A Twelve-Step Program for Democrat Addiction

Jonah Martell lays out a twelve-step program for the Democratic Socialists of America to pursue a path of independent working-class politics. 

Civil War-era Cartoon, 1863. The Union fights off the teacherous Copperheads: Democrats who demanded immediate peace with the Confederacy.

Cheer up, comrades! It has been a sorrowful year for all of us, but the whole world has taken a beating—we’re hardly special. We will always have choices to make, strategies to explore, and opportunities to pursue. In this piece, I will do my best to illuminate some of them. 

We can transform our political prospects. But first we will have to transform ourselves. It is pointless to “keep fighting the good fight” if that means pounding on the same brick wall forever. We must rethink old assumptions and learn some new tricks. If we retreat into isolated local projects or blindly “follow the leader,” we set the stage for another defeat. 

Remember the Sanders campaign? Those months seem like a distant memory now. Bernie Sanders played by the rules of the Democratic Party, and those rules squashed him. Yet we have the power to write our own rulebook—not just by breaking with the Democrats, but by inventing a completely new way of doing politics. It is time to move past the obvious insights. Democrats suck; they are treating progressives unfairly; it is still a relief that Trump got fired. To do better next time, we must ask ourselves more difficult questions. The first one is very simple: who is “we?”

Who Are You?

Nearly every political argument invokes a “we,” a common group that should mobilize around something. Although this is useful for persuasive purposes, it can also muddy the waters. In the real world, there is never just one “we” that any of us belong to—no single collective agent. Readers of this article are presumably part of many “we’s.” 

Several examples come to mind. There is the George Floyd protest movement. There is also Bernie World: the massive network of people who supported the Sanders campaign. And many of us feel a certain kinship with all left-leaning people in America—with our friends who want some kind of welfare state, even if they lack an explicit political ideology.

Then there is a much smaller “we”: the American socialist movement. People who own the word “socialism” and take it seriously, without needing a “democratic” disclaimer in front (most of us are even fine with the c-word). We clump around explicitly socialist organizations—most often the Democratic Socialists of America—and we use the dictionary definitions. We actually want common ownership of the means of production and a new political system to make it possible. 

Socialists are a small but growing minority of the U.S. population. How should socialists handle being in a minority? One option is to embrace it, to turn inward and form angry little echo chambers that achieve nothing. Another is to bow to outside forces, watering down our beliefs in the name of “progressive coalition-building.” Both of these solutions fall short. There is nothing wrong with being in a minority, especially when your side has unique insights on how society works. What’s important is to be an outward-looking minority—a minority with a genuine desire for growth and a clearheaded awareness of its surroundings.

Where Are We?

One tempting idea is that the American Left is finished. With Trump out of office, the masses will become complacent, apathy will reign, and there will be no more appetite for political change. In such bleak times, this pessimism is understandable, but it’s also wrong.

“Don’t underestimate Joe’s capacity to fuck things up.” —President Barack Obama

Total nihilism about our prospects puts far too much faith in Joe Biden and the Democratic Party. The crisis in this country runs deeper than Trump. It began before Trump and will continue long after him. The public may want a return to normalcy, but that is just a short-term impulse. Biden’s party will be governing in the middle of a global pandemic and an economic recession. To govern alone, they will have to pull off an extraordinary political surgery: winning a Senate majority of one, voting unanimously to reform the filibuster, adding new states, and then packing the Supreme Court to keep their legislation viable.

Judging by their track record, are the Democrats up to this task? Are they capable of such ruthless political discipline? And even if they do accomplish it, will their leadership be ready to push through major reforms to help America’s struggling working class?

Perhaps Obama could make a few phone calls and threaten a drone strike on Joe Manchin. Otherwise, they will be governing at the feet of Mitch McConnell. Remember him, the Kentucky boy who looks like a turtle? That’s the man who will be holding Joe Biden accountable, not progressives. The GOP controls the Senate. It now controls the Supreme Court. It has ample weapons to impose a wingnut regime on America without Trump in office. Perhaps that is why they are refusing to wage an all-out war over Biden’s victory.

There will be no “bipartisan” healing, only stagnation and decay. When discontent resurfaces, multiple forces on the Left (not to mention the Right) will pounce to take advantage of it. One force to be reckoned with is Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and the rest of the left-wing Democrats in Congress. Because they will be locked out of Biden’s administration, they have nowhere to go but the pulpit. Their party is already eager to marginalize them, and they know the score. The planet is burning. Millions of us have no healthcare in the middle of a pandemic. Roe v. Wade may well be overturned, making abortion illegal for millions overnight and sparking massive upheaval. Every social gain of the past fifty years stands at the mercy of the Supreme Court.

Left-wing Democrats will have to change their strategy. Will they do so effectively? No one knows, and ordinary rank and file socialists should not rely on it. They are embedded in a coalition that prevents them from building a viable constituency. Our responsibility is to develop a more independent approach to politics, with or without their help.

To understand why, let us talk about redbaiting. It worked this year, both on the Left and the liberals (particularly in Miami). Socialism has a powerful appeal among downwardly mobile young people who escaped their elders’ Cold War indoctrination. For a majority of Americans, however, it remains a dirty word.  The Democrats stoked that base when they tarred Bernie as a shill for Castro. Then Trump took up where they left off, tarring Biden as a shill for Bernie, AOC, and a communist plot to destroy America. He and his party made a bet that even the most ridiculous lies would send the Right marching off to Valhalla. They bet right.

Thanks in part to red-baiting (not to mention race-baiting, jingoism, coddling evangelicals, and actually running an energetic campaign), Trump’s coalition turned out with millions more than they had in 2016. The Democrats lost seats in the House and didn’t win the Senate. Now the neoliberals are furiously blaming the Left. Representative Abigail Spanberger (D-Va.) has been particularly frustrated with her neoliberal colleagues for not repressing us hard enough. In a conference call shortly after Election Day, the former CIA officer had this to say:

“We have to commit to not saying the words “defund the police” ever again,” she said. “We have to not use the words ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ ever again.”

She may well be right. Censoring those slogans would be a smart tactical move for her party (not ours). But the Representative forgets three things:

1)  Socialists are here to stay and will not be shutting up.

2)  Left Democrats like Bernie worked tirelessly to turn out their constituencies for Biden. Despite the Right’s hatred of them, they played a crucial role in Biden’s victory.  

3)  Red-baiting targeted the Establishment’s weaknesses—not just ours.

That third point is counterintuitive, so it deserves some further context. Once again, the Democrats nominated an establishment candidate who set popular expectations as low as he possibly could. Why not fill the empty vessel? It made perfect sense for Trump and his allies to turn boring Joe Biden into a sinister communist puppet. The move served three basic purposes: stoke their right-wing base, pit the Democrats against their progressive wing, and avoid having to debate Biden directly because Donald Trump is an idiot. 

Debating Boogeyman Bernie was easy enough, but had Real Bernie been the nominee, the dynamic would have changed in some very interesting ways. Sanders excels at something that is invaluable for all political leaders: incisive messaging. Instead of promising nothing, he would have countered Trump’s red-baiting head-on by aggressively selling his ideas: “You’re damn right I support Medicare for All and let me tell you why!” Whatever the results on Election Day, his base would have emerged with hardened convictions and itching for a fight. 

A moot point of course: the Bernie constituency did not harden. Instead, it was defeated, co-opted, and now discarded, left to wallow in uncertainty about its future. Bernie lost because the Establishment rigged the primary—not with mail-in ballots and computer hacks, but with fear: fear of losing to Trump. Fear that Bernie accepted from the outset by promising his loyalty to any nominee and justifying his entire campaign by claiming to be America’s Best Trump Remover. Biden crushed that sales pitch the moment he cruised in with an orchestrated wave of big-name endorsements, signaling to all uncertain voters that the party apparatus was his. How could an open hijacker like Bernie be the Unity Candidate? The loyal crew rallied behind its captain and threw the pirate overboard.

Sold one-by-one, his policies were wildly popular, but bundling them together with a big red bow was too hard a sell for Democratic voters who feared Trump above all else. When Bernie lost the primary, he lost his podium as well. He spent the rest of the election shunted off in a corner, working quietly for Biden’s coalition to “save America” from total meltdown. There was nowhere left to go on the path he had set for himself.

How did that coalition treat him? Bernie wanted Medicare for All. The DNC Platform Committee would not even accept a universal program for children. In 1998, Bill Clinton called for lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 55. In 2020, Biden said “lower it to 60,” framing it as a generous concession to Bernie’s eager young whippersnappers. When Bernie delegates pushed for a move back to Clinton’s original proposal, the Committee shot that down too.

Medicare is for Seniors Only, and Biden has been quite firm on that principle. Nor was his public option a genuine concession. His campaign was happy to paste it on the website, but Biden played it down the instant Trump held his feet to the fire, claiming that it would only be a Medicaid-style program for the destitute.1

The American Left is being buried in coalitions that treat us like dirt. We beg them, appease them, and submit to their abuse. Then they still fail, despite all our efforts to prevent it, and each failure deepens our dependency on them. For decades, we have been hopelessly addicted to Democrats.

Let 2020 be the final relapse. We must be our own captains and build our own ship: a self-assured, self-reliant movement with no divided loyalties. A fearless movement powered by millions who cannot be cowed or manipulated. Millions who know exactly what we stand for; who are sold on both our policies and the big red bow that ties them together.

An independent, socialist, working-class party.

Who Will Build the Ship?

Such tired old words! They are usually where reflection ends, because they are infinitely harder to make real.

Will the Squad build the Ship? Will Omar, Tlaib, Pressley, Ocasio-Cortez, and the rest who won their primaries this year form a Democratic Socialist Party? Before socialists rush to take orders from them, the Squad’s track record deserves a partial review. They have:

    • Firmly backed Medicare for All (all of them).
    • Voted for a $2.7 trillion-dollar Pentagon budget (AOC, Tlaib).
    • Endorsed Bernie Sanders (AOC, Omar, Tlaib).
    • Endorsed Elizabeth Warren (Pressley).
    • Held a sit-in at Nancy Pelosi’s office (AOC).
    • Called Nancy Pelosi “Mama Bear” (AOC).
    • Called for defunding the police (AOC).
    • Held a photo-op with the NYPD (AOC).
    • Fired her chief of staff for annoying Democrats (AOC).
    • Slammed the Democratic Party as incompetent (AOC).

Suspend all moral judgments. Just ask from a distance: are these the actions of a disciplined socialist movement with a clear political strategy? Or are they the actions of a loose, informal circle of left-wing Democrats?

It is the latter, of course. Just like Bernie, members of the Squad are grappling with divided loyalties, balancing their genuine desire for progress with their obligations to a party that wants none of it. There has been much talk in DSA of launching a “dirty break”: having socialists run within Democratic primaries and one day splitting off to form a party of their own. But there is no evidence that anyone in the Squad has ambitions to do this. Unlike Bernie, they have spent their entire political careers working within the Democratic Party. Even if they do have secret plans, ordinary socialists are not privy to them and will have no say in how they play out.

DSA has thoroughly confused itself by viewing the Squad as its rightful leaders. A clear majority of DSA members want to chart a course away from the Democrats, but the Squad’s theory of change is based on “winning the soul” of their party. This is quite different from our mission to build an independent socialist movement.

If the Squad will not build the ship, then what about organized labor? If we stay patient and work hard within the unions, could they eventually toughen up to create an American Labor Party? Perhapsbut they will have us waiting for quite a while. For over eighty years the U.S. labor movement has functioned as an appendage of the Democratic Party. It has millions of members, but they are demoralized, dominated by stagnant leadership, and suffering from decades of decline. The Left certainly needs to rebuild labor, but trying to do so as isolated individuals is a vain abdication of responsibility. The Democrats have the labor movement in a political stranglehold, and to break it we must create a political alternative. Many times in history, it has been a left party that organizes and revitalizes the unions, rather than the other way around. Nor are labor-based parties guaranteed to be friendly to socialists—the purge of Jeremy Corbyn and the British Labour Left should give pause to would-be American Laborites. Enough waiting based on hypotheticals. The time for independent politics is now.

If we need an independent party now, then what should it look like? One option is to cast the net as wide as we possibly can. Throw the s-word out and join with every left-leaning person we can find to form a broad-based progressive party. The party could appeal on just a few policies that are already highly popular, like Medicare for All, and de-emphasize other issues that “divide us.”

It’s a tempting idea. Ditching socialism could take the heat off our backs and make growth much easier in the short term. There is already an organization that is trying to do this: the Movement for a People’s Party. Led by former Bernie staffer Nick Brana, it is determined to set up a “new nationally-viable progressive party.” It has recruited tens of thousands of supporters and an impressive lineup of high-profile speakers, from Marianne Williamson to Jesse Ventura. Running on a platform loosely modeled on that of Bernie’s 2016 campaign, it hopes to flip congressional seats in 2022 and win the presidency in 2024.

Although MPP’s ambition is admirable, the recent track record of “left populism” does not bode well for them. Populist coalitions boom and bust; they rise to power only to implement austerity; they speak in simplistic terms of “the People” and “the Elite” that impede more sophisticated class-based analyses. Their frantic rush for the presidency is quite unwise, as is their desire to conjure up an instant majority. Socialists would do well to remember the fate of America’s original Populist Party: cooptation in 1896 by a Democratic presidential candidate who adopted their demand for free coinage of silver.

Marxist political strategist Mike Macnair describes this impatient approach to politics as “conning the working class into power.” Karl Marx had similar warnings to his contemporaries in 1850:

[The faction opposing us regards] not the real conditions but a mere effort of will as the driving force of the revolution. Whereas we say to the workers: ‘You will have to go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil wars and national struggles not only to bring about a change in society but also to change yourselves, and prepare yourselves for the exercise of political power.’

Socialists should be gearing up for this long-term political struggle. We see the obstacles in front of us in a way that catch-all “progressives” cannot. Progressives hold a powerless but accepted niche within the American political system. It is easy for them to cheerfully dream of “taking back our democracy” and “advancing the American experiment.” Socialists have much weaker roots. Constantly derided as un-American, they are driven to question the dominant culture and the entire political system.

This political system is explicitly designed to “restrain the democratic spirit.” The president is not elected by popular vote. The Senate, with total control over cabinet and judicial appointments, vastly overrepresents conservative white voters, and its members serve staggered six-year terms. This is to say nothing of the Supreme Court, whose members serve for life and claim the right to strike down any legislation as they see fit.

The add-ons are helpful as well. Ballot access laws prop up an artificial two-party system, barring all third parties from meaningfully contesting elections. Millions of felons are disenfranchised. Gerrymandering and voter suppression are rampant. Virtually all elections are in single-member districts—winner-take-all.

“But the Founding Fathers intended it this way!” the conservatives screech when pressed for any progressive reform. “You can’t just change it on a whim!”

Meanwhile, they impose their own changes. They pack the courts, purge the voter rolls, and impose right-wing minority rule on the entire country. The Democratic Party will continue to submit to it for years to come because it is equally loyal to this tired Old Regime.

What is needed is not just a break with the Democrats, but a complete break in our way of conceptualizing political power. Will socialists continue to campaign for catch-all progressives, for left Democrats and marginal third parties? Or will we introduce something completely new and unprecedented to American politics—something that challenges not just the rules but the institutions that make them?

There will be no victory for the Left within the established constitutional order. It was designed to keep uppity leftists out of power. Conservatives know this full well. We will never win if we play by their rules. Our job is to develop a coherent strategy to attack their deliberately incoherent political system. A strategy based on incisive messaging, political independence, and a national struggle for power.

Just to be clear: from this point on, when I say “we” I mean DSA. For all its flaws, it is the flagship organization for American socialists. Where its competitors have three or four-digit memberships, its rolls will soon break 100,000. It is the ideal place to hammer out some kind of future for ourselves. 

No individual can do it alone. But just to get the ball rolling, I would propose the following:

A TWELVE STEP PROGRAM FOR SOCIALISTS

(To Break Our Addiction to Democrats) 

1)  Declare political independence.

Remember what Joe Biden said at the first debate to counter Trump’s idiotic redbaiting. He said “I am the Democratic Party.”Don’t hate him! It was true, and it was actually quite clever of Joe. He was leading a messy coalition and he stepped up to assert responsibility for it. With those words, he wiped out the Bernie movement and made it crystal clear what the Democratic Party is about.

Now, remember how Bernie countered his own redbaiters when his campaign was just getting started. He gave a speech about “what democratic socialism means to me.” Do you see the difference here? One man is speaking assertively about an entire political coalition. The other is speaking on behalf of himself to humanize the s-word and make it less intimidating. But in doing so, he is stripping it of any standardized definition.

Is socialism an organized political movement or is it a slogan, a vague personal philosophy? Right now it is mostly the latter in the United States. Popular understandings of the term range from “equality” to “government ownership” to “talking to people, being social … getting along with people.”

If socialism is no more than a slogan, perhaps we should simply abandon it. The entire point of sloganeering is to popularize unpopular ideas. When the slogan alienates people and has no substance, it is useless. 

It’s not quite that simple, of course. As conservatives love to say, we can’t erase our past, and picking a feel-good label for ourselves will not necessarily protect us. The Right will always be pinning the red bow on anything left of Mussolini. Just ask Podemos (and Joe Biden)!

Moreover, socialism is useful because it appeals to a critical target audience: young, downwardly mobile, working-class people who are already skeptical of American capitalism. Anyone can claim to be a progressive, from Maoists to Nancy Pelosi. Socialism is a knife that cuts us apart from the crowd; it has already captured the public’s attention. We just need to make sure that we cut ourselves into an organized political constituency and not a rebellious fashion trend.

DSA should act less like Bernie and more like Joe. It should step up and say, “DSA is the Socialist Movement.” When asked what socialism is, it should give a coherent definition. I will not presume to have a full answer here, but we should be clear that socialism is a mission to bring freedom and democracy to the working class—and that mission will require regime change. Moreover, because most self-professed socialists in America are also communists, perhaps we should be more straightforward about that when asked. A classless, stateless, communist society is our end goal—give or take a few generations.

That is how DSA should define itself publicly. It should also change the way it describes itself to members. It could put out a statement, even if it is completely internal, announcing that DSA considers itself an independent socialist party and expects members to conduct themselves accordingly. It will not have legal status as a party, but that doesn’t matter. Many American socialists, from Seth Ackerman to Howie Hawkins, have acknowledged the need for flexibility on this question. Because state governments dictate the structure of legally recognized parties, we should simply reject their regulatory frameworks and define for ourselves what a party is. Given the public’s understandable impulse to dismiss conventional third parties, we could continue to refer to ourselves officially as “DSA,” “the Socialist Movement,” or anything similar. Our actions will cement our political independence, not the formality of sticking the p-word in our official title.

There is nothing particularly misleading about this (if leaving out the p-word is opportunistic, then so was Rosa Luxemburg’s party). From a Marxist perspective, a communist party is a movement—a structured, organized, revolutionary political movement.2  Framing the party in these terms is therefore perfectly honest and acceptable. It would also subvert the shallow liberal conception of movements as flash mobs and Twitter hashtags. 

All of these maneuvers may seem pretentious and overbearing, but they are necessary. The Right and Center have no qualms about defining socialism for the public. They define it as “misery and destitution.” Nor are the Left Democrats afraid to advance vague, meandering definitions that leave the Right howling and the fence-sitters completely unconvinced. 

The momentum is with DSA. Even Trotskyist sects acknowledge this by routinely imploring DSA to form a new party that they can “affiliate” with. We have the power to step up and assert collective responsibility for the American socialist movement. It’s us, the Right, or the wavering politicians. Let there be no more talk about “What Democratic Socialism Means to Me.” From now on, the phrase should be “What the Socialist Movement Demands.”

2) Hold annual conventions.

This is a short point. For years DSA has held conventions on a biannual basis. Today that will not be enough. The United States has become rather unstable; conditions can change in a heartbeat and we will have to adapt to them quickly. To keep up with the pace of events, we should hold conventions every year, constantly reevaluating our platform and strategy.

3) Form statewide organizations.

What is the mourning cry of a defeated progressive? It’s this:

“Oh well. I’ll just get involved in local politics. That’s where the real change happens anyway.”

A noble thought; every one of us has had it at some point. Unfortunately, it reflects an unconscious peasant mentality. Giving up on large-scale political change, the progressive returns to their village to do what little they can.

“I would never challenge His Majesty the King. Better to cultivate my little garden.”

A garden is not an island. American cities have more autonomy than their counterparts in many other countries, but that is not saying much. State and federal policies shape every aspect of local government. They prohibit cities from requiring paid sick leave for workers. They require them to accept fracking within their boundaries. They force towns to base their speed limits on pre-existing traffic flows, ratcheting up car speeds and slaughtering pedestrians. 

When we confine ourselves to local politics, we become functionaries of the capitalist state. We also play into the reactionary old American idea that all problems are best solved locally, that large-scale social programs can never be trusted. We must build an opposition to the capitalist state at every level, and that means creating strong regional organizations. A DSA caucus called the Collective Power Network raised this point quite effectively in 2019. What they forgot to fully address is the appropriate scale for these regional entities: the state level. The Republicans and Democrats have their state parties. So should we. 

“But that’s modeling ourselves on the bourgeois state!” cry the anarchists. 

No, it is laying siege to the state. Our state chapters will run on simple majoritarian lines; they will not have Senates and Supreme Courts and Governors with veto power. What they will have is the capacity to run statewide campaigns and contest state policies that impact the lives of working-class people. They will also encourage local chapters to collaborate, improve outreach outside the big cities, and alleviate some of the burden on the national organization—which has been charged with the impossible task of managing 235 locals.

Admittedly, there are some sparsely populated states with very few DSA chapters, and in these areas statewide organization could be impractical, at least in the short term. A United Dakota, North and South, might make sense for DSA’s purposes. Fusing states for tactical reasons is perfectly acceptable; the only inadvisable move would be creating regions that cut states into multiple pieces, preventing unified statewide campaigns.

Although a national organizing drive would be invaluable, DSA’s local groups can take the initiative right now. There is already an easy, underutilized process to integrate DSA chapters. According to DSA’s constitution, just two or more locals may petition to form a statewide organization, pending approval by the National Political Committee and a majority of locals within the state. A similar process is available for locals seeking to form regional organizations. 

4) Nurture a committed membership base.

What does it mean to be a DSA member? One impulse is to make it an extremely demanding, prestigious title—the Navy SEALs of activism. In his classic text on Marxist strategy What Is to Be Done?, Vladimir Lenin called for a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries. Should American socialists aim for the same thing?

No, because for Lenin, ruthless discipline was a necessary evil, not a virtue. Russian revolutionaries operated in a Tsarist police state where the slightest misstep invited discovery, police raids, and mass arrests. The United States is in many ways shockingly repressive, but it is not a tsarist autocracy. In our context, socialists have much more to learn from socialist parties outside the Russian Empire that maintained more open membership structures. They cultivated mass movements—millions strong—to build a vibrant oppositional culture against capitalism. They offered social services, opened libraries and grocery stores, set up cycling clubs, choir societies, picnics and social outings. Germany and Austria offer intriguing historical examples. Today, Bolivian socialists are doing similar inspirational work.

But we don’t just have to look abroad. There are non-socialist, all-American organizations in the United States that show us what dedicated membership looks like. In 2015 the National Rifle Association had 5 million dues-paying members, and nearly 15 million Americans identified with the organization whether they paid dues or not. It cultivates group identity with a wide array of community services—including an official magazine, concealed carry insurance, firearms training for millions, and opportunities to join its 125,000-strong army of training instructors. 

Yes, the NRA is a reactionary, racist organization, riddled with corruption and now in decline. We still have much to learn from it (not to mention the churches that, for better or worse, provide millions of Americans with social services and community life). There is thrilling potential for secular left-wing institution-building, from tenant unions and worker centers to art circles and sports clubs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, hiking clubs and other outdoor activities could be a particularly powerful social service, breaking people out of their isolation and alleviating mental health burdens. 

These ideas go beyond feel-good charity work. They are structured party programs, designed to build a massive support base that can be deployed for confrontational political action. They will cost quite a bit of cash.

This brings us to a crucially important, non-negotiable element of dedicated membership: monthly dues. Dues are the life-blood of a mass movement; they foster group identity, incentivize recruitment, and provide the party with a steady, predictable stream of revenue.

But what about low-income, working-class people? Couldn’t dues make the movement inaccessible to them?

Quite the opposite. Dues can be tapered based on income, and studies show that the poor give a greater portion of their income to charity than the rich. Asking people to pay a steady monthly fee is much more reasonable than bombarding them with fundraising emails that endlessly scream “give, give, give!” Nor is volunteer work a more accessible basis for membership than dues. Time is money, and every hour that a person spends with us is an hour that they could have spent working an extra shift or taking care of their children.

Dues allow us to make reasonable asks of others and avoid activist burnout. We don’t guilt-trip the single parent working two jobs or the exhausted volunteer with mental health burdens. We say: “Don’t worry. Take a break as long as you need to. Just help us stay afloat and keep paying your dues.” There will always be varying levels of involvement, and not all of us will be red Navy SEALs. Anyone who supports our mission, votes for our candidates, and pays their dues deserves to be called a member of the Socialist Movement.

We must still take measures to promote membership engagement. Only active members should get a vote in party affairs, and we should encourage all members to come to at least a few key events every year. All chapters need a point person to welcome newcomers and help them forge connections with other members, preventing locals from becoming insular social clubs. We will offer engaging, freewheeling education groups to introduce new members to our politics. All of this is necessary to make ourselves an “outward-looking minority.”

A key task for DSA will be to reevaluate and standardize its dues structure and perhaps ask a little more of its members. DSA membership is worth more than the current 67-cent monthly minimum. Rather than dismantling dues, as some anarchist-leaning caucuses have suggested, we must embrace and celebrate them as the foundation of a self-reliant movement.

5) Adopt a nationwide political platform.

DSA is currently working on a platform to synthesize its political demands. This is a very exciting development and an important step to assert ourselves as a distinct force in American politics. We should develop a truly revolutionary program that, if fully implemented, would hand power to our country’s working class and place society on a socialist transition out of capitalism. We must repeal every law that props up the two-party cartel and eliminate every institution that denies us an authentic majoritarian democracy. Abolish the Senate, abolish the Electoral College, and smash the Supreme Court—send Brett Kavanaugh and all his colleagues packing. 

So that working people can fully participate in political life, we should also demand unimpeded labor rights, a massive reduction in working hours, and a comprehensive welfare state that would make Scandinavians blush. Create programs to reduce the power of bureaucrats and give ordinary workers administrative skills; promote worker self-management in all industries. Place the commanding heights of the economy under public ownership and rapidly phase out fossil fuel production. Dismantle the repressive arms of the state: abolish the military and policing as we know it and replace both with a democratically-accountable popular militia. This last point will be challenging yet still indispensable. We must transform the empty demand for “police abolition” into appealing slogans and substantive policy proposals. 

We have our work cut out for us: we must develop a comprehensive program and find ways to promote it to a mass audience. Even so, we will not be working in isolation. We can learn from the history of past revolutions and from the platforms of our predecessors in socialist parties across the world. 

Is this project too arrogant? Will we alienate ordinary people if we draft a comprehensive platform instead of a short list of popular demands? If we treat the platform as an inalterable holy text, then yes. If we leave it open to regular revision and use it as part of our political education process, then no. The intuitive red-meat demands are indispensable: we should certainly continue to advance Medicare for All and other programs that improve the quality of life for the working class. But we will never achieve those demands unless we attack the political order that is making them unachievable. Our platform must point towards a break with the capitalist state and fight for an authentic working-class democracy. We need to build a constituency that believes in the legitimacy of that fight. A “political revolution” will not be enough to defeat America’s reactionary Old Regime. No, that will require a break of epoch-making proportions, a world-historic social revolution.

6) Run dedicated organizers for office.

Many “revolutionary” organizations have an impulse to steer clear of electoral politics. Stumping for office might seem to legitimize a system we want to overturn, so why do it?

The obvious answer is that the state has tremendous power and it already has legitimacy for most people. It will be here for quite a while. Retreating from the political arena does nothing to stop that. More importantly, electoral work done right can erode the legitimacy of the system and help us win the support of millions. Electoral campaigns can be used as a bully pulpit to attack the system and demand a new political order. Lenin did this, the German socialists did this, and so can we.   

Electoral politics can also embolden and merge with the combative worker and tenant struggles that often capture leftists’ attention. Bernie Sanders taught us that when he personally manned picket lines, and West Virginia teachers showed it when they drew inspiration from Bernie to go on strike.

What we need to avoid is getting sucked into another abusive coalition like Bernie. The key to this is recognizing the Democratic Party as the irredeemable zombie that it is. Bernie tried to heal the zombie and he got bitten hard. Instead of collaborating with the neoliberals, we should strive for total independence and self-sufficiency in our electoral bids. DSA could train and run gifted organizers who promise to coordinate their campaigns, accept the party platform, and vote as one bloc when elected. Candidates would be entirely free to personally disagree with elements of the platform and push for changes through internal party discussion. In the halls of power, however, they would be expected to act as one team, with accountability to the entire membership movement.

We see a preview of this approach in New York, where DSA recently ran a victorious slate of insurgent socialist candidates. If we hardened and expanded this approach nationwide, it would put us to the left of even the Squad–whose members have hesitated to endorse other primary challengers after winning office themselves. 

We would not align with the Democrats. Instead, wherever they won office, our candidates would form an independent socialist caucus. Both parties would be welcome to meet with us to discuss policy–at the opposite end of a long negotiating table. 

This approach would not win us much love from either side. Legislative committee appointments would be sparing or nonexistent, but that is okay. Establishment politicians may hammer us as useless backbenchers, but we would simply counter by pointing out how useless they are, listing off all the ways they have betrayed their constituents in the past. We would make use of our extra free time by serving as relentless advocates for the communities that they have ignored, publicizing socialist policy proposals, providing constituent services, and assisting local organizing projects. To show their dedication, our elected officials would refuse to take more than a typical working-class salary and donate the rest to our community programs. 

The value of electoral work done right cannot be understated. Many “revolutionary” leftists begrudgingly accept its necessity as a type of “propaganda,” but what passes for propaganda on the Left is often just obnoxious megaphone yammering. It would be better to describe it as a form of organizing, as outreach to carve out a constituency that believes in our cause. 

One popular idea in DSA is that candidates should always “run to win.” It is correct that we should be running professional campaigns, with talented candidates who truly want to come out victorious. If we finish with single-digit results, that is probably a sign that we ran our campaign poorly and need to reevaluate our strategy. However, it’s important to remember that the path to victory can be longer than one election cycle, and an honorable defeat can still build the movement. Cori Bush did not win her initial campaign in 2018, but now she is headed to Congress to join the Squad. Nor did Bernie Sanders win his first independent House bid in 1988–that took a second try in 1990. If we abandon every “loser” the moment they fall short, we may end up discarding capable leaders who still have future potential.

In the long run, our goal should be to run candidates for every office possible, even where we cannot win. This boosts our visibility as a national political movement and will help us extend our presence outside the large urban centers. Like Bernie, we must eagerly engage with rural, small-town, and Republican-leaning voters. If we abstain for fear of losing, we will never be able to build a truly national constituency.

7) Stop endorsing outside the party.

Once we have a training program for this new approach to electoral work, we must wind down the faucet of endorsements. DSA should focus all of its energy, messaging, and resources on promoting its own candidates: active, committed members who promise to uphold the platform. The only exception would be strategic collaboration with candidates from other independent left parties. Electoral pacts to avoid competition in certain districts may occasionally be necessary.

Cutting off endorsements may seem like a sectarian move, but it is perfectly reasonable. AOC and other Squad members are sparing with their primary endorsements; they have not mounted a massive assault against their Democratic colleagues. They have pragmatic obligations to attend to, and so do we. We should pour all our energy into cultivating talented candidates who are embedded in our organization and committed to building an independent movement. When we endorse candidates who are not directly accountable to our membership, we muddy the waters on what DSA stands for.

None of this means that we will run around viciously denouncing left Democrats and other progressive candidates. They are not responsible for this crisis. We will sometimes criticize their political strategy, but our fiery speeches will be reserved for the ghouls who actually hold the cards: Biden, McConnell, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and so on. When our rabble-rousing socialist backbenchers take up their seats, they may want to collaborate with the major parties from time to time, and left Democrats could end up playing a valuable role as mediators. And who knows? Some of them may be impressed by our new brand of politics and join our ranks. The goal is not to be sectarian. We are just stepping up to become self-reliant, to make our own independent mark on the world.

8) Choose ballot lines at the state level.

Should we keep running our candidates in Democratic primaries, or should we rush to set up our own ballot lines?

Every state has its unique convoluted rules, so there’s no easy answer to this question. That’s the point. Our system is designed to encourage incoherent thinking, to fragment and divide power to make majoritarian politics impossible. When future schoolteachers describe the decline and fall of the United States, they will point to its divided political system, the fifty jurisdictions marked out on a map. The children will laugh out loud and ask how it lasted so long.

The states have had third parties running like gerbils on a wheel, focusing all their energy on petition gathering and hopeless presidential campaigns (required to secure ballot access). Even staunch third party advocates like Hawkins know that it’s time to break the wheel and try something new. Perhaps we should ditch the ballot access crusades and just run nominal independents. That would allow us to stop running top-heavy presidential tickets, to be more discriminating about which elections we target. An interesting map comes together with a glance at state ballot access laws for House candidates:

Source: https://ballotpedia.org/Main_Page

Green states are reasonably friendly to independent bids. They require the same number of petition signatures as major-party candidates. Or, if the requirement is unequal, the total number of signatures needed is still 1,000 or fewer. Red states have clearly unequal requirements, although they are not necessarily insurmountable. Blue states have very different procedures for major party and independent candidates and are difficult to compare directly.

It’s clear that there are weak spots. California, Texas, and Florida all have equitable access for independents. Why run Democrats for the House in any of those easy states? 

Once we have dedicated state-level organizations, they will be able to make these judgment calls decisively. In New Jersey, where only 100 signatures are required for independent House bids and party machines brazenly rig their primaries, “clean break now” is an excellent approach. 

In Georgia, the rules for independents are extremely inhospitable and primaries are open to voters from any party. There, it would make sense to antagonize the Democrats with a large slate of DSA primary insurgents. For the sake of clear messaging, ballot line choices should generally be consistent across the entire state. We would confuse primary voters if we ran an independent in one congressional district, a Democrat in the one next door, and a Republican for a county office that overlaps both districts.

Even when we run in a party primary, we should still run our candidates on the DSA platform and be committed to political independence. The line could be this: “I’m running as a Democrat. It was the only way to get on the ballot. Once I’m elected, I’ll renounce my party affiliation and serve with the Socialist Independents.”

Off they will go to join the rest of our rabble-rousing backbenchers. Under this framework, the “dirty break” is no longer some vague goal that we banish to the distant future. It is something that we do every time we win an election, enraging both capitalist parties. Call it the filthy break – perhaps we will even run Socialist Republicans in Montana! Eventually, both parties should be expected to crack down and pass laws to close up their primaries. Hopefully, we will already have a mass constituency by that point. 

Right now, DSA prioritizes Democratic bids and neglects independent campaigns. That order should be reversed. Clean independent bids should always be prioritized, wherever we can realistically get a couple strong campaigns on the ballot. They establish our independence and make it clear to the public that we are not Democrats—that we are out to break the two-party system.

“But you’ll never win as an independent!” some will protest. “I did!” Bernie Sanders would have replied in 1990. It’s an uphill battle, but not an impossible one.

Vote-splitting is another valid concern. Unfortunately, it is a fact of life in any winner-take-all election. It happens in Democratic primaries (peace among worlds, Liz!). Even the fear of vote-splitting can do great damage to insurgent primary campaigns. NYC-DSA learned that the hard way when self-appointed socialist kingmaker Sean McElwee released a poll to deliberately tank Samelys López’s congressional bid, claiming that she would split the vote and put a conservative Democrat in office.

Vote-splitting will happen, and we will have to find ways to reduce the public’s fear of it. Establishing ourselves as a viable force worth splitting the vote for will be one important step. We will have to pick our campaigns carefully in the beginning to build capacity and establish a political foothold. But from the very outset, we must make it clear that we are intent on further expansion. The Socialist Movement has the right to run its candidates across the board, just like any other political party.

9) Target the House of Representatives.

What made the Bernie movement so powerful, so terrifying, so utterly invigorating for its participants? It was a national struggle for power.

That point deserves to be repeated: participation in the Bernie movement was participation in a national struggle for power. In the campaign’s words, it was a mission to “defeat Donald Trump and transform America.”

America alienates the U.S. left. We are not nationalists; we are not patriots. We reject much of the dominant culture. This makes it difficult for us to conceive of politics as a nationally coordinated struggle. It is much easier to think in terms of local organizing or international solidarity. Both are crucial projects. The working class has no country; the socialist movement must be international, and our work is hopeless without effective local organizers on the ground. 

But the best thing we can do for our local organizers is to integrate them into a coordinated movement for transformative change. The best thing that we can do to foster internationalism is build a real, unified revolutionary organization in America, a powerful socialist movement that can give inspiration to others around the world. 

If we play our hand well, our next national struggle will be different from Bernie’s in some important ways. We will be more ambitious, more independent, and less deferential to established institutions. Instead of trying to redeem the Democratic Party, we will oppose it head-on alongside the GOP. Instead of seeking a “political revolution” within the capitalist state, we will call for a world-historic revolution and a new political order: an authentic working-class democracy. How can we integrate our union work, tenant struggles, and electoral campaigns into this grand vision? Do we run another presidential campaign?

Not in 2024. Barring something completely unforeseen, we will not have the numbers, organization, and high-profile leaders necessary to mount an interesting presidential bid. We would waste precious volunteer hours collecting signatures and then come out with 1% of the vote. It would be hopping right back on the gerbil wheel. Once we have a larger base, we can contest the presidency (on a platform of abolishing the presidency by revolution).

But our main target should be the House of Representatives. It is a federal institution, elected every two years in local districts that are small enough for us to realistically target. We can run a National Slate of candidates, from Washington to Florida, from Michigan to Maine, and talk it up in our stump speeches. We can use the House as a national soapbox to publicize our demands. We will be speaking to America coast-to-coast, raising our public profile and giving a boost to all of our state and local candidates. The House is the most important electoral institution for us to contest in the years to come.

We can begin in the urban deep blue districts that Democrats have dominated, plus some red district bids to expand our repertoire. This will offer political choice to one-party districts that have had none for years, giving us a chance to establish viability. Then, as quickly as we can, we should strive to contest all 434 congressional seats, forcing a messy national referendum on our political demands every two years.

The next three points could be among the most important demands.

10) Organize for electoral reform.

We must demand an end to the two-party system. We should fight for easy ballot access for all political parties, ranked-choice voting and multi-member electoral districts, proportional representation in Congress, and anything else that gives working-class people more choice at the ballot box. In the wake of the 2020 Census and the GOP’s electoral fraud witch-hunt, a new wave of gerrymandering and voter suppression will be arriving very soon. In this political climate, our campaigns for electoral reform should be connected to wider efforts to protect voting rights, such as citizen redistricting panels and automatic voter registration.  

We must integrate these demands and advance them with incisive slogans, playing on popular antipathy to entrenched politicians and the two-party system. Many states have ballot initiative processes that we could use to our advantage, mobilizing voters to pass electoral reforms at the ballot box. Such campaigns have already been mounted by nonpartisan groups, successfully in Michigan, Maine, and Alaska (and unsuccessfully in Massachusetts). Although petition circulation requirements are often arduous, a volunteer-powered mass movement may well be able to blast through the obstacles.

Source: https://ballotpedia.org/States_with_initiative_or_referendum

Electoral reform campaigns are one more way to establish our political independence. They will also help us establish that socialists are champions of a richer democracy (and that the capitalist parties are not!).

11) Shoot down war budgets.

The U.S. spends more on its military than the next ten countries combined. Trillion-dollar slush funds, poured into graft, arms manufacturers, right-wing dictatorships, and bloody imperialistic ventures all over the world. That is no secret; it is common knowledge to tens of millions of Americans.

We cut ourselves apart through total noncooperation. We should refuse to vote for any spending bill that pours one more penny into the bloated military, police departments, or any other repressive capitalist institution.

If we do this, will we cause endless government shutdowns? Unlikely. The Republicans and Democrats will pass their “bipartisan” budgets right over our heads. Drop a heavy boulder into a creek, and the water finds its way around it. But it gives us something to stand on to capture public attention, to erode the legitimacy of an institution that Americans are taught to view as sacrosanct.

12) Demand a new constitution.

What is a demand that would truly set us apart, that would bring the Right’s worst nightmares to life?

Demand a New Union. A new constitution, developed by mass popular participation. Not an Article V convention. No state-by-state ratification. An accessible process that everyone within the borders of the United States can contribute to, combining grassroots direct democracy with a National Constituent Assembly. The final ratification would be by national referenduma simple majority vote.

In a free society, everyone gets a say in the social contract that they live under. That is not what happened when the current constitution was written. Women had no say; black people had no say; working-class people had no say. We demand that the living, breathing people of the United States be given the right to determine its future. We demand a constitution that guarantees real democracy, majority rule, housing, healthcareeconomic rights. 

We will be quite clear about the additional reforms that we would advocate throughout the process: abolish the Senate, abolish the presidency, abolish the Supreme Court. All power to an expanded, improved, democratized House of Representatives.

“We demand that Congress initiate this process, but if it does not, the people have a right to do so themselves.”

There is a legitimate argument to be made that the Constitution can be legally amended by referendum. This deserves an article of its own, and we should certainly invoke constitutional law as needed. Of course, none of our opponents will take our arguments too seriously. Revolutions make their own laws, and what we demand is nothing less than a world-historic revolution against the forces of Old America.

Let the Trumpers fume over the socialist plot to destroy the Constitution. Let the liberals lecture us about the dangers of norm erosion. Obama can start an NGO to educate young people about the beauty of our institutions and the farsighted wisdom of our Founding Fathers. We alienate most people at first, but we strike a chord with a sizable minority. And every year, we build it out, leaning into every crisis, growing, until finally something snaps.

That is the last point. To recap all twelve:

    1. Declare political independence.
    2. Hold annual conventions.
    3. Form statewide organizations.
    4. Cultivate a committed membership base. 
    5. Adopt a nationwide political platform.
    6. Run dedicated organizers for office.
    7. Stop endorsing outside the party.
    8. Choose ballot lines at the state level.
    9. Target the House of Representatives.
    10.  Agitate for electoral reform.
    11.  Shoot down war budgets.
    12.  Demand a new constitution.

Perhaps these suggestions are unrealistic. They may demand too much of a small organization like DSA; they may overestimate the potential of the era we are living in. But even if we try them and fail, at least we will fail on our own terms, in a more instructive way than ever before. Progressive reform movements rise and fall, both inside and outside the Democratic Party. For decades they have led us to defeat, cooptation, and humiliation. Many generations of the American Left have grown exhausted with this ritual, but instead of building a real alternative, the disenchanted vent their frustration with performative action. Endless rallies, megaphone chants, and radical posturing take us nowhere. Localist organizing projects “feel good,” but they completely lose sight of the national struggle for power.

“And you ought to be careful of them, they’ll overthrow you too.”
–Trump to Biden on the Left

What we need are performative restraint and political aggression. Independent politics is not a distant end goal; it is not something we earn after working hard enough for the Democratic coalition. It is the heart of the socialist project, the foundation of effective revolutionary struggle, and something that we ought to start doing right now. The time has come to forge a new strategy that draws on the best of the Bernie campaign and everything that came before it. A fearless strategy, hardheaded yet still principled, that never loses sight of the real end goal: a world-historic, working-class revolution in the USA.

And the goal of this piece is to contribute some starting points. 

The Problem of Unity: A Comparative Analysis

In a comparative study of Austro-Marxism, the French Socialist movement, and Bolshevism, Medway Baker argues for the left to seek unity around a programme of constitutional disloyalty.

“May Day demonstration in Putilov” by Boris Kustodiev (1906)

What does party-building look like? This has been a topic of great contention in the past months and years, especially as conflicts within and about the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) come to the fore, and as a “base-building” tendency has begun to develop on the left, most notably around the Marxist Center organization (MC). That this question is once again on the left’s radar is a sign of organizational and intellectual resurgence in our ranks, and this must be celebrated. But in the process of these debates, misconceptions have been propagating, in large part because of the linguistic baggage inherited from various traditions: “dual power”, “base-building”, “cadre formation”, “mass work”, and much more. 

These terminological debates, although sometimes useful, often obscure the core issues at hand. In an article published by Regeneration (MC’s publication), Comrade JC counterposes “mass work” to “base-building”, proposes the “creation of autonomous mass organizations capable of collective action to further class power”, and claims that programmatic unity “amounts to a return to… blind-alley sectarianism”. JC, mischaracterizing the concept of programmatic unity, asserts that “for a socialist intelligentsia largely cut off from the wider working class and lacking meaningful structures of counter-power, programmatic unity puts the cart before the horse.” JC’s solution is “cadre formation through mass work”—a nice-sounding phrase, but hardly a new idea. This is simply base-building elevated to a strategy, retheorized with a more Marxist-sounding phraseology.1

As I have argued previously, we must be clear about revolutionary strategy if we are to build a communist party.2 This means that a party in formation, even before attaining a mass base, must be built on the basis of a programme. “Cadre formation through mass work” is itself the process of party-building, and unity within and between cadres can only be forged on the basis of a shared programme. A party without a programme is no party at all, and a cadre without a party can never hope to win the proletariat’s confidence and take power. 

So the question remains unanswered: What does party-building look like? What does “unity” mean, and how can we transcend the theoretical unity model of the microsects? We will explore these questions by comparing the “fanaticism for unity”3 exemplified by the Austrian Social-Democrats, the debates within French Socialism surrounding prospects for unification with the Communists, and the Bolsheviks’ conduct towards other socialist parties during the October Revolution. We will find that programmatic unity can and must be found through comradely debate and shared struggles, and that unity must be constructed on a shared basis of disloyalty toward the bourgeois constitutional order and democratic centralism: freedom of debate combined with unity in action. 

According to Otto Bauer, a leading member of Austrian Social-Democracy’s left-wing, Austro-Marxism “is the product of unity… [and] an intellectual force which maintains unity…. [It] is nothing but the ideology of unity of the workers’ movement!”4 Drawing on the course of the Second International’s split, he explains: 

“Where the working class is divided, one workers’ party embodies sober, day-to-day Realpolitik, while the other embodies the revolutionary will to attain the ultimate goal. Only where a split is avoided are sober Realpolitik and revolutionary enthusiasm united in one spirit…. The synthesis of the realistic sense of the workers’ movement with the idealistic ardour for socialism… protects us from division…. It is more than a matter of tactics that we always formulate policies which bring together all sections of the working class; that we can only get unity, the highest good, by combining sober realism with revolutionary enthusiasm. This is not a tactical question, it is the principle of class struggle…”5

Bauer clearly bends the stick too far towards unity at any cost. Unity with the sorts of reformist social-traitors who urged workers to war and drowned popular revolts in blood (such as the Ebert government in revolutionary Germany) is neither desirable nor possible. But this must be understood in the context of Austrian Social-Democracy, which—while it failed to offer any opposition to the imperialist war of 1914-18, and should be critiqued for this—was not nearly as bankrupt as German Social-Democracy. The Party initially did support the war effort on defencist grounds—defense of the Austrian proletariat from Russian autocracy—but upon coming to power in the aftermath of the war, the Social-Democrats did not turn the repressive apparatus of the state against the proletariat, but rather sought to neutralize the state’s repressive capacity.6 Bauer analyzed the early Austrian Republic as a state “in which neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat could [rule], both had to divide the power between them.”7 Further, the Austrian Republic’s Social-Democratic government was one of the few to recognize and trade with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.8 We should critique the Austrian Social-Democrats for their timidity and avoidance of using force when given the opportunity (Bauer himself would later do just this)9, but we cannot say that they took an openly counterrevolutionary position when revolution came to Austria and actively sided with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. 

Photo of Otto Bauer

Bauer himself made just such an argument in late 1917 when the left-wing of the Party (to which he then belonged) was agitating for a split. He impressed upon his cothinkers that “such a division would be justified only if the majority of the party were in a position to make compromises with the bourgeois elements of the state. Given such a condition, an independent socialist body might exist to prevent reformism.”10 Bauer argued that such conditions were present in Germany—thus justifying the split of the Independent Social-Democrats (USPD)—but not present in Austria. This raises the question of what actions constitute such collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and why support for the imperialist war does not fulfil this condition; perhaps Bauer was more narrowly concerned with ministerialism and direct attacks on the proletariat, or perhaps it can be explained simply by the fact that he himself failed to oppose the war at the decisive moment and did not want to indict himself.11 However, the extent to which this stance constituted cynical opportunism can and has been argued elsewhere, and is not relevant for our purposes. 

Friedrich Adler, who—unlike Bauer—opposed the war from the very beginning, nevertheless took a parallel stance. He wrote, only several months before his assassination of the Austrian Minister-President: 

“All party activity consists in common action toward the realization of the party program. Every individual act rests on the majority decision of a solidary community. Two dangers threaten the party, one from the side of the majority and one from the side of the minority. The majority is always in danger that its decision does not correspond to the party program, that it contradicts the basic principles of the whole movement which it represents, the principles that give the party meaning. The minority is in danger of destroying the community of action, of not complementing the majority, of going its own way and thereby disturbs the majority decision.”12

In essence, Friedrich Adler believed that even when the majority violated the party’s programmatic unity, it was the duty of the minority to correct the movement’s faulty course by way of both inner-party struggle and independent agitation among the working class13; to be, in essence, an opposition within the party that fought against the sins of the majority while remaining loyal to the party itself. This is a shakier justification than Bauer’s, as Adler fails to define a circumstance under which a split might be acceptable. It is, however, consistent with Adler’s personal relationship to the Party, and should be understood in that context.14 It should also be noted that Adler was a political thinker of less depth and breadth than Bauer, and was not as enmeshed in the practicalities of Party and state politics during this period as Bauer and other Austro-Marxists were. 

In summation, these leftist Austrian Social-Democrats believed that unity of the workers’ movement was essential, even if it meant remaining in a party that violated its own revolutionary (or at least anti-reformist) programme. They are unable to define which conditions would justify a split, outside of vague platitudes. Bauer provides a well-reasoned argument as to why this unity is so important, but he has no answer to the challenge of overcoming reformism. We will see later his failed attempts to rectify this problem following the triumph of fascist counter-revolution in Austria. 

If Austro-Marxism was the “ideology of unity” in practice, then French Socialism saw unity as an essential aspiration which was to be actively pursued. Similarly to Austrian and German Social-Democracy, the French Socialist movement coalesced into a single party throughout the end of the 19th and the dawn of the 20th century, emerging in the form of the French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO) in 1905. It would be sundered in two only 15 years later, with the foundation of the French Communist Party (PCF). More than the Austrian Social-Democrats, the French left-Socialists not only strove to maintain unity within the Party, but also actively sought unity in action and even reunification with the Communist Party. Before moving on to a discussion of reunification efforts between the two workers’ parties, however, it is useful to discuss what unity meant to the SFIO in the first place: on what basis did the French Socialist movement first unify, and what were the outcomes? 

There were several currents which merged into the Party in 1905, but the two most prominent were Guesdism15(named for the political leader Jules Guesde, who was credited with introducing Marxism to France) and Jauressianism (named for the leader Jean Jaurès, a reformist who supported alliances with the bourgeoisie16). The dynamics of these currents and others are not interesting for our purposes, but the manner in which they unified is. 

Jaurès speaks to a crowd

 The Guesdists had the majority at the unification congress, but according to Claude Willard, the foremost historian of Guesdism, it was a “deceptive victory”.17 The programme around which the Party united rejected reformism (although not reforms) and declared its irreconcilable opposition to the bourgeoisie and its state, and proclaimed a “party of class struggle and revolution.” But this was a false programmatic unity: the party apparatus was too decentralised to enforce party discipline, and in practice the programme was violated both by local party organisations and by Socialist parliamentarians. In addition, the “tendencies” inside the Party were essentially “parties within the Party”; Willard notes that “the SFIO, more than a merger, [was] the affixation of assorted ideological and political currents.”18

The existence of factions within a party is, of course, a sign of healthy discourse, which is necessary for a workers’ party to adapt to changing circumstances and remain in constant contact with the workers’ movement in all its diversity. However, for a workers’ party to present a consistent opposition to bourgeois rule and ultimately take power, it must be united in action. That is to say, all sections of the workers’ party, from local cadres to parliamentarians, must conduct their activity on the basis of the party programme, which lays out the path to workers’ rule and communism. When party activists and parliamentarians flout the programme, both democracy and centralism within the party break down, and unity in any meaningful sense is impossible. 

Nevertheless, even this half-unity “constitute[d] a pole of attraction for those who had been repelled by the internecine wars between socialists”: by 1914, the Party’s membership had nearly tripled.19 However, much of this new membership, for one reason or another, was not committed to proletarian revolution, facilitating the Party’s reformist turn.20 When the imperialist war arrived, the Party was torn: many believed it was the duty of all classes to defend the Republic from Prussian militarism; a minority pled for peace, and a few declared the death of the International. The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the formation of the Communist International in 1919 intensified the tensions in the SFIO, and so, in 1920, the majority of delegates at the Tours Congress voted for affiliation to the Comintern and left the SFIO behind. 

This was the beginning of a new era for the French workers’ movement. Not only did the entry of the Communist Party into the political arena have massive implications for France at large, but the inner dynamics of the Socialist Party itself underwent a shift. New personalities emerged into the heights of Socialist politics. Factions which had emerged in response to the war and the Russian Revolution morphed and new factions arose.  

This split must not be understood as a simple split between reformists and revolutionaries. It is perhaps more accurate to understand the Tours Congress as a split within the left-wing camp.21 So what were the dynamics of this split, and of the Socialist Party left behind? 

As the war dragged on and workers revolted in France and across the world, the pro-war majority began to adopt the pacifist rhetoric of the minority, although failing to take an active stance against the war.22 The advent of the Comintern, within this context, divided the Party into three general currents: the right-wing “Resisters”, who supported a continuation of the Second International and rejected the application of Bolshevik methods to Western Europe; the centrist “Reconstructors”, who also rejected the application of Bolshevism to France but defended the October Revolution, and wished to “reconstruct” a united International “with the still-useable materials of the Second and the new framework of the Third”; and the left-wing, which supported joining the Comintern without reservations (or, at least, any stated reservations).23 

Léon Blum, for the Resisters, defended the SFIO’s unity on the basis of the socialist pluralism which had characterized French Socialism from 1905. He argued that the Comintern, after the Second Congress which had laid out the famous “21 Conditions” to which all member parties had to submit, was ideologically rigid and wouldn’t allow for internal factions and debate. In his famous speech to the Congress, in which he pleaded for broad proletarian unity, he proclaimed: 

“Unity in the Party… has, up to today, been a synthetic unity, a harmonic unity; it was a result of all [of the Party’s] forces, and all the tendencies acted together to determine the common axis for action. It is no longer unity in this sense that you seek, it is absolute uniformity and homogeneity. You only want men in your party who are disposed, not only to act together, but to commit to thinking together: your doctrine is fixed, once and for all! Ne variatur! He who does not accept will not enter into your party; he who accepts no longer must leave.”24 

Considering what Bolshevisation would entail for the PCF, Blum’s concerns may not be entirely without basis.25 The Comintern and PCF ultimately did clamp down on internal debate, driving many Communists out into a myriad of sects or back into the arms of the Socialist Party. What Blum fails to acknowledge, however, is that the SFIO’s pluralism was of a type that was unable to enforce unity in action. In practice, due to the Party’s decentralized nature, one militant might agitate for total hostility to the bourgeois state and the seizure of power by the workers, at the same time that a Socialist parliamentarian participated in a bourgeois coalition. Blum nevertheless insisted that the Party had enough bottom-up disciplinary mechanisms to guard against abuses by the leadership.26 At the same time, he defended this loose unity, on the basis that the duty of the Party was to assemble “the working class in its totality” in one party—no matter the cost: 

“Begin by bringing together [the proletariat], this is your work, there is no other limit on a socialist party, in scope and in number, than the number of labourers and waged workers. Our Party has thus been a party of the broadest recruitment possible. As such, it has been a party of freedom of thought, as these two ideas are linked and one derives necessarily from the other. If you wish to group, in one party, all the labourers, all the waged workers, all the exploited people, you cannot bring them together except by simple and general formulas…. Within this [socialist] credo, this essential affirmation [of replacing capitalism with socialism], all varieties, all nuances of opinion are tolerated.”27

This view, much as Bauer’s and Adler’s, clearly bends the stick too far towards unity at any cost. It allows for the violation of the party programme by activists and parliamentarians in the name of pluralism, and attempts to reconcile revolutionaries and avowed class-collaborationists in a single party. It is clearly impossible to proceed towards the socialist aim when such fundamental strategic differences remain unresolved. However, Blum raises an important issue: How should socialists maintain an internally democratic spirit, without on the other hand allowing for the encroachment of reformism and opportunism? 

This worry would later be echoed by Marceau Pivert, even as he called for unity between the Socialist and Communist Parties. Pivert was a leader of the SFIO’s “new left”, which arose in the years following the Tours Congress, as Blum reconciled with the Reconstructors and the space of a “left opposition” was left open.28 The new left was firmly opposed to compromise with the bourgeois state or the middle classes, and sought reunification with the Communists.29 It was also fundamentally committed to the principle of democracy. Pivert specified that, while he saw the formation of a “parti unique” (united party) as one of the highest priorities for the workers’ movement, the condition of such a merger was internal democracy, which “means that the sections designate their secretaries, that the federations choose their officials and their delegates, that only the national congresses will be sovereign.” Most importantly, internal democracy for Pivert meant “that all the nuances of opinion, socialist and communist, will be associated to the collective work, in conformity with majority rule; for this, currents of opinion (‘tendencies’) will have a legal existence, will participate in free investigation, in free internal critique, to the distribution of their theses among militants, and their representation will be assured at all levels of the organization, proportionally to their forces, and evaluated in the assemblies by regular polling.” 

This conception of unity is still tinged by French Socialism’s traditional haphazard “affixation” of factions noted by Willard. Pivert defends this, however, on the basis that the Party majority may itself betray revolutionary politics, and in such a situation it would be necessary for the minority to act on what it believes to be right. “There are cases,” he says, “where formal discipline is not possible: when the Party refuses to rectify certain problems.”30 For example, he claims that Party members should be able to engage in direct actions against fascism or join mass organizations, against the instructions of the leadership. The question is, then: what kind of unity can there be in a party where even unity in action cannot be guaranteed? 

In fact, Pivert was very concerned with unity of action; but he believed that it was the spontaneous direct action of the proletarian masses which would forge unity within the workers’ movement, rather than any precepts from above. I have dealt with the issue of spontaneism elsewhere; suffice to say, history has proven this “strategy” (or more properly, non-strategy) to be a dead end. It is true, however, that a united party of the working class cannot be forged simply through conferences of party or sect bureaucrats. Pivert believed that the starting point for unity should be open meetings between local Socialist and Communist party organizations, at which the membership could find common ground and coordinate further united action.31 A key aspect of this strategy was the formation of antifascist paramilitaries consisting of revolutionary workers.32 

Poster from the French Popular Front election

Indeed, spontaneous mass action by workers exploded across France with the election of Blum’s Popular Front government in 1936, celebrating the working class’s newfound unity (of a type).33 However, these mass actions failed to achieve “organic unity”, that is, the formation of the parti unique through the merger of the two workers’ parties. In fact, the Socialist Party bureaucracy worried that “the party was being by-passed by events”, and worked to distinguish the Socialist Party in popular imagination from the greater Popular Front movement, while combatting Communist influence in the workers’ movement. 34

Pivert fought against this tendency in the SFIO leadership and demanded that the Party encourage the creation of a cross-party antifascist paramilitary and allow members to join “popular committees”. In this way, the working class would transcend the limitations of not only each of the workers’ parties, but also of the Popular Front itself, and thus overcome their political leaderships to form a new, bottom-up proletarian unity.35 The fact that the Socialist and Communist leaders were opposed to the masses’ revolutionary impulse was irrelevant, he claimed, because “what counts is not really the supposed intention of a particular leader, but the manner in which the proletarian masses interpret their own destiny.”36The movement would be reborn with a new vitality, all types of socialist views would be tolerated, and mass action would inevitably lead the proletariat to seize power. Presumably, reformist illusions would be discarded by the masses under the pressure of events, and so undemocratic purges and discipline would not be necessary to secure the revolutionary orientation of the party. 

Jean Zyromski was another leader of the new left in the French Socialist Party who was a longtime ally of Pivert’s although they diverging with the advent of the Popular Front. Zyromski admitted to being influenced by both Lenin and Bauer, among other diverse thinkers37, and was even more committed to the formation of the parti unique than Pivert. He only gave up on the endeavor in November 1937, when Georgi Dimitrov, then-head of the Comintern, demanded that the interests of the Soviet state be treated as paramount. Zyromski treated the USSR as a proletarian beachhead in the class war, which was to be defended from capitalism and fascism so that it could continue to exert pressure on the international bourgeoisie but rejected “idolatry” of the Soviet Union or the Comintern.38 

Zyromski’s conception of proletarian unity was more sophisticated than Pivert’s and relied less on the spontaneity of the masses. He hoped that the synthesis of Socialism and Communism would allow the workers’ movement to transcend the limitations of each. He called for “real Unity, solid Unity, that which results from a merger of the existing Workers’ Parties, based in a Marxist synthesis of the general conceptions of the two movements of the working class…. To achieve this result,” he elaborated, “it is evidently necessary to find the points [where our programmes] intersect.”39 Against those who called for a “return to la vieille maison” (the old house—a common term for the Socialist Party, whereas the Communists belonged to the “new” house), Zyromski contested that “the destruction or liquidation of any given branch of the workers’ movement does not seem, to us, to be the path to unity. Once again, we must bring about a merger of the forces of the organized working class. This task, this merger, will be possible if the points of divergence, upon which the split was justifiably made, are reconciled in view of the facts.”40 

Without denying the validity of the split at Tours, Zyromski argued that with the rise of fascism, and the USSR’s resultant shift in foreign policy, the Socialist and Communist parties had lost any real grounds for maintaining the split: both recognized the need for prioritizing antifascism, and both advocated the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. Strategically, both parties favored the combination of legal and illegal means in the class struggle. The Popular Front was the ultimate result of this shared orientation, and although he insisted that it had no revolutionary possibilities, Zyromski believed that it could serve to combat the forces of fascism, and that a Soviet-allied France could allow the proletariat to improve its position, not through insurrectionary means, but rather through supporting a Soviet war effort against German fascism, and through combatting fascism on other fronts as well. Through pursuing these shared aims, the Popular Front might encourage the two parties to merge, as their common programmatic points and actions would trump whatever other differences remained.41 

It was therefore neither “bottom-up” nor “top-down” unity that Zyromski sought, but rather organic unity brought about by unity in action, which was precipitated in turn by programmatic unity. We can thus see that programme and action are inextricable from one another, and unity on the basis of shared programmatic points is not synonymous with unity on the basis of a shared ideology.42 Rather, it constitutes unity on the basis of a shared strategy for the conquest of power, a strategy that necessarily informs present-day tactics. Programme is the immediate basis for both splits and unifications in the workers’ movement. However, Zyromski fails to propose any practical mechanism for maintaining this programmatic unity. 

So we return to Otto Bauer. By this time, he had developed an idea he called “integral socialism”: a synthesis between Socialism and Communism, which would unite the positive characteristics of each while discarding their negative characteristics. 

“On the one hand, we have the great mass workers’ movements: the English Labour Party, the social-democratic parties and unions of the Scandinavian countries, of Belgium, of the Netherlands, with their success, the unions of the United States, the workers’ parties of Australia—all these great mass movements are democratic and reformist. On the other hand, we have the conscious struggle for a socialist society which is realised in the USSR, the influence of which dominates the revolutionary socialist cadres of the fascist countries, makes itself felt in the mass socialist movements in France and Spain, and also in the revolutionary movement of the Far East. The link between the reformist class movement and conscious socialism, this is the problem which we must grapple with in order to devise an integral socialism. 

Marx and Engels surmounted the opposition that existed between the workers’ movement and socialism in the age of bourgeois revolution. They taught the workers’ movement that its aim must be the socialist society. They taught the socialists that the socialist society could be nothing other than the result of the struggles of the working class. But the opposition between the workers’ movement and socialism could not be definitively surmounted. The unification of the movement of the working class and the struggle for a socialist society, the work of Marxism, must be redone in each phase of the development of class struggle…. Surmounting this tension which reappears ceaselessly, uniting the workers’ movement and socialism; this is the historic task of Marxism.”43

What Bauer is describing has elsewhere been termed the “merger formula”. This was no groundbreaking idea in the socialist circles which Bauer frequented. However, what he stresses is that this merger must take place on an ongoing basis, as the objective tendency of the workers’ movement is to obtain the best deal for the working class within capitalism; that is, the tendency is towards reformism, especially under bourgeois-democratic regimes. 

Understanding this fact, for Bauer, is the first step towards reuniting the workers’ movement, a necessary precondition (in his view) for the defeat of fascism. He claims that the polar opposition between reform and revolution, manifested with the formation of the Comintern, was a mistake; in fact, the struggle for reforms (which is inevitable in the workers’ movement) is what will inevitably raise the class struggle to the point where only two outcomes are possible: fascist dictatorship or proletarian dictatorship. The duty of revolutionaries in the meantime, he counsels, is to support the workers’ struggles, propagate the tenets of revolutionary socialism, and organize revolutionary cadres within the workers’ movement to accomplish these goals. In addition, Marxism “must transmit to revolutionary socialism the great heritage of the struggles for democracy, the heritage of democratic socialism… [and] transmit to reformist socialism the great heritage of the proletarian revolutions…”.44

That is to say, the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship must be united in a single party-movement in a single programme. The great split in the workers’ movement had separated these struggles into two internationals, and it was the task of true revolutionaries to reunite them. However, Bauer—much like Pivert—relies too much on the spontaneous will of the masses, which he claims will naturally progress towards revolution under the pressure of events and the influence of the revolutionaries. 

Therefore neither Bauer nor Zyromski can say how it is that the workers’ party can avoid domination by reformist politics, or rebellion of reformist elements against a revolutionary programme. Zyromski comes the closest, in his advocacy of unification around shared programmatic points, while allowing for multiple factions with different theoretical bases to coexist in the same party. But he refuses to draw a definitive line which party members would not be permitted to cross. It is clear that there must be both a minimum political condition for membership in the workers’ party, and a structure which is able to ensure the application of the party’s revolutionary programme in action. 

Ideological conditions—requiring that members agree with a set of theoretical tenets, such as socialism in one country, permanent revolution, protracted people’s war, or what have you—are obviously not the answer. These only serve to perpetuate the preponderance of leftist sects, which have proven themselves incapable of transforming into a mass workers’ party. 

Perhaps the answer lies neither in a broad party, nor in the “party of a new type” advocated by the Comintern and inherited by the sects, but in another part of Bolshevik history: the October Revolution itself. 

Contrary to popular belief, the October Revolution was not an insurrection by one party against all the rest; rather, it was a battle between the soviets and the Provisional Government for absolute authority (vlast, normally translated as “power”), in which the soviets won—thanks to the efforts of not only the Bolsheviks, but also the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Even those socialists who opposed the transfer of “all power to the soviets” often continued to work within the soviet state institutions, playing an active part in legislative work and frequently debating government policy in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, or VTsIK. The government itself—the Council of People’s Commissars, or Sovnarkom—was, from December to March, a multi-party coalition, consisting of both Bolsheviks and Left SRs. But why did the Bolsheviks include the Left SRs and not the other socialist parties? What distinguished these socialists from the rest? 

Banners: “Power to the Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Soviets”; “Down with the Minister Capitalists”.

Lars Lih explains this in terms of “agreementism” versus “anti-agreementism”; the “agreementists” (that is, the “moderate socialists”) favored an alliance between “revolutionary democracy” (that is, the workers and peasants) and the bourgeoisie, whereas the “anti-agreementists” believed that the programme of the democratic revolution could be carried out only by revolutionary democracy, untethered from the burden of the bourgeoisie.45 This was very clearly explained before the revolution by Stalin: 

“The Party declares that the only possible way of securing these [democratic] demands is to break with the capitalists, completely liquidate the bourgeois counter-revolution, and transfer power in the country to the revolutionary workers, peasants, and soldiers.”46

The fundamental message here is that in order to complete the revolution, the workers and peasants had to overthrow the Provisional Government and the constitutional order it had constructed and then replace it with their own organs of governance. The moderate socialists had betrayed the revolution, even as they claimed to defend it, because they refused to break with the bourgeois parties and declare a soviet government. The priority was not a Bolshevik government, but a soviet one, which would refuse all compromise with the bourgeoisie. 

The Left SRs formulated this idea as the “dictatorship of the democracy”47, a more succinct appellation for the old Bolshevik formula of the “revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”. The workers and peasants alone—revolutionary democracy—would exercise power, against the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The Left SRs actively sought to bring all socialist parties into the coalition on the basis of soviet power, and the Bolsheviks were not necessarily opposed to this goal, either (although they were not overly concerned with courting the moderate socialist parties). The debates in the VTsIK are illustrative of this: 

“Kamkov, for the Left SRs: From the start the Left SRs have taken the view that the best way out of our predicament would be to form a homogenous revolutionary democratic government…. We hold to our view that the soviets are the pivot around which revolutionary democracy can unite…. If no agreement [with the moderate socialists] is reached, or if the government consists exclusively of internationalists, it will be unable to surmount the enormous difficulties facing the revolution. 

“Volodarsky, for the Bolsheviks: There is scarcely anyone present here who does not want an agreement. But we cannot conclude one at any price. We cannot forget that we are obliged to defend the interests of the working class, the army, and the peasantry…. I move the following resolution: 

“Considering an agreement among the socialist parties desirable, the [VTsIK] declares that such an agreement can be achieved only on the following terms: 

“… 3. Recognition of the Second All-Russian Congress [of Soviets] as the sole source of authority.”48

The points of contention between the Left SR and Bolshevik positions are relatively minor; their unifying point is the primacy of the soviets, as anti-agreementist organs, which represent the workers and peasants while excluding the bourgeoisie. Their unifying point is a common revolutionary strategy of overthrowing bourgeois constitutionalism in favor of a new constitutional order, one resting on the authority of the armed masses. 

Their unifying point is, in short, constitutional disloyalty. The moderate socialists’ insistence on compromise with the bourgeoisie represents a commitment, on the other hand, to playing by the rules of the bourgeois constitutional order. It is not sufficient to declare oneself a partisan of the revolution (as did many of the moderate socialists); what is necessary, for the most basic kind of unity, is a refusal to abide by the constitution. 

This essential point is what drove all the coalition talks. One Left SR even proclaimed that “the government should base [its policy] on the Second Congress of Soviets. All parties that do not agree to this we consider as belonging to the counter-revolutionary camp.”49 Any party which advocated collaboration with the bourgeois parties, regardless of its stated commitment to socialism and revolution, was a liability. Lenin hinted at this in 1915, in a more raw form: 

“The proletariat’s unity is its greatest weapon in the struggle for the socialist revolution. From this indisputable truth it follows just as indisputably that, when a proletarian party is joined by a considerable number of petty-bourgeois elements capable of hampering the struggle for the socialist revolution, unity with such elements is harmful and perilous to the cause of the proletariat.”50

So we must return to the issue of party unity. Although the Bolsheviks were not looking to unify with the Left SRs, the fundamental principle which drove the coalition talks remains relevant. Programmatic unity, for communists, does not mean a shared commitment to certain theoretical tenets, but rather a shared commitment to constitutional disloyalty. Only on this basis can a common programme be constructed. 

The other condition, then, is structural: multiple factions (each committed to constitutional disloyalty) must be able to coexist in the same party while remaining united in action. This requires both democracy (so that each faction can be represented in proportion to its support among the membership, and each will accept the legitimacy of the central party organs’ decisions), and centralism (so that the central party organs’ decisions will be binding in fact on the actions pursued by local party organizations and by the party’s representatives in parliament). Without democracy, the party will inevitably fracture, as factions chafe under a leadership they may view as illegitimate; without centralism, the party will inevitably crumble, as unity in action breaks down. This does not mean the type of “democratic centralism” (perhaps more properly termed bureaucratic centralism) imposed by the Comintern’s “party of a new type”, which developed under the pressures of civil war and general societal breakdown in Russia. This type of centralism was hardly democratic at all, and while it may be defensible in the circumstances that the Bolshevik party found itself in, it can hardly serve as the basis for a mass workers’ party which has yet to take power—never mind a pre-party formation, which has yet to win a mass base for itself. 

Programmatic unity is not an appeal for unity around theoretical tenets, nor is it an appeal for a broad left party. Both of these extremes have proven to be dead ends and it is time that we leave them behind. Communist programmatic unity means unity around a shared strategy for taking power and initiating the socialist transition, which means a shared commitment to constitutional disloyalty and pursuing multiple tactics simultaneously, all directed towards the common aim. This requires both intellectual and political pluralism and democratic centralism, which means allowing multiple factions to coexist within a single party, but acting only on the democratic decisions of the majority. In a healthy mass workers’ party, it is improbable that any one faction could hold a majority on its own, and all factions would presumably be represented in permanent party organs in proportion to their support among the membership. 

In today’s context, where no such parties exist, the existing left should seek common programmatic points with each other, and unite their efforts on that basis. Adherence to a theoretical framework or opinions on the class character of various countries are not programmatic points, although they may inform certain tactics or slogans. These things, however, are things that can and should be debated, and actionable slogans should be decided through democratic deliberation, without fracturing the movement. 

The starting point is not bureaucratic wrangling between sect leaderships or spontaneous mass revolts that will bypass the existing left, but rather unity in action among the left and comradely debate between communists. This is what the Communist International termed the “united front”. This does not mean glossing over theoretical, strategic, or tactical differences but rather, 

“Communists should accept the discipline required for action, they must not under any conditions relinquish the right and the capacity to express… their opinion regarding the policies of all working class organisations without exception. This capacity must not be surrendered under any circumstances. While supporting the slogan of the greatest possible unity of all workers’ organisations in every practical action against the united capitalists, the Communists must not abstain from putting forward their views…”51

Through such united fronts for action—through common fights for shared aims—similar currents will be drawn together, and the memberships of various socialist and workers’ organizations will begin to move towards organizational unity. They will come to understand which issues are really important in the concrete, ongoing struggle against the capitalist onslaught, and which issues can be put to the side in day-to-day organizing. They will begin to develop a common programme, not only through theoretical debates (although these certainly hold an important place in party formation), but through mass, democratic deliberation and the practical work of organizing the working class side by side. 

In short, common action around common demands will inevitably lead to a common programme. This consolidation is necessary if we wish to form a mass workers’ party. This does not mean that everyone we work with in day-to-day struggles must be a constitutional disloyalist, or that all constitutional disloyalists will choose to work alongside us; but with a true communist consolidation, both the right-opportunists and the ultraleft sectarians will be swept aside, into the dustbin of history. So let’s seek our common programme, a programme of constitutional disloyalty. The revolutionary party of proletarian unity will march forth, and its programme will bring the proletariat to power and towards communism. 

The Need for Organizations that Organize

Ben Reynolds responds to Chris Koch’s The Need for Agitational Organizations.

In a recent article titled ‘The Need for Agitational Organization’ Chris Koch argues that the lackluster growth of revolutionary organizations can be attributed to their petite bourgeois class composition, fetishization of leadership, and ideological rigidity. Koch is right that the predominantly middle-class membership of most left-wing organizations, along with their white and male skew, is a serious obstacle to future growth.1 However, today’s fundamental barrier to positive change is not just an insufficient focus on agitation, but the lack of real knowledge of basic organizing techniques and effective campaign strategy. We have organizations that sell newspapers, call for demonstrations, conduct political education, create podcasts, and infight – we do not, on the main, have organizations that spend their time organizing.

What actually is “organizing?” Members of many leftist organizations would be hard-pressed to find leaders who could give a convincing answer to this question. Indeed, one would probably hear a laundry list of the sort of activities described above which, while important in one way or another, are not organizing. Organizing is the building of relationships with members of an oppressed class in order to create a structure that will enable the group to collectively fight for its interests. It is externally focused, oriented toward uncontacted individuals outside the group who need to be engaged in struggle. By contrast, most left-wing organizations spend their time mobilizing existing members and contacts to come to meetings, attend protests, donate resources, and so on. Because the membership of these groups is predominantly middle class, individuals who happen to join due to existing friendships and chance social connections also tend to be middle class, perpetuating social isolation.

There are a number of reasons that organizations tend to prefer to do pretty much everything except external organizing. First, deliberately trying to forge relationships with new people can be intimidating. It is much more comfortable to spend our time with the already-convinced and with our current friends – the social alienation created by today’s media technologies has exacerbated this problem. Second, organizing is difficult. It requires many hours of work over a relatively long period of time to canvass an area, build relationships with key individuals, and mobilize a community to take action. It is certainly easier to promote a demonstration on social media to the same group of people who show up to every protest.

However, the most important reason for the blockage is that many left-wing organizations have little-to-no knowledge of how to actually undertake an organizing campaign. This is a product of historical circumstances. The defeat of the radical movements of the mid-20th century severed the institutional transfer of knowledge from experienced activists to new members. Leaders of organizations like the Black Panthers were assassinated or imprisoned; student radicals were largely co-opted and reintegrated into capitalist society. Each new generation of activists has thus had to learn the practices and pitfalls of movement work largely blind, with minimal guidance from elders, and has engaged in the same patterns of activity: an influx reacting to an external challenge, symbolic protest action, media coverage and growth, impasse, stagnation, and decay. As burnt-out activists leave in the final stage, so too the knowledge of successes and failures departs from the movement.

Where there are pockets of knowledge about organizing strategy and techniques, the connection to left-wing groups is often insufficient. For example, there are relatively few linkages between organizers in unions that still effectively recruit new members – UNITE HERE and National Nurses United, for instance – and the revolutionary movement. The same can be said of the few nonprofits that focus on base organizing rather than ‘advocacy’ and lobbying. This is not a fatal limitation in and of itself. To overcome it, organizations need to systematically train new members (and, given the present state of things, existing members) on how to become effective organizers. They need to develop training programs, methods for experienced individuals to share skills, and processes of evaluation and self-criticism to allow effective techniques to spread. Most importantly, they must undertake campaigns that put these skills to use, allowing organizers to develop their abilities through practice while recruiting working-class leaders.

While this is not the place for a manual on external organizing, it is still important that we have a basic understanding of what an effective organizing campaign looks like. A campaign begins by identifying a group of people who are being exploited by a shared enemy – a company, landlord, police agency, etc. The organizers must map and canvass the area to understand its social groups, points of agreement, and potential schisms. They must also identify points where the community can exert strategic leverage by inflicting meaningful costs, in dollars, on the adversary, as in a labor strike, rent strike, or blockade. Finally, the organizers need to identify the organic leaders within the community who can help move their social groups to take action when necessary.

The organizers must develop relationships of trust with these leaders and other members of the community, listening to and understanding their problems and motivations. They must then use their understanding to help these individuals overcome their fear and decide to take action. The organizers and community leaders then mobilize a critical mass in the wider community to join the struggle, conduct a pressure campaign against the adversary, and force concessions. Through this process, trust between the organizers and community is created, the oppressed discover their strength, and effective working-class leaders are identified and tried by fire. In one such example, recent organizing by Stomp Out Slumlords in D.C. has led to rent strikes and the creation of a city-wide tenant union.

Chris Koch correctly stressed the importance of credibility, which could be more simply stated as a problem of trust. Working-class communities do not even know that most left-wing organizations exist but, if they did, they would still need to trust them to be willing to risk the real consequences of taking action. Agitation alone is not enough to create this trust. Standing on a soapbox and delivering stirring oratory is no substitute for the relationship building that has to take place before mass action is possible. Agitation, in this context, is more likely to happen over a beer or in someone’s living room than at a major demonstration – it is the part of the process where an organizer helps someone overcome their fear with the dual motivations of hope and anger.

Internal democracy, charismatic agitation, and ideological flexibility are all important – but they are mere window-dressing if an organization has no mass base. The truths of revolutionary socialism will find no purchase if there is no one to listen to them. And, to be frank, the movement needs to spend much more time listening to the problems and demands of the working class, and a bit less time preaching its chosen truths.

Workers like Alexander Shlyapnikov joined the RSDLP and later-Bolsheviks because they developed contacts with members who fought with them in their concrete struggles. Koch rightly emphasized that worker-leaders like Shlyapnikov were far more effective at convincing other workers to take action than socialist intellectuals. Workers in a UPS logistics center, for instance, are still far more likely to listen to their compatriots then some college student radical off the street. This is true of social groups in general – imagine your reaction if a Democratic Party operative tried to advise your local leftist group on the actions it should take. Again, the only way to overcome the social barriers between insiders and outsiders is to undertake a concerted effort to build relationships with insiders, face-to-face.

I believe we need an organization today that somewhat resembles the IWW of old: a big tent comprised of anarchists, communists, socialists, and other militants who unite first and foremost around practical organizing work aimed at engaging the oppressed in struggle and building the organized power of the working class. Unlike the old IWW, such an organization would also engage in campaigns beyond syndicalism, supporting the struggles of tenants, prisoners, the LGBTQ community, and so on. Whether existing organizations can adapt themselves to the task at hand, or whether such a new “people’s alliance” is required, remains to be seen. If the revolutionary movement does not root itself predominantly in the working class, it will fail, plain and simple. It is up to those of us who recognize this reality to side-step the more irrelevant debates within the movement and take up the serious work of creating a movement that organizes.

 

For the Unity of Marxists with the Dispossessed: The Bolsheviks and the State, 1912-1917

 A reply by Medway Baker to Sophia Burns’  article For the Unity of Marxists, or the Unity of the Dispossessed?.    

In a previous article, Comrade Sophia Burns argued for the “unity of the dispossessed,” in opposition to the “unity of Marxists” proposed by Comrades Rosa Janis and Parker McQueeney. She correctly exposes the largely petit-bourgeois makeup of the contemporary left, critiques its culture of protest (which, as she notes, often does little to build up an organised revolutionary force, but rather “attract[s] dissident anger and channel[s] it harmlessly into the ground”), and identifies that Marxists must “gain experience with class struggle, gradually cultivate a base among the dispossessed, and eventually begin to develop the necessary forces to establish revolutionary sovereignty.” However, she goes too far in her identification of what constitutes collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Burns is correct that the goal of any Marxist minimum programme must be “not [to] join[] the official political realm but [to] creat[e] an entirely new one, an insurrectionary proletarian state”. But even as she advocates for the overthrow of the state and the establishment of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, she rejects key lessons of the Bolshevik experience, both before the establishment of “dual power” and after. When she insists on “not lobbying [the government], participating in its elections… or… protesting it”, Burns leaves to us only a single tactic: the formation of “struggle committees” for the fulfillment of the workers’ demands in their struggles against the bosses and the landlords. Presumably these “struggle committees” are to form the nucleus of the future workers’ state. 

This tactical orientation leaves something to be desired, even by Burns’ own admission. “Something more is needed,” she says. “I don’t know what it is. It’ll take a lot of experimentation and, likely, plenty of failures to figure it out.” This is a respectable position to hold, and she is on the right track. She correctly identifies the need for “mass organizations with communist leadership actively destabilizing the liberal order” and “developing the organizational capacity to govern.” As I have argued in the past, it is necessary to form a workers’ party with a revolutionary programme, which will train the proletariat in self-governance through the formation of counter-hegemonic, democratic proletarian civic institutions. These institutions, administered and staffed by the proletariat, must substitute the functions of the bourgeois state following the seizure of power. Burns is not hostile to party-building—indeed, she admits that it “will likely be necessary”—but her conception of this is not comprehensive. 

In How Do You Do Politics? Burns shows the beginnings of the path forward. Although I have some misgivings about her overall thesis, her tactical orientation of directly engaging with workers in the class struggle is correct. But what comes after? Where do we go once we’ve begun to build up this organic base among the workers? 

In accordance with Burns’ own advocacy of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, we will explore the ways in which the Bolsheviks built up their mass base among the proletariat. Contrary to Burns’ insistence that the revolutionary movement must boycott all engagement with the bourgeois state, I will argue that such engagement was crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October 1917. The Bolsheviks did not only engage in elections to the soviets—the “insurrectionary proletarian state”, as Burns puts it—but they also made demands of the Provisional Government, called for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and participated in bourgeois elections to the Constituent Assembly and the municipal Dumas. Even before the February Revolution, they participated in elections to the tsarist Duma, which was hardly representative and had no real legislative power. We will also examine the notion of “dual power” in the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary strategy in 1917, in order to provide context for these discussions. 

It is true that many attempts by modern-day Marxists to engage in elections are frankly opportunistic, and fail to advance the revolutionary cause. However, as this foray into Russian revolutionary history will reveal, boycotting elections (and other forms of engagement with the state) on principle would be a grave mistake. Although Cosmonaut has published examinations of communist electoral tactics in the past, this remains a very muddled issue for the left, and Burns’ needed intervention provides an opportunity to clarify how communists should orient ourselves vis-à-vis the state. For the moment, the Marxist left in most of the Global North remains too weak to engage in successful electoral tactics on any significant scale, but if we are to engage in party-building, we must be clear about what we plan to do with the party once it has been formed. It is impossible to formulate short-term tactics without a long-term strategy; hopefully, this examination of the Bolshevik strategy can help to inform Marxist revolutionary strategy today. 

Last session of the third Duma, October 15, 1911.

Before the Revolution: The Duma

The trial has unfolded a picture of revolutionary Social-Democracy taking advantage of parliamentarism, the like of which has not been witnessed in international Socialism. This example will, more than all speeches, appeal to the minds and hearts of the proletarian masses; it will, more than any arguments, repudiate the legalist-opportunists and anarchist phrase-mongers…. There was a Workers’ Party in Russia whose deputies neither shone with fine rhetoric, nor had “access” to the bourgeois intellectual drawing rooms, nor possessed the business-like efficiency of a ‘European’ lawyer and parliamentarian, but excelled in maintaining connections with the working masses, in ardent work among those masses, in carrying out the small, unpretentious, difficult, thankless and unusually dangerous functions of illegal propagandists and organisers…. The ‘Pravdist’ papers and the ‘Muranov type’ of work have brought about the unity of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia…. It is with this section that we must work. It is its unity that must be defended against social-chauvinism. It is along this road that the labour movement of Russia can develop towards social revolution.

— V. I. Lenin, 19151

The State Duma was hardly a democratic body. It had no true legislative power and absolutely no power over the executive. The Russian workers had little faith in it. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks chose to participate in the elections, even though they knew they would be totally unable to effect any kind of legislative change towards socialism in doing so. Today, in an age of polarisation between electoral opportunism and abstentionism, this may seem strange. If the Bolsheviks had no illusions in the State Duma, and they were committed to effecting revolutionary change, why would they waste their time with sham elections? 

Before answering this question, we should note that the Bolsheviks were not opposed a priori to a boycott of the Duma. In fact, Lenin proposed just this in 1905, when, in response to the great revolutionary upheaval that had taken hold of Russia, the Tsar’s government proposed the convocation of a Duma which would take on a merely advisory role. Nevertheless, Lenin was opposed to “mere passive abstention from voting,” insisting that a boycott of the elections must be an “active boycott”, which “should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth.”2 It is clear from this formulation that the active boycott tactic can only be applied under the conditions of a mass revolutionary upsurge, and requires the existence of a mass workers’ party. 

Lenin would elaborate on this theme two years later, reflecting on the experience of the 1905 revolution. This time, however, he argued against a boycott of the Duma—not on the basis that the Duma had become any more democratic than before, but on the basis that the situation was no longer conducive to an insurrection: 

The Social-Democrat who takes a Marxist stand draws his conclusions about the boycott not from the degree of reactionariness of one or another institution, but from the existence of those special conditions of struggle that, as the experience of the Russian revolution has now shown, make it possible to apply the specific method known as boycott.3

Further, 

All boycott is a struggle, not within the framework of a given institution, but against its emergence, or, to put it more broadly, against it becoming operative. Therefore, those who… opposed the boycott on the general grounds that it was necessary for a Marxist to make use of representative institutions, thereby only revealed absurd doctrinairism… Unquestionably, a Marxist should make use of representative institutions. Does that imply that a Marxist cannot, under certain conditions, stand for a struggle not within the framework of a given institution but against that institution being brought into existence? No, it does not, because this general argument applies only to those cases where there is no room for a struggle to prevent such an institution from coming into being. The boycott is a controversial question precisely because it is a question of whether there is room for a struggle to prevent the emergence of such institutions…. 

… [T]he boycott is a means of struggle aimed directly at overthrowing the old regime, or, at the worst, i.e., when the assault is not strong enough for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be unable to set up that institution, unable to make it operate. Consequently, to be successful the boycott requires a direct struggle against the old regime, an uprising against it and mass disobedience to it in a large number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the conditions for preparing an uprising). Boycott is a refusal to recognise the old regime, a refusal, of course, not in words, but in deeds, i.e., it is something that finds expression not only in cries or the slogans of organisations, but in a definite movement of the mass of the people, who systematically defy the laws of the old regime, systematically set up new institutions, which, though unlawful, actually exist, and so on and so forth. The connection between boycott and the broad revolutionary upswing is thus obvious: boycott is the most decisive means of struggle, which rejects not the form of organisation of the given institution, but its very existence. Boycott is a declaration of open war against the old regime, a direct attack upon it. Unless there is a broad revolutionary upswing, unless there is mass unrest which overflows, as it were, the bounds of the old legality, there can be no question of the boycott succeeding.4

In Lenin’s formulation, it is thus necessary to use the state institutions to the benefit of the revolutionary movement when opposing the state outright is impossible; to boycott these institutions, without having the ability to truly contest their legitimacy, is to spurn a potentially useful avenue of propaganda and revolutionary work. While it could be argued that this formulation is incorrect or no longer applicable, we must understand this context if we are to understand the Bolsheviks’ use of election campaigns and the Duma rostrum. 

With this in mind, we can return to the question of how participation in the Duma could benefit the revolutionary movement. The writings of Alexei Badayev, a factory worker and a Bolshevik deputy to the Duma from 1912 to 1914, offer a great deal of insight into this matter: 

The Fourth Duma was to follow in the footsteps of the Third. The electoral law remained the same, and therefore the majority in the new Duma was bound to be as Black Hundred as before. There was no doubt that the activities of the Fourth Duma would also be directed against the workers and that its legislation would be of no use either to the workers or the peasantry. 

In spite of these considerations the Social-Democratic Party decided to take an active part in the elections as it had done in those for the Second and Third Dumas. The experience of the preceding years had shown the great importance of an election campaign from the standpoint of agitation, and the important role played by Social-Democratic fractions in the Duma. Our fractions, while refusing to take part in the so-called ‘positive’ work of legislation, used the Duma rostrum for revolutionary agitation. The work of the Social-Democratic fractions outside the Duma was still more important; they were becoming the organising centres of Party work in Russia. Therefore our Party decided that active participation in the campaign was necessary.5

Indeed, the election campaign was a great opportunity for the elaboration of the party’s tactics and the development of the workers’ class-consciousness. Although the tsarist police did their utmost to prevent public meetings during the campaigns, debates in Pravda and Luch (the Mensheviks’ newspaper) were widely read by workers and served to clarify the programme of revolutionary social democracy. This helped set the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary platform (centred around the slogans of a democratic republic, an eight-hour workday, and the confiscation of the landlords’ estates, to which the rest of the minimum programme for workers’ power was to be linked) apart from the opportunistic and legalistic slogans of the Mensheviks (which failed to challenge the tsarist, feudal order in a revolutionary manner).6 The election campaign spurred the Bolsheviks to forge true programmatic unity and then helped them to win the proletariat to this programme. Throughout the campaign, the Bolsheviks and their supporters among the working class were subjected to considerable police repression, and while this disrupted a great deal of potentially valuable propaganda work, it also strengthened the solidarity of the workers. 

The most egregious example of such repression is perhaps the invalidation of the election results from 29 factories and mills throughout St. Petersburg, disqualifying their delegates from participating in the electoral college that would choose electors who would go on, along with the electors of the other classes of St. Petersburg, to select a deputy from among themselves.7 

The disqualification of the delegates triggered a militant reaction by the workers of St. Petersburg: more than 70,000 workers would go out on strike, including many of those whose delegates had not been disqualified. No economic demands were presented; the core of the strike was centered around the right to vote. The workers made a great show of unity and discipline and were able to win their demands: not only were new elections to be held, but many factories and mills which had previously been unable to participate in the elections were to be included.8 It was a great victory for the working class, which exemplifies the value of engaging in political struggles against the state, both through elections and in the streets. The electoral and street actions reinforced each other and pushed the class struggle beyond simple economistic demands to a question of state power. The crucial factor is the presentation of concrete demands on a class basis, demands that expose the fundamental opposition between the exploiters and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled. This type of engagement with the state is hardly comparable to the opportunistic election campaigns and liberal activist culture to which so much of the modern left is wedded. 

The election campaign was conducted upon a revolutionary, class basis, which united workers around the struggle for their political rights and the Bolshevik programme. The campaign forced the distinctions between the revolutionary Bolsheviks and the “legalist-opportunist” Mensheviks out into the open, for all the workers to see. It mobilised the forces of labour against the ruling class in a tangible way that clearly raised the workers’ class consciousness. Following the second round of elections, the workers voted to bind their delegates to a set of instructions drafted by the Bolsheviks, which laid out the role of the deputies as specifically revolutionary:

The Duma tribune is, under the present conditions, one of the best means for enlightening and organising the broad masses of the proletariat. 

It is for this very purpose that we are sending our deputy into the Duma, and we charge him and the whole Social-Democratic fraction of the Fourth Duma to make widely known our demands from the Duma tribune, and not to play at legislation in the State Duma…. 

We want to hear the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic fraction ring out loudly from the Duma tribune proclaiming the final goal of the proletariat…. We call upon the Social-Democratic- fraction of the Fourth Duma, in its work on the basis of the above slogans, to act in unity and with its ranks closed.

Let it gather its strength from constant contact with the broad masses. 

Let it march shoulder to shoulder with the political organisation of the working class of Russia.9

The Bolshevik deputies elected to the Duma held to this promise. “During my daily visits to the Pravda offices,” Badayev recalls, “I met the representatives of labour organisations and became acquainted with the moods of the workers. Workers came there from all the city districts and related what had taken place at factories and works, and how the legal and illegal organisations were functioning. Conversations and meetings with the representatives of the revolutionary workers supplied me with a vast amount of material for my future activity in the Duma.”10 

Once within the halls of Tauride Palace, where the Duma sat, the Social-Democratic fraction declared its irreconcilable opposition to the legislative work of the body from day one. They refused to participate in electing the chairman of the Duma, as “the chairman of such a Duma would systematically attack members of the Social-Democratic fraction, whenever the latter spoke from the Duma rostrum in defence of the interests of the masses…. You are welcome to choose a chairman acceptable to the majority; we shall use the rostrum in the interests of the people.”11 In Badayev’s words: 

… [W]e demonstrated, on the first day of the Fourth Duma, that there could be no question of ‘parliamentary’ work for us, that the working class only used the Duma for the greater consolidation and strengthening of the revolutionary struggle in the country. A similar attitude determined the nature of our relations with the Duma majority. No joint work, but a sustained struggle against the Rights, the Octobrists and the Cadets, and their exposure in the eyes of the workers; this was the task of the workers’ deputies in the Duma of the landlords and nobles.12

Another example of the mutual reinforcement of mass action and activities in the Duma came only a short while later. The metalworkers’ union—one of the most advanced workers’ organisations in Russia, with which the party had conducted a great deal of work—was subjected, like all Russian trade unions, to periodic suppressions, forcing it to refound itself under a new name each time. In late 1912, once again, the police shut down the union and worked to prevent its refoundation. In the process, both the police and the municipal government violated the 1906 law that accorded some meager protections to the unions. 

The Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of these illegal proceedings to register an interpellation. This process was always convoluted, and the government did all it could to limit speeches and debate. Nevertheless, the Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of whatever parts of the bureaucratic procedure they could. In particular, they were allowed to make speeches to argue for the urgency of a matter, which would have to be accepted in order for the interpellation to be made. Although the urgency of those matters raised by the Social-Democrats was consistently denied, the fraction frequently used these speeches to denounce the government and call for revolution. In this particular instance, on December 14, the interpellation was accompanied by a one-day strike of the St. Petersburg workers, who held public meetings to pass resolutions of protest against the suppression of the trade unions, and in support of the Social-Democratic fraction’s interpellation. 

What the Social-Democrats had planned as a one-day strike continued the next day, and expanded to include even more workers than the day before. Some of the “unreliable” workers were fired, and this only triggered a third day of strikes, demanding their reinstatement. The Social-Democratic fraction remained at the centre of workers’ struggles during these days. They remained in constant contact with the strikers, helped to coordinate funds and develop slogans, and served as negotiators with the authorities. The workers of the whole city supported, in words and in deeds, the plight of the dismissed workers, and the strike ultimately lasted over two weeks.13

By 1914, the Bolsheviks were a truly mass workers’ party, despite their conditions of illegality. But with the outbreak of the war, this work all came to an end. Patriotic sentiments were running high: pro-war demonstrators marched through the streets, praising the Tsar and beating passers-by who failed to meet the correct standards of nationalist fervour; workers’ organisations were suppressed, and patriotic onlookers aided the police in clashes with strikers and anti-war demonstrators.14

The Bolsheviks declared “War against War”15, and walked out of the Duma rather than participate in the vote for war credits. The Bolshevik deputies were soon arrested, in violation of their parliamentary immunity. The workers protested but were too weak to secure the freedom of the deputies. The party was crippled by the destruction of this centre of revolutionary work, along with the destruction of so many other organising centres. The proletariat won only a single victory in this regard: the government, fearing a backlash in the case that they were to execute the deputies, turned the case over from the military to the civilian courts. 16

Even this was an opportunity for propaganda among the workers, and the party and the deputies seized upon it. The trial was highly publicised by the Bolshevik press, and the deputies defended their revolutionary work with zeal. They insisted that the Russian workers would remember this repression of their chosen representatives, and foretold that they would “not remain long in exile but [would] soon return in triumph.”17 

And so, in 1917, they did. 

From the First Revolution to the Second: Dual Power

The deputies, alongside the rest of the Bolshevik party, returned from exile following the overthrow of the Tsar in February. The bourgeoisie had formed a Provisional Government; the workers and soldiers had formed the soviets. The former represented the bourgeois republic; the latter, the workers’ and peasants’ republic. Lenin described this situation using the term “dual power.” Let us examine what he meant by this, and what political conclusions he drew from this analysis. 

According to the old way of thinking, the rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be followed by the rule of the proletariat and the peasantry, by their dictatorship. 

In real life, however, things have already turned out differently; there has been an extremely original, novel and unprecedented interlacing of the one with the other. We have side by side, existing together, simultaneously, both the rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) and a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which is voluntarily ceding power to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily making itself an appendage of the bourgeoisie.

For it must not be forgotten that actually, in Petrograd, the power is in the hands of the workers and soldiers; the new government is not using and cannot use violence against them, because there is no police, no army standing apart from the people, no officialdom standing all-powerful above the people. 

… [F]reely elected soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies are freely joining the second, parallel government, and are freely supplementing, developing and completing it. And, just as freely, they are surrendering power to the bourgeoisie…18

It is important to note that “power” (vlast) refers specifically to the sovereign state authority. This is a key point: the existence of more than one vlast is necessarily a contradiction in terms because by definition there can only be one sovereign authority in a single state. “Dual power”, then, is a situation in which the narod (the workers and peasants, analogous to Burns’ use of “the dispossessed”) and the bourgeoisie each has an embryonic vlast, the former (the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies) being unwilling to establish a “firm vlast”, and the latter (the Provisional Government) being unable to establish one. In effect, then, there is no true vlast under these conditions. The necessary outcome of this situation is, therefore, the end of dual power, and the establishment of a firm vlast around a single class pole: either that of the bourgeoisie (in the form of the Provisional Government) or that of the narod (in the form of the soviets).19  Lenin summarised this situation thus: 

The bourgeoisie stands for the undivided power (vlast) of the bourgeoisie. 

The class-conscious workers stand for the undivided power (vlast) of the Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’, Peasants’, and Soldiers’ Deputies—for undivided power (vlast) made possible not by adventurist acts, but by clarifying proletarian minds, by emancipating them from the influence of the bourgeoisie20

We must ably, carefully, clear people’s minds and lead the proletariat and poor peasantry forward, away from ‘dual power’ towards the full power of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.21

Soviet power came into existence in February; October was merely the point at which it ceased to tolerate the Provisional Government, ending the period of “dual power.” To speak, then, of dual power as an aim of the revolutionary movement is to fundamentally misunderstand the lessons of October. In the Bolsheviks’ view, dual power was never an aim but an unexpected obstacle—an aberrant result of the peculiar conditions of the Russian Revolution—which was to be overcome. 

Even so, the Bolsheviks were not opposed to the convention of the Constituent Assembly; in fact, they often criticised the Provisional Government for delaying the elections to it. One of the first demands of the Bolsheviks following the February Revolution was “to convene a Constituent Assembly as speedily as possible” (alongside the establishment of the soviet vlast).22 Lenin noted upon his return to Russia, 

I attacked the Provisional Government for not having appointed an early date, or any date at all, for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and for confining itself to promises. I argued that without the Soviets  of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies the convocation of the Constituent Assembly is not guaranteed and its success is impossible.23

Even beyond this, the Bolsheviks participated in the municipal Duma elections in the summer of 1917, much in the same way they used the prewar Duma elections. In particular, they took advantage of the campaign to make a series of demands of the Provisional Government—demands which they knew the government could not meet. “Unless these demands are met,” Pravda proclaimed, “unless a fight is waged for these demands, not a single serious municipal reform and no democratization of municipal affairs is conceivable.”24 These demands were explicitly connected to the transfer of power to the narod. Although the municipal Dumas were not class organs—they did not represent the “insurrectionary state”—the election campaigns were used by the Bolsheviks to agitate for the takeover of the full vlast by the insurrectionary state, as well as to measure the balance of class forces.25 They heartily urged the workers and soldiers to vote, in such forceful terms as: “You, and you alone, comrades, will be to blame if you do not make full use of this right [to vote]…. [B]e capable now of battling for your interests by voting for our Party!”26 

Making demands of the Provisional Government was a key tactic of the Bolshevik party during the revolutionary period. Although in April there was a debate between Lenin and the other Bolsheviks over the issue of “kontrol”, that is, supervision of the Provisional Government by the Soviet, Lars Lih chalks this up to essentially a misunderstanding between Lenin and the Petrograd Bolsheviks, which was resolved by the end of April in a manner that satisfied both camps. The crux of the debate was over the role of kontrol in the revolution: while the moderate socialists proposed kontrol as a means of maintaining the vlast of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks proposed it as a means of exposing the Provisional Government as incapable of carrying out the revolution “to the end.”27 

This tactic of making demands, in order to expose the Provisional Government’s counterrevolutionary nature, was used to great effect throughout 1917. The Bolsheviks maintained in their propaganda that the Provisional Government, to the extent that it carried out revolutionary measures against tsarism, only did so under pressure from the workers and soldiers, and its ultimate counterrevolutionary nature would inevitably lead to a confrontation between revolutionary democracy (i.e. the narod) and the bourgeoisie. Hence, demands for a democratic republic, an end to the war, redistribution of the land, the publication and annulment of the secret treaties, etc. were not made under the pretense that the Provisional Government would or could carry these out. Stalin wrote in August: 

The Party declares that unless these demands are realized it will be impossible to save the revolution, which for half a year now has been stifling in the clutches of war and general disruption. 

The Party declares that the only possible way of securing these demands is to break with the capitalists, completely liquidate the bourgeois counter-revolution, and transfer power in the country to the revolutionary workers, peasants, and soldiers. 

That is the only means of saving the country and the revolution from collapse.28

This method must be clearly delineated from that of making demands in a way that obscures the necessity of taking power. Revolution is not a secondary concern in this type of propaganda, but placed front and centre. Demands are formulated specifically in connection with overthrowing the bourgeoisie: “All propaganda, agitation and the organisation of the millions must immediately be directed towards [transferring power to the soviets].”29

This way of making demands of the bourgeois state is far from the usual, liberal-democratic practice of lobbying. These demands, backed up by organising the proletariat through the Bolshevik type of electoral work and street actions, can be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of the revolution. It is true that none of these methods individually can accomplish revolution, but that goes just as much for organising workers in “struggle committees” as it does for electoral participation, making demands of the government, or participating in street protests. Ultimately, the Bolsheviks used all four of these tools to win the confidence of the dispossessed and take power in October. 

Bolshevik Central Committee on the eve of the revolution.

Conclusion

Burns is correct to call for Marxists to focus on organising the proletariat, and she is equally correct to identify erroneous, opportunistic and petit-bourgeois activist tendencies in the contemporary left. However, her solution falls short: her tactical inflexibility leads her to reject participation in elections or making demands of the bourgeois state out of hand—tactics which, as we have shown above, were crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October. 

Comrades Janis and McQueeney are correct to call for programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists, and they are correct to identify DSA as one possible avenue through which to fight for this unity. The task of Marxists in DSA is not only to organise the working class, but also to fight for a revolutionary programme, and to elaborate on the tactics that may assist organising efforts. While there is an influential opportunistic tendency in DSA that insists on tailing the Democratic Party (either temporarily or indefinitely), this is not the only possible electoral tactic. This opportunism must be fought against, in favour of a class-independent electoral tactic; one that, like the Bolsheviks’, serves to heighten the consciousness of the proletariat, to rally their numbers to the revolutionary programme, and above all to support DSA’s organising work. The specifics of this tactic must be left up to the revolutionary Marxists in DSA, who will need to deliberate among themselves, examine the objective conditions, and engage in debate with both opportunists and abstentionists in order to formulate a revolutionary orientation to bourgeois elections suitable to 21st-century American conditions. That said, the core of this tactic must consist of: 

    1. An immediate break with the Democratic Party and all other bourgeois parties, 
    2. Using electoral and parliamentary work above all to support the task of organising the proletariat, rather than for its own sake, and 
    3. Irreconcilable opposition to the American state, its military and police, and taking advantage of every opportunity to obstruct its functioning. 

It is possible that the best electoral tactic for the present moment is to temporarily refrain from electoral work in favour of organising the working class. It is also possible that the best electoral tactic will involve participation in elections at various levels of government in different degrees. A discussion of these details is well beyond the scope of this essay, but it is urgent that such discussions take place, that revolutionary Marxists in DSA begin to forge programmatic unity, and that the struggle is taken up against opportunist collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Comrade Burns asks us: “For the unity of Marxists, or the unity of the dispossessed?” This question, although thought-provoking in a necessary way, sets up a false dichotomy. For the Bolsheviks, there was never a question of one or the other. They saw the programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists as bringing about the unity of the dispossessed around the programme of revolution; and this unity of the dispossessed, in turn, empowered the party of revolution, transforming it from a circle of intellectuals into a potent weapon of the class struggle. The revolution was made possible, not by one or the other, but by both: the unity of Marxists with the dispossessed, the unity of the revolutionary programme with the workers’ movement. This is the lesson of the October Revolution; this is the lesson that we must remember, as the left vacillates between opportunism and impotency if we are to recreate a revolutionary movement, if we are to win power, if we are to achieve communism. 

Post-Insurrectionary Strategy

Jacob Richter weighs in on the Kautsky debate centering around revolutionary strategy, arguing for a balance of power approach. 

Painting by Yuliy Abramovich Ganf

Earlier this year a series of articles in Jacobin on the Marxism of Karl Kautsky triggered a discussion of socialist strategy. It took a while for an article on Karl Kautsky (when he was a Marxist) to come out which got past the strawmen presented by the Eurocommunist-sounding James Muldoon and the Luxemburgist-sounding Charlie Post. In his original article, Eric Blanc suggests the taking up of defensive parliamentary strategy, the basis of the Finnish Revolution, as the socialist model of revolutionary change in the most developed capitalist countries:

[Kautsky’s] case was simple: the majority of workers in parliamentary countries would generally seek to use legal mass movements and the existing democratic channels to advance their interests […] even when a desire for immediate socialist transformation was deepest among working people, support to replace universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy with workers’ councils, or other organs of dual power, has always remained marginal.

In other words, socialists should win a majority in parliament, thus provoking anti-socialist forces to move against parliament, thus triggering a massive socialist response.

There are major problems with this defensive parliamentary strategy. While it should not be stated that its conceptions of “legitimacy,” “power,” “majority,” and “support” are crude, those same conceptions are too shallow. The best of Kautsky the Marxist is not enough, not because it is not left enough but because its revolutionary centrism is not developed enough. What follows is both a fuller criticism of this strategy and advocacy of post-insurrectionary strategy in a very specific form of party revolution: the mass party-movement making the anti-capitalist rupture on the basis of majority political support from the working class.

Constitutional Limits

The defensive parliamentary strategy does not acknowledge constitutional limits. Every country has a process to amend its constitution which requires much, much more than a simple majority. Even further democratization of liberal-constitutional orders faces this as a major obstacle. Whether it’s replacing elections altogether with sortition (demarchy), getting past fetishes regarding universal suffrage (which will be discussed later in the article), establishing separate legislative bodies for social policy and for economic policy, ensuring that every public official has standards of living comparable to the median professional worker, implementing multiple avenues to recall any public official where there has been abuse of office, or some other fundamental democratic change, the defensive parliamentary strategy evades the constitutional amendment question. History has shown, time and again, that small-d democratic routes to socialism are incompatible with liberalism and its insistence on the constitutional order.

Which Majority?

The defensive parliamentary strategy does not recognize the existence of multiple kinds of majorities, whose individual distinctions are key to advocating any anti-capitalist rupture in an informed manner. There are constitutional majorities, parliamentary majorities, electoral majorities, class majorities, and of course the demographic majority. The first of these has already been discussed. The second, the very underpinning of the defensive parliamentary strategy, ignores the ordinary system of checks and balances in liberal-constitutional orders, be they bicameral legislative setups or the politically unaccountable judicial review. Blanc has already noted the need for major democratic reforms, not least because electoral majorities are not the same as parliamentary majorities.

The longer-term concern is the distinction between electoral majorities and class majorities. Without venturing into Lenin’s emotional outbursts against the renegade Kautsky in 1918, it should suffice to be stated that the defensive parliamentary strategy relies too much on universal suffrage to bring about the socialist government capable of the anti-capitalist rupture. Not for nothing did the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) arrive at the position of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) that capitalists should not be allowed to participate in elections, precisely because of the anticipation of big business resistance. If anything, given the pervasiveness of lobby money and quid pro quo arrangements today, why should they not be excluded from the entire political process altogether?

The distinction between electoral majorities and class majorities gains greater significance when non-worker classes other than capitalists are concerned. Not for nothing did Marx and Engels advocate the self-emancipation of that socioeconomic class which depends on the wage fund – the working class. Even in the most developed of capitalist economies, the various non-worker classes other than capitalists number as much as a third of the population. A defensive parliamentary strategy which somehow wins over supermajority support from these classes, yet which cannot command the majority political support of the working class, cannot be seen as the self-emancipation of the working class!

Which Support?

The defensive parliamentary strategy does not recognize the existence of multiple kinds of support, whose individual distinctions are key to advocating any anti-capitalist rupture in an informed manner. The relevant ones, in this case, electoral support, political support, and class support. When none other than Engels mistakenly judged the individual vote under universal suffrage to be a gauge, he did not anticipate the possibility of protest votes by individuals ordinarily not supportive of the party selected, nor did he anticipate the possibility of spoiled ballots by socialist individuals. The former should not count as political support, while the political support of the latter should be found elsewhere.

Not all political support is mere electoral support. Both Blanc and Post mentioned the need for independent organization and mass action outside parliament and the rest of the electoral arena. However, even that is not the best gauge for political support.

The best gauge is voting membership. Individual commitment to political principles, to a political program, as expressed by economic support (not necessarily financial support) and an appropriate degree of “non-activist” participation (to avoid careerism and burnout), signifies real support that a passive, periodic vote could not express.

Class support, within the context of the voting membership, necessarily entails a workers-only voting membership policy. The likes of Engels understood that the extension of voting membership to those not of that socioeconomic class dependent on the wage fund went against the principle of self-emancipation for that class. While he was a Marxist, Kautsky argued for the mass party-movement to which he belonged, the then-Marxist Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), to maintain this policy, even against the likes of August Bebel and his working-class credentials!

Party Revolution

Historically, the workers’ movement did not create bodies exclusive to itself but which met in continuous session. The concept of the continuous session has historically been the one saving grace of parliaments in relation to trade union bodies or workers councils. Meeting at this most frequent level is required to hold bureaucracies to account, which neither trade union bodies nor workers councils did.

The defensive parliamentary strategy is reductionist in advocating that only the existing parliaments are capable of meeting in continuous session so as to hold bureaucracies to account. The limitations of these establishment bodies are well known.

Instead, what is needed is a mass party-movement or class-for-itself:

  1. Of only those of that socioeconomic class dependent on the wage fund;
  2. By only those of that socioeconomic class dependent on the wage fund;
  3. For those of that socioeconomic class dependent on the wage fund;
  4. Committed to organizing the broader class-in-itself through as many means as conceivable, including but not limited to mutual and alternative culture;
  5. Having internalized as many democratic processes as needed for the class-in-itself to grasp full, unobstructed, public policymaking power and enforcement;
  6. With the capability of creating one or more bodies exclusive to itself that can meet in continuous session so as to hold to account any bureaucracy, whether the latter is exclusive to the workers’ movement or not; and
  7. With the will to create the aforementioned body or bodies.

Legitimacy and Legalisms

It has already been asserted that the mass party-movement as defined above must have majority political support from the broader class in order to have legitimacy. Although the defensive parliamentary strategy does recognize the possibility of anti-socialist forces moving against a socialist-won parliament, as well as an extra-legal socialist response, in turn, the obsession with legal means restricts excessively the resort to extra-legal means to the very end. Legal obstacles, such as hard constitutional limits and regular checks and balances, have already been mentioned.

Legal means ought to be pursued where possible, and extra-legal ones when necessary. The degree of violence should be determined by the extent of violence committed by the opposition.

Revolutionary Centrism

Eric Blanc’s usage of the word “center” is inaccurate. There was indeed an orthodox Marxist center, but it existed before the vulgar “center” from 1910 onwards. The orthodox Marxist center, or revolutionary center, very much included the likes of the Bolsheviks. They opposed both the strategy of reform coalitions, advocated by those to their right and the strategy of shutting down the state with mass action, advocated by those to their left. The latter strategy had its genesis in the insurrectionary general strike of Mikhail Bakunin, flowered in the violence romanticism of Georges Sorel, and continued in very diluted form in the works of Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky.

Best of Karl Kautsky: not enough.

Balance Of Power

Since the original exchanges advocating for or against the defensive parliamentary strategy, the likes of Mike Taber, Donald Parkinson, Tim Horras, and Chris Maisano have furthered the debate.  So have Stephen Maher and Rafael Khachaturian contributed, via Verso.

Earlier in my discussion, I outlined the fundamentals of a post-insurrectionary strategy that address the shortcomings of both the defensive parliamentary strategy and the usual insurrectionary strategy.  Although not all electoral support is political support, and although not all political support is mere electoral support, electoral support remains too big an elephant to be ignored.

Contrary Positions Revisited

It is woefully true that adherents to the usual insurrectionary strategy have been reluctant quite often to step into the electoral arena (Maher & Khachaturian).  Electoral participation has usually been treated as a token means to be a tribune of the people. Those even further to the left abstain altogether, leaving no opportunity whatsoever for working-class expression of discontent at the ballot box, however insufficiently “woke.”

On the other hand, it has been argued by Marxists such as Sophia Burns that there are four types of committed people on the left: government socialists, protest militants, expressive hobbyists, and base builders.  Base builders who are more supportive of the usual insurrectionary strategy have identified supporters of the defensive parliamentary strategy as “government socialists.”  In other words, every “government socialist” is an office-seeker.

At the beginning of my discussion, it was asserted that the best of Kautsky the Marxist is not enough, not because it is not left enough, but precisely because its centrism is not developed enough.  While the broader post-insurrectionary strategy is an attempt at further centrist development overall, the non-tactical, systemic electoral approach for this strategy is one of Balance of Power.

Balance Of Power

Simply put, the Balance Of Power approach strives to achieve a legislative presence that, while deliberately insufficient for a legislative majority, is unambiguously large enough to hold the legislative balance of power.  The electoral accomplishments of the Nazis in July and November of 1932 are the most notorious example of a Balance Of Power approach. Recent electoral milestones by radical “populist” right forces in the European Parliament are another example of a Balance Of Power approach.  In the North American context, the Canadian New Democratic Party held the balance of power between 1972 and 1974, during the parliamentary minority government of the Liberal prime minister Pierre Trudeau.

The systemic application of this approach would include not just federal legislatures, but also provincial and regional legislatures as well as municipal councils.

Right To Spoil Ballots

Neither advocates of the defensive parliamentary strategy nor advocates of the usual insurrectionary strategy have taken into consideration the right to spoil ballots.  Naturally, for the former, this gets in the way of office-seeking. Particular advocates of the latter strategy have carried on the electoral abstentionist line established long ago by Bakunin, in spite of the many flaws pointed out by Marx and Engels.  It is no accident that ballot spoilage is considered by these people to be something that legitimizes the existing system somehow. Still, if a disgruntled voter can spoil but chooses not to spoil, said person has “no right to complain” – to adopt the conventional adage against voter abstention.

The Balance Of Power approach carries the advantage of flexible electoral organizing.  Specific groups of people striving to achieve the legislative balance of power can engage in the usual electioneering.  Specific groups of people who are rightfully skeptical about the electoral process can engage in spoiled ballot campaigns.

Municipal Socialism And Provincial Socialism

In 1900, the Paris Congress of the original Socialist International resolved unanimously in favor of illusions in municipal socialism.  Not even Kautsky the Marxist expressed concerns. In fact, Rosa Luxemburg was even enthusiastic about this. Logically, the resolution extended to illusions in provincial socialism.  Leaving aside the problems of opportunism, the main problem is that neither level of government can print its own currency to fund entertain illusions of “socialist achievement” at its respective level.  Budget cuts from higher levels of government override illusory ambitions. “Red mayors” and “red governors,” not even those of the Italian Eurocommunist tradition, are not the answer.

Again, a systemic application of the Balance Of Power approach means achieving in provincial legislatures, regional legislatures, and municipal councils, a legislative presence that, while deliberately insufficient for a legislative majority, is unambiguously large enough to hold the legislative balance of power.  Contemporaneous examples would be the city councils of Chicago and Seattle.

 

What’s At Stake in the Democratic Socialists of America?

Jean Allen discusses the factional infighting in the DSA and it what it says about the organization at large. 

On Friday February 8 the steering committee and the organizational structure committee of Philly DSA unveiled their proposed bylaws for the chapter. These bylaws, if passed, would lead to a radical restructuring of the chapter and a leadership elected every 2 years with a limited ability for recall; this would effectively be the only decision-making body in the organization. Members would be able to advise the leadership during the bimonthly meetings, but would not be able to create new campaigns on their own initiative and have to work through the existing committees, which they would need to ask to join. Later this spring that structure was approved at a controversial general meeting.

This has formed a part of the latest chapter of national DSA drama, which moves fast and often feels easy to shake off if you aren’t in one of the ‘problem chapters’ which generate so much of the organization’s discourse. In fact, as I write this, the events in Philadelphia have made Spring’s image so toxic that the caucus split on March 17. This event has put DSA politics, which for the last year has largely been merely one of opposition to Spring (née Momentum), into a state of flux.

The Organizational Dispute

The most obvious document to look at for Spring’s organizational vision is their article “For a Democratic and Effective DSA,” particularly the segment “Legitimate Representation is Direct Democracy’s Cool Cousin”:

“General meetings should be held only as frequently as necessary, as they require a good deal of preparation and energy that should be spent primarily on external organizing. Depending on the chapter, the appropriate frequency will vary from once a month to quarterly.

An agenda should be set by the chapter’s elected leadership ahead of time. … It should be up to the steering committee to use its judgment in determining which agenda items should be prioritized at general meetings, but members can and should be able to request that items be placed on the agenda — and should be able to amend the agenda at the start of the meeting by majority vote if necessary.”

This comes bookended by a large amount of concern regarding how radical democracy creates unaccountable rule by those most “in the know.” It is an odd form of doublethink to propose that, in the name of democracy, all decisions be made within heavily regulated general meetings which are only held as frequently as necessary, with necessity, of course, being decided by the leadership. This new ‘managed’ organization is a break from the usual working-group-centric model, where people have some degree of autonomy and can freely associate with projects they find interesting. While this model allows for far more individual agency, there’s some validity to the argument that it is less formally democratic because the decision of individual members to work isn’t ‘exposed’ to formal accountability. But one can make a chapter’s priorities ‘democratic’ without this form of supervision, which is, in fact, the limitation of member agency within the smallest and most managed possible spaces. Furthermore, creating unnecessary levels of bureaucracy is not necessarily supportive of an effective organization, especially given how swiftly things can move and how necessary member buy-in is for new projects. This form, which was argued for in The Call and has become reality in Philadelphia, can easily be seen as anti-democratic while justified as its opposite.

To go further than this, this top-down organizational form has been argued for since the end of Occupy Wall Street and its connected movements. Throughout Europe, left populism came as a reaction to the kind of horizontalist structures that existed during the movements of the squares, offshoots of the Occupy movement. Left populism’s thinkers and politicians argued that to become an effective movement they would have to shed the localized and horizontalist activism of the past and move towards a new kind of organizing which would focus on envisioning the future and controlling the discourse. Doing this would require breaking with some of the sacred ideological cows of the Left, but more importantly, it required a break with the organized left as it previously existed. Over this decade, from Greece to Spain to France and Italy, this new movement manifested itself in new parties which broke from the old, both in terms of the literal old guard of European social democracy-turned-liberalism, but also of the older activist groups which culminated in the movements of the squares.

Since at least 2013, Jacobin magazine has lauded this new populism. They ran articles by the leaders of Syriza, Podemos, and France Insoumise. They spoke to the theory that underpinned those parties, and they excitedly spoke of the revolution that seemed right around the corner the moment that these parties would win.

Except they didn’t. Granted, Syriza had to deal with the whole EU when it began opposing austerity, but this should have been predicted. Across the rest of Europe, the left is losing steam. Podemos went from a trajectory towards one of the two largest parties towards a precipitous decline. France Insoumise was not able to break out of the far left, Corbyn’s Labour has been stuck just below a victory, and across Europe, the willingness to sacrifice the left’s sacred cows seems more like an excuse to give up internationalism and support for migrants to little or no advantage.

Beyond the strategic mistakes the European left has made in its acceptance of nationalism and carceral borders, a large part of its lost momentum has to do with the way the left has narrowed over the course of the last decade. Throughout Europe, the growth of left-populist parties has occurred on the backs of other movements, and in each case these parties have demobilized their predecessors, from the winding down of the councils in Spain to the increasing disconnect between Greek street movements and the Syriza government. This sublimation is concerning, because it means that the failure of the parties to win in elections isn’t just one setback in a wider struggle; it’s a failure in the struggle as a whole.

These are not just abstract problems happening somewhere else. They are not mistakes which will be self-corrected if left alone. It is the product of a totalizing logic which opposes itself to the rest of the organized left. If the main goal of the left is to offer discursive interventions towards altering the common sense, and to use these counter-hegemonic discourses to win state power, then other formations, using different means towards similar ends but perhaps not speaking the same language or using the same words as the think tank socialists, are not allies to be embraced but enemies which can throw the whole movement ‘off message.’ For instance, attempts to push the language of Medicare For All in directions which are more inclusive of disabled people have been perceived by some as poisoning the well, pushing M4A into a direction which (although more anticapitalist) would be less palatable to the voting public. As such, these disability advocates have been straightforwardly treated as enemies to the cause, rather than people who are working from their own experiences who have the capacity to push the conversation on Medicare For All into a broader direction which questions the logic of capitalism.

It was understandable that through the long reaction of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and with the overall silence of the Left that US leftists would look internationally for inspiration. As the Pink Tide steadily ebbed, it was natural that Leftists would look to Europe for examples of a comparatively successful Left. Yet in repeating the strategies of European leftism in the last decade without a glance at the dangers inherent in those strategies, the Left, and Spring in particular, leads us down a dangerous path.

Will we repeat or learn from the failures of the European Left?

 

The Structural Problems

The issue is that on a deep level Spring caucus is right: there is a fundamental flaw in DSA’s structure which came from our massive expansion, overloading an organizational structure built to sustain small chapters that mostly exist as a social space for groups of less than ten activists rather than mass organizations. Building around cities rather than specific projects, workplaces, or neighborhoods, meant that when thousands of members joined, the organization de facto drifted towards the form that’s been used to organize large numbers of activists for the last four decades: the activist network.

The activist network is typically a group of some hundred people connected by an ideological belief in social justice in a specific city arranged into different projects or subcommittees, and aimed at advocacy or activism about a particular issue (note: when I say ‘advocacy’ I mean a broad term involving directly pushing for a specific law or bill; when I say ‘activism’ I mean protests, rallies, and events which might have vaguer relationships with specific policies), often through giving support to a recently created struggle. Because these groups were basically created to make the most of a situation where one has more resources than manpower, these groups would do their best to mediate and use popular movements outside of them to pressure for more radical or more feasible reforms from the state, depending on the group. They would engage in activities which would either require small moments of hyper-organized action such as a protest or a march, or activities which would require a small amount of manpower over a larger period to time, like writing letters to the editor, training the leaders of emerging movements, lobbying politicians, or doing work to spread knowledge of an event or action.

These activities need to be done, and groups of this sort fill an important niche in the Left. But this fundamentally managerial and mediatory role with regards to their unorganized constituents ends up creating problematic behaviors which worsen the more that activism predominates as the only activity on the Left. This managerial role can’t be held by everyone, and thus puts a limit on the degree to which struggles can expand and increasingly do so in a way that is self-replicating over time. These groups exist essentially to be support networks for the spontaneous risings of groups poorer and more oppressed than them, and in support to funnel their efforts towards the channels this group has access to, and this is the beginning and end of their activities and self-justification, often requiring the creation of movements that have no presence at all outside the activist subculture in order to justify themselves.

This structural tendency is worsened by the demographics of such groups, which tend to be alienated college graduates who connect to each other as a subculture of individuals interested in similar histories and ideas rather than as people working towards their material interests within the same workplace, building, or neighborhood. Because of this subcultural aspect (and in a way similar to a snake eating its own tail), when these groups organize around material interests that they share with their constituents, it is often as college students or within college campuses, and often these material interests are still sublimated under a desire to expand one’s activism by expanding one’s subculture through ideological agitation, rather than using said ideology to provide us with our goals and practices.

The DSA suffers from much of these problems on both the structural and demographic level as essentially being a progressive advocacy group which differentiates itself by being composed of self-identified socialists. While this is an unquestionable advance in the politics of the progressive advocacy groups composed of nothing much at all, this still provides the DSA with the problem of not having an easy path towards sustainable membership growth. As of right now, the main reason people have joined the DSA is because they find themselves interested in socialism, either because of events that happen primarily in a few major metropolitan areas or because they’ve been gradually finding themselves more attached to the policy goals of DSA-aligned politicians. Since they are not coming to their DSA locals because of things those DSA locals did, finding a place for these new members becomes problematic because in many cases it might not be immediately clear how their interests can be implemented, and in many other cases (interest in policy rather than practices), it simply isn’t immediately possible to put these into practice except through the mediation of electoral politics. And so many of the people who come to our events once or twice or maybe even spend their money to join us end up being a part of a large and utterly inactive periphery, thus replicating the structural problems the activist network has. Those who remain to become the core are often already linked to existing activist networks, which replicates the demographic problem.

The only reason the DSA hasn’t already fully developed in this direction is because of the occasional actions of members which point in other directions, such as mutual aid events, neighborhood activism, or forms of reproductive unionism. These actions should be lauded, but they are increasingly coming up against the limits of the DSA’s structural and demographic problems, which is that your average chapter outside of a few major areas is far too geographically dispersed to not adopt the kinds of methods seen in activist networks. Actual mutual aid done in a consistent way requires labor and resources which dispersed networks have a hard time providing, and neighborhood activism can’t really be done when hardly any members are concentrated in one neighborhood. So long as new members mostly come from things the chapter is not directly involved in doing but rather in interest with the subculture the chapter is a part of, this tendency will worsen until it is truly self-reinforcing; there is a good chance that this is already the case. We can already see one of the symptoms of this in a collective, if the largely unspoken, assumption that the working class is an outside entity that we need to organize. But whether the trend is permanent or not, the fact is that the DSA has historically been a progressive advocacy group which calls itself socialist, and despite a fragmentation caused by the massive addition of new members, it is on track to become that again.

This is the problem that the Spring caucus sought to solve through formalization. Rather than being an advocacy network on the verge of exhausting itself, the idea is to shear off those elements which are causing burnout, accept a smaller active membership, and become an advocacy group. This perspective does not just come from an ideological perspective originating in Europe, but is also a response to a real problem the DSA is going through right now, and we ignore this at our peril.

Counter Practices

But what follows seems to be the mainstream response from those who would oppose the Spring caucus. Perhaps it has to do with fears of being called entryists, perhaps it has to do with the fragmentation of the Marxist and Anarchist lefts over the last few decades which few seem interested in mending, but the ‘DSA left’ overwhelmingly does not seem to have the same feelings about ownership of the organization, nor does it seem anywhere as willing to engage in political struggles with Spring. Instead we’ve seen, e.g. from the Socialist Majority caucus, an argument of ‘live and let live,’ and a connected argument of avoiding the problems that exist at the national level by investing all power to local chapters. We see the argument that the DSA can continue to be both an organization based around fighting specific campaigns for policy goals, while also being a base building organization which does deeper canvassing, perhaps in support of internal development or in support of these advocacy campaigns, while remaining an internally coherent organization which won’t suffer from burnout.

This ignores the fundamental problem that the political splits in DSA are about, and how this problem exists in every chapter in the organization: Why, outside of a vague political sentiment or a belief in an organization that we could be, would anyone become an active member in our organization? If we do some advocacy work, some activist work, and some base building work, then what we are committing to is being an organization which does the same work a variety of other, better funded, and more experienced organizations do in a less extensive and focused way. Even in small cities it’s not especially difficult to get involved in an activist organization with a large number of self-identified socialists.

What is needed here isn’t just continuing the practical fragmentation DSA is going through. This won’t be effective for two different reasons: one, for the reasons I have described, but even ignoring that, even taking this ‘live and let live’ attitude on its own terms as an attempt to wrest control over our organization from a dangerous faction, this platform doesn’t work. The difference between an organization which works towards discrete policy goals and one which works to elect specific politicians is not much of a difference at all, and it’s still working by the same logic Socialist Majority nominally opposes, where the DSA acts as a mediator for movements assumed to be outside of it, rather than incubating those movements ourselves.

What is needed is more than live and let live, what we need is, to quote Srnicek, a counter-hegemonic argument, and to go further, a counter-hegemonic practice that can create an organization which moves past the limits of advocacy-activism. I mentioned counter-practices in passing in What to do as a Leftist Intellectual, but now is well past time to explain the concept.

A counter-hegemonic practice is not just doing one thing as opposed to something else; it is a practice which can recontextualize all other practices around itself and build a new organizational hegemony around the goals of said practice. As an example, many advocacy groups, including the Medicare For All campaign, have potlucks to draw people to their meetings, but those potlucks are not the center of their practices. They are done in the name of a particular goal which doesn’t necessarily end in a revolutionary potluck destroying capitalism and building a potluck society. In Spring’s conception of the DSA, the main practice is taking state power through election campaigns and by creating a space for socialism in the midst of the governmental-policy complex. Socialist Majority counterposes that with a call for pluralism, but a pluralism without a focus will just kick the can down the road and continue the DSA’s position as a group which tries to do both the work of an Our Revolution advocacy group and the work of an activist group without having the funding or the time to do either. What we need is a strategy which retains the DSA’s existence as a group which brings a variety of strategies and tendencies together, which can also combat both the mono-politics posed by Spring caucus and the degrading trends which every chapter faces.

Base-building

Over the course of the last three years, an alternative has presented itself and been popularized in many corners of the Left. The base building tendency (also called the dual power tendency) has gained traction due to the incisive critiques that proponents such as Sophia Burns, Tim Horras, and the Marxist Center as a whole have put forth regarding the practices of activism and advocacy. The idea of base building as just the extension of things that many successful organizers and organizations do anyways has caught on as an alternative to what many see as chasing our tail.

But this is the problem, not with the strategy itself but with the popularized version of it. How can base building be both a systemic alternative to activism and something which organizations do all the time? The popularized idea of base building, which combines focusing on specific campaigns while developing a base through mutual aid, is indeed just community organizing under another name. This idea of base building as an easy thing has been combined with an idea of mutual aid as being inherently anti-electoral and having its own good politics associated with it to form the bedrock of a certain segment of the DSA left, including the defunct Refoundation caucus.

The flaw with this idea is that structures and organizing forms do not have a content of their own, and supporting them in the abstract just leads to, at best, winning in the abstract. Mutual aid is not inherently anti-electoral and indeed does not have an inherent politics of its own: it has been pursued (in varied forms) by churches, charity groups, and liberal NGOs towards different ends. It is not a magic weapon which will imbue our movement with inherent goodness when used; it is just a technique like any other. Organizations are defined not just by the techniques they use, but by the relationship of these techniques to their broader goals. If members of the DSA call for mutual aid to pull in working-class constituencies and retain them in our organization without merging this technical call with a broader critique and counter-strategy, what we often see as the response is one of mutual aid events or an increasing number of social events which don’t fundamentally change the organization but rather serve as add-ons to existing strategies.

Without a long term goal, an intent to ‘organize the unorganized’ as Tim Horras says, these strategies can (and often have been) integrated into typical activism or typical advocacy. Without a broader project these strategies will turn to dust in the wind, or to be captured either by cranks who want a high horse to affiliate themselves with, or be incorporated into the exact kinds of projects base building was set up to avoid.

If base building is to be a systemic alternative to electoralism or activism, it needs to be more than a hollow technique we project ourselves onto. It needs to include medium and longer-term goals and needs to be feasibly scalable such that any chapter can begin this kind of work. This question of medium and long term goals brings up a question which members of Marxist Center have been asking since before their Unity Conventions: base building for what?

This question brings us into a new territory and finally an answer. The problem has been that the American landscape is littered with the ruins of dead radicalisms that have calcified into institutions by and for capitalism. This has happened not just ideologically but structurally, as groups of demobilized and alienated activists became dependent on funding. Breaking from these formations doesn’t just require being apart from them, but building new institutions by and for the working class that are structured and fight struggles in different ways. As Marx noted, without an independent political party the working class is forced to channel itself through bourgeois parties which it does not and can never truly control. This is true in the American context politically, but it is now also true at all other levels of engagement. The press is by and large the property of a handful of billionaires who decide on the press’s content, the major unions have been business unions since at least the 1950s, mutual aid has primarily existed through churches if not through an edifice of charitable organizations funded by billionaires in a way that wouldn’t be unfamiliar to Victorians, and academies are only ‘radical’ in the frenzied minds of movement conservatives. Finally, at the political level, leaving aside my criticisms of advocacy and activist groups, American cities have been single-party states for so long that they have reverted to the machine politics of old. This structure cannot be defeated with mere ideas or arguments or with some clever trick, and thinking that the magic word of socialism will defend us from cooptation will doom us to the same fate as our predecessors.

So base building would be the preliminary aspect of a strategy aimed at creating institutions of and for the working class which form an alternative to those institutions which currently exist in our cities. In the long term, if we build these independent institutions, we will have built the component parts of a party which, as the culmination of our work, will finally allow socialists and the working class to work within the political sphere in a truly independent way. This is all well and good in the abstract, but how can this be applied to the DSA’s current situation? What campaigns can this strategy be used towards?

In Marxist Center chapters the answer has been reproductive unionism. As opposed to typical unionism that organizes as the point of production (the workplace), reproductive unionism organizes at the multitude of points at which the working class reproduces itself. This includes but is not limited to tenants unions and organizing around utilities consumption. These pathways are far less cluttered with older organizations and building a tenants union or fighting utilities companies can create these organizations while continuing DSA’s plurality. Multiple different practices will be needed to succeed in these goals, from canvassing to journalistic work to agitation to advocacy work to union-style organizing. Each of these practices and struggles can also create possibilities for building lasting institutions while building our capacity to fight for reforms in a sustainable way.

Since such a strategy does not require that one political line be publicly held in order to build support for a program or candidate, this would avoid the limited and autocratic structures Spring suggests, and with a specific goal and a focus on both unorganized people and on areas where other activist groups aren’t working, we’ll avoid the redundant strategies put forward by the Socialist Majority.

Conclusion

The beauty of the Democratic Socialists of America since its rise has been its place as a staging ground for the transformation of theoretical tendencies into practices, its location as a multi-tendency organization, and its sheer size, dwarfing anything else which calls itself the US organized left. Combined, they have created an organization which has allowed the complete recasting of the Left’s fragmentation into practical terms. This has created a new and volatile politics which, due to its state of emergence, leads to often seemingly contradictory positions being held within one organization or one person. But this is for the best. The differences of the previous eras are not completely irrelevant, but they have been narrowed down by decades of Leftist failure that by now they can be largely summed up to doing the same things, holding different signs at the same corners, and hawking different books with the same content. For all its faults, the DSA has acted as a laboratory of the Left, with the conflicting strategies allowing us to know how they work. Important projects like Build, which focus on creating practical knowledge gleaned from a sharp analysis of projects chapters have undertaken, could not have existed in the United States a few years ago, and indeed does not exist in countries which have gone through similar situations as the United States has but have not developed the diverse kind of left which allows for actual strategic thinking. The DSA, Marxist Center, and Symbiosis are all of massive importance in figuring out what our politics mean in a period when our powerlessness is no longer an excuse for impotence.

At the same time, the DSA is hamstrung by inherited tactics and a structure which made sense at a time when we were an organization of a few thousand rather than a few tens of thousands. The lack of regional organizations, a clear inside/outside distinction, or even clear roles within the organization have created their own pathologies. Without mediating regional structures or clear roles it is impossible to enforce any condition or rule, since all you can do at best is rely on interpersonal relationships with the leadership of various chapters to enforce any given rule. Looking at the same structure from the bottom up leads to even worse problems, with support from the national largely being dependent on, again, interpersonal relationships with those who have personally committed to campaigns. Without an inside/outside distinction members are never able to really trust each other, as the continual leaking of information shows, and members can never truly break from agitating or propagandizing to analysis. The forum has not served this function because at this point the organizational pathology has truly set in, and without trust we again see interpersonal cliques emerge as the only sustainable organizing subgroup. This is an objectively regressive trend that will limit our ability to move past our transitory phase into a sustainable mass organization. With that said, it should be clear that what is at stake if we remain on this path is not a mere transformation of slogans, but the squandering of the chance we have at transcending the differences of the past. 

To answer a criticism I imagine this article will bring, this problem cannot be solved with a split. For one, the problems I have described are systemic to the DSA, and without a massive restructuring, any new group is not going to avoid them. For another, DSA’s internal politics are not even conducive to a split right now, with most of the new caucuses either being politically ephemeral or barely extant at the chapter level. Because of these factors, the main danger for our organization is not a split along ideological lines but an increasing burnout we can’t even put a finger on and backsliding into the forms of the last decade as we transform back into a rhizome of overworked cliques.

There is still, regardless, hope. Perhaps it’s a hope borne out of a lack of alternatives, or perhaps it’s a hope borne from just how much things have changed in the last three years. The Left in America has spent nearly fifty years in such a state of isolation that merely referring to yourself as what you are, a radical, a revolutionary, a socialist, was enough to make you impossibly beyond the pale. In such a state we developed a belief that came from this isolation, that socialism, revolution, etc., were magic words which represented our isolation, that giving up those words would make our beliefs easily transmittable and, on the other side, that the use of such words would guarantee an organization a license to good politics and protect us from cooptation.

Things have changed massively in only a few years, yet many of us still cling to these beliefs, that with a mere word we can arrange ourselves on the right side of the story, that with mere words affixed to old and tired practices we can somehow elevate them. History has not borne out either of these beliefs. Now, with tens of thousands working in the organized Left openly as socialists and millions more who identify with the term, it is clear that merely saying the word is not enough. The task for socialists now is to discover what socialism practically means in our age, to create an organization which is socialist in action and not merely in name. To do so will require harder analysis than we have done, massive recalibrations of our organization, and a great deal of work. I’m not going to pretend that it will be easy. But if we wanted an easy path, we would not have become socialists.

I’d like to thank my comrades in Rochester DSA, in Red Bloom, and in the New York State Organizing committee, without whom I wouldn’t have developed these thoughts.

 

No Bernie

One of the major political questions facing the Democratic Socialists of America in the near future is how to relate to Bernie Sanders’ recently announced 2020 presidential campaign. Already, a vocal and well-connected group of DSA members have put out arguments for a full endorsement and strong involvement in such a campaign. Central NJ DSA member Patrick Gibson provides an alternative view, arguing that the organization should not tie itself to a leader it cannot meaningfully influence or discipline.

Most of the pieces encouraging a DSA endorsement of Bernie Sanders in 2020 are quick to admit that his politics are not socialist politics. We want to abolish capitalism, to do that we’ll need a revolution, and clearly Bernie doesn’t support either of those things. Many of his policy positions are far better than those which any other liberal politician has on offer, but at the root of things Bernie’s policies are about getting friendlier managers in charge of capitalism, not abolishing the system itself.

Nevertheless, the argument goes, the DSA should endorse Bernie. Perhaps the argument is that although Bernie’s policies are obviously not socialist, they still represent a vast improvement for working people and that this is worth supporting its own right. Others see a Sanders campaign as the path to further membership growth, noting the relationship between the 2016 primary and the organization’s explosion in rolls. The most sophisticated arguments acknowledge that, while Sanders’ politics fall far short of the social revolution we need, his campaign and his foregrounding of class politics will develop the class consciousness of the proletariat in the United States, putting us one step closer to being able to build a mass socialist party.

Any of these arguments about the historical importance of the Sanders campaign may be correct, but none of them are a good reason for endorsement.

Don’t get me wrong—I hope that Bernie will be elected next year. I will register, briefly, as a Democrat, just to vote for him in the primary. But individual voting choices are different from organizational choices. We’re a socialist organization. We shouldn’t be endorsing somebody who is not a socialist.

To begin with, we shouldn’t endorse anybody just on the basis of harm reduction. Endorsing the viable candidate who would be best for the US working class would have led us to endorse Hillary Clinton in 2016. Nor should we be making our endorsement decisions merely on the basis of the development of class consciousness. If we take this idea to its logical conclusion, we’d be rooting for any number of politically polarizing but decidedly awful events that move masses of people to question the foundations of our political system. The development of class consciousness is a beautiful thing, but it cannot be an endorsement criterion on its own.

By the same token, we shouldn’t endorse Bernie simply because our alignment with his campaign would lead to even further membership growth.

Consider the best-case scenario: Bernie wins. A man we endorsed, a man who calls himself a “democratic socialist,” a man who elicits a familiar fondness with his iconic polemics against “the millionaires and the billionaires,” is now the President of the United States. He is now our most visible spokesperson.

DSA is formally a democratic organization. There is no political barrier to entry. You pay $27 and you can vote. And now our chief recruiter, the man who tells the world what we’re about, the man who determines the political character of the influx we hope for, is not a socialist, is not under our discipline, and seems actively disinterested in DSA. He voted for SESTA/FOSTA, calls open borders a “Koch Brothers proposal,” and has publicly argued against BDS, just to name a few of his chauvinistic tendencies, with his stance on BDS directly running against a policy which was supported by our organization at its last convention. He is running in the Democratic primary, caucuses with Democrats in Congress, and is intentionally left unchallenged by the Democratic establishment in his home state.

Those who argue in favor of a Sanders endorsement propose that we publicly and explicitly tie our political character to a liberal politician in the interest of short-term gain. This is liberalism at worst, and opportunism at best.

Spring Caucus/The Call, the most organized proponent of this strategy, claim to repudiate the Harringtonism of the old DSA. But their approach, constantly pushing just at the leftmost boundary of current US electoral politics, does not differ in any material sense from Harrington’s “left wing of the possible.” They recognize revolution as an eventual historical necessity but believe the road there must necessarily go through a social-democratic party. In seeing Sanders as the next step toward the construction of such a party, they hope to reproduce the exact sort of party that has historically served to quash revolutionary movements, not birth them.

Eugene Debs argued against this sort of opportunism over 100 years ago in an essay entitled “Danger Ahead”. Debs warns against the temptation to dilute socialist politics in the interest of near-term electoral growth:

To my mind the working class character and the revolutionary integrity of the Socialist Party are of first importance. All the votes of the people would do us no good if our party ceased to be a revolutionary party, or only incidentally so, while yielding more and more to the pressure to modify the principles and program of the party for the sake of swelling the vote and hastening the day of its expected triumph. […]

These votes do not express socialism and in the next ensuing election are quite as apt to be turned against us, and it is better that they be not cast for the Socialist Party, registering a degree of progress the party is not entitled to and indicating a political position the party is unable to sustain.

We should be wary of the danger ahead in a Bernie 2020 endorsement. Bernie’s politics are not socialist politics; his campaign will build class consciousness whether we endorse him or not; and indeed, his campaign will build class consciousness through the activity of many DSA members, who are likely to campaign anyway, just without an official DSA imprimatur.

We have goals that go beyond mere Nordic social imperialism: we should aim for DSA to become one of the founding elements of a mass revolutionary party in the United States.

As socialists, we must take revolution as our mission. We understand that this will require the simultaneous and collective action of tens of millions of people who currently hold no revolutionary consciousness at all, and as such it may be a long way off. But revolution remains our guiding principle. We must build the institutions that are capable of introducing revolutionary socialist politics to our fellow workers, of bringing broader and broader layers of our fellow workers into militant class struggle, and eventually of serving as the infrastructure of our collective liberation.

An endorsement of Bernie Sanders would do just the opposite, serving to drag our organization’s politics rightward at a time when they are rapidly maturing. It may help to put us in a position of greater class leadership; it would also leave us pointing in precisely the wrong direction.

I will be running to attend the 2019 DSA convention as a voting delegate on behalf of Central Jersey DSA. If elected by my chapter, I’ll vote against a Sanders endorsement.

Memo on DSA Electoral Campaigns

DSA member Peter Moody looks over DSA’s electoral strategy and its current application, specifically in the Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez campaign, arguing that the task of making candidates accountable to the organization is far from complete. 

The Democratic Socialists of America seems poised to have two members in the next sitting of the House of Representatives- albeit elected on the Democratic Party ballot line- which would be historic for both DSA and the representation of self-described socialists in Congress generally.

This would also be notable in terms of the group’s electoral strategy, as these candidates are well-known as members of DSA, and one of the candidates in particular- Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez- has been endorsed by the national organization and received material support from it; this has also been true to varying degrees for a number of candidates for state and local office.1  This represents a shift for the organization- likely brought on in part by the ‘successful loss’ of the Bernie Sanders campaign, which helped start the ball rolling in terms of membership to get DSA to its current claimed figure of 50,000.

Previous DSA interventions in elections can probably be best described as uneven.  While it is best known on the left for promoting a strategy of ‘realigning’ the Democrats- working with trade union leaders, left liberals and progressive social movements to transform the party into a social democratic formation- its official stance has historically been one of agnosticism between explicit realignment and more tentative support for building some sort of independent political formation.  In practice, however, DSA has given at least tacit support to the Democrats and generally looked askance at electoral efforts to the party’s left- whether in the form of non-socialist radicals like the Greens, or explicitly socialist campaigns. Nevertheless, such efforts were indeed tacit: little energy or organizational resources were spent promoting Democratic candidates. Even when DSA had elected officials previously (including former Democratic member of Congress Ron Dellums), such candidates went largely unremarked, the unspoken logic behind such a stance is that socialism was saddled with too much baggage to be electorally popular outside of some minor-edge cases, and the duty of socialists was to act as the best builders of the ‘broad, progressive’ camp in order to either promote reforms or at least keep conservatives from winning office and ‘making things worse’.

In a post-Sanders political environment, however, things have changed in DSA’s estimation.  Now that some conception of socialism has entered into the wider American consciousness as a positive, the group has taken a much more proactive approach of supporting particular candidates who are DSA members. By and large, the candidates it supports are still running on the Democratic Party ballot line, but are evaluated against a document passed by DSA’s national convention last August- now the national organizations’ priority is given to supporting ‘open socialist candidates’.  Furthermore, the convention document begins to flesh out a commitment to “building a mass socialist political formation in the United States” and speaks of developing candidates (and by extension, elected officials) who are “accountable to DSA’s political agenda and who can serve as the base for increasingly assertive and widespread independent socialist electoral activity in the coming years”.

The accountability question is a vital one.  In an electoral strategy document adopted by DSA’s national political committee earlier this year, which fleshes out the principles adopted at the August convention, the desire to hold candidates running with DSA endorsement accountable to the politics and platform of the organization runs strongly throughout.  In particular, the document correctly notes some of the weaknesses of DSA’s earlier electoral efforts. Under the old method, the resources of DSA largely existed as campaign fodder, subordinate to the candidate running; once elected, said candidate possesses not only access to elected office but also the power of incumbency and but all of the resources (staff, skills, experience, a donor list) required to run a successful campaign and stay in office. On the other hand, the organization has little leverage over the candidate and little to show for the work of its volunteers.

The piece goes on to argue- again, correctly- that this model had the practical effect of subordinating the broader organization to the elected official, rather than the other way round: in order to retain association with the elected official they had to be provided with resources and loyal support, while criticism of their actions had to be either muted or silenced completely.  With such an arrangement, the elected official then had the freedom to pursue whatever agenda best suited their own political career, and DSA either needed to stop supporting said official- thereby losing the much-coveted access that they were aiming for by supporting them in the first place- or provide left cover for what may have ended up being an increasingly centrist or right-wing agenda, undermining the very politics that a socialist organization is supposedly fighting for.

Thus, from the perspective of rhetoric, DSA’s electoral strategy document represents an encouraging, if hesitant, step forward.  Unfortunately, practical proposals for how candidate accountability is to be achieved are rather thin on the ground, which leads to a de facto slide towards the previous model of jockeying for candidate access, while committing greater energy and resources.  This is compounded by DSA’s rather loose political and organizational nature, which purports to place local initiative and the free expression of members at the center of its practice. This is largely positive when it means the rank and file of the organization have the ability to self-manage their own activity, but can also mean that candidates and electoral work can still be treated in the same localist approach.

This slippage has already started in the case of DSA’s highest-profile candidate- Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.  While she prominently featured her DSA support during her campaign for the Democratic nomination (and still calls herself a “democratic socialist” on her website), her Twitter profile was largely scrubbed of DSA content after the primary, and DSA endorsement now only exists on her website as one among a constellation of progressive and left-liberal groups also supporting her campaign – as opposed to the prominent place that one would hope for the organization of which she is a member and supposed representative (and to which- again hopefully- she is accountable).  Moreover, Ocasio-Cortez has made public statements pitching herself as a loyal Democrat, seeking to support all party nominees regardless of their actual politics.  This has led the New York City chapter of DSA to publicly criticize (if perhaps rather mildly) her position. It is positive that this unconditional Democratic Party loyalty is not going unchallenged, but is yet another sign that any process of developing candidate accountability to DSA itself has a long way to go.

A version of this article originally appeared in Issue 1228 of the Weekly Worker, the paper of the Communist Party of Great Britain.