US Constitution: Hiding in Plain Sight

Daniel Lazare writes on the US Constitution, its inherent contradictions, and why socialists should oppose it. 

1982 poster by Soviet artist Evgeny Kazhdan

In order to theorize the United States, socialists must theorize the US Constitution.

By “theorize,” we mean a theoretical analysis not of certain parts, but of the phenomenon as a whole. Rather than focusing exclusively on racism, sexism, and the like, as leftists are wont to do, this means coming to grips with “USA-ness” itself – why it arose, what it means, how it managed to conquer much of North America in a matter of decades, and why it has played such an outsized role in world history ever since. 

The same goes for the US Constitution. Law reviews and poli-sci journals overflow with articles about this or that clause or theory of interpretation. But attempts to grapple with the Constitution in its entirety are rare. Why did eighteenth-century patriots attach so much importance to a written document? Why has it proved so durable? Why do increasingly undemocratic features such as a lifetime Supreme Court or a Senate based on equal state representation draw so little attention? To be sure, articles about the Electoral College have grown common since Republicans used it to steal the presidency in December 2000. But once it becomes clear that reform is impossible within current constitutional confines – which is indeed the case – everyone goes back to sleep. 

So what are we to make of a plan of government that seemingly “disappears” its own shortcomings? Is it simply that Americans are too busy or lazy to care? Or is passive acceptance part of a social contract that is more contradictory and ambiguous than people realize?

What, moreover, does this have to do with socialism? Is Marxism above such local concerns when it comes to the international capitalist crisis? Or, given capitalism’s multi-dimensional quality (which is to say the fact that it is not just an economic system but a political and social one as well), shouldn’t Marxists recognize that the US constitutional crisis is part and parcel of the larger capitalist breakdown and that it is impossible to understand one without the other?

The answer is obvious. Capitalism is concrete. It arises out of real institutions and real societies. We can’t understand it as a whole unless we understand its various components as a whole and determine how they figure in the larger process.

Is the Constitution rational?

The logical place to start is with the document itself. The Constitution (which originally consisted of just 4,300 words but has since grown to around 7,500) consists of a Preamble, seven articles, plus twenty-seven amendments. Article I deals with Congress, II with the presidency, III with the federal judiciary, IV with the states, V with the amending process, while VI contains the all-important supremacy clause declaring that, once adopted, the document “shall be the supreme law of the land.” Article VII, finally, outlines how the ratification process is to proceed.

Since the Constitution says it’s the law of the land, and since law must be rational, the implication is that the document as a whole must be rational as well, meaning that the various pieces must hang together in a logical manner that makes sense. Every legal textbook and every last judicial decision assumes this to be the case; indeed, it would be hard to imagine a society basing itself on laws that it frankly admits are nonsense.

But how do we know this is the case? The Preamble, for instance, seems to advance a straight-forward theory of popular sovereignty in which “we the people” can do whatever they want “in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,” and so forth. Article VII drives the point home even more forcefully since it is clearly at odds with the Articles of Confederation, the plan of government approved by all thirteen states in 1781 and still the law of the land when the framers gathered in Philadelphia six years later. The reason it’s at odds is simple: where the Articles of Confederation stipulate that any constitutional change must be approved by all thirteen states (“…nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made … unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state”), Article VII’s “establishment clause” says that the new constitutional alteration will be considered valid when ratified by just nine.

Since this was contrary to the Articles of Confederation, this means that the Constitution was illegal at the time it was drafted, a problem it promptly rectified via the miracle of self-legalization. It’s like telling a cop who’s pulled you over for speeding not to bother writing a ticket because you’ve just changed the law in your favor. But what would be absurd for an individual is the opposite for a sovereign people as a whole. Just as “we the people” can make any law they want in order to improve their circumstances, they’re free to disregard any existing law for the same reason.

To paraphrase Richard Nixon: if the people do it, that means it’s legal. This is the definition of popular sovereignty— people are over the law rather than under it and hence legally unbounded when it comes to their own self-advancement. So the Preamble states in combination with Article VII. But the rest of the Constitution goes on to say something very different. Article I establishes a complex legislative process whose purpose is clearly to limit the people’s decision-making abilities. Article II establishes an equally roundabout way of electing presidents. Article III says that federal judges may “hold their offices during good behavior,” which effectively means for life even if the people want to remove them mid-stream.

How can a supposedly sovereign people submit to restrictions on their own power? Finally, there is the amending clause set forth in Article V, which imposes the most astonishing restriction of all. It says that the people cannot change so much as a comma without the approval of two-thirds of each house of Congress plus three-fourths of the states. Back when there were just thirteen states, this meant that four states representing as little as ten percent of the population could veto any constitutional reform sought by the other ninety percent. Today, it means that thirteen states representing as little as 4.4 percent can veto any reform sought by the other 95.6. 

What is even more remarkable is that Article V goes on to lay out two instances in which the people’s power disappears entirely. The first says that “no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article,” which deal with the slave trade. The second says that “no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”Even if every last American agreed that the slave trade should be abolished immediately, in other words, the Constitution says they couldn’t do so for a full twenty years after ratification. Even if the overwhelming majority agreed that a Senate based on equal state representation was intolerable affront to democracy, the Constitution says they can’t alter it in the slightest without the unanimous agreement of all fifty states, which effectively makes it impossible. It thus renders the people powerless as well – not for twenty years but for as long as the Constitution remains in effect. 

How can the Constitution declare the people to be simultaneously omnipotent and impotent? This would appear to be the very definition of incoherence. The rightwing Federalist Society claims to believe in “natural law, the idea of law as founded upon reason and logic and not merely the ipse dixit [unproven assertion] of a given power.”1 But if the Constitution is not founded on reason, as it clearly isn’t, then isn’t this a case of seeing logic where it doesn’t exist?

Of course, it’s not just the Federalist Society but the ruling class in general, who feel this way. All schools of constitutional analysis claim to interpret the Constitution in meaningful ways. Hence, all assume that a kernel of meaning lies at the core. But since we know that the opposite is true, that liberal society can be described as a gigantic conspiracy aimed at pulling the wool over the people’s eyes regarding the essential meaninglessness of their founding document. The result is a classic blind spot concerning a flaw that bourgeois society cannot allow itself to see so that it may continue to function.

Such contradictions are hardly limited to the US. To the contrary, liberal society in general rests on such blind spots. Classic English liberalism, for example, prides itself on the rule of law, political moderation, slow and steady reform, and so forth. “I hear you’ve had a revolution,” Harry Truman remarked to Britain’s George VI following Labor’s sweeping victory in the 1945 parliamentary elections. “Oh no,” the king replied, “we don’t have those here.” Revolutions were for lesser people like the Russians or French, not for a civilized nation like the Brits. Yet, British moderation is in fact a product of a century of turmoil beginning with the English Civil War in 1642 and ending with the Battle of Culloden, the result of an attempted takeover by the vanquished Stuart dynasty, in 1746. England had to go through the fire before Victorian legalism could be achieved. It had to be immoderate in order to become moderate and then forget that it had ever been immoderate at all. 

The US Constitution accomplishes the same trick in virtually the same breath. First, it invokes popular sovereignty but then cancels it, so that “we the people” can submit to a rule of law beyond democratic control – and all in the name of democracy no less. It performs the operation so neatly that bourgeois legal scholars forget that popular sovereignty existed in the first place.

So is this our theory of the US Constitution, i.e. that of a self-denying system of government whose purpose is to blind the people to its own contradictions? One that declares the people to be sovereign in theory while denying it in fact? The answer is not quite. First, we’ve got to examine what purpose this blind spot serves.

Political playing field or instrument of class rule?

E.P. Thompson closed his 1975 study, Whigs and Hunters, an examination of eighteenth-century politics and law, with a swipe at a “highly schematic Marxism” that holds that “the rule of law is only another mask for the rule of a class” and that therefore “[t]he revolutionary can have no interest in law, unless as a phenomenon of ruling-class power and hypocrisy; it should be his aim simply to overthrow it.” Against this sort of “structural reductionism,” Thompson argued in favor of a more supple mode of analysis:

…in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the law had been less an instrument of class power than a central arena of conflict. In the course of conflict, the law itself had been changed; inherited by the eighteenth-century gentry, this changed law was, literally, central to their whole purchase upon power and upon the means of life.… What had been devised by men of property as a defense against arbitrary power could be turned into service as an apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the apologia was serviceable up to a point: for these “propertyless” … comprised multitudes of men and women who themselves enjoyed, in fact, petty property rights or agrarian use-rights whose definition was inconceivable without the forms of law.2

Rather than merely imposing class rule, law achieved hegemony by laying out a political playing field with room for everyone to take part. While obviously benefitting the high and mighty, it offered a measure of protection for the “petty property rights or agrarian use-rights” of those below. The poor thus ended up trusting in the law as well, thereby rendering its hegemony all the more complete. The situation was much the same in British North America, where, if anything, everyone had more of a stake since property was more widespread – not counting slaves and Native Americans, that is. Consequently, New England wound up even more legalistic than Old England back home.

Since travel was difficult from north to south, politico-legal arenas of conflict tended to unfold within colonial lines. The War of Independence changed this by drawing the ex-colonies into a common polity, while the Constitution fairly revolutionized it by deepening political integration in general. Moreover, it continually turned up the heat by trying to accomplish several tasks at once: create a powerful central government while ensuring states’ rights, establish an unprecedented level of national democracy while entrenching slavery even further than the British, etc. The elaborate compromises that the framers carved out in 1787 ended up both infuriating and enlivening all sides, which is why the entire structure exploded in civil war just 74 years later.

 While the Constitution summoned up and cancelled popular sovereignty in practically the same breath, it offered a consolation prize in the form of a powerful new politico-legal system in which eighty percent of the population could take part. The new politics were vast and dramatic, especially once slavery emerged as a major point of contention with the Missouri Compromise in 1820. The people were still not sovereign in the strict sense, but they were politically alive in a way they never had been before. In France, the people created constitution after constitution after 1789. In America, the Constitution created the people by taking scattered seaboard communities and molding them into something approaching a unified polity. 

Structuring politics

But not only did the Constitution create a new politico-legal arena, it shaped it.

Of the 85 Federalist Papers written by Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay from October 1787 to May 1788, the most frequently cited is the tenth, with good reason. In it, Madison takes aim at the “factious spirit” that he says is forever the bane of stable government and comes up with both a diagnosis and a cure.

First the diagnosis: “From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.” 

Hence, it not only different degrees of property that lead to conflict, but different kinds of – “[a] landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,” as the Tenth Federalist puts it. “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation,” Madison adds, “and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.” So how can we make sure that all these interests and factions behave themselves for the good of larger society?

Reading between the lines, it is evident what Madison is up to. Not only is he concerned about struggles between rich and poor, but between different economic sectors, slave-owning planters on one hand and bankers, merchants, and incipient manufacturers on the other. Since he feels it would be unjust to allow one sector to violate another, his concern is how to keep them separate but equal.

Hence his cure: Madison admits that in the rough and tumble of daily politics, the task is not easy. Ordinarily, he says,

…the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures … are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. 

What Madison understands as bullying seems inevitable, but Madison hoped to prevent it via the miracle of complexity, i.e. the division of the polity into so many sub-units and sub-sub-units that political movements will wind up dashing themselves upon the rocks. As the Tenth Federalist notes:

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state. 

And, of course, the wickedest and most improper project of all would be the abolition of slavery since it would strike at the Southern landed interest’s very existence. Therefore, the goal was to scatter and confuse the abolitionists. This was the purpose of non-sovereign sovereignty: to prevent the movement from spreading from state to state and thus coming together as a mighty whole. 

This explains both the success and failure of the Civil War. Despite Madison’s efforts, abolitionism succeeded in crossing some state lines. But it didn’t succeed in crossing the Mason-Dixon Line thanks to various pro-slavery provisions that the Constitution had put in place: states’ rights; a three-fifths clause in Article I providing slaveholding states with as many twenty-five extra seats in the House of Representatives and twenty-five extra votes in the Electoral College; a southern-controlled Supreme Court that ruled in Dred Scott that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”; a Senate in which slaveholding states were guaranteed parity, and, finally, an amending clause that gave the South an unchallengeable veto over any and all constitutional changes.

Since the Constitution rendered slavery secure within its southern redoubt, the only way around the problem was to suspend the Constitution and launch a revolutionary war aimed ultimately at expropriating the plantocracy. Even though they would never admit it, this is precisely what northern politicians set out to do.

 But once “normal” politics resumed after Appomattox, northern politicians restored the Constitution in full since it had established the only politico-legal arena of struggle they had ever known. Rather than venture deeper into revolutionary waters, they opted almost instinctively to stick with the existing framework. To be sure, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments abolished slavery and federalized citizenship in 1865-70, which is why Popular Frontists like the historian Eric Foner extoll the supposedly radical changes they wrought. But, in fact, such reforms rapidly disappeared within the constitutional morass. Former slaves sank into neo-slavery while the notion that they “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect” once again became the law of the land throughout the old Confederacy. Roughly one American in fifty had died, yet the only thing the Civil War accomplished was to eliminate southern secession as a political threat.

Such are the results of democratic self-nullification. 

The circularity of American politics

The ups and downs of the socialist movement that emerged after the Civil War are too numerous to cover in this essay. But it suffices to say that the Constitution “over-determined” its failure by scattering the movement’s energies and preventing it from coming together in a single mighty mass.3 It did so by entrenching racism, (one of the SP’s best-selling pamphlets was a broadside against the “ni*ger equality” that bosses sought to impose by forcing whites to work side by side with blacks)4, and fairly mandating massive repression. Officials called in the state or federal troops to break some five hundred strikes between 1877 and 1903, cementing US labor history as the bloodiest and most violent of any industrial nation outside of czarist Russia.5

The constitutional recrystallization of the post-Civil period resulted in a curious paradox: class unity at the top and disaggregation below. In 1902, the leader of a group of anthracite coal-mine owners declared: “…the rights and interests of the laboring men will be protected and cared for – not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of this country.” Sociologist Michael Mann observes: “…no other national capitalist class behaved with quite such righteous solidarity.” Yet workers, split along racial, ethnic, religious, and geographical lines, did the opposite. Socialism requires “a sense of totality,” Mann adds, yet it was precisely a totalizing working-class perspective that the Madisonian constitution was designed to prevent.6

Which brings us to Islam. A footnote that Frederick Engels included in an essay he wrote about the history of religion in 1894 turns out to be oddly relevant to America’s current plight:

Islam is a religion adapted to Orientals, especially Arabs, i.e. on one hand to townsmen engaged in trade and industry, on the other to nomadic Bedouins. Therein lies, however, the embryo of a periodically recurring collision. The townspeople grow rich, luxurious and lax in the observation of the “law.” The Bedouins, poor and hence of strict morals, contemplate with envy and covetousness these riches and pleasures. Then they unite under a prophet, a Mahdi, to chastise the apostates and restore the observation of the ritual and the true faith and to appropriate in recompense the treasures of the renegades. In a hundred years they are naturally in the same position as the renegades were: a new purge of the faith is required, a new Mahdi arises and the game starts again from the beginning. This is what happened from the conquest campaigns of the African Almoravids and Almohads in Spain to the last Mahdi of Khartoum who so successfully thwarted the English. It happened in the same way or similarly with the risings in Persia and other Mohammedan countries. All these movements are clothed in religion but they have their source in economic causes; and yet, even when they are victorious, they allow the old economic conditions to persist untouched. So the old situation remains unchanged and the collision recurs periodically.7

Engels had apparently read the fourteenth-century Moroccan polymath Ibn Khaldun and was therefore familiar with his famous thesis about the three-generation lifespan of Muslim dynasties. What makes the passage relevant is that both systems, modern America and medieval Islam, unfold under a static body of law, the Constitution on one hand, and shariah on the other. Since the law is assumed to be perfect and unchanging, all problems must be the result of laxity in its observance. The solution, therefore, is to restore the law in all its ancient purity. 

This was the message of medieval Muslim reformers like the Almoravids and Almohads, as Engels points out, and, curiously enough, it is the message of American reformers today.

At the height of Watergate, for instance, the black Texas Democrat Barbara Jordan declared in ringing tones: “My faith in the Constitution is whole; it is complete; it is total, and I am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the Constitution.” The solution to Nixon’s misdeeds was to put the Constitution back on the pedestal where it belonged. A liberal New York Democrat named Elizabeth Holtzman excoriated Nixon for never stopping to ask himself, “What does the Constitution say? What are the limits of my power? What does the oath of office require of me? What is the right thing to do?” If he had read the Constitution, he would know the answer. Nearly half a century later, Nancy Pelosi denounced Donald Trump in the same ringing tones for “undermining a system, the beautiful, exquisite, brilliant, genius of the Constitution, the separation of powers, by granting to himself the powers of a monarch, which is exactly what Benjamin Franklin said we didn’t have.”8

The problem is always the same, and so the answer must be the same as well. When presidents go rogue, the faithful must draw them back to what ancient prophets like Benjamin Franklin said were their proper constitutional limits. If the Constitution says it it must be right because, after all, the Constitution is the Constitution. But, then, the Qur’an is also the Qur’an, so does that make it right as well? Here is what Ibn Khaldun said about Islam’s founding document: 

The Qur’an … is in itself the claimed revelation. It is itself the wondrous miracle. It is its own proof. It requires no outside proof, as do the other wonders wrought in connection with revelations. It is the clearest proof that can be, because it unites in itself both the proof and what is to be proved. … All this indicates that the Qur’ân is alone among the divine books, in that our Prophet received it directly in the words and phrases in which it appears. … Inimitability is restricted to the Qur’an.9

So is the Constitution, that wondrous miracle that is its own proof, inimitable as well? According to liberal politicians such as Jordan, Pelosi et al., the answer is yes.

Towards a theory of the Constitution 

The upshot is a political system as arid and unchanging as the constitutional structure that controls it. Which is what Madison wanted to accomplish, i.e. to sterilize politics so that the plantation system could continue ad infinitum. 

The result is a society that is unable to grow and hence address a growing list of problems in a constructive and meaningful way. This is not to say there haven’t been bursts of reform. There have, obviously, but it’s invariably a case of one step forward and two steps back. Reconstruction led to Jim Crow and the unbridled corporate dictatorship of the 1880s and 90s. The mixed bag of reforms that comprised the Progressive Era led to the violent suppression of the Wobblies, grim wartime repression under Woodrow Wilson, the Palmer Raids, and Prohibition. The black revolution of the 1950s and 60s gave way to a growing “southernization” marked by the growth of pro-gun and anti-abortion movements and a sophisticated effort aimed at rolling back civil rights. This was observed the British journalist Godfrey Hodgson in 2004: “One of the surprise developments of the last thirty years has been that, where it was once assumed that the South would become more like the rest of the country, in politics and in many aspects of culture, the rest of the country has come to resemble the South.”10

Obviously, popular prejudice is a factor. But it’s an effect rather than a cause, given a slave constitution subject to no more but the most cursory reforms. Take the three-fifths clause that gave southern slaveholders twenty-five extra congressional seats and electoral votes. One might imagine that the abolition of slavery would have done away with such abuses. But with the termination of Reconstruction in 1877, the opposite was the case as black individuals now counted as “five-fifths” of a person for purposes of congressional apportionment— even though they couldn’t vote. Racism wound up expanding all the more, not despite the Constitution, but because of it. The seniority system rewarded racism by allowing the one-party South to expand its tentacles throughout Congress while the Electoral College and the Senate multiplied the power of agrarian states that were less populous and less developed, thus undermining democracy as well.

Despite the civil-rights reforms of the 1950s and 60s, the situation today is largely unchanged. In fact, in many ways, it is worse. Equal state representation, for instance, allows the majority of the population living in just ten states to be outvoted four-to-one in the Senate by the minority living in the other forty. Sixty years ago, the implications were neutral, at least in terms of race, since the top ten actually had fewer minorities than the nation as a whole. Today the situation is reversed with the top ten most populous states home to twenty percent more minorities. The result is a growing premium for whites in places like Montana, the Dakotas, New Hampshire, and Vermont and a growing disadvantage for minorities in places like California, Texas, and New York.

This is why America is racist – not because of some disease that Americans can’t kick, but because of a slave-era constitution that is beyond their control. Meanwhile, the filibuster allows senators from 21 states, like Montana, the Dakotas, etc., to veto any and all bills while the Electoral College gives voters in lily-white Wyoming more than twice as much clout in presidential elections as voters in a “minority-majority” giant like California.11 

Not only does the Constitution prevent the people from tackling the problem of racial inequality, but it also prevents them from advancing on other fronts as well – environmental protection, labor, women’s rights, and so forth. Corporations adore the Constitution because by sterilizing democracy, it gives them a free hand to plunder society as they wish. The working masses are paying a growing price for a constitution that prevents them from taking society in hand and making it work for the benefit of the overwhelming majority. 

Towards a theory of constitution breakdown

If the Constitution’s structure has remained static over the centuries why is it breaking down now? Why has Congress been gridlocked since the 1990s, why has the Electoral College overridden the popular vote in two out of the last five presidential elections, why do Supreme Court nominations generate such bitter fights on Capitol Hill, and why is everyone filled with trepidation over what November will bring – whether the vote count will be honest, whether Trump will leave the White House peacefully if he’s defeated, whether there will be fighting in the streets, etc.? There’s more than a whiff of Weimar in the air. But why now as opposed to, say, the 1950s?

The answer has to do with the larger arc of capitalist development. Les trentes glorieuses, the golden age of postwar capitalism, was a time when seemingly everything worked. In Washington, three white men, two Texans and a Kansan– Dwight Eisenhower, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson – essentially ran the government. Although some leftists feared that Joe McCarthy represented a fascist resurgence, what’s striking now is how neatly Eisenhower was able to nip the threat in the bud. Ike handpicked lawyer Joe Welch to confront the senator at the Army-McCarthy hearings, and the patrician Welch was careful to rehearse his famous line – “Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?” – beforehand.12 In the end, McCarthy was denied his beer-hall putsch and collapsed just a few months after the Senate voted overwhelmingly to condemn his behavior.

So the center held – and what’s more, it continued to hold even during the tumult of the 1960s. Indeed, Watergate marked a high-point of constitutional reverence in 1974. In that moment Alexander Cockburn couldn’t resist poking fun at American piety, as a columnist at the old Village Voice:

On the word front, the sky is still dark with clichés coming home to roost. The nightmare of Watergate is slowly receding, the long national trauma is over, the country’s profound need for rest has been appeased, a catharsis has taken place, a curtain is falling on a tragedy almost Greek in its dimensions, agony is giving way to peace, the nation’s wounds are being healed, the healing has begun, the Constitution has worked, the system has worked, pretty well everything you’ve ever heard of has worked, except the economy.13

The economy had ceased working thanks to the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the unraveling of the great postwar boom, this meant that the Constitution would soon stop working as well. Although Republicans went along with Watergate, temperatures quickly started to rise. The 1980s saw the Iran-contra scandal in which a lieutenant colonel named Oliver North denounced Congress like a two-bit Latin American putschist, with legislators too intimidated to say anything in return. House Speaker Newt Gingrich declared war on the Clinton administration with his 1994 “Contract with America” and then tried to use the Monica Lewinsky affair to drive him out of office in 1998. November 2000 saw the “Brooks Brothers Riot” in which Republican thugs tried to disrupt the vote count in Miami in order to steal the election for George W. Bush.14 Republicans tried to use “Birthergate” and “Benghazi-gate” to sabotage another Democratic administration after Obama won office in 2008. Then, as if to prove that subversion was not a one-way street, Democrats tried to overthrow Trump via a no-less-bogus pseudo-scandal known as Russiagate.

Russiagate deserves a book in itself. Although liberals will no doubt cry out in protest, it plainly amounted to an attempted coup d’état by Democrats, the corporate media, and the intelligence agencies, all of whom were up in arms over Trump’s confused ramblings about a rapprochement with Russia and who therefore pushed the theory that he was a Kremlin agent. It was a paranoid fantasy cooked up by unrepentant cold warriors like Hillary Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, and Robert Mueller. But beneath it lay a crisis of imperialism that had been building for years, a crisis of capitalism, and a deepening constitutional breakdown. It was the interaction of all three that made the situation so explosive.

As the Marxist economist Michael Roberts has noted, capitalism has been in the grips of a crisis caused by declining profitability since the late 1960s. The 1970s, the decade of de-industrialization and rocketing energy prices, saw a long sickening plunge in corporate profits, while the neoliberal “reforms” of the 1980s saw a brief uptick. With the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the dot-com bust in 2001, capitalism resumed its downward course. It plunged again in 2007-08 and, thanks to Covid-19, has now gone crashing through the floor.15

Each downward plunge caused the mood in Washington to turn nastier and nastier while convincing disgruntled whites in the hinterlands that the cost of empire is not worth the blood that they had to shed. Deteriorating social conditions among rural whites sparked the anger that provided Trump with his margin of victory in 2016. American society was coming apart at the seams because the constitutional structure was disintegrating with astonishing speed. 

The Declaration of Independence, America’s original founding document, says with regard to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” After nearly a century and a half, Americans have arrived right back where they started, i.e. with a government that is undermining their safety and happiness at every turn and which they therefore must replace, not in part but in toto. They can’t do so with eighteenth-century methods— only those of the twenty-first, which is to say with revolutionary socialism.

But that’s a subject for another essay.

 

Building Camaraderie in the CPUSA, 1930-1950

Josh Morris investigates how the Communist Party USA created a sense of camaraderie in its organizing efforts between members, looking at how both circumstances forced on organizers as well as conscious efforts of the party helped create an organizational culture that promoted (or in some cases damaged) solidarity among workers and oppressed people. 

Communist Demonstration on Wall Street, 1929

“I remember a sea of signs, the hat-makers, the dressmakers, the pocketbook makers, the men’s clothing workers, the printers, on and on.  Everyone was a maker, a worker. Then it began to rain. ‘It’s raining Papa,’ I said, ‘Let’s go home.’ ‘Wait just a while,’ he answered. The rain kept coming down and the marchers continued to march.  Their hair got wet and the paint on their signs began to run. I did not fully understand what was going on but I was impressed. This must be very, very important, I thought. Otherwise people would never march in the rain.” -Beatrice Lumpkin1

As a small child of less than twelve, Beatrice Lumpkin experienced an emotion that takes longer to read than it does to feel. Hoisted on her father’s shoulders, Lumpkin watched the May Day parades march down the major boulevards of New York City. The meaning of May Day rested in the remembrance of idolized martyrs of the Haymarket massacre of 1886 in Chicago. But it also commemorated something else: a spirit of fellowship, a warm feeling of loyalty and brotherhood, a solidarity among comrades. Although not old enough to vote nor educated enough to understand the history of May Day, Lumpkin went home that day with a solid sense of camaraderie. Camaraderie is not strictly political, however: it also contains a vital social and cultural component.

Throughout American history, the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) best exemplified the concept of camaraderie in the fullest sense of the word, that of being inclusive of both political and social elements. American communists espoused the notions of camaraderie in a way that gave them a sense of purpose both inside and outside the Party. Historian Randi Storch showed how the fraternal order had an immediate effect on how the Party’s upper and lower strata coordinated with one another, with upper-level comrades handling oversight and lower-level comrades dealing with the physical organization of workshops, but with both being seen as equal parts of a whole.2 Camaraderie differs slightly from broader concepts like solidarity, in that camaraderie implies a feeling alongside an act. As an act of expressing solidarity, camaraderie was the social and political glue for American communist organizations both large and small, and it transferred over to those they associated with during the height of their activism from the 1930s to mid 1950s.  

Politically, camaraderie solidified upper Party allegiance to the Communist International (Comintern) and local radical movements, while socially it served as a bridge to civil and labor organizations that shared a fraternal ordering such as United Auto Workers Local 600 in Detroit, creating the foundation for the Party’s support of the Popular Front. These fraternal aspects responded to and transformed under the social and political elements of camaraderie espoused by the Party, and created the conditions whereby Party members were forced to rely on one over the other. This essay explores the element of camaraderie in CPUSA history, and offers to uncover a critical examination of a solidifying yet also potentially divisive element of social activism. The fraternal sense of comradeship defined the labor movement for members of the CPUSA and supporters of international communism, starting during the Party’s rise into social activism in the 1930s and continuing well into the present.

To a large extent, it is impossible for any historian of either military or labor studies to avoid addressing the most critical element to a movement or army’s success, that being cohesion and unity among the constituent parties. In this loosely described manner, the concept of camaraderie extends back as far as Livy, who addressed the issue while discussing Quinctius’ military campaign against the Aequians and asserted that because “of [the] close cooperation between the army and its commander,” the Aequians did not attempt an offensive assault against the army. In the resulting victory, the Roman army plundered, Livy continued, taking advantage of the “valuable material, including cattle” that was stolen from Rome by the Aequians earlier in the year. Livy remarked that upon returning to Rome, “the cordial relationship between the army and its commander rendered the men…less hostile towards the Senate, which they declared had given [them] a father.”3  

What Livy described was political camaraderie, a bond between individuals of shared ideals. These ideals themselves can be almost anything political or religious in nature. We can see similar parallels between the opposing ideals of soldiers during the American Civil War. Chandra Manning describes how religion created for troops during the war a unified perception that “the hand of God is in this struggle, and the hand would not be stilled until the Union complied with God’s will.”4 The soldiers’ appeal to religion in this sense represented the political ideals of the war effort: the North fought to rid the world of “unholy” slavery. This use of camaraderie was not limited to the North, however, as Manning showed that “Confederate soldiers’ devotion to the material aspirations of themselves and their families…sustained men’s convictions of the necessity of the war.”5 The solidarity of the soldiers combined under the veil of religion and protection of family but nevertheless secured a political identity behind their solidarity. Quinctius’ men’s collective desire to reclaim the rewards of Rome was fundamentally no different from the Union’s desire to preserve the Republic, nor the Confederates’ desire to defend the institution of slavery.

Camaraderie is not limited only to the military, nor is camaraderie itself exclusively political.  While making an appeal to broad audiences on celebrating socialism, Gerald Cohen explained his interpretation of a community bond among individuals as a “common aim” to have a good time and enjoy life.  He explained this idea through the concept of a simple camping trip. A camping trip naturally has facilities as an enterprise in order to fulfill the conditions and desires of a basic camping excursion, things like wood for fire, tents for shelter, canned food, and clothing. Unlike traditional city life, however, the facilities of a camping trip are “availed to collectively: even if they are privately owned things, they are under collective control” for the duration of the trip. To an extent, Cohen stretches his argument by comparing a general desire to have fun with communal solidarity, but his text emphasizes human beings’ natural desire to work together when the time calls for it. Similarly, a worker in a factory shares the productive capacity of the factory with everyone else working it; the production process as a whole is a collective act. This understanding “ensures[s] that there are no inequalities to which anyone could mount a principled objection” within the specific group.6 

Cohen argued that most people, particularly in closely defined settings such as a workplace, “cooperate within a common concern,” that being everyone’s general desire to both “flourish” and “relax” at their own pace on “condition that [he/she] contributes…to the flourishing and relaxing of others.”7 Cohen used examples of competition among campers to show how individualism naturally conflicts with this social sense of camaraderie.  If a man, for example, is “very good at fishing,” he will most likely “[catch] more fish than others do.” If in the context of a camping trip he were to argue that he “should have better fish” when the group eats, the group would naturally question “why should [they] reward his good fortune?”8 Similarly, Cohen argues that rights of inheritance, such as having camped at a site ten years prior, would yield no greater support from the group for the individual claiming ownership and thus leadership over the trip. Cohen describes social camaraderie as well as its political variant. Social camaraderie is a bond between individuals of shared concerns. This is substantially different from political camaraderie: instead of sharing a bond over an abstract, idealistic concept like nationhood or God, the social element of camaraderie is concerned exclusively with practical and achievable ends. Cohen’s limitation in his argument is that he reduces society to the size of a small community. In doing so he created an “ideal” of socialism, and later questioned the feasibility of implementing this ideal in society at large: “Many would point to features special to the camping trip that distinguish it from the normal mill of life in a modern society and… consequently cast doubt on the desirability and/or feasibility of realizing camping trip principles in such a society.”9 Without going into complex Marxist language, Cohen refers to the social conditions of society that limit the feasibility of this socialist ideal.

Camaraderie as a whole is also an element in the generation of happiness among employees within a workplace. Writing for the Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, Dr. Armenio Rego and Dr. Solange Souto refer to the “perceptions of spirit of camaraderie” as a “predictor” of “affective well-being,” or AWB.  AWB is described as simply a “frequent experience of positive affects and infrequent experience of negative affects” within a workplace. “Workplaces play a crucial role in people’s happiness,” Dr. Rego contends, by “providing them with…resources that satisfy their primary and secondary needs.” This is similar to Cohen’s conception, but different on the issue of satisfying needs instead of ease and relaxation. Camaraderie is exceptional in that it can be “considered to be a source of positive emotions.” The most interesting finding of their study focused on camaraderie’s connection with the “need to belong” shared by all human beings.  Their conclusion stated that “on the whole, lower levels of affective well-being emerge when poor camaraderie [is combined] with a high need to belong.”10 Political ideals do not necessarily always correlate into acceptance, nor do they fully satisfy the desire of belonging. Social camaraderie can perform these functions, but it fails to emerge as strong as political camaraderie due to social camaraderie’s more general approach to happiness, and political camaraderie’s more action-oriented understanding of happiness.

The separation of camaraderie into social and political spheres is fundamental to understanding how individuals within the CPUSA express the concept as a whole. Although the bonds between the social and political aspects culminate in social unity, they nevertheless remain disconnected from what guides and solidifies the bond. Political camaraderie is, for the most part, an idealistic principle, one that has many names depending on the context, from dogmatism to nationalism, to even strict pragmatism. This can contrast sharply with social camaraderie, as it did in the context of the American Revolution: the social camaraderie against unjust taxation proved stronger than the political camaraderie of British identity, and in many ways worked to dismantle any bonds colonists had with Great Britain. Likewise, political camaraderie within the CPUSA proved to be both their defining and unraveling feature: it not only created a unity whereby the political party itself was manifested, but it also created the divisive element that contributed to the CPUSA’s falling-out with American labor and civil rights during the second Red Scare. Social camaraderie for the Party proved to be the glue that kept political camaraderie in check, typically supporting or suppressing political elements in favor of social and cultural ones by the needs of practicality.

Mitchell Siporin, ‘Workers Family,’ 1937, Mary and Leigh Block Museum of Art, Northwestern University

Social Camaraderie

“This good fellowship, camaraderie, usually occurring through the similarity of pursuits, is unfortunately seldom super-added to love between sexes; because men and women associate, not in their labors, but in their pleasures.  The compound feeling proves itself to be the only love which is as strong as death.”
-Thomas Hardy

Understanding social camaraderie forces one to abandon abstract ideals of political tenants and methodology, and instead focus on the small elements that bring people together for action. Thomas Hardy’s words from his 1874 book Far From the Madding Crowd focus on the social bond one shares with a lover and how the combination of love and fellowship create an even stronger bond, one as binding and consuming as death itself. This idea of a consuming or an associated pleasure among individuals of friendship and community is fundamental to the feeling of social camaraderie. Kets de Vries argues that mankind’s “essential humaneness is found in the seeking of relationships with other people.”11 Dr. Rego pointsout that social camaraderie outside the workplace and political spheres “play a crucial role in meeting social, intimacy, and security needs, and in promoting physical and psychological well-being.”12 It doesn’t take a leader, it doesn’t take a constitution, and it certainly does not require a method.  All it requires is “similarity of pursuits,” an association “in pleasures,” or a community-sense of belonging. Social camaraderie within the CPUSA proved to be the one single element capable of keeping political camaraderie, and its propensity to divide and conquer, under relative control by defining the Party’s movement under the broad movement of socialism, as opposed to the political movement of other Communist Parties around the world. As the testimonies show, social camaraderie kept humanity within the Communist Party, while its political tenants attempted to break it down into statism and authoritarianism.

For Russell V. Brodine, social camaraderie began in the family.  Before he was old enough to work a job or even drive a car, Brodine remembered how his family “developed habits of scrounging, reusing, and recycling, as poor people did out of necessity;” habits that continued throughout his life “as a matter of ecological principle.”13 Lumpkin remembered the vivid tales of her parents; her father who was “afire with the revolution,” and her mother who “caught the flame” from her father. As the daughter of two “active participants in the anti-Czarist Revolution of 1905,” Lumpkin experienced familial solidarity at a young age, as did Brodine, the son of two Swedish immigrants who fled Europe to escape the draft in 1903.14 Because of their backgrounds, the social solidarity of young CPUSA members like Russell Brodine and Beatrice Lumpkin differed from that of the typical family. Their solidarity was invariably more politicized than the average person, but that didn’t necessarily mean that they understood the politics of it. Brodine’s parents instilled him with social values that not only benefited him but also connected him with others in his community, exemplified by his emphasis on what impoverished people of a community “do out of necessity.” Similarly, Lumpkin’s parents instilled her with a historical connection to a movement much larger than any one individual, and the stories of her father’s triumphant escape from Czarist Russia created the social identity she carried with her throughout her life.15

Party members often looked up to their parents as role models of activism, sometimes from early adolescence.  Armando Ramirez learned from Vicki Starr, a prominent Party organizer, of his father’s union efforts and Party involvement as a shop steward in the stockyards of Chicago when he was only a child in 1939. “They were all comrades,” his father told him, some “40,000 workers in four major plants” organized by the Party and through his father’s assistance.16 Lumpkin’s attendance of May Day parades with her parents, although neither of her parents was a Party member, provided role models for to admire. Lumpkin’s parents excused her absence from school, but not in the typical fashion of calling in sick. According to her, “it was considered more loyal to the cause to stand up for your beliefs and say: ‘I was absent May first because it is a workers’ holiday.'”17 Again, with both Lumpkin and Ramirez’s stories, we can see how camaraderie instilled itself by connecting individual actions to larger movements at work.  Ramirez didn’t just learn of his father’s union efforts; he learned of union efforts among a workforce of 40,000. Similarly, Lumpkin experienced May Day as a day of remembrance tied with social activism, as opposed to merely a holiday. These examples separate social camaraderie from more benign interpretations of what Dr. Armenio called “a need to belong.” Camaraderie, unlike the more basic need to belong, is naturally more pragmatic toward social acts.

Social camaraderie is engineered outside the family as well. Personal experience in social relationships proved to be the defining element that solidified camaraderie among individuals. Party member Danny Rubin, born in 1931, grew up in a region of Philadelphia where “everything was named after the Distin family, and they had a restrictive covenant: No Negros, no Jews, no dogs, no bars.” Luckily, he lived in a region of the community where the covenant did not apply strictly. In understanding camaraderie, Rubin explained that

“Life had a big impact; I can remember at the age of six, my school was made up of primarily German-Americans and there was one Jew in each class, one Negro in each class, and there was one Italian in each class.  We were, you know, the victims of various words used against each: Kyke, dirty kyke, so on and so forth. So we would be teased and hit, so on, from six years old on. The three of us, one Italian, one African, and me, we would stand up to them, all of them.”18

Here we see an example in memory of a social camaraderie between classmates. But their solidarity did not build simply by sharing a classroom or a class year, which would fit the concept of a need to belong. Rather, their camaraderie built off the tension created by the social elements of racism and anti-Semitism; their solidarity was a natural antithesis to the solidarity of the white Christian students.

But the repression and antagonism extended beyond the classroom. Rubin explained that at “every high holiday in the Jewish religion, the [local] Synagogue was defaced with Nazi swastikas and broken windows and fires built up against the building.” Rubin felt “very aware of anti-Semitism,” and even more importantly realized “that it had something to do with the way African-Americans were being treated as well.”19 For Rubin, the expression of hate against minority groups solidified his understanding of social camaraderie.  To him, it was about standing up for what’s right in the community. Rubin’s perspective on anti-Semitism at first prompted him to seek out becoming a Rabbi. By 9th grade, his concern over anti-Semitism’s connection with racism drove him to become active in the Philadelphia Campaign for Free City College in 1944, a campaign organized by the American Youth for Democracy, affiliated with the CPUSA. By age 16 he was a Party member.

Still, for others, the social element of camaraderie existed in the American political experience with fascism and the depression. It was “only the Communists,” charged Party member John Gates, who “were able to infuse youths with idealism, missionary zeal, and a crusading spirit” against the forces of fascism and the depression.  For members like Gates, the Party during the Depression “was the locomotive of the future,” that created a sense of purpose for those participating in the struggle.20  “American Communists were passionate about winning the war against fascism,” Lumpkin explained. Joining the defense industry, Lumpkin “felt that [she] was helping to win the war.” Marc Brodine, son of Russell Brodine and current Chair of the Washington State CPUSA branch, solidified his social camaraderie in resistance to Vietnam by joining peace organizations.  For him, growing up a “red diaper baby”  as Lumpkin did “wouldn’t have been enough to set [his] political path.”

The effects of anticommunism on social relationships contributed to social camaraderie among American communists as well.  Ramirez knew of a close associate of his father’s who “was immediately fired” once his Party affiliations were found out. When the man asked Ramirez to help him pass out the Party’s local newspaper to the company he formerly worked at, he “swallowed…whatever feeling of fear” he still had and took on the assignment.  After a year or two, at age 17, his father allowed him to formally join the Party.21 The fact that men like Ramirez joined the political organization out of personal concern highlighted the separation between social camaraderie and a more basic need to belong. Seen this way, social camaraderie through these social experiences helps explain the swell in Party membership by the mid-1930s across broad groups of workers, though the Party retained an extremely high turnover rate throughout the 1930s.  In 1928, the Party branch in Chicago had only 650 members. By 1934, with the impact of the depression and the rise of fascism in the background, the city’s Party local collected dues from 3,303 city residents, an increase of over 450%.22

In workshops where Party presence was a regular expectation, social camaraderie found itself performing some of the most humane tasks. Local 600 of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in Detroit was known for its indirect affiliations with the local CPUSA branch of Detroit, particularly its defense councils.  Maurice Sugar, for example, was the legal representative for Local 600 during the 1930s and was open about his Party affiliation.23 A correspondence letter between Local 600 members on March 31, 1944, advised workers to avoid “so-called tax experts who will charge excessive prices” for applying their NLRA back pay to their tax returns, and instead insisted that members use the local’s own personal expert, Jack Valian.24 With a flat fee of only $3 per year, per worker, the union provided internal support for ease and efficiency. Elements of the Party’s organization efforts naturally blended into the fraternal community of Local 600 unionism. Throughout all of the correspondence minutes of Local 600, the words “brother” and “comrade” appear no less than once per paragraph. The utility of the language of camaraderie worked to further instill the social notion of solidarity among fellow employees within a specific workplace. Lastly, Local 600 supported its members beyond their employment, providing instruction to “assist [members] in seeking or obtaining employment after alleged discrimination and discharge.”25

Social camaraderie functioned in a similar way to how it was built, through social networks and personal relationships, but this occasionally led to different interpretations of solidarity. Lumpkin’s extensive 342-page autobiography made no mention of the CPUSA’s switch in policy during the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, where Stalin stunned the world by aligning with the very power he condemned as the epitome of capitalism. Instead, she covered the period of February 1939 – June 1940 with a discussion about her extensive work in organizing elections for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America Local 328. Peggy Dennis, on the other hand, explained that only through elaborate discussions with her lover, Eugene Dennis, did she come to accept and understand the meaning of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as a “well-written plot” by Soviet leaders for their own national defense, and the defense of the international Communist movement.26 For Dennis, social camaraderie extended beyond simply the borders of the United States to encompass allegiance to a larger, more international movement.  

When CPUSA activist and field organizer Dorothy Ray Healey was asked her opinion on the shift in political ideals by Stalin, she said that it “becomes a disastrous thing…if a radical movement in another country takes what is fundamentally a diplomatic act for a separate foreign country and makes it its own political banner.”27 For Healey, social camaraderie, unlike political camaraderie, could not extend beyond the borders of the United States if that fraternity threatened the solidarity of American workers. Danny Rubin, who joined the CPUSA during the McCarthy era, described himself as a “Marxist” before he even formally began paying his Party dues. “I’d been doing [political work] for years, all kinds of stuff,” he reflected.  By 1949, “[he] was co-head of the Labor Youth League, the official youth organization of the Communist Party [at the time].” For him, activism in the community was his “political work” and the social camaraderie he built through it was more defining of his ideology than his actual physical political membership and allegiance.28

On the whole, social camaraderie tells more of a story of human social experience than it does of a bond shared over cherished ideals. It builds off personal interaction and upbringing; it functions as a connection between shared concerns and collective action; and most importantly, it bleeds through the divisions created by political boundaries. It was not capable however, as shown, of breaking down those boundaries. In the field, political and social camaraderie intertwined in a dialectic that succeeded externally better than it did internally within the Party.

Unemployed workers rally in front of Communist Party headquarters in Union Square, 1934. (Charles Rivers, Tamiment Library / Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University

Political Camaraderie

“The deeps are cold: in that darkness, camaraderie does not hold.
Nothing touches but, clutching, devours.”
-Ted Hughes

Party member Alex Bittleman gave an effective description of the purpose of political camaraderie in the eyes of the Party in his essay on The Party and the Peoples’ Front.  Political solidarity intended, he stressed, “to build the Party and build the mass [labor] movement as part of an all-inclusive great task.”29 In short, unite the masses behind the political ideal of socialism. Many activists echoed the same perspective, namely that the ideal of socialism and the end of the capitalist mode of production functioned as the everlasting bond between Marxists, socialists, and communists. The political bond solidified through the ideals of specific groups, typically outside the mass majority of society. Still, differences in theoretical and tactical ideals inevitably caused tension. For radical political groups like the CPUSA, political camaraderie, unlike social camaraderie, in the U.S. labor movement required a method, a constitution, and most importantly a vision for what the future had in store for working people. Its ideological basis naturally carried with it an obvious downside: a propensity to factionalize and divide the movement as a whole when people or groups differed from the pre-established vision. Political camaraderie within the CPUSA proved incapable of bending against the will of Soviet authoritarianism, which John Gates believed manifested a “closed system of dogmatic thought, blinding its adherents to the complexities of reality.”30

The Communist Party was born out of a political division in 1919, a division that it carried through the 1920s right up through the present.  Factionalism has a long history with American radicals, particularly among socialist groups like the Knights of Labor and the Socialist Party of the United States (SPUSA).  Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who became chairman of the Party in the 1950s, mentioned factionalism as an element in the Party’s creation due to a split in the SPUSA. It was September, when “the Socialist Party convention was held in Chicago,” and the majority-holding “left wing”, made up of predominantly Slavic immigrants, was ousted from the conference and Party altogether.  In response, the left wing “went to the IWW hall and organized the Communist Party,” which split yet again by the end of the year.31 Thus the political camaraderie among the mostly white minority sect of the Socialist Party exemplified a refusal to submit to the political camaraderie of the mostly foreign majority.  “From its very beginning,” explained Party General Secretary James Cannon, “the American Communist movement was wracked by tremendous factional struggles.”32 Political camaraderie, as seen by the SPUSA’s rejection of the left element and the left element’s immediate re-solidification into a new body, did not naturally carry with it the seeds for social camaraderie, but rather carried the seeds of political division.  

Flynn pointed to the effort made against the post-World War I Palmer raids, which targeted labor leaders as threats to the U.S. government, and the formation of an organizational platform by the Party’s future General Secretary, William Z. Foster.  Foster’s methodology put the communists and the more radical workers who supported him at odds with existing labor institutions, such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL). This was due to the AFL’s structure and political affiliations that excluded unskilled and non-white workers.  With Foster’s guidance, labor had, in Flynn’s eyes, “a new leader; a great organizer and strategist.” Slowly but surely, Foster’s achievements among laboring people gave him the clout to embody an ideal of political camaraderie, rallied behind the more radical approach of mass organizing the unskilled. Despite the popularity and success of Foster’s organizational platform among steel and packinghouse workers, the “AFL rejected his plans” and worked toward their own organizational platform alternative to Foster’s syndicalist approach.

Flynn pointed out that Foster succeeded in organizing over 20,000 African-Americans and broke the boundaries of racism to unite them with their “white brothers,” though she failed to connect this success with the AFL’s selective racism.33 Despite this, there nevertheless remained an element of division and internal factionalism that pitted one element of the labor movement against another, this time outside the Party’s structure.  Solidarity instilled within the workplace through political camaraderie could generate a movement as it did for Foster in the steel industry, but it does not necessarily break down pre-existing political or social barriers such as those set up by the AFL.  The Party elaborated on the AFL in 1929 in its recurring pamphlet, The Communist.  The AFL was portrayed as an organization that utilized “specific methods for specific times,” referring to the era of craft unionism that dominated during the 1860s-1890s. This “skilled aristocracy” embraced fraternalism and limited class solidarity, but “could afford to ignore the interests of the broad masses.” The failure on part of the AFL, in the eyes of the CPUSA, was their attachment to older methods and interpretations of labor that had, by World War I, lost their social applicability.  The article charged that the AFL built its solidarity only upon social camaraderie; skilled craftsmen naturally have more in common with one another than they do with unskilled laborers. The article also argued that it was the same kind of social camaraderie that drove the unskilled labor movement: “large masses of unskilled workers were drawn into the vortex of the struggles through revolutionary solidarity natural to the unskilled.”34 The only clear difference that remained, in the Party’s view, was between the AFL’s non-revolutionary methods and the unskilled working class’ revolutionary ones.  By 1920, political camaraderie solidified the ideals of the Party and helped form a cohesive strategy for organizational methodology, but, as the case of the AFL shows, tended to conflict with the practical reality of the politics of labor in the United States.  To overcome this dilemma, the CPUSA needed political recognition to separate itself from the multitude of other socialist political organizations, including its parent, the SPUSA. That support came from the Communist International (Comintern) in 1921.35 

The CPUSA saw its political support from the Soviet-run Comintern (sometimes called the Third International) as an indication that the Party was the true leader of American radicalism.36 On the 10th Anniversary of the October Revolution of 1917, commemorating the establishment of the Russian Soviet and subsequently the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR), Comintern representative A. Lozovsky wrote a short essay on organizational strategy that exemplified the standard Party line throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Solidarity could not build without communists first being knowledgeable on the needs and concerns of the workers in question. Winning over the masses of any country, Lozovsky stated, did not rest on “miracles,” but rather by obtaining “a clear understanding of the trend of development of the workers’ movement.” Lozovsky went on to define camaraderie “as strong political consciousness” among individuals, which follows “two lines: political and organizational.”  

As a traditional Marxist, Lozovsky attributed organizational efforts to “varied conditions of class struggle,” as opposed to a singular theory of organizational success.  “Bolshevism,” he contended, was “not a dogma, [nor] an abstract formula” for organization. As opposed to a unified blueprint for organizational success, Lozovsky emphasized that “the art of Bolshevik tactics consists of being continually in the advance-guard, not severed from the masses, not getting too far ahead, but certainly not hanging on their tail.”37 Thus organizational efforts, in the eyes of the worldwide Communist body, depended upon the specific material conditions of particular nations and working-class groups.  But Lozovsky’s theory wasn’t his own, and the source of the Comintern’s early policies usually derived from the same set of sources.

From its creation, the Comintern’s views were backed up with excessive references to the writings of Marx, Lenin, and other revolutionaries from 1905-1917.  In many respects, the publications of the Comintern through the 1920s and 30s were reflections and reiterations of conclusions previously made. In August of 1932, the CPUSA re-published excerpts from Lenin’s Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, written almost 12 years prior, to substantiate claims made by Lozovsky and other Comintern authors who wrote in the late 1920s.  Lenin’s essay reiterated the concept of uniformity among Communists as being less important than the uniformity among the general masses. “We must not,” he said, “deem that which is worn-out for us is necessarily worn-out for the masses.”38 In criticizing those who failed to recognize this, Lenin pointed to the German Communists who, he charged, were “mere babblers.”  They embodied strong elements of political camaraderie among each other but lacked any substantial connection with the workers of Germany.  Citing the German socialist philosopher Joseph Dietzgen, Lenin asserted that “every truth, if it be ‘carried to excess,’ [or] if it be exaggerated…it can be reduced to absurdity.”39 Lenin’s message was straightforward when it came to political solidarity:  political camaraderie was only as worthwhile as it was useful and practical.  Rejecting parliamentary participation is “substance-less” when the revolutionary considers that workers generally support parliamentary procedure. In short, the perceptions of the working class create the foundation for the perceptions of a revolutionary. Thus the political camaraderie solidified through the Comintern contained strong support for Soviet leaders and revolutionaries while simultaneously urging CP locals to generate leaders and revolutionaries of their own, an aspect of their strategy that ultimately proved difficult as years proceeded.

The constant repetition of Comintern policy through the words of Lenin, Marx, and Stalin over lengthy periods of time without considering differences in circumstance inevitably created inconsistencies in carrying out policy. The Comintern’s publications remained for the most part political tenets as opposed to actual suggestions for organizational activity. The problem was not so much what the publications said, but rather the individual parties’ unquestioning loyalty to it.  Historian Peter Kenez showed how the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) utilized its Comintern influence as early as 1927 to dictate requirements for European and non-European Communist Parties to join the International. This forced a quasi-ideological agreement between Party leaders that subordinated all organizations to the Comintern and thus the CPSU. “The Stalinists,” as Kenez referred to the ardent followers of Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of power, “never contemplated collaboration.”40 Their goal was control of the movement as a whole by utilizing the one body capable of doing so.  On the grounds of the Bolshevik victory, “Bolshevism became the authoritative doctrine among revolutionary circles in all the workers’ political movements of the world.”41  

The inconsistency was that the CPSU emphasized a fight against “superficial and mechanical methods” of organization while it simultaneously used superficial means of internal conformity within the Comintern in order to assure its own dominance.42 As such, Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union, including the CPUSA, dealt with the issue of organization in a two-fold manner.  On the one hand, they had to remain practical in terms of their organizational methodology; but they simultaneously had to assure that their actions and methods did not at any point contradict the boundaries of political camaraderie established by the Comintern or the CPSU. This dual nature of policy and practicality created turbulence within the political spheres of the CPUSA, often resulting in additional factional splits.

One of the largest problems the Comintern experienced during this pre-Depression period was amalgamating various communist parties into a cohesive international unit capable of dealing with factional elements of political solidarity.  In 1929, Comintern representative to the United States Otto Kuusinen wrote about how “comrades talk a great deal about analysis, about slogans, political lines…etc…concerned all too little with the organization of mass work.” His point was simple, that the political party should engage itself in the organization of labor.  This however created a factional debate within CPs. Coming from the Comintern, it was an unquestionable order put forth. The complication was how to go about doing it. Kuusinen condemned “internal shortcomings” that failed to be addressed by Party leaders, referring to the internal fractions of the Comintern. “Success,” Kuusinen emphasized, defined itself through the “permeability” of the Party “into other organizations and industries.”43 He did not imply, however, that presence equated to solidarity among the workplace.  Kuusinen focused his criticism on “some comrades” who were “in [shop] nuclei merely in the sense that…they all work in the same factory.” Thus Kuusinen argued that social camaraderie alone failed to support the revolutionary platform of the Comintern. The revolutionary function required a more abstract and idealistic element to transform social solidarity into a bond that was capable of supporting political work.  That bond was political, not social, camaraderie.

The CPUSA endorsed Kuusinen’s perspective through its monthly publication, The Communist, and it began pushing for active political organization within workshops across New England, the deep South, and the Midwest. The Party’s Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), an umbrella union organization, and the Youth Communist League (YCL), a small recruitment league for the sons and daughters of Party members, exemplified CPUSA’s perspective of using political camaraderie in organizational campaigns.  Both organizations modeled the platform of a politically-driven strategy to revolutionize workers and citizens alike. The TUUL’s model was similar to the Party’s own internal setup, but organized unions with political idealism that espoused general support for socialism. A product of Foster’s Trade Union Educational League, the TUUL “radicalize[d] established unions from the inside−Communists referred to this activity as ‘boring from within.'”44  

In contrast, Lumpkin described the YCL as an organization “of commitment, comradeship, and exploration.” At just 15 years old, Lumpkin was exposed to the “message of unity and the need to fight racism and fascism” in the YCL.  Setup not far away in the same neighborhood, was the local branch of the CPUSA. The TUUL, according to Dennis, was “a militant Left center, [an] almost lily-white AFL,” that “shift[ed], as did the Party, to a great emphasis on independent organization of the unorganized.”45 The YCL perfected the means of solidifying political camaraderie among the children of American radicals in a way similar to how the Boy Scouts of America, or the military itself, instilled nationalism and patriotism among American youths.  The TUUL as well took political camaraderie into unionism and defined organization of the unorganized as a key to success.46

Unknowingly, the Comintern put forth the perspective on organization that would ultimately become the standard Party line during the would-be Popular Front Era.  Lenin’s perspective, and its continuance by Kuusinen and men like Lozovsky, demanded flexibility of Party functioning that allowed the development of camaraderie outside political work. The Party had a dual functioning role. On the one hand, it had to remain united in its efforts to organize methodologically, but also had to “become more sensitive to the fighting moods of the masses.”47 These words, made by the head editor to The Communist in August of 1932, linked political camaraderie to social camaraderie, in that the social bonds strengthened the political ones.  The political camaraderie that solidified Party policy among constituent members responded to the social camaraderie in society. It reflected the Party’s utility of Leninism by trying to remain responsive to the general public, but as the 1930s rolled on, the Party experienced increasing confusion over the application of this theory.  Stalin’s theoretical restructuring and political consolidation in Russia caused a reassessment of theory done at the international level that was pushed down to the CPUSA through the Comintern.

The issue of confusion over Comintern policy in terms of how to ensure internal Party camaraderie became complicated when the Party began publishing and emphasizing the works of Stalin in the mid-1930s. The “negative side” of political camaraderie under the auspices of the Comintern, was working with “the Trotskyists.”48 Since the late 1920s, Stalin’s program for Russia included an effort to liquidate opposition to the Stalinist minority, including those in the Comintern. Followers and admirers of Trotsky, such as James Cannon, were labeled the “organizers of terror,” thereby creating an internal division within the international communist movement, and thus the CPUSA itself.49 Discussing the isolation created by the Comintern, Cannon stated that “the enhanced prestige of the USSR, and of Stalinism which appeared to be its legitimate representative in the eyes of uncritical people…made our oppositionist movement appear bizarre.”50 “Bizarre” in the Stalinist world was also a word for counter-revolutionary or rebellious. Stalin’s publications on loyalty policies to the Comintern and against the Trotsky movement compounded the inconsistencies between the organization’s emphasis on the practical methodology set forth by Lenin and political loyalty demanded by Stalinists. In this way the Party’s work in the early Popular Front era embodied political camaraderie but contained abrasive limits that excluded and isolated many existing members.

While CPUSA members who cited Lenin in 1929 or 1933 found themselves emphasizing a model based on practicality, members who later cited Stalin in 1934 found themselves condemning their Leninist comrades for failing to display sufficient loyalty to the Comintern. This political division among comrades deserves examination, especially considering that the CPUSA survived it. Kenez argued that Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, utilized the Comintern to respond to their growing concerns over anti-Bolshevism throughout Europe, particularly in Germany after the election of Adolf Hitler to the chancellorship in 1932 (which began a year later).51 Often the Party’s support for Stalinism created blind acceptance among Party members, as Dorothy Healey recollected in her interviews. “All you ever heard was the one position which the majority had agreed upon,” she explained, “you did what I did…simply accept that, of course, it’s right.”52

Despite their contributions to sectarianism, within the workplace the Party’s use of political camaraderie among workers had its periods of advantage. When Walter Reuther and Homer Martin indicted Local 600’s lawyer, Maurice Sugar, for being a Communist, the workers of the Local and the CPUSA flocked to his defense. The Union president condemned Sugar in 1939, although Sugar’s membership was fairly well known throughout the Local’s existence, including by Reuther. Reuther failed, however, to see the unity of strength behind Sugar, represented by the Local’s staunch resistance to Reuther’s attempts to complain about “reds.” Reuther’s accusations were meaningless, claimed the Local, because “under [Reuther’s] administration our union and members have been led closer and closer to company unionism.”53 Party General Secretary Earl Browder was in attendance of the meeting where Sugar was charged. He asserted that the Party’s efforts “must continue,” referring to the “hold[ing] of member meetings in various locals of the UAW.”54 Browder recognized the Party’s presence in the union and its importance to it. His goal was to “avoid a split in the UAW.” The irony of Sugar’s accusation was that it highlighted the Party’s involvement with the local and the Union as a whole, but no negative aspects of their involvement were determined. It was merely the presence of the CPUSA that warranted condemnation. By the end of the month, the UAW newspaper United Auto Worker published a further condemnation of the Party’s alleged attempt to “capture control of the UAW.” A further connection to Moscow made the article as well, although no evidence to substantiate it was referenced. The political solidarity shared by the workers of Local 600 with their Party influences, exemplified by their resounding support for Sugar despite his Party affiliation, showed the effectiveness of camaraderie when poised against strong political barriers.

For the most part, political camaraderie remained an internal element to the Party. It solidified the identity by which the Party isolated itself from other political organizations such as the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as other labor organizations such as the AFL. The labor unions that reflected the political camaraderie of the Party, such as locals of the UAW and the United Mining Workers (UMW) ended up in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Political camaraderie, however, builds off social camaraderie. It is a response to political barriers that prevent social camaraderie from extending. There must exist some element of cohesion among a group before an abstract ideal of organization and methodology can be achieved. It was this cohesion between individuals that allowed the Party to utilize its political camaraderie with focused action and practical activism.  

Political camaraderie also contains the seeds of its own destruction. As Ted Hughes’ poem suggests, in the darkness of power, even camaraderie cannot hold on.  Ultimately, Party members relied on the social camaraderie of individuals and communities to continue the activism across broader and less political organizations. It was the more humanistic element of solidarity that kept political camaraderie under control, and occasionally capitalized on the unity it created.

Communists protest against lynchings and black oppression.

Valorizing Comradeship

Both the social and political elements of camaraderie provide an explanation for the relationships shared between individuals of various social contexts, and the political context of American Marxism.  Understanding the political side of solidarity and comradeship allows the researcher to see the limits of social activism and the transformative nature of solidarity when placed under the pressure of pre-existing political barriers. Similarly, understanding the social side of solidarity illuminates the smaller connecting elements that keep a movement of people together despite overwhelming political divisions and difficulties. Men like William Foster and Maurice Sugar could not have succeeded in their efforts without the power of their political spirit of comradeship among those they represented. In a similar manner, women like Beatrice Lumpkin and men like Danny Rubin would never have looked up to men like Foster and Sugar had they lacked a social understanding of unity and solidarity through the association of concerns and interests.

Dr. Rego showed the importance of understanding solidarity within the workplace, but solidarity is much more than just a workplace trait, or an expectation among fellow employees: it is rooted in familial upbringing, the early social relationships we experience, and the moments in our development where we gain a sense of self. It can be simple and unrestricted, as well as complex and idealistic. The same qualities fit the history of the CPUSA: simple and unrestricted in the form of a justice-seeking solution to social problems, as well as complex and idealistic in the form of international committees and idolatrized leaders.  It is no wonder that words like brotherhood, comrade, and red found themselves on the lips and fingers of every communist: they embodied the symptom of solidarity that activists hoped to uncover among the rest of society. The CPUSA took solidarity to another level, fusing the social bond between community members with a strong political solidarity for social change. These two elements, political and social, worked together to support basic needs of organization, espoused ideological tenets, and prevented the Party from dominating the lives of workers in the way that other Communist Parties, such as the CPSU, did.  At the same time, the political element carried a natural tendency for factionalism, a quality that limited the solidarity between two politically opposed communists to the social camaraderie of simply being communists.

Understanding camaraderie as a social and political glue that both worked for and against itself illuminates the complexity of the CPUSA in the 20th century, as well as helping to break down the romanticizing of Party effectiveness throughout labor, civil rights, and politics, a memory that is quite strong among the existing Party membership. While the CPUSA had, and still does have, many members spread out throughout the various social organizations of the United States, including some political parties, it never operated with the full authoritarianism and unified singularity as that of the CPSU. It simply couldn’t do so, as the internal divisions created by the Comintern forced members like Lumpkin, Rubin, Sugar, and Healey to rely on the social camaraderie of the workshop and the community, while the Party gave them the background political unity for them to all call each other “comrades.” The task at hand now is to examine these elements individually in a more vigorous manner, and to understand which element is more palatable for the average American laborer. Perhaps such a study can unveil further the connections human beings find with each other through political and social means, and how those means ultimately come to define us culturally.