Justice of the Inca by Tristan Marof

Translation and Introduction by Renato Flores.

Tristan Marof was the pseudonym of Bolivian revolutionary Gustavo Adolfo Navarro. Navarro was born in Sucre in 1898. He took an early interest in politics: in 1920 he joined the socialist wing of the broad-tent “Partido Republicano” (PR) that was composed of republicans and socialists who were opposed to the ruling liberals. The PR would come to power following a coup d’etat in the same year of 1920, and as a reward for his services during the coup, Navarro obtained a job as French consul and moved across the ocean. During his stay in France, he would become more radicalized, and produced the two influential oeuvres he is best known for: El Ingenuo Continente and his shorter La Justicia del Inca, to which the fragments translated below pertain. In both of these works, he makes the case for an explicitly American communism, which was based on the traditional indigenous practices of that continent, especially that of the Inca. 

These works lay out a program for a socialist transition that would bypass the capitalist stage, opposing the dominant conception at the time. Marof realized that any attempt to build capitalism in Bolivia would entail the building of a neo-colonial economy, and would end up with Bolivians forever chained to US capital. He proposed that socialism could be built directly, by nationalizing the Bolivian mines and by returning the land to the existing Indian communities, hence his slogan “Las minas al Estado y la Tierra al pueblo”. In the fragments below, Marof claims that there is no land more fertile than America, and within it no country better than Bolivia to proceed to communism, due to the existing Incaic culture. Indeed, the Incas are believed to have a tightly and centrally planned state that redistributed resources across its empire through a palace economy and leveraged collective work through institutions such as the mita. While Marof may over-romanticize the past, it is clear that the palatial economy of the Incas provided much more welfare to the people of the Tawantisuyu than the post-Colombian period ever would. As Steve Stern details in Peru’s Indian People and the Challenge of the Spanish Conquest, the new European arrivants would corrupt the system, and force the inhabitants to work to death in the mines, forever destroying this paradise. Indeed, between the fragments below we can find the repented confession of a Spaniard who realized they had corrupted excellent people.  

Just after the 1920 coup, the PR would split into its more moderate “authentic” and more radical “socialist” factions. These were not radical enough for Marof, and on his return to his homeland he would found a new party of explicitly Marxist socialism. The late 1920s had brought a turn to the right of the government, and Marof, about to be elected to parliament, would be exiled after an accusation of plotting to install communism. His exile through Latin America would lead him to constant strife with fellow communists, especially over the nature of the post-revolutionary Mexican state, and over Trotsky’s exile. A particular figure of importance that Marof would meet and share ideas with was Mariategui. Indeed, it is said that the Mariategui’s ideas of indigenism originated, or at least were very shaped, by his meeting with Marof, as La Justicia del Inca is prior to Mariátegui’s seminal Siete Ensayos, even if it cannot be denied that Mariategui took a way deeper study of his own present conditions. During his exile, Marof would found the “Tupac Amaru ” group, with an express focus on Marxism and Pacifism against the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. Tupac Amaru would then later merge with other forces into the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR). This is hardly surprising, as Marof’s ideas rhymed well with the Trotskyist opposition to the crude stageism espoused by the “Official” Commmunist Party tied to the Comintern. 

The POR would play a large role in the Bolivian revolutionary period between the 1954 Bolivian revolution and the 1964 coup by Barrientos that put an end to it. This period was an extremely radical transformation that is even more forgotten than the Mexican revolutionary period of 1910-20 and merits an essay of its own. During this period, Marof slowly blends out of history, producing mainly scholarly work and taking a second line seat to other more protagonists like Guillermo Lora and Juan Lechin. He eventually passed away in 1967. 

The fragments we translate below compromise three parts of a longer work. They show not only his commitment to an indigeneous (and sometimes overromantized) strain of communism, but also the seriousness of his political thought. He understood what it took others to find out: that neo-colonial countries need not start up a capitalism of their own because they would never be able to break out of dependency. Marof also discusses the role of planning in the Incaic palatial economy, how surplus should be allocated, and dissects the concepts and duties of freedom for those living in a communist society. In the wake of another radical period of Bolivian society where indigeneity is taking a front role, we present the text below to bring attention to a thinker that is almost unknown. His ideas written down almost a hundred years ago influenced many, and prefigure debates on communist freedom and communist virtue which are still important today. 

Marof (bottom row, second from the right) poses with José Carlos Mariátegui (left of Marof) in Lima, 1928.

Ama Sua Ama Llulla Ama Kella1

During the period of Inca domination, the people of what is today called Bolivia undoubtedly enjoyed greater benefits than what the republican regime gives them today. In that happy and distant time, politics was not known, and consequently there were no personalistic and bloodthirsty factions that destroyed each other. Life was calm, simple, laborious, and it went on singing eclogues with no other aspiration than that of the happiness of the community through labor.

The Incas – great statesmen whose wisdom to govern peoples has never been sufficiently praised and has instead been forgotten with a regrettable injustice both by the Spaniards and by the children of Spaniards – ruled their people in such a way that every inhabitant had his life and his future assured. It is after the arrival of the conquerors and during the long years of colonialism and of those named republicans, that the inhabitants became involved in a series of problems and concerns that until today cannot be solved, and which will only be solved the day that we return to the land and give each inhabitant their economic independence. That is, together with giving land, we give them the idea of ​​organized and community labor.

Without a doubt, a people cannot be formed without first establishing the material bases on which the other branches of society must float. To have willed making a simple and hardworking people who did not know the value of money, – and who until today do not give it their full appreciation, – who ignore individualistic gestures, which represent a special race that is accustomed to these exercises for centuries, I say, to have wanted to make this Indian people of America into Europeans, and to have given them all the habits of Europeans, has been the great mistake of politicians for a hundred years.

The civilization of the Incas, which understood the race and psychology of its inhabitants, did not hand over the organization to the whim of an individual, nor did it allow the disruption of the system. Judicious and authoritative organizers were in charge of regulating everything. From the time an individual was born, his bread and his future were assured. People of conscience made each inhabitant know their duties by gently accustoming them to honest and simple labor. These organizers, who were not individualists, had a passion and interest for the whole which is not seen or equaled to this day.

This civilization was in fact not only far-sighted but was also fraternal and had high moral standards. Its code is simple and eloquent. With three words the whole gospel has already been said. Any modern society should be proud to own it. When they said: “ama llulla, ama sua, ama kella”, they meant it and they practiced it.

A civilization that did not make literature about morality and that punished the lazy, the dishonest and the thieves with severe penalties is a surprising example in history. The spirit marvels to know that everything could be excused to a man except him being lazy. The ancients said all other vices spring from laziness and they were right. This is why the Incas recommended to their governors that they always keep their subjects busy with useful work for the benefit of the spirit and the body. You have to admire them without reservation in this. They legislated and organized labor in such a way that in their Empire neither misery nor the pain of hunger was known. Nor did they neglect the health of the soul, because if historians paint the Incas as tough, fair, and impassive, they were also describing them as poets. The Empire was permeated with poetry and art. When you talk to a Quichua, they dramatize everything, and even work is a romantic note for them. Their sweetness and affability are proverbial.

When we remember in this present time that it was just a few centuries away, or that large silhouettes are evoked by living chronicles in silver nights, the hand unintentionally approaches the visor, the imagination is elevated and a deep respect piously takes hold of us. It is necessary to return to the source, and to convince our conscience that the happiness of our people is found on this land just one step away from us. Let us organize the last descendants of the Inca, let us return to the fraternity, give each inhabitant land and bread, and make fun of all the democratic charlatans of the globe. 

The Communist Idea

The honestly communist idea is not new in America. Centuries ago, the Incas practiced it with the best of success and formed a happy people that swam in abundance. The laws that existed were rigid, severe, and just. No one could complain of misery without unjustly sinning. Everything was wonderfully planned and financially regulated. The good years served as reserves for the bad ones. The harvest was scrupulously distributed and the Inca state revolved around a system of harmony.

Mr. Rouma in his interesting work, “L’Empire des Incas”, observes that, far from diminishing the rigidity of the system over time, it strengthened and acquired new vigor. And is that no member of the community lived discontent. They all ate freely and were happy. Crime was unknown, and a tutelary shadow of refined honesty hung over the empire. There was only one misdemeanor: laziness.

The Incas wanted to realize their ideal throughout America and they would have done so without the disputes of Huáscar and Atahuallpa, and the arrival of the Spanish. Already their famous empire before the conquest extended to near what is now Colombia and to the south and east, it crossed the provinces of Santiago del Estero, Córdoba and Tucuman.

These magnificent Incas, so wise and meticulous about the general welfare, truly constitute the only civilization that America has known, and it is never possible to equal them in virtue and prudence. Today, four centuries after them, and in the middle of the Republican period, we find ourselves disoriented and stagnant. But this does not mean that another more vigorous and modern communism cannot sprout from the ruins of the Empire and revive the ashes of the old Quichuas, because neither the wind nor the conquest with all its cruelties have been able to extinguish them or to destroy the most sober and intelligent race of America.

When one reads the chronicles of those fantastic times, one is amazed that the human species had reached such an advanced degree of economic and moral perfection. Without wanting to, enthusiasm sprouts and the hands tremble along with the heart. They were not brutal warlords, nor did they breed disorder and adventure. Prudent and thoughtful they were interested before the little glory or the plume that puffs up the luck of all. Optimistic philosophers only believed in the earth and loved it dearly, while their thoughts went to the methodical organization of a group, of a hundred, of the last of the community. Practical men knew that man lives on bread before anything else, and their efforts were to solve this problem that was not difficult in a fertile and lavish land like a mother. The rest, the ideas of art, astronomy, poetry, etc. They sprang from the sweetness of the race and the magnificence of nature. And those who made poetry and art were solid and capable heads whose natural and advantageous inclination was maintained by the State.

All the Inca aspiration, both for prestige and for good government, strives to give the State all its potency. In a simplistic time, that sovereign State was constituted by the Inca. The state was the owner of the land, animals, pastures, gold, silver, precious stones. The Inca jealously distributes all these products, and guarantees the economic existence of the Empire, managing it by means of rigorous accounting. Everything comes to his knowledge. He knows how many inhabitants a region has, how many are born in a year, how many have died. A special caste of functionaries brings him up to date with the most minute details.

The historian does not have much to tell about the Incas’ warrior deeds, but instead of the great acts of administration. Their very conquests have no other purpose than to spread the economic well-being among the barbarian tribes. Their captains wage war without the idea of ​​robbery and pillage. The act of conquest is secondary. When they wage war they organize the loser instead of taking advantage. Nor do they subjugate and enslave him. They forgive the prisoners and dress them all at the Inca’s expense. They let the conquered peoples be governed by their former captains while hinting at Inca methods. The historian Luis Paz tells us, in his history of Upper Peru, that when the Incas conquered the Araucanians, after much bloody and hard fighting, they found them in such a state of misery and barbarism that the Inca could not contain himself from crying. The inhabitants could not but count to ten, they lived naked and they supported themselves by hunting and fishing. The Inca immediately ordered that the prisoners be given clothing and the people instructed in agriculture. As it is understood, this way of governing surrounded them with great admiration throughout the continent, which in practice was translated into the adherence to the Empire of vast settlements. For their part, the Incas developed a very skillful policy that earned them sympathy. They did not go against the religious sentiments of the subject or adhering tribes. On the contrary, they honored them. In Cuzco, the capital of the Empire, pompous tribute was paid to all religions. This example of wisdom and kindness immediately contributed to the fusion of all peoples. In the long run, the only thought would be that of the dominant religion of the Sun, and the Inca mold did nothing more than translating the triumph of communist politics.

Their discipline was so solid and so unshakable that the Spaniards, not being able to destroy it, took advantage of it, but not with an altruistic purpose like that of the Incas but with that of favoring their greed and their insatiable appetite for gold. That is why the Empire fell, the jealous centurions (ilacatas) were replaced by new men who from the beginning abused all privileges. Instead of the simple priests of the sun, the old cross that was already discredited and inglorious in the West was imposed by blood and fire on the altars. But even today the spirit of the Quichua through the centuries remains standing. The Republic, with all its lyricism and its proclamations, has not conquered their heart. And in short, this republic is nothing but the happy creation of some doctors for whom twenty percent of the population is killed by the knife on the day of an electoral farce. The original race remains inexorable and far from the supposed democratic conquests, waiting for the return of its old formulas and its great morality destroyed by the lust of the conquerors.2 But wanting to implant communism in the Inca form is still a bitter dream at the present time. Times have changed, Western civilization with its inventions, its machines, its greed and its sordidness, although we refuse to believe, also lives among us. On the other hand, democracy, although falsely interpreted, separates us from the road. Owners of republican life are in fact the petty-bourgeoisie – natural enemies of the indigenous – who made the liberating revolution and fortunately followed Bolívar. But for this caste, any economic reform in the sense of equalizing the social and economic conditions of the indigenous native would be a contradiction in terms. And the truth is that the indigenous people have the right to this reform because they constitute in certain republics of America up to eighty percent of the population, they work hard and yet they live in slavery and misery. This is why heroic remedies are imposed.

As long as there are fierce semi-enlightened governments that, in short, think that economic freedom is reduced to lyrical discourse and the opportune madrigal, theoretical and material demagogues, who have solved the problem of the republic by taking the most succulent slices for themselves, this matter is lost. From when Castell came with an Argentine expedition, until today, a sentimental cry is being made for the equality and education of the Indian. President Morales, self-titled protector of the indigenous class, and other presidents, have had the naivety or the bad faith to try to improve their sad condition with decrees that are either not fulfilled, or that are impossible due to the poverty of the national treasury. So what must be done is to discard the political phenomenon and abandon it to the bourgeoisie. What does a plebiscite matter to the indigenous people! The proletarian class must simply demand its economic equality. Everything that is done in this regard is honest and fair. The American continent is the continent made for socialism, where it must bear its best fruits. The land, the environment, the common origin, the lack of lineage and fatal prejudices, predict it. Here they came to our land, naked Europeans without shoes, to eat our bread. Everyone should know that the only privilege in the new world is honesty and the only crime is laziness; that not even those born with talent can boast of this privilege which cannot be bought but which nature distributes for the good and social improvement.

However, it is not difficult to liquidate prejudices, nonsense and vested interests, in good harmony. The feisty and formidable spirit of the new continent cannot sit idly by waiting for material evolution. The spirit and coexistence must precipitate the socialist era without having any illusions that a prior development of capitalism is necessary. And here I want to stop for two minutes. The development of capitalism in the new states will only lead them to deliver them bound hands and feet to the Yankees. As our societies progress, the lack of a national capital, the lack of private initiative, and the fierce cries for foreign capital as an urgent need, will only result in these capitals coming, raising their arms and concluding by destroying their sovereignty. That is why I maintain that the American Revolution should not wait for capitalist flourishing but rather trap the national capital at every point and harmoniously seek its own development at the same time as its power.

The capital of America is the mines, the oil, the thousands of arms, the intelligence put at the service of the State. The rest does not lend itself more than to silly legends of sovereignty, when deep down all the countries of America, considered from the European point of view, are no more than colonial, without any political personality.

Social organization

A great organized community is the great dream of today’s new men. A community where men shake hands with men in wide loyal gestures, where everyone speaks to each other in a brotherly manner and without double-mindedness, where associates cater and work without being taxed by Europe or the United States.

This test can and must be done in Bolivia. No nation in America is as vigorous, as rich in wealth, and has the communist past as this one. And it will lose nothing in the experience of returning to the old and happy life that was diverted by the conquest. Many centuries before, these provinces were administered by the Incas with the best of successes. The Collasuyo was magnificent for their plans, and the communist idea and realization triumphed centuries ago in America. All the tests were done, the town was organized into families, into centuries and into large agricultural communities under the watchful eye of the central axis. The people thus organized never protested the regime to which they were subjected, on the contrary, the adherents grew, and the forward-looking communism gave its most opposing fruits. The small and large details, family life, fellowship, travel, traveler inns, temples to the Sun, art and science, everything was planned and regulated. Following Mr. Rouma in his commendable brochure “L’Empire des Incas et son communisme autocratique”, these latter words to satisfy the Belgian liberals. In addition to that, M. Rouma, married to a wealthy and rentier woman, finds it a bit dangerous to use inordinate praise for the Incas without naturally objecting to the communist system. That is why the subtitle is significant. The reader knows what it is about. A perfect but autocratic communism. In any case, the good connoisseur will understand, when Mr. Roma, satisfying his thirst for a scholar, gets to write this paragraph: “It cannot be denied that an administration that ends up radically suppressing poverty and hunger, which reduces crimes and offenses to a minimum that no modern civilized nation has ever reached, that makes order and security reign, that ensures impartial justice, that ignores the existence of social parasitism of the lazy, the badly rich, the speculators, etc. constitutes a unique phenomenon in the world and deserves our most complete admiration”.3 After saying this and obeying his petit-bourgeois nature, very enthusiastic about liberal principles and privileges – a chalet and athenaeum liberal- he adds that, nevertheless, this beautiful civilization was equal to a mechanism moved by a central axis where the individual or freedom did not exist. How many nations that live in disorder and anarchy would not wish to be moved by a single central mechanism that watches over, organizes and brings happiness! The enormous British Empire whose manifest organization and seriousness never denied, is it not perhaps a great modern mechanism? Have the disciplined German people not tried to conquer the world? Are not the Romans a great piece of history? Let us leave freedom to weak, disorganized nations that are eaten up by an unhappy philosophy.

The Quichuas, great statesmen, understood that this rigorous state mechanism was precisely what guaranteed them abundance and peace, because without this order in their life and that prudence in their actions, they would have returned to the primitive source where crime and violence. misery was frequent.4

Freedom in fact and in practice was better understood than today. The Quichua, after fulfilling his obligations, a travail pas trop penible, adds M. Rouma, could rest or distract his spirit. The field was eternally green and joyous and wherever it went there was always an open door and a friendly and brotherly hand. The current civilization with all its machines and inventions has not brought us, on the one hand, that comfort at a very expensive price, and on the other, the werewolf, the wolf of bail and industry, who has a thirst for vileness and insatiable blackness. This singular man, who for the law, civilization, and justice wages fierce wars and kills each other. Who in homage to freedom assassinates defenseless races and distributes the oil fields and mines; who has divided today’s society into two definite classes that hate each other. Famous western civilization! I have traveled all the states of Europe and have lived for several years in one of the most industrialized countries, in Great Britain, and I have seen with my own eyes, the long lines of workers dressed in rags, some without shoes, black from coal, and exhausted from work, sleep under a canvas tent and fed by just a loaf of bread and a cup of tea. In this powerful country, I have seen how the workers live by sharing one room between eight, with no hygiene, without bedding, without fire in winter, in the most appalling misery. And even worse things I have witnessed in that industrial country of lords and slaves.5

Wanting to overthrow Inca communism with the infallible argument that liberals or millionaire democrats claim, is not understanding what brotherhood means when it is practiced from the heart, giving it all its reality and its value. Men can easily get used to being very free on the condition that they live by hunting and fishing. But when freedom is widely proclaimed, those same bourgeois democrats call it anarchic and persecute it. The people of the city must remember, even though they may want to avoid it, that they have to eat and dress, and for these pressing needs it is necessary to work hard without all their effort being rewarded and without having any security in the future. For this, it is better to live within a regime that organizes production and wealth. Freedom at the present time is reduced to practically nothing. A beautiful poetic plot! Freedom within the current period of civilization is a privilege of the chosen, of capitalists, of profiteers who, thanks to their cunning and talent, placed at the service of the strongest or of crime, enjoy it as an unlimited inheritance. These will be the only ones who can dream on the côte d’azur, Mr. Rouma! As for the millions of workers, they hardly have the freedom to take the tram that will take them to the factory and to glimpse the delights of nature through an eighth-floor window. The famous English liberty, after the war, has been reduced to letting the pipe smoke everywhere! … When the poor English go to the countryside, they only have a path to walk. On the right and left, large insulting and aggressive signs against poverty warn that anyone who dares to step foot on private property will be prosecuted and persecuted. The shade of the trees, the air we breathe, the pheasants, also constitute private property …

If freedom were a palpable, tangible fact and something man could conquer forever, if it were possible to return to the primitive and human state, without laws, without police, without modesty or honor, man as absolute owner of his life and his actions without knowing what is a crime – since there are no laws there would be no crimes – and if above all, it were very easy to live on fruit trees, hunting and fishing, I would be in love with freedom, just as was Jack London, the great American writer. But like all this, it was nothing more than a dream of Rousseau, a theoretical and wonderful dream that had the virtue of enthralling the men of the last century and even some today, backwards thinking for convenience, and certain politicians who exploit it wonderfully for their electoral purposes. I am in favor of organizing society within a more human and just realistic sense, using all forces, whether they come from man or nature. This is what the Incas did more than five centuries ago and they had the greatest of successes, and this is what we must do at the present time. To return to the same communism with the advantages of modern advances, with the perfected machine that saves time and leaves the spirit free for another kind of speculation, is not a literary rambling or a fantasy in a country full of resources of all kinds that only audacious hands and convinced workers await. The dangerous thing is to live without a compass or to disorderly imitate civilizations that have another origin and unforgettable prejudices. In fact, in Europe, revolutions and things take centuries. Small details cost rivers of blood because it is the natural homeland of selfishness. Civilization of iron and blood! In our America, man is more daring, more courageous and more selfless. Things go on impatiently, spurred on by an insatiable thirst for improvement. There is a desire for improvement that has not been sufficiently understood. Then, people fraternize easily and forget grudges and hatreds. Our direct way is to go toward a purely American communism with its own manners and tendencies. We have two things in front of our eyes that assure us success: the fertile land ready for every trial and the industrial improvement that we freely collect from the Western civilization. Then we will not lack prudence, talent and justice, to make good use of the machines and serve us in the interest of all.

The FARC: Between Past and Future

Today we have an interview with Yanis Iqbal, a student and freelance writer from Aligarh, India, who has written many articles on the topic of the subaltern under neoliberalism and the topic of imperialism in Latin America and Colombia.

 

Q: Hello Yanis, first of all to get us started we have this question. Why are you interested in studying the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and Latin America?

A: I’m a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, in India 

I’m interested in studying FARC because of two reasons: Firstly, the contemporary situation in Colombia necessitates that we reanalyze the status of the FARC Guerillas in the country. Currently, violence against social leaders, environmental leaders and even Afro-Colombians has intensified. Colombian armed forces have killed indigenous peoples, journalists, part of the environmentalist Group for the Liberation of Mother Earth, and two other environmentalists have been killed. One of them was the president of the community action board of a village. And these killings belong to a systematic framework where social leaders, environmentalists, are being assassinated. 185 social leaders and human rights defenders have been assassinated in 2020 and more than 30 ex-FARC guerillas have been murdered in the same year. And under Ivan Duque, the killing of social leaders has intensified. Since Duque’s election to power in 2018, more than 500 social leaders and more than 80 ex-FARC guerillas have been killed. Within this general picture of violence we can analyze how FARC guerillas consist of more than narcoterrorism which is what the corporate MSM portrays them as in many countries. And their history is actually composed of forging hegemony. The analysis of FARC in the present-day concrete conditions is that FARC was more than a group of bandits.

The second reason is that the FARC organization has operated in the age of neoliberalism where the peripheries of global imperialism where the peripheries have suffered intensified exploitation. In neoliberalism, there has been a drastic decline of the left in the current stage and a complete dominance of capitalism. Existing in this new liberal era where analysis such as Francis Fukuyama has already declared the end of history. FARC has resolutely opposed the mechanisms of exploitation and pillage and has provided the left with a glimpse of what a materialistic optimism can look like. Whereas many leftists have chosen to satisfy themselves with measly electoral gains and have revered in meek reformism, FARC has continued with the supposedly Leninist thesis of smashing the state apparatus, thus proving to the world that a thorough revolution and a complete negation of capitalist conditions are still possible.

Q: How do you think the FARC compares to other groups like the Maoists in India & the Philippines? They seem to have similarities in the way they hold territory and operate?

A: Yes, their strategy is similar to other organizations. For this comparison, we can analyze the political philosophy of FARC. FARC does not have a foco theory, and they have followed the theory of PPW. While outlining this foco theory, Che had said that while conditions for revolution cannot be created by guerilla activity, the praxis of the guerilla group is both the cause of material conditions and the creation of material conditions. While he did believe that some structural conditions were necessary for guerilla activity, he wrongly deemphasized the work of preparatory social work giving a thrust to armed struggle. Che thought that a bond was created between the guerrilla and the people through the armed struggle itself, contradicting this claim FARC has maintained a model where power is accumulated by the establishment of broad support over long periods of time. It has undertaken careful and particular revolutionary work in the form of social welfare for instance, and this is a prerequisite for a socially embedded force. FARC’s organizational work has therefore involved the building of an alternative state within the state and establishing broad support. The local armed action has disrupted the state and has provided them with opportunities to emerge. And the state has not been able to deal with this disruption except with increased violence. FARC works by demoralizing the military with constant blows and delegitimizing the state by showing its inability to provide even a minimum welfare.

Q: One of the things that pop up is the big role of women in the FARC.

A: Women in the FARC have played an important role and the relationship of women in the FARC guerillas has been a bit ambiguous. 50% of members are female with 30-35% of the commanders also being female. The percentage of women in the Colombian government is 10%, with municipal levels being 5%. Only 2% of [Army] soldiers are female. In this sense, the FARC has involved a lot of women in its organizational activity and has involved them in their combat activity. This is a good sign, the high percentage can be explained by the fact that women see in FARC an organization that fights for their interest and can contribute to solving their problems. 

While the work as a member of the FARC is dangerous, women’s membership in this group offers protection from daily violence. FARC even has created a zero-tolerance policy in regard [to sexual violence] with the punishment being up to death. This is an extreme policy but it has offered them protection and protects them against sexual violence both from their comrades and other groups.

Their membership also permits them actual freedom. While relationships must be approved by a commander both begin and end, permission is rarely withheld. To avoid a situation that could risk a woman’s allegiance to the cause, contraception is mandatory and pregnancy means the child must be either aborted or sent away. This can often lead to traumatic experiences and abortion was often one of the main causes of female desertion. Repeated abortion has repeatedly disillusioned female fighters and caused them to abandon the fact. 

Q: What do you think of the change in FARC through the peace talks? How do you think this reflects on the philosophy of FARC?

A: The political effects of FARC’s demobilization have been huge on the subaltern classes in Colombia. The intense relationship between the internalization of the relations of oppression which inhibited the ability to antagonize the dominant classes and the potential to rebellion that indicates characteristics of autonomous initiative. With the demobilization of the FARC, I believe that the tense relationship has shifted to the internalization of the relationships of domination. When the FARC was engaged in armed struggle, it was totally opposed to the Colombian state and operated as an external actor opposed to this instrument of oppression. The relationship of antagonism was one of the few cases where an external actor attempted to undermine the external mechanisms of the Colombian state. This means that the political subject was completely and critically defined in relationship to the state, and the experience of subordination subjectively heightened by the FARC guerillas in relation to the state.

With demobilization, the guerillas have entered in a relationship with the state and have ceased being external actors. They are now struggling in and against the state as they are integrated into the state apparatus and participate legally in the political process. Consequently, this has meant a re-subalternization of the people who have experienced the de-intensification of the antagonism from rebellion to resistance. Resistance is the constitutive political action of subaltern subjects. The act of subjective emergence is the movement from passivity to action, from subjection to politicization. Nonetheless, it expresses a relationship of subordination as it cannot attempt to breach the regulation limits of the relationships of domination that establishes their concrete boundaries. The subaltern instantiates resistance and ultimately resistance is not merely a reaction but merely aims on a proactive level to modify its totality, negotiating the terms where the relationship of authority and obedience is exercised. Resistance does not reject the relationships of domination, since domination is permitted to continue. Resistance establishes a balance that allows for a permanent renegotiation where the subaltern classes forge a specific political subjectivity.

Colombian Army soldier inspecting handed over weapons handed over from FARC.

In contrast, [armed] rebellion questions the structures of domination by establishing life at the edges of this structure with the intention of ultimately subverting these structures. Rebellion tries to provoke a crisis of domination. With demobilization, FARC has entered a phase of resistance as the guerillas have been incorporated into the structures of dominance and are renegotiating their position within the system to actualize their situation. 

Q: How did this group of 50 peasants grow up to be the FARC, such a large organization?

A: There are many factors that can explain the ballooning or strengthening of the FARC guerillas. They grew from a small force to a large organization through a strategy of socially embedded guerilla warfare wherein they listened to the practical necessities of the poor people and worked with them, helping the revolutionary culmination of class contradictions. Firstly, the guerillas were grounded in a highly unequal rural political economy in which the majority of the rural people are agricultural laborers or precarious owners of extremely small crop farms facing constant displacement by rich actants. Displacement in Colombia is a large-scale phenomena and it is estimated that displaced farmers were forced to abandon more than 10 million hectares of land. 

In addition to small-scale subsistence farmers, coca farmers present another section of oppressed people who are strengthening the FARC organization. Sometimes small scale farmers are forced to cultivate coca by a nexus of drug traffickers and paramilitaries. When paramilitaries arrive at a certain region they make it clear that those who wish to remain living must cultivate. FARC, by combatting paramilitary violence and instituting social welfare projects was able to gain a foothold in rural regions of Colombia. 

Take an example, in Putumayo for example FARC’s daily activities have made them social actors which could intervene in the civic strikes, help the peasants and magnify the impact of the marches by organizing the campesinos to stay mobilized months at a time. By lending support to the movement, FARC helped strengthen the movements’ negotiating capacity to manipulate the state. On top of providing logistical support, FARC guerillas have also been combatting political violence and essentially stabilizing the life of the movement. Instead of drug use, the FARC have regulated the coca trade for the benefit of growth. They control the majority of the coca growing territory and that’s for a reason. If they didn’t have that control, the paramilitaries would come into the coca growing territories laying waste to the peasants. They are a bigger threat. Paramilitaries do not care if they have to kill to steal the product. FARC therefore utilizes a passive mobile warfare strategy and Marxist-Leninist ideological unity, to resist the onslaught of paramilitaries and narcos, and guarantee a minimum level of income to coca growers. 

This combative capacity to resist para institutional violence was developed at the 7th conference of the guerilla movement, where FARC declared itself as a people’s army. And this also helped it consolidate itself and grow into a large organization since this now meant that the party would no longer wait and ambush the enemy but surround it. This was the transition of the guerillas from a defensive organization to a revolutionary offensive movement geared towards more offensive military operations and protecting the oppressed people. 

Talking about social welfare projects. 50% of the taxes from coca-based production has been invested in infrastructure projects. This is done regularly. Besides regulating the coca trade, they incentivize the growers to plant food crops to attain a certain level of food security. Through these small strategies, FARC has attained hegemony and has consolidated itself.

Q: How important do you think is the FARC’s ideological unity as compared to the role of its standing army and the broad coalition of movements it represents?

A: FARC’s ideological unity and military strength can’t be analytically separated out into two separate components. Both these elements have cohesively combined to produce a “politico-military” unity. While military capacity ensured that the FARC was able to materially provide existential support to various oppressed social sectors, ideological unity sowed the seeds of revolution in that existential support and helped in the political symbolization of FARC’s military offensive. Here, we can observe a dialectical unity between FARC’s ideology and its combative strength. If the guerrillas had only given security to the masses without any revolutionary education, a stasis would have been produced where the people passively relied on some armed actors for protection from paramilitaries and multinational companies. But instead of doing that, FARC lubricated existential security with ideology and thus, politically mobilized the people. Now, we can say that FARC’s organizational-operational activities consisted of the material construction of counter-hegemonic de facto governments and the carrying out of activities such as obstruction of roads, attacks against infrastructure, extortion and kidnapping, sabotage, ambushes, control of mobility corridors, and generation of resources. Through these activities, the guerrillas subjectively translated the discontent with the objectively oppressive conditions into a dialectically grounded revolutionary optimism. This revolutionary optimism stemmed from the institution of ideologically-informed small material-economic changes that brought superstructural changes in the consciousness of the masses, convincing them of the materially grounded possibility of radically re-configuring the existing social relations of production. Looking at your question from this conceptual prism, one can say that FARC’s ideological unity and military capacity exist in a dialectical balance to mobilize the various social sectors.

Q: Which factors do you think have contributed to FARC’s failure to break down the military in Colombia and disarm the Colombian state’s armed forces?

A: FARC has not been able to weaken the military because of the military campaigns waged by the state and the imperialists. Through Plan Colombia, implemented in 2000, the privatization of violence and the installation of asymmetrical warfare took place. Through this, security companies operated on Colombian soil using specialized violence to defeat the guerillas. The military magnitude of these private companies is indicated by the fact that in 2005, for example, there were 2000 private military contractors on Colombian soil.

Second, the system of asymmetric warfare with new military modalities has also hurt FARC. This was designed by the USA, who integrated the operations and provided advice to implement the process.  These changes have allowed for the military to be at a tactical advantage. Through this army modernization, the Colombian state was able to kill three important leaders of FARC and this did a lot of damage. Martin Dempsey, a US army general, had said in 2012 that the US would send to Colombia brigade commanders with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq to train and work with the Colombian Police and Army combat units, to be deployed in areas controlled by the rebels. These brigade commanders were already existing commando units for counter-intel missions. These aggressive military campaigns reduced the FARC guerillas by 50%. And paramilitaries have quickened the military defeat of the FARC by establishing the everyday-ness of violence. Through a network of microaggressions they have created an omnipotent atmosphere of perpetual violence. Despite the demobilization of paramilitaries in 2006, various organizations continued to exist, destabilizing and weakening the military structure of FARC. 

Q: But Plan Colombia has only been there for the last 20 years. As a principle the armies in Latin America have tended to be reactionary. There have not been many leftists groups which have won the support of the army. It’s not just about Colombia or Plan Colombia, right?

A: Right, armies cannot take the side of the people because they are part of the instruments of violence of the state.

Q: But in other places, armies have been disrupted by revolutionary movements. 

A: I think it is hard to explain this, but I can give an example. In Bolivia the army supported a coup even if they earlier supported the government of Evo [Morales]. Now they lend their support to US puppets, and this seems to be a historical tradition in Latin America, but I don’t really know the factors which can explain it. 

Q: It seems to me that ever since the demobilization of FARC, the Colombian left has found much more support in urban areas again; as in the election of 2018, that saw Gustavo Petro come second in the presidential election, a leftist ex-guerilla from Humane Colombia. How do you think the future of the left in Colombia looks?

A: To explain the future of the left in Colombia we have to first look at the concrete conditions which have been implemented by the peace agreement, which are going to consolidate leftist politics in Colombia. The peace agreement can be seen as a passive revolution, functioning as a ruling class counter-movement that has marked important but limited changes, and has acted as an antidote to FARC’s revolution from below and the significant pressure from the subaltern classes. So after the peace agreement, neoliberalism has intensified in the form of the productivity increase in the extractive sector such as coal, emeralds, and other resources. And foreign direct investment has also increased by 25%, another important factor. This indicates that neoliberalism is consolidating in this post peace period. And these conditions are going to be conducive factors for the left. As the objective conditions exacerbate, the political potentialities for the left are going to consolidate. And as the ongoing realization of which peace has been achieved dawns on the Colombian masses, class struggle is set to intensify and the political prospects of the left will likely improve. 

During the peace process, the leftist political fraction had supported the need for replacing neoliberalism and installing an integrated rural program. As the crisis exacerbates, more people will identify with the revolutionary demands of leftist politicians. These politicians can exploit the deep disaffection of the coca growers with state-sponsored military offensives and intimidation in the coca producing regions. Whereas leftists try to cater for a regulated program with lesser crop distribution and comprehensive rural development, the current government’s overtly militaristic tactics are not a solution. Comprehending this contrast between those two approaches, coca growers are bound to lend support for the leftists as the state’s repressive tactics to achieve coca eradication are tied to large military operations.  

Despite the good political possibilities for the left, there still are two major problems. Colombia’s history of violence where the carefully constructed hegemony of electoral leftists has been sapped by the violence enacted by the ruling class. For instance, in the 1980s the FARC had agreed a ceasefire with the Betanzos regime. And many of its militaries had opted for electoral politics by forming a mass electoral party called the Patriotic Union. The Patriotic Union had substantial electoral support with 21 elected representatives in parliament. But before, during, and after scoring these substantial wins in local and state and national elections, the military squads murdered three of these elected candidates. Over 500 legal electoral activists were killed and the FARC was forced to return to arms because of the Colombian regimes’ mass terrorism. Between 1985 and 2000 many peasant leaders, human rights activists, and other figures have been assassinated. This historical precedent suggests that in the current conjuncture, where oppressive objective conditions are amplifying, the peace process has been torn apart. Leftist political candidates are being murdered by state-sanctioned violence, and the recurrence of targeted violence in 2019-20 are possible political breaks to electoral politics. 

Q: Just this week there was another massacre where many people were killed. This is a recurring theme. Staying on the topic of the 2016 peace agreement… The demobilized FARC soldiers are complaining in interviews that farmers in Colombia still have no land, even if the 2016 peace agreement promised it. There is still no land reform and farmers still suffer under the minority, 1% of landowners who own most land.  What do you think of FARC’s agreement in general? Is the faith in the electoral process or a civic solution naive or justified as a solution to paramilitary terror?

A: Colombia is entangled in the web of capitalism. Because of its very specific conditions and the entire arrangement of imperialism, paramilitarism has been economically admitted into this integrated system of capital accumulation and functions as a structural condition and not a temporary condition. Paramilitary activities are below the political realm of rising ideology or the military realm constituted by the national armed forces and the appropriation of land. Paramilitaries function in the structure by securing a suitable investment climate by not only combatting the guerillas but by displacing rural residents and providing security for companies that take over these lands, and attacking labor unions that fight against neoliberal policies and fight privatization. In a nutshell, paramilitaries serve to clear the ground of anything subversive that would fight the advance of capital or oppose neoliberal policies. Those who believe in a civic solution to the paramilitary terror have to ask themselves the following question: is the judiciary or any state apparatus going to intervene to stop paramilitarism and curtail the process of capital accumulation that is highly important to Colombia’s ruling classes with Colombia’s vast resources? 

Moreover, there is already a history of people like Uribe having strong differences between what is said and what is done regarding paramilitarism in the ground reality. For example, paramilitarism was outlawed in 1989, but in the 1990s there was a boom in paramilitary activities. Taking cognizance from these facts, and stating that there have been paramilitary pressure from below on social movements, a civic solution to violence would find it hard to survive on the basis of that pressure.

Q: Do you think the recent proliferation of Unions has to do with FARC using its money to prop them up?

A: The proliferation of trade unions is unrelated to the FARC because FARC does not have the requisite financial resources to fund different groups. Under the peace accord, the FARC’s funds had to be declared and surrendered to the government to be used to compensate the millions of victims of the 60-year conflict. In the peace agreement, there were subsections called the “Strategy for the effective implementation of the administrative expropriation of illicitly acquired assets” and the section 3.1.1.3 “Provision of information” of the “Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive  Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying down of Arms” which required the FARC to give up its financial resources. All this happened while the FARC-EP remained in the Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation (TLZNs) in the process of laying down arms. So, now the FARC does not have sufficient monetary clout to financially influence trade unions. 

Q: To sum up… how does this link to your other interest of the neoliberal ethos? I guess if you don’t take up arms again the only thing really left for you is to become a neoliberal subject.

A: In the current period, we have neoliberalism as a social structure of accumulation, and have started a process of subjectification in which new subjectivities have been created. I would highlight four changes, or elements to this structure: they are radical abstraction, entrepreneurship of self, growth imperatives and effect management. Firstly, radical abstraction is the extraction of individuals from their economic conditions, this results in the elimination of local languages and struggles, and the imposition of dominant cultures which facilitate the growth of consumptive environments. So along with the loss of regional struggles and anti-accumulation struggles, radical abstraction also causes precarious existence abstracted from material conditions. You are told that you can do anything, and you can build anything, and this increases the impact of structural conditions on you.

Second is the entrepreneurship of self, which is the individualization of the subject. In this, the individual sees themselves as a portfolio of investment. Third is the growth imperative, which encapsulates the urge to seek new investments and diversify risks. And the growth imperative is an integral element in neoliberalism because it itself is the perpetuation of capital accumulation and the constant search to devise new ways to maximize profits. The last is effect management, which is a method that neoliberalism uses to manage culture. In this effect management, positive effects are over-highlighted to obscure what Gramsci calls “the pessimism of the intellect”, and prevent people from understanding structural conditions exercising a downwards impact on them. And qualitative effects also decorate the self by energizing them to go about taking risks of aspirational desires. 

Q: If you encourage people to take more risks wouldn’t that backfire and cause them to join a guerilla?

A: That’s a possible cause of action, but there’s also the structure. They take the risks from a predetermined repertoire, and guerilla activities are out of this repertoire. 

 

‘The United Front’ by Jose Carlos Mariategui

Translation and introduction by Renato Flores. 

Portrait by Bruno Portuguez Nolasco

Jose Carlos Mariategui was a Peruvian Marxist, who became the founder of the precursor to the Peruvian Communist Party. He was born in 1894, in Moquegua, but he came of age in Lima and on the Peruvian coast. Plagued by health problems, Mariategui’s flame extinguished at just thirty-five years of age. The world was robbed of one of the most brilliant South American Marxists of his generation. For decades, his work remained obscure outside of Peru, and available only to those who spoke Spanish. 

In this piece we present, Mariategui lays out a vision for a united front as the initial step of building the proletarians’ forces. Shadows of Sorel’s influence on Mariategui can be seen, as he constructs a myth of the united front and of the workers’ souls in longing for it. But more importantly- Mariategui’s united front was his conception of party-building. He wanted class and programmatic unity before strict theoretical unity. For years he resisted the Comintern’s wishes to build a Peruvian Communist Party that strictly adhered to the 21 theses, especially once the Comintern turned to the ultra-leftist “third period”. Instead, he started off with a newspaper, Amaunta, while collaborating closely with the weak workers’ and indigenous’ movements. 

The united front was central to Mariategui’s conception of politics. Two experiences had shaken him profoundly.  Mariategui was present in the Livorno congress, where the Italian Communist Party was founded. He had witnessed firsthand the failure of the Italian Socialist Party in the early 1920s to capitalize on the occupation of the factories, and how this had opened the floodgates for the later rise of Mussolini and fascism. Mariategui, like Gramsci, recognized that the Italian Socialists had no base among the Southern Peasantry, and this had hurt them substantially.

Mariategui was also shaken by the Mexican Revolution. Often ignored in the West, it took place as Europe was fighting in the trenches and the Bolsheviks made their wager for power. The Mexican Revolution was a complex social progress, with many sides to it. One of the most critical episodes took place in 1915 after the nascent bourgeoise led by Venustiano Carranza and Alvaro Obregón had defeated the semi-feudal forces of reaction. The bourgeois needed to consolidate its power against the peasant armies of Villa and Zapata, their previous allies. For this, they tragically drew from the anarcho-syndicalist workers in Mexico City’s Casa del Obrero Mundial, who willingly provided soldiers and support to destroy the “feudal and barbaric” peasant revolt of Villa and Zapata. Mexico’s revolution was interrupted as the workers delivered the state power to the national bourgeoisie. 

In both of these instances, the bourgeoisie had split the dispossessed and had pitted them against each other to defeat their radical pretenses. But some leftist Peruvians actually looked up to the Mexican model. APRA, led by Haya de la Torre wanted to move beyond Peru’s “semi-feudal” system through an alliance between the proletarian and the revolutionary bourgeoisie. Mariategui wanted nothing of this losing scheme and insisted on the centrality of the united front to unite all workers and Indian peasants against the real enemy, the bourgeoisie which had no revolutionary role to play. 

Mariategui fought on many fronts, theorizing a Peruvian Marxism that was both internationalist, and sensitive to the local conditions. Aside from running Amaunta, he lectured at a popular university, where he was regularly accosted by orthodox anarchists (something he refers to in the text). Mariategui was also involved in the indigenous movement, attending the third Indigenous Congress in 1923. He was one of the first Marxists to theorize the material relationship between the colonized Indians of Peru, understanding that Marxists should relate to their “question” not by declaring the inevitability of assimilation and trying to accelerate it, but by giving them control over the land. 

Mariategui’s group establish the Peruvian Socialist Party in 1928 only after the final break with de la Torre, who had founded a personalist party to contest the elections. The united front would slowly break, the PSP became a Comintern-compliant party after his death and was renamed to the Peruvian Communist Party. Mariategui’s legacy is ironically claimed by such diverse parties as ARPA, which he regularly polemicized against, and Shining Path, who could not be further from Mariategui’s united front as they bombed and killed other leftists as often as they attacked the state. Mariategui is today seeing renewed interest in the Anglosphere, including the recent publication of “In the Red Corner” by Haymarket books. As today’s socialist forces reckon with a defeated and nonexistent workers’ movement, Mariategui’s united front remains as relevant as ever to rebuild our fighting forces.

Soviet May Day Poster

The United Front

May the First is a worldwide day of unity for the revolutionary proletariat, a date that gathers all the organised workers in an immense international united front. On this date, the words of Karl Marx resound, unanimously abided and obeyed: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!”. On this day, all the barriers that differentiate and separate the proletarian vanguard into several groups and several schools spontaneously fall. May 1st does not belong to a single International. It is the day of all Internationals. Today, socialists, communists, and libertarians of all shades mix and blur in a single army that marches towards the final struggle.

In short: this date is an affirmation and an instantiation that the proletarian united front is possible, that it is practicable, and that no present interest or requirement is opposed to its realization.

This international date invites many meditations. But for the Peruvian workers the most current, the most timely one is that which concerns the necessity and the possibility of the united front. Recently, there have been some sectionist attempts. It is thus urgent to understand each other, it is urgent to be concrete to prevent these attempts from prospering, preventing them from undermining and undercutting Peru’s nascent proletarian vanguard.

Since I joined this vanguard, my stance has always been that of a convinced patreon, that of a fervent propagandist of the united front. I remember declaring this at one of the opening conferences of my course on the history of the world crisis. I answered the first gestures of resistance and apprehension from some veteran and hieratic libertarians, who are more concerned with the rigidity of dogma than with the effectiveness and fecundity of action, I said then from the tribune of the People’s University: “We are still too few to divide ourselves. Let us not make an affair out of labels or titles.”

Subsequently, I have repeated these or other analogous words. And I will not get tired of repeating them. The class movement, among us, is still very incipient, very limited, for us to think about fractioning it and splitting it. Before the inevitable hour of division arrives, it falls unto us to perform plenty of common work, plenty of solidarity work. We have many long journeys to undertake together. It is up to us, for example, to awaken in the majority of the Peruvian proletariat class consciousness and class belonging. This task belongs equally to socialists and syndicalists, to communists and to libertarians. We all have a duty to sow the seeds of renewal and to spread class consciousness. We all have a duty to keep the proletariat away from the yellow unions and the false “institutions of representation”. We all have a duty to fight against reactionary attacks and repressions. We all have a duty to defend the proletarian tribune, the proletarian press, and the proletarian organization. We all have a duty to uphold the demands of the enslaved and oppressed indigenous race. And in the fulfillment of these historical duties, of these elementary duties, our paths will meet and join, whatever our ultimate goal is.

The united front does not cancel the personality, nor does it not void the affiliation of any of those who compose it. It does not mean the confusion or amalgamation of all doctrines into a single one. It is a contingent, concrete and practical action. The program of the united front considers exclusively the immediate reality outside of all abstractions and utopias. To preach the united front is not to preach ideological confusion. Within the united front each one must preserve his own affiliation and his own ideology. Each one must work for his own beliefs. But all must feel united by class solidarity, bound by the struggle against the common rival, bound by the same revolutionary will and by the same rejuvenating passion. To form a united front is to have a mindset of solidarity in the face of a concrete problem; in the face of an urgent need. It does not mean renouncing the doctrines that one serves, nor abandoning the position that one occupies in the vanguard. The diversity of tendencies and ideological nuances is inevitable in that immense human legion called the proletariat. The existence of defined and precise tendencies and groups is not an evil. On the contrary, it is the sign of an advanced period of the revolutionary process. What matters is that these groups and tendencies know how to understand themselves when facing the concrete reality of the day. Let them not be Byzantinely sterilized in reciprocal exconfessions and ex-communications. Do not drive the masses away from the revolution with the spectacle of dogmatic quarrels between their preachers. Do not use your weapons nor waste your time in hurting each other, but use them in combating the social order, its institutions, its injustices, and its crimes.

Let us warmly reach out to feel the historical bond that unites us to all the men of the vanguard and to all the patrons of renewal. The examples that come to us daily from outside are uncountable and magnificent. The most recent and poignant of these is that of Germaine Berthon. Germaine Berthon, an anarchist, accurately fired her revolver at an organizer and operator of White terror, thus avenging the murder of the socialist Jean Jaurés. The noble, heightened and sincere spirits of the revolution perceive and respect the historical solidarity of her efforts and her works. The privilege of sectarian incomprehension and egotism belong to the petty spirits, who lack horizons and wings, and the dogmatic mentalities, which desire to petrify and immobilize life inside of a rigid formula.

Among us the proletarian united front is fortunately a choice and an evident longing of the proletariat. The masses call for unity. The masses demand faith. And that is why their soul rejects the corrosive, disintegrating and pessimistic voice of those who renege and of those who doubt, and instead seeks the optimistic, warm, youthful and fruitful voice of those who assert and of those who believe.

 

Long Term Failures: A Short History of the CIA and Destabilization of Leftist Governments in Latin America

M. Earl Smith’s extensive research into and historical expose of the CIA’s activity in South America displays a historical truth which is systematically and strenuously suppressed in the American mass media. The American public consequently has a disturbingly high approval of the CIA, with more citizens supporting than opposing ‘the Company’. M. E. Smith asserts correctly that many south and central American countries have seen successful leftist governments, despite many contrary efforts of the CIA. Yet the editors of Cosmonaut believe it necessary to clarify our views on this matter: The elected governments of South America, such as the Ecuadorian government under Correa, Morales’s government in Bolivia or Chile’s social-democratic policies, all do not leave the framework of capitalism and its state order. While they certainly have improved the lives for many millions, these are gains resting on the shaky foundations (and economic vulnerabilities) of liberal capitalism.

Trying (as Allende tried) to strenuously not go beyond what is “reasonable”, implicitly, ‘reasonable’ for the ruling class and its bureaucracy, is a losing strategy in the long run. Power has yet to be seized from the hands of the bourgeoisie under these governments, and (as the example of the social-democrats Allende or even Lula shows) even political power is not immune to economic and political sabotage.

As such, the Latin American ‘Pink Tide’ movement is a different animal from Marxism altogether. Marxism’s goal is preparing the ground for successful social revolution and seeing it through. What the historical relevance of these Latin American leftist movements is to be for social revolution remains to be seen. What is sure is that those who are disturbed and outraged at the legacy and continued activity of the CIA, entombed in secrecy away from democratic control, ought to realize that the only way to mitigate the damage and suffering caused by the institution must come through the radical politics of revolution. Without an internationalist vision that calls for the abolition of the CIA as a heinous and immoral organization, along with other violent US institutions, Latin American leftists will continue being at the mercy and knife of the United States government, and American progressives and Socialists will be responsible. – Cosmonaut Editorial Board 

US imperialism: a mortal enemy of the Latin American proletariat.

INTRODUCTION

On 17 October 1967, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow announced in a since-declassified memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson that Che Guevara was dead. This fact in itself was not extraordinary: Guevara was executed by Bolivian forces on 9 October, and the intelligence community was abuzz with the news. What makes this memo extraordinary is the fact that, in three steps, Rostow lays out the implications of Guevara’s death. The last point bears the most significance; at this moment Rostow explains America’s policy of “preventive medicine”:

It (Guevara’s death) shows the soundness of our “preventive medicine” assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency – it was the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year that cornered him and got him.

The history of CIA intervention in South America is well documented, and credit must be given to scholars such as Noam Chomsky for detailing these incidents. However, what has not been explored is how these efforts have, ultimately, failed. Despite the intended long-term ramifications, most of the governments involved (after periods of military rule and instability) have returned leftist politicians to power, even if these politicians are not as purely Marxist in thought as those that came before them.

Using the case studies of Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile, this hypothesis plays out with a fair amount of consistency. By exploring the historical context of each revolution, the leader who was deposed, the governments that followed, and the current state of political thought in each nation, we are left with a picture that shows how, despite the best-laid plans of intervention, each country has returned to an identity that is uniquely leftist.

GUATEMALA

HISTORY

According to the CIA World Factbook, Guatemala is a small country in Central America, bordering Mexico to the north, and bearing a coastline on both the Gulf of Mexico to the north and, to the south, the Pacific Ocean. The country was originally settled around the beginning of the first millennium CE, by the ancient Mayan civilization. The country was taken over by Spain in the 1500s, spending almost three centuries under oppressive Spanish rule, before finally gaining its independence in 1821. In either what is an episode of blind irony or a tongue-in-cheek nod to their ability as the former creators of dictatorships, the CIA states the following:

During the second half of the 20th century, Guatemala experienced a variety of military and civilian governments, as well as a 36-year guerrilla war. In 1996, the government signed a peace agreement formally ending the internal conflict, which had left more than 200,000 people dead and had created, by some estimates, about 1 million refugees (CIA World Factbook).

Due in large part to the interests of United Fruit and other US-owned businesses in the country, Guatemala has a long of history of business-friendly, US-backed dictators. This includes Jorge Ubico, who was in power until 1944. On the strength of the Guatemalan Revolution, Ubico was tossed out of office in favor of Guatemala’s first democratically elected president, Juan Jose Arevalo. While Arevalo was a middle of the road president, in favor of what he termed “liberal capitalism” (a school of thought that, while still beholden to US business interests, implemented minimum wage laws, universal suffrage, and a great increase in educational funding 1, his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, sought to institute a land reform policy that seized assets from business assets and redistributed them to the workers of Guatemala. 2 This, of course, did not fall in line with the desires of US business interests in Guatemala and was counter to anti-Communist beliefs in Washington, DC.

CIA INTERVENTION

A treasure trove of declassified documents have been released by the CIA under various Freedom of Information Act requests. The documents pertaining to the CIA’s intervention in 1954 are housed online by George Washington University and have been cataloged and indexed by Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh. In a detailed historical analysis, Gerald K. Haines, writing for the CIA in 1995, lays out the motivating factors behind the CIA’s plans in Guatemala. With morbid detachment, Haines details how the United States formulated two plans for the assassination of Arbenz, along with plans to arm Guatemalan refugees, and how the CIA planned to use psychological warfare and intimidation tactics to achieve its ends in Guatemala. While assassination was ultimately not used to bring an end to Arbenz’s freely-elected government, Haines gives us valuable insight into the aims of the CIA when he discusses the two scenarios proposed, Operation PBFORTUNE in 1952 and Operation PBSUCCESS in 1954.3

The CIA, in a Guatemala-related document entitled A Study of Assassination, defined what assassination meant for the CIA. In their own words, assassination is:

… Used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages for that organization.

One cannot help but notice the ambiguity in such a definition: the document does not exclude any type of organization from being capable of assassination, including foreign governments and business interests. In doing so, the CIA has given itself implied permission to carry out such extrajudicial killings by tailoring their own definition in a broad enough sense to allow for the pursuit of their own goals.

This document provides the CIA with its own form of justification for pursuing operations in Guatemala. The document is broken down into several sections and serves as a guidebook for any would-be American assassins. In the “Employment” section of the document, the CIA stresses that:

It should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U.S. Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by members of an associated foreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded.

The document goes on to consider the morality of such extrajudicial killings, saying that while it is never morally acceptable to kill a human being, exceptions can be made. The removal of genocidal dictators and self-defense are discussed before the CIA gives itself justification for its plans, not only in Guatemala but in every assassination plot it would carry out over the next sixty-five years. In dry, plain language, the unknown author writes: “Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held necessary”.

With justification in place for its actions, the CIA moved forward with its removal of Arbenz from power. The first attempt was Operation PBFORTUNE, set in motion with the help of Nicaraguan dictator Anastaiso Somoza Garcia 4. Eventually, the US-backed dictators in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic agreed to help, and on September 9th, 1952, Operation PBFORTUNE was put into action. 5 The mission in itself was a massive failure; however, Arbenz’s government had little to do with said failure. Garcia had a penchant for discussing the coalition’s plans in Guatemala publically amongst his cabinet and government. This led the CIA to believe that Arbenz may have had prior knowledge of the attack. 6 The State Department, fearful of both an international incident and the loss of troops and supplies, aborted the mission, and the soldiers and supplies headed to Guatemala were instead rerouted to Panama. 7

The CIA, however, was not to be deterred. On March 31st, 1954, plans were put into place to assist a military junta led by colonel and director of the military academy Carlos Castillo Armas. These plans included an “extermination list” drawn up by the junta since released (without the intended individual targets) by the CIA in 1997. One of the target groups was “out and out Communist leaders whose removal from the political scene is required for the immediate and future success of the new government” (see Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group). While none of the assassinations came to fruition, Operation PBSUCCESS, as it was named, was a rounding success.

On June 18th, 1954, Armas’s forces, armed by the CIA, launched their first counterrevolutionary action in Guatemala. At first, the combined efforts were frivolous: Armas’s forces were unable to defeat governmental forces. The US intervened on the rebel’s behalf with air strikes, and nationwide civilian panic ensued. 8 A campaign of distributing anti-Communist propaganda, by means of flyer and video, was undertaken by the CIA throughout Central and South America, with great success. The government-sponsored radio system was incapacitated by upgrades around the same time, and historians are quick to give this campaign extensive credit in the success of the counterrevolutionary forces. 9 As history tells us, Arbenz’s government fell with his resignation, and the United States installed Armas as the military dictator: he ruled the country with an iron fist until he himself was assassinated in 1957. A succession of military rulers followed for the next 36 years.

AFTERMATH

Guatemala is the outlier of the four nations studied herein. Despite 36 years of military rule, the country has yet to make a move back to the leftist policies that made the revolution of 1941 so successful. The Guatemalan Civil War followed between various military juntas and leftist guerrillas, a campaign that, among other horrors, saw genocide perpetrated against the indigenous Mayan people (May). While these aggressions ended in 1996 with a peace accord on both sides that allowed for a general amnesty for all parties, the damage was done: 200,000 were dead, and the country was an economic and humanitarian disaster.

For its part, the United States has done little to alleviate any of the issues caused by its lawless intervention into Guatemalan affairs. President Clinton offered a belated apology in 1999, stating that ”For the United States, is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake”.  The numbers, however, bear out how little the United States has invested in the well-being of Guatemala: for the fiscal year 2012, the United States provided less than 144 million dollars in total aid. By comparison, the United States provides 3.1 billion dollars a year in aid to Israel. The United States has a long way to go if it is to truly show contrition for its actions in Guatemala.

Victims of the Guatemalan Genocide

BRAZIL

HISTORY

According to the CIA World Factbook, Brazil existed under three centuries of colonial rule before finally gaining its independence from Portugal in 1822. It also notes that Brazil was a monarchy at its inception, and slavery was abolished in 1888. The article goes on to mention leadership prior to the rise of leftist politicians, noting that “Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio Vargas rose to power in 1930”. What the article fails to mention is that Vargas, while viewed as a populist, was a dictator who did not gain power through legitimate elections until he had ruled the country for close to two decades. While some of Vargas’s policies favored the working class, he was a staunch anti-Communist and, therefore, was seen as an asset to the United States in the years leading up to the Cold War.  The CIA, much as it did with Guatemala, glosses over its involvement in the destabilization of the country on its site, stating the following about the period in question:

By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil underwent more than a half century of populist and military government until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers (CIA World Factbook).

After several protracted parliamentary and procedural moves, leftist president Joao Goulart finally prepared to ascend to the presidency, which he did in 1963. Although Goulart was more centrist than he is usually given credit for, the United States saw his alliance with the People’s Republic of China as a harbinger of communist sympathies, and plans were made to remove Goulart from the presidency. On 31 March 1964, a military coalition led by right-wing elements of the Brazilian military moved to take over the country. They were backed, in part, by the United States and the CIA (see Kingstone).

CIA INTERVENTION

The CIA has released very little information concerning its role in the 1964 coup. As with the documentation involved in the United States’ role in Guatemala, Peter Kornbluh of George Washington University has done an outstanding job in organizing and archiving the evidence needed to show how the United States intervened in Brazil.

On 27 March 1964, a diplomatic cable arrived from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at the State Department in Washington, DC. Composed by then-US Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, the document describes at great length the news of an impending coup by General Castello Blanco. Gordon states almost immediately that President Goulart had aligned himself with the Brazilian Communist Party:

My considered conclusion is that Goulart is now definitely engaged on campaign to seize dictatorial power, accepting the active collaboration of the Brazilian Communist Party, and of other radical left revolutionaries to this end. If he were to succeed, it is more than likely that Brazil would come under full Communist control, even though Goulart might hope to turn against his Communist supporters on the Peronist model which I believe he personally prefers.

Gordon’s comment is curious on several levels: first, he lends credence to the theory that the Communist Party was not the only leftist element of concern to the United States. Secondly, he compares the level of control that Goulart sought to the control of the Peron family in Argentina, a dictatorship that, while borrowing from Marxist ideals, had several serious deviations from the Communist parties of the day. Finally, Gordon speaks of a campaign that he is all of certain exists, ignoring the fact that Goulart rose to power in Brazil as an elected official and, therefore, had every right to serve as the president of the country.

This document also displays how US intervention strategy had evolved since the Guatemalan Revolution in 1954. Seeing as the country was thrown into chaos, and suffered through several coups since Gordon opines that the United States should “prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage”. This is fascinating from the perspective that the United States made the perceptive assumption that the overthrow of one leftist figure would not deter other leftist elements from rising up to fill the void left by Goulart’s absence.

On 29 March, Gordon offered an update on the impending coup in another diplomatic cable.  Gordon notes the ascension of a leftist Navy Admiral to a top post in Goulart’s administration and opines that there will soon be a purging of anti-Communist elements from the Brazilian Armed Forces. Gordon appeals to the ability of the United States to promptly show force and aid the insurgency against Goulart’s government. Gordon’s communication ends with the following plea:

What we need now is a sufficiently clear indication of the United States’ government concern to reassure the large number of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to a Communist revolution here, but couched in terms that cannot be openly rejected by Goulart as undue intervention.

This is similar to the strategy that the CIA and the executive branch would employ throughout its endeavors of intervention throughout the second half of the twentieth century: plausible deniability. Not only did this type of planning allow the United States to influence the outcomes of current insurgencies, it allowed it, as discussed earlier, to plan for the governments that would follow the one ousted from power.

On 3 March 1964, the coup began. Troops from several regiments began to march on Rio de Janeiro, feeling that, by taking the country’s largest city, they would hold a strategic military advantage over the government stationed in the inland capital of Brasilia. 10 The importance of Rio being a port city cannot be understated, as it provided the insurgency with a key drop point for supplies ferried in by the United States Navy. 11 When given this knowledge, President Lyndon Johnson seemed all but giddy. In a recorded conversation with Undersecretary of State George Ball, Johnson insists on actively supporting the insurgency, stating that “I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do”. Johnson, however, anticipated a strong resistance despite CIA intervention, telling Ball that “we can’t just take this one”. Finally, he gives Ball a direct order to assist the coup in whatever way possible, telling him that “I’d get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little”.

The next day, April 1st, began with the United States willing to do whatever it had to, short of invasion, to ensure the deposition of Goulart. One of the few documents released by the CIA that pertains to the coup records a meeting at the White House concerning the ongoing plans for assisting the insurgency, with representatives from the State Department, the Department of Defense, Johnson’s cabinet, and the CIA. Secretaries Rusk and Gordon are pleased with the coup’s process, insomuch that they suggest that direct American intervention would be a detriment at that point (Meeting at the White House). The document moves on to other issues, including matters in Panama and Cuba, before closing with a discussion of logistics as it pertains to moving supplies to Brazil to assist with the coup. This assistance, however, would not be needed.

The next day, April 2nd, a cable arrived from the CIA. The document, striking in its brevity (just a single page long,) announces the departure of Goulart for asylum in Uruguay (see Departure of Goulart). A military government took power, and it would rule Brazil, with US backing, until elections were held in 1985.

AFTERMATH

Unlike the Guatemalan insurrection, the events in Brazil caused a far less violent fallout. Most of the benefits, however, seemed to fall into the laps of American business interests. Paul L. Williams, for example, brings to light the military government’s policy of “constructive bankruptcy,” where the state-owned industries would be starved to the point of either selling off their assets to private, foreign (mainly US) interests, or going completely broke, to the point that the government sold off their remaining pieces. 12 By the time 1971 rolled around, fourteen of Brazil’s twenty-seven major industries were owned by foreign business interests. 13

Brazilian-US relations, however, remain rocky. The United States has never offered a formal apology for its role in the removal of a democratically elected President. However, the United States has, it seems, looked for further chances to spy on and interfere in Brazilian affairs. In 2013, documents released by whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that the National Security Administration was spying on the emails, phone calls, and texts of leftist Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff (see Borger). Despite the flagrant violation of international law, the United States still refuses to apologize (see Roberts), just as it never has for its removal of Goulart sixty-one years before.

Students protest in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, circa 1979

BOLIVIA

HISTORY

The bulk of the CIA World Factbook article concerning Bolivia focuses on the current government of leftist Evo Morales, so as a source of history it leaves much to be desired. The slight section that does focus on the history of the nation, from Spanish colonial rule until the present, reads thus:

Bolivia, named after independence fighter Simon Bolivar, broke away from Spanish rule in 1825; much of its subsequent history has consisted of a series of nearly 200 coups and countercoups. Democratic civilian rule was established in 1982, but leaders have faced difficult problems of deep-seated poverty, social unrest, and illegal drug production.

Bolivia is unique in this study because, unlike the other four nations discussed, there was, until that time, no history of a successful, post-Communist Manifesto leftist government. Bolivia did have a small Communist party, but it was not until the arrival of Che Guevara that the leftist movement in the country sought to make any great strides in national politics. Guevara was not one who favored gaining power through elections: he saw the process as too contrived and slanted towards the ruling elite. Rather, Guevara was smuggled into Bolivia for one reason: to incite, much as he had in Cuba, a proletarian revolution that would lead to a single party government.

This section focuses on exploring the events surrounding CIA intervention and US foreign policy through the lens of the campaign to capture and execute Guevara. Bolivia is unique in that US troops, on the ground, trained the Bolivian Army in anti-guerrilla tactics. Also, there is conclusive proof that the CIA had operatives within the country, working both independently and within the Bolivian Army. In one small campaign, the CIA concludes that it accomplished the one act that would end Communist revolution in Latin America: the murder of a Communist icon, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.

CIA INTERVENTION

Guevara arrived in La Paz, Bolivia, on November 3rd, 1966. Recounting in his journal, Guevara quoted former Argentine president Juan Peron, who admired Guevara but saw his guerilla tactics as outdated, as saying that he “will not survive in Bolivia. Suspend that plan. Search for alternatives. Do not suicide”. 14

There is a trove of documents, released by the CIA between 1993 and 2013, pertaining to the CIA’s actions in containing Guevara’s insurgency in Bolivia. These, as with the documents from Guatemala and Brazil, have been archived in PDF format online by Peter Kornbluh. The documents pertaining to Guevara’s actions in Bolivia start almost two years earlier, in a CIA memo by a young intelligence analyst named Brian Latell. While most of the document focuses on Guevara’s falling out of favor with Castro in Cuba, it does spare a moment to explain Guevara’s revolutionary plans going forward. Latell states that “Che felt that his revolutionary talents now could be used better elsewhere”. 15

Bolivia was an impoverished part of South America that seemed to contain all the prime ingredients for a revolution. The United States, anticipating this (perhaps encouraged by their successes in Guatemala and Brazil, or worried by their failures in Cuba), came to an agreement with the Bolivian Army. In this Memorandum of Understanding, signed by representatives from both sides, Bolivia agrees to provide suitable training areas, individuals with talents suited to quashing revolutionary action, ammunition, maintenance of all US equipment provided for said training exercises, and provisions to the United States Army in return for training, equipment, logistical support, advice, officers, and intelligence.

Despite what appeared to be a brilliant stroke of luck, the United States had no direct knowledge of Che’s initial arrival in Bolivia. However, on 11 May 1967, Rostow offers Johnson the first credible evidence that Guevara is alive and operating in South America, not dead as previously thought. The methods, as well as the evidence itself, are heavily redacted, as are most of the documents in the Guevara collection. Rostow does point out, however, that more evidence is needed to prove that Guevara was “operational” and now merely “alive”.

Guevara’s diary offers a less than rosy view of his circumstances. An excerpt from the closest day to the White House memo above (May 13) shows the struggles that Guevara and his band of revolutionaries were having:

A day of burps, farts, vomiting and diarrhea – a real concern from our organs. We remained completely immobile trying to digest the pig. We have two cans of water. I was feeling very bad until I vomited then I felt better. At night, we ate corn fritters and roast pumpkin, plus all the leftovers from our feast the day before – those who were in a condition to eat.

The next passage, written on the same day, presents an alarming reality for the rebels:

All the radio stations are constantly covering news that some Cubans landing in Venezuela were intercepted. The Leoni government presented two of the men with their names and ranks; I do not know them, but everything suggests that something has gone wrong.

Given the struggles of Guevara and his band of confederates, it’s shocking that the Bolivian ‘revolution’ lasted as long as it did. Guevara was constantly ill, had little support from the Bolivian Communist Party, and the peasants were quick to sell him and his men out to the Army, either for extra food or under the threat of torture and arrest. Still, it came as a surprise when Guevara was captured and executed by Bolivian 2nd Battalion forces on October 8th, 1967,  forces trained by the United States Army.

On 9 October 1967, Rostow offered Johnson tentative reports that Guevara was dead. At 10 AM on the same day, the Bolivian president told a group of newsmen that Guevara was dead; however, he asked them to sit on the information. In the closing paragraph, Rostow states that there are at least four revolutionaries dead, including Guevara, two fellow Cubans, and a Bolivian rebel.

Contemporary sources tell us that Guevara did pass away on the night of October 9. Guevara biographer Jon Lee Anderson describes Guevara’s last moments, stating that a sergeant named Mario Teran volunteered to kill Guevara to avenge some of his fellow soldiers that had fallen at the hands of Guevara’s band of guerrillas. Guevara, defiant even to the end, told Teran “I know you have come to kill me. Shoot, coward, you are only going to kill a man!”. 16 After nine bullets, Guevara was dead.

Three further White House documents bring a finality to the issue of Guevara’s death. On October 10, White House staffer William Bowdler expresses some doubt that Guevara is among the dead. On October 11, Rostow tells Johnson in a memo that they were “99% sure that Guevara is dead” based on currently redacted evidence. This letter also outlines the aforementioned circumstances of Guevara’s death. Finally, on October 13, Rostow provides Johnson with irrefutable proof of Guevara’s downfall. To this day, the vast majority of the document is redacted, leaving a single line of text after the censored section: “This removes any doubt that ‘Che’ Guevara is dead”.

What remained of Che’s guerrillas fled to Chile, and, on 19 October 1967, Cuban President Fidel Castro confirmed what the rest of the world knew: the greatest revolutionary of the 20th century was dead. In Guevara’s eulogy, Castro declared that the citizens of Cuba, the children of future generations, and future revolutionaries should all strive to “be like Che”.

AFTERMATH

Guevara’s death was a return to business as usual for the ruling elite of Bolivia. Dictator president Rene Barrientos, already in power as a result of a separate CIA-backed coup, ran the country until his death in a helicopter crash in 1969. Barrientos’s hand-picked successor, Alfredo Ovando, led the country until his death in 1971. Bolivia then put a socialist leader, Juan Jose Torres, in power, but he was assassinated by the CIA in 1976 as a part of Operation Condor. Several generals led the country as a part of dictatorships or as elected presidents (although the legitimacy of these elections must be questioned) until 2005, when Evo Morales was elected President, becoming the first indigenous Bolivian to run the country.

Morales is an admirer of Guevara so the influence of Guevara on Morales’s socialist policies cannot be understated. The CIA, and especially Walter Rostow, sought to erase the influence of popular revolutionaries such as Guevara from South America. However, at least in the case of Bolivia, the popular spirit of Marxist politics seems to be alive and well. Quoting Thoreau Redcrow, a doctoral candidate in International Conflict Analysis at Nova Southeastern University in Florida, “Guevara’s appeal is a result of the fact that his message is more prescient than ever in Bolivia and throughout Latin America”.

The remains of famed Argentine-Cuban Marxist revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara

CHILE

HISTORY

Of all the articles on the CIA World Factbook website, the one covering Chile is, without a doubt, the most disgusting. The article starts out innocuously enough, describing the country thus:

Prior to the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century, the Inca ruled northern Chile while the Mapuche inhabited central and southern Chile. Although Chile declared its independence in 1810, decisive victory over the Spanish was not achieved until 1818. In the War of the Pacific (1879-83), Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia and won its present northern regions. It was not until the 1880s that the Mapuche were brought under central government control.

The article, however, takes a flagrant turn when it describes the events that led up to the installation of Augusto Pinochet as dictator in a CIA-backed coup against democratically elected Marxist president Salvador Allende:

After a series of elected governments, the three-year-old Marxist government of Salvador Allende was overthrown in 1973 by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled until a freely elected president was inaugurated in 1990. 

Allende was a lifelong politician in Chile, with unsuccessful presidential runs in 1952, 1958, and 1964. Allende rose to the presidency in 1970 and began an immediate process of nationalization and collectivization. The Chilean Congress, a fractured group, did not take well to Allende’s Marxist policies. There was a movement to have Allende impeached, but such efforts were protracted drawn-out affairs. On September 11th, 1973, a coup sponsored by the CIA was launched with an all-out assault on the presidential palace. Declaring that he would not surrender, Allende offered what would prove to be his own epitaph: These are my last words, and I am certain that my sacrifice will not be in vain, I am certain that, at the very least, it will be a moral lesson that will punish felony, cowardice, and treason.”

CIA INTERVENTION

While Allende seemed intent on going down in a blaze of glory, the fact is that the CIA planned his ouster since the early days of his presidency. Peter Kornbluh once again provides us with a treasure trove of documents, all housed online by George Washington University. The first of these documents is a series of diplomatic cables from September 5-22, 1970. These cables, sent by American Ambassador Edward Korry, paint a picture that is alternatively desolate and hopeful. What is shocking about this series of cables is the candid manner in which they are written. Korry lambasts the situation, stating that “it is a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to Communism with only a little more than a third of the nation approving the choice, but it is an immutable fact.” These cables would play a significant role in Nixon’s policy as it pertained to Allende.

A handwritten note from 15 September 1970 survives, taken by CIA director Richard Helms from a meeting with President Nixon. Helms writes:

l in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!; worth spending; not concerned; no involvement of embassy; $10000000 available, more if necessary; full-time job–best men we have; game plan; make the economy scream; 48 hours for plan of action”.

This meeting is detailed to a CIA operative, whose name is redacted, in a report the following day. Stating that “The President asked the agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him,” Helms sets a deadline of September 18 for a plan. The mission is coined “Project FUBELT.”

A month passed, and several high-profile Cabinet members met to discuss further plans, plans that evolved around Chilean general Roberto Viaux; a plan entitled “Track II” was developed, with “the unfortunate repercussions, in Chile and internationally, of an unsuccessful coup […] discussed”. By this point, the United States had shown an evolution in how it involved itself with coups in South America, showing under Nixon an aggressive yet pragmatic approach. This is displayed in a document from the next day, October 16th, 1970. The document calls for Allende to be overthrown by October 24th, with the plans from “Track II” chosen. Ambassador Korry is left out of the loop (see Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting). However, their plans were foiled two days later when another group working with the CIA in Chile managed to assassinate General Rene Schneider, rallying Chile around Allende. (see Cable Transmissions on Coup Plotting).

In a series of documents stretching from 3 November to 4 December 1970, the implications of Schneider’s execution and Allende’s ascension to the presidency are discussed. An “Option C” – maintaining a cool attitude towards Allende while working covertly to overthrow him – was chosen by Nixon at a National Security Council meeting on November 3 (see Option Paper on Chile). Three days later, Helms briefed the NSC on operations in Chile, omitting the CIA’s role in the first failed coup. The role of Moscow in Chile’s government is discussed and ultimately dismissed, as Helms believes that Allende “will exercise restraint in promoting closer ties with Russia”. These views are reiterated on November 9th, with the President’s plan of cool disengagement becoming official policy. (see National Security Decision Memorandum 93). Finally, CIA operative John Hugh Crimmins detailed on December 4th, 1970 the steps were taken by the CIA, in cooperation with the World Bank and other global business entities, to put economic pressure on Allende’s administration. This document calls for an effort to expel Chile from the Organization of American States.

Direct efforts to dispose of Allende, however, are not documented again until 1973. The first document from this era is from the now-defunct Defense Intelligence Agency, which offered a biographical sketch on Augusto Pinochet, the leader of a coup that had overthrown President Allende. The document is heavily redacted, yet it offers a glimpse into the background of the most brutal dictator in Chilean history (see Biographic Data on General Augusto Pinochet). On 1 October 1973, naval attaché Patrick Ryan provided the Department of Defense with a glowing review of both Pinochet and the coup that removed Allende from power. According to Ryan, “Chile’s coup de etat [sic] was close to perfect”.

By this point, the reality of Pinochet’s coup had set in. On September 12, Allende’s death was announced. Reports conflict over whether he committed suicide or was assassinated by Pinochet’s forces. In an ominous harbinger of things that were to come, Guardian reporter Richard Gott noted that:

All radio stations supporting the Allende Government have been taken over, the headquarters of the Communist Party have been raided, and the detention of 40 prominent figures in the Popular Unity Coalition, which supported Allende, has been ordered.

The next day, Gott offers a bleaker portrait of the situation when he announces that Pinochet and his junta have dissolved the Chilean Congress, having decided to rule by decree. At this point, the massacre of those who were too loyal to Allende began, and most democratic rights were suspended:

There is strict censorship of the press, and only the two newspapers owned by Chile’s most powerful industrial magnate, Agustin Edwards, have been permitted to appear. The large number of Bolivian exiles have been told to leave the country, and doubtless the contingent of Brazilians will also have to leave.

The United States, eager to complete the ouster of the socialist Allende, quickly recognized Pinochet’s government and for the next twenty plus years fostered close ties with the Chilean military dictator.

AFTERMATH

Of the four countries studied, Chile has the largest database of post-coup documents available. The George Washington website yields a whopping eight documents on the circumstances in post-coup Chile, from articles detailing the use of summary executions by the Pinochet government (see Kubisch) to documents detailing the executions of American citizens by Chilean authorities (see Popper), and on to details of the expansion of DINA, Pinochet’s dreaded “secret police” (see DINA Expands Operations and Facilities). However, the most horrifying of these documents recounts the capture and torture of Chilean leftist Jorge Isaac Fuentes. A product of Operation Condor, the intelligence garnered from this interrogation was used to push forward a culture of violent repression in Chile, including the “disappearing” of thousands of people, including Fuentes himself.

Aside from a brief aside at the UN in 1977 (UPI), the United States has never offered a formal apology for bringing Pinochet’s brutal regime to power. Close to four thousand people were murdered, another 30,000 tortured, and 1,500 simply disappeared. Another 200,000 people fled Pinochet’s regime. Today, Chile is led by a socialist president, Michelle Bachelet, who has done much to return leftist policies to Chilean politics.

Repression of Chileans by the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, 1973

CONCLUSION

Although the events of CIA intervention often led to the overthrowing of elected leftist leaders in the short term, the fact remains that most of these countries have returned to a somewhat milder strain of leftist thought. Aside from aforementioned Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (with President Joseph Kabila Kabange) and Nicaragua (under President Daniel Ortega) have returned leftist politicians to power in the post-CIA intervention years. This shows that, while leftist thought has been tempered, politicians inspired by socialist thought are still not only electable but preferred by the people in the countries the CIA sought to repress.

A greater failure for the CIA, however, are the countries in which the CIA did not incite fundamental change. The glaring failures are, of course, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. One thing that must be pointed out, however, is that CIA actions were also responsible for reactions that led to the installation of Iran’s brutal theocracy, Iraq’s Baath government led by Saddam Hussein, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, who housed and trained Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Each of these countries has been unable to recover from the aftermath of brutal regimes put into power by the CIA. The reasons behind this vary, however, the human rights abuses perpetrated by these regimes far outstrip any brutality that occurred under the preceding leftist rulers.

The influence of the desires of American business interests in the coups cannot be understated. United Fruit played a role in every regime change outlined here, and all of the regime changes led to dictatorships that were extremely friendly to American business interests. Perhaps having learned its lesson from its inaction in Cuba, the United States sought to ensure that each intervention led to the protection of the rights of American business above all else, even the native populations of said nations.

While I am of the view that the CIA, in spite of its anti-Communist tendencies, ultimately failed in its goal to protect Central and South America from anti-capitalist thought, there are those that differ in opinion. One such is the aforementioned Professor Redcrow. His view, while derisive of the CIA and full of praise for Morales in Bolivia, offers a bleaker view of the rest of the nations touched by CIA-incited insurgency:

A depressing irony is that materially, all through Latin America, much of the conditions that Guevara fought against are actually worse now than they were when he was killed. Although several governments have social democratic leaders, the structural changes necessary to overturn capitalism have not been made, nor can most governments even attempt such a measure without finding themselves the victim of a U.S.-backed coup attempt. A few hours before Guevara’s murder he was served a bowl of soup by a local school teacher and he asked her how she could possibly teach children in the dilapidated mud schoolhouse that he was being held a prisoner in. Sadly, in places like Brazil, where the wealthy take helicopters from their work to their high-rise apartments, these conditions are still present. However, what is even further away, is the chances of a guerrilla army being able to do anything about it.

While I choose to respectfully disagree with Professor Redcrow’s view of events in Central and South America, I will concede the truth that today’s leftist politics are a watered down version of what was propagated throughout Central and South America in the Cold War years. That being said, the advancement of leftist governments, including the Maduro government in Venezuela (which thumbs its nose at the United States on a daily basis) can only be seen as a positive sign for those that espouse the virtues of Marxism. As time moves forward, I only see the governments of these countries moving further to the left, despite the plans and schemes of CIA-backed American imperialism.

Works Cited

Anderson, Jon Lee. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. New York: Grove, 2010. Print.

“Bolivia.” CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Dec. 2015. Web.

Borger, Julian. “Brazilian President: US Surveillance a ‘breach of International Law'” TheGuardian.com. The Guardian, 24 Sept. 2013. Web.

“Brazil.” CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Dec. 2015. Web.

Broder, John M. “Clinton Offers His Apologies to Guatemala.” The New York Times 11 Mar. 1999. NYTimes.com. The New York Times, 11 Mar. 1999. Web.

Castro, Fidel. “Fidel Castro Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara.” Fidel Castro Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara. Cuba, Havana. The Death of Che Guevara: Declassified. Web.

“Chile.” CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Dec. 2015. Web.

Cullather, Nicholas. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2006. Print.

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