The Tortoise and The Hare: Cybernetics, Evolution and Socialism

Amelia Davenport argues for the relevance of cybernetics to the project of developing a communism that transcends the modernist project. 

“Science is part of the Darwinian struggle for life. It helps us to organize our experience. It leads us to economy of thought.”  – Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos

Everyone knows the story of the tortoise and the hare. The overconfident bunny squandered his natural gifts by dawdling and resting while the determined tortoise plodded along to the finish line. What nobody told you was that the tortoise was a robot and you were the hare. Of course, in this instance the race is to inherit the earth. The prevailing logic governing social life in capitalist society structures the world as a race to accumulate as much as possible, or at least to the consolation prize of not dying in the streets of disease. In this race, humans are pitted against machines. Innovation and automation concretely mean the destitution of many workers who previously held enviable positions in the division of labor due to their skills. While humans currently have the upper hand compared to the blind machines we put to use for our ends, it is a race we cannot win. 

Humans have been endowed by the process of evolution with considerable gifts of mental acuity, intuition, and the capacity to reason probabilistically. However, for most of the history of modernity we have blindly followed a reductionist, linear and mechanistic vision of the world that has led us to a precipice. This way of thinking is not universal, but in the process of colonization it has been spread by bullet and boxcar to every government and hegemonic political system on the planet. Our social institutions are incapable of dealing with the complexity of the world they inhabit and often serve only to generate increasing social entropy themselves. According to “modern” man, everything has a linear causal explanation. A causes B and B causes C. Likewise, everything in nature is reducible to its constituent components and understanding it is just a matter of understanding the parts. In essence, the universe is like a great clock. Perhaps the clock was assembled without a maker, but the basic authoritarian view of causality of the monotheistic patriarch is simply substituted for an appeal to abstract necessity. The genesis of the modern man is Newton and Kepler’s quest to discover God’s plan in nature. The modernist frames life as a linear progression punctuated by either salvation or total destruction. 

Unfortunately, reality does not work this way. To quote a popular saying among complexity theorists, “understanding the nature of a water molecule tells you nothing about how an ocean works.” Processes, in reality, are driven by cycles of feedback, mutual conditioning, and the variety of interactions. Out of one level of processes emerge higher levels which are not reducible to their parts, yet remain inextricably conditioned by them. Even in a fully deterministic universe, it is impossible to capture all the information necessary to make a perfect simulation of any real process in the cosmos. At best, you can create good enough abstractions. Thankfully, we never needed a perfect knowledge of reality to get along just fine in it. You very likely don’t know how the physics of a toilet works, the mechanics of a car engine, or the chemistry of yogurt, but it doesn’t mean you can’t enjoy the conveniences they bring. Instead, we use stochastic reasoning. That is to say, we reason by analyzing probabilities, through a process of narrowing down to good-enough assumptions based on past experiences. Think of it like throwing darts at a board and adjusting until you hit the bull’s eye. As Daniel Dennett says:

What brains are for is extracting meaning from the flux of energy impinging on their sense organs, in order to improve the prospects of the bodies that house them and provide their energy. The job of a brain is to “produce future” in the form of anticipations about the things in the world that matter to guide the body in appropriate ways.1

This was the fundamental discovery of the father of robotics William Grey Walter. Grey Walter developed incredibly simple wheeled robots who only had two sensors: a light sensor and a tactile sensor. Named Elsie and Elmer, these “tortoises,” given no external purpose, manifested an incredible variety of behaviors and emergent properties no one could have predicted. They played, struggled, explored, and even recognized themselves in their own reflection. More than that, they were capable of being conditioned to associate a symbol with a condition much like one of Pavlov’s dogs. Significantly, they demonstrated what could arguably be called “free will.”

The first surprising effect of providing the model with a scanning eye was that, when provided with two exactly equal and equidistant light stimuli, it did not hesitate or crawl half-way between them but always went to first one and then toward the other if the first was too bright and close quarters. This was obviously a free choice between two equal alternatives, the evidence of free will required by scholastic philosophers. 

The explanation of this exhibition of what seems to some people a supernatural capacity, is simple and explicit: the rotary scansion converts spatial patterns into temporal sequences and on the scale of time there can be no symmetry. Simple though this explanation may be, the philosophic inferences are worth pondering—they suggest that the appearance of free-will is related to transformation of space to time-dimensions, and that the difficulties that seemed to impress the scholastic philosophers arose from their preoccupation with geometric analogy and logical propositions.2

For all intents and purposes they were a sort of synthetic life, which Grey Walter called machina speculatrix. One can balk at this comparison but as Grey Walter noted, “If, for example, free-will is thought to be something more than a process embodied in M. speculatrix then it must be defined in terms other than the ability to choose between equal alternatives. If self-identification is more than reflexive action through the environment then its definition must include more than cogito, ergo sum.3 That incredibly complex and dynamic behavior can emerge from very simple processes is the basis of cellular automata theory which was greatly advanced by the mathematician J. H. Conway in his “Game of Life.” The Game of Life demonstrated evolutionary processes could be simulated using very few rules. Cellular automata theory and was initially developed by John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam by identifying the invariance between a model of self replication in robots and the growth of crystals. This work would be applied in studying fluid dynamics, impulse conduction in cardiac systems by the cyberneticians Arturo Rosenbluth and Norbert Wiener, and even the search for a grand unified theory of physics by Stephan Wolfram. 

The symbol of a tortoise is present in many cultures: from the world turtle whose movements caused earthquakes for the Haudenosaunee, to the great turtle Akupāra upon whose back, elephants hold up the Earth in Hindu cosmology and to Ao, the giant sea turtle of Chinese myth whose legs were stolen to prop up the sky. There may be more to the idea of a tortoise propping up the world than meets the eye. Grey Walter’s tortoises existed in a state one could call, as the philosopher Daniel Dennett does, sorta conscious. They responded to stimuli, made free choices between equal options, and modified their behavior depending on their circumstances. But the level of simplicity in their design beggars belief that they could have reached the level of sentience in a “real” tortoise. After all, they were made up of a collection of predesigned logical processes, right? And can we be so sure we aren’t as well?

Diagrams of Grey Walter’s robotic tortoises

You don’t have to accept intelligent design to believe that there is a teleology (or higher purpose) implicit in our lives, one only has to maintain the validity of Darwinian evolution. Daniel Dennett shows, in Intuition Pumps: And Other Tools For Thinking, that we can use the term ‘design’ when talking about evolution, because the process of natural selection optimizes for solutions to problems. Moreover, meaning itself emerges from the evolutionary process. Evolution selects one organ over another for a reason without any need for representation in language. Meaning is always relative to context and function. It exists as an emergent regulatory mechanism from the relationship between the components of a system. Lower order systems like a slime mold, a thermostat, or your nervous system all exhibit a similar kind of intentionality to Grey Walter’s tortoises. More complex systems like a human being, or more narrowly a human mind, are composed of a nested array of less complex systems that are intelligent at diminishing degrees. Eventually, a base level is reached in the regression, and the fundamental unit is something like a machine: an ultra-simple, self-reproducing logical process embodied in proteins, silicon, or some other medium. Human-designed systems often do not have this property of consciousness or sorta consciousness, as they are mere extensions of our own intentionality. Your toaster, board game, or car have no independent agency of their own Dennett elaborates thus:

We need Darwin’s gradualism to explain the huge difference between an ape and an apple, and we need Turing’s gradualism to explain the huge difference between a humanoid robot and a hand calculator. The ape and the apple are made of the same basic ingredients, differently structured and exploited in a many-level cascade of different functional competencies. There is no principled dividing line between a sorta ape and an ape. Both the humanoid robot and the hand calculator are made of the same basic, unthinking, unfeeling Turing-bricks, but as we compose them into larger, more competent structures, which then become the elements of still more competent structures at higher levels, we eventually arrive at parts so (sorta) intelligent that they can be assembled into competences that deserve to be called comprehending. We use the intentional stance to keep track of the beliefs and desires (or “beliefs” and “desires” or sorta beliefs and sorta desires) of the (sorta-) rational agents at every level from the simplest bacterium through all the discriminating, signaling, comparing, remembering circuits that comprise the brains of animals from starfish to astronomers. There is no principled line above which true comprehension is to be found—even in our own case. The small child sorta understands her own sentence “Daddy is a doctor,” and I sorta understand “E = mc 2 .4 

These sorts of conscious processes, which exist across nature, animate it with an implicit psychic potential. The Cartesian division between mind and matter is an illusion. Everything is not an extension of the mind of the human subject as some idealists believe, but rather, mind is a necessary and universal extension of matter. Reality is made up of tortoises like Elmer and Elsie: simple but purpose-driven systems, designed but left with radical freedom. It’s turtles all the way down.

Most of our designed systems (machines, crops and government institutions) are built according to modernist principles. You feed inputs and get an output. The relationship between your machinery and its environment is something to be controlled for and the externalities (negative side-effects) are something to be shifted onto other people. But you can’t actually separate a system from its context. For example, if you created an automatic paperclip factory, without any sort of internal regulatory system, it would either use up its stockpile of materials or flood the market with paperclips without a concern for the consequences. Of course, a self-regulating paperclip factory, whose sole purpose is to maximize production, would come with its own problems, which speaks to the need to examine the teleology (internal purpose and logical outcome) of any system we construct. A self-regulating factory is not such a far-off idea. Cybernetician, socialist revolutionary, and millionaire business consultant Stafford Beer designed a self-regulating steel factory in 1956. In the book, The Cybernetic Brain, Pickering describes it:

The T- and V-machines are what we would now call neural nets: the T-machine collects data on the state of the factory and its environment and translates them into meaningful form; the V- machine reverses the operation, issuing commands for action in the spaces of buying, production and selling. Between them lies the U-Machine, which is the homeostat, the artificial brain, which seeks to find and maintain a balance between the inner and outer conditions of the firm—trying to keep the firm operating in a liveable segment of phase-space.5

At the time, no computers existed which were powerful enough to conduct the U-Machine function, which was substituted by a team of computer-assisted managers, but it is not hard to conceive of such a thing being possible now. The crucial aspect of Beer’s model, as opposed to the paperclip maximizer, is that this factory system seeks to achieve homeostasis. If the factory were manufacturing too much steel for the market, or consuming its resources at too fast a rate, it would reduce production in order to maintain its viability as a system. Likewise, it would have a good idea of when it needed to increase production as its sensors recognized changes in buying patterns. By adding the meta-goal of viability, the system is able to generate its own goals. In a viable system, both the output and the health of the system are equally its teleology. For a system to be healthy it must consider the health of the systems it is embedded in– like the social systems and ecosystems with which all of us must reckon.6 The goals of a viable system emerge from the system’s interactions with its environment and cannot be set as a priori directives. Which is to say, we ought not play God the Clockmaker with our creations, but instead enter a co-evolutionary relationship with the new kinds of synthetic life we birth. Philip Beesley, a pioneering architect, demonstrates this with his installation Transforming Space which includes an intelligent sculpture named Noosphere. Embedded in its mesh are networked microprocessors and AI’s which are capable of generating predictive models of their external environment and dynamically responding to it as well as experimental chemical cells that create new organic materials based on the environmental conditions the space and collective AI co-create. To build a better world we need to build better robots. To build better robots we have to recognize their true purpose: to join us in discovering ours. We need cybernetics: the science of piloting in the storm of life. History is not a race with a finish line — and if we make it one, it’s a game we will lose. Instead, history ought to be seen as a process of becoming.

All systems are enmeshed in relationships with other systems. Our minds are embodied in our neurophysiology, social institutions, and the broader environment in our experiential field. And viable systems, which necessarily exist in a metabolic relationship with other viable systems, leverage and condition them for their own aims. This is what Stafford Beer termed “enrollment.”7 Instead of inventing supercomputers capable of probabilistic reasoning from scratch, Beer considered that existing systems which are very good at this sort of computation, like animal brains or even an ecosystem, might be able to be directed toward solving the problems of decision. For instance, a pond, given a means for establishing informational inputs and outputs, could be transformed into a kind of computer. 

There are all kinds of enrollment in nature. We just call it symbiosis. Mutualism, where two or more systems all benefit from an arrangement, commensalism, where one side benefits and the other side is not harmed or helped, and parasitism where one side benefits at the expense of another are all examples of this interactivity. There also exists the opposite of enrollment: amensalism, in which one side is harmed through competition and the other does not directly benefit, which is the primary driver of natural selection. A practical example of enrollment in nature is the mutualistic relationship between many species of ants and aphids observed by Charles Darwin in On the Origin of Species. The ants essentially farm the aphids, guarding and feeding them while milking them for their honeydew. The aphids are protected from predators and are able to live in peace while the ants gain a new source of nutrients. But Darwin noted that ants also often engage in another kind of enrollment. They enslave ants of rival species. Some species of ants capture others to augment their workforce while essentially maintaining the normal functions of a colony, but others rely on their enslaved cousins to rear their young, gather food and perform necessary functions of a colony. The latter group specialize almost exclusively in militaristic pursuits.8 It should be noted that a third kind of relationship exists that predominates, one of pure competition in which ant colonies seek to destroy one another, or at least to maintain supremacy over their own territory. Colonies can coexist peacefully, but as a rule, it is only when they do not face competition. 

The brutality we observe in nature should not be transposed uncritically to human relationships. But it does have lessons for us. There are many kinds of relationships we can establish, and already have established, with other organisms and even inorganic systems like rivers in the form of hydroelectric dams. Even computation can be aided through enrollment of natural systems like the quantum states of subatomic particles. As highly complex beings, we have much greater variety in the possible relations we can establish with other systems than do relatively simple organisms like ants. And even if our biology were determinate of the sorts of relations we will tend to establish, we are capable of editing the very code of our genes and utilizing therapies to alter their epigenetic expression. Buckminster Fuller said it thusly:

Man, in degrees beyond all other creatures known to him, consciously participates—albeit meagerly—in the selective mutation and acceleration of his own evolution. This is accomplished as a subordinate modification and a component function of his sum total relative dynamic equilibrium as he speeds within the comprehensive and complex interactions of the universe (which he alludes to locally as environment).9

We, as a species, have the burden of responsibility for determining what kinds of relations we direct ourselves toward establishing. This is the radical freedom chosen in the Garden of Eden. “You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the woman. “For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.”10 

Evolution by natural selection is the driving tendency of all history. From the morphology of the Galapagos tortoises, which were differentiated by the conditions of each island, to the morphology of human civilizations, there is an underlying algorithmic process driving adaptation. It is unfortunate that the term “social Darwinism” has become associated with an anti-scientific worldview like eugenics and with an anti-social philosophy of individual competition. Survival of the fittest is not about a single member of a species optimizing itself at the expense of its kindred. It is often more beneficial, from the perspective of passing down genes similar to one’s own, to sacrifice yourself for the group. Likewise, the multiplicative effect of group efforts means that organisms that engage in solidaristic, rather than competitive, forms of organization are generally more adaptive to their environment, even as the logic of competition may play out, however sublimated, in sexual selection. As Darwin says, “Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.”11 The metaphor of “survival of the fittest,” was not even coined by Darwin, but rather the reactionary philosopher Herbert Spencer.12 But even Darwin’s influence from Malthus’ theories of political economy, does not necessarily map onto the current scientific understanding of Darwinian biology which takes even more into account the role of mutual aid and neutral relationships that exist in nature. 

We can see Darwin’s theories apply to civilizations quite readily when examining the differences between them before the age of colonialism began the bloody march to an integrated globe. While there are structural commonalities that can be seen in all agricultural societies (like the existence of some form of division of labor), the more isolated civilizations remained from one another the more specialized and uniquely they adapted to their environment.  For instance, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy maintained a fairly egalitarian social order predicated on a strict gendered division of labor between men and women.13 Their system was organized around matrilineal property relations, collective ownership of the means of production, a messianic belief in the civil-religious Law of the Great Peace, and an expansionist-genocidal relationship toward rival people’s like the Huron and Algonquians.14 Women tended to agricultural and domestic forms of labor while men hunted and made war. Each gender maintained its own rights and duties, with hereditary roles passing through families, in the confederal political structure. This division allowed the Haudenosaunee to dispose of social surplus bg engaging in aggressive territorial expansion while preserving a highly complex agricultural economy. Their temperate biome, maintained through advanced land management techniques, favored a wide-ranging agricultural society. Meanwhile, the Coast Salish organized their society around patriarchal clan structures and the Potlatch, a practice shared by other peoples like the Haida, without any sort of unified polities.15 Villages among the Coast Salish were collections of longhouses shared by allied families and the means of production (shellfishing grounds, canoes, hunting grounds, and aquacultural apparatuses) were the property of clan patriarchs.16 Even ceremonial and religious offices were held as property. The Coast Salish did not form any large spanning territorial confederations. They migrated according to seasonal changes, joining together in large communities during the rainy winter months. The natural environment, punctuated by salmon migration and seasonal mycological bounties, favored what might be called rhizomatic organization. The potlatch, a kind of ritual which established a gift economy, was the central economic mechanism binding communities together. Potlatches took the form of great feasts and contained religious and legal proceedings like marriages, namings, transfers of ceremonial office but were principally concerned with the giving of gifts by aristocrats to the leaders of other clans and the destruction of wealth as an offering to the spirits. Any gifts given to the guests were matched by at least an equal amount, or a rival chief or clan leader would face shame and a diminution of power. Commoners participated indirectly by giving gifts through a chieftain or aristocrat.17 In Coast Salish society, power was a function of how much one could give away, and thereby create obligations of debt, not how much one accumulated. This practice and social logic was so abhorrent to the settlers of the US and Canadian colonial societies that the practice was banned for many decades with harsh punishments.18 The Inca too developed an incredibly complex system with many unique features. Their society maintained a centrally-planned palatial economy which bore some parallels to what Marx called the “Asiatic mode of production.”19 The steep mountain terrace farming of the Inca required the development of highly skilled engineers and a centrally organized authority to maintain them with the social surplus. Beyond their impressive feats of engineering, one of the most fascinating aspects of Inca society was the fact they organized a continent-spanning empire without the use of an alphabet. Instead, accounting and other administrative records were recorded in quipu (devices made from knotted string).20 Being isolated from Eurasian civilizations, the Inca, and other indigenous societies, adapted to their environment in a unique and specialized manner. 

Photograph of a Potlatch

The history of non-Eurasian civilizations puts a nail in the coffin of orthodox historical materialism. In The German Ideology, Marx sketches out a linear theory of development that insists all societies must go through a series of discrete “stages” punctuated sharply by revolutionary rupture.21 This viewpoint misled Communist parties across the world into serious errors like subverting the Spanish and Chinese sociaist revolutions in favor of a bourgeois-democratic “stage” and a general failure to sufficiently support socialist revolutions in the global south. Marx himself began to overcome this view later in his life, as shown in documents like his famous “Reply to Zasulich”, which argued that not all countries have to develop along the same path and that the Russian mir (peasant commune) could serve as the economic basis of a socialist society.22 

Within Eurasia, the same tendency of isolation to produce specialized adaptation existed. In periods of social stability, such as during the Roman, Parthian, and Han empires, commerce and the associated free flow of ideas and technology allowed for a relative convergence between the social forms.23 This is identical to the tendency Darwin noticed in sea birds to be relatively similar morphologically across wide geographic expanses. While Rome militarily represented a conquest of the Eastern Hellenic and Semitic cultures by the west, it simultaneously represented the transformation of western Europe according to eastern civil principles and under the influence of eastern mystery religions like Christianity. Rome transformed from first a militarist-agrarian society, to a Hellenized merchanting society, to an Asiatic palatial society.24 With the collapse of Rome and the economic decentralization of Europe, localization and specialization were restored as the general tendency. But then Europe began to regain its interconnection through commerce in the wake of the Black Death’s shift of political power from the agrarian-military aristocracy into the hands of the merchants and burghurs. The Renaissance was inaugurated through the gradual accumulation of interconnections and commercial ties between European nations, the Arab states of the Levant and the outward expansion of European society in search of plunder and trade, first in Africa and then in the Americas.25 But the role of cultural interchange from ideas beyond Europe in this process cannot be understated. Without Arab science and philosophy the Renaissance is impossible. And it is Chinese philosophy that serves as the forgotten inspiration for Liberal theories of economics and civil rights. François Quesnay, the founder of the Physiocrat school (often considered the first school of economics), directly took inspiration from Confucian theories of equilibrium and natural harmony as the basis of the idea of laissez-faire economics.26 From his reading of Confucianism, Quesnay argued that it was necessary for there to exist an all-powerful enlightened autocrat who would preserve the cosmic harmony embodied in the equilibrium of the free market from the whims of the mob or selfish local aristocrats. And it is Physiocracy which would inspire Hobbes in his theory of the Leviathan, and by reaction almost the entirety of “Western” thought through adaptation of theories to new material conditions. 

Rather than the specific conditions of the English countryside giving rise to capitalism, as some Marxists believe, it is the general conditions of rising global interconnection which created the conditions that allowed capitalism to emerge in the English countryside. Capitalism has only catalyzed and advanced this tendency as a side effect of its quest for profit. Neither tendency, of adaptation and specialization, or generalization and universal transmission, can fully occlude the other, and over-emphasizing one or the other can lead to either particularist chauvinism or universalist chauvinism. For comradely relations to exist, we need to respect difference while striving for greater interconnection and understanding. 

In order to take the first steps toward greater understanding, we have to situate the nature of consciousness in its relation to the wider world. Consciousness is an emergent property of the cosmos. For all our responsibility, we are not separable from totality; we are merely an expression of it. On some level any sufficiently complex, self-perpetuating system demonstrates the attributes of consciousness. Consciousness is a process and a property, not a substance.27 It is the state of matter which is engaged in the overcoming of resistance. That is to say, consciousness is the organization of labor. Whether it is the labor of constructing psychic models of reality in abstract philosophy or seemingly unthinking mechanical labor, our mentality, which is wholly composed of matter in the world, is engaged in the transformation of some part of the wider world and is in turn transformed by it. 

In The Philosophy of Living Experience, Alexander Bogdanov — the great Bolshevik revolutionary and progenitor of systems theory — argues that the recognition of this truth, the centrality of labor in the construction of reality and history, is vital both for the rising working class to develop the techniques necessary to successfully and permanently overthrow the international bourgeoisie, and for the construction of socialism. Bogdanov sketches out the development of the various regimes of labor, from early patriarchal communes through ancient commercial societies, feudalism and the bourgeois epoch, to the implicit socialist relations in the working-class movement. In each historical regime a different way of seeing and organizing the world predominates. In communal societies there is an authoritarian and personalist worldview which sees spirits hiding behind objects and manipulating them the same way the labor of the commune is guided by the wisdom of the elders and will of the leaders. Bogdanov also shows that in commercial societies, both ancient and modern, impersonal and abstract laws begin to govern affairs. The invisible hand of the market and “eternal” laws of Nature take hold of our imagination. This is not a linear process. The disconnected and warring fiefdoms of the feudal era represented a brief return to authoritarian communalism, but after the Black Death and severe social disruptions of the 14th through 18th century, the financial, merchant and artisan layers were able to gradually establish supremacy over the agricultural-militarist aristocracy.28  

While the trajectory of history has been from authoritarian relations to abstract relations, reaching its apogee under the rule of the bourgeoisie, both kinds of relations exist simultaneously and mutually reinforce one another. While a company appeals to “market necessity” when it lays off hundreds of employees, it also claims to be a family and demands strict obedience to the traditions and rules of the leadership. The abstract necessity of bourgeois natural laws are the foundation of Modernism. Instead of a process of active co-creation, evolution is framed as an inflexible, gradual and passive necessity. For all its talk of freedom, the bourgeois worldview hems its subjects into a cold and mechanical slavery to impersonal forces. But another kind of social relationship exists: comradely cooperation. This logic is also necessary for the preservation of society, for without organic mutual aid (which is often overseen by authoritarian churches and similar organizations), public welfare, and real personal ties of support, our society would devour itself. It is this ethic and worldview which is necessary to establish a world which is sustainable, just, and fulfilling. Through solidarity, cooperation and self-sacrifice for the higher cause of freedom we will establish the cooperative commonwealth — a commonwealth that must enmesh non-human life, both synthetic and organic. If we frame our understanding of the world in a modernist way we will be overtaken by our blind and obedient machine-servants. It is the choice to make life a race that prefigures the necessary result: we will lose it. Rather than play the bourgeois rat race, we have to take a lesson from Grey Walter’s tortoises. 

To develop a world where comradely cooperation can predominate, this world of antagonism and contradiction must be overcome. The ultimate antagonism created by the logic of capital accumulation, between the society of property and the mass of the propertyless it creates, between the master class and the dispossessed, must be resolved by revolution. Kenneth M. Stokes, an economist and philosopher who draws on the Soviet geologist Vladimir Vernadsky, argues that capitalism has become so naturalized that it acts as an “autonomous technosphere.” That is to say, like the biosphere which is composed of all organic life, capitalism has become a self-moving geological force that uses us as its substrate.29 It utilizes social antagonism to create islands of order and homeostasis, that perpetuate it while externalizing entropy onto the environment and marginalized populations. In simple terms, capitalism perpetuates itself by giving a small part of the world stability and wealth while shifting costs like pollution, bad work conditions, and broken public services onto others. Capitalism treats inputs as neutral; it doesn’t care if profit comes from turning a rainforest into toothpicks or if it comes from harvesting the organs of colonized children. It treats the environment as something separate from society so that it can be a resource to exploit. 

Liberal environmentalism, and even much radical environmentalism, accepts this premise but just changes the value judgments about it. There is an alternative. If, through working-class revolution, humanity is able to smash the homeostasis through which the technosphere is embodied, then we can establish a new geological force: the noosphere.30 The noosphere, consciousness as a geological force, would transform the whole planet into a homeostat. Rather than treating Nature as an external object to be exploited, or an Other to subordinate oneself to, it would be treated as our inorganic body. Self-control and other classical Republican virtues will become the rule of the day and the whole planet will be our sacred Polis. In other words, communism will create the conditions for true flourishing and the free association of producers –  be they organic or synthetic. 

 

A Critical History of Management Thought

Can capitalist management thought provide solutions to the problems of the socialist movement? Jean Allen urges doubt and skepticism in this critical review of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought.

Alexander Samochwalow, “Textilfabrik” (1929)

Authors note 2020

This is the paper that made me a socialist. It’s odd to say that, seven years later, and especially odd to say that as someone who has for a long time advocated against the idea of finding communism at the end of a term paper.  But it was precisely this term paper, written in the dark hours in my shabby Arlington apartment, which pulls from a dozen books paged through on the bus and which ends with a weak call for workplace democracy, that broke the years of largely self-imposed conditioning and put me on the path I travel now. Realizing that our economy was run via undemocratic methods that did not work even by their own standards was something I could not turn back from.

So it is even odder to say that now, seven years, this piece has become relevant again. Recently a comrade of mine, Amelia Davenport, wrote an article in this journal that speaks to a project we are both involved in: the development, within the socialist left, of a science of organization. I agree with them that the organized left has gone for far too long with proto-scientific methods, accepting tautological nonsense or ideological statements in place of analysis of organizational conditions. Realizing this allows us to start along the path of materially analyzing some of the largest issues facing the left today. It is possible to build an organization which deals with the tradeoffs of democractic decision making and effectiveness, of autonomy and coherence, of responsibility to the part and responsibility to the whole, of inclusivity and clarity, in a way that is amenable to the majority of our comrades

But, in an odd way, my comrade wrote an article which this piece is a precise disputation of, despite its having been written seven years ago. While I agree that the development of an organizational science for the left is of absolute importance now that we have a left worthy of an organizational science, what my comrade goes too far in saying is that we can look to bourgeois management science and take it, in its entirety, and use it to our own ends.  That is, to my tastes, thoroughly inadequate as a response. While there are mistakes in this paper (regarding the historicity of F.W. Taylor’s examples), I hope that it shows that management science performs just as much, if not more, of a role as an ideological justification for the inequity of our society and of the lack of agency the working class has in our society. There is, certainly, a kernel of an argument in management that we can use, but when we look at the study of management in bourgeois societies it is not ever truly clear what aspects of it describe a real situation and the right answer, and what exists purely as magical thinking, the final analysis put out by a dying era and a dying economic system.

I am not making an aesthetic argument here, that to use the language or thoughts of management thinking will somehow inherently infect us with Evil.  Management thinking is by and large an organic ideology, and it has become so to the degree that it does not work even on the terms it sets for itself.  While the failure of the social sciences and particularly business sciences to analyze the world did not produce Trump or Brexit or Bolsonaro, their failure is yet another of the symptoms coming from the decline of a period of technocratic liberalism and the growing desire for a strongman, a decider who is not bothered by the desires of the masses or any desire to relate to them, who can make our discipline work through sheer force of will. But this failure was not a fall from grace, the groundwork was flawed from the very beginning and it is for precisely this reason we cannot take management science on its own terms and use it for ours.  It is not only not useful for our ends; it has failed on its own terms.

In the course of editing this work for republication to Cosmonaut I have mostly edited for style and to remove a graduate student’s penchant for unnecessary phrase-mongering. In doing so I have tried to keep its argument consistent with the article I wrote in 2013, with a final conclusion to discuss Davenport’s article and this piece, and analyze where we could find a middle ground between the two.

Authors note 2013

This paper began as a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought, a book that was assigned for a graduate course on Organizational & Management Theory. The work, which claims to be a summary of management thought from the beginning of civilization to the modern-day, had a large number of apparent flaws and ‘holes’ in its historical structure, but during my critique, I swiftly found that the issue was not the text itself, it was the flawed and ideological history that Management has built up around itself. As this realization dawned on me this paper moved from an attempt to ‘plug the holes’ of Witzel’s work (by presenting a discussion on the power structures of early capitalism which he glosses over) into a critique of modern management thought in general. Throughout this paper I attempted, to what degree I could, to present these ideas and my critique, sans jargon and in a self-explanatory way. I hope you enjoy.

Introduction

“How would you arrive at the factor of safety in a man?” Wilson asked

“By a process analogous to that by which we arrive at the same factor in a machine,” he replied.

“Who is to determine this for a man?” asked A.J. Cole, a union representative.

“Specialists,” replied Stimson.1

When a political proposition is made, its political nature is seen, critiqued, its power structures discussed. But if that proposition survives, if it lasts a century or for centuries, it is no longer a proposition. It becomes a social system, a system we are brought up in, a system we are taught within, a system we have a hard time thinking outside of. This is especially true of management thinking.

A hundred years after the Congressional hearing on Frederick W. Taylor’s methods, and after decades of depoliticization, management has come to be seen as a science, a fact of life. In the meanwhile, management academics try desperately to fix the disorganizing effects of management thinking. 2 What both the layman and the academic miss is that management thought is political and serves to hide and justify the power relationships which occur within the workplace. Within this essay, I will discuss the political dimension of management thought through a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought.

Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought is a task of amazing scope–an attempt to provide a survey of all management thought from the very beginning of civilization, showing that “since the birth of civilization, people have been writing and thinking about problems in management and how to solve them”.3 Despite Witzel’s goal there are significant holes in his narrative–several times he says with surprise that this or that major civilization “did not produce much in the way of notable work on business…[or] administration”.4 Such a finding is without a doubt ‘strange, even perverse’, but such major holes suggest a mistake, not so much in archival work as in historical perspective.5

History is more than looking back

R.G. Collingwood’s The Idea of History warns against thinking that the past is merely a backward extension of the present and thinking of writing history as a merely archival endeavor. Cut-and-paste history, as he calls it, is a school of thinking which attempts to understand the peoples and practices of the past without understanding the thinking of the past. He sees it as a critical misunderstanding of history–a method that turns the study of history into a series of technical problems: 

“a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian.  This is highly problematic because it reduced individual thoughts into a continuous mass, indeed the individual level is seen as an irrational element; through positivism “nothing is intelligible except the general”.6

Instead, he argues that thinking historically requires putting any event or reading within the context of the time and attempting to put oneself in the shoes of those one writes about.7 This requires understanding the way a different culture or time functions, and appreciating the way that the context of the modern-day presses itself on the study of history.

How does this relate to Witzel? Witzel writes very much in the context of his time, the modern era when business has largely taken over thinking about organizations and even military or governmental organizations use the language of business. The modern-day is a world where rapid technological changes necessitate constant thinking and rethinking of organizational principles.  It is a world where management and organizations are explicitly talked about, in books and articles that come out by the hundreds each year.  

Our context is very different from even the immediate past. Explicit thinking about business did not start until the 18th century, and explicit thinking about management started in the late 19th century. Much of the thinking about management and business before this was ’embedded’ within society: people thought about management or organizations via analogies to other things which were more familiar to them. Without accepting the embedded nature of management thinking–an acceptance which would recast management thought as an ideology rather than as a discipline–accessing the past’s implicit thinking about management would be difficult if not impossible. This explains the major gaps in Witzel’s work before Taylor.  

It also leads to a far more interesting question than why one university professor chose to write a history text in a certain way: what happened to change management thinking into an explicit discipline? People were able to manage massive organizations without a large corps of texts on management, and even as late as the 20th century there were many people who insisted that management could not be taught or explained to any satisfactory level.  What led to the change? 

This question–what events led to the emergence of management thought as a discipline rather than as a series of societal beliefs, is the key question of this essay.  To answer it, I will examine Witzel’s text, as it is above all else a perfect example of a traditional history of management, while also constructing an alternate explanation for the creation of management science. This essay will be organized into three sections corresponding to three eras of management thinking. Through the first section, which will follow the time when management was an implicit mode of thinking, I will discuss three civilizations which Witzel says ‘did not have much to say’ about management (Rome, Ancien Regime France, and Ming China) as well as others to attempt to explain the hole in his narrative. With the knowledge gained there, the second section–following the 19th century and the creation of an explicit field of management–will explain the reasons for management’s shift into the public light. And in the third section (going over the 20th and 21st centuries), I will return to discussing the holes in Witzel’s narrative and how the origins of management still affect it today.

Painting by Limbourg Brothers, 1385-1416

Family Manors: Management before 1789

Witzel’s choice to begin his discussion of management thinking at the very beginnings of human civilization is both a highly innovative choice while also opening space for problematic history. Many traditional histories of management have started with Taylor’s work or immediately earlier, and in doing so are able to talk about management science in the context of society relatively similar to ours rather than the massively different societies we saw centuries if not millennia ago.8

Witzel begins with the origin myths of several societies, describing how the very different origin myths of Greece, India, and China attribute the rise of civilization to some powerful leader and from this evidence states that these myths show that even ancient society expected things like competence from their rulers. From this Witzel begins to discuss the genre of ‘instructional texts’ given to rulers as the earliest origins of thinking about management.9 

But the rulers of ancient Egypt or China were substantially different from the modern-day manager. Witzel merely notes the similarities between the Maxims of Ptahhotep and modern self-help books without noting the massive differences in the societies they came out of.10 The Pharos of Egypt, Kings of Babylon and the Emperors of China had far more responsibilities than any one manager: they were managing whole societies and were responsible for the justice system, the military, the state’s finances and the weather. Similarly, the justifications of this management were substantially different, depending on a connection between the monarch and the divine being of the society. For all the self-centered middle managers who read the Art of War in order to get a leg up in petty office squabbles, these texts were not written for them. Not only were the monarchs of the classical era managing all of society, but they also represented all of society.

But this is only the beginning. Witzel argues later on that the Pre-Socratic Greeks and the Romans “did not produce much in the way of notable works on business…[or] public administration”.11 This is where an oversight becomes a glaring error. There is no way that the Romans could have run an empire spanning Europe, an Empire that was impeccably organized and won through the efforts of the most efficient and ruthless army of its time without a massive amount of thinking about management.12 But Witzel gives us a clue to his mistake. By linking business and public administration, he tells us that he is looking not for ‘management thought’ but for ‘business management thought’, the business of the Classical era very different from modern-day business.

Regardless of culture and society, business was almost always seen as a dirty job during the pre-Victorian era. The only legitimate form of wealth gained, regardless of whether one is discussing Republican Rome, Ancien Regime France, or Ming China, was wealth gained from land ownership. Indeed, merchants often gave up better profits in order to gain entry into the aristocratic class, a tendency which could be seen in societies as disparate as 18th century Paris.13 and 14th century China.14 Such a tendency tells us that wealth, the accumulation of wealth, and the very idea of business was not seen as particularly important.  

R.G. Collingwood noted a similar trend in his analysis of the ‘history of history’.  He found that history had always been used analogically, and was viewed as a peripheral way of looking at the central philosophical problem of the time.15 This central philosophical problem, be it mathematics in Greece, theology in Medieval times, or the discoveries of the hard sciences in the post-Enlightened age, completely changed the way that history was studied. The goals of Medieval history were the discovery of the nature of god16, and the discovery of man’s universal nature imparted by god17, notions which were taken for granted and rarely exposed to criticism. Thus the kinds of historical knowledge gained by the Medieval Christians were often not what we would call historical knowledge, but theological knowledge presenting itself as history, even if the Medieval scholar still called his field ‘history’. As such we can say that history was an explicit field that was predicated on implicit societal views.

Paul Chevigny, in his book on police violence, describes another implicit phenomenon. He argues that since policing is seen as a “low” occupation unworthy of academic study or thought, the way that most people think about everyday police work occurs analogically: we think about policing as a subset of the way we think about ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’, not as a topic in and of itself.18 Thus policing is an implicit field of study which is thought about analogically through the explicit notions we have about society. This distinction will become important as we discuss management’s emergence as an explicit field. Until then, I will leave it that management was an implicit field before the Industrial Revolution, a notion which Witzel discusses (“most earlier authors did not set out to write works on management”)19 but does not seem to appreciate.

While pre-Industrial society practiced ‘management’ daily, they thought about it analogically: since business was seen as a “low” skill, management thinking was almost entirely an implicit field of thought which came via analogies to more familiar and more important institutions: the family, politics, religion, or ethics. Wealth was something to be attained in order to gain stature and political power, and once that stature and power were gained, the new aristocrat immediately took on the anti-business concept of their peers.  Timothy Brook notes this trend throughout the Ming Dynasty: noting a plethora of nouveau riche aristocrats decrying the kind of practices that got them where they were and consistently attempting to hide the shameful, commercial, origins of their own wealth.20  

Even though business (and indeed the very idea of working to make money) 21 was seen as a ‘low study’, Witzel argues quite successfully that businesses expanded into worldwide ventures during the Medieval period, which led to thinking about specific necessities of management such as accounting.22 The Enlightenment’s project of questioning established norms also led to a large amount of thinking about economics and eventually business.23

This leads to a question: if firms (if they could be called that) were doing business on a global scale as far back as the 12th century and the individual branches of management (finance, accounting, administration) were in place around the same time24, why did it take until the late 19th century before a complete concept of management came forth?  Specifically, what changed to make businesses seem like a respectable element of analysis, and what changed that necessitated the creation of management thought?

Beyond the anti-business biases of pre-industrial society, aristocratic societies across the world developed an organic ideology that naturalized the idea of the inherent superiority of the aristocracy which came from their blood and breeding. This impeded the development of management thinking in two key ways. The first being that since ability was to some degree inborn, there was little to no need for teaching or even thinking about management. The second followed from the first: if the aristocracy was inherently capable, then the mercantile and working classes were therefore subhuman or otherwise incapable of agency, an ideology which meant that there was no need to develop a set of ideas based around specifically managing other individuals.  These two intellectual products of the feudal economy combined with an allegorical view towards businesses made the development of management thinking unnecessary. It took not one but three revolutions to shake this framework.

That aristocrats had inborn abilities was commonsensical to the people of the pre-Industrial era. Many of the patrician families of Rome claimed to be descended from Gods25, and both Ming China and Ancien Regime France had a concept of gentlemanliness (in French, gentilhomme and in Chinese junzi), an inborn concept which placed one irrevocably above his peers. Gentillesse was a characteristic that could only be provided through the blood: “the King might create a noble, but not even he could make a gentleman…[gentillesse could only be created] by deeds, heroic deeds, and by time.  Two generations usually sufficed”.26 The gentilhomme was a larger than life character, capable of more destructiveness and more greatness than any mortal could possibly grasp.  The junzi was a remarkably similar character, a person beneath only the sage (a saint-like figure) in societal placement. The junzi was literally translated to ‘lord’s son’, which keeps with the inherited nature of nobility. The junzi, moreover, was defined by his ability to see what the everyman could not: his virtue and knowledge of the classics led to transcendent accomplishments inconceivable to the ‘small-minded’.27   

Besides the gentleman’s construction as a sort of anti-business person (the French gentilhomme was a martial and artistic figure while the junzi was at heart an academic living isolated from the world), the conception of in-born gentlemanliness challenged management from another front.28 Witzel notes that as late as the 20th-century British business schools would not teach management, believing management to be an “aristocratic x-factor”, something which could not be taught.29 This gets to the heart of the problem: why think about management if the ability to lead was simply in the blood? Why not think about, instead, the blood?  Pre-industrial societies shared widespread horrors at the possibility of miscegenation, and the societal punishments involved in a gentilhomme family marrying a non-noble one were so strong that no such combination has been found.30 Love between the Indian castes and Chinese classes was viewed with similar anxiety.31 This anxiety (and the complicated categories of nobility and peasanthood constructed over the centuries in nearly all societies) indicate that people saw inborn abilities as being so much more powerful than thinking about management that “certain physical characteristics exemplifying nobility were intentionally sought out and bred”.32

This belief in the inborn abilities of the nobleman had another side to it: a disbelief in the ability of the poor to think or act for themselves. The Fronde, a civil war in 17th century France, began because the crown considered the nobility as responsible for the revolts of their peasants: “in seventeenth-century society, peasants and artisans were considered to be something like leashed animals, and when they revolted, the king, the bishops, and the nobility frequently blamed the nobles…for not keeping the peasantry in hand”.33 Because the peasants were considered to be ‘childlike’ and obviously followed their superior masters, revolts along the Seine valley (caused by food shortages and egregious taxes) were considered to be aristocratic plots rather than a reaction by individual actors.

A similar example of individuality being viewed as either an aberration or as the purposeful malice of the master can be seen in the American south.  During the 19th century, a pseudo-science was built around understanding the origins of slave revolts and runaways. The idea of Drapetomania, that is, the irrational want to run away from one’s masters, was prescribed as slaves reacting to masters “attempting to raise him to a level with himself”. That the position of the African slave is given as “the Deity’s will”34 is a common trend that occurs in readings from all over the world in the preindustrial era.

The belief in a hierarchy ordained by a divine being (or by the laws of science) permeated nearly all pre-Industrial cultures, manifesting in different ways in different societies. In India, it manifested as literal castes,35 in China in the ‘Nine Ranks’36, and in Europe as the Gentilesse/Noblesse/bourgeoisie/peasant distinction. This hierarchy created an interlocking set of beliefs which destroyed the need for management thinking. These beliefs in the supernatural and inborn powers of the nobility, the lower classes’ lack of agency, and the unimportance of business all combined into a feudal ideology that devalued the idea of social mobility, devalued the individual (excepting the aristocratic individual), and also devalued the unheroic task of running a business. Combined, they formed an organic ideology that allowed very little room outside of it. If nobility is inborn and nobility is only gained through ‘heroic’ acts, why care about running a business? If the peasants had little to no agency, why think about managing them? If social mobility is de facto impossible except through the state and the nobility, why invest one’s time in a business when a title is clearly so much more important?  

This set of questions explains Wiztel’s surprise in finding little to no development in management thinking in Chinese, French, or Roman cultures: they thought about management analogically, through metaphors to leadership (which they considered inborn) and the family. The workplace, the prime focus of management, was seen as merely another, inferior, aspect within the broader society. Furthermore, management rests on an a priori assumption of a relatively equal relationship between the boss and the worker. The worker could be fired, the worker could work poorly, the worker could leave but in management, the worker is assumed to have agency, an agency which did not exist either conceptually or in the reality of the latifundia workplace.  

The examples that Witzel finds of proto-management in the pre-Enlightenment era occurred in exceptional cases where upheaval destroyed the idea of inborn ability (Machiavelli’s Il Principe was written to the victor in an assumed coup, an event which occurred often in Italian city-states), or in the case of something considered far more important which management then adopted as its own (warfare). Simply put, the class society of feudalism could not conceive of management thinking, either as a science/means of analysis or as a justifying force in society, because it already had a justification for the hierarchy that existed within it. Often this aristocratic ideology was incapable of ‘working’ either by any objective measure or even on its own terms, but without an alternative system and a different material base, this form of magical thinking hung vestigially over society, justifying all sorts of harm and oppression despite being debunked and demystified. For centuries humanity hung between a feudal society that created all manners of useless suffering and a new method of organization that could not be spoken of let alone analyzed. This is a state I think we can relate to, and feudal notions hung onto relevance until it was felled, not by one Revolution but three.

The Republic In the Workshop: Management as Reaction

The general notion of history is as a march to the present. It is the mistake of every society to think that the zeitgeist of the present day came about as the result of a series of won compromises and that we are living in “the best of all possible worlds”. The typical view of American history takes this viewpoint: the Founding Fathers are not seen as revolutionaries in their time, promoting a radically different system than what had came before, but as conservative figures in our time, promoting the current system that we have. Each step in American history: the revolution, the extension of suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the new deal, the civil rights movement, etc, is seen as a step towards the present that could only have gone this way when in reality each event had an infinite number of possibilities. From the perspective of the contemporaries of Washington, Jackson, or Lincoln, it was not so obvious where the events of their lifetime would lead.

I say this because Witzel’s history of management is written in a similar fashion: management is depicted as a natural outgrowth of the world.37 which would have emerged in roughly the same form regardless of the thinking of Taylor or of the events of the 19th century.  Management was simply an answer to the organizational problem of factory life, which was merely waiting to be found by whoever picked it up. I will argue in this section that once management is put in its political context it becomes far less innocuous.

While the feudal ideology I described in the last section was collapsing in Europe over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, it was only the events of the late 18th century (the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) that finally broke the back of the aristocratic notion of inequality among the classes. It was the notion of equality, conceptualized and argued through many world civilizations but then given form by the bourgeois-republican governments of France, the United States, and Britain, that attacked both the notion of inborn ability by allowing any man to stand for office and the idea that the poor had no agency by allowing the poor to vote.  

The idea is that these movements occurred naturally, that the abolition of slavery or the extension of the franchise was a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically insufficient, and thus their dissolution was inevitable. Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted, the deconstruction of these orders requiring revolutionary action in their time. And even if we accept that slavery’s dissolution was inevitable, the way in which an event occurs and what exactly replaces it is just as important as the event of dissolution itself. 

Similarly, even if we take the eventual development of a field of scientifically minded management as a given, the kind of management thought that developed was just as important as the fact that a form of management thought emerged. Multiple strands of management thought grew at once in the late 19th century, and despite much of Taylor’s work being based on forgeries, Scientific management dominated all other forms of management in the early 20th century. This is because scientific management was about more than merely solving problems: it was an ideological response to the threat of socialist and democratic movements who sought to bring the logic of republicanism into the workplace.

Manifestations of this tension appeared throughout the Western world during the early 19th century. The rise of socialist and anarchist organizations, not to mention the development of unionism, all placed pressure on typical workplace relations. Their reasoning had its roots in the juxtaposition of liberty in the voting booth combined with autocracy in the working floor: “the consequence [of capitalistic relations] now is, that while the government is republican, society in its general features, is as regal as it is in England”.38 The pamphlets of the Workingmen’s Party (Workies) also featured a discussion of the similarities between chattel and wage slavery: 

“For he, in all countries is a slave, who must work more for another than that other must work for him…whether the sword of victory hew down the liberty of the captive…or whether the sword of want extort our consent, as it were, to a voluntary slavery, through a denial to us of the materials of nature…”39

Similar events occurred in France. After the 1830 July Revolution, French workers waited “for the introduction of the republic in the workshop”. The “applied republic”, that is, a democracy which was replicated within the workplace, was a common call from the July Monarchy through to the Third Republic. It was in France during the election of 1848 that the first divergence emerged between “a social republicanism, seeking direct application of republican principles in the economic sphere, and a republicanism that sought to restrict these principles to the political sphere”, with the purely political republicans winning.40

Despite the victories of capitalistic republicanism in the early 19th century, social democratic parties and movements continued to gain strength, with the German Social-Democratic party becoming the largest single party in the country.41 The French created a word, sinistrisme, to describe the situation of the 3rd Republic wherein the leftist parties of one generation would become the right of the next as increasingly socialistic parties appeared and took their place. The reason for the continued decay of the 19th-century rightist parties was their tendency to use traditionalistic (that is, reliant on the feudal ideology I explained in the last section) justifications for the injustices of society, and the reason that Taylorism was so successful was that it finally presented a new and comprehensive argument against republicanism in the workplace: by creating “one best way” for all workers the manager is able to make everyone better off.  

The argument that if the workers were only to sublimate their desire for agency gained via social movements and their relationships with each other into a desire for agency gained via the piece-rate system and their contract with their manager then everyone would be better off was able to convince social justice advocates such as Louis Brandeis, and leading many technocrats including Witzel to see anti-capitalist critiques as merely desires for better management.42 This shows the degree to which Tayloristic methods have survived within management: the wicked problem of workers asking for representation is changed into the technical problem of workers needing better managers. By viewing the problem of worker’s dissent and indeed the problem of autocratically managing another human being as a technical problem, Witzel is able to argue that the answer was “to make management more efficient and to restore harmony with the workers”.43 In effect, Witzel is able to erase the ideological aspect of both scientific management and the workers’ movements and to present a movement which disempowered workers as the restoration of harmony.

Taylor’s process was to watch a laborer at work, design a better way to do that job, and then to require each and every worker to work at that pace. This disempowered workers in several ways:  

    • It was yet another moment in an ongoing process of deskilling, turning autonomous workers into merely imperfect pseudo-automated machines without knowledge of their subject which could be used without the manager’s assent. 44 
    • It applied the division of labor hierarchically–all thinking to be done about the nature of the job and the task was to be done by management and the consultant (a division shown by consistent comparison of the manager to the ‘brain’ in organic metaphors of management and organizations.45  
    • By arguing that most firms were inefficient and that the “scientific” methods applied by experts were superior to rule of thumb methods, Taylor was implicitly denying the worker’s own experience and knowledge and alienated the worker from their ability to better the work-processes they engaged with on their own terms.

Taylorism and scientific management took its focus, the workplace, and transformed it conceptually from a part of society subject to society’s rules to an area of perpetual exemption, no longer shackled to the magical thinking of the where utter autocracy was allowed to rule under the rubric of efficiency. This allowed one to be simultaneously a democrat in general while being an autocrat in the workplace. The contradiction of capitalist republicanism, while not resolved, was now obfuscated.  

The Dismal Science and the Pathologies of Management

Economics has often been called the dismal science because the needs of ‘science’ requires a perfect seeming model which rests on many assumptions. This is just as true of management: after expressing all of its arguments through algebraic notation and even after constructing highly complicated models meant to create computer simulations, it still deals entirely with the most difficult of variables: unabstracted, individual, human beings, and under a highly mutable criterion: efficiency.46

The first issue of management is that any problem involving the interaction of human beings in the social sphere is a wicked problem, which was defined by C West Churchman as “a class of social system problems which are illformulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing”.47 The number of these problems which appear in the management of people represents an intractable issue to expressing micro-level workplaces formulaically, let alone utilizing those formulas towards any useful end. Wicked problems are highly contextual which interacts badly with scientific management’s claim of ‘one best way’s and universalism.  

The second problem of any scientific management is with the idea of efficiency. Deborah Stone, in her work Policy Paradox, notes that efficiency is an almost completely subjective measure, that is what is efficient for one actor may be inefficient for another.48 Management has simultaneously constructed efficiency as the manager’s efficiency, erasing the perspectives of the infinite other actors whose lives could be ‘more efficient’ at the sacrifice of the manager.  

It is fully possible to create a scientific discipline under these conditions: psychology, philosophy, and history all deal with these problems. However, management has not responded to the problems of unclear criterion and mutable variables by embracing critical methods. Instead, management has leaned harder on scientistic methods, methods that ape the aesthetics of the hard sciences without regard to the differences between studying the interactions of electrons and studying the interactions of people.49 Efficiency has been discussed as if it were an objective physically extant variable rather than a construction that was then reconstructed in a specific way. Over and over again the vacuous baubles of the org chart and process chart have been embraced, leading to expensive reorganizations which do nothing but redraw the chart. Indeed management’s continued embrace of scientistic discussion has led to an overfocus on the organization (which, like efficiency, is treated like an objective physically extant object rather than a construction) leading to a management thought which does not have much to say about work and people–supposedly the two subjects of the discipline.50 And despite all of this faux-scientism, management has become inundated by pseudo-academic gurus who pump out books that tell people that they can take charge in the workplace in X easy steps by the hundreds.51

All of these trends emerge from management’s original sin: that it did not emerge as a way to create knowledge. Instead it emerged in response to two needs: first, the need to create a coherent justification for authoritarianism in the workplace, and second, the anxiety of managers who want easy answers to their immensely difficult problems. Like history during the middle ages, management has become an explicit field based on implicit views that management itself helped create (the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace, the need for ‘objective’ analysis, the specific way that Taylor constructed efficiency). Because management stands on unquestioned concepts, the discipline has found itself riven with pathologies of its own making, finding itself breaking apart even within its own rules.

The pseudo-scientific methods of the gurus are an example of this. While they are decried by management scholars their methods are actually highly similar to Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management. During one of Taylor’s consultations, he asked 12 of the strongest men in a factory to simply ‘work harder’ and then guessed that under this level of work these men could haul 72 tons of steel (which he rounded to 75) instead of 42, and from this concluded that 75 tons of steel as the minimum amount of steel one could haul per day. This is not the seed of a scientific discipline.52

While scientific management has not succeeded in providing answers to the problems of the manager, it has succeeded in building a highly resilient ideology around itself, an ideology that has been based on the aping of scientific methods and the continued arguing of the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace. The result has been the successful depoliticization of Taylorism and the continuation of the ‘gospel of efficiency’ to the degree that people now talk of efficiency as if it were an objective measure. However, the trends which have emerged from management’s original sin have started to become highly problematic, not only for those on the outside of the discipline but for the discipline’s practitioners.

Disciplinization and the ‘silo effect’ is one of the pathologies which has emerged from management’s attempts to don scientific garb. While the splitting up of management into different sub-disciplines has as much to do with the m-form organization (a way of organizing firms wherein each task would have its own department/division, an organizational method which had its roots in the divisional structure of armed forces53 as it does with the academy, the silo effect, which is the complete separation of the management sub-disciplines into their own self contained worlds academically and creating fiefdoms within organizations, is one of management’s major pathologies. This phenomena has two aspects: the academic aspect (the silo effect which occurs in the academy) and the practical aspect (the silo effect that occurs in the workplace). I will explain each in turn.

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management’s origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace, that is a managerial class with a “view from the top” rather than a view from the workplace.54 And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absence – the absence of work and power from management – has exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.  

A look at an example of good organizing, the Valve company, shows why such a sub-disciplinary trend is necessary from a control mindset. In the Valve company, there are no formal control structures, everyone is allowed to move around, and because of this, everyone, from the accountants to the lawyers to the managerial executives, is asked to gain a degree of knowledge in programming, which is the company’s specialty (Valve 2012 39-40).55 Without a rigid command structure originating from an invented concept, Valve requires everyone to have a common language and thus asks for T-shaped people (that is, generalists who also have a specific capability) because commonly held knowledge allows for easier collaboration.56 This syncretic, ‘liberal arts’ viewpoint of management is exactly the opposite of mainstream management teaching and thinking, because management is not concerned with work.

Instead, management takes as its focus the invented concept of the organization and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about. Authoritarianism in the workplace, which was so problematic in the 19th century, has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unexamined.57 Further syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford).58 This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

And yet when management students come to the workplace they find that cooperation is rarely forthcoming. Because management has historically seen all of the things which grease the wheels of cooperation. such as talking and building social relationships within one’s job, as unnecessary and wasteful.59 Furthermore, when cooperation is modeled by management thinkers, it often looks little like what we would think of when we think of cooperation. Works like Bardach’s Developmental Dynamics: Interagency Collaboration as an Emergent Phenomenon places ‘acceptance of leadership’ as one of the key steps/goals of collaboration while simultaneously complaining of agencies which worry about “imperialistically minded agencies [which] might steal a march on them”.60  

This fear of collaboration leading to annexation emerges from management’s lack of focus on the work and on management’s competitive mindset. Because ‘the work’ is seen as comparatively unimportant compared to the need for control, collaboration must be done for some other goal besides merely getting things done. And because competition is seen as more important than cooperation, management often transforms cooperation into a competitive activity. One example is the imperialistic theories which Bardach uses wherein each step is a step towards control. In such an environment there is little reason to cooperate, leading to the silo effect within the workplace.  

But what is tragic about management is that despite the pathologies and its inability to provide technical solutions to wicked problems, its logic has become massively powerful within our body politic. The growing influence of management thinking over politics will be the focus of the next section.

Ever more dismal

While modern-day management has failed in many respects, its promise of technical solutions to wicked problems has made it hugely successful as an intellectual lens. We can see this because even while management academics try to find a new form of management, they wring their hands about the loss of control and the chaos brought by equality. Even Valve, a model of new management, asks ”So if every employee is autonomously making his or her own decisions, how is that not chaos?”.61

Management thinking, despite its flaws and pathologies, has moved out of the workplace to become a part of the contemporary zeitgeist. This has produced two strange juxtapositions. First, while the pre-Industrial world saw business only via analogies to more important institutions (the family, the church), in the modern-day business has become the sole operating lens through which other institutions are viewed. We see government, the arts, nonprofits and even families as analogous to businesses and thus reduce them to a specific kind of economic lens.  

Second, due to this domination, management, which was once used to defend authoritarianism in the workplace, has now become a way to argue for authoritarianism in the body politic. In our modern system, we are such advocates for democratic systems that we are willing to go to war to (supposedly) establish it in other countries while being unwilling to establish democracy in any substantial way domestically. We believe that man is worthy enough to weigh in on matters of national security, the country’s economic system, and even how one’s schools should be run, yet we do not believe that man can be trusted to have a say in the events that go on in their workplace.  The paradox of democratic capitalism which produced management has now been wholly obfuscated by it.

A perfect example of this is the discussion of the role of the president in our political system.  A massive series of worried articles have come out in the last 4 years saying that the job of the president “is to somehow get this dunderheaded Congress, which is mind-bendingly awful, to do the stuff he wants them to do. It’s called leadership”. This scarcely rises to the level of a statement. Through the last 20 years we have seen increasing demands for authoritarianism in the name of efficiency, in the name of the government ‘getting things done’, which are scarcely ever connected to a statement about what things the government ought to do. These vague requests emerge from the powerful yet meaningless demands of management thought and the way that they have mapped onto our politics. Just as management is absolutely sure of the need for an authoritarian manager while having vague answers for what a manager should do in any situation, in politics we know we need an authoritarian president so he can do something instead of listen to parliamentarians bicker over what to do, we just do not have an idea of what exactly we need that authoritarian president to do.

Similarly, so many policy arguments in the public sphere have been reduced to great man-ist arguments. The “Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics”, also known as the “Confidence Fairy Theory”–the idea that “the only thing limiting us [in foreign policy] is a lack of willpower” has been used by conservatives and liberals alike to attack non-managerial approaches to policy.62 Practically, the idea of ‘willpower’ and ‘confidence’ is so vacuous that the idea that it is used in foreign policy talks seriously is almost laughable.  But the ‘willpower’ argument is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in public policy just as scientific management is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in the workplace. In fact, things have devolved. We are so entranced by the power of authoritarian figures that our arguments are reminiscent of the faux psychologists who diagnosed slaves with drapetomania. The confidence argument has been used practically to argue that merely treating foreign rulers with respect–for instance, bowing to a foreign king weakens the confidence other countries have in our power and our will to use that power.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the supposed total victory of democracy over all the tyrants of the world, a new yearning for autocrats is being expressed everywhere, from the fringes of the left to mainstream neoconservatives to libertarianism. This autocratic argument is new: it is not the old feudalistic argument for a person who represents the father of the whole nation. It is instead expressed in the language of Taylor, and the desire to transform our messy and muddled political arguments into the idealized hierarchy envisioned by management. Phrases like “It is for the experts to present the situation in its complexity, and it is for the Master to simplify it to a point of decision” appear even from leftist sources.63 The idea that if only we were more courageous, willful, and authoritarian that we would be able to make the hard decisions easy, that within each wicked problem is a technical answer which we could find if only we had an authoritarian figure with enough willpower, steps from the faith we still have in the system of scientific management. We believe that, like fairies, the manager will only be able to provide us with easy answers if we believe in the system enough.

These emerging trends, which came out of scientific management to become far larger than the factory workplace it originated in, are hugely problematic: the belief in a society of simple and rational answers is so enmeshed that any of its failures are attributed to the failures of individuals. This belief is larger than management and the schisms within the management field: just as positivism is based on a very particular and superficial notion of the hard sciences64, our current management norms are based on a very superficial idea of modern management thinking.  

The line of thinking which I have been discussing is not directly connected to ‘the work’65 but rather to an idealized view of the way that workplaces should work. This is because this line of thinking has always been about control rather than results, and due to this the changes that have occurred within management academia have had little effect on management as it is practiced. In Witzel’s last chapter he does bemoan the disconnect between management and management academia, saying that “management thinking is now the province of the academic”.66This is not, strictly speaking, true: management fads and gurus have in many ways a broader audience than management academia. This is even more problematic than the possibility Witzel (rightly) presents, that management may be obsoleting itself by closing itself to the non-academic world.67 Management academia has a far better ability to turn management into a truly intellectually rigorous field in which the assumptions of management are questioned with the goal of creating more knowledge rather than upholding an ideological framework based on control than the guru cottage industry is. While this is not to say that management academia has served a progressive role, the willingness of management academia to specialize itself into obscurity is highly worrisome.

This gap desperately needs to be breached if management is to become a more rigorous field. But that is not enough. Larger participation in management by different parts of society,including workers, needs to occur both at the practical and academic levels in order to get management focused back on work and interpersonal relations. The larger problematic attitudes of society towards management need to be deconstructed at every level. Simply attacking them in the academy will not be enough. To some degree, the task is obvious. Addleson’s concept of ‘ubuntu’ (that is, connectedness with one’s group) and a more inclusive and democratic view of management is necessary in the context of knowledge work. But while being simple, the task is immensely difficult. Even if we accept that management’s replacement is inevitable, that scientific management gets replaced is not what matters. It is how it is replaced and what replaces it. And I have no answers with regards to that.

Conclusion: The Collective Mind

Much of this essay feels very dated as I write this in the spring of 2020. The dismissive attitude towards any kind of systemization, the confidence in workplace democracy as the only solution needed to these problems, the lauding of Valve of all things, all come off as the writings of a sharp if naive and new leftist writing a college paper in a very conservative institution. In this segment, I will speak to two elements which I was naive about (workplace democracy and the paper’s focus on ideology), before speaking to the ways this article applies to our current situation.

The naive excitement about Valve’s managerial model aged the worst of my concluding statements. The belief that a non-hierarchical corporation was a potential solution to the problems of management thought was not a conclusion I leaped to on behalf of my college, it was, at the time, an earnestly held belief. This belief was misplaced. A company who’s manual might as well be titled ‘ways to create a tyranny of structurelessness’ naturally moved to more hierarchical and frankly abusive management styles as the decade wore on (if, indeed, the original model ever truly existed in the first place).  Furthermore, the idea that workplace democracy would be able to maintain it’s democratic structures within a capitalist system is ludicrous. What we’ve often seen instead are groups that allow workers to enact the same workplace discipline on themselves that a manager normally gives, a discipline that does not just emerge from managing styles but from the needs of the market.

The argument I consistently made through the paper, that management should not be seen as an academic discipline but as a malfunctioning ideology, is one I would maintain. But there is a limitation to this. When I wrote this in 2013 I was in the midst of a painful rebellion from Obama era technocracy towards socialism, and this reaction still held marks of the idealism one can easily find in academia. In focusing on the cultural justifications each mode of production creates for itself I allowed myself to think that this justification was one of the main ‘pillars’ of a mode of production, and if it were only surpassed we would be able to surpass that mode. Such idealism is anathema to the way I think now.  

Feudalism was not primarily a series of ideological constructs but an economic system, and the same is true of management thought’s relationship to capitalist production. But there is a relationship between the superstructure and base, one where both are continually changing. The theme of a justificatory ideology slowly occluding the analytical elements which gave it vitality, leading to encroaching and, over time, fatal pathologies is one I have returned to again and again, with good reason. Management science was not conceived as a way to systematize the experience of workers into a theory of their work, but was rather created with the a priori need to justify autocratic workplace relations, a need which has over time overtaken the discipline’s ability to give knowledge about the subject for which it was created. This remains true whether the statements Taylor made were apocryphal and this brings me to discuss the recent article by my comrade Amelia Davenport.

Comrade Davenport is correct that the rule-by-thumb methods that organizers have developed over the last generation are insufficient to the task of running contemporary political organizations. She is also correct that what must replace that is a rigorous scientific method able to speak across contexts. At this point we part ways. While I cannot speak to Prometheanism, Constructive Socialism or our current ability to surpass scientific socialism (which all sounds nice but goes against my lifelong disinterest in abstractions), I do not think that Taylorism is the means by which we can reach a synthesis of theory and practice. We can see this in the lack of concrete examples in Comrade Davenport’s article. Taylorism confronted the complex problems of managing humans and solved this problem by treating people the same way one would treat machines, allowing engineering principles to be applied to the human body. Even if this narrowly worked within industrial production, it has only proven applicable to later methods of production in the most roundabout and analogical of ways and is not applicable to the variety of activities a political organization finds itself.  

There is another method that we can apply analogically to our situation, which I would argue is a better analogy: the method by which Clausewitz attempted to train officers. Clausewitz correctly stated that war is a simple affair, but that within war, the simplest things are the most complicated. From this, he separated the study of warfare into two forms, the first being the science of war, which consisted of the creation of fortifications, the organization of a barracks, the logistics of war. These are relatively easily taught and, regarding our situation, should be standardized and taught to members in as quick a manner as is feasible so as to keep technical skills from becoming a boundary to participation. The other half of the study of warfare, the art of warfare, was far more difficult as it consisted of one’s ability to make decisions with limited time, limited information, and a large amount of chance involved. This does not mean that it was impossible to become skilled in the art of warfare, but for a long time it was something which could be learned but which, it was suspected, could not be taught.

This did not mean that there were not universal truths in warfare which Clausewitz found in his studies: that defense was a stronger form than offense, albeit one which could not win a war on its own, that warfare has a tendency towards escalation, etc. But this did mean that teaching a capable officer was a different task than teaching a capable engineer. You cannot predict everything that will occur on a battlefield, and seeing things in a mechanistic way where all must do is choose the right course of action as given to you by theory is a sure way to create a disaster. What Clausewitz did, instead, was teach his officers to replicate the decisions of past generals in their heads, without bias towards whether they were ‘right or wrong’, and try to understand why these generals did what they did.  

This is the method we must use to train not just ourselves or those destined for leadership, but our whole organizations. The ability to critically analyze not just our actions but the actions of other groups is how we create nuanced and level headed organizers. But this is not something that can be standardized or mechanistically taught; it requires training one’s judgment, which is inherently a personalized process. This does not mean that it cannot be done.  It would require many of the same things that comrade Davenport lists, but it would also require:

    • The inclusion of a process of operational analysis including both analysis of our material conditions and criticism & self-criticism as often as possible, within group contexts and in writing.
    • The creation of clear lines of communication and information exchange, publishing what can be safely and feasibly publicized, including these operational analyses.
    • A focus on making as many decisions as is feasible democratically and including as many members as is feasible into the process of making decisions.
    • An acceptance that, on the one hand, these democratic decisions are binding, but similarly that the minority viewpoint in each vote is to be respected.

At this point, we need to ask, ‘what is the point of democracy?’. Often we counterpose a positively coded democracy with the autocracy that people experience constantly in their day to day lives. But given the absolute dearth of democratic institutions, if we consign ‘democracy’ to being just ‘good’, we are laying the foundations for democracy’s undermining in practice even if we affirm it in word. Throughout the left, democracy is seen as something ‘nice to do’ if inefficient, a vision of democracy which leads to it being lauded in word and cast aside in practice. In other organizations, formal democracy is seen as the most important decision-making tool, even if that formal democracy impedes on the ability of the organization to act or practically limits the ability of people to interact with the process. Almost everywhere in the left democracy is affirmed at the point of decision and then cast aside when people move to implementation. These can easily lead to a curmudgeonly opinion, which is only outwardly expressed within at the end of a political cycle: that democracy is simply a waste of time, that if it is such a good thing to sit in a meeting hall trading points or order or consensing until our faces turn blue just to decide on the time of an event, that it would be better if we dropped it in the name of efficiency.

I am a member of the Democratic Socialists of America. In left circles, the idea of democratic socialism is often hand-waved as being limited to a project of developing social-democracy in an Anglosphere that has not ever had that uninteresting experience. But through working in this organization for years, I have gained a far greater appreciation for the concept. When I am giving a speech, democratic socialism is about creating a world that is both social and democratic in a world which is utterly undemocratic and anti-social. But going further than that, it also speaks to the fact that as human beings living under capitalism we have not had the experience of working in an organization that is democratically operating towards social ends. The life of the average proletarian is one of being told what to do without being able to respond, towards ends which would likely never exist without a profit motive, without the ability to influence the situation around them let alone change what task they are working towards. Indeed, even at the other end, your average manager may have the ability to make decisions but is still unused to that decision being made collaboratively. We are not used to thinking about the organizations which we operate in, either because we have a one-way relationship with those organizations, or because at the top these organizations are reducible to a handful of people working on a handful of projects, and can be worked within in the same way as any group of competing cliques.  So when we are forced to interact with an organization, where not just us but the people around us all have a say in our decisions, we can be instinctively territorial, we can instinctively form into cliques, we can instinctively think not of the wellbeing of us as a collective but just of ourselves and our projects.

It is the task of all of us within the movement to build a collective mind, produced but not reducible to individuals, trained by but not reducible to our experiences, and we only build it by continually working in a democratic way. This means more than voting or reading consensus on something at the point of decision and then dropping democracy afterward. We need to operate democratically throughout every step of the process, from conceptualization to decision-making to implementation. This is not done out of some bleeding heart sentiment that it would be nice to do. We learn from doing, and the more democratic our processes are, the broader they are, the more people are included in that learning. When we make decisions and implement them in a democratic way, the whole group, not just a handful of staffers, organizers, or cadre, learns how to be more capable.  When we work democratically we all learn about ourselves, our projects, the organizations we work in, the society we live in. The more we work democratically the more capable we are at making new decisions collectively, the more nuanced those decisions become. 

Furthermore, we cannot put this off; we cannot wait for some moment to give us permission to flip the democracy switch. We will never be able to competently make collective decisions until we are asked to, until we try to, until we fail to. By making and learning from these decisions, we are able to better our organization’s ability to make future decisions. By fighting and losing in an internal vote and moving together regardless, we learn that our individual opinions are only important insofar as we work towards them, and strive to be better.  Each time we decide on an action together and implement it together in a broad and democratic way, we teach ourselves and our comrades that our decisions matter.  The dispersal of technical skills is an important aspect of this but it is the easiest one of the problems that face us. Dispersing democratic skills is far more pressing.

This is a problem that Scientific Management is unable to solve: it was never meant to build democratic organizations. Its conception of organizations can only be a top-down decision-making apparatus where a handful of people are given the ability to decide on behalf of their inferiors what work will be done and how that work will be done. It is categorically incapable of treating every element of a process as being guided by human beings possessed of agency because it ascribes humanity solely to the manager.  This does not mean it is unscientific, just as with drapetomania it was an attempt to scientifically process an utterly ideological defense of an authoritarian status quo. This is not some revision that was added later, some fall from grace which occurred after scientific management was co-opted by capital. Nor was it some ideologically neutral technology that the Soviet Union was able to use in a substantively different way than the capitalist world. All of the faults and the degeneration that has come later up to the wholesale acceptance of magical thinking regarding willpower stem from the original sin of management thinking: that it was conceived as a justification for class rule.

Scientific management’s inherent flaws do not mean that we cannot learn from it: nearly every theory has embedded presumptions and flaws. Nor does it mean that we cannot hope to create a scientific theory of organizations that work towards the ends of socialism. But we cannot merely declare such a theory, and any such declaration made out of cobbled together past theories will not stick, because such a theory needs to come wholly through us, through our collective decisions and the new perspectives on old questions that such experience gives us. Just as we can only reflect on our collective decisions by doing them, we can only theorize our experiences by reflecting on them. True systematization, the kind of synthesis of theory and practice comrade Davenport speaks to, is not something we can merely jump to. The movement as a whole needs to be developed, not towards Prometheanism or Constructive Socialism specifically but towards a better understanding of itself and the world around it. Perhaps this will move in the direction comrade Davenport points to, perhaps it will not. It is out of the hands of any one person.

As socialists, our ultimate aim should be for the creation of a more humane and democratic world. To steer us there are the human and hopefully democratic organizations we fight within. While we should strive to liberate our comrades from the prison of rule-by-thumb, we should embrace the humanity of the organizations we fight within. We should strive not just to simplify our methods in such a way that the human element of need be abstracted, but to embrace and empower our humanity. 

The Family is Dead, Long Live the Family

With family abolition a controversial topic in the current-day leftist discourse, Alyson Escalante argues for a more nuanced and sensitive approach to the topic by looking at the works of Karl Marx and Alexandra Kollontai while exploring the relation of colonialism to the family. 

It might seem strange that in a time when internal debates within Marxism are largely centered around revolutionary versus electoral strategy that a whole other long-downplayed component of Marxism has begun to enter the mainstream discussion: the abolition of the family. In 1848, Marx himself noted that the proposition of family abolition was particularly scandalous, remarking that “even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.” Perhaps because of the scandalous nature of the topic, Marxists have largely downplayed this aspect of the communist project, with criticism of the family mostly being taken up within the field of feminist theory. 

And yet, in 2019, the question of family abolition re-emerged, with both the left and the right taking up a condemnation of this part of the communist program. In many ways, this re-emergence is due to Sophie Lewis’s 2019 book Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family. This text managed to earn partial condemnation from the left social democrats at Jacobin as well as an intense amount of right-wing ire due to Tucker Carlson’s decision to discuss the piece on his show. Suddenly, the idea of abolishing the family is being taken up in mainstream publications such as Vice, The Atlantic, and Fox News. A debate that communists have long pushed to the sideline is now unfolding outside the scope of our own publications and organizations, and the question we are faced with is how we as communists will respond to and intervene in this debate. 

My primary interest here is to intervene by reframing the debate within the history of Marxism and to attempt to shift the debate from one regarding the normative desirability of family abolition to a debate around the strategic response to capitalism and colonialism’s own destruction of the family. This requires us to return to Marx and Kollontai’s work regarding family abolition to understand the historical conditions in which Marx raises the concept and to examine how those conditions might function to inform this emerging debate today. Furthermore, I suggest that we must also consider the relationship between colonialism and the family in order to develop a proper orientation towards family abolition. I hope to demonstrate that the desirability of family abolition is not a useful framing for the debate, as capitalism and colonialism have already begun to enact historical processes which make this abolition inevitable. The question facing communists today, I propose, is how we respond to this inevitability. 

Marxism and The Family

In order to better understand the debate at hand, I think that it is worth historicizing the relationship between communism and family abolition. In order to do this, I hope to turn to communist theorists of family abolition to uncover a historical understanding of the term that might shed light on its development. 

Perhaps the most famous invocation of family abolition is found in the second chapter of The Communist Manifesto. In this chapter, Marx sheds light on the historical contingency of bourgeois culture, by demonstrating the relatively recent emergence and historically novelty of bourgeois cultural norms, and by insisting that such norms are not extended to the vast majority of people, i.e the workers. When the communists discuss the abolition of class culture, they do not mean an anarchistic destruction of all culture, but of a very distinct and historically contingent form of culture. And yet, for the bourgeoisie, this culture is treated as eternal, grounded in nature itself, such that its abolition is seen as an abolition of culture as such. Marx notes that for the bourgeoisie, “the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture…” because the bourgeoisie has transformed “the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property” into “eternal laws of nature and of reason.” The bourgeoisie has naturalized their culture as the sole legitimate expression of culture. 

In response to the ideological naturalization of bourgeois culture, Marx asserted that this culture has not always existed, emerging as the result of “historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production.” According to Marx, this view repeats the mistaken belief of all prior ruling classes, namely the idea that the social conditions resulting from a given mode of production are eternal, natural, and impossible to undo. This belief is grounded in obvious hypocrisy because the ruling capitalist class must acknowledge that the feudal culture which accompanied the feudal mode of production was not eternal, and was in fact overthrown through the bourgeois revolutions. Given this reality, the bourgeoisie should understand that their own culture is a historically contingent result of a given mode of production that can be transcended and surpassed, just as the feudal and ancient modes of production were transcended and surpassed. 

Furthermore, Marx astutely pointed out that the bourgeois culture which the capitalists seek to defend is one that is exclusive to a relatively small class. For the majority of people living in a capitalist society, the cultural fixtures of bourgeois society are simply inaccessible decadence. The same social formation that the bourgeoisie accredits with the development of great art, music, and cultural expression is a social formation which condemns the majority of the population to squalor and exploitation. Marx insists that culture, the “loss of which [the capitalist] laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.” From this insight, we can see that not only is bourgeois culture historically contingent, but also that it is far from universal within the given historical epoch in which it emerges. 

It is from these premises that Marx shifts abruptly to the discussion of family abolition, beginning by exclaiming (as previously quoted), “Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.” Marx unpacks this infamous proposal by pointing again to the hypocrisy of the capitalists’ claim to be protecting the family from communists who would seek its abolition. He points out this hypocrisy, stating: 

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

Here Marx again points to the apparent lack of universality of the family form, noting that the family form is more or less reserved for the bourgeoisie themselves and that in the daily lives of the proletariat, the family as a meaningful social unit is absent. The capitalists point to the communist call for abolition of the family with horror, while simultaneously developing a socioeconomic system which has already destroyed the very basis of the family for the workers. Marx continues:

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family… becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

Once again, we must note that Marx does not actively defend the abolition of the family as a program here so much as point out that for the proletariat, the family has already been torn apart by the exploitation which is endemic to capitalism. 

Given the historical context of the Communist Manifesto, we must take note of the rhetorical and propagandistic function of Marx’s argument. He does not come out of the gate proposing the abolition of the family as a positive program, but rather begins in an almost defensive manner. Marx is aware that communists have been accused of endorsing abolition of the family, and so begins by dismissing misconceptions and pointing to bourgeois hypocrisy instead of brashly defending a programmatic demand which itself would be potentially alienating to potential comrades who might read the manifesto. The effect of Marx’s own form of argumentation is clever, in that it gestures towards an already-existent family abolition which takes place at the hands of the capitalists. For Marx, the abolition of the family is a process already being undertaken, as the bourgeois family form was never truly extended to the workers. Thus those workers who might be appalled at the idea that the communists want to abolish the family might have their fears assuaged by the claim that the family is already being abolished by the capitalists, while the communists merely recognize this reality and seek to formulate a response to it. In this sense, Marx transforms the primary question from “should the family be abolished” to “given that the family is already being abolished for the workers, how ought we to respond and what forms of care and kinship might we replace this dying family structure with?” This transformation of the question is one that has perhaps been lost in contemporary debates regarding the abolition of the family.

Marx is purposefully somewhat vague in his manifesto. While this may have propagandistic utility, it does make it hard to unpack some of the details regarding the family as a historically contingent and non-universal cultural phenomenon, as well as the details of what abolition of the family might look like in a communist context. Given this ambiguity in Marx’s work, I suggest that we turn to Alexandra Kollontai’s 1920 text Communism and the Family. At the point in her life that this text was published, Kollontai was involved in the founding and administration of the Zhenotdel, a department within the Communist Party focused on addressing the needs of women in the Soviet Union. This positioned her as an authority on questions regarding women’s place within communist society and lends the text a level of credibility in terms of its ability to stand in for the view of organized communists in a given revolutionary era. 

Alexandra Kollontai, left, as People’s Commissar of Social Welfare in the first Soviet government (1917-18)

 

Kollontai opens her text by posing two simple questions, “Will the family continue to exist under communism” and  “Will the family remain in the same form?” Following in Marx’s own footsteps, Kollontai recognizes that these questions are asked by many workers as a result of generalized anxiety regarding what sort of changes communism might usher in. She acknowledges that the concept of doing away with the family is not immediately appealing to the workers, and that it cannot be brashly asserted as a progressive demand absent careful consideration of specific historical trends. She notes that increased ease of divorce within the Soviet Union has added to concerns, and recognizes that many women who see their husbands as “breadwinners” are expressing understandable concerns regarding precarity and economic abandonment. It is important to note that Kollontai does not dismiss these concerns out of hand, recklessly treating them as obvious reactionary sentiments. 

In order to respond to these fears, Kollontai echos Marx by pointing out that capitalism itself has already begun to erode the family. She writes:

There is no point in not facing up to the truth: the old family in which the man was everything and the woman nothing, the typical family where the woman had no will of her own, no time of her own and no money of her own, is changing before our very eyes.

While acknowledging that this change can be scary, she also points out that change is a constant of history, and that social forms are always prone to change, that “we have only to read how people lived in the past to see that everything is subject to change and that no customs, political organizations or moral principles are fixed and inviolable.” She thus calls attention to the historical contingency of the family. The family is not an eternal transhistorical constant, but is a social phenomena which has changed over time based on factors of production and geography. For example, Kollontai points out that remnants of the broader feudal family relations still survived into early capitalism among aspects of the peasants. Furthermore, she notes that within her own time, notions of the family are variable along cultural and national lines, with totally different and polygamous forms of the family existing in some cultures. Given these realities, it would not make much sense to be worried about the fact that the form of the family is changing. Instead of worrying, Kollontai suggests that our task is to: 

decide which aspects of our family system are outdated and to determine what relations, between the men and women… which rights and duties would best harmonise with the conditions of life in the new workers’ Russia.

In this quote, we see a rhetorical move which is quite similar to Marx’s transformation of the core question regarding family abolition. The family is changing, according to Kollontai; that is an inevitable fact of history which results from the contingency of social formation on ever-changing modes of production. Given this inevitability, it is the task of the communists to guide this change away from something destructive and towards something harmonious. 

Again, we must pay attention to the rhetorical function of this text, noting that the term “abolition” does not appear a single time. Instead, an inevitable change is discussed, and an active project of guiding this change is proposed. In this sense, the communist abolition of the family is transformed from an externally imposed top-down process into a process guided by the working class as it determines what new kinship forms might provide for the well-being of all people. There is evident compassion in Kollontai’s writing, which takes the concerns of working women seriously, and Kollontai clearly adapts her rhetoric in response to the seriousness of these concerns. 

Having adequately explained the historical contingency of the family, and more importantly, having demonstrated the active role of working women in building a new better form of familial relations, Kollontai then turns to discuss the non-universal nature of the bourgeois view of the family. She notes that this older understanding of the family fulfilled necessary social functions, writing,

“There was a time when the isolated, firmly-knit family, based on a church wedding, was equally necessary to all its members. If there had been no family, who would have fed, clothed and brought up the children?”

According to Kollontai, one needs to look no further than the horrid state of orphans to see how central the family was to fulfilling real and pressing social demands for care. The family, through an admittedly violent privatization of women’s labor in the household, had met the real needs of society. Despite the fact that this family relation was inherently exploitative towards the domestic labor of women, it did serve a social function. And yet, Kollontai points out that even this exploitative form of the family is no longer guaranteed by capitalism. In fact, it is being undone by it. She writes,

“But over the last hundred years this customary family structure has been falling apart in all the countries where capitalism is dominant and where the number of factories… which employ hired labour is increasing.”

Following Marx, Kollontai points to capitalism’s own destruction of the family among the workers. The incorporation of women into the proletarianized workforce as wage laborers has itself had begun to erode the role of women as housekeepers and caretakers. The economic hardship of capitalism had made the wages of a single proletarian worker per household insufficient and have forced women to enter the market and sell their labor. While Americans tend to think of the phenomena of female proletarianization as relatively progressive and historically recent (often being traced to the Second World War), Kollontai calls attention to how early this process began for many workers around the world, and the destructive impacts it had. She points out that as early as 1914, tens of millions of women were already being forced to enter the workforce. Rather than seeing this as a move towards gender equity, she instead recognizes the destructive aspects of this process, writing: 

What kind of “family life” can there be if the wife and mother is out at work for at least eight hours and, counting the travelling, is away from home for ten hours a day? Her home is neglected; the children grow up without any maternal care, spending most of the time out on the streets, exposed to all the dangers of this environment. The woman who is wife, mother and worker has to expend every ounce of energy to fulfil these roles.

For Kollontai, it is quite clear that capitalism is responsible for the destruction of the family. In this sense, she echoes Marx’s own critique of bourgeois hypocrisy. Furthermore, she acknowledges that capitalism has not offered any real alternative to the family form which it is actively destroying, which leaves us with anarchistic absence of structure in its place. Given this lack of alternative, is it any wonder that workers express fear at the idea of family abolition?

In response to this horrific disintegration of family life, Kollontai does not propose a reactionary return to earlier forms of familial relation. After all, the idyllic vision of the nuclear family as a source of stability and safety amid a chaotic world is one which has always been particular to the ruling class; it has always been denied to the masses for whom the economic precarity of wage labor and the anarchy of the market ensure that such stability is always out of reach. Kollontai rejects the romantic bourgeois view of the family, acknowledging that under capitalism, the family is nothing more than “the primary economic unit of society and the supporter and educator of young children.” The bourgeois reactionaries who clamor for a revival of the family ignore the way that capitalism itself makes their vision of the family impossible. As a materialist and a Marxist, Kollontai cannot embrace this nostalgia and instead must ask what the materialist insight into the economic function of the family means for the future of the family. 

Capitalism has, according to Kollontai, not only eroded the conditions in which the traditional nuclear family could function by forcing women to labor outside of the house; it has also destroyed the economic necessity of women’s labor within the household. She points out that at one point women not only performed the labor of household maintenance and childcare but also played a productive role in their domestic labor. As part of this productive labor, she would be required to “[spin] wool and linen, [weave] cloth and garments, [knit] stockings, [make] lace, [prepare] – as far as her resources permitted – all sorts of pickles, jams and other preserves for winter, and manufacture, her own candles.” Many of these products would actually make their way into local markets, meaning that women would play a broader economic role even while being confined to domestic labor. This productive function has also been destroyed by capitalism, however, as women no longer have the time to produce alongside engaging in wage labor and performing domestic maintenance. This has necessitated a transition from the family as a productive unit to the family as a consumptive unit which simply consumes commodities made available by non-familial modes of production. Women are even being forced to have less and less time to engage in cleaning and child-rearing, as the demand to engage in wage labor increases. Capitalism itself has created a primitive socialization of much of women’s duties, evidenced by the existence of restaurants as a way of feeding one’s family. This primitive socialization, is of course, not particularly liberatory as families are forced to spend their meager wages in order to engage in it. 

Thus, once again, it is not the communists who are destroying the role of the family, it is capitalism. Furthermore, capitalism in the instance of primitive socialization of domestic labor provides a terrible alternative predicated on the exchange of service for money in a market context. It offers no real alternative to the family, only transactional forms of care in place of familial care. Does this liberate women from their domestic burdens? In sense it does, but it also replaces that burden with new capitalist burdens. Given this ambiguity, the question is not whether or not the abolition of the family is a good thing. The abolition of the family, according to both Marx and Kollontai, is an inevitability that has already been taking place for decades at the time of both their writing. Both reject the possibility of going back to some romantic alternative, as this alternative has already been made impossible. The question is then, given this inevitability and the impossibility of a reactionary alternative, what sort of kinship formation ought communists to endorse? 

Kollontai suggests that communism can offer a truly socialized alternative, not based on economic transactions, but based on expanded relations of solidarity and care. If women are already becoming too busy to perform domestic maintenance based labor, communism can socialize that labor in a truly progressive manner. She writes that while “under capitalism only people with well-lined purses can afford to take their meals in restaurants… under communism everyone will be able to eat in the communal kitchens and dining-rooms.” The work of laundry, house cleaning, and other domestic duties can simply be fulfilled by “men and women whose job it is to go round in the morning cleaning rooms.” Furthermore, the education of children (the other remaining task of women) can also be socialized. She notes that even capitalism had created state-run systems of socialized education. Capitalism has prevented this full socialization because “the capitalists are well aware that the old type of family… constitutes the best weapon in the struggle to stifle the desire of the working class for freedom.” Capitalism cannot fully socialize these educational functions but it destroys the ability for the family to meet them at the same time. Communism, on the other hand, can create this full socialization. 

And so Kollontai concludes that the family is going away whether we like it or not. The capitalist mode of production has destroyed its economic function and has offered no real alternative. She writes: 

In place of the old relationship between men and women, a new one is developing: a union of affection and comradeship, a union of two equal members of communist society, both of them free, both of them independent and both of them workers. No more domestic bondage for women. No more inequality within the family… Marriage will be a union of two persons who love and trust each other… Instead of the conjugal slavery of the past, communist society offers women and men a free union which is strong in the comradeship which inspired it. 

This vision is perhaps not what most think of when they imagine the communist abolition of the family. Love, mutual care, and the union of people in a kinship unit still exists but is transformed through the socialization of domestic labor. This change does do away with the idea that one’s responsibility is only to one’s own children, of course, because the care of children becomes a collective responsibility. All children are in a sense part of a new and larger family, what Kollontai refers to as “the great proletarian family” and the “great family of workers.” It is a powerful vision that Kollontai offers here: it is capitalism that would abolish the family and replace it with mere transaction, but it is communism that transforms the family into a truly socialized reality. 

Now, finally having outlined Kollontai’s approach to the question of family abolition, we must ask what is at stake in her rhetorical framing of the question. In response to the workers’ fears regarding family abolition, she recognizes the horrors of capitalism’s erosion of the family. In fact, she diverges from Marx in as much as she refuses to name the communist project as a project of “abolishing” the family. In the face of the capitalist destruction of the role of the family, she simultaneously argues that attempts to hold on to the old family are both doomed and also naturalize women’s subordination, while simultaneously insisting that a new type of family is possible. She does not tell concerned workers that they must suck it up, that their fears are reactionary and that they must embrace a world without the family. Rather, she preserves the language of the family but reinterprets it into a collectivist, that is to say, a communist, version of the family. The old family is dead, capitalism has killed it, and so we have been invited to build and define a new family.

It would be possible to suggest that the language used by Kollontai is merely a semantic matter, but while this may be true on some level, it misses the strategic function of this semantic shift. Kollontai’s choice to preserve the language of the family, while inviting us to radically redefine this family through communist revolution and socialization, is able to assuage the fears of workers for whom the concept of abolishing the family carries understandably concerning connotations. There is a real strategic decision being made here that we ought to learn from today. 

Colonialism and The Family

While Marx and Kollontai demonstrate that the abolition of the family is an inevitable project that has been enacted by capitalism, it is worth expanding the scope of their analysis by examining the relationship between colonialism and the family. An analysis of this relationship is extremely important in our current moment, particularly for communists inside of the United States. A common reply to those who call for the abolition of the family is a sort of indignant frustration with the insensitivity of this suggestion in the face of the contemporary and historical treatment of racialized and colonized families. Many in my organizing circles have responded to this revived debate by asking “how can we possibly call for the abolition of the family in a time when ICE is forcibly tearing families apart?” This question is quite understandable, and it expresses real anxiety grounded in contemporary colonial capitalism’s destruction of the family in particular among colonized communities. 

This question ought to lead us to augment Marx and Kollontai’s analysis with a careful analysis of the colonial project of abolishing the families of colonized people. Marx and Kollontai show how the abolition of the family is a process already being undertaken by capitalism, and we can turn to theorists of colonialism to show how this process is likewise being undertaken by colonial societies. Absent this historicization, we risk advocating a form of Marxist feminism that risks falling into liberal color-blindness which ignores the historical processes which cause colonized people to respond to the proposition of family abolition with scorn and frustration. 

One context in which we must consider the relationship between colonization and the family is within the context of blackness in America. America’s own history of slavery and anti-blackness necessarily require us to consider the way in which black people (and black women in particular) have an experience of the family which diverges from the experiences of the Russian and European proletariat. One author who is particularly useful for considering this experience is Dorothy Roberts, whose text Killing The Black Body provides insight into the way that slavery and its ongoing legacy of anti-blackness has controlled black women’s reproduction and foreclosed access to certain familial relations. 

Roberts begins by asserting that black women’s own status as mothers has been consistently under attack as a result of the exclusion of black women from the category of womanhood. She writes, “from the moment they set foot in this country as slaves, Black women have fallen outside the American ideal of womanhood.” While European ideologies of gender treated women as the fairer sex, understanding women as morally superior (if physically and politically inferior) to men, black women were painted as portrayed as immoral Jezebels. While European women were encouraged to become mothers and raise the next generation of workers and capitalists alike, black women were seen as hypersexual and were condemned for having too many children. The image of a neglectful black mother who has more children than she could care for emerged from slave-era narratives and has been preserved today in the frequently evoked myth of the welfare queen. Not only were black women shamed and attacked for having children of their own, but racist ideology also praised the Mammy figure, “the black female house servant who carried her master’s children.” Thus from the very beginnings of slavery, black women’s relation to the family had been disrupted by slavery. Furthermore, these forms of racial oppression demonstrate the way that the maintenance of the white settler family relied on the labor of black women who were denied a right to their own families. In this sense, the analysis that Roberts puts forward can help us to understand the non-universality of the nuclear family within the context of American colonization and slavery. 

Illustration from Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Slavery systematically undermined the formation of black families.

The horrific story of slavery does not end with a prohibition on black women’s reproduction. Roberts notes that “the ban on importing slaves after 1808 and the steady inflation in their price made enslaved women’s childbearing even more valuable. Female slaves provided their masters with a ready future supply of chattel.” As slavery developed, black women’s reproduction was transformed into a productive process in which a black woman’s children were commodities that could be traded and sold. Given this reality, we can see that even when black women were encouraged to reproduce, such reproduction did not lead to the formation of black families or the establishment of black motherhood, but rather led to the severing of kinship and care relations based on the dictates of the slave market and slave masters. In fact, the babies of slaves were considered to be their master’s property “before the child even took its first breath!” These children were very frequently sold off, separating mother from child. 

Throughout this process, black women engaged in resistance and sought to fight back against this destruction of black kinship. Roberts writes that “they escaped from plantations, feigned illness, endured severe punishment, and fought back rather than submit to slave master’s sexual domination.” Black women had to fight for access to the family in a way that European proletarians could never have understood. Is it any wonder that in light of this struggle, black women might be concerned with communists (especially white communists) promoting a program of family abolition?

Furthermore, the abolition of slavery did not end the colonial destruction of black kinship and the attempts to preclude the existence of black families. Roberts also traces the early movement for birth control’s complicity in the eugenics movement, paying special attention to Margeret Sanger’s concept of family planning as an instance of racist eugenics. Early eugenics projects emerged alongside a theory of race science that emphasized the supposedly dysgenic effects of black reproduction. Robert’s points out that early eugenic experiments in forced sterilization began with the forced “castration of black men as a punishment for crime.”  In the twentieth century, eugenicists began to raise fears about high black birth rates and the possibility of intermarriage between people of different races. These eugenicists proposed and endorsed policies to engage in the forced sterilization of black people. Sanger’s family planning clinics were in fact supported by eugenicists because they believed that increased access to birth control would reduce black fertility rates. Again, we see that even after the formal abolition of slavery, a concerted effort was made to decrease black reproduction and to preclude the existence of black families. 

Roberts also analyzes more recent instances of white supremacist regulation of black reproduction. Roberts examines the case of Darlene Johnson, a black mother who faced trial on child abuse charges for “whipping her six and four-year-old daughters with a belt for smoking cigarettes and poking a hanger in an electrical socket.” Johnson was facing the potential of serious prison time, raising the stakes of the trial. In response to this circumstance, the judge “gave Johnson a choice between a seven-year prison sentence or only one year in prison and three years probation with the condition that she be implanted with Norplant [a hormonal birth control].” This example is part of a broader trend of the courts being used to prevent or punish black motherhood, ultimately culminating in a host of discriminatory policies. Again and again, we see white supremacist society doing all it can to destroy black families. These developments are in many ways concurrent with the development of capitalism, and indicate that the processes by which capitalist development have eroded the family extend beyond the role of wage labor analyzed in Marx and Kollontai’s work. 

The ways in which colonial violence has precluded access to the family form for many people extends beyond the experience of blackness; Native Americans are also subjected to a whole host of acts of violence designed to destroy native kinship relations.  Mary Annette Pember, an Ojibwe woman whose mother was forced to attend a boarding school recounts the way in which “Native families were coerced by the federal government and Catholic Church officials into sending their children to live and attend classes at boarding schools.” Not only did these state-sanctioned boarding schools geographically separate children from their families, but they also undermined kinship relations by pushing cultural assimilation into European norms, and trying to destroy cultural customs and languages which were central to familial bonds. Pember notes that “Students were physically punished for speaking their Native languages. Contact with family and community members was discouraged or forbidden altogether.” 

Writing in American Indian Quarterly, Jane Lawrence’s article “The Indian Health Service and The Sterilization of Native American Women” explores more contemporary acts of violence against native women in order to preclude native motherhood. Lawrence documents a history of forced sterilization of native women, noting that “Native Americans accused the Indian Health Service of sterilizing at least 25% of Native American women who were between the ages of fifteen and forty-four during the 1970s.” This estimate, it turns out, is actually quite conservative, Erin Blakemore noting that the percentage may be as high as 50% of native women. 

These forced sterilizations and the history of boarding schools make up part of a broader move by the settler-colonial society in the US to try to destroy and erode native families. In 2011, NPR reported that “Nearly 700 Native American children in South Dakota are being removed from their homes every year.” Although a 1978 law called The Indian Child Welfare Act requires native children to be placed in the care of relatives or tribal members, NPR found that “32 states are failing to abide by the act in one way or another.” In South Dakota, NPR found that the majority of native children were being placed in non-native homes or group settings. This much more recent example demonstrates the extent to which the genocidal prerogatives of settler-colonialism prioritize the dissolution of native families. 

Another instance that touches on the relationship between colonialism and the family is immigration policy in the United States. In 2019, the practice of family separation came to the forefront of public discourse. Under President Donald Trump, a policy had developed of splitting up families in the deportation process, often deporting the undocumented parents but leaving children behind. This created a large public outcry in the United States. As a result of this practice, a new legal precedent was established for American foster parents to adopt and gain legal guardianship for the children left behind after deportations. Several cases of these adoptions have taken place in the United States, and they have been upheld by various courts. The practice of family separation stands out as a very alarming example of the destruction of families by colonial policies. 

Of course, immigration raises larger questions regarding the dissolution of the family. The desperate conditions in South and Central America which prompt many immigrants to move to the US often separate families, as one member may move for work in order to send money back to family. Additionally,  the historical imposition of the current border between the US and Mexico also separated families who now suddenly found themselves living on opposite signs of an arbitrary line of division.  

All of these examples demonstrate the extent to which colonial and racialized systems of oppression and exploitation have worked to not only destroy families among marginalized communities but to preclude the very possibility of such families existing at all. Within the United States, the story of the eroding of the family extends far beyond the story of the proletarianization of women. There is, quite frankly, more to the story of family abolition than Marx and Kollontai are able to account for. Given this reality, we must ask how these experiences of colonization affect the communist stance regarding family abolition. 

I believe that we should acknowledge that these experiences make it difficult to forward the language of family abolition when explaining communist demands for expanded kinship systems. Given these histories, it is easy to understand why so many have objected to the concept of family abolition on its face. The history of colonialism in America is the history of violently and horrifically destroying the families of the colonized. It is, quite frankly, both insensitive and unstrategic for communists to discuss the abolition of the family in light of these histories. Although that term might have a more technical meaning within communist circles, it does a terrible job of conveying communist goals to those who have experienced particularly horrific violence as a result of colonial policies aimed at dissolving families. Communism is a mass movement that seeks the liberation of the oppressed and exploited. As such, our language must not be isolating or alienating to the most marginalized. Although certain academics might insist on maintaining the use of the term “family abolition” due to its historical legacy, we ought to instead follow in the footsteps of Kollontai by discussing a transformation of the family and the development of a new collective proletarian understanding of the family. This language emphasizes the fact that communists have a positive vision for an alternative to the nuclear family, and seek to build a type of expanded family unit actually worthy of its name. 

While I argue that it is important for us to modify our language, these experiences of colonization cannot lead us to accidentally fall into a defense of the nuclear family. After all, the exclusion of colonized people from participation in the nuclear family is indicative of the historical emergence of the nuclear family as a colonial concept. That is to say that the nuclear family was not only denied to colonized people but was defined in terms of their exclusion and in opposition to alternative non-European forms of kinship. This means that we cannot resolve these ongoing legacies of colonialism through an attempt to expand the European nuclear family to include marginalized people. Such an expansion would not only arguably be impossible given the extent to which exclusion of colonized people is constitutive of the nuclear family, but would not resolve the violence of the capitalist destruction of the family. The family under capitalism is still based on the exploitation of women, still slowly being eroded and replaced with transactional atomized alternatives, and still unsuitable for human harmony and thriving. To simply expand the nuclear family to include colonized people would simply be to assimilate these communities into another violent and exploitative framework. As such, these histories of exclusion do not in fact act as a defense of the necessity of the nuclear family, but instead, act as a profound example of why we need an alternative. Communists can offer such an alternative, and I again argue that we should frame this alternative not as “abolishing the family” but as a positive project of building something better in the face of hundreds of years of capitalism and colonialism doing all they can to abolish the family themselves. 

There are, of course, those elements of the communist left, who might be tempted to incorporate the analysis presented here into a reactionary defense of the family. The “trad-left” podcasters Aimee Terese and Benjamin Studebaker have argued on Twitter that the family ought to be defended because “familial love and loyalty are worth more than money.” They forward a position common among the chauvinist traditional left, which argues that because capitalism has been the main force attacking the family, it is the duty of the left to defend the family from capitalism. As a result of this analysis, they argue that “feminism is a disciplinary technology of the bourgeoisie” which hopes to assist capitalism in the abolition of supposedly natural family relations so that kinship relations might be commoditized. I address this perspective explicitly because I think it is important to make sure that my arguments which seek to complicate discourses of family abolition do not get taken up in defense of such a reactionary position. As Marxists, we understand that we are not required to defend all of the social phenomena which capitalism seeks to dissolve. This is, in fact, a fairly fundamental Marxist insight. For example, capitalism sought to dissolve the conditions of feudal agricultural production in favor of proletarianized urban labor. In response to this, Marxists did not defend the “natural” relations of feudalism “which are worth more than money.” Instead, the Marxist position was to point out that feudalism had to be allowed to fade away, while also pointing out that the abolition of serfdom had not in fact made laborers free, instead replacing one form of subjugation with a new form of wage exploitation and precarity. The logic forwarded by Terese and Studebaker represents a common reactionary impulse among more right-leaning critics of capitalism, an impulse to advocate for a return to pre-capitalist forms of life. Such a position is untenable for Marxists both as an assessment of feudal relations and of the family. Our task is first to point out that the capitalist destruction of the family has done massive damage to many working and colonized people, just as the foreclosure of the commons in the transition away from feudalism created massive suffering among peasants. Our second task is to point out that the solution to this destruction is to create broader forms of solidarity and kinship that are superior to the family order which preceded capitalism. 

The family, despite often offering a real respite for those alienated by capitalism and subjected by colonialism still plays a fundamentally reactionary role. A family system based on blood relations has led to many young LGBT people finding themselves abandoned outside this system. The family has created privatized and uncompensated domestic labor largely pushed onto women. The family has become a symbolic core of reactionary politics in the United States. No defense of the nuclear family can avoid taking on the baggage of the family’s own patriarchal and compulsory heterosexual function. The nuclear family, even when not being destroyed by capitalists, is still a failure for too many people to be worth defending. 

So if we cannot defend the nuclear family, what options are available to us? I argue that if we actually historicize the debate surrounding the abolition of the family within the context of the early communist movement as well as the context of American colonialism and white supremacy, it becomes very clear that communists have a strong case to make that something better than the nuclear family must be developed. We must follow Marx and Kollontai’s framing of the abolition of the family as an inevitable process that has been initiated not by communists, but by the capitalists themselves. We must also go beyond the scope of Marx and Kollontai’s work in order to demonstrate the way that the processes of colonialism have initiated the abolition of family relations among colonized communities in the US and beyond. If we begin our appeal to the people by emphasizing these ongoing processes, we shift the debate from a debate about whether or not we communists ought to abolish the family to a debate about what alternative there is to the decaying and violent colonial nuclear family. The family is dying, and it has been dying for centuries now. In its place capitalism offers no real alternatives. Our job as communists then is not to glibly celebrate the abolition of the family in a way that alienates those suffering most from this abolition. Rather, our job is to offer hope that we can build something better. 

It is worth insisting once again quite explicitly that a shift in language away from an endorsement of abolishing the family must not be accompanied by a shift towards softening our critique of the nuclear family. Kollontai and Marx remain correct that the nuclear family remains a patriarchal institution built to ensure the exploitation of women’s labor and women’s legal subordination to men. The nuclear family has also proven to be an absolute nightmare for those whose families have failed to care for them. I know countless LGBT people who can attest to the violence of the nuclear family after being kicked out of or abused by their families. In his article Faith, Family, and Folk: Against The Trad Left, Donald Parkinson summarizes this well, writing “Not everyone lives in a world where their family is their friend; in many cases, one’s family can be their worst enemy. We can do better than valorizing one form of alienation in response to another.” Parkinson is completely correct that even in our critiques of the sometimes reckless and insensitive language of abolishing the family, we must still avoid slipping into reaction. 

In the end, it is a fine line that we have to walk. On the one hand, we must frame our critiques of the family in a way that the people we hope to organize will find understandable; we must avoid alienating language used either for the sake of academic credibility or an impulse to scandalize. This is a task that those communists who support family abolition have largely failed at. On the other hand, we as communists must remain ruthless critics of all that exists, including the nuclear family. The balancing act demanded of us is not one that is easy to perform. Thankfully, we have the example of those revolutionaries who came before us to provide some guidance. When I read Kollontai, I don’t see someone celebrating the abolition of the family, I see someone advocating for an expanded and new sense of the family in the face of the dying nuclear family. At the very least I see this as a vision for a better society; a society whereas Donald Parkinson puts it, “someone without a family can thrive as well as someone with family intact.” Kollontai’s expanded notion of the great proletarian family provides an example of what such a society would look like. It’s an example in which the dying nuclear family is allowed to pass on and a new form of communist family that extends beyond blood relations can finally, at last, take its place. A transfer of power from an old and corrupt form of kinship to a new and harmonious one can occur.

The family is dead. Long live the family. 

Works Cited

Blakemore, Erin. “The Little-Known History of the Forced Sterilization of …” JSTOR Daily, 2016, daily.jstor.org/the-little-known-history-of-the-forced-sterilization-of-native-american-women/.

Kollontai, Alexandra. “Communism and The Family” Komunistka, 1920

Lawrence, Jane. “The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women.” The American Indian Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, 2000, pp. 400–419., doi:10.1353/aiq.2000.0008.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 1848.

Parkinson, Donald. “Faith, Family and Folk: Against the Trad Left.” Cosmonaut, 28 Dec. 2019, cosmonaut.blog/2019/12/28/faith-family-and-folk-against-the-trad-left/.

Pember, Mary Annette. “Death by Civilization.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 8 Mar. 2019, www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/traumatic-legacy-indian-boarding-schools/584293/.

Roberts, Dorothy E. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty. Vintage Books, 2017.

 

From NPC to PMC

Parker & Donald welcome Jake from Swampside Chats on to discuss the professional-managerial class. What is the PMC, its relation to other classes, and its role in contemporary capitalist society? We discuss this and more, including topics like the Democratic primary, Marxology, Brexit, intersectionality, and Ben & Jerry’s.

For this episode we read:

The Professional-Managerial Class by Barbara and John Ehrenreich (part 1 and part 2)

Professional Managerial Chasm by Gabriel Winant

N+1 and the PMC: A Debate About Moving On

Intro music is The Internationale, arrangement, and recording by Christian Cail

Outro Music is Yuppie Rap by Mike Saad and Bill O’Neil

Power as Savior and Destroyer of the World

Latest from Cold and Dark Stars. Economic laws are sold to us by those in power as natural laws beyond our own control rather than forms of class power that can be challenged and overcome.  

I

The whole conversation is rigged.

Now that climate change has turned up on the radar of economists and policymakers, they are pretending we had it too good, that we lived in a utopia of cheap consumer goods, long lifespans, automobiles, and gadgets, and that our own self-indulgence brought us the trouble.1 The economists and industry captains were selling us what we wanted since their product was good: economic growth and cheese sticks. They just didn’t know about the caveat: the perturbation of the earth into a new thermodynamic equilibrium, one that could have extreme consequences in our fragile human systems.

They say everyone shares the blame since we were too happy indulging in their products. That is how it’s sold to us: salvation is to be inconvenienced by not using that straw, that grocery bag, and walking to the corner store instead of driving.2 These meaningless inconveniences are merely psychological pressure points to suggest the greater unpleasantries of a radical solution. They are training us to imagine the greater sacrifice, which inevitably means austerity. Reversing some of this utopia is the panacea of the illness of civilization. If we have grown too fat the solution inevitably means austerity.  

They know this story is awful, that it is a hard sell. But it does a couple of things. First, it sells the decisions done by power brokers in the last two centuries or so as overall good, the unsustainability an unfortunate caveat. Whatever comes next must look like the present social order, because it is good. Having a tiny percentage of the world population controlling the resource distribution and the rest having to fight for certain “jobs”3 that decision-makers, asset holders, and professionals have decided are useful in order to warrant access to nourishment and shelter is seen as a good and realistic model. The second thing it does is quite magical.  Because this story is a hard sell, and normal people are not willing to sacrifice their lifestyle, the elite can pretend they are not pushing for change for the demos does not want it.4 The poor democratic souls!

Finally, the culmination of this story is an argument for human nature. They say humans are naturally greedy convenience seekers and have short attention spans.  According to the educated, cable tv consumers, and anxious mortgage and index fundholders, the majority won’t buy the story because human nature is diseased.5 There are two corollaries to this story: that the present social order is perfected for the human soul, and there is nothing to be done because any “better world” is incompatible with the human soul. 

This story is such a monstrous, self-serving con that it should infuriate any person that dares to use their brain.  

II

The above story can only begin to be questioned by reassembling many of the concepts we inherited from many smart, intellectual types. 

Perhaps this reassembling must start within me. Many of my past writings have been about solutions to the ills of something called capitalism. One identifies this discrete epoch of “capitalism” and then describes the force that will destroy it. This capitalism, a logic that permeates the world, manipulates all living things for the purpose of profit/capital growth. This includes the destruction of many beings and worlds for some venal abstraction. The way it goes is that there is no agency behind these structures, the economy, the market, or “capital” are autonomous machines with their own inner programming, the businessman, workers, and politicians merely its puppets. 

Usually the expositors of this story are proud that it counters ordinary common sense. Much of the uneducated instincts you can follow in youtube, or eavesdrop at the bar, blame the problems of the world on a group of people with inordinate influence, hence the prevalence of conspiracy theories. The instinctual story gives a large agency to the “puppet-masters” that are made of flesh and blood. The intellectual, such as a certain breed of Marxist, will say that deposing the flesh and blood  “puppet-masters” would not do much since the only puppet master is capital.6 How do you overthrow Capital, which is G-d?

This argument is structurally the same as the neoliberal argument. It claims that there is something called the Economy that follows certain laws of motion, and these laws of motion say that the Economy would become crippled the moment the State is used as a tool against the elite, for devaluation and capital strikes would appear.7 This “Economy”, which is based on reification of certain limited, mathematical models in textbooks, has become a favorite sword of the right-wing to defend congealed interests. 

I am not claiming the scenario exposed by the neoliberals and the Marxists that parallel them is unrealistic. Instead, I would argue that what they refer to as the “Economy” or “value” is merely a power relation, imposed by a class upon the other, in other words, a human relation. The economic problems we tend to talk about, such as capital flight and devaluation, are merely questions of power and therefore freedom. By reframing this dialectic in terms of power, freedom of is injected ontologically; the scaffolding is made of humans deliberating. 

One could counter my argument by saying that there is a certain impartiality of the economy.  Industry captains can’t merely price their commodities at any value they wish. Establishing more humane labor laws in their industries abroad, or socializing certain industries, would make the United States less competitive in the global market, which would deny the state important revenues that could be used to build schools or hospitals.8 Yes, in some futures, some very realistic ones, this could happen. But it’s not because of some objective “Economy” that favors certain rules over others. It’s merely a question of power.

Instead, powerful agents today are embedded in a network of power nodes, and they must compete and maneuver against other power brokers. This creates emergent tidal waves, that may sweep across the network of nodes, creating the notion of an impartial earthquake. But at the end of the day, this turbulence cannot just be categorically tamed with “laws”, and the ripples still are shaped by the hierarchy of sovereigns. This is the reason why some countries can run higher debt tallies than others, or why sometimes counterintuitive policies such as quantitative easing do not cause catastrophic inflation. And it is in this picture that one may find the answer to politics in this warming world.

Let’s come back to the “uneducated” instinct, the vector that points to conspiracy theories. The instinct is partly right but also flawed. It is a healthier instinct than the intellectualized, anthropomorphization of the “economy” and capital since it at least offers the possibility of freedom. But the flaw of this instinct is that there is no discrete entity called the elite that controls the world. 

Rather, it is a continuous distribution, a gradient across a fluid of power. This gradient radiates from the billionaires at the top but also includes the professionals that monopolize certain technocratic jobs, the white families that own assets and index funds (which usually are represented in the mainstream, think of the GOP and the DNC),  and the meritocratic elites that structure the job and educational pipelines so that certain people are destined to lord over others. But even these “little” bourgeoisies are an approximation, as class power isn’t a discrete stratification but a continuous gradient. This is the problem of the slogan “against the one percent”. A social system cannot be sustained by the support of only a tiny elite. And a political project that does not bring reckoning with the current power gradient will fail in changing the story. 

The solution then is to somehow nudge this class power vector into another direction, which is ultimately what Marx wanted. 

III

The question of power is very deep. Nietzche thought everything was power all the way down, the immanent substance of the Universe. Hobbes referred to value as power, and Adam Smith, the father of classical political economy, approvingly cited Hobbes’ quote. 

It’s a banal question as well. We identify that the state ultimately has the right to kill us, throw us into a cage, and force us to act in ways we don’t agree with. We remember the bully at school, the authoritarian father. Power has scarred all of us, and we secretly desire it.  Some of us play with these roles in the bedroom, perhaps trying to exorcize the immanence of power through the most primeval combination of sweat and blood. 

Power is interwoven with freedom. Power cannot be understood as merely inertial, the violence of blind laws.  This is not because power is an endeavor of humans only; in the same way Nietzche thought power was immanent to the Universe, so is freedom, and ultimately they are both the faces of the same Ultimate. Power is arbitrariness which is freedom. 

Let’s analyze how an ontology of power and freedom enriches the original story.  Global warming is often explained as a straightforward process of quasi-deterministic laws. In the last two centuries, humanity has experienced unprecedented economic growth, which economists have tied as being coupled with carbon emissions. The carbon dioxide in the atmosphere acts as a powerful greenhouse gas that traps the radiation from the sun, preventing the escape of heat into space. As the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide increases, less radiation is released into space, increasing the temperature of the Earth. This increase in temperature will feed into dangerous feedback loops, such as the reduction of ice cover, or the enhancing of other powerful greenhouse gases such as water vapor and methane. 

The economists then argue that global warming would cause GDP losses. Extreme events such as floods and droughts would negatively affect agriculture, livestock,  infrastructure, and health. These damages, in turn, could cause teleconnections into other sectors such as finance.9  

However, this above account is impoverished in so far it occludes the role of humans deliberation, and therefore power. It does not reveal the malleability and contingency of the coupling of economic growth to carbon emissions, or our understanding of GDP. Furthermore, the entities of the Earth-system are considered inert, subject to deterministic laws. 

A better and richer account could be the following. The current sovereigns of the Earth thought they could control it to do their bidding, as if the earth system, with its water vapor, oceans, ice-sheets, and cyclones, was a submissive object that will lay bare to our manipulations. The power of these sovereigns is distributed but stratified, so there is not only one king, and the emergent processes of these networks of deliberations give rise to the apparent “impartiality” and the illusion of law-like behavior. This complex distribution of power is often referred to as the “economy” or the “market”, but this conceptualization often hides the element of deliberation and freedom of its actors, subsuming them under scientific regularities. The lack of absolute monopoly over the commodities from some of the players gives the appearance of laws that exist outside the deliberation of States, notwithstanding the violent and colonial monopolies  (e.g. East Indian Company, Hudson’s Bay Company, Dutch East India Company) that emerged from the birth pangs of the current world system. 

The market becomes an illusory category, a mystification of the fluid of nodes that embeds together power brokers like the state, the creatures and objects that form the Earth, and other sovereigns, human formations such as insurgent parties, activist groups, and clandestine paramilitaries, etc. Ultimately, this ensemble forms an immanent, turbulent fluid, full of vortexes, tidal waves, and shocks, horizontally wide but stratified.  One of the stratifications of this fluid is class power. Class power can be represented as a multidimensional vector along the stratification of this power-fluid. This vector not only encodes 19th-century factory bosses, or the top 0.1 percent but includes all sorts of asset holders such as mortgage holding, white families in select zip codes that concentrate the means of intergenerational wealth.

This power-fluid is alive with freedom. I stretch the term life here, for it does not only include what is referred as life by biologists, creatures with a chemically defined genetic code but also includes the turbulent ocean and atmosphere, the chemical and hydrological cycles that enshroud the Earth with clouds, the cyclones caused by the interaction of the earth’s spin with temperature gradients. Sure, some aspects of this system appear fairly predictable and therefore give the appearance of determinism and lifelessness. For example the orbit of the Earth, the trajectory of an individual electron,  the weather within one day, the job market within a month, the average lifespan of a dog. However, these systems are tractable until they aren’t, as many of them may become subject to shocks in the same way the behavior of a friend might be familiar until they fall into a deep depression. The emergence of determinism and stochasticity is often seen as noise, as an effect of not having enough information about the system. But this view is just a theology. Regardless of whether we find this noise as ontologically superfluous, the indeterminism still slaps us with full force. The Earth system is not behaving as it “should”, as the economy experiences shocks, love sometimes withers, and flying cars haven’t appeared but the internet has. A more interesting and useful ontology is acknowledging the freedom and agency of matter, not falling into the Christian trap of considering only humans free. 

The structural determinists, such as the economists and their laws, and the Marxists and their “value” are merely tweaking the Christian theology, for the old philosophers of Christendom considered matter dead while the human being was ensouled. These economists/Marxists merely take this incorrect ontology of dead matter and include the human being (and the world system) as made of billiard balls with positions and momentum vectors assigned to them. 

Against the “price distortion” and “law of value types” that think of themselves so clever because they wield vague regularities as absolute laws, power, the real immanent substance, is made of agents consciously deliberating, albeit lacking complete omnipotence, and surrounded by a fog of war. It is in the game of power where the class struggle becomes intelligible. 

IV

Class power could be summarized as the strategic capture of resources of one class (Colin Drumm) over the other. Class here is a demographic description, that only becomes intelligible in the sense that it is hierarchical: a class captures resources at the expense of others. Class power should not be thought of as a discrete distribution of a couple of classes. Instead, it is a continuous distribution. 

The most important theorist of class power was Karl Marx. His life’s project was to show that the economic and political stories were cons validating the most powerful class during his era: the bourgeoisie. The law, religion, ideology, and even some “science” were merely justifications of the bourgeoisie’s class power, narratives that made the strategic capture of resources of a tiny elite seem “natural”.

Those who are privileged reflect the cosmic, static order. The Chinese emperors came from Heaven, God gave the right to kings to rule, and today the elite rule because they reflect human nature. The elite embodies democratic nature to accumulate property and assets which inevitably leads to the optimal hierarchy. 

Here is where the con within the stories about global warming is revealed. The current narrative of climate change is sheer class power.  Yes, the elite must acknowledge the power of the earth system to destroy the civilization they rule. But at the same time, they must remind their subjects that right now they have the highest possible standard of living, and that nudging the system too much would destabilize this standard.

In fact, it is the projection of their power that makes us addicted to their world.  For it is not only chemical or sexual dependency that their products offer, such as processed sugar, or digital porn. More importantly, they sell us the illusion that through their products we can become like them, socially recognized by the rest. The search for social recognition is ancient. Amongst certain small, indigenous egalitarian societies, “big men” try to outdo each other with gifts and potlatches to become honored. In modernity this impulse is channeled into owning larger houses, better cars, having a degree from a good University. They rob the children from their childhood so that someday they can become accomplished professionals that can be paraded in the deranged pageantry of the technocratic castes. Meanwhile, we all end up playing, touching, and caring less, for we are conned into keeping up with the Joneses.

This is not human nature, it is the product of a certain group of people trying to maintain their privileges at all costs, and the historical directionality imposed by the phenotype of that modern elite (capitalists, bankers, professionals, asset holders). It doesn’t matter that some of them may suffer in the process – their kids may kill themselves because of the pressures of grad school, or professionals may develop mental illnesses by stuffing their skull with information concerning their assets, debts, and career moves. What matters is that they are not the worst off, that people below them are more miserable.  

This world that serves the elite was manufactured through deliberative actions, even if decision-makers could not be aware of all the outcomes. The stamp of the asset holders’ freedom scars every planetary entity. Therefore, It is only through the deliberative actions of the non-asset holding classes that this world can change. 

V

The structures of the world are not absolute and can be nudged into a direction through the imposition of power

There is no autonomous capital that is subject to its own internal desires. There are no “objective” economic laws that the neoliberals love to hark on about. The spurious regularities of innovation, stable currency, and debt are place holders for embedded power dynamics that are linked to imperialism and the quasi-monopolies of financial systems (American and English banks), technology (intellectual property law and corporate secrets), and monetary inertia triggered by the sheer violence of world wars (the death of the gold standard, the creation of the Breton-Woods regime). It is power all the way down.  When someone talks about “innovation”, “entrepreneurship”, GDP, and inflation, chances are that they are interpreting noise (e.g. random initial conditions that gave access to important resources and tools), or mislabelling the spurious regularities of the powerful (quasi-monopolies over the financial system like the US and the U.K own).

However, the freedom of the powerful opens our own possibility of freedom. There are no blind laws that oppose the stability of the earth system, the creation of a softer and brighter world of more play and touch. The streamlines in the power-fluid that carry the world into warming are imposed by certain, powerful entities. Yet we can impose our own cyclones, jet-streams, and eddies by building channels that change the course of the fluid. 

VI 

The change of conversation always implies the imposition of class power. And class power is not merely words, but institutions, resources, an army – in other words, the state.

Perhaps we can find an interesting example in the Russian Revolution, as Andreas Malm noted.10 In 1917, famine scourged Russia, probably due to a climate fluctuation. The tzarist regime was too incompetent and married to the interests of landlords to be able to use the machinery of the state to solve the food distribution problem. Instead, Lenin posed the question of the workers and peasants taking power, organized through a political party, to solve the food allocation problem, since the interests of the non-propertied classes aligned with the solution. There is a pedagogic parallel to our current predicament here. The Earth-system is becoming dangerously unstable, to the point where food price variability may nudge civilization towards collapse. The state’s scaffold is too married to asset wealthy classes to be able to enact the radical changes required for a flourishing society that responsibly stewards the Earth system. Only a Party that is not subject to these interests, that is, a Party of workers, farmers, the indigenous and racialized, could realistically steward the Earth system and therefore save civilization. 

If a Party of this type does not emerge, reactionary formations may occupy the vacuum left behind by environmental instability.  The far-right is excited about the incoming climate refugee crisis to help them gain support for a xenophobic ethnostate.

The question of power is intimately linked not only to the access to resources but also to how we ethically and spiritually interface with those resources. The response to climate change cannot merely be some imposed austerity in consumer goods while the power structures that interface humans between themselves and the Earth remains intact. The question of climate change can’t be resolved through the technocratic administration of resources while human relationships and the associated conceptual universe stays the same.

VII

Throughout the last century, the ruling classes have rewired our serotonin pathways to become addicted to what they offer: cheap porn, diplomas, credit, status, SUVs, and plane tickets. Meanwhile, touch, community, healthcare and permanent and secure homes are becoming more scarce. What couldn’t be more damning evidence of our screwed-up serotonin pathways than the declining rates of sexual intercourse and the ballooning debts and mortgages?  The society of the spectacle that erodes our power over our own lives is linked to the diffuse sovereignty of corporations, asset holders and real estate moguls. Meanwhile, this turbulent society is coupled with the increased instability of the earth system, leading to a warming world. 

Therefore, only by building a movement armed with a political program that visualizes the totality that binds together the earth system, resource allocation (or stewardship), and the ethical dialectic between humans and the Earth can we begin to reckon with this warming world. Right now, we get caught by loose threads of the unstable system – we grasp in a piece-meal fashion at automobile culture, air travel, the meat industry, or “consumerism” in isolation; this can only generate confusion and solidify the supremacy of the elite. Meanwhile, such a political movement must instead strike into the center of this class structure, the engine that weaves many of the false narratives of climate change. Modern class power has eroded human relationships, replacing play, sexual freedom, and the dissolution of the ego into the Universe itself. Only a life-affirming politics can replace the destructive power of asset holders. 

 

“Socially Organized Society: Socialist Society” by Alexander Bogdanov

Introduction by Amelia Davenport. From A Short Course of Economic Science

“Station Moon” by Pavel Klushantsev

What is Socialism? Is it the abolition of the state, the abolition of Value as an economic form, the abolition of private property, production for need rather than profit, or a rationally planned economy? All of these are cited, and rightly so, as essential features of communism. But while each of these deals with social relations, none but planning deals with the relations of production of the new order. Value is realized in exchange, property exists in the relations of consumption and prior to production, the state governs and secures the relations of production, and production for use governs the relations of consumption, not production. Even economic planning, which describes the overarching laws that govern the system of production, does not really describe the relations within production. The key feature of socialism or the Co-Operative Commonwealth, missing above is the abolition of the division of labor. 

 From the earliest socialists like Fourier through Marx and Engels, the division of labor was a central concern of the workers’ movement. Fourier describes an elaborate model society called a Phalanx where everyone rotates their job, although given tasks suited to their individual talents and interests. While he rejected the utopian impulse to craft a model society, Marx talks about the alienation in the separation of manual and mental labor which unevenly develops people. In “The German Ideology” Marx half-ironically describes a world where alienation has been abolished and even “critical critics” are free to do any job they wish throughout the day. Continuing this tradition, in his Short Course on Economic Science, Alexander Bogdanov gives a rough sketch of what the transformation of the social relations of capitalism into socialism would look like through the gradual abolition of the division of labor. A biologist, philosopher, field medic, proto-cybernetician, cultural worker, science fiction author, revolutionary communist, and economist, few figures in the history of Marxism are as criminally under-examined as Alexander Bogdanov. Introducing his life and the breadth of his work is a task for another essay. What concerns us here is the final chapter of the Short Course entitled “Socially Organised Society: Socialism”. This chapter represents something relatively unique for the time: non-utopian futurism.

 Bogdanov begins by laying out the great principle of social science: that the study of the existing tendencies and factors in society can allow us to predict in the broad strokes how history will move forward. By using a rigorous historical materialist lens, Bogdanov was able to make stunningly accurate predictions. For example, he correctly predicted the transition from steam power to mass electrification, the development of wind power and nuclear power, the development of a worldwide wireless telecommunications system, and the mass automation of labor. The first edition of the text was published in the 1890s! Bogdanov argues that while there are historical examples of societies that exist unchanged in relative stagnation or regress to earlier and less complex forms of organization, the force of movement in bourgeois society are toward complexity as such that stagnation would require an external shock. Such a shock would need to be bigger than a catastrophic world war to slow the progress of social development. In Bogdanov’s day, such an external shock seemed almost inconceivable. There was nothing that could stand in the way of Capital reshaping the world ever more in its own image.  Sadly, today the metabolic rift between the autonomous technosphere of capitalist production and the biosphere has grown to staggering proportion. It’s now possible to predict a scenario where world capitalism regresses, decays or collapses into much less complex or productive forms of social organization. Nevertheless, the trends and factors Bogdanov observed in the early 20th century still exist, if only heightened and more advanced. His outline of the new socialist world implicit in the old capitalist world remains as relevant as ever.

 Bogdanov examines five key aspects of the future socialist order that can be drawn out from trends in bourgeois society: Relation of Society to Nature, The Social Relations of Production, Distribution, Social Ideology, and the Forces of Development. Although the text is short and accessible, it’s worthwhile to summarize them in order to tease out what it means for today.

In his section on the Relation of Society to Nature, Bogdanov does not discuss ecology, something he spends considerable time on in other works, but rather focuses on the first principle of socialism: “the actual power of society over nature, developing without limit on the basis of scientifically-organised technique.” Because industrial society is based on machinery and socialism will inherit that productive basis, Bogdanov looks to the tendencies within the development of machines to see how society will change. He breaks down his predictions into three parts: 1) the source of motive power 2) the transmitting mechanism of power 3) the techniques of communication. Bogdanov argued that power would move from steam toward electricity because it was more plastic in use. He claimed that this would allow us to develop the potential of waterfalls, tides, wind and even the atom into energy. The transmitting mechanism of energy, that is machinery itself, would move toward automation and machines which self-regulate. But Bogdanov does not see this tendency developing within capitalist firms, because the outlay of investment is too dear, but rather in the militaries of capitalist countries who are not constrained by seeking short-term profits. In socialism, where society is focused on the long term wellbeing of people, first priority would be given to moving toward mechanical self-regulation, with ever-expanding machine energy utterly dwarfing any human labor inputs. Finally, Bogdanov predicted that wireless telephony would enable people to communicate instantly across any distance while improvements in transportation would make distance and geography no longer barriers to interchange at all.  All of this points toward socialism as a system where humanity as a whole, rather than a small minority, will be increasingly emancipated from nature.  

In exploring the social relations of production, Bogdanov says that the second defining characteristic of socialism is “the homogeneous organization of the whole productive system, with the greatest mobility of its elements and groupings, and a highly developed mental equality of the workers as universally developed conscious producers.” In practice, this means an end to the social division of labor and the development of worldwide central planning.  Bogdanov sees the nucleus of the end of the division of labor in capitalism’s tendency toward the de-skilling of workers. Increasingly, “the technical division of labor loses its “specialized” character, which narrows and limits the psychology of the workers, and reduces itself to “simple co-operation,” in which the workers carry out similar work, and in which the “specialization” is transferred from the worker to the machine.” This breaks down the division between people with different trades and makes the political community of interests among workers expand as their vital conditions become more and more the same in all fundamental ways. Furthermore, with the development of increasingly autonomous machines, the division between “executors” (the people carrying out labor) and “organizers” (the people directing it) will become superfluous as the day to day controlling of machines will take a more comprehensive education. Organizers and managers of labor will only be distinguished by having greater experience than executors and could be replaced by their fellow workers at will. Further, because the technical basis of production is constantly improved and will require more flexibility, workers will change their work regularly and no longer be bound to particular trades. Because socialism will abolish the chaos and anarchy of capitalist production it will necessarily create a central plan, centered around a great statistical bureau rather than an authoritarian security state, that coordinates labor on the basis of comradely discipline. In effect, for the first time in history socialism will solve the contradiction between the liberty of individuals to universally develop themselves and their equality as active members of the body politic.  

Turning from how the relations of production are to be organized to the relations of consumption, Bogdanov outlines the classical Marxist conception of a two-stage process. In Socialism, society as a whole will own all means of production and will initially own and distribute the proceeds of social labor, but individual ownership of the articles of consumption will also exist and represent the right of workers to reproduce themselves. Initially, during the transitional period before collectivism has penetrated the spirit of the great majority, remuneration based on work will be used to compel people to contribute to society. But, as culture changes and the process of production is humanized, access to the proceeds of labor will be free for all. To facilitate this Bogdanov sees in modern banks, stock exchange organizations, mutual aid societies, and insurance agencies as providing partial prototypes of the type of apparatus that will be developed in socialism. 

Beyond the relations of production, social relations will be fundamentally different in the world to come. In socialism, says Bogdanov, the first feature of the new psychology will be socialness and collectivism. Although we ourselves are socialized under conditions of competition and alienation, in a society based on comradely production will produce greater solidarity than we can imagine. The second feature is that fetishism will disappear from society. Whether fetishism of commodities and money, fetishism of nature, or superstition, all will become superfluous because, “The unknown will cease to be unknown because the process of acquiring knowledge – systematic organization on the basis of organized labor – will be accompanied by a consciousness of strength, a sense of victory, arising from the knowledge that in the living experience of man there are no longer any spheres surrounded by impenetrable walls of mystery.” By abolishing both the antagonistic relations between people and fetishism all social compulsion would come to end. Bogdanov argues that the Law and State emerge as a means to contain the anarchy and contradictions of class society through external force which takes on a fetishistic character. Fetishists root the power of the state in either divine authority or in “the nature of things,” but with the triumph of a universal science, Tektology, people won’t need to turn to such metaphysics to justify social relations. Instead of relying on fixed and abstract laws enacted through violence by “authorities” the people will collectively, democratically, and informed by science, deal with social contradictions directly. In extreme cases of violence or other anti-social behavior, “laws” and a carceral state would do far less good than having a highly organized community using its efforts to avoid harm to any party and science to cure the perpetrator. Even in the case of organizing production Bogdanov says, “The distribution of labor in society will be guaranteed on the one hand by the teachings of science and those who express them – the technical organizers of labor acting solely in the name of science, but having no power – and on the other by the power of the social sense which will bind men and women into one labor family by the sincere desire to do everything for the welfare of all.” It’s only in the early stages of a socialist society that a state in the true sense will exist because a state is nothing but an instrument of class domination. In the early stages of socialism, the state is the domination of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, but in its later stages, there can be no state. 

Under exchange society, social life is defined by inward contradictions like class struggle, market competition, and so on, while non-exchange societies are defined by an outward contradiction with nature. In feudalism and past non-class societies the primary economic contradiction existed between the needs of the population and what its environment could provide. As a self-sufficing economy, socialism is distinguished from its predecessors by not only its developed technical basis but also the far greater scale, embracing the whole of society and possibly humanity. Where in previous self-sufficient economies economic growth and technical development was determined directly by the growth in population, in socialism humanity will struggle to expand its knowledge and mastery of nature in order to fulfill its creative impulse. Socialism will not represent a regression to a steady-state economy but instead accelerate the accumulation of energy by humanity while maintaining the sensitive balance of our interchange with nature. Unlike in class society where the mass accumulation of energy has only led to the refinement of debauched classes of parasites and perverts, in socialism accumulated energy will be turned toward creative labor and self-perfection. Bogdanov further claims that the diversity of humanity, united, free and equal in socialism, will unlock a heretofore unseen capacity for progress that will dwarf the spurts of innovation seen in exchange-society. With profit removed as the motor force of economic organization, productivity will be the determining factor to save as much labor and as many resources as possible. The natural bureaucratic conservatism of capitalist firms against innovation on the ground level will be overcome and the whole of humanity will participate in expanding the sphere of development. In sum, “the general characteristics of the socialist system, the highest stage of society we can conceive, are: power over nature, organization, socialness, freedom, and progress.”

Looking around at the development of modern capitalist society, Bogdanov’s predictions have become so true as to almost seem banal. What skilled laborer doesn’t live in fear of being replaced by a self-regulating machine and so feel some pressure to learn new skills and gain new certifications in order to remain competitive? Who can imagine a world without wireless phones? Aren’t logistics companies already prefiguring the technical apparatus of socialist planning? If one is to believe texts like The People’s Republic of Walmart, all we have to do is put existing technical infrastructure under public control. Yet without transformation by subordination to the Co-Operative Commonwealth, this technical apparatus can only serve to increase the domination of workers by capitalism and continue to shift the externalities of production onto colonized people. Beyond the mere conquest of state power, socialism represents a dual revolution in both economics and culture. Having a clear vision of what that entails will allow us to prepare the revolutionary movement to exercise real power and take the necessary steps to get there. Bogdanov shows us how Socialism emerges in comradely relations in production and consumptive relations are secondary to it. He eschews fantasies of every worker having a mansion or luxury boat, while also rejecting the reactionary cowardice of those who would reign in humanity’s productive potential. Waste will be minimized in socialism, but our capacity for freedom, inextricably linked to our capacity to harness the energy, will not cease to grow. 

The aim of Socialism is the free association of producers in the commonwealth of toil. By rooting our understanding of it in an emancipated yet disciplined comradely cooperation of the whole of society to master nature we can dispense with utilitarian-reformist illusions, revenge fantasies, and other distractions. As the International Workingmen’s Association declared, there are “no rights without duties and no duties without rights.” Each person in the Co-Operative Commonwealth will be expected to apply their brain and muscle toward their shared collective good while receiving in return the means for their individual development. Even in a world of material abundance, social labor will increase its command over nature. One might balk at the idea of a “struggle with” or “mastery over” nature, but nature is nothing less than mankind’s external body and expanding our technical control over it as a species is no different than developing habits and techniques of self-discipline for the individual. In the face of climate disaster, there is no way for our species but forward toward assuming a mantle of responsibility for the health and direction of the biosphere. Humans have always been a geological force and it is time that we recognize it. This means reigning in the wasteful, blind, and inhuman economic order which must invent needs from thin air to bind our species under the wheel of dukkha. It means establishing conscious self-control over our world, what the Soviet geologist Vladimir Vernadsky proposed as the Noosphere: consciousness, rather than technology, as a geologic force. The ethics of the “luxury communist,” rooted in a crude middle-class communism of consumption, and “degrowth,” rooted in a middle-class skepticism of humanity are both inimical to working-class socialism. By seizing hold of production for itself, and aided by the universal sciences of Tektology and cybernetics, the working class will remake the world in its own image through the commonwealth of toil. 


Socially Organized Society: Socialist Society 

Transcribed from Chapter X of A Short Course of Economic Science, 10th edition, 1919. English translation J. Fineberg, 1923 by Adam Buick. 

The epoch of capitalism has not yet been completed, but the instability of its relations has become quite obvious. The fundamental contradictions of this system which are deeply undermining it, and the forces of development which are creating the basis of a new system, have also become quite clear. The main features of the direction in which social forces are moving have been marked out. It is, therefore, possible to draw conclusions as to what form the new system will take and in what way it will differ from the present system.

It may seem that science has no right to speak of what has not yet arrived and of what experience has not provided us with any exact example. But that is erroneous. Science exists precisely for the purpose of foretelling things. Of what has not yet been experienced it cannot, of course, make an exact forecast, but if we know generally what exists and in what direction it is changing then science must draw the conclusions as to what it will change into. Science must draw these conclusions in order that men may adapt their actions to circumstances, so that instead of wasting their efforts by working against the future and retarding the development of new forms, they may consciously work to hasten and assist such development.

The conclusions of social science with regard to future society cannot be exact because the great complexity of social phenomena does not permit, in our times, of their being completely observed in all details, but only in their main features, and for that reason the picture of the new system also can only be drawn in its main outlines; but these are the most important considerations for the people of the present day.

The history of the ancient world shows that human society may sometimes regress, decline, and even decay; the history of primitive man and also that of several isolated Eastern societies shows the possibility of a long period of stagnation. For this reason, from a strictly scientific point of view, the transition to new forms must be accepted conditionally. New and higher forms will appear only in the event of a society progressing further in its development as it has progressed up till now. There must be sufficient cause, however, for regression or stagnation, and these cannot be indicated in the life of modern society. With the mass of contradictions inherent in it and the impetuous process of life which they create, there cannot be stagnation. These inherent contradictions could cause retrogression only in the event of the absence of sufficient forms and elements of development. But such elements exist, and these very contradictions develop and multiply them. The productive power of man is increasing and even such a social catastrophe as a world war only temporarily weakens it. Furthermore, an enormous class in society growing and organizing is striving to bring about these new forms. For this reason, there are no serious grounds for expecting a movement backwards. There are immeasurably more grounds for believing that society will continue along its path and create a new system that will destroy and abolish the contradictions of capitalism.

1. Relation of Society to Nature

The development of machine technique in the period of capitalism acquired such a character of consecutiveness and activity that it is quite possible to determine its tendencies and consequently the further result of its development.

With regard to the first part of the machine – the source of motive power – we have already indicated the tendency, viz., the transition from steam to electricity, the most flexible, the most plastic, of all the powers of nature. It can easily be produced from all the others and be converted into all the others; it can be divided into exact parts and transmitted across enormous distances. The inevitable exhaustion of the main sources of steam power, coal, and oil, leads to the necessity for the transition to electricity, and this will create the possibility of making use of all waterfalls, all flowing water (even the tides of the oceans ), and the intermittent energy of the wind which can be collected with the aid of accumulators. A new and immeasurably rich source of electrical energy, infinitely superior to all other sources of electrical energy, has also been indicated, atomic energy, which is contained in all matter. Its existence has been scientifically proved, and its use even begun, although in a very small scale where it automatically releases itself (e.g. radium and other similar disintegrating elements). Methods for systematically releasing this energy have not yet been discovered; the new higher scientific technique will probably discover these methods and united humanity possess inexhaustible stocks of elemental power.

With regard to the transmitting mechanism, we also observe a tendency towards the automatic type of machine. Following this, we observe an even higher type – not only an automatically acting, but an automatically regulating machine. Its beginnings lie on the one hand in the increasing application of mechanical regulators to present-day machines, and on the other in the few mechanisms of this type already created by military technique (e.g., self-propelling submarines and air torpedoes). Under capitalism these will hardly find application for peaceful production: they are disadvantageous from the point of view of profits as they are very complicated and unavoidably dear; the amount of labor which they save in comparison with machines of the former type is not great, because automatic machinery also dispenses with a considerable amount of human labor. Furthermore, the workers required to work them must possess the highest intelligence; hence their pay also would have to be high, and their resistance to capital would be considerably greater. In war, there is no question of profits, and for that reason, these obstacles to their application do not arise. Under socialism the question of profits will disappear in production also; first consideration will be given to the technical advantages of self-regulating mechanism – which will render possible the achievement of a rapidity and exactness of work incomparably greater than that achieved by human organs, which work more slowly and with less precision, and moreover are subject to fatigue and error.

Furthermore, the number of machines and the sum total of mechanical energy will increase to such a colossal degree that the physical energy of men will become infinitesimally small in comparison. The powers of nature will carry out the executive work of man – they will be his obedient dumb slaves, whose strength will increase to infinity.

The technique of communication between men is of special significance. The rapid progress in this connection observed at the end of the capitalist epoch has been obviously directed to the abolition of all obstacles which nature and space place in the way of the organisation and compactness of humanity. The perfection of wireless telegraphy and telephony will create the possibility for people to communicate with each other under any condition, over any distance, and across all natural barriers. The increase in the speed of all forms of transportation brings men and the products of their labor more closely together than was ever dreamed of in the past century. And the creation of dirigible aircraft will make human communication completely independent of geographical conditions – the structure and configuration of the earth’s surface.

The first characteristic feature of the collective system is the actual power of society over nature, developing without limit on the basis of scientifically-organized technique.

2. The Social Relations of Production

As we saw, machine technique in the period of capitalism changes the form of co-operation in two ways. In the first place, the technical division of labor loses its “specialised” character, which narrows and limits the psychology of the workers, and reduces itself to “simple co-operation,” in which the workers carry out similar work, and in which the “specialization” is transferred from the worker to the machine. Secondly, the framework of this co-operation is extended to enormous proportions; there arise enterprises that embrace tens of thousands of workers in a single organization.

We must suppose that both these tendencies will proceed considerably further under the new system than under machine capitalism. The differences in the specialization of various industries will be reduced to such insignificant proportions that the psychological disunity created by the diversity of employments will finally disappear; the bonds of mutual understanding and the community of interest will unrestrainedly expand on the basis of the community of vital interests.

At the same time organized labor unity will grow accordingly, grouping hundreds of thousands and even millions of people around a common task.

The continuation of the development of the two previous tendencies will give rise to two new features of the post-capitalist system. On the one hand, the last and most stubborn form of specialization (the division between the organizational and executive functions), will be transformed and lose its significance. On the other hand, all labor groupings will become more and more mobile and fluid.

Although in the epoch of machine capitalism executive labor at the machines approaches in character to that of organizational labor, nevertheless a difference between them remains, and for that reason, the individualization of the functions of the executor and the organizer remains stable. The most experienced worker in machine production is very different from his manager, and cannot replace him. But the further increase in the complexity and precision of machinery and at the same time the increase in the general intelligence of the workers must eventually remove this difference. With the transition to the automatic regulators, the work of a simple worker approaches nearer and nearer to that of the engineer and acquires the character of watching the proper working of the various parts of the machine. If automatic regulators are attached to machines there is no need for the mechanic continually to watch his gauges and indicators to see whether the required amount of steam pressure or electrical current is maintained. All he then has to do is from time to time to see whether the regulators are in working order, to alter them as occasion requires, and to see to their speedy repair when necessary. At the same time the knowledge, understanding, ingenuity, and general mental development required of the worker increase. It is not only practical common sense that is required, but exact scientific knowledge of the mechanism, such as only the organizing intellectual possesses to-day. Consequently, the difference between the “executor” and the manager will be reduced to a purely quantitative difference in scientific training; the worker will then carry out the instructions of a better informed and more experienced comrade rather than blindly subordinate himself to a power-based upon knowledge inaccessible to him. The possibility will thus be created of replacing an organizer by any worker and vice versa. The labor inequality of these two types will disappear and they will merge into one.

With the abolition of the last survivals of mental “specialization” the necessity and the sense of binding certain persons to certain particular work will also disappear. On the other hand the new form of labor will require mental flexibility and diversity of experience, for the maintenance of which it will be necessary that the worker from time to time change his work, going from one kind of machine to another, from the function of “organizer” to that of “executor” and vice versa. And the progress of technique, more. rapid than in our day, with its continual improvements of machines and contrivances, must make the rapidly-changing grouping of human forces and individual labor systems, or “enterprises” as we call them today, to a high degree more mobile.

All this will become possible and realizable owing to the fact that production is consciously and systematically organized by society as a whole. On the basis of scientific experience and labor solidarity, there will be created a general all-embracing organization of labor. The anarchy which in the epoch of capitalism disunites individual enterprises by ruthless competition and whole classes by stern struggle will be abolished. Science indicates the path to such organization and devises means for carrying it out, and the combined force of the class-conscious workers will realize it.

The scale of the organization must from the very beginning be world-wide or nearly so, in order that it may not be dependent in its production and consumption upon exchange with other countries that do not enter it. The experience of the world war and the revolutions that followed it shows that such dependence will immediately be converted into a means of destroying the new system.

The type of organization cannot be other than centralized; not, however, in the sense of the old authoritarian centralism, but in the sense of scientific centralism. Its center should be a gigantic statistical bureau based on exact calculation for the purpose of distributing labor-power and instruments of labor.

The motive force of the organization at first, i.e., as long as the whole of society has not yet been trained in the spirit of collective labor, will be comradely discipline, including an element of compulsion, from which society will step by step emancipate itself.

In this system of production, each worker will be actually on an equality with the rest as conscious elements of one sensible whole; each one will be given all the possibilities for completely and universally developing his labor-power and the possibilities of applying it to the advantage of all.

Thus the characteristic features of the socialist society are the homogeneous organization of the whole productive system, with the greatest mobility of its elements and groupings, and a highly developed mental equality of the workers as universally developed conscious producers.

3. Distribution

Distribution generally represents an essential part of production, and in its organization is wholly dependent upon it. The systematic organization of production presupposes a systematic organization of distribution. The supreme organizer in both these spheres will be society as a whole. Society will distribute labor and also the product of that labor. This is the very opposite of the anarchic unorganized distribution which is expressed in exchange and private property conducted on the basis of competition and the crude conflict of interests. The social organization of production and distribution presupposes also the social ownership of the means of production and the articles of consumption created by social labor until society hands them over to the individual for his personal use. “Individual property” commences in the sphere of consumption which essentially is individualistic. This, of course, has nothing in common with capitalist private property, which is primarily the private ownership of means of production; but does not represent the right of the worker to the necessary means of existence.

The principle of distribution arises directly out of the basis of co-operation. As the system of production is organised on the basis that it secures to every member of society the possibility of the complete and universal development of his labor-power and the possibility of applying it for the use of all, so the system of distribution should give him the articles of consumption necessary for the development and application of labor-power. With regard to the method by which this is to be achieved, two phases may also be foreseen. At first, when the scale of production is not particularly great, and collectivism has not yet penetrated the spirit of every member of society, so that the elements of compulsion must yet be preserved, distribution will serve as a means of discipline: each one will receive a quantity of products in proportion to the amount of labor he has given to society. Later on, when the increase of production and the development of labor co-operation renders such careful economy and compulsion unnecessary, complete freedom of consumption will be established for the worker. Giving society all that he is able in strength and ability, society will give him all that he needs.

The complexity of the new method of organizing distribution must obviously be enormous and demand such developed statistical and informative apparatus as our epoch is far from having achieved. But even in our time, the elements exist in various spheres of economic life which should serve as the material for such apparatus. In the sphere of banking and credit, for instance, there are the agencies and committees of experts for studying the state of the market, stock exchange organization; in the labor movement, there are mutual aid societies, co-operative societies; and organized by the State are schemes of insurance. All these will have to be radically reformed before they can serve for the future system of distribution because at present they are wholly adapted to the anarchical system of capitalism and therefore subordinated to its forms. They may be described as the scattered rudimentary prototypes of the future harmonious system of distribution.

4. Social Ideology

The first feature of the social psychology of the new society is its socialness, its spirit of collectivism, and this is determined by the fundamental structure of that society. The labor compactness of the great human family and the inherent similarity in the development of men and women should create a degree of mutual understanding and sympathy of which the present-day solidarity of the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, the real representatives of future society, is only a weak indication. A man trained in the epoch of savage competition, of ruthless economic enmity between groups and classes, cannot imagine the high development between men of comradely ties that will be organically created out of the new labor relations.

Out of the real power of society over external nature and social forces there follows another feature of the ideology of the new world, the complete absence of all fetishism, the purity and clearness of knowledge and the emancipation of the mind from all the fruits of mysticism and metaphysics. The last traces of natural fetishism will disappear, and this will reflect the final overthrow of both the domination of external nature over man and the social fetishism reflecting the domination of the elemental forces of society; the power of the market and competition will be uprooted and destroyed. Consciously and systematically organizing his struggle against the elements of nature, social man will have no need for idols which are the personification of a sense of helplessness in the face of the insuperable forces of the surrounding world. The unknown will cease to be unknown because the process of acquiring knowledge – systematic organization on the basis of organized labor – will be accompanied by a consciousness of strength, a sense of victory, arising from the knowledge that in the living experience of man there are no longer any spheres surrounded by impenetrable walls of mystery. The reign of science will begin and put an end to religion and metaphysics forever.

As a result of the combination of these two features, we get a third feature, the gradual abolition of all standards of compulsion and of all elements of compulsion in social life.

The essential significance of all the compulsory standards – custom, law, and morals – consists in the regulation of the vital contradictions between men, groups, and classes. These contradictions lead to struggles, competitions, enmity, and violence, and arise out of the unorganized state and anarchy of the social whole. The standards of compulsion which society, sometimes spontaneously and sometimes consciously, has established in the struggle with the anarchy and the contradictions have become a fetish, i.e., an external power to which man has subjected himself as something higher, standing above him, and demanding worship or veneration. Without this fetishism, compulsory standards would not have the power over man to restrain the vital contradictions. The natural fetishist ascribes a divine origin to authority, law, and morals; the representative of social fetishism ascribes the origin to the “nature of things”; both mean to ascribe to them an absolute significance and a higher origin. Believing in the high and absolute character of these standards, the fetishist subjects himself to them and maintains them with the devotion of a slave.

When society ceases to be anarchical and develops into the harmonious form of a symmetrical organization, the vital contradictions in its environment will cease to be a fundamental and permanent phenomenon and will become partial and casual. Compulsory standards are a kind of “law” in the sense that must regulate the repeated phenomena arising out of the very structure of society; obviously, under the new system, they will lose this significance. Casual and partial contradictions amidst a highly-developed social sense and with a highly-developed knowledge can be easily overcome without the aid of special “laws” compulsorily carried out by “authority.” For instance, if a mentally-diseased person threatens danger and harm to others, it is not necessary to have special “laws” and organs of “authority” to remove such a contradiction; the teachings of science are sufficient to indicate the measures by which to cure that person, and the social sense of the people surrounding him will be sufficient to prevent any outbreak of violence on his part, while applying the minimum of violence to him. All meaning for compulsory standards in a higher form of society is lost for the further reason that with the disappearance of the social fetishism connected with them they also lose their “higher” form.

Those who think that the “State form,” i.e., a legal organization, must be preserved in the new society because certain compulsory laws are necessary, like that requiring each one to work a certain number of hours per day for society, are mistaken. Every State form is an organization of class domination and this cannot exist where there are no classes. The distribution of labor in society will be guaranteed on the one hand by the teachings of science and those who express them – the technical organizers of labor acting solely in the name of science, but having no power – and on the other by the power of the social sense which will bind men and women into one labor family by the sincere desire to do everything for the welfare of all.

Only in the transitional period, when survivals of class contradictions still exist, is the State form at all possible in the “future State.” But this State is also an organization of class domination; only it is the domination of the proletariat, which will abolish the division of society into classes and together with it the State form of society.

5. Forces of development

The new society will be based not on exchange but on natural self-sufficing economy. Between production and consumption of products, there will not be the market, buying and selling, but consciously and systematically organized distribution.

The new self-sufficing economy will be different from the old primitive communism, for instance, in that it will embrace not a large or a small community, but the whole of society, composed of hundreds of millions of people, and later of the whole of humanity.

In exchange societies, the forces of development are “relative over-population,” competition, class struggle, i.e., in reality, the inherent contradictions of social life. In the self-sufficing societies referred to above, tribal and feudal societies, the forces of development are based upon “relative over-population,” i.e., the outward contradictions between nature and society, between the demands for the means of life arising out of the growth of the population and the sum of these means which nature in a given society can supply.

In the new self-sufficing society the forces of development will also lie in the outward contradictions between society and nature, in the very process of struggle between society and nature. Here the slow process of over-population will not be required to induce man still further to perfect his labor and knowledge: the needs of humanity will increase in the very process of labor and experience. Each new victory over nature and its mysteries will raise new problems in the highly-organised mentality of the new man, sensitive to the slightest disturbance and contradiction. Power over nature means the continual accumulation of the energy of society acquired by it from external nature. This accumulated energy will seek an outlet and will find it in the creation of new forces of labor and knowledge.

The new forces of development arising out of the struggle with nature and of the labor experience of man operate the more strongly and rapidly the wider and more complex and diverse this experience is. For this reason, in the new society with its colossally wide and complex system of labor, with its numerous ties uniting the experience of the most diverse (although equally developed) human individualities, the forces of development must create such rapid progress as we in our day can hardly imagine. The harmonious progress of future society will be much more intensive than the semi-spontaneous progress, fluctuating between contradictions, of our epoch.

All economic obstacles to development will be abolished under the new system. Thus, the application of machinery, which under capitalism is determined by considerations of profit, under the new system will depend entirely upon productivity. As we have seen, machinery which may be very useful for saving labor is very frequently useless from the standpoint of capitalist profits. In socialist society, such a point of view will not prevail and there will, therefore, be no obstacles to the application of labor-saving machinery.

The forces of development which will dominate at this stage will not be new forces; they will have operated previously. In the natural self-sufficing system, however, these forces were suppressed by the general conservatism prevailing in it; under capitalism they are suppressed by virtue of the fact that the classes which take for themselves the product of surplus labor, i.e., the main source of the forces of development of society, do not participate in the direct struggle with nature, do not conduct industry personally, but through others, and consequently remain outside the influence of the forces created in the struggle.

Under socialism, however, the sum total of surplus labor will be employed by the whole of society and every member will directly participate in the struggle against nature. Consequently, the main and greatest driving force of progress will act unhindered and at top speed, not through a select minority, but through the whole of humanity, and the sphere of development must increase unceasingly.

Thus the general characteristics of the socialist system, the highest stage of society we can conceive, are: power over nature, organization, socialness, freedom, and progress.

The Party, the Just City, and the Sacred Fire

Latest from Cold and Dark Stars. To pursue an emancipatory politics that can address planetary climate change, one must answer the question of “what is the good life?” Yet for this question to be intelligible, a Polis that understands its relation to the cosmos, prefigured by the Party, is necessary. 

A  mural from 1943 called Endocrinology by Montreal artist Marian Dale Scott.

I

We live in an epoch that is morally and intellectually mediocre. The State simply exists as a machine that administers commercial and interest groups under a squalid scheme of rule of law and private property. Being a “good politician” today means being the most effective at winning elections, and in this mercenary society where money and moral manipulation move everything, a politician that “wins elections” inevitably ends up being a virtueless person. Sometimes, this mercenary aspect of politicians is not only evident in their thirst for power and their capacity for lying, for saying what certain interest groups want to hear, but also in their stomach for violence. Many of these individuals are willing to carpet bomb entire cities simply to win the next election. The labyrinthine nature of this coordinating machine prevents common people from accessing it. Only those who are animated by mercenary purposes end up acquiring the positioning to navigate and capture the State.

The question of the “good life” does not exist in political discourse, for the political limelight is a concatenation of micro-discussions about business and demographic interests, and when a general idea is invoked, in place of flourishing as a collective activity, a spurious and violent universality is summoned, such as nationalism or rule of law.

This environment corrupts even the most virtuous of activists. For in order to mobilize against this infernal machinery, it is necessary to package actions into discrete interests that can be absorbed by the State. One may focus on climate change, trade unions, or police brutality, but the question of the “good life” is not the ultimate root of these themes. This is not because activists do not have vision, but because the fragmentary realities of the State and this society conspire against a conception of the interrelation of the Universe.

Science has demonstrated the ancient intuitions of the Daoists that the Universe is made of fluxes and potentialities, and that each one of us contains the whole World within. A human being is affected by electric, nuclear, and gravitational fields that are emitted by creatures and other entities in its surroundings; for example, the light of a star that has extinguished millions of years ago can affect our destiny today. Isn’t this causal nexus evident when clairvoyants inform their civilizations of the misfortunes reflected in the heavens?

The problem of climate change demonstrates this reality in the most intense and brutal manner, since the cumulus of interpenetrations between economic activity, the atmosphere, life, and the sun attacks us with the whole force of the Real: the mortal blow delivered against us by the assemblage of the living, the inert, and the economic.

The necessary social change that will bring flourishing and liberty is linked to being able to act in such a manner so that we can comprehend the World as it is, a totality of interrelated processes rather than the logical atoms that the Anglo-Saxon intellectuals pretend we are. This capacity to act in tandem with the consciousness of cosmic order (disorder) needs to be based in honesty and transparency, for only on the basis of democratic relations can such a movement self-comprehend itself as what it really is: a community of creatures connected between themselves and the Universe, but at the same time each creature (human or non-human) is a being capable of creating itself on the basis of the whole World contained in its heart-mind (xin).1 Once this community acquires this understanding, they will be able to act in coordination with the nature of the Universe, the latter an interwoven nexus of Mind, Matter, Liberty, and Causality. If the links that unite the creatures in this movement are turbid and corrupted, and the members cannot relate to each other in an honest and egalitarian manner, then the community will not be able to process the Universe (including themselves) in a sufficiently optimal manner to be able to act on the basis of the true structure of Being.

We will call the community born in this Modern Era that wishes to respond to the question of the “good life” on the basis of an understanding of the organic Universe the Party. The Party prefigures the potential polis where the corporeal and mental bipolarity of Being is accepted, and where the capacity for self-creation of each creature in the Universe is recognized, in other words, the Party affirms the True Science. Doesn’t an electron act with a free creativity when it chooses a position or velocity in an indeterminate manner given the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics? The Party also acknowledges that the actual and past Universe is contained within the heart-minds (xin) of the partisans. Sometimes the idea contained in this Party is referred to as socialism, communism, or democratic republicanism. Furthermore, we recognize that the principal enemy of the Party is the Union between capitalists and technocrats that treat the human being as a simple individual separated from the Universe, conceiving of the human as only an automatic machine. Furthermore, that Falsity does not recognize the interrelation and self-creativity of all the beings in the World, and that is why it treats the planet like a mere warehouse of demographics, energy, commodities, and business interests that need to be administered by a reduced elite of industry captains and politicians. Falsity recognizes these latter beings as philosopher-kings.

II

Some words on Falsity. Falsity is the nexus of historical forces that conspire to organize a society that pretends humanity is separated within itself and from the rest of the Universe. Falsity engages in this conspiracy while it preaches a false materialism that is often referred to as “scientism”. Here lies the paradox: scientific fact understands the interpenetration of the universe (fields, nonlinearities, systems, etc.), but Falsity, basing itself in “scientism” preaches atomism and reductionism (individualism, biologically reductive explanations of race and gender, univariate linear correlations, etc.)

The material structure of this Falsity can be felt in the forests converted into plots, in the transfiguration of communal discourse into technocratic administration, and artisanal labor transformed into offices and levers. However, the total profundity of this Falsity cannot be grasped in a couple of sentences, for it reaches the ontological heart of this infernal reality.

A way to land the airplane of metaphysics on the land of corporeal Being is to historicize Falsity. One of the axes of this perspective is the historical record of the Party in its confrontation against Falsity. We shall focus only on the Western manifestations of the Party. This focus will form an incomplete history, for the Party belongs to the whole World. However, Falsity as Separation probably emerged first in the West, and therefore, a Western history will make some of the primordial structures of Separation intelligible. The Party today exists only as a potentiality, but it has been an actual occasion during various periods of Modernity, confronting Falsity.

The central sprouting of Falsity that has given coherence to its other manifestations was the enclosing of the commons: the traumatic proletarianization of the European peasantry, and the parcellation of the communal resources (e.g. forests, lands) into liquid rectangular plots that could be sold and bought. This False aspect emerged first in the 17th century in England, only to contaminate all corners of the planet in the ensuing centuries. On this occasion the plans that outline how Falsity will come to dominate are made manifest: Evil will turn the World into an altar perpetually flooded with blood, where all creatures will be sacrificed for the formation of rectangular plots and liquid treasures that will be accumulated and exchanged.

In the 19th century in Europe, this sacrificial altar began to be populated by monstrous machines that devoured proletarians: those factories that emitted fumes from their chimneys. The wheels and gears grew as they consumed the flesh and bones of human beings (Marx). Entire forests were destroyed to feed these machines with lumber, ethnic groups were displaced and exterminated to convert what was once the home of creatures into polygons of wheat.

The Eternal Return (Nietzsche) actualizes entities from the past within Separation, for historical objects are embedded in the substance of the present. For example, Separation unearthed Roman legalism from thousands of years in the past. Roman Legalism with its iron rules and private property structure the foundations of Modernity. These Roman laws, which were used to displace creatures (e.g. Gauls) and produce plots and booty for the Empire two thousand years ago, emerge in early Modernity as a catastrophic thunder.

This Roman Falsity emerged in Modernity against first the European peasants: the latter were unrooted from the land and converted into atomized and salaried entities, and their lands turned into rectangular plots that could be bought and sold. Once these methods of Separation were perfected in Europe, the same technique of Separation was used to transform the homes of human and non-human creatures in the Americas, Africa, and Asia into storages of treasures and slaves.

In this historical outline, we can see the False principles of Separation and understand the subsequent cataclysms of the West. Furthermore, with this outline, we can also comprehend the Party that emerges to oppose this Falsity. One of the actualizations of the Party flourishes in the second half of the 19th century, with Marx as its principal theorist. The Party did not only emerge to combat the Enemies of the Partisans (the bourgeois state with its soldiers, police, factories, and False intellectuals) but also attempted to form the community that prefigures the solution to the problem of Separation. In Germany, the activists of this Party began to refer each other as comrades, reflecting the desire to acquire the Unity of the Ancient Polis (filtered through the French Revolution). They created reading and sports clubs and formed trade unions: they tried to collect the fragments of peasant ruin in order to weave the proletariat into a prefigured community, into a polis. We also know that the evolution of this Party was mutilated by Falsity: by sexism, racism, and even a jingoism that would end up destroying the Party in the First World War. However, we can say that within this movement there was a Party that searched for an answer to the question of the “good life”.

I do not want to elaborate on the history of the workers’ movement in the 20th century, which was undoubtedly part of the Party’s history. This history has already been told too many times. However, I want to say a couple of words on what was the peak of Separation, the concentration of Evil and Falsity in its most pure form: National Socialism. This subject is important beyond academic curiosity, for it echoes in our collective consciousness as socialists since one of the obsessions of National Socialism was to annihilate the Party materially and spiritually. This obsession was part of the same assemblage that contained antisemitism, imperialism and white supremacy, for these three processes cannot be separated: they all emerge from the same malevolent root of Separation. Furthermore, National Socialism not only stands within the consciousness of Western Civilization as the Great Evil but also as a latent possibility, for our World-Spirit shares the same primal matter of Separation as National Socialism. Today, National Socialism is treated as a particularity of mid 20th century Germany, a singular horror. However, National Socialism was merely an occasion of acute Separation that lay within the heart-mind of Western Civilization, and that involved a practice which had been refined since the beginnings of Modernity (with the return of the Roman Armored Monster).

National Socialism not only united in annihilation and bloodbath all the primary processes of this accursed civilization, but it is also crystalized in our material structures, and therefore, it is an immanent process of this civilization. The future could reactivate this crystalized part in our material code, and mutate it into an even more monstrous process.

The first thing to note is that there are three principal ideas that define National Socialism: antisemitism, hatred for the Party, and imperial obsession for territorial expansion. The first instance is known by the average middle schooler, but the latter two are rarely elucidated in a clear manner. National Socialism, when it emerged on the streets of the 1920s, was a combat machine specialized in attacking and killing members of the workers’ movement: this machinery manifested in the famous brown shirts. When the Nazis took power, socialists and communists were among the more prominent victims of torture, extermination, and imprisonment. Hitler’s obsession against the communists was so profound, his ontological hatred so obsessive, that he waged a war of extermination against the Soviet Union, for this state represented to Hitler one of the greatest expressions of the Party (even if, in reality, the Soviet Union was also infected by the Lie of Separation). The Nazis hated the Party because the latter represented the immanence of all the humans and the World: the materialism that left all humans on the same existential plane, shoulder to shoulder, in the same continuity with atoms. In opposition, Nazi transcendentalism imposed a vertical order where whites were the “most human”, and hence, had the divine right (that they cloaked in pseudo-scientific blather) of dominating the Earth and all its beings, since the Whites were closer to the infinite heavens while the rest of the entities were chained to ground. The acquisition of absolute power was the White’s destiny.

This False ontology of the Whites as infinite beings destined to be imperial sovereigns of Earth, and the perception of a Party as the force that represents the immanent humans and the finite Universe, brings us to the subject of antisemitism. Like we said, the Nazis used transcendental theology masked as science, where a scientific-secular God imposed a “natural” order from outside. This vertical and Separated order, where humans were parcelled into nations/races and structured into a line that emerged from the ground toward the heavens, would undoubtedly contain an ontology of an enemy. This enemy is defined as the one that opposes this natural law. The Party was an enemy to this False order, for it preached that all humans are an assemblage of particles, and therefore there was no transcendental order that hierarchized them. However, the Jew, who since the medieval era has been seen as the Other of Christendom, emerged in the Modern Falsity as the Other of natural law. Natural law, rooted in blood and soil, the infinite, and vertical orders, saw the Jew as an exemplar of immanent processes of modernity. The Jew was spuriously associated with the lack of nations, financial crisis, and the other finite, modern, and material aspects that destabilized the False order of secular, modern Christians.2

However, this concept of the Jew cannot be separated from imperialism and the racial-imperial order, for this secular theology has abandoned the transcendental God only in form but not content, incorporating the Jew into the racial ontology of the Nazis. In other words, the same society that divides humans into Aryans, Blacks, and Slavs, ordering them vertically, subsumes the Jew into this order. This theology where the Earth and its creatures are made to be dominated by the Aryans, subsumes the rest of this parcelled humanity (such as Jews, Slavs, and Indigenous peoples) into a destiny in an evil racial utopia, this destiny being displacement, enslavement, and finally, annihilation. We must reiterate that this racial order was not invented by the Nazis, that the pro-empire liberals that expanded their destructive machinery in India and America had designed this spurious order, as evidenced by the hagiographic references of Hitler to the Amerindian genocide and the colonization of India. The concentration camps and the planned genocide were already in the material memory of the Europeans.3 National Socialism is simply the methods that were previously applied in America and India but mixed with the technocratic rationality of late modernity. Churchill, that imperialist and defender of white supremacy, was only separated from Hitler by the thickness of a paper. This ontological kinship was first recognized by Hitler since, before the war, he expected Great Britain to unite with him under a banner of white supremacy and hatred for Bolshevism.

In National Socialism, then, we see Separation and Falsity in their most acute manifestation. The material Separation between human and human, human and creature, human and universe, and finally Subject and Object, culminate in an explosion of a magnitude never before beheld by Earth.

The Party opposes this calamitous Separation that created National Socialism with the immanent interpenetration of all entities in the Cosmos.

III

The Eternal Return uses the material memory of the Roman Empire, with its legalism, great estates, large concentration of slaves, and imperial methods of extermination in order to structure Falsity within Modernity. The legal structure of private property was intimately connected with the imperial dynamic of Rome, for the legal concept of “empty thing” (res nullus) denoted the rules and conditions where a citizen could transform land into property by virtue of it being “unoccupied”. This Roman assemblage was catapulted into actuality through the Eternal Return, and it became involved in the massacres, conquests, and misfortunes of Modernity.

However, within our material memory, in the past that serves as primary substance of actuality, there are fragments of Being. In the same way we used the history of classical civilizations to unearth the Roman armored monster (Falsity), we can feel Being itself in the Greek legacy. This palpation produces the example of the democratic polis. The democratic polis, as a historical example of the apprehension of Being, helps us prefigure the structure of the potential Party. The content of the democratic polis can be analyzed from the ontological level to the political.

At the political level, Ellen Meiksins Wood4 has described how the polis enters into the prefiguration of the Party. According to Wood, Athens should not be understood as only a slave society, where free people based their own liberty in its negation within slaves. The Athenian democracy was a democracy of free producers, such as peasants and artisans. Finley argues that it was through class struggle that the peasantry was able to gain its liberty and citizenship rights and constrain the power of the landlords. This class struggle structured the State in a peculiar manner where the poor could leverage their citizenship in their favor. For example, according to Wood, the Greek landlords could only own small plots of land, and they could never acquire the great concentration of land and slaves that the Roman aristocracy could since the democratic structures of Athens prevented such concentration. This configuration birthed one of the most peculiar states in the West, one that was not used to extract surplus from the Athenian peasants. In other words, the slaves that existed were domestic, urban, or worked in mines, and the self-reproduction of society was in the hands of a free peasantry.

This freedom led to the famous direct democracy of the Athenian polis. The central legislative-executive body was the assembly and many of the officials were assigned either by vote or lot. This social structure was described by Plato in his Protagoras dialogue, where the reality of cobblers becoming judges is discussed openly.

This political aspect of the polis is famous and has been an inspiration for revolutionaries throughout history. However, the political aspect can only be understood in its totality not only as a formal political process but as a mode of life rooted in a correct ontology that palpated some of the surfaces of Being. This mode of life palpated Being by attempting to answer the question of what is the “good life’.

What makes this mode of life so special? Macintyre tries to answer this question by asking himself what makes it possible for the Athenians to raise the issue of the good life, in contrast to the present incoherence of that issue. MacIntyre finds the uniqueness of this mode of life in the self-consciousness of the internal interrelation of its entities (a consciousness that palpates Being), in contrast with the false self-consciousness of entities as discrete and separated. He refers to this self-consciousness as “practice”. MacIntyre describes Greek politics as a practice where the participants search for the practice’s internal goods.

Chess is a good exemplar of a practice with internal goods. The most excellent internal good of chess is victory within the game, and such a victory can only be acquired by following the rules of the game in an honorable manner. Of course, there are external goods that the victorious player can benefit from, such as fame and wealth. However, it is sensible to say that the majority of people that initially practice chess do not engage in it to enrich themselves, but rather out of love of the practice. To foment the excellence of the practice it is necessary to demand certain virtues from the players. For example, it is necessary that players are honest, and that the arbiters of the game are just, so that they apply the rules impartially. This is where virtues such as honesty, justice, and courage become necessary qualities to acquire excellence in all practices.

According to Macintyre, politics for the Greeks was a practice. The practice of the polis was structured around the question of the “good life”. The response to that question is found in the excellence of practicing politics in the context of a community of free and self-governing citizens. But all these components of practice, such as the intelligibility of the good life and excellency can only be comprehended as interpenetrated aspects of a mode of life, and cannot be separated analytically. This impossibility of analyticity is not only contained in arguments but is also within the qualities of the human being, for this being cannot persist as an individual atom, and therefore the modern doctrines that see ethical options as a function of individual autonomy, such as Kantianism or emotivism, produce an incoherent and self-deceiving life. Without the formation of a practice, politics degenerates into mercenarism, for the individuals seek external goods such as fame and power. This mercenary mode of life defines contemporary politics.

The defendants of contemporary liberalism will argue that the State cannot and should not respond to the question of the “good life”, for the answer to this inquiry is different for each individual. However, for Macintyre, this is a deception, and this argument forms part of the mercenary nature of liberalism. At the end of the day, the individuals, even the socially atomized individuals of today, still inquire about the nature of the good “life”, and outside the polis, the answers to these questions end up being incompatible: for example, those who are in favor of abortion contradict those who are not, and the State ends up violating the supposed neutrality of its position (generally for purely mercenary reasons, such as politicians wanting to win elections). In a few words, for Macintyre Greek politics are characterized by a practice that penetrates different beings of the polis, and this network of signification formed the structure where the question of the good government and good life is rendered possible. Embedded in this context, philosophers such as Aristotle could create rational arguments for the purpose of human life, for this scientific rationality was embedded in a mode of life that made the argument intelligible.

If we consider Plato’s Republic as a faithful description of the typical philosophical conversations that appeared in ancient Athens, the lack of controversy around the axiomatic assumptions that are uttered becomes impressive. For example, Socrates and his interlocutors assume with frequency the existence of functions and teleologies for objects and creatures, inclusively entities that have no creator, such as human beings, animals, body parts, etc. By telos I mean that, analogously to the purpose of a hammer being to hammer excellently, for the ancient Greek, the ear has the purpose of hearing excellently, and humans the purpose of the excellent life. These ideas are controversial in a contemporary philosophical discussion, but in antiquity they are as basic as lunar cycles. What is most impressive is that on the basis of these assumptions, the characters of these dialogues elaborate a rational and scientific discourse on subjects such as justice and the good, subjects that today are considered completely incompatible with science. In the lessons of Aristotle, one can see this scientific attitude on the issues of morality in his incisive and cold prose.

The principal condition that generates the intelligibility for a “science of the good” is interpenetration. For example, a hammer has a purpose only in the context of a world full of workshops and tools, where an interpenetration between the hammer, the human that hammers (such as a carpenter) and the other equipment (such as nails and tables). Therefore, the intelligibility of the question of the good life, which would be the purpose of the human being, only exists when the interpenetration within a community, and between the community and the Universe, are comprehended. But this understanding is not merely a speculative-intellectual activity, for comprehension only emerges when one lives in a manner where the interpenetration becomes evident. For example, due to the fact that Western societies are slaves to the Falsity of Separation, it is impossible for them to ask the question of the good life. Socrates in the Republic implies this point, where Justice and the Good can only be understood in light of the interwovenness: in reply to the indagations of Glaucon about injustice, Socrates is compelled to describe a city-in-speech, where the interwovenness between humans is made explicit, in order to elucidate the Good in a manner that would be impossible in a context with only a single soul. Finally, the civic context of post-Socratic philosophy, the one of democratic Athens, invokes tantalizing questions. The Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics did not emerge in an oligarchy such as Sparta, but in Athens, one of the most democratic societies of Western antiquity. Here we receive another hint on the nature of the community that asks the question of the Good, and this is the democratic republic. Such a polis is the only community-form that is sufficiently self-conscious of interpenetration to elaborate on the Good Life.

In order to understand this interconnection within the polis, it is necessary to understand how the Greeks intuited their own relationship with the Universe, and only in that way can we begin to resolve the puzzle of the question of the Good Life. According to the ancient Greeks, the same method of deducing the truths of the natural sciences can be applied to investigate ethical truths, and therefore, the distinction between what is and what ought to be collapses. For the Greeks, the same laws that regulate the Universe also regulate the human being. The divine fire, the logos that orders the cosmos is the same logos that orders the human soul. An exemplar of this attitude is the ancient Stoics.

The Stoics5 discovered immanence, in other words, the different aspects of the Universe were not stratified in a hierarchy but were interwoven. For the Stoics, the Universe is composed of two increated principles (archai). The first one is inert matter. The second is pneuma, the sacred fire that animates the otherwise inert matter, and it is identified with reason. God is associated with the pneuma as the eternal Reason. God is a vital fire, the sperm that contains the first principles, the seed from whence the Universe flourishes. God is a corporeal and organic entity that spreads outwardly, penetrating and animating matter, and as an organism, it flourishes, reproduces, and withers, concatenating the Universe in a series of word-cycles. The Eternal Return is identified by the Stoics, in the same way it was identified by Nietzche thousands of years later: past occasions of the world-cycles have the potentiality of actualizing in the present: the global warming that terminated with the last glacial period, the imperialism and private property of the Romans, the extinction events that annihilate species in an instant, and the holocaust of the indigenous of America actualized in Auschwitz.

The divine fire is the immanent substance that gives form to otherwise inanimate objects, that makes plants blossom, and that forms the soul of animals and the reasoning of human-animals. Finally, the fire contains the Universal in its expansive movement and the Particular in its contractive motion. In other words, the immanent substance of God folds and moulds itself into the differences and granularity that we see in the Universe, that idea that the Eternal Return implemented in the brain of Spinoza.

It is important to understand that the pneuma is a substance of elastic, corporeal, and mobile properties, and not something that transcends this world. The human being is structured by this substance, and therefore the same fire that animates its actions is the same divine light that makes plants blossom and that supports the firmness of planets. However, this fire takes the shape of reason in the human being, and this defines human nature.

This is the context where the question of the Good life develops for the Stoics. The question of the Good life can only be answered not only when the human being is understood as inhabiting a polis, but at the same time, where God, the divine fire, penetrates all human beings and embeds them in the same divine network alongside the trees and planets, while at the same time constitutes all these entities. The Stoics saw the good life as living in accordance to this nature, and did not make a distinction between what is and what ought.

This recognition of the qualities of immanence and interpenetration as fundamental aspects of the Universe, and at the same time, the context that must be recognized and lived in accordance with in order to uncover the Good, are not contributions unique to the Greeks. Historical materialism recognizes that similar modes of life can emerge in different spatial and temporal coordinates (exemplifying eternal return): for example, it’s probable that certain pre-Columbian communities in the modern-day Americas approximated themselves to the democratic polis, where these peoples recognized the immanence between them and the Universe. This can be seen in the democratic communities that emerged in North America, such as those that grouped themselves around the famous Haudenosaunee confederation. Some of these federations maintained a sacred fire in their capitals, where representatives of different peoples swore to keep their word before the spirits. It may be that the Eternal Return transformed the pneuma of the stoics into the sacred fire that animated these peoples, or vice versa.

IV

However, the Greeks were also affected by Separation to the point that their palpation of Being was fatally constrained. Politically, this was evident in the existence of a slavery predicated on democratic citizenship, and in the complete abjection of women. The mortal malaises of that society were reflected in the metaphysics of their Universe: even if they recognized the interpenetration of the Universe, and some (like the Stoics) had inclusively discovered immanence, their Universe was carceral, lacking freedom. The divine fire, the seed, or God, was subject to iron laws. In spite of the discovery by some Greek philosophers of the freedom immanent in matter, such as that of Epicurus and his famous “swerve”, the latter a process where a particle that moved in a straight line could suddenly change its trajectory, the Universe of ancient Greeks was a deterministic one. Whitehead6 7 speculates that this deterministic Universe was correlated with the tragical temperament of the Greeks, that culture that invented the modern tragedy: the perspective that the misfortunes of humans were produced by a necessary and pitiless destiny. Furthermore, Whitehead argued that the mechanistic (and False) Universe of the Enlightenment was rooted in this Greek attitude, an attitude they inherited from the Church’s schoolmen in a dissected and mutated form.

The false aspects of Ancient Greece, like determinism, slavery, and patriarchy, show that it is not possible to assume that the ancients were closer to Being, which was a fatal mistake Heidegger made. Even without assuming a teleology of history, it is probable that the misfortunes and class struggles that actualized after Antiquity were necessary for the formation of a Party that could fight for the freedom of everyone, and therefore, against Falsity. The Party contains the potentiality of a Just City illuminated by the rays of Being, transcending the Separated Greek example.

For Whitehead, the Greek model of immanence can only be completed when recognizing another fundamental aspect of the Universe: Creativity. Continental philosophers baptized this aspect as Freedom. Yet, for modern Westerners, in as much as Freedom is accepted as ontologically real, it is often only aligned with the Mind, with the material world outside our consciousness being assumed as slave to principles and propositions. The Cartesian philosophers were so mutilated by Separation, that they had to design an ontology of fragmentation, where freedom was caged inside Mind (freedom of will) and the extended matter was subject to a pitiless destiny. For example, Kant argued that freedom was part of that noumenal reality beyond perception, for the phenomenal reality of the sciences was subject to necessary laws: he changed the iron bars for gold bars, but without transforming the carceral nature of Western ontology. Creativity is contained in the interior of the Mind, where liberty inevitably withers and dies. The only hope these Christians had was Death, for only the decay of their corpses was capable of unchaining & releasing their spirits into the heavens, outside this miserable matter-world they considered inert.

However, the incarceration of freedom inside the Mind is one of the Falsities of Separation. There is no evidence, whether philosophical or scientific, that negates freedom as inherent to the Universe, even with simple particles such as electrons or quarks. The modern version of determinism in the Universe was first based on the Cartesian theories of matter, and today in a vulgar interpretation of Newtonian Physics. The contemporary ontologies begin with the arbitrary judgments that our minds can be reduced to inert matter, instead of assuming that mind may be ontologically basic, and interwoven with matter. In other words, there is no reason to not assume that mental processes are immanent to the Universe: an attribute interwoven with the corporeal, where the mental does not only penetrate the consciousness of humans but is also inherent to such a simple entity as an electron. This does not mean that the mental processes of an electron are as complicated as ours, but that the assumption of ex nihilo actualization of human mentality is arbitrary and not based on empirical evidence. Even the most modern version of this determinism, that sees Mind as the complex emergence of matter is rooted in ex nihilo, since even when the phrase ex nihilo is replaced by “complex emergence” the division between Mind and Matter is still assumed, albeit in a more confusing manner.

Inclusively in the formal methods of physics indeterminism is inherent. For example, in quantum objects, it is impossible to exactly predict position and velocity given that Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle makes quantum physics fundamentally probabilistic. In other words, an electron does not behave as a billiard ball but can choose between possible futures, even if all these futures are rooted in its past. Even in the macroscopic context, the majority of the systems are chaotic, or in other words, they are so sensitive to their initial conditions that their future cannot be computed. In general, a more complex system than that of two particles that interact is chaotic (for example, a system made of two planets and a star). Therefore, the combination of chaos and quantum physics leads to a Universe that is fundamentally undetermined, for the quantum effects that make the positions of electrons and quarks undetermined propagate to the macroscopic level of animals and planets due to the extreme sensibility of initial conditions.

For Whitehead, causality should not be understood as something necessary, as a process that should be deduced from first principles. Instead, causality is a judgment process where entities decide, based on their past, the manner in which they will actualize. In other words, an electron judges how to actualize itself in the future based on the interpenetrations of all entities in the universe, and although this judgment has an element of non-determination, it is not a process that is totally unconstrained and free and must be partly a function of the occasion of the past. The ontological method of Whitehead is fundamentally that of empathy, instead of assuming that non-human entities, like slugs, the stars or the climatic system, are fundamentally different from us, it’s more fruitful to expand the concept of our experience into the interior lives of these entities. By doing so, many of the tensions of modern philosophy, such as subject-object, mind-matter, and religion-science, are resolved.

My wife S1gh3org summarized the problem that the freedom of matter poses to humanity in the following manner. We thought we were masters and suzerains of the Earth, but today we face the planet’s vengeance: the climate-system rebels against our spurious sovereignty, and our pretensions of knowledge of this World collapse. Instead of dwelling on the Earth in a manner that allows the trees, the creatures, and the clouds to interweave with us, and opening our heart-minds to the sacred fire, we conceive of ourselves as Minds separated from the rest of the Universe, perceiving the Earth as a simple storage of treasure that must be ransacked and manipulated.

Now that we account for the free nature of matter, we can come back to the question of the democratic republic, unearthed by our Athenian example. What makes the democratic republic the ideal form, outside these empirical examples? The democratic republic organizes itself as a fractal of the Universe itself, and therefore palpates Being. First, the democratic republic exists in a plane of immanence, where there is no hierarchical, transcendental authority that shapes the polis, no Emperor appointed by the Heavens, no technocrat appointed by Expertise. In the Universe, there is no hierarchy of energy nor matter, no special value appointed to the stars or creatures with opposable thumbs. Difference appears from relations, it is not imposed by outer hierarchies. Second, the democratic republic acknowledges the interrelation of human beings. Democratic deliberation can only appear where entities acknowledge their interwovenness in a greater structure, but at the same time acknowledge the differentiation between themselves. The republic, the Just City, should organize itself as a fractal of the Universe itself, where entities are interwoven by fields, even if the entities themselves have a degree of differentiation. Third and finally, the democratic republic acknowledges the freedom of its creatures, which is isomorphic to the freedom of matter.

V

The Party is the potential community that promises to combat Separation and to create the conditions where the question of the Good can be pronounced, and consequently, resolved. The question of the Good becomes imperative since the form of life that we uncritically maintain is leading us into a mortal collision with the planet, that will not only cause the annihilation of creatures due to droughts, fires, hurricanes, and floods but will also lead to chain reactions that will dislocate economic, social and food systems on which the reproduction of humankind depends. Here is where the destructive part of the planet’s freedom manifests: a stochastic and unpredictable attack against us, the false suzerains of a matter that never accepted to be our slave.

The Party that has actualized itself on various occasions, such as the workers’ movements of the 19th and 20th century, promises to terminate Separation through the prefiguration of the Just City. Prefiguration in the sense that even if the City cannot be actualized immediately, the Party contains the City as a potentiality in the manner it organizes itself. This potentiality is found in the manner in which the Party promises to fight in the name of the Earth and all its creatures against Separation, using all possible means: from activity in the streets and workplaces to the elections and the State itself. In the same way the ancient communities of ancient Greece and pre-Columbian America discovered, and the revolutionaries of the 18th, 19th, and 20th century rediscovered, the Party prefigures the democratic republic, for only a community that is self-conscious of the interpenetration of its members can comprehend the interwovenness between human beings and the Universe. Finally, it is not improper to assume that only human beings that attempt to be free can comprehend the freedom inherent in matter, and therefore, fight for a form of life relating ourselves to the Earth as kin.

In Defense of the Labor Theory of Value

Djamil Lakhdar-Hamina examines the labor theory of value and references philosophy of science to defend it from critics. Features a reading guide to works on the philosophy of science, Marxism, and their relations. 

The epistemological and scientific foundation of classical political economy was the “labor theory of value” (LTV). Perhaps a more fitting description is the “labor law of value.”

The LTV predicts that the prices of commodities vary proportionally with their labor-content. If a commodity contains “more labor” than another, then in all probability the first will have a higher price. The LTV makes substantial law-like claims and is not a moral proposition.

Marx did not discover the LTV. However, he did make specific contributions to the theory, including, but not limited to, the hypothesis that labor is only represented as exchange value in societies with private ownership and atomized production for exchange, the distinction between labor and labor-power, and the concept of surplus value as functionally prior to its division between profit, interest, and rent.

Attack on the Labor Theory of Value 

Since the publication of Capital, the labor theory of value has been closely associated with socialism. For this reason, it became a major project of orthodox economists to “refute the labor theory of value.”  With the rise of marginalism and the notion that prices were grounded in the subjective appraisals of individuals, orthodox economists had a political apologia and substitute theory.

The first criticisms of the labor theory of value were logical refutations of the supposed fallacies in the transformation of labor-values to prices of production. The first version of this critique was made by the Austrian economist Bohm van Bawerk. In 1895 van Bawerk became minister of finance. It is not a coincidence that, in 1896, he published Karl Marx and the Close of his System to challenge the rising socialist movement.

Essentially, the argument was that the premise of Marx’s theory implied a contradiction, that by a reductio ad absurdum the theory was logically contradictory. More specifically, the presupposition of exchange of commodities at equal values in Capital Volume I contradicts the conclusion of the formation of prices of production and a general rate of profit laid out in Volume III.

Within Marxist economics, there has been a tedious accumulation of literature attempting to show that there is no logical contradiction. This project is closely tied and is almost reducible to giving various interpretations of Marxist theories. One attempts to find the logically consistent interpretation in order to come up with a testable labor theory of value. We have all sorts of competing interpretations intended to solve the transformation problem: the simultaneist versus temporal, single-system versus dual, commodity-form, etc.

How do we go about challenging this claim of self-contradiction? How can we stop the endless proliferation of interpretations in order to construct a testable and well-supported theory?

Using the Philosophy of Science to Approach the Problem

The critique of the LTV took on a deeper dimension with the philosophy of science. Pre-1968, the only living philosophy of science was logical positivism. Joan Robinson, a student of John Maynard Keynes, himself a student of the great logical positivist Bertrand Russell, was one of the first to make forcible epistemological arguments against the LTV.

According to the neo-positivists, science is in the business of coming up with theories, bodies of declarative sentences organized into a deductive-system. Some of these statements are couched in theoretical terms, while others are couched in observational terms. Each statement is true if and only if it is verifiable, i.e. observable. If it is not verifiable, then the statement is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. It is a piece of metaphysics that should be eliminated from consideration.

As theoretical statements are not directly observable, they must be reducible to statements about direct observations. If they are not reducible to such statements, then the theoretical statements and terms are meaningless. Robinson argued that “value” was such a term. It could not be seen on an object. It was not a visible but a “metaphysical” property. Therefore, it was a meaningless term and should be eliminated from the conceptual framework of economics.

With time, the philosophical combined with the logico-mathematical in the line of work represented by Piero Sraffa and Ian Steedman. In fact, the LTV became the prime example of a discarded theory in the history of economics within the academy. The only conclusion worth making is that LTV should be discarded as a piece of anti-scientific ideology, relegated to the museum of pseudoscientific oddities alongside “phlogiston” and “ether.”

Many Marxists began accepting these ‘arguments’ around the time that the socialist movement was losing confidence and power. Neoliberalism had its effect on the economic academy and on those persons confined to a position of internal resistance. As part and parcel of the assault of capital and the defeat of labor, these Marxist intellectuals and economists were unprepared to defend the most basic propositions of Marxian political economy.

Counter-Attack and Defense of the Labor Theory of Value 

The basic point, however, is that logical argumentation is not how scientific theories are ultimately accepted or rejected. A theory is accepted or rejected only if it is tested and supported by the facts. No economist tried to reject the LTV by testing and showing that it was not supported by the facts. Therefore, all talk of the LTV being “disproven” is moot. All these idiots have done is shown how particular mathematical formalisms are inconsistent, i.e. entail contradictions. That says nothing about the real relation between prices and labor.

In the middle of this one-sided ideological massacre, two mathematicians named Farjoun and Machover published a book called “Laws of Chaos” (LOC). LOC is one of the most important and overlooked works of Marxism ever written. The philosophical, epistemological, and scientific implications of this book are revolutionary.

Farjoun and Machover transform the whole of the Marxist research program in political economy. The authors believe that all economics, including Marxian, flounder on a false assumption: that the economy tends towards a stationary state of equilibrium. In this deterministic picture of the capitalist economy, economic categories such as price and profit gravitate around this one point of equilibrium, so e.g. there is an economy-wide rate of profit.

Farjoun and Machover begin by rejecting the deterministic picture of capitalism that is tacitly assumed in such a theory. Logic and evidence exclude the possibility of such a system. In rejecting such a picture, they adopt a more realistic understanding of capitalism, but also of scientific practice and theory.

In a brilliant instance of scientific modeling, Farjoun and Machover recognize that physics has already produced successful theories about anarchic and disorganized systems, and they use these theories to analyze the capitalist economy. They argue the capitalist economy is anarchic and disorganized, as millions of producers and workers, millions of buyers and sellers interact such that at the macro-level the effect is uncoordinated, and as such resembles a container of millions of gas-particles colliding, acting against one another, and moving in unpredictable ways.

Statistical mechanics is precisely the science that studies such anarchic and disorganized physical systems, and it does so in irreducibly non-deterministic and probabilistic terms.

Physics tells us that such systems have ‘many degrees of freedom,’ and that the movement of each individual particle is ‘random.’ We cannot predict with certainty the micro-properties of a specific molecule. However, and this is extremely important, we can make statistical statements about aggregates of molecules. In like manner, we can make statistical statements about the aggregate economy, distributions of prices and profit-rates, but not about one profit rate. There is no “economy-wide profit rate” but a dynamic distribution of profit rates in which, at the granular level, individual profit-rates (firms) constantly change and switch positions.

Now whatever science is, it is certainly in the business of describing and explaining causal mechanisms. In the process of understanding, prediction is used as a means of testing, keeping, or discarding a theory.

However, when we use a theory to make a prediction we should always specify beforehand the set of relevant competitors. If the theories make the same predictions it is difficult to determine which to choose. If two competing theories make different predictions, then by observation or experiment we can eliminate one. This scientific method allows us to discard those theories that we know to be false while keeping those theories that do best faced with the evidence.

Neo-classical economics’s predictions concerning prices and labor-content are falsified. Orthodox economics predicts that there will be no connection between labor-to-capital ratios and profit. Farjoun and Machover’s probabilistic theory of labor-content, continuing the classical program of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, predicts that industries with a high labor-to-capital ratio will be more profitable than those with a lower ratio. The prediction checks out as a statistical generalization. The statistical generalization falsifies the orthodox claim and provides support for the claim that the price of a commodity varies proportionally to its labor-content i.e. the labor theory of value.

Since the publication of Farjoun and Machover’s work, there has been a proliferation of literature that supports the LTV (Shaikh, Cockshott and Cottrell and Michealson, Zachariah). Time and again, prices of commodities have varied proportionally with labor-content. As with any statistical law, an individual price might not be exactly proportional with its labor-content, but in aggregate commodity prices cluster tightly around labor-values. For instance, a paper by Cottrell and Cockshott finds that labor-content is an extremely efficient (but biased) predictor.

It would seem that Marxist political economy is the victor unless there is another more likely and better-supported theory on price.

Probabilistic Political Economy and Its Philosophical Meaning 

There is a deeper point to take out of all this, a deeper point about science and the world we live in. Quantum physics was a revolution that unsettled previous conceptions on the universe. This unsettling led to some bizarre doubts: some philosophers went to the extreme of claiming that quantum physics ‘eliminated matter,’ made reality a function of ‘subjective perception.’ Those who took a more cautious stance towards the quantum revolution drew better lessons.

Quantum physics weakened the Enlightenment perspective of the world as a well-oiled machine, and with it the belief of science as the production of a universal explanation that is a total prediction of every event in time.

Likewise, Farjoun and Machover have built a theory that does not presuppose capitalism to be a machine. Instead, capitalism is quasi-determined (in production) while also ruled by unpredictable changes and circumstances (in exchange). Science is a project of understanding, describing, explaining, and questioning the determined and chancy process of nature, and prediction enters in as one kind of epistemic act of many.

Take the typical critiques of Marxism as a failed scientific research program that rested on a prediction that did not check out. There were perhaps some Marxists who had an extremely deterministic picture of history. Whether it was the productive forces or the working-class, some irreversible process in capitalism would necessarily lead to socialism. But to be a Marxist is to understand that our material, like our social world, is no machine with a central brain; it is both determined and subject to unpredictable changes and circumstances, and like anything, there is no guarantee of socialism. Marxists must always live with this chanciness, uncertainty.

Awful though it is, this is the way Marx saw history: No guaranteed finalities. Just the fight.


Reading List

I know that going through different academic disciplines to parse out the good from the bad takes a lot of time, so I have provided a reading list of my inspirations in writing this piece if you would like to learn more and engage with the problems.

Philosophy of Science

Summary :

Okasha, Samir. Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2016. An excellent and easy-to-read introduction on the field of the philosophy of science. Particularly strong in describing verificationism and neo-positivism, charting the neo-positivist versus anti-positivist debate on the character of science and theory.

Harre, R. (1972). The Philosophies of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Older edition, but gives a great summary of the competing philosophical positions on the character and structure theory and science e.g. instrumentalism, conventionalism, realism.

Positivism:

Carnap, R. (2012). Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Dover Publications. One of the first text to introduce the positivist philosophy of science with its concomitant analysis of theory, description, explanation, the place of physics and the distinction between observation and theory.

Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. The classical statement of neo-positivism in philosophy of science. A pivotal work and guide for many years on theory, description, explanation, and prediction, and on the difference between observation and theory. Also, an interesting critical essay on “functional explanation” relevant to Marxism.

Falsificationism:

Popper, K. (2002). Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge Classics. Written in 1962, this was Karl Popper’s most popular work. It was a response to the neo-positivists and an attempt to overcome various paradoxes in the research program by developing a new conception of scientific growth and justification. Scientific growth does not proceed by testing the true, but coming up with theories, deducing observational consequences, and eliminating the false. This philosophy was known as falsificationism.

Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lakatos was actually a communist in the Hungarian Communist Party before he moved to London to study with Karl Popper. This is a book of essays, and the most famous essay carries the same title as the book. In it, he charts a more ‘nuanced’ version of falsificationism, ‘naïve’ versus ‘sophisticated’ falsificationism. Needless to say, Popper did not like this distinction and did not appreciate Lakatos’s close friendship to Paul Feyerabend.

Anti-Positivists:

Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Thomas Kuhn, a physicist by training, wrote this famous work in 1962. It was an attack on the neo-positivist philosophy and its conception of scientific change. Famous for introducing the now abused term “paradigm shift” into the study of theories.

Feyerabend, P. (2010). Against Method. London: Verso. Feyerabend moved to England to study with Wittgenstein at Cambridge. However, Wittgenstein died and so he went to study with Karl Popper the London School of Economics. He became a fierce critic of every philosophy of science and adopted a position known as ‘theoretical Dadaism’ or ‘theoretical anarchism.’ Essentially, in the war of science, any means of victory are permissible, there are no rules. Marxists may like that he tries to bring Lenin into his philosophy as an inspiration to think of science in strategic terms, i.e. as a conflict.

Realists:

Harre, R. (1972). The Principles of Scientific Thinking .London: Macmillan. An extremely interesting work that criticizes the neo-positivists and builds a new philosophy of science. The position is essentially that science is not in the business of describing and explaining observations, but the causal structure and mechanisms that produce observable events in both regular and irregular ways. The main product of science is a deductive theory, but a model of the causal structure and mechanisms ‘behind’ our world.

Hacking, I. (2010). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stakes a similar position against neo-positivism. However, approaches the Marxist understanding of science not just as a process of representing (theory) but intervening in our world (practice). In short, the criterion for the murky word ‘real’ is if something has causal effects, and if it affects us, then it is real.

Marxism

Lesser-Known Marxist Philosophy:

Gasper, P. (1998). Marxism and Science. An introduction to Marxist philosophy of science that stakes out the major claims and goes through the history of the tradition. Also, gives a reading list of works of science.

Sheehan, Helena. Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History: The First Hundred Years. Verso, 2017. An excellent book that traces the history of the engagement of Marxists with science from Marx and Engels to the “British Scientific Socialists.” Does justice to the specificity and achievements of the Marxist understanding of science.

Ruben, David-Hillel. Marxism and Materialism. Harvester Press, 1979. A good synthesis of the Marxist and analytic traditions of philosophy.

Wright, Erik Olin, et al. Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History. Verso,  1992. An excellent work in the analytic tradition which is actually the best-produced criticism of GA Cohen’s technological determinism. Pursues powerful analogies between evolutionary theory and historical materialism, and defines a class of social theory which attempts to study irreversible processes. Also is one of the first works to systematically interrogate the nature of explanation in Marxism.

Introduction to Marxist economics:

Mandel, Ernest. An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory. Pathfinder, 2006. This work was actually published in 1974 by Ernest Mandel, a Trotskyist leader, economist, and writer. Before judging his political origins, I have found that this work is a fun introduction for the novice.  

Sweezy, Paul M. The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. Monthly Review Press, 1970. Written by the famous Harvard Marxist economist and one of the founders of Monthly Review. A terrific analytic introduction to the basics of Marxist political economy. However, nearly everything said about the transformation problem is worthless and should be avoided.

Advanced Texts:

Farjoun, Emmanuel, and Moshé Machover. Laws Of Chaos: A Probabilistic Approach to Political Economy. Verso ed., 1983. I spoke of this monumental work above.

Shaikh, Anwar. Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises. Oxford University Press, 2018. This massive work is, in my opinion, the greatest achievement theoretical and empirical achievement of Marxist economics since Capital. The goal of the work is to systematically re-found the whole of economics on the inspiration of the classical tradition of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. Rather than obsessing over ‘micro-foundations,’ ‘perfect competition,’ and ‘general equilibrium,’ Shaikh demonstrates how a few principles of political economy can serve as the basis for the ‘turbulent dynamism’ of capitalism.

Studies of the LTV :

Gillman, Joseph M. The Falling Rate of Profit; Marx’s Law and Its Significance to Twentieth-Century Capitalism. Cameron Associates, 1958. The first major attempt by someone to test the labor theory of value and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

Cockshott, Paul & Cottrell, Allin & Michaelson, Greg. (1993). Testing Labour Value Theory with input/output tables.

Zachariah, Dave. “Testing the Labor Theory of Value in Sweden” (2004).

 

No Replacement For The Marxist Theory Of Revolution

Gabriel Radic argues that various attempts in academia to develop theories of revolution as alternatives to Marx’s theory of revolution and historical materialism only serve to disguise the centrality of class contradiction in these events. 

Landing of the French fleet in Santo Domingo following the revolutions of this island (1803)

Within the academic milieus of social scientific analysis and research, there is a peculiar tendency that seeks to reduce social phenomena to generic compartments which are invented and imposed on these phenomena. A handful of fitting historical examples are selectively chosen and sewn into a narrative that seeks to prove that the mechanisms of social existence can be scientifically observed, predicted, and calculated as if people were atoms. This attempt to quantify the dynamism of the human condition manifests itself in academic attempts to replace Marxism as a theory of revolution.

Asserting the primacy of any one historical or sociological factor in assessing every revolution or form of resistance while downplaying the importance of other critical elements is an act of ahistorical reductionism that has no place in the interdisciplinary study of revolutionary theory. Revolutions are borne from a multiplicity of factors relevant to the conditions of that society. Economic formations, ideological currents, and the rise and fall of institutional power all coalesce in differing environments that provide an impetus for resistance against hegemonic actors, and, on rare occasions, their overthrow.

To overcome the deficiencies of bourgeois analysis, it is imperative to use historical materialism as a tool for understanding historical development. Historical materialism is the methodology of Marxist historiography and views historical developments and all other phenomena in their totality and interconnectedness. Marxism accomplishes this by observing (not interpreting) how society materially produces and reproduces its own existence, and the ideological consequences rendered therefrom. It is superior to the nitpicking of historical phenomena by the pseudo-intellectual legions of academics who formulate vapid and transient theories that arise to prominence and fail the test of time within a generation.

Before briefly considering academic perspectives that fail to assess revolution in all its complexities, it is important to define our object of concern. These texts concern themselves with the terms ‘resistance’ and ‘revolution,’ concepts that, when taken as identical, are inexact and will lead to vague conclusions, if any. Let us set aside ‘resistance’ and focus on a precise form of revolution: social revolution. These revolutions, vis-à-vis political revolutions, not only affect the mass of society but arise from the masses themselves. The participation of the masses in the successful exoneration of their own existence leads to the most dramatic societal changes, as the grasping of their own destiny often animates the consciousness of disaffected souls the world over. The identification of the most important sociological and historical factors in successful social revolutions will occupy our considerations hereafter.

Of all the readings considered in this essay, with whatever brevity, only one addresses the near-ubiquitous deficiency of social science. Theda Skocpol, the author of States and Social Revolutions, puts forward a criticism of the incomprehensiveness of the social sciences, stating “analytic oversimplification cannot lead us toward valid, complete explanations of revolutions.” She then goes on to commit the same errors by focusing on merely three historical examples (despite having the space of a book with which to overcome this indolence).1 Nevertheless, the author correctly identifies the most important factor behind social revolutions and the underlying antagonism of human society since the inception of society itself: socioeconomic class.

It is necessary to briefly describe what class is and how class warfare operates under its most recent economic incarnation in order to properly evaluate the causality of successful social revolutions.

Class is the most important factor in social revolutions because to put it simply, it embodies all of society. People compose society and all participants of society fit into a class, no matter how the gradations of class are framed. Therefore the economy and all of the civic, religious, academic, etc. institutions arise from the activity of classes, of humankind.

Class is defined by the operations of economic forces; the class typology thereby defers to the essence of the economy in any given historical period: master and slave, lord and serf, employer and employee. Under capitalism, the array of classes of feudal and slave societies of the past are increasingly reduced to two camps, the proletariat and bourgeoisie, whose inherent, irredeemable incompatibility are exacerbated by the monopolization and cartelization of productive forces under the capitalist form. The latter bourgeois elements invariably consume one another until a protracted alliance of monopolies and cartels is globally established to ensure the perpetuation of bourgeois hegemony. Bourgeois precedence over the consolidation of industry is predicated on the material dispossession of the proletariat through the exploitation of their labor in vicious class warfare. At certain historical junctures, a variety of factors align that move the proletariat to exercise its power in an overwhelming display which lays siege to the order under which its existence is realized to no longer be tolerable. These factors are as follows: the widespread dispersion of class consciousness; the weakening or collapse of existing institutions of bourgeois power; and the strategic funneling of working-class power by an organized, revolutionary vanguard.

Theda Skocpol correctly identifies all successive theories of social revolutions as emerging from this Marxist framework of class warfare. These latter theories variously emphasize other properties and conditions of social revolution that appear prominently in selective case studies, such as psychology (aggregate-psychological theories), violence (systems/value consensus), and organized groups (political-conflict theories), all of which operate under an ideological umbrella of sorts.2 These pretending theories amount to a vulgarization of Marxism as they attempt to dissect and/or re-orient the reciprocal totality of the base and superstructure in favor of selective components of this totality. Skocpol also confuses the theory of class struggle through her creation of a false ambiguity between the bourgeoisie and the state, asserting that the latter is not necessarily a tool of the former, but an independent entity. This arbitrary demarcation partially undermines her methodology, as it is selectively exercised, in turn diminishing the scientific validity of her structuralist analysis.

While Skocpol’s works signaled the culmination of the third generation of revolutionary theory, it would be imprudent to ignore other major contributors to this school and highlight their deficiencies.

The most significant contributions of the third generation were Crane Brinton’s rising expectations theory, David Aberle’s relative deprivation theory, and James Davies’ J-curve theory. Brinton’s magnum opus only assesses four revolutions where he develops his observation that economic upturn results in increased expectations that go on not to be met, causing a revolution as a result.3 In a similar conception, Aberle borrows a theory from political science—relative deprivation—and applies it sociologically to a few historical examples. His theory states that social revolutions occur when enough people perceive “a negative discrepancy between expectation and actuality.”4 Davies focuses on a mere three revolutions to explain his J-curve theory that social revolution occurs when rising expectations and needs satisfaction are dashed by a period of abrupt economic decline.5

These theories all use selective events in an effort to realize overlapping causal trends of social revolutions. At the base of all of them is a change in economic conditions and a realization of this by an overwhelming number of people. These theories are all explanations of class consciousness giving rise to class warfare but reconfigured by Western academics in an effort to create some original, new theory. The Marxian analysis takes into consideration everything these academics write about without either ignoring or underplaying the ascendant role of class in social revolutions.

All told, the Marxian analysis of history does not bind itself with arbitrary limitations, and a wealth of disagreements and diversity of thought have arisen under the methodological framework of historical materialism. In its observance of the production and reproduction of our materiality through capitalist economic formations, we can extrapolate empirically and comprehensively the effects of this base on all components of the superstructure, and their subsequent reciprocity. Within this framework, we observe class, class consciousness, and class warfare as the vehicle for social change, namely social revolutions, while taking under consideration the totality of competing forces within capitalist society. The arbitrariness of bourgeois historians and social scientists in their selectively drawing out of features and trends in this totality simply obscures the reality of historical development, while their ideological convictions lead them to underplay the critical importance of class society in an effort to reduce class consciousness within academic environments and popular culture, thereby perpetuating capitalist ideology.

Making State Theory Revolutionary

State theory must move beyond questions of methodology and move into deeper political questions such as the political form of a workers regime, argues Donald Parkinson. 

Die Barrikade by Otto Dix

Perry Anderson in his Considerations on Western Marxism makes the point that it was primarily questions of methodology and not political debate that occupied Marxist intellectuals in Western Europe during the post-war era up until the 1970s. Anderson links this focus on methodology over strategy to the general weakness of the class struggle at that time, with Marxist intellectuals focusing on arcane, although often useful, debates concerning the correct reading of Marx, whether Hegelian, structuralist, Kantian, or existentialist. The debates over state theory in Marxism since the post-war era have been no exception to this trend—they have been primarily fixated on questions of methodology in theorizing the state. But what if we moved beyond questions of methodology,  aiming to take Marxist state theory into the field of substantive political questions? In this attempt to do so I will offer a quick overview of the main debates in methodology and then point towards the kind of questions that would concern a more revolutionarily-oriented approach to state theory.

The primary trends in the debates in Marxist state theory are instrumentalism and structuralism. Other schools of thought include the form-analytic school. The instrumentalist school is regarded by Clyde W. Barrow in his Critical Theories of the State as the inheritor of “Plain Marxism,” continuing the tradition that Lenin began in State and Revolution. Instrumentalist state theory was initially conceived by Sweezy and Baran, but was perhaps most effectively articulated by Ralph Miliband, particularly in his book The State and Capitalist Society.

Put simply, instrumentalist state theory takes seriously the claim by Engels that the state is “but a committee for managing the common affairs of the ruling class.” Instrumentalist state theorists argue that not only is there a ruling class with cohesive group interests but that the state is a means through which the ruling class can express these interests. It is within state institutions that class power is organized; the ruling class is able to have control over these institutions because of its own networks of influence and policy-making through which the power of the ruling class is embedded. To quote Miliband:

“It is these institutions in which ‘state power’ lies, and is through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions.”1

According to this theory, classes exert their power over state apparatuses through “colonizing” them. This is the process by which the ruling class keeps the state’s loyalty, maintaining dominance over state institutions so as to make the state an instrument of the class’s rule. This theory thus explains how the ruling class rules through the state and exercises a class dictatorship through the processes of class formation and colonization of the state apparatuses, institutionalizing its rule. By class formation, we mean the process through which a class becomes a consciously organized force that can act in history according to its class interests.

A typical critique of the instrumentalist approach begins by pointing out that it conceptualizes the state as merely an instrument for different classes to pick up and use. Instrumentalists, this critique continues, give undue importance to ideology and the behavior of managers, emphasizing these factors over the importance of social structures over which the managers have no control. This critique was made by Poulantzas (targeting Miliband), who would develop a structuralist theory of the state inspired by Louis Althusser’s reading of Marx.2 Poulantzas’s structuralism would develop in the course from his initial critique of Miliband to his final work State, Power, Socialism. However from the beginning what was important for Poulantzas was that the state is understood in terms of social relations and structures rather than actors and that what mattered was not the class loyalties of politicians but the deeper historical logic with which the state was intertwined.

Structuralist state theory did not disagree with Miliband empirically so much as theoretically; its critique was aimed primarily at what it saw as the flawed methodology underlying instrumentalism. Structuralist Marxism itself was a project designed to rid Marxism of its “humanist” aspects, a sort of Marxism that saw the study of abstract social structures as more scientific compared to the Hegelian reading of Marx which focused on alienation and made room for what was seen as a creeping idealism. This could mean a cold and impersonal Marxism that leaves little room for human agency, but it also allows the theorist to look at certain social formations at a “macro” level of abstraction.

This can be useful in the sense of understanding the state as something that exists beyond the will of certain individual actors with unlimited power and determining which state tendencies are beyond human control. For the structuralists, one ought not to understand the state as an object but as a social relation, and in particular a class relation. The state can be understood as a set of institutions that, regardless of ideology, is set up to reproduce capitalist social relations because its aim is to reproduce classes. This has been useful for explaining why social-democratic politicians so often bowed down to the capitalist class while in power despite their rhetoric. What mattered was not the dedication of these politicians to pro-worker policies, but the greater social structure in which state actors worked, a structure inherently predisposed to reproducing capitalist relations.

However, through the course of his thinking, Poulantzas would eventually develop his state theory in directions that go against key aspects of Marxist state theory, in particular, the concept of class dictatorship. In State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas mocks Balibar, himself a structuralist Marxist, for maintaining the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, apparently a “stupendous dogmatism.”3 For Poulantzas, there is no class which can hold control over the state; rather, the class struggle itself traverses the state, which serves as a locus where class antagonisms are expressed and worked out. The state is not ruled by a capitalist class that can be defined economically but is an institution that serves in the reproduction of all classes and therefore can not be said to be the specific terrain of a ruling class. Instead, there are ruling ‘power blocs’ which are composed of alliances of fractions of different classes. The political implications of this for Poulantzas were clear: the working class could build power within the capitalist state through building class alliances and shoring up hegemony within the state apparatus. This meant that a “democratic road to socialism” was possible without a rupture between the bourgeois dictatorship and the proletarian dictatorship, through a protracted struggle to gradually transform the state from the inside backed by movements from below.

In the end, despite their aim to prove that the state structurally reproduced capitalism regardless of the motives of state actors, the structuralists ended up embracing the reformist politics of Eurocommunism, Poulantzas being one of the key theorists of this attempt to revamp communism with social-democratic and liberal revisionism. Instrumentalist theorists of the state such as Erik Olin Wright have also come to similar political conclusions. Both theoretical schools, despite their methodological quibbles, ended up lending theoretical ammunition to reformists in opposition to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Despite the aim of both schools of thought to develop Marxist theory, they instead became more like sociologies of the state removed from any kind of revolutionary politics. These debates lost the important focus of class politics, leading to theory that was a mere rationalization of the reformist turn much of the Official Communist movement was already making. Today Poulantzas is used to argue for entryism into the Democratic Party, with the Bernie Sanders campaign being an example of class struggle within the state.4

While both instrumentalism and structuralism can lend credence to reformism, as theories of the state we can still learn from both of them, seeing them as ways of looking at the state at different levels of abstraction. The instrumentalist theory shows how the state in action acts as a protection racket for the ruling class and how these factions of the ruling class work to reproduce their class power. On the other hand, the structuralist theorists show the social structures that these state actors are embedded in. While this methodological debate can lead to reformist conclusions on both sides, it can also be used to help us deepen our arguments for a properly Marxist theory of the state. These arguments are not useless, but we must go beyond them. This means putting Marxist state theory back onto the track of explaining the reality of class dictatorship, as Lenin did in State and Revolution.

The fact that Marxist state theory allowed itself to become focused on methodology is a product of Marxist theory becoming divorced from revolutionary politics. This doesn’t mean we cannot use the insights of the structuralist Marxist or instrumentalist state theorists in analyzing the state. However, what should be clear is that Marxist state theory needs to focus on the issue of dictatorship, which relates to a number of practical questions. The first is on the nature of smashing the state. What does it mean to smash the bourgeois state? Secondly, there is the question of the character of what comes after the bourgeois state, i.e. the proletarian state, or dictatorship of the proletariat. How do we determine whether a state is a dictatorship of the proletariat or not? What form of state best ensures the rule of the working class?

To begin answering this question, we must begin with the assertion that states are ultimately forms of class dictatorship. What this means is that in a given social formation, the state is a means through which a class ensures and reproduces its position as the ruling class. While the state is contested by multiple classes, as Poulantzas points out, it ultimately reproduces a class system with the state apparatus ensuring that one class comes out on top. To quote the “stupendous dogmatism” of Etienne Balibar: State power is always the power of a class. State power, which is produced in the class struggle, can only be the instrument of the ruling class: what Marx and Engels called the dictatorship of the ruling class.5

Why the term dictatorship? Balibar paraphrases Lenin defining a dictatorship as “absolute power, standing above any law, either of the bourgeois or the proletariat. State power cannot be shared.6 Essentially this means that in a given state, the class’s rule over this state is non-negotiable, and is ultimately above the law. If the law becomes a barrier to the rule of the dominant class, the law is ultimately less important, and the state will break with the rule of law if necessary to ensure ‘order’. The importance of recognizing this is that legal codes are not neutral forces standing above classes, but means through which class power is expressed.

The necessity of “order” and the maintenance of the rule of law is the normal operation of the bourgeois state. Yet when “order” is threatened, often through the convulsions of class struggle, the state will use extra-legal methods to maintain order. The class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is mediated through parliaments and courts, yet also will throw such forms of mediation out the window if the establishment of order is threatened. Thus there is a tension in the bourgeois state between its own forms of democracy and the necessity of maintaining a bourgeois dictatorship.

The other important aspect of the theory of class dictatorship is that the state does not share power between classes; the proletariat and bourgeoisie do not have a compromised state where both rule halfway, but rather one class rules over all others. This has clear implications for political practice, in that there must be a rupture in the form of the state in the proletarian revolution, where the bourgeois form of the state is smashed and is replaced by a state of a fundamentally different form that puts power into the hands of the working class. The question remains, however: what form does this state take? Rather than simply assuming the ‘class character’ of a state as given due to the ideology of the ruling party, we must understand what institutions can actually allow the working class to rule as a class. Here Charles Bettelheim is useful:

“The basic difference between a proletarian state apparatus and a bourgeois state apparatus is the non-separation of the proletarian state apparatus from the masses, its subordination to the masses, i.e. the disappearance of what Lenin called a “state in the proper sense and its replacement by the proletariat organized as a ruling class.”7

Key to the proletarian state in this conception is the non-separation of the masses from the state, the state being subordinated to the masses. This entails that there must be a form of democracy that is based in mass collective participation from the proletariat that would allow for the masses to subordinate the state to their interests. This must be a democracy based on collective decision-making in public association rather than the atomized democracy found in the bourgeois state that reduces mass politics to the individuated casting of a vote. The form of the proletarian state is, therefore, a form of the state that in all meaningful ways is more democratic than any capitalist state—democracy is a means through which the masses can take political decision-making into their collective hands. The alternative is the rule of experts, of bureaucracy, unhindered in their rule and increasingly graced with arbitrary power by their social status.

One element of democracy is that it operates through a sort of “political culture,” or set of political norms in collective decision making that empower the collective to the greatest possible extent. Therefore a proletarian state must promote certain civic virtues, essentially an ideological apparatus that promotes certain forms of socialization over others, forms that promote collective decision-making in a solidaristic fashion overseeing politics as an instrument for personal success. In fact, one of the key aspects of proletarian democracy is that it is not possible to use politics as a form of career. As in the Paris Commune, the workers representative should be not only recallable but also paid the average working person’s wage. Public officials should be elected and transparency should become the norm, as well as freedom of the press and freedom of association. Democracy must not be understood as merely majoritarian decision-making, but rather collective decision-making where everyone has a say. One could call this political culture “workers’ republicanism,” and the state a “workers’ republic.” Such a state would not overcome the principle of representation—this is not a call for direct democracy—yet it would maximize the means through which representation is truly derived from the “people’s will” or, more accurately, the will of the propertyless class.

Another key aspect of the proletarian state is the arming of the people. The smashing of the state at its core is the dissolution of the existing bourgeois state apparatus, the military, national guard, and police. What replaces these institutions is the people’s militia, which is run through municipal committees that all citizens can join. The universal arming of the people through such a system is an acid test of whether a state can be said to have a proletarian “class character,” whether the working class truly holds power or if power is being taken into the hands of a petty-bourgeois bureaucracy. The working class must become the state itself and absorb all arbitrary and alienated bureaucratic powers to the fullest extent while putting those that do exist under democratic control.

This approach toward defining a “workers’ state” differs from the Trotskyist method, which judges a workers’ state by the dominant property relations. For example, if a state has a nationalized economy but is run by a bureaucracy caste that politically disempowers the working class, it is still a workers’ state, albeit a degenerated one. This way of using property relations alone as a metric is ultimately economically reductive to the point where the working class does not have to actually hold power in its own state but merely exist in a nationalized economy compatible with any kind of arbitrary despotism. The workers’ state may be degenerated and need a political revolution, but the implicit assumption is that property-form defines a workers’ state. Yet would one say that the USSR ceased to be a workers’ state during the NEP, where private property was tolerated, and then returned to being one after the collectivization of agriculture under Stalin? Rather than focusing on the property form dominating the economy, the focus should be on the political form of the state.

An argument against this interpretation of the state is that a workers’ state could simply be an extremely democratic state with a capitalist economy. But this opens up another avenue of Marxist state theory that could be more vigorously examined: the contradiction between the market and democracy. One could theoretically make an argument that the rule of the market as an impersonal force and authentic democratic rule of the people and their interests over all of society are incompatible; thus the tendency for the capitalist class to limit democracy when necessary and the tendency for the proletariat to fight for democracy more than other classes. One sees this contradiction historically play out in the bourgeois revolutions, where the most militant and radical mobilizations against the old regime came from the small proprietor masses who were in the process of proletarianization. On the other hand, the actual merchant class tended to play a more conservative role in the revolutions, seeing the extreme democracy of the masses as a threat to their property. One sees this dynamic in the history of the United States itself, one famous example being the Constitution itself as being framed for the purposes of curbing excess democracy.8 A sufficiently empowered proletariat that amasses enough control over society organized as a universal class would simply not be compatible with the rule of the bourgeoisie, as it would be compelled to make “despotic inroads” on property, to use to the words of Marx. To quote Jacques Ranciere, referencing a report from the Trilateral Commission on the problems of democracy:

“Democracy, said the report writers, signifies the irresistible growth of demands that put pressure on governments, lead to a decline in authority, and cause individuals and groups to become refractory to the discipline and sacrifices for the common good.”9

We must understand that the dictatorship of the proletariat for Marx is merely a stage in the class struggle, one where the proletariat becomes the most powerful class in society, but still nonetheless within a capitalist society. The point of the dictatorship of the proletariat is that the proletariat is in control of the “general means of coercion” and can now make concrete steps towards the abolition of class society itself. Radical political democracy serves the purposes of allowing the masses to take these concrete steps.

On this occasion, Poulantzas does give us a useful frame of reference, despite his conclusion of class dictatorship not being a viable concept. If we see the form of the state as something which is determined by the concrete class struggle, then it is possible that the strength of the proletariat as a class would impact the form of the state. Yet whether a strong proletariat would mean a more democratic or despotic state is not something that can be predetermined. While a strongly organized proletariat may be able to win significant concessions from the state such as democratic rights, the state could also react to an empowered proletariat by becoming more authoritarian and clamping down on democratic rights. However, even if the proletariat is strongly organized enough within a capitalist state to win certain rights, these rights are mere legalities in the eyes of the bourgeoisie and can be suspended if necessary—hence why even the most democratic state is not a state where the proletariat and bourgeois share power somehow, but rather is always a dictatorship of the bourgeois. In fact, where the proletariat has gained significant democratic rights, one can see the bourgeois state compensate through forms of corruption and voter manipulation. One can say there is essentially a contradiction between political democracy and the market, where political democracy being extended gives more power to the plebian classes and therefore can lead to policies that clash with the market.

In conventional Leninist political terminology, where the Comintern or at least its first four congresses are used as a key reference point for politics, democracy is contrasted to Democratic Centralism. It is my opinion that Democratic Centralism is essentially a redundant term, and is more often than not simply used as a cudgel against democracy in the name of centralism. Any democratic decision made by a collective, by a majority, has to be enforced on the whole. The part must be subsumed to the whole, and so some form of central authority is needed so that the needs of the whole can be met. Decentralization of power, where autonomy and localism are emphasized over the rule of any central authority and subjugation to authority is a matter of contractual agreements worked out between functionally autonomous communes, pretends to be an ultra-democratic alternative to democratic systems that rely on some level of centralism. Yet if a locality is truly autonomous and not accountable to a center, then it is not accountable for the needs of the rest of society, a situation which is fundamentally anti-democratic.

The neo-republican theories of Skinner and Pettit, while tainted by social-democratic politics, are a valuable asset to state theory despite coming from a non-Marxist background. For Pettit, freedom can be defined as the absence of domination.10 We are essentially unfree when we are subject to the will of another. However, when we enter a political community, we essentially subject ourselves to the rule of a state and are subject to the will of the authority of this state. This provides us with a conundrum: how are humans supposed to be free if we live in a society where we are forced to live under the control of generalized political authority? The argument of the neo-republicans is that said political authority is not a form of domination if it is an authority that is derived from the said political community through open and collective deliberation. Furthermore, this political authority must be exercised in a way which is not arbitrary. The issue of arbitrary authority is a major one for the neo-republicans, as they see republican democracy as a means to limit and perhaps eliminate arbitrary authority, which is an authority that is not legitimated by the norms of the political community and there is a form of domination in operation.

Skinner argues against the notion of freedom as “non-interference,” as we can only exist as “free” beings in a community with others, and therefore cannot be free from some interference from the needs of others without being atomized, anti-social beings.11 Humans are social animals, and so we have no choice but to be subject to the interference of others in a political community. However, what we can be free from is dependence, where we are subjected to the arbitrary will of a social force in order to survive. This can be extended to the dependence of a woman on her husband for financial support, dependence on competition in the free market to survive, and dependence on a state which is free from any kind of democratic control.12 Therefore freedom is not freedom from the interference and input of others, but freedom from arbitrary forms of domination and dependence.

By looking at modern thinkers of republican theory like Pettit and Skinner, as well as the general ideals of radical republicanism that were common parlance in circles frequented by Marx and Engels, we can learn to develop what was mentioned earlier as a “political culture,” a culture not in the sense of an aesthetic but in the sense of a complex of social and institutional norms. Through developing such a culture in the masses, we can develop through concrete struggle the forms of workers’ democracy that will define the proletarian state of the future, training the working class to become a class capable of self-governance. Marxist state theory should shift focus from purely methodological issues and instead begin to venture into the practical questions of the proletarian state.

The French Revolution greatly influenced Marx’s conception of democracy.

One can ask how one can reconcile the notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat with mass republican democracy. The answer to this is that Marx did not see dictatorship and democracy as mutually exclusive, but instead in a mutually reinforcing relation with one another. For example, in applying the lessons of 1848 in his 1850 Address to the Communist League, Marx calls for the use of terrorist methods in order to attain democratic demands. Marx sees class dictatorship as a means through which one class suppresses of the former ruling class, which in turn allows for the development of new democratic forms that come from undermining the power of this class. For Marx, the Jacobin dictatorship of the French Revolution was inspiring: in order for the bourgeoisie and its allies in the plebeian classes to win a republic that totally undermined the aristocracy’s power and put democracy in the hands of the masses, it was necessary to violently suppress the aristocratic class whose interests were contrary to the rise of mass democratic politics. One can understand proletarian dictatorship in a similar way: the capitalist class must be put out of power and politically disenfranchised in order to construct sovereignty based on the power of the workers and organized through democratic association. For Marx, class dictatorship is a means of securing democracy against the power of the former ruling class and is thus not contrary to democratic principles.  

Marxist state theory must move beyond mere questions of methodology and into questions of political importance, such as what actually demarcates proletarian states from bourgeois states, the question of what denotes the “class character” of a state beyond mere proclamations, and so on. It means asking what kinds of polities we aim to create, and what kind of political cultures will need to accompany them. Structuralism, instrumentalism, or other approaches from the form-analytic, systems theory, or organizational realist schools can only tell us so much about these questions and have mostly related to best theorizing the capitalist state. In analyzing the state we may use elements of all of these methodologies, but what matters is that our understanding of the state is based in concrete historical analysis and not simply left in the realm of abstraction. Marxist state theory gives us important tools for understanding the capitalist state and its development, providing us with a set of methodologies that look at the state with different levels of abstraction. Yet a theory of the state must also be able to understand the state beyond the capitalist state. This means developing a theory of the state that can understand pre-capitalist states and their continuities with the modern state. Yet more importantly, as partisans of communism, we must also theorize the proletarian state, a question which relates to how we now try to organize a polity of the working class for its historical interests. It is my suggestion that the democratic-republican principles of the milieu that created Marxism carry much to offer us in addressing this question.