of the social division of labor. Though we can and should dispense with the eugenicist bias in Taylor’s own approach, it does not mean that scientific selection itself isn’t a necessary part of organizing any large-scale endeavor. People have different inclinations, different traits, and different areas in which they have developed themselves. One person might be stronger physically than another, or more gifted with languages. However, these differences are not the sole domain of genetics or other immutable factors, and they do not create an intractable hierarchy of capacity. While within one’s own organism one might have a lower ability to lift heavy objects than another, our society has developed countless methods of adaptation to render this difference superfluous. An ever-growing number of people use prosthetics and other forms of technology to enhance their natural capacities. Likewise, one might have a poor memory, but by maintaining a journal or notepad there’s no functional difference in outcomes compared to someone with an average memory when trying to recall a piece of information. Humans have always been cyborgs. It isn’t anything innate to a particular human organism that enables this, but rather collective intelligence and cooperation which gives rise to the overcoming of limitations. Likewise, jargon simplifies and eases the work for people with a sufficient background but excludes those without it. Many of the barriers to learning are artificial and socially established. According to Taylor, Schmidt could never understand why he should take regular breaks when he worked. He would naturally over-strain himself by laboring as hard as possible straight through. But this strains credulity. It seems more like a failure on the part of Taylor to adequately explain his science. Or maybe Taylor’s narrative is a post hoc justification for capital’s unwillingness to allow him to train men like Schmidt to run production by themselves. 

Art from Soviet science magazine Tekhnika Molodezhi

Class Leadership

For revolutionaries, the uneven distribution of skill is a challenge to overcome. The ability to conduct a meeting, do accounting, create propaganda, give a speech, take minutes, edit a publication, maintain a community garden, and so on are skills which it is necessary for as many members of the movement to possess as possible. Some people may have an inclination towards one area, but it is critical for organizers to move beyond their comfort zones and take on new expertise. Revolutionary organizations must not end up dependent on a few people. But just as much as up-skilling members, it means de-skilling the work. Simplifying meeting procedure, using QuickBooks, fundraising through Chuffed, employing automated graphic design templates on Canva, using an email marketing platform like MailChimp, and so on are examples of how we can streamline the necessary work of organization. 

But, while communists must discard Taylor’s commitment to an essentialist view of ability, individuals do have different attributes which make them suited for different kinds of work. Proven loyalty and soundness are as important as skill and inclination. Soundness is a function of how good someone’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness are. Taylor does not address this area because in capitalist firms the threat of termination and promise of financial promotion is enough to discipline most workers. Many tasks involve levels of responsibility that require a significant amount of trust. In revolutionary situations, peoples’ lives are in the hands of leaders and seasoned people are needed for those jobs. Likewise, not just anyone can serve as the public face of a campaign; considerations like public image and personal reliability become far more important in such situations. If it came out that the spokesperson for a tenant’s rights group had, unbeknownst to their comrades, threatened or assaulted their landlord, it could serve to discredit the entire organization in the eyes of the public. Just as important when it comes to soundness are roles involving financial responsibility. All too often in the movement have charismatic people wormed their way into positions of trust from which they can embezzle from or defraud their comrades for selfish aims. Louis C. Fraina is a famous example from the early movement in the US. Fraina helped found the Communist Party out of the left-wing of the Socialist Party. As an agent of the Communist International in Mexico, he embezzled considerable funds. Fraina was a gifted writer and speaker which fooled the far-off Comintern officials into trusting him despite the suspicions of the comrades he worked with. After being cleared of charges of being a spy for the US government, he stole between four and fourteen thousand dollars.1 Fraina quit the movement, claiming that factionalism and dogmatism drove him away. Even though Fraina was seen as too suspect and divisive to return to the American party, and clearly had factors pushing him away from unity with his comrades, the Comintern foolishly trusted him with an enormous sum of money. 

Soundness is a framework for scientific selection that allows us to attenuate (though not eliminate) the negative effects of personality and personal relationships in leadership. It’s through objective metrics without relying on the essentialization of traits that we can measure soundness. This is not to deny that there is a rational kernel to personality politics; collegiality is a factor in determining reliability. If someone is unable to work with others in a friendly or respectful manner, they can’t accomplish the goal of collective liberation. Likewise, there is a real basis for looking at ability when determining qualification for a job. Education and what innate gifts one brings to the table have a serious impact on one’s ability to accomplish a task. If you understand how to do double-entry bookkeeping, you can consistently do good accounting. If you have gifts in mathematics, you will be better able to adapt to situations where aids like computer software aren’t available. Regardless, it is important to keep three things in mind when discussing individual ability:

1) Any individual can be elevated to a higher level of competence through education. 

2) Many of the obstacles to functional ability are artificial. Society creates barriers through social dynamics like unnecessary formalization or insufficient clarity. 

3) Access can be expanded in any type of work; it’s just a matter of committing resources to do so. 

Action proves reliability. If someone shows they can handle smaller tasks with lower stakes, the movement can trust them with larger, complex tasks. But, failing to complete tasks isn’t an individual moral failing. Their comrades should apply themselves to solving the issue of reliability. We solve problems by identifying the concrete source of the issue and mitigating or solving it. When someone repeatedly fails to show up to actions because of parental responsibilities, providing childcare may be an appropriate solution. If a union committee member fails to do a one-on-one they signed up for out of nervousness, it is an opportunity to boost their morale and confidence. Increasing reliability has positive benefits for individuals just as much as for the group; it serves as a direct and immediate means to transformatively benefit those who participate in class struggle.

It is all well and good to talk about soundness in the abstract, but if we are to take anything positive from Taylorism it is the impetus toward quantifiable metrics and concrete rubrics. What does that look like in practice? The best example we have today is the ranking system promoted in the Industrial Workers of the World’s “Organizer Training 101.” In union campaigns, the fulcrum of the organizing effort is a select group of the most class conscious and reliable members of the shop. This group, referred to as the “committee,” conducts repeated and sustained analysis of the conditions of the shop to guide strategy. Most important for our purposes is the “assessment.” When a committee assesses someone in the shop, they assign them a rank between one and six. This rank is based on how committed to the union a worker is. The most committed people in the shop are 1s while the most hostile are 5s. 6s are those whose position the committee is ignorant of. Committee members don’t assess someone’s position on expressed sentiments alone, though they do take statements of sympathy or opposition into consideration. To be a 1, you have to both express sympathy and do concrete tasks for the union. Taking on tasks not only shows support beyond words, it builds commitment and creates a stake in the success of the union. Everyone in the committee must be a 1 and the committee should include as many of the 1s as is feasible once it begins to become more public. To be a 2 you need to have expressed support for the union and not have recently done any tasks to support it; it is possible to go down from a 1 to a 2 if you repeatedly fail to do your tasks or refuse to take any on. A 3 is someone who is at an intermediate level of alignment to the campaign and either has stated that they have no opinion or has given mixed opinions but has taken no action either way. A 4 is someone who has expressed negative views about the union, unions in general, or the actions of the committee but who has taken no concrete actions against the union. Organizers should never write off 4s, and through the course of a campaign, they can often become 1s. A 5 has taken concrete steps against the union or their coworkers. They might have snitched on someone, tried to talk a coworker out of supporting the union, or engaged in bigoted behavior. Sometimes 5s can be won over and the committee should make every effort to do so, but as long as they are 5s the committee needs to marginalize them within the shop. Quarantining the destructive behavior of 5s is critical. Every member of the committee should rank each member of the shop, including themselves. This helps mitigate biases and allows cross-comparison. Often one organizer will have different information than another or interpret the same information differently. This ranking system allows the organization to strategize with real data and figure out what actions to take to uplift their coworkers to a greater level of reliability. The IWW ranking system is just one example of how to quantify soundness in a simple, straightforward, and easy to implement manner.

If we use reliability as our metric for selection and seek to break down the social division of labor, it is necessary to build up reliability among all cadre and members of working-class organizations. And if reliability is a priority, how is it cultivated in practice? Here Taylor comes back into the picture. Within scientific management, the individual scientific education and training of workers is fundamental. This has three principal goals: 

1) To teach workers the means to conduct their work according to the methods developed through scientific analysis;

2) To demonstrate to workers why these new methods are superior to the old methods while avoiding industrial disruption due to insufficient support built up for the new system;

3) To continually ensure that workers can meet the challenges of production.

Basic to the framework of scientific management is treating each worker as an individual whose needs in the labor process are unique, not as an interchangeable cog. Training in scientific management takes three forms:

1) The elevation of a worker from the old rule-of-thumb methods to scientific methods; 

2) Functional supervision which breaks up the tasks of management into several roles;

3) Giving each worker detailed and specific instructions for the work they are to carry out each day on a card. 

By breaking down the work into clear and understandable instructions, people can immediately begin their assigned tasks and complete them with as little room for error as possible. People don’t generally want to have to figure out each necessary task for themselves every time they work. It is much more desirable to just know how you can contribute. These components are important for any organization that wants to ensure its members use their limited time as effectively as possible.

Building Our Communities

If the “management by initiative and incentive” so dominant on the left is ineffective, how do we motivate people to take on tasks? There are two methods to use in conjunction. The first is to identify and constitute a community of shared interests. Let’s use the example of a labor union. Labor unions root themselves in the shared interests of the workers against the bosses. Likewise, a tenants union grows from a shared interest against the landlords, a serve-the-people grocery project comes from the shared interest in ending the risk of hunger in one’s own community, and a cultural group is a function of a shared interest in edification and recreational enjoyment. There’s a real stake in the success of the project for the constituency. Such communities of interest do not emerge organically: organizers consciously build them. By default, most people are content to suffer whatever abuses their bosses and landlords heap on them because that’s what society taught them they should accept. It takes agitation and education to overcome this and bring people together into identifying with one another and their common cause.

 It is out of direct communities like unions, mutual aid societies, and cultural organizations that more abstract and general communities of interest grow. Insofar as it naturally exists in capitalism, the proletariat exists in a negative relationship to the means of production. It is defined by what it lacks, not what it has. There’s no organic identification with the broader working class to be found within it. What historically did organically emerge without intervention were narrow communities of interest like the craft unions. But these organizations exclusively served the interests of a small section of skilled laborers and pitted workers against each other. This is why Vladimir Lenin, Karl Kautsky and others held to the “merger formula.” This thesis says that socialist and class consciousness develops outside the workers’ movement.2 For merger theorists, it is the duty of Marxists to merge socialism with the workers’ movement. Lenin saw this socialist consciousness developing as an intellectual pole of attraction organized around a media outlet. This outlet would win workers over to the true analysis of the situation. He saw the role of the party as a group of professional militants who would carry out the socialist line. The party would win the masses to its line by winning the leadership of workers’ organizations. But is this really how you develop socialist consciousness? 

The history of failure evidenced by the Trotskyist and Marxist-Leninist movements seems to belie this notion. Socialist consciousness emerges through the development of concrete bonds in the class struggle. It develops through a shift in collective identity among broad sections of the population. If someone is to oppose the American empire in favor of the Co-operative Commonwealth, they have to come to identify as a socialist, as a worker, and as a member of humanity, not as an American, a Democrat, or a conservative. Socialism does not demand that one gives up all their other identities; you can still be a Christian, black, queer, an environmentalist, etc. But it does demand that the identities you hold, and the communities of interest they signify, are emancipating and do not oppress others. It is the task of communist militants to embed themselves in communities of interest. We must begin the process of congealing conscious organizations for the struggle to change conditions. It’s only by organizing within the class, not above and outside it, that building a socialist movement is possible. However, it is important to recognize that identification with socialism alone is not an end but only a means to an end. In “Red Vienna,” Amsterdam, Berlin, Milan, and Paris there have been widespread socialist cultures that failed to bring about the victory of the working class. In the absence of a science of revolution, the socialist movement cannot make revolution, but in the absence of a socialist movement, the science of revolution is a dead letter.

Up-skilling and De-skilling

This, therefore, poses the question: how do we develop a science of revolution within the socialist movement? By creating a culture of comradely co-operation. By default in our society there is a culture of authoritarianism and passivity where we expect other people to give direction to our lives and do our thinking for us. Even if an ideology is ostensibly democratic, anarchist, or revolutionary in content, the practices around it are often incredibly authoritarian. This is a reality that all socialist organizations confront. But by training up of new members, giving them structured tasks that help increase their confidence, and also treating them with the utmost respect, we can enculturate our organizations into a way of acting which prefigures the Co-operative Commonwealth to come. 

Respect, though, does not mean accepting any excuse for why someone hasn’t done a task; it means holding them accountable in a gentle but firm way. It means “pushing” people beyond their comfort zones. It means helping them address the things that stand in the way of realizing the goals that they believe in. Pushing, a tactic developed by unions to build solidarity, is the bedrock of creating a culture of comradely cooperation and it applies to leaders as much as rank-and-file members.

Likewise, up-skilling and education are processes that should happen constantly. By encouraging the full, well-rounded development of cadre, each member, rather than an isolated intellectual pole, can use their own faculties to reason and engage in communist politics. Up-skilling needs to recognize the interdependent nature of social labor in advanced economies. Rather than creating a movement of independent artisans who jealously guard their autonomy, communists can create a higher freedom for people to realize their goals through their willing subordination to functional discipline and the recognition of necessity.

On the Left, education almost universally takes the form of either reading classic texts in groups or having an intellectual lecture to a captive audience about the correct positions on abstract political theories. There are exceptions to this. Sometimes it takes the form of what amounts to liberal racial sensitivity training, re-framed with radical jargon. Other times a particularly enthusiastic undergraduate might ramble on about the ideas of postmodern philosophers. In fewer cases, parties or affinity groups put on practical skills-based training sessions. These might be about how to screen-print, legal rights, how to conduct a picket, security culture, and so on. In particular, the General Defense Committee of the Industrial Workers of the World provides workshops on these topics. Unfortunately, their reach is limited to the disparate, unorganized, activist community from which GDC membership is generally drawn. It is true that skills-based training in and of itself doesn’t have political content; someone can screen-print a shirt for any reason, whether it’s making money or helping a cause. However, there’s no reason that organizers must segregate political enculturation and education from skills-based training. If you are teaching people how to set up a blockade, the politics of why you use blockades is a necessary part of the training. Even with seemingly apolitical subjects like gardening, there are innumerable places where you can tie in political education. With gardening, this can take the form of talking about why capitalism creates food deserts, the unsustainable agricultural practices of major farmers (and the insufficiency of community gardens as an ultimate solution), the cultural chauvinism in the produce section of supermarkets, or the concrete politics of seed suppliers. There is no area of practical education that does not have aspects which can be politicized. That said, there is still a need for comprehensive analysis of the world and a need for engagement with abstract ideas like the economic contradictions of capitalism, the nature of the state, and so on. Yet, this education should highlight real-world examples and struggles as much as possible. It is after you have a foundation in the real meaning of class struggle that it makes sense to begin to explore higher theory, because you can relate it to the world rather than just other ideas you’ve read about.  

In scientific management, the principal method of educating people in new methods is not just lecturing at them or using abstract arguments. Instead, managers use object-lessons that allow the worker to see firsthand why the new methods are superior and draw their own conclusions. Feedback and explanations are used to supplement the practical education. Taylor says:

…The really great problem involved in a change from the management of “initiative and incentive” to scientific management consists in a complete revolution in the mental attitude and the habits of all of those engaged in the management, as well of the workmen. And this change can be brought about only gradually and through the presentation of many object-lessons to the workman, which, together with the teaching which he receives, thoroughly convince him of the superiority of the new over the old way of doing the work. This change in the mental attitude of the workman imperatively demands time. It is impossible to hurry it beyond a certain speed. The writer has over and over again warned those who contemplated making this change that it was a matter, even in a simple establishment, of from two to three years, and that in some cases it requires from four to five years.

The first few changes which affect the workmen should be made exceedingly slowly, and only one workman at a time should be dealt with at the start. Until this single man has been thoroughly convinced that a great gain has come to him from the new method, no further change should be made. Then one man after another should be tactfully changed over. After passing the point at which from one-fourth to one-third of the men in the employ of the company have been changed from the old to the new, very rapid progress can be made, because at about this time there is, generally, a complete revolution in the public opinion of the whole establishment and practically all of the workmen who are working under the old system become desirous to share in the benefits which they see have been received by those working under the new plan.

An object-lesson is showing the truth of something in practice instead of theory. Originally, object-lessons were a form of education which used a visual prop to teach a concept, but they have come to mean any sort of practical illustration.  For instance, when Taylor sought to introduce scientific management to the machine factory, his improvement of the output of the initial subject served as an object-lesson to the management. It proved to the foreman that his methods worked. Likewise, when Taylor introduced scientific management to pig-iron shoveling, it was having Schmidt work under the close direction of a supervisor that enabled him to see first-hand that he could do the higher rate of work just by using particular motions. For Taylor, these lessons are much stronger than theoretical discussion can be. They prove the truth of the efficacy of a method directly. Taylor believed each worker should be individually trained in this manner so that they personally develop buy-in to the methods. 

The work of philosopher and educator John Dewey validated Taylor’s theory. Dewey had seen generations of students pumped out by the academy who knew science, philosophy, economics and so on abstractly, but had no idea how to apply it to the real world. To solve this problem, he began with the premise that if someone cannot make use of information in finding solutions to problems, they don’t have a meaningful understanding. From this, he concluded that the best way to give someone real knowledge was to have them solve problems themselves, with any necessary information available.3 Testing his pedagogical theories at the University of Chicago Laboratory School, Dewey showed that learning by doing is more effective than simple theoretical instruction. Some educators inspired by his work took this to mean that completely unstructured education where students problem-solve themselves was ideal, but Dewey himself pushed back on this. In his framework, students need carefully crafted object-lessons that demonstrate the principle at stake and work under careful supervision from instructors who are ready to provide abstract knowledge as students need it. Unfortunately, capital appropriated Dewey’s research and reduced it from a theory of how to instill deeper knowledge into a method of imparting narrow skills. Capitalists promote models of “learning by doing” and technical education that leave out the abstract knowledge and comprehensive vision that is essential for making narrow technical knowledge useful beyond a specific application. This logic is the same one that Taylor himself used as a means to enforce the social division of labor. 

The final piece of scientific management is the system of “functional foremen.” Rather than relying on a single manager whose job it is to coordinate and motivate the workers, each area of competence is divided between several individuals whose job it is to direct the workers in their own area. By dividing up the tasks of management, Taylor was able to create a system where each part of the job of organizing labor is given someone’s full attention rather than it being left up to the motivation of the one-man manager or workers to get it done. 

Under functional management, the old-fashioned single foreman is superseded by eight different men, each one of whom has his own special duties. These men, acting as the agents for the planning department, are the expert teachers, who are at all times in the shop, helping and directing the workmen. Being each one chosen for his knowledge and personal skill in his specialty, they are able to not only tell the workman what he should do, but in case of necessity they do the work themselves in the presence of the workman, so as to show him not only the best but also the quickest methods.

 One of these teachers (called the inspector) sees to it that he understands the drawings and instructions for doing the work. He teaches him how to do work of the right quality; how to make it fine and exact where it should be fine, and rough and quick where accuracy is not required, — the one being just as important for success as the other. The second teacher (the gang boss) shows him how to set up the job in his machine, and teaches him to make all of his personal motions in the quickest and best way. The third (the speed boss) sees that the machine is run at the best speed and that the proper tool is used in the particular way which will enable the machine to finish its product in the shortest possible time. In addition to the assistance given by these teachers, the workman receives orders and help from four other men; from the “repair boss” as to the adjustment, cleanliness, and general care of his machine, belting, etc.; from the “time clerk,” as to everything relating to his pay and to proper written reports and returns; from the “route clerk,” as to the order in which he does his work and as to the movement of the work from one part of the shop to another; and, in case a workman gets into any trouble with any of his various bosses, the “disciplinarian” interviews him. 

Co-equal members of a collective can take these roles without recourse to the social division of labor. In place of a “disciplinarian” might be an arbiter, but otherwise if you are organizing work that is complex and at a large enough scale, it makes sense to break down roles and responsibility functionally. Leadership is a burden that we should spread around as much as possible to avoid burn-out and dependency on super-organizers. While Taylor would have one individual specialize in each type of functional management, by breaking management apart it actually makes rotating responsibility much easier.

Capitalism is the New Feudalism

Our society developed the technical system that governs capitalist production by and for the logic of capital accumulation. The way we design machines is not to empower workers, but to increase productivity. The tendency of development in both production and distribution have created conditions of dependency. These asymmetries are incompatible with an emancipated society. For instance, the move toward content-streaming and away from physical media has turned consumers of content into rent-payers dependent on a service provider. This initially presented itself as a centralization in the form of Netflix replacing local video distributors. However, a plethora of rival streaming services have emerged who divvy up the pool of consumption-rents into ever-smaller fiefdoms. Likewise, within production itself, the de-skilling of workers creates more dependency on capital than if they were merely denied the means of life without working. It was plausible that a skilled tradesman could escape bondage to a master under the pre-industrial manufacturing system. After saving enough to purchase physical means of production, a tradesman could open their own shop and even hire their own apprentices. But if an unskilled worker tried this, assuming the acquisition of sufficient money to buy physical means of production, they would lack the knowledge necessary to do anything but the same menial tasks they had been employed in before. To illustrate this point, we can look to Uber and Lyft, which have begun the process of proletarianizing taxi workers. While drivers for both firms are nominally “independent contractors” (a legal position hotly contested in the courts) and own their own physical means of production in the form of their car, they are dependent on the navigational and commercial technology of the app. Even if an Uber driver knows the city they work in well, it’s unlikely that their knowledge approaches the dense working-knowledge taxi drivers possess of the streets. Likewise, while taxi drivers are usually also dependent on a dispatch company, they can develop their own network of clients, while Uber drivers are in a more precarious position. Taxi services are a classic example of a protected craft. In some cities like New York, the government directly limits how many taxis can be on the street. They use a system of “medallions” which entitle the owner to provide taxi services. In other cities, heavy regulation and education requirements prevent easy access to outsiders. Ultimately, Uber and Lyft seek to replace their drivers with fleets of autonomous vehicles, but for now they are happy to shift the costs of business onto their proletarianized workforce’s physical means of production in the form of wear and tear.

Marx misidentified the source of the power imbalance between workers and capitalists as the legal ownership of the physical means of production. In his day, productive technology seemed to exclusively take the form of tools. If Marx were right, there should be no alienation within employee-owned enterprises beyond a certain level of externally imposed labor discipline forced by the market. This is the thesis of some reformist Marxists like Richard D. Wolff. Wolff claims that worker-owned enterprises would in themselves create a genuinely democratic society.4 But employee-owned companies, like the grocery chain Winco and the Chinese phone manufacturer Huawei, are only different from traditional capitalist firms in offering stock compensation and the same kind of indirect control shareholders exert over joint-stock companies. Even if, as Wolff proposes, you have formal democracy in management, under capitalism you are still dependent on technical experts to actually run the firm. In Yugoslavia, where the Communists created a system of “self-management,” it was still technical experts who directed production.

The source of Capital’s power is the monopolization of the technical knowledge to direct production and transmute the inputs of production, including the expended lifeforce of workers, into wealth. Is it any wonder that the biggest blows in the trade war between the US and China are in the form of the US denying Chinese technology companies access to intellectual property? Capital designs the physical means of production, be they apps, looms, grocery check-out kiosks, or anything else, with dependency in mind. The legal ownership of the physical means of production is a necessary moment in the alchemical process of capital accumulation. But ownership follows from the occulting of organizational and technical knowledge. This doesn’t mean that the denial of the necessities of life to workers, ownership of physical resources, and minority control of the physical means of production are unimportant. These are features of property-societies in general, like ancient slave empires. They are not unique to capitalism. It is after the development of class divisions that society established property. What traditional Marxist analysis calls “the law of value,” the emergent logic of capital accumulation through market competition, helps create conditions of alienation and exploitation within capitalist firms, but it cannot explain the full scope of economic oppression in bourgeois society. Significant portions of the economy have insulation from market forces. Both civil and military bureaucracies exhibit many of the same features as market enterprises even as they also face other pressures. Within capitalist firms, the logic of central planning predominates. There’s little data on how much of the economy is non-market corporate activity, but over 1/3 of US international trade is intra-firm.5 In The People’s Republic of Walmart, Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski argue that much of global capitalism is already a planned economy.

While the notion that this type of planning relates to genuine socialist relations, beyond generating useful mathematical tools, is suspect, it is important for considering how much of the hell of the firm is created by logics of domination beyond that of capitalism proper. Wage-labor is only a particular form of a tributary regime in both capitalist enterprises and public bureaucracies. With the transfer of power into the hands of the working class, we will abolish the tributary system of labor. However, while socialist society will inherit the existing physical apparatus of production, it must be altered according to the principles that will govern socialist society. When capitalism formally subsumed manufacture and feudal society under the logic of value, it still used the old craft methods. Capitalism came to really subsume production when it introduced the system of economic dependency characterized by asymmetrical knowledge hierarchies and the domination of individuals by machines. Socialist society too will formally subsume the capitalist methods of production, but only by introducing the principle of comradely cooperation will it begin the process of its own real subsumption by creating the general mastery of knowledge by the working class and designing machines whose telos is to serve the laborers running them.

Whose Science?

In most cases, mastery of different areas of knowledge requires the mastery of their particular jargon. Sociobiology, communications, psychology, economics, political science, anthropology, sociology, management theory, and so on each have their own ways of talking about identical phenomena. Each approach acts as a lens for talking about social reality and organizing it intellectually. This allows us to discuss different aspects of problems. But academics segregate themselves into closed discourses, creating an impediment to intelligibility between fields and accessibility for the uninitiated. Even in academic contexts where departments encourage multidisciplinary approaches, the volume of work that an individual theorist can synthesize is a hard limit on analysis. Unless they can break down jargon, or become world-renowned, the impact of their work will be confined to one or two fields. Each department represents centuries of the application of human brainpower toward understanding and organizing our world for the benefit of the species. Workers must master the knowledge they create and make it serve the whole people if we have any hope of achieving a meaningfully free society. Departmental specialization, with its accompanying requirement of many years of indoctrination, serves to perpetuate intellectuals as a class. It robs the masses of the knowledge that is their birthright. Most people today cobble together a worldview from anecdotes, random facts, and whatever “education” the bourgeois state feels is sufficient to ready them for entry into the workforce. The process of creating a unified world science is as much the systematization of knowledge for the broad masses as it is the unification of the disparate fields of the academy. To quote Alexander Bogdanov:

Until now, although scientific philosophy appears as the property of only a few people, it nonetheless reflects in reality a level of cultural development common to all humanity. The unreflective philosophy of laypeople rules over the masses, but it corresponds merely to scraps and fragments produced by the general labour of culture, merely to the lowest steps on the ladder of social development that have already been climbed. ‘The role of scientific philosophy in the practical struggle of life’, our author says, ‘is similar to the role of a military commander who has climbed to the top of a high mountain from which the disposition of the troops of both armies and possible routes are most visible and so finds the most suitable route’. I agree. The high mountain is formed from the entire gigantic sum of attainments achieved by humanity in its collective labour-experience. For an individual person, it is a long and difficult journey to the very peak, but everyone ought to know what can be seen from there. If one only takes bits and pieces of scientific philosophy and learns them without systematically connecting them with other parts of socially accumulated experience and without monitoring them by means of a variety of socially produced techniques, then what is obtained, for all that, is a poor and unreliable ‘homemade’ philosophy.

To systematize science, Bogdanov drew on Karl Marx and Richard Avenarius. Avenarius was a leading philosopher of science who, along with Ernst Mach, revolutionized epistemology. Bogdanov’s goal was to transcend the limitations of both dialectical materialism and positivism. What he created was a unified organizational science which he termed Tektology. This science was first denounced by dogmatic Hegelian philosophers like Abram Deborin and then struggled against by leading Bolshevik theorists.6 At first, the party leadership tolerated Tektology because many of the men instrumental in building the planned economy, like Vladimir Bazarov and Nikolai Valentinov, drew on it. Eventually, the Soviet authorities under Stalin ruthlessly suppressed it where under Lenin it had merely faced official censure. The regime systematically imprisoned or killed researchers and Bolsheviks who promoted Tektology in the first purges before the Trotskyists and others faced similar methods. Tektology faded from memory but the underlying principles were not lost.

As the technical needs of capitalist society in the West grew more intensive, a new school of thought emerged. Arising simultaneously in two places, it would revolutionize both STEM and the social sciences. In Austria and the German-speaking world, Ludwig von Bertalanffy plagiarized Bogdanov and developed the science in a technocratic direction to create General Systems Theory (GST),7 while in America, Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann developed cybernetics. The core features included treating systems in a non-reductionist way, using the same language to describe similar phenomena across disciplines, exploring the self-organization of systems, and focusing on the communication of information, among other things. For the uninitiated, non-reductionism is the principle that a system is greater than the sum of its parts and that their relationships are a component of the system. Cyberneticians and General Systems Theorists described the same observations of reality, but their political projects varied greatly. William Gray Walter, the inventor of the first autonomous robots and a major contributor to neuroscience, was a fellow traveler of the Communist Party.  After World War II he became an anarcho-communist. Norbert Wiener was a progressive anti-militarist and was sympathetic to unions. Wiener envisioned an economy one might call socialist, though quite different from the USSR, based on centrally-regulated autonomous work units organized much like a power grid.8 John von Neumann was a deeply anti-communist conservative militarist. Ludwig von Bertalanffy was a fascist who opportunistically committed his theories to the Nazi cause and fled Austria to avoid denazification.9 These theorists saw wildly different implications in their research for how to organize society while all contributing to the general advancement of collective knowledge. This is not unlike how a century before, many different political projects claimed the dialectical worldview developed by Hegel. On the left, you had Marx, Engels, and the Young Hegelians like Mikhail Bakunin, Bruno Bauer, and Ludwig Feuerbach; in the center, liberal philosophers like Benedetto Croce; and on the right,  right-Hegelians like Leopold von Henning who saw the End of History in the conservative Prussian state. Also drawing heavily on Hegel was the father of Italian Fascism, Giovanni Gentile. Every advance in science serves as the catalyst for further development of the political currents in society. What distinguishes the revolutionary and emancipationist currents from reactionary currents is their commitment to using the new insights in science for undermining social hierarchies and increasing material freedoms. But within each social current there is a tendency towards a kind of philosophical conservatism. Utopian socialists and anarchists, though critically, defended the Positivism of the early socialist and philosopher of science Auguste Comte against Marxist dialectical materialism. It allowed them to maintain an individualist view of how to further science.

In the same vein, conservative elements in command of the Soviet Union defended dialectical materialism against Tektology. These elements included Stalin’s “center” and the primary opposition to it. Trotsky and his “left” faction, were no less committed to the rule of the technical intelligentsia. They proposed to go so far as to “militarize” labor by introducing rank and extreme discipline into the factories to industrialize.10 Yevgeni Alekseyevich Preobrazhensky, the principal leader of the Left Opposition aside from Trotsky, believed in the forced collectivization of the peasants through grinding them into the dust by extracting a “tribute” from them and exploiting their surplus to fund the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union (the same essential policy Stalin unleashed more crudely after his rivals were dead or exiled).11 The Left Opposition mainly drew its support from the military and party intelligentsia while Stalin’s faction drew its support from the party bureaucracy, state factory managers  who owed to Stalin’s political machine their jobs, and initially the small peasants (with whom his regime would later engage in open warfare during the forced collectivization and subsequent famine). On the other hand, the International Communist Opposition, which Trotsky slandered as a “right” opposition, was less ideologically rigid. It attempted to merge the insights of Tektology with Dialectical Materialism. Bogdanov’s theories of equilibrium influenced Bukharin’s book Historical Materialism and his prison writings, though he still made use of dialectical materialist jargon.12 The “right” opposition represented the technical specialists, scientists, trade unionists, cooperatives, and to a lesser extent the petty bourgeoisie whom the market-socialist system of the New Economic Policy benefited. This meant that while they too had a vested interest in the social division of labor, their objective interests remained with the development of real science unlike the “Left” and “Center,” whose Manichaean ideologies served unproductive social layers. All three factions stood against Tektology in its pure form because a universal organizational science would have challenged the primacy of the social-organizing class. This “nomenklatura” used Hegelian jargon to create artificial barriers to participation in government.

Proletarians vs the Petty Bourgeoisie

The contradiction between the intelligentsia, skilled laborers, and organizing class on the one hand and the unskilled masses on the other is not specific to socialist society. It is one of the defining contradictions within capitalism. Back when it was a young organization and the vanguard of the revolutionary socialist movement, the Industrial Workers of the World identified this contradiction and made it the basis of their organizing. Exemplifying this insight in his pamphlet Proletarian and Petite Bourgeois, Austin Lewis, a prominent socialist and theorist of the Industrial Workers of the World, demonstrated that the working class is not a monolithic bloc. Instead, much of what we call the “working class” is actually petty-bourgeois in character. Before the rise of industrial capitalism, free artisans who individually owned their own means of production were the basis of the petty-bourgeoisie. These means of production often included tools, but the primary feature was a skill-monopoly which enabled them to directly produce goods or provide services to sell and support themselves.13 But as the wealth from colonial conquests poured in, concentrated manufacturing began. There emerged a system where capitalists purchased commodity-producing equipment that they hired “hands” to work, destroying the ability for independent artisans to compete with these mass-produced commodities. Back in Marx’s day it appeared that this tendency would inevitably result in the mass pauperization of the artisans. Eventually, they would diminish to the point of extinction. Rather than following this mechanistic logic, the petty bourgeoisie transformed itself. While it is true that there remains a layer of independent artisans today (capital’s great work of standardizing and centralizing the means of production cannot seem to overcome consumers’ thirst for authenticity), capital employs the overwhelming bulk of the petty bourgeoisie. Lewis shows that they adapted themselves by forming craft unions to create skill-monopolies. Their unions then negotiate to sell their specialized labor above the cost of simple labor-power. Craft unions are a form of petty-bourgeoisie organization suited for the age of collective, rather than individual, production.14 For instance, bricklayers, teachers, electricians (who straddle the line between the old and newer petty bourgeoisie), and nurses do not have the same relationship to the process of production, to capital, and to the public, as the day laborers, janitors, and certified nursing assistants who work alongside them. Even unionization on the part of unskilled labor does not change this relation. This is not a moral condemnation; these kinds of workers are essential to the reproduction of society and provide important services. But they do have a vested interest in maintaining their monopoly over their skills through forms of educational gatekeeping. This layer, in both its social-democratic and anarcho-syndicalist expressions, fetishizes autonomy and abhors the discipline necessary to achieve general freedom. In another IWW text titled The Advancing Proletariat, Abner Woodruff identifies this craft petty-bourgeois class basis as the reason for anarcho-syndicalists opposing the organizational centralization suited to proletarian methods.15 Though Taylor does not share these political concerns, he does address the spurious claims that scientific planning within the labor process strips people of freedom:

Now, when through all of this teaching and this minute instruction the work is apparently made so smooth and easy for the workman, the first impression is that this all tends to make him a mere automaton, a wooden man. As the workmen frequently say when they first come under this system, “Why, I am not allowed to think or move without some one interfering or doing it for me!” The same criticism and objection, however, can be raised against all other modern subdivision of labor. It does not follow, for example, that the modern surgeon is any more narrow or wooden a man than the early settler of this country. The frontiersman, however, had to be not only a surgeon, but also an architect, house-builder, lumberman, farmer, soldier, and doctor, and he had to settle his law cases with a gun. You would hardly say that the life of the modern surgeon is any more narrowing, or that he is more of a wooden man than the frontiersman. The many problems to be met and solved by the surgeon are Just as intricate and difficult and as developing and broadening in their way as were those of the frontiersman.

And it should be remembered that the training of the surgeon has been almost identical in type with the teaching and training which is given to the workman under scientific management. The surgeon, all through his early years, is under the closest supervision of more experienced men, who show him in the minutes” way how each element of his work is best done. They provide him with the finest implements, each one of which has been the subject of special study and development, and then insist upon his using each of these implements in the very best way. All of this teaching, however, in no way narrows him. On the contrary he is quickly given the very best knowledge of his predecessors; and, provided (as he is, right from the start) with standard implements and methods which represent the best knowledge of the world up to date, he is able to use his own originality and ingenuity to make real additions to the world’s knowledge, instead of reinventing things which are old. In a similar way the workman who is cooperating with his many teachers under scientific management has an opportunity to develop which is at least as good as and generally better than that which he had when the whole problem was “up to him’’ and he did his work entirely unaided.

If it were true that the workman would develop into a larger and finer man without all of this teaching, and without the help of the laws which have been formulated for doing his particular job, then it would follow that the young man who now comes to college to have the help of a teacher in mathematics, physics, chemistry, Latin, Greek, etc., would do better to study these things unaided and by himself. The only difference in the two cases is that students come to their teachers, while from the nature of the work done by the mechanic under scientific management, the teachers must go to him. What really happens is that, with the aid of the science which is invariably developed, and through the instructions from his teachers, each workman of a given intellectual capacity is enabled to do a much higher, more interesting, and finally more developing and more profitable kind of work than he was before able to do. The laborer who before was unable to do anything beyond, perhaps) shovelling and wheeling dirt from place to place, or carrying the work from one part of the shop to another, is in many cases taught to do the more elementary machinist’s work, accompanied by the agreeable surroundings and the interesting variety and higher wages which go with the machinist’s trade. The cheap machinist or helper, who before was able to run perhaps merely a drill press, is taught to do the more intricate and higher priced lathe and planer work, while the highly skilled and more intelligent machinists become functional foremen and teachers. And so on, right up the line.

It may seem that with scientific management there is not the same incentive for the workman to use his ingenuity in devising new and better methods of doing the work, as well as in improving his implements, that there is with the old type of management. It is true that with scientific management the workman is not allowed to use whatever implements and methods he sees fit in the daily practice of his work. Every encouragement, however, should be given him to suggest improvements, both in methods and in implements. And whenever a workman proposes an improvement, it should be the policy of the management to make a careful analysis of the new method, and if necessary conduct a series of experiments to determine accurately the relative merit of the new suggestion and of the old standard. And whenever the new method is found to be markedly superior to the old, it should be adopted as the standard for the whole establishment. The workman should be given the full credit for the improvement, and should be paid a cash premium as a reward for his ingenuity. In this way the true initiative of the workmen is better attained under scientific management than under the old individual plan.

One still might object to the idea that a surgeon is as complete a person as the frontiersman in Taylor’s analogy. The famous line Marx half-sarcastically penned in The German Ideology springs to mind: 

…in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.16

But this objection doesn’t hold up when you realize the surgeon may also be a master chef, a fisherman, a literary critic, and a meme page admin in their free time. Socially useful labor they engage in doesn’t have to define them. Returning to individualist forms of labor wouldn’t enable someone to develop fully or as they desire. Objective necessity, not individual inclination, determines their labor, and their labor relies on limited self-acquired knowledge and resources. The frontiersman has no choice but to spend their time building a cabin, hunting, drying meat, etc. if they want to survive. Conversely, in co-operative production, you can choose what kinds of work you want to perform to develop yourself. It is also worth considering how the “frontiersman” as a historical class only existed because of the mass genocide of (predominantly) communal indigenous societies to clear the land for their individualist lifestyle. Opposing individualist production does not mean that socialism will force everyone to accept co-operative labor. There are societies which have made room for hermits, holy men, yogis, witches, and outcasts who live largely self-sufficient lives on the fringes of civilization. Such space can exist within a co-operative commonwealth. But unlike the free artisan and his collective craft petty-bourgeois successor, the proletariat has no use for romantic visions of labor.   

The collective craft petty-bourgeoisie is not the only section of this class that has emerged in modern capitalism. A third form of the petty bourgeoisie also maintains its position through skill and the division of labor but does not rely on craft unions because their role is to direct the organization of labor process. Managers, engineers, accountants, financial analysts, computer programmers, and so on constitute this class. Unlike the artisan petty bourgeoise and craft petty bourgeoisie, the organizational petty bourgeoisie is wholly dependent on the existence of large-scale enterprise. Human resources agents, social workers, and database managers cannot meaningfully find employment outside of firms. Even if they are self-employed as consultants, they are dependent on the existence of large firms. These categories are not tidy; no economic category really is. What matters is that categories give us an insight into the structural relationships between things. Before the Russian Revolution, many “proletarians” spent much of the year as peasants working on family farms. The proletarians returned to the countryside as food became scarce during the Civil War.17 Some members of the organizing petty-bourgeoisie also partly fit into the artisan petty bourgeoisie. Organizational petty bourgeoisie make this transition when they attract the capital to run a start-up or take up a private practice. Doctors in particular blur this line because their primary role in hospitals is to use their knowledge to direct the labor of others, but they can also act as independent artisans selling a service to patients. Programmers too straddle this line because their work might be directed towards creating a saleable product, but it may just as easily be to design applications for improving the internal efficiency of a firm. Likewise, today many unskilled proletarians have “side hustles” where they earn an increased income doing artisanal work. These categories are relevant because they allow us to tease out how different layers of society have different interests.

Many sections of the artisanal and craft petty bourgeoisie bear the cost of business taxes and state regulations, like environmental protections, which tends to drive them towards conservative politics. They tend to have little need for policies like single-payer healthcare themselves because they either can afford premium plans or have them through union contracts. Artisans as a class are a reservoir of racism due to their personal competition with skilled immigrant labor. There are exceptions: those sections of the artisanal petty bourgeoisie who depend on public infrastructure and investment tend to be more liberal. So do those dependent on public funding like teachers. At one time the craft petty bourgeoisie and artisanal petty bourgeoisie were at the forefront of American radicalism with movements like the Farmer-Labor Party, the Non-Partisan League, the Greenback Party, the Populist Party, the Progressive Party and even the Socialist Party of America. Changes in America’s political economy led to a re-drawing of the class battle lines. Now the organizational petty bourgeoisie, instead of the craft and artisan petty bourgeoisie, benefits from liberal policies. They’re drawn to programs like student debt forgiveness, single-payer healthcare, ending the gender pay-gap, and the “green new deal.” Capital directly dominates them and they face less economic pressure from the state than the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. There are members of the organizational petty bourgeoisie who benefit more from income tax cuts or tariffs, but this layer’s interests tend toward liberalism. The craft and organizing petty bourgeoisie, respectively, are the voting bases of the Republican and Democratic parties. They both have interests opposed to the proletariat just as much as interests opposed to capital. All sections of the petty bourgeoisie are at constant risk of proletarianization as some big capitalist could automate their work, break their union, or introduce a new contracting system that disempowers them. Our movement has room for members of these layers, and we need their skills to construct the Co-operative Commonwealth, but only insofar as we win them to the proletarian camp. 

Poster by Alexei Gastev

Leninism vs the Cultural Revolution

It isn’t just the defenders of the capitalist system who valorize the system of intellectual monopoly. “Revolutionaries” across all tendency divisions weaponize their education to set themselves up as leaders over the movement. This takes two common forms: 

1) Professional intellectuals in various Leninist sects who browbeat naïve activists into uncritically adopting their views wholesale (creating a sort of mental dependency in the process). For example, in Socialist Alternative’s Seattle branch, an organizer drove multiple women to tears by ridiculing their deviations from Trotskyist orthodoxy. 

2) Authors in the anarchist book circuit who wage bitter fights against one another in the struggle to sell their postmodern, jargon-laden polemics against things everyone already knows are bad. An example here is the long struggle between the “post-work” anarchist Bob Black and the anarcho-syndicalist John Bekken. 

This trend is nothing new. In the struggles among the Russian Marxists, long before the October Revolution, two camps existed. Rather than Mensheviks vs Bolsheviks, whose leaders were on the same side in this struggle, there was a now-forgotten struggle between the philosophical intelligentsia and professional revolutionaries against a coalition of scientists and worker-militants. On one side were Lenin, the leading Bolshevik, and Plekhanov, the leading Menshevik, and on the other were Bogdanov and Bazarov, cofounder of the Bolshevik faction and an independent group, respectively. Others in the latter group included the Menshevik Pavel Yushkevich and the future Bolshevik Commissar of Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunacharsky. 

The first camp tried to transform Marxism into a means to preserve the intelligentsia; they thought it was necessary for intellectuals to lead the workers. This is the merger thesis that Lenin, Martov, and Plekhanov took from Kautsky. Though democratic in aim, it was elitist in content. Instead of seeing a merger between Marxism and the workers’ movement in the form of the working class mastering science, they saw it in the working-class movement merging with Marxist theory. This smuggles in a preserved role for a layer whose special task is to create that theory that the workers’ movement is to adopt.  Lenin and Plekhanov did have differences: Lenin wanted to have a tighter-knit group of militarized intellectuals while Plekhanov was comfortable with a looser, more traditional party. Where Lenin’s vanguard took on an air of bourgeois professionalism, a marketing firm with a sleek aesthetic, Plekhanov’s vanguard remained a debate circle for academics and their sympathizers based around a poorly circulated newspaper. Lenin represented the outlook of the newly forming organizational petty bourgeoisie, and Plekhanov represented the outlook of the artisanal petty bourgeoisie. Lenin and Plekhanov didn’t consciously or even uniformly represent these classes. Both of them were genuinely committed to proletarian emancipation on an ideological level and had radically democratic aspirations. But abstract ideas and concrete attitudes are two different things. In The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, Lenin lays out a vision in which the necessity of technical specialists, as a class, is assumed a priori. It’s merely a question of whether or not workers know accounting and have disciplinary control to prevent sabotage.18 He never questions the leading role of political coordinators except insofar as they are efficient at their jobs. The other camp wanted to break Marxism free from the holdovers of nineteenth-century philosophy. They wanted to modernize it in light of new scientific discoveries and abolish the division between intellectual and manual laborers. Like Lenin, Bogdanov wanted a disciplined and militarized organization, but he also wanted Bolshevism to be led by worker-intellectuals, not specialists in theory. Bogdanov believed that a cultural revolution that created new modes of thought, art, production, architecture, etc., was necessary to create the foundation for a socialist society and must be concurrent with the political revolution. Bazarov for his part subscribed to a stageist view of social evolution and believed that prior to socialism the productive forces must be very advanced. He saw the cultural revolution as more suited to Western capitalist countries and only applicable to Russia after the bourgeois-democratic revolution destroyed feudalism. Like the theorists of the classical IWW, Bazarov opposed anarchic visions of decentralization and saw the true interests of the proletariat in comradely cooperation united centrally.19 Both Bogdanov and Bazarov based their perspective on the viewpoint of the proletariat seeking power for itself, but Bogdanov was able to see the proletariat’s full potential. It didn’t have to wait on the bourgeoisie, even if, as Lenin and Plekhanov also believed, there were still bourgeois-democratic tasks to be completed. Critically, what Bogdanov brings to the table is that the merger between socialism and the working class is not the ideas of self-appointed revolutionaries being adopted by workers, but rather the skills and knowledge of the intellectuals becoming the property of the working class acting for itself. And if these skills and knowledge are to become the property of workers instead of specialists, they must be translated into common language instead of the language of specialists. A factory worker from the city of Kaluga named Nikifor Volonov had this to say:

Commonly, the most absurd hearsay about philosophy is widespread among us. The essence of it is that philosophy is a science of the select few, a science which mere mortals are not supposed to peek into. This hearsay is confirmed in countless attempts when workers take books of philosophy into their hands and run up against the kind of terminology that makes your eyes roll up into your head. I myself two years ago happened to run into a worker-philosopher. After a short conversation, I was convinced that he and ordinary workers could not understand one another, that his language was not the language of the people. It was an encrypted message to which only a few people have the key. Talking about philosophy in ordinary language is taken to mean not knowing good manners and even of not knowing philosophy at all, bringing to mind the saying ‘like a pig in a silk suit’. And this attitude, unfortunately is still maintained among some of our theorists. So, Plekhanov, in an argument with the Bogdanovites, writes, ‘when discussing philosophy with you, one has to speak in ordinary language’, and further, ‘when you need to translate this into the language of philosophy, you must turn to Hegel’. If this advice had been taken by the leadership of the Bogdanovites, who at that time were becoming familiar with the realm of philosophy, then we ordinary workers would not have had the chance to discuss philosophy. And even if one or another of us had succeeded in studying philosophy, how could a general trend have emerged to guide our common affairs? Could the language of philosophy be understood by the remaining comrades? It is necessary to do one of two things: either get rid of philosophy itself, or return the right to philosophical language back to the gentlemen-scholars and to study philosophy and give an account of it, ourselves, in completely understandable language.

The single most revolutionary act an intellectual in the socialist movement can do is to make scientific theory and philosophy more accessible to the masses. If the working class is to make revolution itself, as an expression of its own interests, then it needs the means to understand and organize the world that confronts it. The role of the revolutionary intellectual, insofar as they are revolutionary, is self-abolition. Under capitalism, this won’t result in the end of the social division of labor. This means that the working-class movement must fully embrace cultural revolution. Contrary to common wisdom, the theory of cultural revolution did not originate in China. It first arose when, like the Chinese Revolution, the Russian Revolution was faced with an incongruity between the old culture and the new kind of society that the masses intended to build. The Proletkult, an organization created by a mix of prominent Bolsheviks, artists, militant workers, and scientists, acted as a fulcrum for a new proletarian culture. Though Bogdanov was a leading theorist and member, others included Bolshevik heavyweights Nadezhda Krupskaya and Alexi Gastev. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik leaders Lenin and Trotsky took umbrage with the notion of a specifically proletarian culture. They thought the working class should take the patrimony of bourgeois and aristocratic culture for their own.20 Instead of the new forms of education, new architecture, new graphic arts, and so on, after a brief period of avant-garde exuberance, the Soviet government gave its patronage to realist and neo-classical art forms, adopted the Prussian model of education, and created a cultural edifice more suited to a nineteenth-century liberal bourgeois republic than a continent-spanning experiment in human emancipation. Proletkult leaders tried to organize a new approach to every aspect of life that would promote emancipation and break down the social division of labor, but this was at odds with a government whose power depended on a monopoly of organizational knowledge.

This same contradiction emerged in China during its much more famous and world-historic cultural revolution. Though it is unclear how much influence Bogdanov had on Mao, Mao does refer favorably to his economic works.21 Mao and Bogdanov differ in many ways including in how they saw the nature of proletarian culture. Mao retained the Leninist truth-monopoly of dialectical materialist philosophers and a commitment to political orthodoxy, but he did emphasize the role of the masses in driving socialist construction. Mao also recognized the perverse role the bureaucracy and experts played in achieving an egalitarian society, but, like Lenin, he seems to have believed that the solution was to discipline them to the democratic will of the people and to the theoretical specialists like himself. Mao encouraged the masses to replace the old ideas of capitalist society with the new ideas of socialist society. The new culture was determined in a top-down way. For instance, in the theater, only eight “model operas” were allowed, and Mao’s personal calligraphy style was promoted as a universal model.22

Bogdanov, however, saw the cultural revolution as a victory of a new approach to social organization over the old instead of new ideas over the old. He favored cultural freedom, and he rejected attempts to impose a single culture from above as inherently chauvinistic. During the Chinese cultural revolution, many ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims, Mongolians, Zhuang people, Koreans, and others faced extreme persecution.23 Where Mao set the Red Guards to smashing and clearing away the relics of the old society, including those of regional minorities, Bogdanov set himself to helping his fellow workers build a new way of living of their own while emphasizing a need to respect the cultural heritage of minorities. Where the Red Guards burned classical art, the Proletkult invented new textile patterns and furniture for the enjoyment of workers. But even with its Leninist and Han chauvinist deformations, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents a high watermark for the working-class struggle. The Chinese workers, of their own initiative, built the Shanghai Commune and themselves embarked on emancipatory social experiments like setting up factory committees to democratically run production and the massively expanded rural healthcare system with the renowned “Barefoot Doctors.” While similar forms have emerged in other revolutionary waves, none have existed on as large a scale as in China. Many of these initiatives had support from sections of the Communist Party, just as they had sharp opposition from other currents in it. Men like Liu Shaoqi, who had been staunch revolutionaries, transformed into members of the organizing class. Despite initially endorsing the revolutionary wave, Mao sided with the organizing class, and the People’s Liberation Army crushed the burgeoning socialist society.

A cultural revolution of the working-class movement is a continual process that must begin prior to the seizure of power by the class if something approaching the withering of the state is possible. Had the masses already possessed at least some of the tools of self-government, the balance of power between the organizing class and the proletariat might have been different. It will require the dictatorship of the proletariat to cement, but the cultural revolution cannot wait on the seizure of formal political power.  “Knowledge is power” is the bedrock of the socialist transformation of production. 

Towards a Second Titanomachy

Among the fearsome gods of antiquity, one alone stood with mankind: the Titan Prometheus, whose name means foresight, the father of our species. After helping Zeus secure the Olympian throne from his despotic father Kronos, Prometheus stole fire from his colleagues and gave it to mankind. His cosmic principles are that of self-mastery, reason, prophecy, and the creative potential of labor. These are the very principles that define us as humans. Zeus intended for humanity to live ignorant and brutish lives in fear of the cosmic order he ruled. Prometheus, the god of the workshop and mapper of the stars, taught us all the sciences and gave us tools so that through the sweat of our own brow we might earn our bread instead of suffering at the mercy of Olympus. As punishment for Prometheus, Zeus had the gods Bia and Kratos (Force and Strength) bind him to a rock and had him tortured. Meanwhile, Zeus inflicted Prometheus’ children, the humans, with all the miseries of the world. The sly Zeus offered them as a gift to Pandora, who unwittingly released them.  Each day an eagle came to consume Prometheus’ liver only for him to heal again each day. In ancient Greek philosophy the liver is the seat of emotion. From then on, forethought remained bound to kings and alienated from the passions of life. That eagle in our world is American empire, which serves to keep science docile and apart from the righteous fury earned by capital. As Stafford Beer said in his lecture series, Designing Freedom:

There are two things wrong with the role of science in our society. One is its use as a tool of power, wherever that is concentrated by economic forces. The other is its elite image. None of us wishes to be manipulated by power; and if science is the tool of power, to hell with it. None of us wishes to entrust our liberty to a man in a white laboratory coat, armed with a computer and a row of ball-point pens in his pocket, if he does not share in our humanity.

Compare Prometheus to Hephaestus. One is a scientist and noble rebel who stood against tyranny, and the other is the god of engineers and craftsmen who Ares, the god of war, cuckolds. Hephaestus creates wonders like self-propelled tripods, voice-controlled machines, and even artificial women, but he keeps them to the use of the gods and not humans. To quote Percy Shelley, “all spirits are enslaved which serve things of evil.” The choice is between fighting for the freedom of all or submitting to tyranny. The revolutionary scientist must be a Promethean and reject the path of Hephaestus. They must be willing to give up everything so that mankind might stand upright against those who would dominate it and lord over it. Tyrants must all be cast down, be they capitalists, technocrats, or warlords. Insofar as a communist ought to have faith, it is in the liberation of Prometheus from his chains and the toppling of the Olympian order. 

Marx and Engels called their systematic, knowledge-based vision of socialist theory “scientific socialism” because it took an understanding of the world, rather than ideal ends, as its basis. But if Marx’s thesis that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world, the point is to change it” is valid, then there is a need to transcend the reflective and abstract nature of scientific socialism. Theory and practice aren’t two separate poles united dialectically; they’re one continuous process. Theorizing is just one part of the labor process. Whether it is drafting blueprints for a machine or solving a malfunction, every stage of the labor process requires both manual and mental labor. Beyond “scientific socialism,” we need constructive socialism. Constructive socialism has a long provenance stretching back to thinkers like James Connolly and Eugene Debs. It calls for the positive creation of new working-class power and the nucleus of the new society now, without waiting for revolutionary rupture. To realize this aim, our movement should make use of any technology suitable to the task. Organizational forms like parties, unions, soviets, and affinity groups are nothing more than technologies with different applications. Strategies like the minimum-maximum program, transitional program, and mass line are likewise technologies. Even tactics like street protests, blockades, and electoral campaigns are just technologies when you peel back the layers of fetishization that leftists apply to them. Socialism itself can only be a social technology for the emancipation of humanity from domination by the wage-system. One could also call Constructive Socialism “Technological Socialism,” if the term did not imply a sort of naive techno-optimism and belief in the neutrality of technology. It proudly bears the label “Promethean” in the knowledge that the term is misapplied to the acolytes of Hephaestus. The seven components necessary to realize constructive socialism are: 

1) Cultural revolution;

2) The replacement of “management by initiative” with a community of shared interests and a culture of comradely cooperation;

3) The breakdown of the division of labor and the up-skilling of members of socialist organizations;

4) The combination of education and practical work to the highest degree possible;

5) The scientific selection and training of cadre;

6) A focus on organizing the unskilled sections of the working class and winning skilled labor to its camp rather than treating them as identical;

7) The development and advancement of a universal organizational science. 

In creating a constructive socialism, we need a universal organizational science which develops through the creation of better practices to reach the Co-operative Commonwealth. This is the great task of the communist movement today. Means cannot exist without consideration for the ends one seeks to bring about; if scientific management, critically transformed for use by socialists, is the means, then what kinds of ends will it realize? To see forward, we must look backwards. As above, so below. There are two key points in history we must examine:

1) The historical experience of the Soviet Union in implementing scientific management, as the first socialist society, which therefore stamped all subsequent with its experience.

2) The role that scientific management has played in the development of the economy of the United States.

Though an imperfect science, historical materialism is the best guide we have. As much as our context may change and new factors may create new possibilities, there are fundamental commonalities that stretch across time we can narrow in on. In the next essay in this series, this history will be explored.

“Socially Organized Society: Socialist Society” by Alexander Bogdanov

Introduction by Amelia Davenport. From A Short Course of Economic Science

“Station Moon” by Pavel Klushantsev

What is Socialism? Is it the abolition of the state, the abolition of Value as an economic form, the abolition of private property, production for need rather than profit, or a rationally planned economy? All of these are cited, and rightly so, as essential features of communism. But while each of these deals with social relations, none but planning deals with the relations of production of the new order. Value is realized in exchange, property exists in the relations of consumption and prior to production, the state governs and secures the relations of production, and production for use governs the relations of consumption, not production. Even economic planning, which describes the overarching laws that govern the system of production, does not really describe the relations within production. The key feature of socialism or the Co-Operative Commonwealth, missing above is the abolition of the division of labor. 

 From the earliest socialists like Fourier through Marx and Engels, the division of labor was a central concern of the workers’ movement. Fourier describes an elaborate model society called a Phalanx where everyone rotates their job, although given tasks suited to their individual talents and interests. While he rejected the utopian impulse to craft a model society, Marx talks about the alienation in the separation of manual and mental labor which unevenly develops people. In “The German Ideology” Marx half-ironically describes a world where alienation has been abolished and even “critical critics” are free to do any job they wish throughout the day. Continuing this tradition, in his Short Course on Economic Science, Alexander Bogdanov gives a rough sketch of what the transformation of the social relations of capitalism into socialism would look like through the gradual abolition of the division of labor. A biologist, philosopher, field medic, proto-cybernetician, cultural worker, science fiction author, revolutionary communist, and economist, few figures in the history of Marxism are as criminally under-examined as Alexander Bogdanov. Introducing his life and the breadth of his work is a task for another essay. What concerns us here is the final chapter of the Short Course entitled “Socially Organised Society: Socialism”. This chapter represents something relatively unique for the time: non-utopian futurism.

 Bogdanov begins by laying out the great principle of social science: that the study of the existing tendencies and factors in society can allow us to predict in the broad strokes how history will move forward. By using a rigorous historical materialist lens, Bogdanov was able to make stunningly accurate predictions. For example, he correctly predicted the transition from steam power to mass electrification, the development of wind power and nuclear power, the development of a worldwide wireless telecommunications system, and the mass automation of labor. The first edition of the text was published in the 1890s! Bogdanov argues that while there are historical examples of societies that exist unchanged in relative stagnation or regress to earlier and less complex forms of organization, the force of movement in bourgeois society are toward complexity as such that stagnation would require an external shock. Such a shock would need to be bigger than a catastrophic world war to slow the progress of social development. In Bogdanov’s day, such an external shock seemed almost inconceivable. There was nothing that could stand in the way of Capital reshaping the world ever more in its own image.  Sadly, today the metabolic rift between the autonomous technosphere of capitalist production and the biosphere has grown to staggering proportion. It’s now possible to predict a scenario where world capitalism regresses, decays or collapses into much less complex or productive forms of social organization. Nevertheless, the trends and factors Bogdanov observed in the early 20th century still exist, if only heightened and more advanced. His outline of the new socialist world implicit in the old capitalist world remains as relevant as ever.

 Bogdanov examines five key aspects of the future socialist order that can be drawn out from trends in bourgeois society: Relation of Society to Nature, The Social Relations of Production, Distribution, Social Ideology, and the Forces of Development. Although the text is short and accessible, it’s worthwhile to summarize them in order to tease out what it means for today.

In his section on the Relation of Society to Nature, Bogdanov does not discuss ecology, something he spends considerable time on in other works, but rather focuses on the first principle of socialism: “the actual power of society over nature, developing without limit on the basis of scientifically-organised technique.” Because industrial society is based on machinery and socialism will inherit that productive basis, Bogdanov looks to the tendencies within the development of machines to see how society will change. He breaks down his predictions into three parts: 1) the source of motive power 2) the transmitting mechanism of power 3) the techniques of communication. Bogdanov argued that power would move from steam toward electricity because it was more plastic in use. He claimed that this would allow us to develop the potential of waterfalls, tides, wind and even the atom into energy. The transmitting mechanism of energy, that is machinery itself, would move toward automation and machines which self-regulate. But Bogdanov does not see this tendency developing within capitalist firms, because the outlay of investment is too dear, but rather in the militaries of capitalist countries who are not constrained by seeking short-term profits. In socialism, where society is focused on the long term wellbeing of people, first priority would be given to moving toward mechanical self-regulation, with ever-expanding machine energy utterly dwarfing any human labor inputs. Finally, Bogdanov predicted that wireless telephony would enable people to communicate instantly across any distance while improvements in transportation would make distance and geography no longer barriers to interchange at all.  All of this points toward socialism as a system where humanity as a whole, rather than a small minority, will be increasingly emancipated from nature.  

In exploring the social relations of production, Bogdanov says that the second defining characteristic of socialism is “the homogeneous organization of the whole productive system, with the greatest mobility of its elements and groupings, and a highly developed mental equality of the workers as universally developed conscious producers.” In practice, this means an end to the social division of labor and the development of worldwide central planning.  Bogdanov sees the nucleus of the end of the division of labor in capitalism’s tendency toward the de-skilling of workers. Increasingly, “the technical division of labor loses its “specialized” character, which narrows and limits the psychology of the workers, and reduces itself to “simple co-operation,” in which the workers carry out similar work, and in which the “specialization” is transferred from the worker to the machine.” This breaks down the division between people with different trades and makes the political community of interests among workers expand as their vital conditions become more and more the same in all fundamental ways. Furthermore, with the development of increasingly autonomous machines, the division between “executors” (the people carrying out labor) and “organizers” (the people directing it) will become superfluous as the day to day controlling of machines will take a more comprehensive education. Organizers and managers of labor will only be distinguished by having greater experience than executors and could be replaced by their fellow workers at will. Further, because the technical basis of production is constantly improved and will require more flexibility, workers will change their work regularly and no longer be bound to particular trades. Because socialism will abolish the chaos and anarchy of capitalist production it will necessarily create a central plan, centered around a great statistical bureau rather than an authoritarian security state, that coordinates labor on the basis of comradely discipline. In effect, for the first time in history socialism will solve the contradiction between the liberty of individuals to universally develop themselves and their equality as active members of the body politic.  

Turning from how the relations of production are to be organized to the relations of consumption, Bogdanov outlines the classical Marxist conception of a two-stage process. In Socialism, society as a whole will own all means of production and will initially own and distribute the proceeds of social labor, but individual ownership of the articles of consumption will also exist and represent the right of workers to reproduce themselves. Initially, during the transitional period before collectivism has penetrated the spirit of the great majority, remuneration based on work will be used to compel people to contribute to society. But, as culture changes and the process of production is humanized, access to the proceeds of labor will be free for all. To facilitate this Bogdanov sees in modern banks, stock exchange organizations, mutual aid societies, and insurance agencies as providing partial prototypes of the type of apparatus that will be developed in socialism. 

Beyond the relations of production, social relations will be fundamentally different in the world to come. In socialism, says Bogdanov, the first feature of the new psychology will be socialness and collectivism. Although we ourselves are socialized under conditions of competition and alienation, in a society based on comradely production will produce greater solidarity than we can imagine. The second feature is that fetishism will disappear from society. Whether fetishism of commodities and money, fetishism of nature, or superstition, all will become superfluous because, “The unknown will cease to be unknown because the process of acquiring knowledge – systematic organization on the basis of organized labor – will be accompanied by a consciousness of strength, a sense of victory, arising from the knowledge that in the living experience of man there are no longer any spheres surrounded by impenetrable walls of mystery.” By abolishing both the antagonistic relations between people and fetishism all social compulsion would come to end. Bogdanov argues that the Law and State emerge as a means to contain the anarchy and contradictions of class society through external force which takes on a fetishistic character. Fetishists root the power of the state in either divine authority or in “the nature of things,” but with the triumph of a universal science, Tektology, people won’t need to turn to such metaphysics to justify social relations. Instead of relying on fixed and abstract laws enacted through violence by “authorities” the people will collectively, democratically, and informed by science, deal with social contradictions directly. In extreme cases of violence or other anti-social behavior, “laws” and a carceral state would do far less good than having a highly organized community using its efforts to avoid harm to any party and science to cure the perpetrator. Even in the case of organizing production Bogdanov says, “The distribution of labor in society will be guaranteed on the one hand by the teachings of science and those who express them – the technical organizers of labor acting solely in the name of science, but having no power – and on the other by the power of the social sense which will bind men and women into one labor family by the sincere desire to do everything for the welfare of all.” It’s only in the early stages of a socialist society that a state in the true sense will exist because a state is nothing but an instrument of class domination. In the early stages of socialism, the state is the domination of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, but in its later stages, there can be no state. 

Under exchange society, social life is defined by inward contradictions like class struggle, market competition, and so on, while non-exchange societies are defined by an outward contradiction with nature. In feudalism and past non-class societies the primary economic contradiction existed between the needs of the population and what its environment could provide. As a self-sufficing economy, socialism is distinguished from its predecessors by not only its developed technical basis but also the far greater scale, embracing the whole of society and possibly humanity. Where in previous self-sufficient economies economic growth and technical development was determined directly by the growth in population, in socialism humanity will struggle to expand its knowledge and mastery of nature in order to fulfill its creative impulse. Socialism will not represent a regression to a steady-state economy but instead accelerate the accumulation of energy by humanity while maintaining the sensitive balance of our interchange with nature. Unlike in class society where the mass accumulation of energy has only led to the refinement of debauched classes of parasites and perverts, in socialism accumulated energy will be turned toward creative labor and self-perfection. Bogdanov further claims that the diversity of humanity, united, free and equal in socialism, will unlock a heretofore unseen capacity for progress that will dwarf the spurts of innovation seen in exchange-society. With profit removed as the motor force of economic organization, productivity will be the determining factor to save as much labor and as many resources as possible. The natural bureaucratic conservatism of capitalist firms against innovation on the ground level will be overcome and the whole of humanity will participate in expanding the sphere of development. In sum, “the general characteristics of the socialist system, the highest stage of society we can conceive, are: power over nature, organization, socialness, freedom, and progress.”

Looking around at the development of modern capitalist society, Bogdanov’s predictions have become so true as to almost seem banal. What skilled laborer doesn’t live in fear of being replaced by a self-regulating machine and so feel some pressure to learn new skills and gain new certifications in order to remain competitive? Who can imagine a world without wireless phones? Aren’t logistics companies already prefiguring the technical apparatus of socialist planning? If one is to believe texts like The People’s Republic of Walmart, all we have to do is put existing technical infrastructure under public control. Yet without transformation by subordination to the Co-Operative Commonwealth, this technical apparatus can only serve to increase the domination of workers by capitalism and continue to shift the externalities of production onto colonized people. Beyond the mere conquest of state power, socialism represents a dual revolution in both economics and culture. Having a clear vision of what that entails will allow us to prepare the revolutionary movement to exercise real power and take the necessary steps to get there. Bogdanov shows us how Socialism emerges in comradely relations in production and consumptive relations are secondary to it. He eschews fantasies of every worker having a mansion or luxury boat, while also rejecting the reactionary cowardice of those who would reign in humanity’s productive potential. Waste will be minimized in socialism, but our capacity for freedom, inextricably linked to our capacity to harness the energy, will not cease to grow. 

The aim of Socialism is the free association of producers in the commonwealth of toil. By rooting our understanding of it in an emancipated yet disciplined comradely cooperation of the whole of society to master nature we can dispense with utilitarian-reformist illusions, revenge fantasies, and other distractions. As the International Workingmen’s Association declared, there are “no rights without duties and no duties without rights.” Each person in the Co-Operative Commonwealth will be expected to apply their brain and muscle toward their shared collective good while receiving in return the means for their individual development. Even in a world of material abundance, social labor will increase its command over nature. One might balk at the idea of a “struggle with” or “mastery over” nature, but nature is nothing less than mankind’s external body and expanding our technical control over it as a species is no different than developing habits and techniques of self-discipline for the individual. In the face of climate disaster, there is no way for our species but forward toward assuming a mantle of responsibility for the health and direction of the biosphere. Humans have always been a geological force and it is time that we recognize it. This means reigning in the wasteful, blind, and inhuman economic order which must invent needs from thin air to bind our species under the wheel of dukkha. It means establishing conscious self-control over our world, what the Soviet geologist Vladimir Vernadsky proposed as the Noosphere: consciousness, rather than technology, as a geologic force. The ethics of the “luxury communist,” rooted in a crude middle-class communism of consumption, and “degrowth,” rooted in a middle-class skepticism of humanity are both inimical to working-class socialism. By seizing hold of production for itself, and aided by the universal sciences of Tektology and cybernetics, the working class will remake the world in its own image through the commonwealth of toil. 


Socially Organized Society: Socialist Society 

Transcribed from Chapter X of A Short Course of Economic Science, 10th edition, 1919. English translation J. Fineberg, 1923 by Adam Buick. 

The epoch of capitalism has not yet been completed, but the instability of its relations has become quite obvious. The fundamental contradictions of this system which are deeply undermining it, and the forces of development which are creating the basis of a new system, have also become quite clear. The main features of the direction in which social forces are moving have been marked out. It is, therefore, possible to draw conclusions as to what form the new system will take and in what way it will differ from the present system.

It may seem that science has no right to speak of what has not yet arrived and of what experience has not provided us with any exact example. But that is erroneous. Science exists precisely for the purpose of foretelling things. Of what has not yet been experienced it cannot, of course, make an exact forecast, but if we know generally what exists and in what direction it is changing then science must draw the conclusions as to what it will change into. Science must draw these conclusions in order that men may adapt their actions to circumstances, so that instead of wasting their efforts by working against the future and retarding the development of new forms, they may consciously work to hasten and assist such development.

The conclusions of social science with regard to future society cannot be exact because the great complexity of social phenomena does not permit, in our times, of their being completely observed in all details, but only in their main features, and for that reason the picture of the new system also can only be drawn in its main outlines; but these are the most important considerations for the people of the present day.

The history of the ancient world shows that human society may sometimes regress, decline, and even decay; the history of primitive man and also that of several isolated Eastern societies shows the possibility of a long period of stagnation. For this reason, from a strictly scientific point of view, the transition to new forms must be accepted conditionally. New and higher forms will appear only in the event of a society progressing further in its development as it has progressed up till now. There must be sufficient cause, however, for regression or stagnation, and these cannot be indicated in the life of modern society. With the mass of contradictions inherent in it and the impetuous process of life which they create, there cannot be stagnation. These inherent contradictions could cause retrogression only in the event of the absence of sufficient forms and elements of development. But such elements exist, and these very contradictions develop and multiply them. The productive power of man is increasing and even such a social catastrophe as a world war only temporarily weakens it. Furthermore, an enormous class in society growing and organizing is striving to bring about these new forms. For this reason, there are no serious grounds for expecting a movement backwards. There are immeasurably more grounds for believing that society will continue along its path and create a new system that will destroy and abolish the contradictions of capitalism.

1. Relation of Society to Nature

The development of machine technique in the period of capitalism acquired such a character of consecutiveness and activity that it is quite possible to determine its tendencies and consequently the further result of its development.

With regard to the first part of the machine – the source of motive power – we have already indicated the tendency, viz., the transition from steam to electricity, the most flexible, the most plastic, of all the powers of nature. It can easily be produced from all the others and be converted into all the others; it can be divided into exact parts and transmitted across enormous distances. The inevitable exhaustion of the main sources of steam power, coal, and oil, leads to the necessity for the transition to electricity, and this will create the possibility of making use of all waterfalls, all flowing water (even the tides of the oceans ), and the intermittent energy of the wind which can be collected with the aid of accumulators. A new and immeasurably rich source of electrical energy, infinitely superior to all other sources of electrical energy, has also been indicated, atomic energy, which is contained in all matter. Its existence has been scientifically proved, and its use even begun, although in a very small scale where it automatically releases itself (e.g. radium and other similar disintegrating elements). Methods for systematically releasing this energy have not yet been discovered; the new higher scientific technique will probably discover these methods and united humanity possess inexhaustible stocks of elemental power.

With regard to the transmitting mechanism, we also observe a tendency towards the automatic type of machine. Following this, we observe an even higher type – not only an automatically acting, but an automatically regulating machine. Its beginnings lie on the one hand in the increasing application of mechanical regulators to present-day machines, and on the other in the few mechanisms of this type already created by military technique (e.g., self-propelling submarines and air torpedoes). Under capitalism these will hardly find application for peaceful production: they are disadvantageous from the point of view of profits as they are very complicated and unavoidably dear; the amount of labor which they save in comparison with machines of the former type is not great, because automatic machinery also dispenses with a considerable amount of human labor. Furthermore, the workers required to work them must possess the highest intelligence; hence their pay also would have to be high, and their resistance to capital would be considerably greater. In war, there is no question of profits, and for that reason, these obstacles to their application do not arise. Under socialism the question of profits will disappear in production also; first consideration will be given to the technical advantages of self-regulating mechanism – which will render possible the achievement of a rapidity and exactness of work incomparably greater than that achieved by human organs, which work more slowly and with less precision, and moreover are subject to fatigue and error.

Furthermore, the number of machines and the sum total of mechanical energy will increase to such a colossal degree that the physical energy of men will become infinitesimally small in comparison. The powers of nature will carry out the executive work of man – they will be his obedient dumb slaves, whose strength will increase to infinity.

The technique of communication between men is of special significance. The rapid progress in this connection observed at the end of the capitalist epoch has been obviously directed to the abolition of all obstacles which nature and space place in the way of the organisation and compactness of humanity. The perfection of wireless telegraphy and telephony will create the possibility for people to communicate with each other under any condition, over any distance, and across all natural barriers. The increase in the speed of all forms of transportation brings men and the products of their labor more closely together than was ever dreamed of in the past century. And the creation of dirigible aircraft will make human communication completely independent of geographical conditions – the structure and configuration of the earth’s surface.

The first characteristic feature of the collective system is the actual power of society over nature, developing without limit on the basis of scientifically-organized technique.

2. The Social Relations of Production

As we saw, machine technique in the period of capitalism changes the form of co-operation in two ways. In the first place, the technical division of labor loses its “specialised” character, which narrows and limits the psychology of the workers, and reduces itself to “simple co-operation,” in which the workers carry out similar work, and in which the “specialization” is transferred from the worker to the machine. Secondly, the framework of this co-operation is extended to enormous proportions; there arise enterprises that embrace tens of thousands of workers in a single organization.

We must suppose that both these tendencies will proceed considerably further under the new system than under machine capitalism. The differences in the specialization of various industries will be reduced to such insignificant proportions that the psychological disunity created by the diversity of employments will finally disappear; the bonds of mutual understanding and the community of interest will unrestrainedly expand on the basis of the community of vital interests.

At the same time organized labor unity will grow accordingly, grouping hundreds of thousands and even millions of people around a common task.

The continuation of the development of the two previous tendencies will give rise to two new features of the post-capitalist system. On the one hand, the last and most stubborn form of specialization (the division between the organizational and executive functions), will be transformed and lose its significance. On the other hand, all labor groupings will become more and more mobile and fluid.

Although in the epoch of machine capitalism executive labor at the machines approaches in character to that of organizational labor, nevertheless a difference between them remains, and for that reason, the individualization of the functions of the executor and the organizer remains stable. The most experienced worker in machine production is very different from his manager, and cannot replace him. But the further increase in the complexity and precision of machinery and at the same time the increase in the general intelligence of the workers must eventually remove this difference. With the transition to the automatic regulators, the work of a simple worker approaches nearer and nearer to that of the engineer and acquires the character of watching the proper working of the various parts of the machine. If automatic regulators are attached to machines there is no need for the mechanic continually to watch his gauges and indicators to see whether the required amount of steam pressure or electrical current is maintained. All he then has to do is from time to time to see whether the regulators are in working order, to alter them as occasion requires, and to see to their speedy repair when necessary. At the same time the knowledge, understanding, ingenuity, and general mental development required of the worker increase. It is not only practical common sense that is required, but exact scientific knowledge of the mechanism, such as only the organizing intellectual possesses to-day. Consequently, the difference between the “executor” and the manager will be reduced to a purely quantitative difference in scientific training; the worker will then carry out the instructions of a better informed and more experienced comrade rather than blindly subordinate himself to a power-based upon knowledge inaccessible to him. The possibility will thus be created of replacing an organizer by any worker and vice versa. The labor inequality of these two types will disappear and they will merge into one.

With the abolition of the last survivals of mental “specialization” the necessity and the sense of binding certain persons to certain particular work will also disappear. On the other hand the new form of labor will require mental flexibility and diversity of experience, for the maintenance of which it will be necessary that the worker from time to time change his work, going from one kind of machine to another, from the function of “organizer” to that of “executor” and vice versa. And the progress of technique, more. rapid than in our day, with its continual improvements of machines and contrivances, must make the rapidly-changing grouping of human forces and individual labor systems, or “enterprises” as we call them today, to a high degree more mobile.

All this will become possible and realizable owing to the fact that production is consciously and systematically organized by society as a whole. On the basis of scientific experience and labor solidarity, there will be created a general all-embracing organization of labor. The anarchy which in the epoch of capitalism disunites individual enterprises by ruthless competition and whole classes by stern struggle will be abolished. Science indicates the path to such organization and devises means for carrying it out, and the combined force of the class-conscious workers will realize it.

The scale of the organization must from the very beginning be world-wide or nearly so, in order that it may not be dependent in its production and consumption upon exchange with other countries that do not enter it. The experience of the world war and the revolutions that followed it shows that such dependence will immediately be converted into a means of destroying the new system.

The type of organization cannot be other than centralized; not, however, in the sense of the old authoritarian centralism, but in the sense of scientific centralism. Its center should be a gigantic statistical bureau based on exact calculation for the purpose of distributing labor-power and instruments of labor.

The motive force of the organization at first, i.e., as long as the whole of society has not yet been trained in the spirit of collective labor, will be comradely discipline, including an element of compulsion, from which society will step by step emancipate itself.

In this system of production, each worker will be actually on an equality with the rest as conscious elements of one sensible whole; each one will be given all the possibilities for completely and universally developing his labor-power and the possibilities of applying it to the advantage of all.

Thus the characteristic features of the socialist society are the homogeneous organization of the whole productive system, with the greatest mobility of its elements and groupings, and a highly developed mental equality of the workers as universally developed conscious producers.

3. Distribution

Distribution generally represents an essential part of production, and in its organization is wholly dependent upon it. The systematic organization of production presupposes a systematic organization of distribution. The supreme organizer in both these spheres will be society as a whole. Society will distribute labor and also the product of that labor. This is the very opposite of the anarchic unorganized distribution which is expressed in exchange and private property conducted on the basis of competition and the crude conflict of interests. The social organization of production and distribution presupposes also the social ownership of the means of production and the articles of consumption created by social labor until society hands them over to the individual for his personal use. “Individual property” commences in the sphere of consumption which essentially is individualistic. This, of course, has nothing in common with capitalist private property, which is primarily the private ownership of means of production; but does not represent the right of the worker to the necessary means of existence.

The principle of distribution arises directly out of the basis of co-operation. As the system of production is organised on the basis that it secures to every member of society the possibility of the complete and universal development of his labor-power and the possibility of applying it for the use of all, so the system of distribution should give him the articles of consumption necessary for the development and application of labor-power. With regard to the method by which this is to be achieved, two phases may also be foreseen. At first, when the scale of production is not particularly great, and collectivism has not yet penetrated the spirit of every member of society, so that the elements of compulsion must yet be preserved, distribution will serve as a means of discipline: each one will receive a quantity of products in proportion to the amount of labor he has given to society. Later on, when the increase of production and the development of labor co-operation renders such careful economy and compulsion unnecessary, complete freedom of consumption will be established for the worker. Giving society all that he is able in strength and ability, society will give him all that he needs.

The complexity of the new method of organizing distribution must obviously be enormous and demand such developed statistical and informative apparatus as our epoch is far from having achieved. But even in our time, the elements exist in various spheres of economic life which should serve as the material for such apparatus. In the sphere of banking and credit, for instance, there are the agencies and committees of experts for studying the state of the market, stock exchange organization; in the labor movement, there are mutual aid societies, co-operative societies; and organized by the State are schemes of insurance. All these will have to be radically reformed before they can serve for the future system of distribution because at present they are wholly adapted to the anarchical system of capitalism and therefore subordinated to its forms. They may be described as the scattered rudimentary prototypes of the future harmonious system of distribution.

4. Social Ideology

The first feature of the social psychology of the new society is its socialness, its spirit of collectivism, and this is determined by the fundamental structure of that society. The labor compactness of the great human family and the inherent similarity in the development of men and women should create a degree of mutual understanding and sympathy of which the present-day solidarity of the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, the real representatives of future society, is only a weak indication. A man trained in the epoch of savage competition, of ruthless economic enmity between groups and classes, cannot imagine the high development between men of comradely ties that will be organically created out of the new labor relations.

Out of the real power of society over external nature and social forces there follows another feature of the ideology of the new world, the complete absence of all fetishism, the purity and clearness of knowledge and the emancipation of the mind from all the fruits of mysticism and metaphysics. The last traces of natural fetishism will disappear, and this will reflect the final overthrow of both the domination of external nature over man and the social fetishism reflecting the domination of the elemental forces of society; the power of the market and competition will be uprooted and destroyed. Consciously and systematically organizing his struggle against the elements of nature, social man will have no need for idols which are the personification of a sense of helplessness in the face of the insuperable forces of the surrounding world. The unknown will cease to be unknown because the process of acquiring knowledge – systematic organization on the basis of organized labor – will be accompanied by a consciousness of strength, a sense of victory, arising from the knowledge that in the living experience of man there are no longer any spheres surrounded by impenetrable walls of mystery. The reign of science will begin and put an end to religion and metaphysics forever.

As a result of the combination of these two features, we get a third feature, the gradual abolition of all standards of compulsion and of all elements of compulsion in social life.

The essential significance of all the compulsory standards – custom, law, and morals – consists in the regulation of the vital contradictions between men, groups, and classes. These contradictions lead to struggles, competitions, enmity, and violence, and arise out of the unorganized state and anarchy of the social whole. The standards of compulsion which society, sometimes spontaneously and sometimes consciously, has established in the struggle with the anarchy and the contradictions have become a fetish, i.e., an external power to which man has subjected himself as something higher, standing above him, and demanding worship or veneration. Without this fetishism, compulsory standards would not have the power over man to restrain the vital contradictions. The natural fetishist ascribes a divine origin to authority, law, and morals; the representative of social fetishism ascribes the origin to the “nature of things”; both mean to ascribe to them an absolute significance and a higher origin. Believing in the high and absolute character of these standards, the fetishist subjects himself to them and maintains them with the devotion of a slave.

When society ceases to be anarchical and develops into the harmonious form of a symmetrical organization, the vital contradictions in its environment will cease to be a fundamental and permanent phenomenon and will become partial and casual. Compulsory standards are a kind of “law” in the sense that must regulate the repeated phenomena arising out of the very structure of society; obviously, under the new system, they will lose this significance. Casual and partial contradictions amidst a highly-developed social sense and with a highly-developed knowledge can be easily overcome without the aid of special “laws” compulsorily carried out by “authority.” For instance, if a mentally-diseased person threatens danger and harm to others, it is not necessary to have special “laws” and organs of “authority” to remove such a contradiction; the teachings of science are sufficient to indicate the measures by which to cure that person, and the social sense of the people surrounding him will be sufficient to prevent any outbreak of violence on his part, while applying the minimum of violence to him. All meaning for compulsory standards in a higher form of society is lost for the further reason that with the disappearance of the social fetishism connected with them they also lose their “higher” form.

Those who think that the “State form,” i.e., a legal organization, must be preserved in the new society because certain compulsory laws are necessary, like that requiring each one to work a certain number of hours per day for society, are mistaken. Every State form is an organization of class domination and this cannot exist where there are no classes. The distribution of labor in society will be guaranteed on the one hand by the teachings of science and those who express them – the technical organizers of labor acting solely in the name of science, but having no power – and on the other by the power of the social sense which will bind men and women into one labor family by the sincere desire to do everything for the welfare of all.

Only in the transitional period, when survivals of class contradictions still exist, is the State form at all possible in the “future State.” But this State is also an organization of class domination; only it is the domination of the proletariat, which will abolish the division of society into classes and together with it the State form of society.

5. Forces of development

The new society will be based not on exchange but on natural self-sufficing economy. Between production and consumption of products, there will not be the market, buying and selling, but consciously and systematically organized distribution.

The new self-sufficing economy will be different from the old primitive communism, for instance, in that it will embrace not a large or a small community, but the whole of society, composed of hundreds of millions of people, and later of the whole of humanity.

In exchange societies, the forces of development are “relative over-population,” competition, class struggle, i.e., in reality, the inherent contradictions of social life. In the self-sufficing societies referred to above, tribal and feudal societies, the forces of development are based upon “relative over-population,” i.e., the outward contradictions between nature and society, between the demands for the means of life arising out of the growth of the population and the sum of these means which nature in a given society can supply.

In the new self-sufficing society the forces of development will also lie in the outward contradictions between society and nature, in the very process of struggle between society and nature. Here the slow process of over-population will not be required to induce man still further to perfect his labor and knowledge: the needs of humanity will increase in the very process of labor and experience. Each new victory over nature and its mysteries will raise new problems in the highly-organised mentality of the new man, sensitive to the slightest disturbance and contradiction. Power over nature means the continual accumulation of the energy of society acquired by it from external nature. This accumulated energy will seek an outlet and will find it in the creation of new forces of labor and knowledge.

The new forces of development arising out of the struggle with nature and of the labor experience of man operate the more strongly and rapidly the wider and more complex and diverse this experience is. For this reason, in the new society with its colossally wide and complex system of labor, with its numerous ties uniting the experience of the most diverse (although equally developed) human individualities, the forces of development must create such rapid progress as we in our day can hardly imagine. The harmonious progress of future society will be much more intensive than the semi-spontaneous progress, fluctuating between contradictions, of our epoch.

All economic obstacles to development will be abolished under the new system. Thus, the application of machinery, which under capitalism is determined by considerations of profit, under the new system will depend entirely upon productivity. As we have seen, machinery which may be very useful for saving labor is very frequently useless from the standpoint of capitalist profits. In socialist society, such a point of view will not prevail and there will, therefore, be no obstacles to the application of labor-saving machinery.

The forces of development which will dominate at this stage will not be new forces; they will have operated previously. In the natural self-sufficing system, however, these forces were suppressed by the general conservatism prevailing in it; under capitalism they are suppressed by virtue of the fact that the classes which take for themselves the product of surplus labor, i.e., the main source of the forces of development of society, do not participate in the direct struggle with nature, do not conduct industry personally, but through others, and consequently remain outside the influence of the forces created in the struggle.

Under socialism, however, the sum total of surplus labor will be employed by the whole of society and every member will directly participate in the struggle against nature. Consequently, the main and greatest driving force of progress will act unhindered and at top speed, not through a select minority, but through the whole of humanity, and the sphere of development must increase unceasingly.

Thus the general characteristics of the socialist system, the highest stage of society we can conceive, are: power over nature, organization, socialness, freedom, and progress.

In Defense of the Labor Theory of Value

Djamil Lakhdar-Hamina examines the labor theory of value and references philosophy of science to defend it from critics. Features a reading guide to works on the philosophy of science, Marxism, and their relations. 

The epistemological and scientific foundation of classical political economy was the “labor theory of value” (LTV). Perhaps a more fitting description is the “labor law of value.”

The LTV predicts that the prices of commodities vary proportionally with their labor-content. If a commodity contains “more labor” than another, then in all probability the first will have a higher price. The LTV makes substantial law-like claims and is not a moral proposition.

Marx did not discover the LTV. However, he did make specific contributions to the theory, including, but not limited to, the hypothesis that labor is only represented as exchange value in societies with private ownership and atomized production for exchange, the distinction between labor and labor-power, and the concept of surplus value as functionally prior to its division between profit, interest, and rent.

Attack on the Labor Theory of Value 

Since the publication of Capital, the labor theory of value has been closely associated with socialism. For this reason, it became a major project of orthodox economists to “refute the labor theory of value.”  With the rise of marginalism and the notion that prices were grounded in the subjective appraisals of individuals, orthodox economists had a political apologia and substitute theory.

The first criticisms of the labor theory of value were logical refutations of the supposed fallacies in the transformation of labor-values to prices of production. The first version of this critique was made by the Austrian economist Bohm van Bawerk. In 1895 van Bawerk became minister of finance. It is not a coincidence that, in 1896, he published Karl Marx and the Close of his System to challenge the rising socialist movement.

Essentially, the argument was that the premise of Marx’s theory implied a contradiction, that by a reductio ad absurdum the theory was logically contradictory. More specifically, the presupposition of exchange of commodities at equal values in Capital Volume I contradicts the conclusion of the formation of prices of production and a general rate of profit laid out in Volume III.

Within Marxist economics, there has been a tedious accumulation of literature attempting to show that there is no logical contradiction. This project is closely tied and is almost reducible to giving various interpretations of Marxist theories. One attempts to find the logically consistent interpretation in order to come up with a testable labor theory of value. We have all sorts of competing interpretations intended to solve the transformation problem: the simultaneist versus temporal, single-system versus dual, commodity-form, etc.

How do we go about challenging this claim of self-contradiction? How can we stop the endless proliferation of interpretations in order to construct a testable and well-supported theory?

Using the Philosophy of Science to Approach the Problem

The critique of the LTV took on a deeper dimension with the philosophy of science. Pre-1968, the only living philosophy of science was logical positivism. Joan Robinson, a student of John Maynard Keynes, himself a student of the great logical positivist Bertrand Russell, was one of the first to make forcible epistemological arguments against the LTV.

According to the neo-positivists, science is in the business of coming up with theories, bodies of declarative sentences organized into a deductive-system. Some of these statements are couched in theoretical terms, while others are couched in observational terms. Each statement is true if and only if it is verifiable, i.e. observable. If it is not verifiable, then the statement is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. It is a piece of metaphysics that should be eliminated from consideration.

As theoretical statements are not directly observable, they must be reducible to statements about direct observations. If they are not reducible to such statements, then the theoretical statements and terms are meaningless. Robinson argued that “value” was such a term. It could not be seen on an object. It was not a visible but a “metaphysical” property. Therefore, it was a meaningless term and should be eliminated from the conceptual framework of economics.

With time, the philosophical combined with the logico-mathematical in the line of work represented by Piero Sraffa and Ian Steedman. In fact, the LTV became the prime example of a discarded theory in the history of economics within the academy. The only conclusion worth making is that LTV should be discarded as a piece of anti-scientific ideology, relegated to the museum of pseudoscientific oddities alongside “phlogiston” and “ether.”

Many Marxists began accepting these ‘arguments’ around the time that the socialist movement was losing confidence and power. Neoliberalism had its effect on the economic academy and on those persons confined to a position of internal resistance. As part and parcel of the assault of capital and the defeat of labor, these Marxist intellectuals and economists were unprepared to defend the most basic propositions of Marxian political economy.

Counter-Attack and Defense of the Labor Theory of Value 

The basic point, however, is that logical argumentation is not how scientific theories are ultimately accepted or rejected. A theory is accepted or rejected only if it is tested and supported by the facts. No economist tried to reject the LTV by testing and showing that it was not supported by the facts. Therefore, all talk of the LTV being “disproven” is moot. All these idiots have done is shown how particular mathematical formalisms are inconsistent, i.e. entail contradictions. That says nothing about the real relation between prices and labor.

In the middle of this one-sided ideological massacre, two mathematicians named Farjoun and Machover published a book called “Laws of Chaos” (LOC). LOC is one of the most important and overlooked works of Marxism ever written. The philosophical, epistemological, and scientific implications of this book are revolutionary.

Farjoun and Machover transform the whole of the Marxist research program in political economy. The authors believe that all economics, including Marxian, flounder on a false assumption: that the economy tends towards a stationary state of equilibrium. In this deterministic picture of the capitalist economy, economic categories such as price and profit gravitate around this one point of equilibrium, so e.g. there is an economy-wide rate of profit.

Farjoun and Machover begin by rejecting the deterministic picture of capitalism that is tacitly assumed in such a theory. Logic and evidence exclude the possibility of such a system. In rejecting such a picture, they adopt a more realistic understanding of capitalism, but also of scientific practice and theory.

In a brilliant instance of scientific modeling, Farjoun and Machover recognize that physics has already produced successful theories about anarchic and disorganized systems, and they use these theories to analyze the capitalist economy. They argue the capitalist economy is anarchic and disorganized, as millions of producers and workers, millions of buyers and sellers interact such that at the macro-level the effect is uncoordinated, and as such resembles a container of millions of gas-particles colliding, acting against one another, and moving in unpredictable ways.

Statistical mechanics is precisely the science that studies such anarchic and disorganized physical systems, and it does so in irreducibly non-deterministic and probabilistic terms.

Physics tells us that such systems have ‘many degrees of freedom,’ and that the movement of each individual particle is ‘random.’ We cannot predict with certainty the micro-properties of a specific molecule. However, and this is extremely important, we can make statistical statements about aggregates of molecules. In like manner, we can make statistical statements about the aggregate economy, distributions of prices and profit-rates, but not about one profit rate. There is no “economy-wide profit rate” but a dynamic distribution of profit rates in which, at the granular level, individual profit-rates (firms) constantly change and switch positions.

Now whatever science is, it is certainly in the business of describing and explaining causal mechanisms. In the process of understanding, prediction is used as a means of testing, keeping, or discarding a theory.

However, when we use a theory to make a prediction we should always specify beforehand the set of relevant competitors. If the theories make the same predictions it is difficult to determine which to choose. If two competing theories make different predictions, then by observation or experiment we can eliminate one. This scientific method allows us to discard those theories that we know to be false while keeping those theories that do best faced with the evidence.

Neo-classical economics’s predictions concerning prices and labor-content are falsified. Orthodox economics predicts that there will be no connection between labor-to-capital ratios and profit. Farjoun and Machover’s probabilistic theory of labor-content, continuing the classical program of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, predicts that industries with a high labor-to-capital ratio will be more profitable than those with a lower ratio. The prediction checks out as a statistical generalization. The statistical generalization falsifies the orthodox claim and provides support for the claim that the price of a commodity varies proportionally to its labor-content i.e. the labor theory of value.

Since the publication of Farjoun and Machover’s work, there has been a proliferation of literature that supports the LTV (Shaikh, Cockshott and Cottrell and Michealson, Zachariah). Time and again, prices of commodities have varied proportionally with labor-content. As with any statistical law, an individual price might not be exactly proportional with its labor-content, but in aggregate commodity prices cluster tightly around labor-values. For instance, a paper by Cottrell and Cockshott finds that labor-content is an extremely efficient (but biased) predictor.

It would seem that Marxist political economy is the victor unless there is another more likely and better-supported theory on price.

Probabilistic Political Economy and Its Philosophical Meaning 

There is a deeper point to take out of all this, a deeper point about science and the world we live in. Quantum physics was a revolution that unsettled previous conceptions on the universe. This unsettling led to some bizarre doubts: some philosophers went to the extreme of claiming that quantum physics ‘eliminated matter,’ made reality a function of ‘subjective perception.’ Those who took a more cautious stance towards the quantum revolution drew better lessons.

Quantum physics weakened the Enlightenment perspective of the world as a well-oiled machine, and with it the belief of science as the production of a universal explanation that is a total prediction of every event in time.

Likewise, Farjoun and Machover have built a theory that does not presuppose capitalism to be a machine. Instead, capitalism is quasi-determined (in production) while also ruled by unpredictable changes and circumstances (in exchange). Science is a project of understanding, describing, explaining, and questioning the determined and chancy process of nature, and prediction enters in as one kind of epistemic act of many.

Take the typical critiques of Marxism as a failed scientific research program that rested on a prediction that did not check out. There were perhaps some Marxists who had an extremely deterministic picture of history. Whether it was the productive forces or the working-class, some irreversible process in capitalism would necessarily lead to socialism. But to be a Marxist is to understand that our material, like our social world, is no machine with a central brain; it is both determined and subject to unpredictable changes and circumstances, and like anything, there is no guarantee of socialism. Marxists must always live with this chanciness, uncertainty.

Awful though it is, this is the way Marx saw history: No guaranteed finalities. Just the fight.


Reading List

I know that going through different academic disciplines to parse out the good from the bad takes a lot of time, so I have provided a reading list of my inspirations in writing this piece if you would like to learn more and engage with the problems.

Philosophy of Science

Summary :

Okasha, Samir. Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2016. An excellent and easy-to-read introduction on the field of the philosophy of science. Particularly strong in describing verificationism and neo-positivism, charting the neo-positivist versus anti-positivist debate on the character of science and theory.

Harre, R. (1972). The Philosophies of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Older edition, but gives a great summary of the competing philosophical positions on the character and structure theory and science e.g. instrumentalism, conventionalism, realism.

Positivism:

Carnap, R. (2012). Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Dover Publications. One of the first text to introduce the positivist philosophy of science with its concomitant analysis of theory, description, explanation, the place of physics and the distinction between observation and theory.

Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. The classical statement of neo-positivism in philosophy of science. A pivotal work and guide for many years on theory, description, explanation, and prediction, and on the difference between observation and theory. Also, an interesting critical essay on “functional explanation” relevant to Marxism.

Falsificationism:

Popper, K. (2002). Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge Classics. Written in 1962, this was Karl Popper’s most popular work. It was a response to the neo-positivists and an attempt to overcome various paradoxes in the research program by developing a new conception of scientific growth and justification. Scientific growth does not proceed by testing the true, but coming up with theories, deducing observational consequences, and eliminating the false. This philosophy was known as falsificationism.

Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lakatos was actually a communist in the Hungarian Communist Party before he moved to London to study with Karl Popper. This is a book of essays, and the most famous essay carries the same title as the book. In it, he charts a more ‘nuanced’ version of falsificationism, ‘naïve’ versus ‘sophisticated’ falsificationism. Needless to say, Popper did not like this distinction and did not appreciate Lakatos’s close friendship to Paul Feyerabend.

Anti-Positivists:

Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Thomas Kuhn, a physicist by training, wrote this famous work in 1962. It was an attack on the neo-positivist philosophy and its conception of scientific change. Famous for introducing the now abused term “paradigm shift” into the study of theories.

Feyerabend, P. (2010). Against Method. London: Verso. Feyerabend moved to England to study with Wittgenstein at Cambridge. However, Wittgenstein died and so he went to study with Karl Popper the London School of Economics. He became a fierce critic of every philosophy of science and adopted a position known as ‘theoretical Dadaism’ or ‘theoretical anarchism.’ Essentially, in the war of science, any means of victory are permissible, there are no rules. Marxists may like that he tries to bring Lenin into his philosophy as an inspiration to think of science in strategic terms, i.e. as a conflict.

Realists:

Harre, R. (1972). The Principles of Scientific Thinking .London: Macmillan. An extremely interesting work that criticizes the neo-positivists and builds a new philosophy of science. The position is essentially that science is not in the business of describing and explaining observations, but the causal structure and mechanisms that produce observable events in both regular and irregular ways. The main product of science is a deductive theory, but a model of the causal structure and mechanisms ‘behind’ our world.

Hacking, I. (2010). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stakes a similar position against neo-positivism. However, approaches the Marxist understanding of science not just as a process of representing (theory) but intervening in our world (practice). In short, the criterion for the murky word ‘real’ is if something has causal effects, and if it affects us, then it is real.

Marxism

Lesser-Known Marxist Philosophy:

Gasper, P. (1998). Marxism and Science. An introduction to Marxist philosophy of science that stakes out the major claims and goes through the history of the tradition. Also, gives a reading list of works of science.

Sheehan, Helena. Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History: The First Hundred Years. Verso, 2017. An excellent book that traces the history of the engagement of Marxists with science from Marx and Engels to the “British Scientific Socialists.” Does justice to the specificity and achievements of the Marxist understanding of science.

Ruben, David-Hillel. Marxism and Materialism. Harvester Press, 1979. A good synthesis of the Marxist and analytic traditions of philosophy.

Wright, Erik Olin, et al. Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History. Verso,  1992. An excellent work in the analytic tradition which is actually the best-produced criticism of GA Cohen’s technological determinism. Pursues powerful analogies between evolutionary theory and historical materialism, and defines a class of social theory which attempts to study irreversible processes. Also is one of the first works to systematically interrogate the nature of explanation in Marxism.

Introduction to Marxist economics:

Mandel, Ernest. An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory. Pathfinder, 2006. This work was actually published in 1974 by Ernest Mandel, a Trotskyist leader, economist, and writer. Before judging his political origins, I have found that this work is a fun introduction for the novice.  

Sweezy, Paul M. The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. Monthly Review Press, 1970. Written by the famous Harvard Marxist economist and one of the founders of Monthly Review. A terrific analytic introduction to the basics of Marxist political economy. However, nearly everything said about the transformation problem is worthless and should be avoided.

Advanced Texts:

Farjoun, Emmanuel, and Moshé Machover. Laws Of Chaos: A Probabilistic Approach to Political Economy. Verso ed., 1983. I spoke of this monumental work above.

Shaikh, Anwar. Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises. Oxford University Press, 2018. This massive work is, in my opinion, the greatest achievement theoretical and empirical achievement of Marxist economics since Capital. The goal of the work is to systematically re-found the whole of economics on the inspiration of the classical tradition of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. Rather than obsessing over ‘micro-foundations,’ ‘perfect competition,’ and ‘general equilibrium,’ Shaikh demonstrates how a few principles of political economy can serve as the basis for the ‘turbulent dynamism’ of capitalism.

Studies of the LTV :

Gillman, Joseph M. The Falling Rate of Profit; Marx’s Law and Its Significance to Twentieth-Century Capitalism. Cameron Associates, 1958. The first major attempt by someone to test the labor theory of value and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

Cockshott, Paul & Cottrell, Allin & Michaelson, Greg. (1993). Testing Labour Value Theory with input/output tables.

Zachariah, Dave. “Testing the Labor Theory of Value in Sweden” (2004).

 

Envisioning a Revolutionary Food System

For the revolution to win, it must feed the people. Gringo Campesino argues for a vision of what this may look like. We publish not as a blanket promotion of this vision but to spark a greater discussion/debate on the role of agriculture in a communist revolution. 

Staring at a re-greened Mars from the weary eyes of the working class is an outright fantasy. Forested with a speckling of towns, farms, places of craft, commerce, and play, you have to squint to see it through the fog. The vacuum of space between here and there seems too far to overtake. Still, there is reason to shoot for the stars. There is no NASA nor Muskian path to survival of humans on the Earth after ecological collapse. At least there is not one worth taking. Beneath the layers of detritus atop the forest floor, there lies the soil that bears the fruit of Full Communism. The only choice is to slow the approach of collapse while building socialism on Earth. The goal is to develop not a collapse oriented ideology of “disaster communism”, but to formulate a scientific approach to combating the woes of failing ecosystems and rotten economics. The final stop is a star called Communism. A concrete study of agriculture informs us to dig in before we reach for it.

The answers were beneath our feet, even before the planet was enveloped in the ever-warming blanket which Capitalism requested on its deathbed. Cycles other than its own become interrupted. Existing in a purely extractive relation to nature leads to death, and even some parasites can recognize when their survival depends on saying enough is enough. With the aid of the death program that is capitalism, humans have far surpassed the simple gut parasite and have achieved even greater strides in death than the likes of the Naegleria fowleri, or the Brain-Eating Amoeba. These creatures rise in numbers with the rising temps and tides. If working people are to see that Red Planet, Naegleria fowleri is going to have to eat the brains of the rich. There is too much work to be done – reforesting the Amazon, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Southern US; replenishing the grasslands, and bolstering the wetlands. No time for swimming about in the hot, methane burping pools from which the capitalists summoned their demons. A better bet is to swim in passages of Masanobu Fukuoka, whose work on regreening deserts and natural farming informs a socialist project in defense of the living. A focused perspective from the lens of the indigenous farmer and those in tune with regional biomes will be critical if we are to achieve our lofty goals in the night sky.

The business of growing food and medicine for the working class becomes nearly impossible under quickly changing and worsening conditions, but it is most certainly impossible under the mechanics of capitalism. As nature trends toward diversification and adaptation, Capitalism tends toward monopolization and accumulation. The farmer under capitalism is irrevocably trapped by this dichotomy, a hellish and living dialectic. The need for sustenance never ceases but the growing conditions continue to sharply narrow the yield. The farmer can only be liberated by the participation of the working class, guided by the communist project. Free of the limits of capital, farm workers across the globe can participate in the defense of the Earth and its living through regenerative agriculture, growing food while putting carbon back into the soil. The science already has shown its results, now the land and the worker must be liberated to unlock the potential that our soil brings to our mutual defense. A deep historical look agrarian socialism in the US is in order. The Sharecroppers Union and Oklahoma Communists know where the pitfalls lie.

A food system for socialism and survival is yarrow for our wounds. Natural farming can and will provide equal to higher yields than the exploitative and extractive harvests of Industrial agriculture under the supervision of monopoly control. There is no way for a large agricultural corporation to diversify its products and methods to the degree required by climate catastrophe. There is little profit in such research or strategies. Much of modern crop technology will become futile when faced with rapid and widespread changing of conditions. Farmers today are seeing wild swings within the span of a single season. A centralized private interest cannot understand the needs and whims of an ecosystem in real time, including and perhaps most egregiously, those of working people. Such a dire situation calls for a diversity of seed genetics in the hands of diverse growers using diverse methods, all while rooted firmly in the local habitat.

A socialist project encourages such a horizontal network of support and resources, so long as it actively supports each regional biome with its own specific project geared toward adaptation and survival. A centralized hub of resources and research also proves integral, so that all of the localized work can be put into a context and coordination that is international, as both climate change and class are globally shared struggles. In the heart of Jackson, Mississippi, a group of comrades called Cooperation Jackson created a microcosm of this network for their own survival in the face of their racist and exploitative enemies. We still have much to learn from their continued project, and in the meantime, it is best used as a concrete jumping off point so that we can begin to observe our options for a life worth living in the future. As does Cooperation Jackson, a revolutionary food system needs to apply both modern scientific knowledge and practical ancestral wisdom to provide nutrition and livelihoods. A network of cooperatives is not revolutionary in itself, but it does offer a path forward towards a more just food system, positioned to smooth over revolutionary change with minimal interruption to food security. The model is certainly better equipped to defend against climate disaster that is capitalism.

Developments in technology are hugely important, but they must be accessible and openly sourced so that the horizontal network of growers and researchers can pull from it and apply it in their fields. We must not rely strictly on technology for adaptation on the farm. We must also encourage natural cycles to allow for mutation and diversity. The potential confluence of plant-based medicine and modern lab technology may focus on the microscopic, but it also serves as a form of telescope so that the farm in the stars seems ever closer. The scientific method must be applied alongside concepts of ecology and ancestral knowledge. Web-based technology will prove critical towards distributing food in a way that meets the needs of all people, while also tracking the ecological impacts of our food use. The logistics of connecting a network of many smaller growers with end users will be regional and web-based, minimizing gaps in need. In this example, it is clear why a higher number of smaller farms are necessary for such a food system to exist. If one farm that is grown on clay is hit hard by a particularly unrelenting wet season, another farm down the road on sandy soil can better survive and drain away the effects of the season. We need a diversity of tactics in the field after all. May monocropping burn in hell.

The necessary diversification of seed genomes and the agricultural methodology envisioned is impossible under capitalism. This remains the case even if capitalism is removed from the equation, so long as socialism firmly rooted in community building is not its replacement. Further, a revolutionary food system requires a broader revolution of society at large, conducted by the working class and its organizations. it’d implementation relies on socialized medicine, housing, and life. It almost seems too obvious. How can we possibly patch up our planet enough to survive our escape if we cannot even take care of each other as humans? We must see ourselves as part of the whole, while also as uniquely important. Practicing communism of the hoe provides us with the strength and sustenance we need when reaching towards revolutionary skies. We have to transform this Earth and our relations upon it so that working people, not the filthy rich and fascist scum, may one-day plant turnip seeds on Mars.

References

Akuno, Kali & Nagwaya, Ajamu. Jackson Rising: The Struggle for Economic Democracy and Black Self-Determination in Jackson, Mississippi. 2017.

Bisset, Jim Agrarian Socialism in America: Marx, Jefferson, and Jesus in the Oklahoma Countryside, 1904-1920. 1999.

Fukuoka, Masanobu. The One-straw Revolution: An Introduction to Natural Farming. 1978.

Fukuoka, Masanobu. Sowing Seeds in the Desert: Natural Farming, Global Restoration, and Ultimate Food Security. Chelsea Green Publishing, 2013.

Farmers Encouraged to ‘Champion Soil’ in Face of Climate Change:

https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2018-12-28/sustainable-agriculture/farmers-encouraged-to-champion-soil-in-face-of-climate-change/a65059-1

Pilot program encourages farmers to adopt carbon-conscious growing styles:

https://www.heraldandnews.com/news/local_news/business/pilot-program-encourages-farmers-to-adopt-carbon-conscious-growing-styles/article_04b7ab0d-00b7-589e-80c4-ee28af24e877.html

 

Who Thinks Abstractly? 2.0

To think in a non-linear way is necessary for scientific socialism. Cold and Dark Stars presents an argument for a systematic, emergentist and complex way of thought that doesn’t naturalize the hierarchies of class society. 

Soviet poster from 1923, reads “Let Us Unite All the Forces of Science with the Creative Energy of the Working Class”

For too long there appeared a conflict between what seemed to be eternal, to be out of time, and what was in time. We see now that there is a more subtle form of reality involving both time and eternity. 

Prigogine, describing physical non-equilibrium systems.

The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that A building is not finished when its foundation is laid; and just as little, is the attainment of a general notion of a whole the whole itself. When we want to see an oak, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. In the same way science, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not found complete in its initial stages.

Hegel

I

The world is complicated and opaque. The old societies, such as hunter-gatherer tribes or agricultural communities, could comprehend themselves in a more total way than modern societies. We may understand better today the laws that rule the natural universe, laws that we have been able to manipulate to send man to space, impregnate the air with electromagnetic waves that carry instantaneous messages, and annihilate whole cities with the mass-energy of atoms. But the self-comprehension of ourselves as a society is lower than in antiquity, for today’s laws that make the community flourish are sunken below layers of complexity and abstraction. In ancient cities, like Rome, or Athens – or inclusively in the urbanization projects of many developing countries of the 20th century – the restrictions that inhibited flourishing were well known. For the destiny of communities was rooted in their capacity to create the calories and housing necessary to sustain a population, and these activities were constrained by the capacity of agriculture to create sufficient flows of energy.

Today, our bodies and spirits are subject to many complex and contradictory forces, that sometimes lead to tidal waves that submerge our destinies beneath emergent properties of which we have very little control or understanding. Even the economic elites, with their capital and firms, only have partial epistemological access to the chain reactions that their activities can unleash. These actions can lead to financial chaos, the elite’s capital devaluation, or mediatic crisis. Another complexity nexus is how our biological bodies react before the abstract layers and terraforming created by the capitalist world-system. We are evolved animals, produced by natural selection, but we are also abstract animals programmed by the semi-autonomous systems created by modern civilization, including its landscapes of concrete, glass, and steel. Trying to grasp the specific mechanisms that mould the human spirit is a very complex task.

In other words, we human beings are subject to microphysical mechanisms, constrained by particularities like “free” choices and biological processes, but we are also regulated by macroscopic forces that are universal and abstract, such as financial systems, history, culture, and the market. This dialectic of the particular and universal cannot be dissected surgically, for the microphysical and macrophysical aspects are in communication with each other, generating an interrelation that is not easy to disassemble.

The cosmos is living and palpitating, in constant flux. For example, the worlds of the hunter-gatherer and the 21st-century cybernetic-worker are entirely different universes, even if there are similarities rooted in the human being’s evolved animality. However, today’s self-mythology of modernity is based on inert and linear laws. This is due to the victory of the technique, which had triumphed in the 19th and 20th century. Chemistry, electromagnetism, and nuclear physics could be manipulated to create a world filled with light, machines, and mechanical monsters that devour human bodies. This capacity of the technique to convert a forest into a storehouse of energy created a class of enthusiastic intellectuals that wanted to apply it to every class of problems. In other words, they wanted to violently convert the universe into a mechanical clock.

In all disciplines, inclusively in those not related to the natural sciences, this tendency towards the technique can be seen in the dissection of a substance into its analytic parts. However, the properties of the natural sciences are different from those of the human body and its mind. In the case of the systems of natural sciences, the problems studied are linear and static. Linear in the sense that the system can be approximated as the sum of its parts. For example, in many calculations involving elementary particles such as electrons or photons, the system can be approximated as the sum of its parts, and this makes possible a very precise mathematical study. Since many systems that are studied in the natural sciences can be approximated in this manner, the technique, that method that dissects the substance into digestible units, proved enormously useful in the investigation of the natural universe. However, the social world is an accumulation of interrelations, emergent properties, and totalities, and cannot be approximated as the sum of its parts (a linear system). In other words, the human totality is an assemblage of biological, historic, and economic processes, and cannot be disassembled that easily.

However, given the predominance of the technique, many intellectuals, scientists, and opinion makers have enthusiastically pushed it as a method to study the bio-historical-geographical assemblage that is society, trying to linearize the problem as if we were just a cumulus of electrons and quarks in steady-state, without taking into account the nonlinear, emergent properties and feedbacks. This tendency towards linear equilibrium not only is fundamentally naive but also encourages very conservative and reactionary thinking. Indeed, if this world can be explained as a product of unchanging, static universalism, then the impulse to change it for a freer and more dignified cosmos becomes an affront to science itself. Since I think this approach is not only fundamentally wrong but also imposes unfreedom – as the heart is merely reduced to electrons, springs, and wheels – I find that it is my duty to combat this cretinization. Furthermore, I also noticed that there is a tendency in both thought and activism to challenge this linear thought by pretending the world is just flux and difference, dismissing universal patterns and properties.

Curiously, I learned that our world is pulsating with life, light and change from science itself, as my doctorate in physics ultimately concerned the fate of nonlinear systems. A nonlinear system is ultimately a coupling of both the universal and particular. At the microscopic level, there is indeed difference and particularity, such as the random motion of particles, but this apparent individuality gives rise to macroscopic phenomena, that in turn influence the trajectory of these microscopic world-lines. Nonlinear thought tries to grasp the coupling of both the particular and universal, for a non-linear system is more than the sum of its parts, yet the behavior and properties of each individual part become relevant too.  Therefore, this article is concerned with a study of the origins of this reductionist impulse to either reduce the world to the universal, or in the opposite case, the particular, and how a living and nonlinear thought should, in turn, supersede this impulse.

Designs for a monument to Issac Newton by Etienne-Louis Boullée

II

In philosophy, the technique emerged in the form of analytic philosophy in the Germanic countries, where the old form of philosophizing, which was impregnated with historicity, literature, and forests of concepts, was replaced by a philosophical program that wanted to reduce the world into logical atoms. Although the seed of this philosophical technique can be found in the work of Descartes, for in his “Discourse of Method” he explicitly describes the method of reducing a system into its atomic parts so that it can be analyzed (the geometric method), this seed did not become totalizing until the 20th century.

This assault against traditional philosophy began with the criticisms against Hegel and Heidegger launched by English and German philosophers. In England, Russell rebelled against the Hegelian-inspired idealism that was popular in that era, to replace it with a research program that exchanged the ambiguous language of traditional philosophy with logical precision. This logical-mathematical language was inherited from Frege, a mathematician-philosopher from the 19th century whose project was to reduce arithmetic to a logically consistent system that could be derived from axioms. In Germany, Carnap severely criticized the language of Heidegger, for Carnap thought the utterances of Heidegger lacked sense and were misuses of language that could indicate the emotional state of the utterer but not describe the world. These positivist philosophers wanted to reduce the world to logical and atomistic propositions that could be verified with empirical observations.

The project of logical-atomism that emerged in the early 20th century is considered a failure by philosophical consensus, but its technical spirit persists in that impulse to reduce the world to thought experiments on a canvas emptied of history. For example, one of the most famous analytic philosophers of the second half of the 20th century, John Rawls, developed a theory of justice where the initial assumption of his thought experiment was a “veil of ignorance” where the citizen has no knowledge of their social, cultural, and psychological position in relation to other members of society. I will not affirm that Rawls’s methods cannot be useful in specific contexts, but it still demonstrated that tendency to linearize the world into a thought experiment, ignoring the nonlinearities of history. Given that the political world is nonlinear, and is more than the sum of its parts, the true materialist dialectic must grasp the interactions between the abstractions of history and the particularities of individuals, not just reduce the problem to a geometric derivation.

III

Another example of thought infected by linear technique is economics. The political economy of the 19th century, which studied the couplings between social classes, and the value and labor chains that began in agriculture and ended in factories, has been marginalized to the remote wing of only a few university departments. Today, the economy focuses on mathematical functions of utility that are maximized in order to calculate agent preferences and Walrasian equilibrium. In other words, the destiny of mankind, with all its historical, institutional and cultural dimensions, is reduced to mathematical functions, equilibrium and stationary state assumptions.

These assumptions exist because they linearize the problem, approximating it into something similar to those systems that are already well understood in the natural sciences. However, these assumptions that treat the economy as a linear problem end up converting the abstract mathematical model into a concrete policy objective, especially after the economic shock of the 70s. In other words, Washington tried to submit the rich and nonlinear complexity of developing countries to the violence of a myopic universality. For example, the policies of developing countries focused on the liberalization of the market due to models of Walrasian equilibrium that were in fashion in that era. The state intervention that was ubiquitous in developing economies, including such policies as fiscal expansion and import-substitution, was criticized for distorting the market, and therefore triggering scarcities of commodities.1 Anglo-Saxon economists counseled Latin American countries to liberalize their economies, pointing at the economic growth experienced by some countries in Eastern Asia (e.g. Singapore, South Korea, China).

This linear and abstract thinking wishes to submit the chaotic world to the violence of universality, yet, it was unable to capture the historicity of developing countries, which goes beyond tepid Walrasian equilibrium. The economic liberalization of Latin America did not birth the economic growth that was expected, but caused contractions, inequality, and slow growth.2 A more materialist analysis of Asian economies would reveal that the liberalization narratives of those Western economists were simply a caricature. In all of those Asiatic countries, the government intervened in an extreme manner that countered the counsel of Washington, to the point that such intervention contradicted Anglo-Saxon economic orthodoxy. According to the models of Washington, governmental presence of such magnitude would lead to great distortions of the market, producing inefficiencies and scarcities. However, these Asian countries instead experienced great economic development thanks to state planning.

An example of the misjudgments of these economists is the case of South Korea. While the marginalists argued that South Korea experienced an explosive economic growth thanks to market liberation, more accurate studies found that the state had great control of the most important industries.3 Even if the state did not possess these industries in a legalistic and transparent manner (the only manner intelligible to Anglo-Saxon brains with their myopia of formal structures), the state manipulated them for the accomplishment of discrete and planned objectives. A great part of this planning was possible because the state controlled the financial system and could manipulate corporate incentives through discretional credits.4 In fact, some economists saw the relation of the state to firms as forming one organization, where firms were simply internal organs of a corporate association between them and government.

Other Asian examples demonstrate even more the deficiencies of Western orthodoxy. For example, all the economists that see the growth of China as evidence of the supremacy of the free market are blinded by their fidelity to Anglo-Saxon abstractions. Other more nuanced thinkers have argued that the current growth of China is rooted in the base of the “socialist” state imposed in the 50s, when China adopted the Stalinist model, since this was an era where a rational state capable of organizing society under a unitary plan was erected.5 Today, the plan of the Chinese Communist Party is to be open to the global market, but this process is imposed through planning that is possible due to the Stalinist base of the state.6  Furthermore, a great part of capital-intensive industry is still controlled by the state.

Finally, the experience of the USSR can be seen as a refutation of many of the precepts of marginalism. The USSR did suffer from inefficiencies and scarcities, and thus it could be said that it did not obtain the Walrasian equilibrium between supply and demand, but even then the country industrialized extremely quickly, destroying illiteracy, unemployment and turning into an industrial power. Finally, a great part of this growth happened when the majority of the capitalist world was sunken into a depression.

I do not want to justify the experiences of Asiatic countries and the USSR as examples that must be followed, I simply seek to show how myopic and incorrect economic orthodoxy is. Given its violent abstractions, it was incapable of grasping the roles of culture, state, and economy that a genuinely materialist and dynamic thought comprehends. Given these concrete nonlinearities, the counsel of Washington’s economists led many developing countries to inequality, economic contraction, and slow growth. The Anglo-Saxon technocrat linearized concrete reality in the economic periphery through coercion and the spillage of blood, in the form of military dictatorships and economic blockades.

the USSR showed a non-capitalist form of industrialization and development in action

IV

Until now, I have only focused on the linearity of philosophy and the social sciences. However, the same reductionist impulse can be found in some corners of psychology and genetics. This tendency is to reduce the destiny of mankind to microscopic variables – specifically biological ones – a  tendency manifests itself at various levels of intensity. In the field of behavioral genetics, there exists a legitimate scientific debate (erroneous, in my opinion, which I will explain later) about what is nature versus nurture. For example, there is a consensus that our psychology and behavior is partially inherited, where inheritance explains about thirty to fifty percent of our behavior.7 Yet, inherited variables do not necessarily have a biological origin, for example, cultural aspects can also be inherited. As a matter of fact, the most advanced techniques of behavioral genetics, such as the statistical correlation of clusters of genes to intelligence, only find correlations of five to ten percent.8

Therefore, these studies have only been able to demonstrate a correlation with a percentage that, in the best of cases, is of fifty percent, but without being able to show that these inherited variables have biological origin. This limitation has not stopped scientists like Robert Plomin of proclaiming that our behavior is determined mostly by our biology, and that neither therapy nor environment can change this fact.9 A related argument is the divergence of behavior between different sexes, for example, the paucity of women in the mathematical sciences, that some psychologists correlate with biological variables.10

In a milieu outside scientific legitimacy, there exist extremists that give a radical and macro-economic twist to these statistical correlations. I have analyzed this style of argument in a previous article.11 Basically, the most extreme versions of this perspective try to explain socio-economic divergences between the core and periphery as a function of pseudo-biological variables such as intellectual quotient. These thinkers also blame poverty of certain demographics on genetics, arguing that certain races are less intelligent than others. These viewpoints are not orthodox and only exist in the internet periphery, or are uttered by a few scientists that aren’t accepted entirely in the community of scientific legitimacy.

Rather than arguing against these extremist-racists, which I have done in a previous article, I want to return to the debate of nature versus nurture.12 In my opinion, to grasp the problem as one of biological inheritance versus environmental attributes is an inadequate scheme. The human being is integrated in a nonlinear manner to its environment, where the biological parameters interact with the social and material geography of the world, influencing each other mutually, so that disentangling the interaction into isolated poles is probably impossible.

A contemporary advance that demonstrates these nonlinearities is epigenetics, where environmental parameters determine which parts of the genetic code express themselves phenotypically, and these epigenetic modifications can be inherited even when in theory they do not change the DNA. For example,  research has shown that stressful environments can impose epigenetic modifications on an organism.13

Some psychologists have begun to understand that the scheme of nature versus nurture is erroneous. For example, scientists in the field of child development have sketched how genetic and epigenetic factors interact with early childhood experience, and how this interaction leads to the structuring of neural connections and moulds the manner in which complex and mental activity is effectuated. In other words, these scientists developed a nonlinear theory of childhood development as a function where both biology and environment are coupled.14

In conclusion, in the same way orthodox economists cannot grasp the world system as a dynamic organism filled with historicity, for they submit it to dead and steady-state laws, those who try to explain the destiny of the human being as a simple function of biological parameters do not grasp the nonlinearities of Homo sapiens as a being embedded within its historical-geographic surroundings. In other words, these thinkers entertain false and vulgar materialism. A sophisticated materialism would grasp how the biological processes are interrelated with the environment, influencing each other. Nafis Hasan described these limits of biological determinism and presented dialectical materialism as a method of understanding nonlinearities.15

Genetic determinism is challenged by findings in the field of genetics itself

V

While the technicians have erred in abstracting the world under universalism, there are those who oppose this abstract realm by enshrining the particular and different. For example, activist and intellectual movements of the Left celebrate the microphysical and particular to oppose the centralization of capital and the American empire. In this type of thought, macrophysical properties that emerge from microphysical processes, and at the same time mould and constrain the microphysical, are not taken into account. In the case that these macrophysical-universal processes are considered, they are perceived as obstacles to freedom, and therefore, fragmenting them becomes imperative. This fetishization of the particular emerges in pure thought and also in political activism. Its origins can be pinpointed to the continental philosophy of the 20th century. Heidegger, at the beginning of the 20th century, rebelled against the abstract and calculating thought of the West in order to push forward a philosophy that emphasized intuition, the immediate environment, and the particular culture.  

The great abstraction of the West, the desire to catalogue and describe entities in a systematic manner, was seen by Heidegger as an obstacle which prevented the disclosing of Being in a more holistic and immediate sense. Instead of tapping into truth through speculative-abstract thought, Heidegger saw the authentic being as rooted in the destiny of blood and soil – in the existential confrontation before Death.

Heidegger’s students informed the French philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. In the world of French post-structuralism, logical meshes did not constrain entities, but entities existed in a universe of fluxes, multiplicities, and difference. These processes in flux could only be investigated at the local level since, according to these philosophers, theory became unintelligible and unstable at the global level. For Foucault, local networks of power constrained knowledge. Derrida considered all conceptual infrastructure, such as science or Marxism, to be unstable. The universe of Deleuze was one of fluxes of energy, matter and signs, where unstable nodes could exist, but not universal laws.

However, the materialist, informed by natural sciences, knows that the laws that rule the universe are interconnected across various scales, and that macroscopic scales influence the microscopic scales and vice versa. For example, gravity, which distorts space and time, regulates cosmic scales, creating cobwebs of stars and light. In these cobwebs, spherical bodies of gas and rock pulsate, their perfectly round forms a function of the radial symmetry of gravitational force. However, the radius, temperature, and mass of these stars, planets or compact objects are caused by atomic processes that interact with gravity, such as the nuclear force between protons and neutrons, or the concentration of electrons. In this cosmic dance, the microscopic laws of quantum mechanics, and the macroscopic laws of gravity are in communication, influencing each other mutually. An authentic materialist assumes that humanity, including its collective spirit, is an emergent property of elementary particles such as quark and gluon fields, but at the same time, the social abstractions and material geographies created by mankind, such as the economy, urban spaces, and history, constrain the flux of these elementary particles. In summary, war, waged by Homo sapiens, develops the nuclear bomb that turns human bodies into vaporized carbon. Modern capitalism, that accumulation of human actions, emits photons and electrons that unite the whole world in a network of finance and communication.

This local thought also informs today’s politics. On the left, particularism manifests as the destruction of universal programmatism, like that embodied by the parties of the Second and Third International. Instead of internationalism and the struggle for the universal and socialist republic, localism, nationalism and fragmentary struggles are fetishized. An example of this phenomenon has been the European left, which sees the struggle against neoliberalism as manifested in secession from the European Union and in the affirmation of national sovereignty.

With liberals in the United States, sometimes this thought process manifests itself as the glorification of small businesses, the movement of organic farming, and the irrationalism against scientific medicine.

This reaction against universalism is understandable from a left perspective, for the bloody history of modernity is tied to empires that violated and pillaged the world with “enlightened” pretensions. Yet, materialist thought grasps that national sovereignty is illusory, for there exists a world economic system that traverses the borders of nation-states, and even if these states have the capacity to manipulate some endogenous variables in their territory, the destiny of these national economies is controlled by the tidal waves of the world-system, and the long and slow historicity that drags the corpses of dead generations. Given this reality, it is necessary to struggle against the world-system not only in a local and fractal manner but also with the creation of a global, sovereign machine that can channel the world-system for the benefit of all. In other words, it’s necessary to build a worldwide socialist republic.

VI

Not only is linear thought incompatible with the truth of a palpitating and living universe, but it cannot imagine a world of a flourishing humanity, for linear thought considers the current dark state in equilibrium and eternal. This attitude inhibits the march toward the splendid city that will give light, dignity, and justice to all human beings (Neruda). We not only require an infinite patience for the future dawn, but also a deep comprehension of the nightmare of the past. Yet, technical barbarism conceals the weight of the past generations, for it sees the human being as an individual agent surrounded by a canvas emptied of history and geography. This tendency will always end in reaction, for the laws of its world are inert and, therefore, fundamentally conservative.

To be a radical is to be a non-linear thinker. The problems of the present are embedded in a complex system, for the historical and economic laws that regulate this world are the same laws that cause global warming and financial crisis. Therefore, a radical and socialist solution requires a total program that transforms the nexuses that connect the present calamities. Furthermore, the socialist knows that the present world system is dynamical, with only a couple of centuries of existence, for in a more remote past, coinage, the waged worker, and the commodity were not totalizing. Ironically, treating a system as nonlinear, opaque, and dynamic, converts its destiny into something transparent, capable of being channeled for the benefit of collective flourishing. In contrast, those barbaric intellectuals that theorize capitalism as something transparent and eternal, with genes and hormones as the machinery of this spurious destiny, chain humanity to the domination of elites and venal interests.

Spherical flames with two ambient pressures. In image b) instabilities are developing in the surface of the flame. Image from C.K. Law, published in Matalon, M. (2009). Flame dynamics. Proceedings of the Combustion Institute, 32(1), 57-82.

Eugenics 2.0: How Dialectical Materialism can end the Nature vs. Nurture debate

Race “science” has not disappeared, and with the rise of xenophobic nationalist politics, it is making a comeback in the form of vulgar genetic determinism. The classic nature vs. nurture debate is returning, with right-wing ideologues firmly on the side of “nature”. Nafis Hasan argues that through dialectical logic we can overcome the nature vs. nurture debate and understand the human species in a way that doesn’t bow before genetic reductionism. 

2018 seems to be the year when fetishism around genetic determinism has returned to vogue. From the bitter fights over the CRISPR gene editing technology patent and its alleged use in editing human embryos that were carried to term signaling changes in the ethics of reproduction and a potential wave of “CRISPR babies” in the future, to US politicians embracing direct-to-consumer genetic testing kits to uphold identity politics, and white supremacists embracing genetics as another avenue to display their superiority and the idea of intellectual superiority of whites over Blacks in the US becoming more acceptable in the US white population, it appears that this has really been the year when the Nature vs Nurture debate, always simmering in the background, has jumped out in the foray of politics and society. In some cases, scientists have clearly tried to separate themselves from the use of genetic data for political use, e.g. when the American Society of Human Genetics “denounced attempts to link genetics and racial purity”, although it did not recognize that in the public mind, race and genetics are intertwined. But in other cases, scientists called for more research into the link between genetics and racial differences in sociological and behavioral parameters, going the full spectrum between cautious interpretation of genetic association studies advocated by David Reich, to the ultimate victory of Nature over Nurture as concluded by Robert Plomin in his new book “Blueprint.”

The debate on race, genetics, and intelligence is not a new one — after eugenics was supposedly put to rest, it appeared that this ideology had taken refuge in the shadows of evolutionary psychology and behavior genetics. It is not surprising that the latter field, built on the Nature vs. Nurture duality, is a hotbed of debate and sensationalism, given the sociopolitical implications and our collective obsession with genetic determinism. Over the years, the question of whether differences in intelligence are due to environmental factors or genetic factors has been repeatedly raised. In 1994, Charles Murray co-wrote the notorious book, The Bell Curve, in which he argued that blacks are less intelligent than whites because of genetic differences. While the book was criticized by the evolutionary biologist Stephen J. Gould in his summary analysis & rebuttal The Mismeasure of Man (revised ed., 1996), the idea that there are inherent genetic differences in intelligence across races stuck around in other forms. Once the human genome was sequenced, and genetic determinism again became fashionable in its technological reincarnation, billions of dollars of public money was funneled into studying the genetic basis of complex traits, including behavioral and psychological ones, and their differences across racial and ethnic boundaries. The belief that the answer lay in the genes nurtured the idea of eugenics along with it.

Current day eugenics, Eugenics 2.0, takes the form of hyper-rationalism, scientific racism, race realism, and the misleading idea of “human biodiversity.” It is not surprising, then, that the alt-right and white supremacists have taken up Eugenics 2.0 behind the shield of “Science”, just as they espouse their bigoted views from behind the mask of Free Speech. For example, earlier this year, a secret conference on eugenics and intelligence was hosted at University College, London, featuring white supremacist speakers like Toby Young. Sam Harris recently hosted Charles Murray on his podcast under the title “Forbidden Knowledge”. This was after Murray was protested against at a lecture at Middlebury College, the underlying premise being that Murray’s ideas were being restricted due to the “college PC culture” (Murray was recently awarded a hefty prize from the Bradley Foundation and is regularly invited to give talks on conservative platforms). The cautious approach advocated by Reich is naive at best, since as geneticist Razib Khan’s case shows, white supremacists can use such studies as evidence for racial superiority, and they are increasingly leaning towards genetic testing for validation.

This is not to say that Eugenics 2.0 hasn’t faced its own share of resistance in academia — much has been written against the idea that inherent genetic differences explain the variable performances in IQ tests along racial lines. The scientists that championed the environmental causes of such differences in IQ test outcomes have put forth socioeconomic status (SES) as the primary cause. A seminal study by Turkheimer et al in 2003 showed that genetic differences could only explain differences in intelligence among kids from high SES background. For the kids from lower SES, environmental factors were the primary cause for variation observed in IQ. A more recent critique of the paper showed that the differences observed between the two SES groups were not significant along racial lines. A paper by Figlio et al, published in 2017, was the largest study to test the idea that “genetic influences on cognitive abilities are larger for children raised in more advantaged environments”, found no evidence to support their hypothesis. However, they do admit that “articulating gene-environment interactions for cognition is more complex and elusive than previously supposed.” A host of scientists across disciplines have accused Reich of conflating the implications of modern behavior genetics research, and one scientist even questioned Reich’s expertise in understanding evolutionary biology and whether he is a racist. Academia is not without rebuttals, as evolutionary biologist Michael Eisen took to Twitter to criticize the above-mentioned rebuttal op-ed to Reich, asking whether social scientists understand genetics themselves. Beyond the discussion of study design and other scientific details of contradictory results, the question has attracted other meta-analyses. Some of these include a sociological perspective on whether race is a biological or social construct, the limitations of IQ tests, whether the term “Race” should be used in the context of genetic differences between population groups, and whether this debate belongs in the realm of Free Speech.

In his defense, Plomin (author of Blueprint) argues that he’s focusing on the differences between individuals rather than groups and that genetic data provides a probability on where an individual’s cognitive ability lies on a normalized distribution of the population. He concludes that 50% of the differences between individuals, in personality, mental health and illness, and cognitive abilities can be explained by inherited DNA differences. These differences can come in the form of single nucleotide changes in the DNA, otherwise known as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and it is using this parameter that variability among individuals is determined. Of course, in the 3 billion bases that constitute human DNA, it is very possible to have a wide array of SNPs and therefore, modern-day behavioral genetics uses an outcome known as polygenic score, a statistical tool that incorporates variations at particular genomic locations that carry different weights in terms of phenotypes; the polygenic score, therefore, provides a risk estimate, a probabilistic score. However, as James Freese writes in his well-balanced review on the use of genomics in social sciences, “polygenic scores are purely predictive scores,” and they only explain only a portion of complex human behavior such as cognitive outcomes, which are still influenced by environmental effects.

This endless debate, however, is spurred on by a major epistemic flaw in understanding the Nature and Nurture equation. In his detailed analysis of the behavior genetics field in the post-genome sequencing era, sociologist Aaron Panofsky writes, “Behavior geneticists’ focus on environmental factors and interactionism has involved looking at different parts of the nature versus nurture equation, not a rethinking of the presumptions of that equation or the notion of the analytic separability of genes and environment.”1 Something perceived to be a change in the paradigm ended up being just a shift towards one variable or the other. The individual focus on genes or environment as separate entities have resulted in much contradictory evidence so far, allowing the white supremacists to weaponize scientific evidence to their favor and change public perception (for years, Nicholas Wade misrepresented scientific data to make racist claims as a science writer for the New York Times). However, Panofsky doesn’t provide an avenue to escape the quagmire that behavior geneticists find themselves in.

The promised paradigm shift can be achieved through a shift in how we view the relationship between us and our environment. And turns out, Marxist ideas can help us do exactly that. Engels first proposed the idea of using Marx’s dialectical materialism to examine this relationship is his unfinished book Dialectics of Nature (1883). Marx, in his revision of Hegel’s dialectics, asserted that dialectics should deal with the “material world” of human history and activity rather than the metaphysical world or the world of ideas. As Ernest Mandel describes in his introduction to Capital (Penguin edition, 1976), “when the dialectical method is applied to the study of economic problems, economic phenomena are not viewed separately from each other, by bits and pieces, but in their inner connection as an integrated totality.” Dialectical materialism allows for studying the interactions between phenomena in an empirical manner. Engels’ intention in his unfinished book was to employ this philosophy to understand the ever-changing relationship between Man and Nature.

Biologists such as J.B.S. Haldane and others had tried to keep this tradition alive through their writings over the years. But the pseudoscience practiced by Trofim Lysenko and the misuse of dialectical materialism by Stalinists resulted in a shunning of this approach in Western philosophy and scientific understanding. However, in its unadulterated form, dialectical materialism can provide a solution to the nature vs nurture debate, as Richard Levins & Richard Lewontin outlined in their book The Dialectical Biologist (1985). Levins & Lewontin write:

“an organism does not compute itself from its DNA. The organism is the consequence of a historical process that goes on from the moment of conception until the moment of death; at every moment gene, environment, chance, and the organism as a whole are all participating….Natural selection is not a consequence of how well the organism solves a set of fixed problems posed by the environment; on the contrary, the environment and the organism actively codetermine each other.”

The central premise of Levins & Lewontin’s argument is that because the relationship between an organism and an environment is reciprocal (and hence dialectical) it is this relationship that should be the subject of empirical study rather than either the environment or the individual organism. Additionally, they argue that this relationship cannot be studied outside the context of evolution, echoing both Marx and the famous biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky who proclaimed “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. Lewontin went on to further solidify the necessity of using a dialectical approach to studying evolution and development of an organism. In his book The Triple Helix (2002), he writes “the ontogeny [development] of an organism is the consequence of a unique interaction between the genes it carries, the temporal sequence of external environments through which it passes during its life, and random events of molecular interactions within individual cells. It is these interactions that must be incorporated into any proper account of how an organism is formed”, establishing the organism as a site of interaction between the environment and genes. Therefore, under dialectical materialism, the Nature vs. Nurture debate is replaced by how Nature AND Nurture contribute to the development of an organism.

It is therefore interesting to note that while Plomin admits that “we select, modify and even create our environments in line with our genetic propensities”, he chooses to label environmental effects as “largely unsystematic, unstable and idiosyncratic” even though they account for the rest of the 50% of differences among individuals. He goes as far as to argue that while environmental factors may have temporary effects, these effects are largely erased in the course of reproduction. This argument, in fact, should be discarded in the face of mounting evidence from laboratory studies using rodents and from human studies that show transgenerational heritability of phenotypes. Epigenetics, long heralded as the connection between the environment and the genome, shows that genomic imprinting (the phenomenon by which genes are expressed in a strictly parent-of-origin pattern), has been observed in approximately 75 genes in humans and around 150 genes in rodents. Endocrine disrupting chemicals in the environment that mimic hormones and interfere with their physiological functions have shown to transgenerationally affect multiple disease states in humans and rodents that range from cancer, diabetes and obesity to neurological disorders such as ADHD, despite not being classic mutagens (chemicals that alter the DNA). More recently, it has been shown that male offsprings of male mice exposed to stress exhibit symptoms of social anxiety disorders, and this effect is carried through changes in microRNAs carried by the sperms. The microorganisms that inhabit our bodies are gaining a more central role in our development, and affect our physiological as well as our neurological functioning to the point that the individuality of the organism has been brought under question, leading to the concept of the organism as an ecosystem, a “holobiont”.

With the rise of observations in developmental plasticity, such as the examples mentioned above, it would appear that Lamarckian concepts of transmission of heritability are quickly gaining traction in Western science. While fetishism around the gene as the central identity has been the key ideology of the neo-Darwinians such as Richard Dawkins and has propagated a reductive “DNA as the blueprint of life” ideology, neo-Lamarckian systems of transmission of inheritance as proposed by Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb (1995) can be used to argue against such ideas.2 Jablonka and Lamb argue that short-term evolution does not depend on new mutations in the DNA, but rather on epigenetic modifications that uncover genetic variants already present in the population. Additionally, genes undergo “shuffling” through recombination during cell division, thus giving rise to further variation within the population. They also argue that the structure of the chromatin (the condensed version of chromosomes in cells) affects changes in the DNA sequence and therefore “highlights the complexity of the role of the environment in evolutionary change, the environment is not the just the agent of selection. Through its effects on genes phenotype, ti also biases the direction, rate, and type of DNA changes at the locus.” Jablonka and Lamb also propose group selection rather than individual selection and counters the neo-Darwinian idea of the gene as the unit of selection by proposing groups of cells as units of selection instead. Cognizant of the fact that inheritance at the social and behavioral level is different compared to genetic and epigenetic level, Jablonka and Lamb (2005) describe four properties of Behavioral Inheritance Systems (BIS) that are founded on a fusion of collective-individual activity devoid of genetic hierarchy. They argue that: 

“with variation transmitted by the symbolic system, there is a quantum leap in social complexity with families, professional groups, communities, states, and other groupings all influencing what is produced in art, commerce, religion and so on. Construction plays an enormous role in the production of variants, yet because symbolic systems are self-referential, the rules of the systems are powerful filters. The ability to use symbols also gives humans the important and unique ability to construct and transmit variants with the future in mind” (Evolution in Four Dimensions, 2005).

In his analysis of evolutionary theory using dialectics, Julio Munõz-Rubio3 further argues that this mechanism of inheritance is essentially a dialectical one since Jablonka and Lamb’s work implies the evolutionary process to be a synthesis between the genetic information and the environmental influences, which Lewontin (1983) had described to be conceived as “two opposed, active, and mutually selective elements”, thus forming “a dialectical Aufhebung of the organism-environment.”4 Munõz-Rubio extrapolates his analysis to social interactions and human evolution:

“In this case it is a synthesis resulting from actions of self-aware beings: human beings, the only species that evolves at this level, the only species that does not cease being Homo Sapiens and which, consequently does not shed its biological condition in its evolution. This evolution emerges as what is defined as self-relation, of a negative nature, that is, an internal relation of societies (or of populations within them) that leads to self-negation, to a movement in which humans shed their previous nature, they deny it in their next stage, in which they self-assert themselves.”

Current scientific rationale employs the neoliberal and capitalist ideology of individualism to champion the cause of genetic determinism, and in turn, scientific racism. While scientists (both geneticists and sociologists) have acknowledged that both the environment AND genes play a role in the development of cognitive functions, their study designs are flawed because of this reductionist, individualistic approach. Modern technological advances have done little to end the debate despite promises; scientific evidence generated using a reductionist view will only continue to be co-opted by chauvinists and white supremacists. Scientists cannot afford to ignore the sociopolitical impact of their work. It is time for a more encompassing understanding of our biology and our relationship with the environment, and dialectical materialism, as Marx and Engels had intended, and Levins & Lewontin have applied theoretically, is poised to do so.