Materialist History or Critical History: A Reply to Jean Allen

Amelia Davenport responds to Jean Allen’s A Critical History of Management Thought, continuing the debate on scientific management. 

 

Before diving into the substance of this essay, I want to thank comrade Jean Allen for their contribution to the broader discussion on the role management science plays in the contemporary ordering of production and its potential (mis)application to socialist organizing. While there are points of disagreement between Comrade Allen and myself on historical facts, we share much more common ground than might be inferred from reading their essay. In fact, there is far more common ground between Comrade Allen and me politically than between myself and the Amelia Davenport their essay presents. 

To clear up some confusion, I do not support the application of Taylorism, as a framework that is articulated in the pages of Principles of Scientific Management, to either the process of production or to the socialist movement. I certainly do not believe in “uncritically applying it” or “applying it in its entirety,” No quotations are provided showing that I intended such a thing or supporting any of the claims made about my essay. The purpose of Stealing Fire was twofold: on the one hand, I sought to use Taylor as a lens to examine the pre-scientific forms of organization commonly employed on the left, but on the other hand, I turned Taylorism in on itself and expose the flawed and authoritarian character of Taylor’s original analysis. Taylorism was the name given to one of the early attempts to rationalize the labor process according to newly discovered laws of nature. In its original conception, it empowered a layer of engineers and experts who determined the best way to carry out labor tasks which eroded the power of shop floor managers, business owners, and skilled workers in favor of engineers. Instead of bosses issuing arbitrary orders and workers trying to meet them, roles and tasks were broken down into their simplest elements to maximize the potential output of machines. Stealing Fire is not a call for the adoption of classical scientific management theory but an immanent critique of it in the tradition Karl Marx critiqued David Ricardo and Adam Smith. 

Likewise, contrary to Comrade Allen’s claims, I do not present an abstract science of management that socialists can simply apply to any situation,  nor do I claim such a science exists. One of the most critical portions of Stealing Fire is its brief treatment of the theories of educator and philosopher John Dewey and the role practice plays in education. I emphasize learning by doing precisely because the science of organization is a practical science. What formulas I do present, like the IWW’s organizer ranking system, are tried and true methods formed out of the collective experience of the workers’ movement, not theories derived from a laboratory. The Industrial Workers of the World, through decades of experiment, developed a training system that educates its members in best practices for workplace organizing. I explore a small portion of that system which does not contain any secret tactics used for evaluating members of the target business because it is an excellent practical example of the socialist application of management science. 

To make their point about the nature of organizational science, comrade Allen cites Carl von Clausewitz’s approach to military science. Few thinkers on military issues are as cited as Clausewitz besides Sun Tzu, and his book On War, lays out important theoretical tools for understanding how war and other kinds of conflict work. Breaking from old traditions that tried to create perfect models of how war “should” work, Clausewitz applied social scientific methods drawn from History and critical philosophy. He started with the reality that war involves randomness and is unpredictable. 

Clausewitz, as a proto-complexity theorist, is rightly skeptical of abstract schemas that can be claimed to universally apply to military strategy. There is no textbook that can teach you war nor is there one that can teach you organizing. Here comrade Allen and I are in perfect agreement. However, Clausewitz, as singularly brilliant a mind as he was, was writing in a period before the development of the sciences that deal with exactly the sort of problems under discussion. It is also worth noting that the same objections Comrade Allen raises over the use of Taylor apply equally if not more so to Clausewitz. While Clausewitz maintained a much more flexible and dynamic vision of military strategy than his contemporaries, his vision was of a deeply authoritarian character and was inextricably linked to the ideological imperatives of the Prussian state. While Clausewitz rejected the subordination of strategy to the authority of political ministers, he also saw the army general as the singular Will for which the army is merely a body, with available autonomy of decision diminishing down the line of command until it is nonexistent at the level of the individual troop. If Taylorism was an ideological justification for an unequal society, what else could Clausewitz’s thought be? Clausewitz was an aristocratic apologist of the mass slaughter of workers for the aims of imperialist states. At least Taylor, for all his elitism, distributed authority in a collegiate fashion among managers so as to not rest in the monopolar figure of the field commander. 

Reductionist and specialized sciences which most of us are taught in primary school certainly do have trouble generating theories that can account for highly complex, probabilistic, and dynamic processes. But that does not mean that those areas are immune to the ever-widening grasp of science. Cybernetics, Tektology, Complexity Science, Operational Research, General Systems Theory, and other paradigms have been developed to deal precisely with the invariant properties of all organizations and chaotic environments. The results of these sciences are true whether or not they are employed for one set of class interests or another. However, the implications of their findings consistently show the superiority of socialist organizational principles like autonomy, solidarity, rational planning, democracy and collectivity. Second Order cybernetics, represented by Heinz von Foerster, Stafford Beer, Francisco Varela, and others, emphasizes the active role of the scientist/observer in constructing and shaping the system of their analysis.1 It is the insights of these sciences which necessarily entails the framework of constructive socialism. Constructive socialism is not a foreordained framework brought down from Mount Sinai, it is exactly the principle that comrade Allen supports: creating the kinds of organizations that will give the working class itself the experience it needs to take power rather than continuing the path of socialisms which depend on a caste of specialist “revolutionary scientists.” Nor does it replace scientific socialism outrightit extends it beyond the limitations of the past.

As with the principle of constructive socialism, Comrade Allen misunderstands the purpose and meaning behind the advocacy of Prometheanism in Stealing Fire. Prometheanism is an ethic, not a framework of analysis. While some eco-socialists wrongly attribute the term to a blind faith in technology, it is instead a statement of libertarian socialist values. That is to say, Prometheanism is openly declaring an allegiance to the cause of freedom, to the oppressed, to understanding the world, and to the martyred dead who can no longer speak for themselves. To be a Promethean is to be willing to bear an eternity of agony rather than bend the knee for a tyrant or choose comfort over justice. To be a Promethean is to turn the tools of the masters into weapons against them, to believe in the possibility of a better world where science can serve the people. It is to accept one’s responsibilities. I utterly reject any framing of Prometheanism as scientistic or rooted in a belief in the salvific power of technology. Such a set of values is not a product of study. No length of time as a comfortable trade union bureaucrat, leftist intellectual, or political canvasser will teach these values. They come from experience, but they’re an a priori commitment a revolutionary must make. There is no science of morality, nor logical proof of its validity. But that does not mean it is not necessary. Comrade Allen is under no obligation to accept the ethic I propose, and acceptance of it is obviously not a prerequisite for engaging in working-class struggle. 

Nevertheless it is necessary for members of the professional class to shed their immediate class interests in favor of their higher collective interests as members of the species. Prometheanism is an ethic which offers a way forward for the revolutionary movement as it tries to secure knowledge of the world. The Promethean ethic is best articulated by Stafford Beer in The Brain of the Firm:

But because science has indeed been largely sequestrated by the rich and powerful elements of society, science becomes an integral part of the target of protest for the artist. Each makes his own Guernica. My own view, which I set about propagating in these circles, is that science, like art, is part of the human heritage. Hence if science has been sequestrated, it must be wrenched back and used by the people whose heritage it is, not simply surrendered to oppressors who blatantly use it to fabricate tools of further oppression (whether bellicose or economic).2

The reception of my work as a defense of Taylorism, as supporting managers, or endorsing the mental/manual division of labor (alleged by commentators less serious than Comrade Allen) is alien to what is contained within it. One has to wonder if some critical voices read Stealing Fire at all. It is decidedly ironic when Leninists and academic leftists charge me with elitism or being anti-worker control given the historical role both groups have played in the workers’ movement. Leninists, and most particularly Trotskyists, have a very long history arguing against worker control. In fact, Trotsky proposed the full militarization of labor in the USSR during debates against the Workers’ Opposition, Bukharin and Lenin over the role of trade unions. My argument that the results of Taylorism, like objective time study and safety analysis, were used by the new industrial unions for the benefit of workers against management is simply a recognition that class struggle takes place even within changed productive terrain. Workers still have agency and are not helpless objects of Capital. 

Scientific managers themselves recognized the potential dual aspect of their work in the struggle of interests between labor and capital. In a debate hosted by the Taylor Society in 1917 over the use and misuse of time-studies, Navy production coordinator Frederick Coburn explained how the objective measurement of time could be used as a tool to argue against unreasonable managers and arbitrary demands: 

We have found out that by carrying along the time idea that we can say to the request for immediate completion of a job, “very well, if you want that job done by Wednesday noon, here are some other jobs that must be deferred,” naming the particular jobs, and how long they will be deferred. In the old days we were told to do the job, and were expected to get that job done… 3

Coburn went further and explained that the introduction of scientific management experts meant that because they could put the objective needs of production into language the accountants and directors of factories could understand the owners could no longer “grind the neck of the working man with an iron heel” simply out of ignorance or apathy. It does not mean exploitation stops, or that the interests of capital and labor are reconciled. But anyone who has ever worked for a wage knows that a large part of the hell of work is the ignorance, stupidity and capriciousness of managers. Objectifying the work relation removes some power from lower-level management and creates a basis for resisting arbitrary authority. A manager can only demand a worker violate their company’s own “one best way” guides with some risk to themselves. Even in a society without hierarchical labor relations there will be conflicts between different interests within production and having objective standards can only serve to smooth out unnecessary friction. 

Imputing motives of secret technocratic designs into my good faith treatment of Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management misses the point. By not studying or mastering the science of organization that bourgeois, authoritarian, and reactionary forms of management will re-assert themselves. These forms of organization are the social default which the general public has been conditioned into accepting. What most critics of Taylorism miss, and the reason why I made my initial contribution, is that what came before Taylorism was also bad and Taylorism emerged as a way to overcome the limits that pre-scientific capitalism had run into. These are limits that pre-scientific socialism will run into as well. When voluntarist and unscientific attempts at reorganizing the economy fail, technocratic methods of organization will be restored just like in the real history of actually existing socialism in power. The stakes are far too high to fall back on easy answers that confirm our pre-existing prejudices or allow us to write off large swaths of the accumulated knowledge of humanity. How can we defeat our enemies if we do not seriously study them? Our solutions will necessarily be far different from those presented by bourgeois theorists of management like Taylor, but we should deal with them honestly if we want to solve the problems of social and productive organization.

 As Doc Burton said in Steinbeck’s classic of proletarian literature, In Dubious Battle:

I want to see the whole pictureas nearly as I can. I don’t want to put on the blinders of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and limit my vision. If I used the term ‘good’ on a thing I’d lose my license to inspect it, because there might be bad in it.

Engaging in dispassionate analysis does not mean endorsing the object of analysis. 

The essay that follows is more than simply a critique of what I maintain are historical and theoretical errors on Comrade Allen’s part. It is an elaboration of an approach to history, science, and the organization of labor. It is also a defense of the materialist conception of history, developed by Karl Marx, as understood in light of contemporary advancements in our understanding of complexity and pre-modern society. The first section uses Comrade Allen’s reading of the historical development of management thought as a springboard to defend the materialist account of the role of ideology in production. The second section looks closely at the real history of scientific management in practice while exploring the nature of science and its role in society. While I hope that this essay can stand alone as a contribution to the discussion of these topics, I strongly recommend reading Jean’s essay, both for its own value and to see both sides of the debate. 

Critical History or Materialist History?

Turning now to Comrade Allen’s own contribution to the discussion of management theory, they begin with a critique of Morgan Witzel’s historicization of “management thought.” Allen sketches a compelling narrative, attempting a historical materialist lens, as to why business management thought was unable to emerge in tributary societies despite the presence of widespread commercial enterprise. However, while Comrade Allen begins by looking at the structural economic factors (the ruling class existing as a landed aristocracy whose wealth is extracted by tribute rather than commercial growth), they also fall into the idealist trap set out by Robin George Collingwood’s form of historiography. Where Collingwood avoids projecting contemporary ideas and mores backwards onto the people of the past, his methodology is focused on what people thought about themselves and their world.4 Though he rejected the label Idealism because of its association with axiomatic rationalists, Collingwood’s approach is idealist in character. It pays insufficient attention to the technical and material forces of production and the real process of organizing life. Collingwood rejects the scientific approach to history that seeks invariance, that is the common aspects of things that always hold true, and sought to contextualize history within the particular subjectivity of heterogeneous epochs.5 While this style of history can create excellent fodder for use by the authors of historical fiction, and may have explanatory power for the actions of great persons, focusing on the ruling ideas of an era obscures far more than it tells us. Using R.G. Collingwood’s style of analysis, Allen says:

Simply put, the class society of feudalism could not conceive of management thinking, either as a science/means of analysis or as a justifying force in society, because it already had a justification for the hierarchy that existed within it. Often this aristocratic ideology was incapable of ‘working’ either by any objective measure or even on its own terms, but without an alternative system and a different material base, this form of magical thinking hung vestigially over society, justifying all sorts of harm and oppression despite being debunked and demystified. For centuries humanity hung between a feudal society that created all manners of useless suffering and a new method of organization that could not be spoken of let alone analyzed. This is a state I think we can relate to, and feudal notions hung onto relevance until it was felled, not by one Revolution but three.

By why did aristocratic ideology “work”? And why did it stop working  In the above passage Comrade Allen answers the former question with a failure of imagination on the part of the whole of society and the latter with the bourgeois revolutions which broke the spell of aristocratic mystification. But if we want to understand management as a science, that is to say, a method of organizing the economic base, it’s precisely to the base we must look when examining its antecedents. 

What Comrade Allen misses is that pre-capitalist production lacked a complex technical division of labor. The kinds of management thinking which preceded business management were characterized by total cosmovisions which had a place for everything and put everything in its place. As Alexander Bogdanov shows in The Philosophy of Living Experience, for most of known history and for the vast majority of society, people organized themselves within authoritarian communes where strict adherence to the accumulated traditions passed down by ancestors was essential to maintaining stability. In this set-up every aspect of the world could be understood within a coherent framework where every aspect of life was imbued with sacred significance and every phenomena was caused by some kind of will.6 Whether this took the form of innate animistic spirits, gods, ghosts, or wood goblins varied depending on the particular evolution of the people in question. It is with the introduction of trade that the unity of life began to break down. When tools and techniques arrived from outside the received traditions of the community they took on a secular character while those less productive or useful ones that had emerged endogenously were often preserved in a ceremonial capacity. While the day-to-day farming of a community might use iron tools, ritual activity would be performed with bronze or copper implements in many neolithic communities. As communities became more interconnected, the domain of secularization expanded, and was reconciled with the sacred in a new hybrid social body: the state. Imposed from a level above the commune, the laws of the state blended the mundane character of the secular with the authoritarian understanding of causality brought forth from authoritarian communism. The King’s laws carried divine sanction and represented the will of the gods, god, or ancestors but they served to regulate practical affairs and an increasingly dynamic social intercourse. Now, appeals could be made to the abstract necessity of laws rather than to divine revelation or tradition. With the rise of the new tributary society, where a sovereign authority managed the interconnection of a multicellular social body, business was born. People entered productive relations with those they had never (or would never) meet and sought out a greater share of the social surplus generated by the synergy of social elements (Bogdanov, 2016).7 As archeological evidence shows, men like the Babylonian copper merchant Ea-nasir often did so at the expense of their countrymen.8

Enterprises in tributary societies could be managed by single individuals because the level of economic complexity was very small. Success was largely characterized by luck, personal initiative, cleverness, and a predatory instinct as Thorstein Veblen notes in The Theory of Business Enterprise. Farming methods changed little across lifetimes, consumer goods required enormous investment of labor power and skill, and individuals largely remained confined to their assigned social rank and even trade. While the peasants remained exploited and oppressed by their liege, the general conditions were highly stable and regular except when struck by external shocks like disease, invasion, and famine. Moreover, even in bureaucratic systems like those which emerged in China, the primary mode of economic organization, agricultural labor, was extremely decentralized which fostered an organic corporatism. The complex Mandarin bureaucracy emerged as a means of organizing a resilient meta-systemic infrastructure for the decentralized production units to be insulated from climactic and social changes that might otherwise cause famine and disorder. Rulers would centralize and decentralize the administrative structure based on the level of stability and balancing competing political factions (Cao, 2018).9

Ruling ideologies like Confucianism, Brahminism, and Roman Catholicism were not just post-facto rationalizations of aristocratic control; the peasants were not reading ruling class ideologists. Nor did the ruling class need a metaphysical sanction for their actions: humans are perfectly capable of acts of exploiting and controlling others for their own sake. Instead, these cosmovisions were the tools which organized social reality for the purpose of labor.  

While Rome did not produce much in the way of “business theory,” following their longstanding practice of appropriation from the Greeks, they did have robust theoretical frameworks governing conduct in the area. Not only did holy texts like Hesiod’s Works and Days, among others, contain advice on commercial activities (along with wise warnings regarding seductive women out to steal men’s granaries), but Aristotle wrote an entire book titled Oeconomica. While Aristotle condemns the act of making money for its own sake (what he calls “chrematistics”) he provides a clear overview of the principles which govern both household management and the management of commerce in his social context. Being situated in a culture which had extensive contacts with very different but similarly advanced civilizations like Persia and Egypt, Aristotle was able to take a somewhat objective view of the laws of economics which transcend those differences. What is crucial is that Aristotle in this book, like his others, was organizing and crystalizing the collective knowledge and techniques of his community into a coherent philosophy. This is the same role Confucius played in China. Medieval confucian scholar Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance, though focused on political management, shares much with the best of contemporary management theory from practical illustrations to deep insights in how to navigate a complex network of social relations to effectively discharge one’s duty.10 Morgan Witzel, who is the main object of Comrade Allen’s critique, denies this sort of thinking is “management thought” because it does not relate specifically to business, which Comrade Allen rightly criticizes. One of Comrade Allen’s strongest points is their discussion of the areas of unity between pre-capitalist management and capitalist management. Once the work of codifying a broad theory of management is finished, in a relatively stable society such as Rome, there is no objective imperative to develop a new cosmovision. This can be contrasted to the fractious Hellenic merchant states. Once Rome began to crumble, Roman Catholicism filled in the gap of the previously dominant cosmovision’s capacity to model and control reality. It is worth noting that while monarchs saw unruly subjects as children misled by their local liege, as Allen points out, those same subjects almost universally saw their sovereign as innately good and merely misled by wicked advisors. 

But while Comrade Allen emphasizes the differences between contemporary society’s conceptualization of management and antiquity’s, they fail to sufficiently explore the differences in antiquity itself. While it’s certainly true that Chinese aristocrats maintained strong conceptions of blood purity and innate ability, that was not necessarily true of the wider Chinese society and virtue was certainly not seen as wholly innate. In Confucianism, Mohism and many other prominent schools of thought, virtue, which was inextricably tied to social managerial functions, was actively cultivated and could be far better expressed by a hardworking peasant than a decadent noble.11 In Confucian thought in particular, hierarchy was justified on the basis of necessary ritual performance, not innate qualities of blood. The noble’s social role was to be an exemplary individual and actively exercise consummate conduct in every sphere of life.12 Failing this, it was a sacred duty of advisers and potentially even commoners to remonstrate and correct the errors of the rulers lest Heaven bring ruin to society as a whole. The justification for hierarchy in China was not a top-down sanction from God, but rather a proto-Darwinistic view with the role of Heaven as the final arbiter of viability. Each noble was both a decisionmaker and spiritual guide within a distributed hierarchy, but the vast majority of administration was exercised by a merit-based bureaucracy. The “Nine Ranks” of officials in China which Comrade Allen cites from Francis Fukuyama can only very loosely be considered based on descent. They were principally determined by administrative ability but the rank of one’s father did play a role.13 This was not about the innate quality of blood, but about the perceived moral and spiritual health of the private upbringing of the candidate. A good father will raise a good son. Of course this did limit class mobility, but it was a different way of organizing social economic reality than those employed contemporaneously in Europe. It is also worth noting that the “Nine Ranks” were fairly short lived and were replaced by an examination system long before capitalism took root. Different methods of determining merit were employed in China in different periods, but it was always founded on performance rather than property. Unlike in Europe, pre-modern Chinese society largely saw what you did (within your prescribed social role), rather than who you were, as what mattered ideologically. 

Most tributary societies from the Achaemenid Empire14, the Islamic Caliphate15, and even much of the Roman Empire, from Diocletian’s economic reforms until the rise of feudalism, were run principally by merit-based bureaucracies16, not the gentilshommes who directly ruled backwaters like Medieval France. Comrade Allen mistakes the existence of blood-based aristocratic systems, which were very widespread, with a universal social structure. Even India, with its caste system, was largely ruled through merit based and “individualist” managerial structures across many periods and in many regions. Whether in the Shaivist Tantrika principalities of Kashmir, the Maurya Empire of Chandragupta and Ashoka, or the Islamic Caliphate of Delhi, the Caste system was frequently overthrown or undermined as the political-economic order of the subcontinent remained in flux.17 The purpose of caste, like any other system of social classification was to structure the economic order as an active process. Today caste serves a different purpose: it is a means for opportunity hoarding. Well-off families utilize family and caste networks to better position themselves within the market economy.18 Caste persisted only insofar as it completely changed to fit the modern world. Buddhist, Jain and Islamic rulers maintained unequal systems without justifying themselves with caste, and, while they claimed spiritual authority supported their rule, differences between their regimes and those of the Brahmins can be found in how they structured the division of labor. Ashoka based his rule on freeholding farmers whom he awarded land based on right of tilling, while Islamic rulers introduced slavery to northern India.19 Spiritual texts which specified relations between the castes, toward free citizens or toward slaves were practical guides not ideological cover. 

The colonial slave societies in the Americas differ from the empires of antiquity, as they did need to develop an ideological sanction for their dehumanization and brutality towards kidnapped Africans. This is because the newly emerging economic order was incongruous with the feudal cosmovision of Christianity. Christianity emerged as the ideology of slaves already engaged in class struggle against their masters.20 It was cemented in feudalism as the naturalization of a corporate relationship between the individual and the universe mediated by the church and crown. While the Christian cosmovision provided ample excuse for genocide and conquest, built up by precedent in the expansion into the lands of European pagans and defense against Islamic conquests, it stood in glaring contradiction with the principle of slavery. Christian clerics initially sanctioned this depravity by claiming it served a tutalary role, by which the “savages” would become Christianized.21 But eventually the slavers would turn to theories of racial superiority, not only as a means of “justifying” their rule, but practically enacting it and organizing the production of society. “La Casta” became a social reality for countless people. The development of secular biological sciences went hand in hand with racist control over African and indigenous labor just as much as it did with gaining greater control over our relation to our own bodies for the sake of health and general social welfare.22 A microcosm of the essential unity of this historical process is the life of the father of gynecology, James Marion Sims, who performed heinous experiments on enslaved women for the benefit of their masters. We may call things like phrenology pseudosciences today, but they were merely replaced by new ways of organizing a racialized division of labor using science. Race-based theories of intelligence and genetics continue to receive active funding by both public and private institutions. Popular scientists like Steven Pinker aren’t just doing apologism for racismthey’re creating practical models to use for organizing a racist economy. 

What’s crucial here is that scientific socialists cannot take historical (or present) ideology as merely a reflection of the world that gives it sanction, nor as the driving force of human behavior divorced from the general social labor process. While ruling class ideology in our society does serve as a means to internalize control into the minds of subordinate people to avoid the necessity of deploying direct coercion, its primary function is to organize objective reality. The masses of Rome had no understanding of Aristotle or Plato but their ideas remained useful to the ruling class. Though they will have profound differences, societies that are organized around a common mode of production will share invariant properties in their cosmovisions. Feudal Japan and feudal France were worlds apart yet closer in many characteristic ways than either were to their neighbors the Chinese empire and Almohad Caliphate. This is necessary to understand why Taylorism developed. It was not a post hoc rationalization for the domination of workers by managers, but a framework for organizing society around large scale manufacturing. Taylorism is not the only possible way to organize large scale manufacture, as it is suited particularly to societies that maintain a social division of labor, but it will necessarily share invariant commonalities with a framework suited for the most egalitarian and emancipatory society which can be organized on this basis. 

The nature of contingency in history is a fraught topic. It is certainly true that given a slightly different confluence of events Fredrick Taylor may have never developed his theories of management. However, contra Comrade Allen, the laws of motion of society do entail certain necessary outcomes like the development of management thought. Comrade Allen says: 

The idea is that these movements occurred naturally, that the abolition of slavery or the extension of the franchise was a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically insufficient, and thus their dissolution was inevitable. Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted, the deconstruction of these orders requiring revolutionary action in their time.

While it is true that revolutionary rupture was necessary to break with the old mode of production, it seems unwise to cast aside historical materialism as readily as Comrade Allen is willing to do here. Revolutions being acts of organized agency in no way violates the fact we live in a deterministic universe. The authority of the laws of physics is not delimited by a border that begins at the edge of the human mind or society. That we cannot possibly create a comprehensive model of the universe that allows perfect predictions of what will happen, (the laws of information theory, mathematics and cybernetics show why in the form of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety) does not mean that our actions aren’t determined. The dissolution of slavery, noble privileges and the caste system being inevitable couldn’t possibly be predicted with absolute certainty. The ability to make an equivalently complex model necessary for the task would only be possible for a god of equal complexity to the universe. As we have already discussed, the ideologies Comrade Allen speaks of are regulatory models for the economy and they are part and parcel with it. They’re not something distinct from the dynamics of historical materialism. 

The Rise of the Technocrats

Management as a discipline emerged as a part of a much broader imperative that exists in bourgeois society: the specialization of knowledge. Comrade Allen acknowledges this phenomenon, referring to it as “siloing” but mistakenly argues that it is the result of a delusion or mistaken belief in the need for specialization:

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management’s origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace, that is a managerial class with a “view from the top” rather than a view from the workplace. And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absencethe absence of work and power from managementhas exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.

Instead, management takes as its focus the invented concept of the organization and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about. Authoritarianism in the workplace, which was so problematic in the 19th century, has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unexamined. Further syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford). This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

Before continuing the discussion of why Comrade Allen’s analysis of the atomization of work is flawed, it is worth noting that scientific managers, in particular the members of the Taylor Society, were very much concerned with the relations of power between management and labor. Beyond Frederick Taylor’s references to the conflict in Principles of Scientific Management itself, there are literally hundreds of essays and books written by Society members on the topic. Of particular note are C. Bertrand Thompson’s The Relation of Scientific Management to Labor, Man and His Affairs by Walter Polakov, and Work, Wages and Profits by Henry L. Gantt. While it is true that most practicing Scientific Managers were ideologically aligned with the rights of property, the majority who weren’t socialists were at the very least Progressive reformers within the pro-labor New Deal coalition.23 

Division, reduction, pulverization, and analysis of discrete phenomena works for the needs of capitalism. It’s not just a delusion brought about by a perverse desire for control. The modernist logic of mechanical causality, which is properly studied through increasingly narrow division into incommensurate fields, was a revolutionary and progressive assault on the authoritarian cosmovision of the tributary societies.24 Where once Mankind had a unified system of knowledge, the inexorable logic of the market smashed Platonic Reason’s great Tower of Babel with an invisible hand. In its place rose a thousand tongues for a thousand new sciences. Now, rather than knowledge being handed down from God to the people through the King, any free citizen, with sufficient resources, could unlock Nature’s mysteries. By simplifying the universe into the logical models of Newton, Descartes, and Kant, humans gained real mastery over their world in meaningful ways. As the accumulated experience of capitalist society grew, these cosmovisions were translated into the practical philosophies of men like James Watt, Joseph Marie Jacquard, and Charles Babbage. The steam engine, Jacquard loom, and analytical engine were physical instantiations of the real and objectively valid principles of the modernist organization of reality. But was this kind of philosophy, this science, limited to the study of dumb matter? Or to soulless automata like the animals of Darwin’s studies? “No!” said Auguste Comte and other early socialists like Henri de Saint-Simon and Robert Owen. The methods of science, brought forth by Francis Bacon, could be applied to the study of social systems and applied toward their perfection (Hansen, 1966). Management Thought, truly applied though not yet conscious of itself, begins with Owen, not Taylor. 

Robert Owen was a Welsh textile industrialist and social reformer born in 1771. By the end of the 18th century Owen went into a partnership and acquired ownership of the New Lanark mill as a successful entrepreneur.25 Owen is not often thought of as a “management thinker.” His proposals and social experiments took on a much wider scope than the scientific management of early pioneers (barring Lillian Gilbraith who applied the theories she and her husband developed for business with equal fervor to home-economics). But this was in part due to the context in which he worked. The spheres of social scientific study had not yet been fully differentiated. But it is also likely because of his socialist politics. Nobody doubts that Henry Ford, the pro-Nazi industrialist who revolutionized the assemblyline, was a management thinker. Yet Ford engaged in Utopian social planning himself; he created an experimental colony in the Brazilian jungle called Fordlandia and played an active role in designing the social life of the residents of Dearborn Michigan. An example of Owen’s management reforms was introducing a “silent monitor” system, in which supervisors would rate the work of an employee and display their status for all to see using a multi-colored cube placed above each workstation. Likewise he used tactics similar to labor organizers, and personnel managers, but for the purpose of winning workers to proposed technical changes, by identifying ‘champions’ among workers with social influence who he could win over as proxies to generate support.26 Owen’s utopian socialism, like that of Saint-Simon, was an attempt by the newly emergent technical intelligentsia to re-integrate society, ripped asunder by the economic laws of bourgeois production, on the basis of the conceptual framework this society had produced for the transformation of the world in its image.27 It was doomed to fail, and every community modeled on his precepts did fail, precisely because of the very thing that had given its representatives real power in the world: the social division of labor. Owen went on to become one of the founders of the British trade union movement, education reform movement, and the co-operative movement where his management theories found a more receptive audience than among his bourgeois peers and would have a more enduring impact than in the all-encompassing socialist colonies his more idealistic disciples would establish.28 It would take nearly 100 years for later researchers like Swedish-American mathematician Carl Barth, French mining engineer Henri Fayol, and Polish economist Karol Adamiecki, to transform the study of management into an institutionalized scientific discipline.

Robert Owen’s New Lenark.

Why did it take so long for management as a field of scientific analysis to emerge after Owen? Because the technical division of labor had not yet reached the degree of development where it was possible. In Owen’s day, science itself had only recently been separated from philosophy and the broad disciplines like biology, physics, chemistry, medicine, mathematics, economics, and so on were at the genesis of their heroic periods. Other fields like psychology, sociology, and computation were a faint dream. In production, there were the “mechanical arts” rather than discrete fields like mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, and civil engineering.29 So the idea of there not being a science specifically for management prior to the general intensification of disciplinization is hardly surprising. Management science has the same relationship to earlier forms of management practice that civil engineering has to the engineering of antiquity. 

Comrade Allen’s objection that management science is “unscientific” because it is ideological rests on the mistaken assumption that any science is non-ideological. One does not have to be a vulgar Marxist to see that actually existing scientific institutions are inextricably bound up with the power and interests of capitalism. Funding, institutional access, and prevailing courses of research are all heavily conditioned by the needs of both capitalism and imperialism. And even beyond this practical level, the struggle between foundational philosophies that underlie disciplines like physics are as fraught and intense as any between political ideologies. In the heroic age of physics there were sharp debates between the disciples of Viennese scientist-philosophers Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann on the existence of atoms and later Einstein’s theory of general relativity would be decried as “Jewish science” by rival physicists like Philipp Lenard. In mathematics, the debates between formalists like David Hilbert and intuitionists like Georg Cantor over whether mathematics represented true laws of reality or was merely a human construct for describing reality devolved into petty feuds and an intellectual battle to the deathuntil it was dissolved by Kurt Gödel’s development of incompleteness.30 And in biology, the struggle between the followers of Gregor Mendel and Ivan Michurin took a bloody turn under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. The problem with most accounts of the ideological nature of science is that they grossly oversimplify what is happening and still rely on the notion of a “pure science” beyond history that is then tainted by ideology on a practical level. This opens the door for non-scientist specialists of ideology to assert themselves as the real arbiters of truth over the scientists. Rather than demand the subordination of science to philosophy, or attempt to “free” science from ideology, the communist ought to insist that the scientist herself recognize the philosophical component, and non-neutrality, of her labor. That management science often pretends to be fully objective and neutral is not a special feature of it, and the answer is not to simply write it off because it has been used for power or because the confidence intervals of its predictions are too large. To the credit of the Taylorists, they were very open about the fact that their framework was a philosophy. This, I think, is the crux of our disagreement. Comrade Allen sees in management science a system of symbolic representation that contains falsehoods, which distinguishes it from “true” sciences that represent the world truthfully. But this kind of dualism misses the living process of science and scientists. It’s true that representation does occur within science, but it is a mechanism for gaining greater control. Science is the activity of scientists, not a commodity they produce. The lie of neutrality in science is a much deeper problem in modernity than can be laid at the feet of Taylor.  

More specifically, Comrade Allen makes the case that Fredrick Taylor was a pseudoscientist because of claims made by ex-management consultant and self-admitted grifter Matthew Stewart. Unfortunately, as appealing as Stewart’s narrative is for leftists who want to dismiss scientific management without engaging with the literature, it is highly misleading. One of the claims Stewart makes is that Taylor bilked Bethlehem Steel by charging far more in consulting fees than he generated in profits from moving pig iron more efficiently.31. However, this claim depends on ignoring the fact that Taylor spent very little of his time at Bethlehem Steel focusing on the application of scientific management to pig iron at all. His true work consisted of months of conducting scientific analysis on the steel manufacturing process and transforming the management structure internal to the factory.32 In fact, Taylor’s work in the pig iron fields was primarily an attempt to appease his employer Robert Linderman. In addition to his scientific work at Midvale Steel which set him on the course for developing his framework of scientific management, Fredrick Taylor had developed a new labor incentive structure called the “differential piece-rate” system. This system, described in Principles of Scientific Management, was what attracted Bethlehem Steel’s leadership to Taylor because it promised to encourage a considerable boost in productivity with little investment of capital. Linderman was impatient with Taylor’s slow and methodical approach to time and motion studies and needed rapid results.33 While the pig iron example features heavily in Principles of Scientific Management, it’s clearly intended as a hook to draw in potential clients who would otherwise not be interested in Taylor’s system due to their natural conservatism. Using the differential piece-rate as a bait and switch, Taylor could emphasize that scientific management is fundamentally a philosophy rather than a grab-bag of techniques, and thereby begin changes to the labor process the capitalist would have otherwise never consented to. Taylor never fully implemented the differential piece-rate system in Bethlehem’s pig iron fields, as he found it unnecessary to introduce a lower penalty wage below the standard.  

Turning to the claims of forgery, Stewart cites the work of Robert D. Wrege (although mischaracterizing his results), and alleges that the entire time and motion study conducted by Taylor on the pig iron operation was fabricated. But this is a result of undue extrapolation. According to Stewart, Taylor took a group of strapping workers, worked them as hard as he could without rest, and then arbitrarily decided to subtract 40% of this output to account for rest breaks. It would be comical if it were true. Taylor did not personally oversee the time and motion studies, nor did he come up with the ratio of rest to work ratio. Taylor hired a former colleague, James Gillespie, along with veteran Bethlehem foreman Hartley C. Wolle, to conduct the studies.34 From the fact that in their report Wolle and Gillespie do not provide an explanation for how they determined the 60/40 work to rest ratio, Stewart concludes that they simply made it up out of thin air. Further, the entire episode is alleged to have been a farce because very few people, excluding Henry Knoll (the real name of Schmidt) and the minority of highly able workers, were able to meet the “first rate” level of productivity which guaranteed high wages. Many workers had initially resisted transitioning to the new model because they feared a risk of losing wages if they failed to meet the productivity standards though their existing standard simply became the minimum rate.  As communists, it should be clear to us that any such incentive structure implemented by a capitalist firm will ultimately be in Capital’s favor, and by the metrics of business management (that is increasing the productivity of outlayed constant capital), the experiment was a wild success.  

Under scrutiny, the bleak narrative of workers driven to the bone under Taylor becomes murky. Workers who failed to meet productivity standards were almost all given otherless taxingpositions, provided they demonstrated effort.35 Similarly, part of how workers were won over to the new piece-rate system was by being offered to switch to lower intensity and higher-level work after reaching exhaustion by Gillespie and Wolle. The details of the significant work which was to define Taylor’s approach to labor in this episode, namely the “science of shoveling,” are sparse. His notes do describe creating a new kind of tool store room, figuring out optimal motions for shoveling, and there is independent corroboration of studies on shovel size. Moreover, contrary to the claims of Stewart, Taylor’s pig iron experiments were independently replicated multiple times, first by French physiologist Jules Amar and later, carefully documented on film, by Frank Gilbraith.  Reviewing the footage and research conducted by Gilbraith, it is clear that the general results of Taylor’s pig iron study are correct, within a standard 5% margin of error.36 It is also true that the version of events laid out in Principles of Scientific Management contain inaccuracies. Various events are smoothed over and differ from what historical documentation says actually happened under the direction of Gillespie and Wolle. But it is important to remember that the text is a recollection intended to give color to a boring topic, not a scientific paper itself and does not contain willful falsehoods in any areas that relate to the central argument. In fact, as the research of pro-Taylor scholars Jill Hough and Margaret White shows, Taylor likely deserves none of the credit, given the study was neither original (similar studies were well documented at the time) nor did it involve his personal intervention.37  Moreover, much of the text was not written by Taylor himself. The bulk of the manuscript, in particular its theoretical core, was penned by Taylor’s protege Morris Cooke.38 

Unlike Stewart, Taylor critic Chuck Wrege does provide illuminating insight into Taylor’s character, and willingness to bend the truth. Rather than demonstrating the invalidity of Scientific Management, Wrege sets out to deflate the myth of Frederick Taylor as a lone genius who revolutionized management. However, Wrege himself frequently bends the facts to paint Taylor in an even more salacious light than his unadmirable behavior creates on its own. This has allowed management gurus like Stewart, with less compunction than Taylor himself, to issue a blanket dismissal of scientific management in favor of their own “wisdom.” 

It is well accepted that Taylor’s experiments were remarkably successful according to several metrics. From the perspective of capital, Taylor improved productivity threefold at Bethlehem Steel. This greatly boosted Taylor’s credibility among capitalists. From the perspective of labor, the average worker received 60% more pay than before.39 While wages did go up, the increase in wages can in part be accounted for by the high turnover the new system created which cast off unproductive (and therefore low-paid) piece workers. Most of these workers were moved to other jobs within the company, though not all. While as socialists we decry the inhuman aspect created by the iron link between employment and subsistence, this high turnover is itself a success from the perspective of the scientific management philosophy, as it enabled a more rational allocation of laborers to the places they were most suited. In a socialist society where survival is not linked to the selling of labor-power, eliminating the need for labor hours would be a benefit, not a curse. Ironically, the turnover of labor was a specific concern of the owner Linderman and the Bethlehem Steel management and a source of friction with Taylor. The company owned the homes the workers lived in and robbed them through the company stores.40 By turning over unproductive labor and rationalizing production, Taylor was disrupting the quasi-feudal debt-bondage system Bethlehem Steel had set up.  

Taylor saw the factory as a machine for producing social wealth. The workers and managers were to both be molded into rationally perfected components, each playing their own specific part. This idea seems naturally revolting to those of us not indoctrinated into the ideologies which permeate engineering departments at universities. But it is hard to articulate exactly why in objective terms, leaving critics open to accusations of sentimentalism or moralism. Taylor is the ever-present foil for management theorists precisely so they can paint themselves as more able to factor in the “human element” of business.41 Even in his own day the great bulk of management publications pilloried his engineer’s mindset. But rather than such an impoverished view of productive life representing an engineering or scientific view, it was overcome already through management science in Taylor’s lifetime. 

It was not Taylor who implemented the overall system in Bethlehem as he was preoccupied defending his reforms to senior management and working on specific improvements to steel manufacture. Instead, the system was implemented by his protegee Henry Gantt.42 Taylor had successfully, and quite scientifically with the help of mathematician Carl Barth, optimized much of the machinery engineers were working on, created a planning office, and created his specialized system of “functional forement.” However, productivity had not improved, and machinists simply adjusted the speed of their work to maintain the same output as before. To overcome this, Gantt, with Taylor’s approval, introduced a new piece-rate system which greatly improved on Taylor’s model. Rather than punishing workers for failing to reach a minimum threshold, like in the original differential piece-rate system, Gantt preserved the existing wage and only introduced the higher rate for meeting a higher productivity threshold. In so doing, he avoided the risk of labor unrest. 

Gantt chart

The other key difference between Gantt’s system and Taylor’s model developed at Midvale is that the machinists at Bentham were actively included in the design and implementation of the labor process. Workers understandably resented being completely excluded from the intellectual aspect of their work and would often refuse to follow the instructions provided by managers, believing that they knew better. Gantt found a way around this: if workers disagreed with guidance on their instruction card they were encouraged to write feedback and return it. If they were more effective than the instructions the managers had laid out, the planning office would adjust the instructions going forward. If the worker’s ideas were less effective, the managers could demonstrate it and win the worker over to the more effective methods.43 What Gantt had discovered is that by treating the workers as more than mere implements of science and instead as vital parts of the planning apparatus he could leverage a greater social intelligence to the collective enterprise of production. These experiences were crucial for transforming Gantt politically from a liberal into a socialist. Scientific management, as a practical science, was not limited to Taylor’s personal authoritarian approach.

The key lesson of scientific management is that “management” itself acts as a fetter on the organization of production. This is something I am sure comrade Allen agrees with. The traditional business management holds back the engineers, eschewing techniques that would reduce waste, increase output, and generate social surplus because they challenge the direct material interests of the management class. Likewise, the engineer-managers themselves, by virtue of their monopolization of expertise, are structurally incapable of realizing efficient production. For all their knowledge of scientific principles, they cannot possibly hope to manage the complexity of the labor process, without effectively ceding decision-making control to the workers. By getting rid of rule-of-thumb and artisan methods in production through scientific analysis, the scientific engineer-managers set the terms for a dialogue between the abstract and the concrete in production rather than setting in stone a “one best way” like they believed. That the Taylorist view does not accord with modern scientific understandings of complexity implicates Taylorism exactly as much as it implicates the entirety of the Enlightenment scientific project. A true organizational science, which moves beyond the horizon of bourgeois reductionism, will overcome modernity and make itself of and for the masses. 

Beyond accusations of pseudoscience, Comrade Allen’s narrative of the development of scientific management rests on the myth that it was created as a tool for the bourgeoisie to discipline the rising working class. Given as support are a series of anecdotes that demonstrate a correlation in history between the rise of scientific management and the period of classical anarchism and social-democracy’s ascendance. Allen argues that the contradiction between Republicanism in the civil/political sphere and the authoritarianism of the workshop resulted in the birth of a movement that demanded an “applied republic” in the economic sphere. Scientific management is cast as an ideological tool to avoid such an outcome by tricking workers into demanding “better” management instead of democracy. 

Such a tidy narrative is as compelling as it is ahistorical. While it is true that there were forces that demanded democracy, demands that are certainly worthwhile, the French workers’ movement was not so straightforwardly “Republican” in political or economic thought. In fact, many, though not all, leaders of the General Confederation of Labor, the largest, most powerful and most radical union in French history at the time, explicitly disavowed all aspects of republicanism and democracy.44 They believed majoritarianism, procedural voting and universalist politics were inherently bourgeois. Instead they called for a decentralized aristocracy of labor which would mobilize the workers through charisma in direct corporate association and build a world with unmediated and direct relations of production. Some on the left held more favorable views of democracy than others, but all agreed that the only means for workers to achieve their aims was direct struggle. Likewise, within the political social-democratic parties there was no universal demand for a republic within the workplace though some social-democrat leaders like Karl Kautsky did make references to it. The chief demand of the political socialists and the right wing of syndicalism was social control of production. Economic democracy meant disciplining production to the political democracy of the republic. Within the CGT, the leaders most aligned with the Republican tradition like Léon Jouhaux took this line and advocated nationalization with a tripartite management scheme consisting of worker, consumer and public representatives.45 In fact, Jouhaux, along with both leftist and rightist CGT members came to enthusiastically embrace Taylorism, provided it was conducted by the union in the popular interest of efficiency rather than the employers to sweat workers harder.46 It was the right-wing current of the syndicalists which most strongly identified with the French Republican tradition’s notions of liberty and progress, along with the political Socialists, while revolutionary elements sought a break with what they viewed as a great scam by men like Robespierre.47 What French syndicalism and political socialism ultimately aimed for was a “full life” for the people, and it was this which the bourgeoisie denied them. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Democracy and Civilization were not themselves the aim; they were judged by how suited they were in providing satisfaction to the direct material needs of workers.  

If economic republicanism itself does not actually represent either a universal aim of the workers, it follows that it does not make any sense to juxtapose it to scientific management theory. Fredrick Taylor’s system, completely unmodified, is perfectly compatible with the democratic election of the leadership of an enterprise. It is even compatible with democratic deliberation and voting on policy. What it is not compatible with, and this is something incredibly valuable and often stands in opposition to democracy when each is taken to extreme, is autonomy. And while autonomy has long been a demand of the workers’ movement, it is not always a universal demand and takes on a different character depending on the perspective under which one applies it. The autonomy of a labor collective freely associating and jointly engaged in production is different than the autonomy of the petty bourgeois artisan who answers to no one but himself and his clients. And though Taylor himself opposed autonomy, many scientific managers did not. Taylor Society member Edward Filene for instance, by no means a radical like Marxist Taylor Society members Walter Polakov and Mary van Kleeck, was a pioneer and key promoter of credit unions and actively supported the transition of businesses into worker-owned cooperatives.48 His vision of “economic democracy,” at least in the 1930s, was not unlike the “applied republic,” yet he was committed to the principles of a movement that was supposedly a reaction against it. 

Conclusion 

Most people are not opposed to applying universal principles in the labor process if it makes their life easier. We only stand to benefit from techniques that reduce the arbitrary nature of the labor process. The scientific management proposed by Frederick Taylor is obviously incompatible with communism if taken on its own terms, but for many Marxist theorists like Lenin, it contained seeds of the future form of organization in spite of itself. Which is to say, Taylorism ideologically talks about scientific truths. As will be seen in the sequel to Stealing Fire From the Gods, the rational kernel within Taylorism, separable from its reactionary content, is labor analysis. This is the breaking down of the labor process into its elements so they can be understood and improved. While not sufficient on its own terms, labor analysis is a crucial tool for the design of any goal oriented process. Taylorism is already outdated in relation to capitalist production compared to schools like Operational Research and the Toyota Way, while capitalism long expired as a defensibly progressive economic system. But this does not mean it contains no lessons. Critics who might charge that using labor analysis does not require rehabilitating Taylor, the Taylor Society, or scientific management more broadly, miss the fact that any implementation will be conflated with Taylorism regardless of our rejection of Taylor and criticisms of his philosophy. Hopefully my forthcoming account of the development of scientific management in the early 20th century in the United States, France and the USSR will serve as inspiration for the kind of thought necessary to develop an organizational science of labor beyond management.

Though this essay takes a sharp tone and gives little ground to Jean’s analysis of the history and development of management thought, I do see it as an important contribution to the debate. Their critique of Morgan Witzel’s inconsistency, advocacy of workers’ freedom, and strident opposition to managerial hierarchy are welcome and needed interventions in our society and unfortunately in much of the left. Those of us on the left who want to win have to firmly reject commandist and authoritarian methods of organizing. Jean is absolutely right to see them as less efficient and resilient than forms of organization that leverage autonomous organization. Though the danger remains far more with personalist and charismatic forms of hierarchical organization than technocratic forms in the contemporary left, we shouldn’t simply trust experts to run our organizations for us either. As stated earlier, Jean and I are very close politically in terms of values and even immediate prescriptions, but that only makes the necessity of polemic greater. Being in the same political camp means we have a duty to one another to work together toward clarity. By critiquing Stealing Fire, Jean gave me the opportunity to elaborate and clear up misconceptions about my analysis, and I hope my critique of their essay will serve them equally well. 

Unlike Jean, at the risk of arrogance, I do have a vision of what kind of management will replace the authoritarian personal management of capitalism. I do not believe that we have to wait until a new framework spontaneously emerges from the political struggle of leftists. Of course a new management must emerge from practice, but the “collective mind” of humanity is much bigger than “the movement.” Within the real living history of management thought, and outside the sclerotic majority of business schools, there are repeated revolutions born out of necessity. The introduction of the assembly line, the October Revolution, World War 2, the countercultural revolution of the 1960s and other periods before and since represent moments where we can identify real science being done to re-conceptualize how humans can organize themselves economically. 

There is a spirit that Stafford Beer identifies in the final remarks of his book Brain of the Firm which flows through innovative schools of management thought up to the point they reach their limits.49 Frank and Lilian Gilbreth had it, as did the founders of Operational Research like Russell Ackoff and Heinz von Foerster. Others like Beer himself and Lenin had it too. In each case what is important is the process of scientific inquiry, commitment to a vision, and a way of being in the world. In Confucian terms, it is a kind of Ren or “consummate conduct.” In other words, becoming good at being human. In this, I think Jean and I are in full accord. The specific models and theories that are created to represent phenomena are not important for defining the new management. I fully agree with Jean that we can’t find some abstract scheme to apply to solving all our problems. I reject the worldview that sees science as a form of representation; science an action. I recognize that what will replace bourgeois management is the redevelopment of management as a collective science of performance. Fortunately, some of that work is being done right now by researchers like Raul Espejo and others advancing the Viable System Model, and we have a wealth of research from both Western and Soviet scientists of organization to draw on. The new organization of labor will be a philosophy of living practice.

A Critical History of Management Thought

Can capitalist management thought provide solutions to the problems of the socialist movement? Jean Allen urges doubt and skepticism in this critical review of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought.

Alexander Samochwalow, “Textilfabrik” (1929)

Authors note 2020

This is the paper that made me a socialist. It’s odd to say that, seven years later, and especially odd to say that as someone who has for a long time advocated against the idea of finding communism at the end of a term paper.  But it was precisely this term paper, written in the dark hours in my shabby Arlington apartment, which pulls from a dozen books paged through on the bus and which ends with a weak call for workplace democracy, that broke the years of largely self-imposed conditioning and put me on the path I travel now. Realizing that our economy was run via undemocratic methods that did not work even by their own standards was something I could not turn back from.

So it is even odder to say that now, seven years, this piece has become relevant again. Recently a comrade of mine, Amelia Davenport, wrote an article in this journal that speaks to a project we are both involved in: the development, within the socialist left, of a science of organization. I agree with them that the organized left has gone for far too long with proto-scientific methods, accepting tautological nonsense or ideological statements in place of analysis of organizational conditions. Realizing this allows us to start along the path of materially analyzing some of the largest issues facing the left today. It is possible to build an organization which deals with the tradeoffs of democractic decision making and effectiveness, of autonomy and coherence, of responsibility to the part and responsibility to the whole, of inclusivity and clarity, in a way that is amenable to the majority of our comrades

But, in an odd way, my comrade wrote an article which this piece is a precise disputation of, despite its having been written seven years ago. While I agree that the development of an organizational science for the left is of absolute importance now that we have a left worthy of an organizational science, what my comrade goes too far in saying is that we can look to bourgeois management science and take it, in its entirety, and use it to our own ends.  That is, to my tastes, thoroughly inadequate as a response. While there are mistakes in this paper (regarding the historicity of F.W. Taylor’s examples), I hope that it shows that management science performs just as much, if not more, of a role as an ideological justification for the inequity of our society and of the lack of agency the working class has in our society. There is, certainly, a kernel of an argument in management that we can use, but when we look at the study of management in bourgeois societies it is not ever truly clear what aspects of it describe a real situation and the right answer, and what exists purely as magical thinking, the final analysis put out by a dying era and a dying economic system.

I am not making an aesthetic argument here, that to use the language or thoughts of management thinking will somehow inherently infect us with Evil.  Management thinking is by and large an organic ideology, and it has become so to the degree that it does not work even on the terms it sets for itself.  While the failure of the social sciences and particularly business sciences to analyze the world did not produce Trump or Brexit or Bolsonaro, their failure is yet another of the symptoms coming from the decline of a period of technocratic liberalism and the growing desire for a strongman, a decider who is not bothered by the desires of the masses or any desire to relate to them, who can make our discipline work through sheer force of will. But this failure was not a fall from grace, the groundwork was flawed from the very beginning and it is for precisely this reason we cannot take management science on its own terms and use it for ours.  It is not only not useful for our ends; it has failed on its own terms.

In the course of editing this work for republication to Cosmonaut I have mostly edited for style and to remove a graduate student’s penchant for unnecessary phrase-mongering. In doing so I have tried to keep its argument consistent with the article I wrote in 2013, with a final conclusion to discuss Davenport’s article and this piece, and analyze where we could find a middle ground between the two.

Authors note 2013

This paper began as a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History Of Management Thought, a book that was assigned for a graduate course on Organizational & Management Theory. The work, which claims to be a summary of management thought from the beginning of civilization to the modern-day, had a large number of apparent flaws and ‘holes’ in its historical structure, but during my critique, I swiftly found that the issue was not the text itself, it was the flawed and ideological history that Management has built up around itself. As this realization dawned on me this paper moved from an attempt to ‘plug the holes’ of Witzel’s work (by presenting a discussion on the power structures of early capitalism which he glosses over) into a critique of modern management thought in general. Throughout this paper I attempted, to what degree I could, to present these ideas and my critique, sans jargon and in a self-explanatory way. I hope you enjoy.

Introduction

“How would you arrive at the factor of safety in a man?” Wilson asked

“By a process analogous to that by which we arrive at the same factor in a machine,” he replied.

“Who is to determine this for a man?” asked A.J. Cole, a union representative.

“Specialists,” replied Stimson.1

When a political proposition is made, its political nature is seen, critiqued, its power structures discussed. But if that proposition survives, if it lasts a century or for centuries, it is no longer a proposition. It becomes a social system, a system we are brought up in, a system we are taught within, a system we have a hard time thinking outside of. This is especially true of management thinking.

A hundred years after the Congressional hearing on Frederick W. Taylor’s methods, and after decades of depoliticization, management has come to be seen as a science, a fact of life. In the meanwhile, management academics try desperately to fix the disorganizing effects of management thinking. 2 What both the layman and the academic miss is that management thought is political and serves to hide and justify the power relationships which occur within the workplace. Within this essay, I will discuss the political dimension of management thought through a critique of Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought.

Morgan Witzel’s A History of Management Thought is a task of amazing scope–an attempt to provide a survey of all management thought from the very beginning of civilization, showing that “since the birth of civilization, people have been writing and thinking about problems in management and how to solve them”.3 Despite Witzel’s goal there are significant holes in his narrative–several times he says with surprise that this or that major civilization “did not produce much in the way of notable work on business…[or] administration”.4 Such a finding is without a doubt ‘strange, even perverse’, but such major holes suggest a mistake, not so much in archival work as in historical perspective.5

History is more than looking back

R.G. Collingwood’s The Idea of History warns against thinking that the past is merely a backward extension of the present and thinking of writing history as a merely archival endeavor. Cut-and-paste history, as he calls it, is a school of thinking which attempts to understand the peoples and practices of the past without understanding the thinking of the past. He sees it as a critical misunderstanding of history–a method that turns the study of history into a series of technical problems: 

“a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian.  This is highly problematic because it reduced individual thoughts into a continuous mass, indeed the individual level is seen as an irrational element; through positivism “nothing is intelligible except the general”.6

Instead, he argues that thinking historically requires putting any event or reading within the context of the time and attempting to put oneself in the shoes of those one writes about.7 This requires understanding the way a different culture or time functions, and appreciating the way that the context of the modern-day presses itself on the study of history.

How does this relate to Witzel? Witzel writes very much in the context of his time, the modern era when business has largely taken over thinking about organizations and even military or governmental organizations use the language of business. The modern-day is a world where rapid technological changes necessitate constant thinking and rethinking of organizational principles.  It is a world where management and organizations are explicitly talked about, in books and articles that come out by the hundreds each year.  

Our context is very different from even the immediate past. Explicit thinking about business did not start until the 18th century, and explicit thinking about management started in the late 19th century. Much of the thinking about management and business before this was ’embedded’ within society: people thought about management or organizations via analogies to other things which were more familiar to them. Without accepting the embedded nature of management thinking–an acceptance which would recast management thought as an ideology rather than as a discipline–accessing the past’s implicit thinking about management would be difficult if not impossible. This explains the major gaps in Witzel’s work before Taylor.  

It also leads to a far more interesting question than why one university professor chose to write a history text in a certain way: what happened to change management thinking into an explicit discipline? People were able to manage massive organizations without a large corps of texts on management, and even as late as the 20th century there were many people who insisted that management could not be taught or explained to any satisfactory level.  What led to the change? 

This question–what events led to the emergence of management thought as a discipline rather than as a series of societal beliefs, is the key question of this essay.  To answer it, I will examine Witzel’s text, as it is above all else a perfect example of a traditional history of management, while also constructing an alternate explanation for the creation of management science. This essay will be organized into three sections corresponding to three eras of management thinking. Through the first section, which will follow the time when management was an implicit mode of thinking, I will discuss three civilizations which Witzel says ‘did not have much to say’ about management (Rome, Ancien Regime France, and Ming China) as well as others to attempt to explain the hole in his narrative. With the knowledge gained there, the second section–following the 19th century and the creation of an explicit field of management–will explain the reasons for management’s shift into the public light. And in the third section (going over the 20th and 21st centuries), I will return to discussing the holes in Witzel’s narrative and how the origins of management still affect it today.

Painting by Limbourg Brothers, 1385-1416

Family Manors: Management before 1789

Witzel’s choice to begin his discussion of management thinking at the very beginnings of human civilization is both a highly innovative choice while also opening space for problematic history. Many traditional histories of management have started with Taylor’s work or immediately earlier, and in doing so are able to talk about management science in the context of society relatively similar to ours rather than the massively different societies we saw centuries if not millennia ago.8

Witzel begins with the origin myths of several societies, describing how the very different origin myths of Greece, India, and China attribute the rise of civilization to some powerful leader and from this evidence states that these myths show that even ancient society expected things like competence from their rulers. From this Witzel begins to discuss the genre of ‘instructional texts’ given to rulers as the earliest origins of thinking about management.9 

But the rulers of ancient Egypt or China were substantially different from the modern-day manager. Witzel merely notes the similarities between the Maxims of Ptahhotep and modern self-help books without noting the massive differences in the societies they came out of.10 The Pharos of Egypt, Kings of Babylon and the Emperors of China had far more responsibilities than any one manager: they were managing whole societies and were responsible for the justice system, the military, the state’s finances and the weather. Similarly, the justifications of this management were substantially different, depending on a connection between the monarch and the divine being of the society. For all the self-centered middle managers who read the Art of War in order to get a leg up in petty office squabbles, these texts were not written for them. Not only were the monarchs of the classical era managing all of society, but they also represented all of society.

But this is only the beginning. Witzel argues later on that the Pre-Socratic Greeks and the Romans “did not produce much in the way of notable works on business…[or] public administration”.11 This is where an oversight becomes a glaring error. There is no way that the Romans could have run an empire spanning Europe, an Empire that was impeccably organized and won through the efforts of the most efficient and ruthless army of its time without a massive amount of thinking about management.12 But Witzel gives us a clue to his mistake. By linking business and public administration, he tells us that he is looking not for ‘management thought’ but for ‘business management thought’, the business of the Classical era very different from modern-day business.

Regardless of culture and society, business was almost always seen as a dirty job during the pre-Victorian era. The only legitimate form of wealth gained, regardless of whether one is discussing Republican Rome, Ancien Regime France, or Ming China, was wealth gained from land ownership. Indeed, merchants often gave up better profits in order to gain entry into the aristocratic class, a tendency which could be seen in societies as disparate as 18th century Paris.13 and 14th century China.14 Such a tendency tells us that wealth, the accumulation of wealth, and the very idea of business was not seen as particularly important.  

R.G. Collingwood noted a similar trend in his analysis of the ‘history of history’.  He found that history had always been used analogically, and was viewed as a peripheral way of looking at the central philosophical problem of the time.15 This central philosophical problem, be it mathematics in Greece, theology in Medieval times, or the discoveries of the hard sciences in the post-Enlightened age, completely changed the way that history was studied. The goals of Medieval history were the discovery of the nature of god16, and the discovery of man’s universal nature imparted by god17, notions which were taken for granted and rarely exposed to criticism. Thus the kinds of historical knowledge gained by the Medieval Christians were often not what we would call historical knowledge, but theological knowledge presenting itself as history, even if the Medieval scholar still called his field ‘history’. As such we can say that history was an explicit field that was predicated on implicit societal views.

Paul Chevigny, in his book on police violence, describes another implicit phenomenon. He argues that since policing is seen as a “low” occupation unworthy of academic study or thought, the way that most people think about everyday police work occurs analogically: we think about policing as a subset of the way we think about ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’, not as a topic in and of itself.18 Thus policing is an implicit field of study which is thought about analogically through the explicit notions we have about society. This distinction will become important as we discuss management’s emergence as an explicit field. Until then, I will leave it that management was an implicit field before the Industrial Revolution, a notion which Witzel discusses (“most earlier authors did not set out to write works on management”)19 but does not seem to appreciate.

While pre-Industrial society practiced ‘management’ daily, they thought about it analogically: since business was seen as a “low” skill, management thinking was almost entirely an implicit field of thought which came via analogies to more familiar and more important institutions: the family, politics, religion, or ethics. Wealth was something to be attained in order to gain stature and political power, and once that stature and power were gained, the new aristocrat immediately took on the anti-business concept of their peers.  Timothy Brook notes this trend throughout the Ming Dynasty: noting a plethora of nouveau riche aristocrats decrying the kind of practices that got them where they were and consistently attempting to hide the shameful, commercial, origins of their own wealth.20  

Even though business (and indeed the very idea of working to make money) 21 was seen as a ‘low study’, Witzel argues quite successfully that businesses expanded into worldwide ventures during the Medieval period, which led to thinking about specific necessities of management such as accounting.22 The Enlightenment’s project of questioning established norms also led to a large amount of thinking about economics and eventually business.23

This leads to a question: if firms (if they could be called that) were doing business on a global scale as far back as the 12th century and the individual branches of management (finance, accounting, administration) were in place around the same time24, why did it take until the late 19th century before a complete concept of management came forth?  Specifically, what changed to make businesses seem like a respectable element of analysis, and what changed that necessitated the creation of management thought?

Beyond the anti-business biases of pre-industrial society, aristocratic societies across the world developed an organic ideology that naturalized the idea of the inherent superiority of the aristocracy which came from their blood and breeding. This impeded the development of management thinking in two key ways. The first being that since ability was to some degree inborn, there was little to no need for teaching or even thinking about management. The second followed from the first: if the aristocracy was inherently capable, then the mercantile and working classes were therefore subhuman or otherwise incapable of agency, an ideology which meant that there was no need to develop a set of ideas based around specifically managing other individuals.  These two intellectual products of the feudal economy combined with an allegorical view towards businesses made the development of management thinking unnecessary. It took not one but three revolutions to shake this framework.

That aristocrats had inborn abilities was commonsensical to the people of the pre-Industrial era. Many of the patrician families of Rome claimed to be descended from Gods25, and both Ming China and Ancien Regime France had a concept of gentlemanliness (in French, gentilhomme and in Chinese junzi), an inborn concept which placed one irrevocably above his peers. Gentillesse was a characteristic that could only be provided through the blood: “the King might create a noble, but not even he could make a gentleman…[gentillesse could only be created] by deeds, heroic deeds, and by time.  Two generations usually sufficed”.26 The gentilhomme was a larger than life character, capable of more destructiveness and more greatness than any mortal could possibly grasp.  The junzi was a remarkably similar character, a person beneath only the sage (a saint-like figure) in societal placement. The junzi was literally translated to ‘lord’s son’, which keeps with the inherited nature of nobility. The junzi, moreover, was defined by his ability to see what the everyman could not: his virtue and knowledge of the classics led to transcendent accomplishments inconceivable to the ‘small-minded’.27   

Besides the gentleman’s construction as a sort of anti-business person (the French gentilhomme was a martial and artistic figure while the junzi was at heart an academic living isolated from the world), the conception of in-born gentlemanliness challenged management from another front.28 Witzel notes that as late as the 20th-century British business schools would not teach management, believing management to be an “aristocratic x-factor”, something which could not be taught.29 This gets to the heart of the problem: why think about management if the ability to lead was simply in the blood? Why not think about, instead, the blood?  Pre-industrial societies shared widespread horrors at the possibility of miscegenation, and the societal punishments involved in a gentilhomme family marrying a non-noble one were so strong that no such combination has been found.30 Love between the Indian castes and Chinese classes was viewed with similar anxiety.31 This anxiety (and the complicated categories of nobility and peasanthood constructed over the centuries in nearly all societies) indicate that people saw inborn abilities as being so much more powerful than thinking about management that “certain physical characteristics exemplifying nobility were intentionally sought out and bred”.32

This belief in the inborn abilities of the nobleman had another side to it: a disbelief in the ability of the poor to think or act for themselves. The Fronde, a civil war in 17th century France, began because the crown considered the nobility as responsible for the revolts of their peasants: “in seventeenth-century society, peasants and artisans were considered to be something like leashed animals, and when they revolted, the king, the bishops, and the nobility frequently blamed the nobles…for not keeping the peasantry in hand”.33 Because the peasants were considered to be ‘childlike’ and obviously followed their superior masters, revolts along the Seine valley (caused by food shortages and egregious taxes) were considered to be aristocratic plots rather than a reaction by individual actors.

A similar example of individuality being viewed as either an aberration or as the purposeful malice of the master can be seen in the American south.  During the 19th century, a pseudo-science was built around understanding the origins of slave revolts and runaways. The idea of Drapetomania, that is, the irrational want to run away from one’s masters, was prescribed as slaves reacting to masters “attempting to raise him to a level with himself”. That the position of the African slave is given as “the Deity’s will”34 is a common trend that occurs in readings from all over the world in the preindustrial era.

The belief in a hierarchy ordained by a divine being (or by the laws of science) permeated nearly all pre-Industrial cultures, manifesting in different ways in different societies. In India, it manifested as literal castes,35 in China in the ‘Nine Ranks’36, and in Europe as the Gentilesse/Noblesse/bourgeoisie/peasant distinction. This hierarchy created an interlocking set of beliefs which destroyed the need for management thinking. These beliefs in the supernatural and inborn powers of the nobility, the lower classes’ lack of agency, and the unimportance of business all combined into a feudal ideology that devalued the idea of social mobility, devalued the individual (excepting the aristocratic individual), and also devalued the unheroic task of running a business. Combined, they formed an organic ideology that allowed very little room outside of it. If nobility is inborn and nobility is only gained through ‘heroic’ acts, why care about running a business? If the peasants had little to no agency, why think about managing them? If social mobility is de facto impossible except through the state and the nobility, why invest one’s time in a business when a title is clearly so much more important?  

This set of questions explains Wiztel’s surprise in finding little to no development in management thinking in Chinese, French, or Roman cultures: they thought about management analogically, through metaphors to leadership (which they considered inborn) and the family. The workplace, the prime focus of management, was seen as merely another, inferior, aspect within the broader society. Furthermore, management rests on an a priori assumption of a relatively equal relationship between the boss and the worker. The worker could be fired, the worker could work poorly, the worker could leave but in management, the worker is assumed to have agency, an agency which did not exist either conceptually or in the reality of the latifundia workplace.  

The examples that Witzel finds of proto-management in the pre-Enlightenment era occurred in exceptional cases where upheaval destroyed the idea of inborn ability (Machiavelli’s Il Principe was written to the victor in an assumed coup, an event which occurred often in Italian city-states), or in the case of something considered far more important which management then adopted as its own (warfare). Simply put, the class society of feudalism could not conceive of management thinking, either as a science/means of analysis or as a justifying force in society, because it already had a justification for the hierarchy that existed within it. Often this aristocratic ideology was incapable of ‘working’ either by any objective measure or even on its own terms, but without an alternative system and a different material base, this form of magical thinking hung vestigially over society, justifying all sorts of harm and oppression despite being debunked and demystified. For centuries humanity hung between a feudal society that created all manners of useless suffering and a new method of organization that could not be spoken of let alone analyzed. This is a state I think we can relate to, and feudal notions hung onto relevance until it was felled, not by one Revolution but three.

The Republic In the Workshop: Management as Reaction

The general notion of history is as a march to the present. It is the mistake of every society to think that the zeitgeist of the present day came about as the result of a series of won compromises and that we are living in “the best of all possible worlds”. The typical view of American history takes this viewpoint: the Founding Fathers are not seen as revolutionaries in their time, promoting a radically different system than what had came before, but as conservative figures in our time, promoting the current system that we have. Each step in American history: the revolution, the extension of suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the new deal, the civil rights movement, etc, is seen as a step towards the present that could only have gone this way when in reality each event had an infinite number of possibilities. From the perspective of the contemporaries of Washington, Jackson, or Lincoln, it was not so obvious where the events of their lifetime would lead.

I say this because Witzel’s history of management is written in a similar fashion: management is depicted as a natural outgrowth of the world.37 which would have emerged in roughly the same form regardless of the thinking of Taylor or of the events of the 19th century.  Management was simply an answer to the organizational problem of factory life, which was merely waiting to be found by whoever picked it up. I will argue in this section that once management is put in its political context it becomes far less innocuous.

While the feudal ideology I described in the last section was collapsing in Europe over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, it was only the events of the late 18th century (the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) that finally broke the back of the aristocratic notion of inequality among the classes. It was the notion of equality, conceptualized and argued through many world civilizations but then given form by the bourgeois-republican governments of France, the United States, and Britain, that attacked both the notion of inborn ability by allowing any man to stand for office and the idea that the poor had no agency by allowing the poor to vote.  

The idea is that these movements occurred naturally, that the abolition of slavery or the extension of the franchise was a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically insufficient, and thus their dissolution was inevitable. Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted, the deconstruction of these orders requiring revolutionary action in their time. And even if we accept that slavery’s dissolution was inevitable, the way in which an event occurs and what exactly replaces it is just as important as the event of dissolution itself. 

Similarly, even if we take the eventual development of a field of scientifically minded management as a given, the kind of management thought that developed was just as important as the fact that a form of management thought emerged. Multiple strands of management thought grew at once in the late 19th century, and despite much of Taylor’s work being based on forgeries, Scientific management dominated all other forms of management in the early 20th century. This is because scientific management was about more than merely solving problems: it was an ideological response to the threat of socialist and democratic movements who sought to bring the logic of republicanism into the workplace.

Manifestations of this tension appeared throughout the Western world during the early 19th century. The rise of socialist and anarchist organizations, not to mention the development of unionism, all placed pressure on typical workplace relations. Their reasoning had its roots in the juxtaposition of liberty in the voting booth combined with autocracy in the working floor: “the consequence [of capitalistic relations] now is, that while the government is republican, society in its general features, is as regal as it is in England”.38 The pamphlets of the Workingmen’s Party (Workies) also featured a discussion of the similarities between chattel and wage slavery: 

“For he, in all countries is a slave, who must work more for another than that other must work for him…whether the sword of victory hew down the liberty of the captive…or whether the sword of want extort our consent, as it were, to a voluntary slavery, through a denial to us of the materials of nature…”39

Similar events occurred in France. After the 1830 July Revolution, French workers waited “for the introduction of the republic in the workshop”. The “applied republic”, that is, a democracy which was replicated within the workplace, was a common call from the July Monarchy through to the Third Republic. It was in France during the election of 1848 that the first divergence emerged between “a social republicanism, seeking direct application of republican principles in the economic sphere, and a republicanism that sought to restrict these principles to the political sphere”, with the purely political republicans winning.40

Despite the victories of capitalistic republicanism in the early 19th century, social democratic parties and movements continued to gain strength, with the German Social-Democratic party becoming the largest single party in the country.41 The French created a word, sinistrisme, to describe the situation of the 3rd Republic wherein the leftist parties of one generation would become the right of the next as increasingly socialistic parties appeared and took their place. The reason for the continued decay of the 19th-century rightist parties was their tendency to use traditionalistic (that is, reliant on the feudal ideology I explained in the last section) justifications for the injustices of society, and the reason that Taylorism was so successful was that it finally presented a new and comprehensive argument against republicanism in the workplace: by creating “one best way” for all workers the manager is able to make everyone better off.  

The argument that if the workers were only to sublimate their desire for agency gained via social movements and their relationships with each other into a desire for agency gained via the piece-rate system and their contract with their manager then everyone would be better off was able to convince social justice advocates such as Louis Brandeis, and leading many technocrats including Witzel to see anti-capitalist critiques as merely desires for better management.42 This shows the degree to which Tayloristic methods have survived within management: the wicked problem of workers asking for representation is changed into the technical problem of workers needing better managers. By viewing the problem of worker’s dissent and indeed the problem of autocratically managing another human being as a technical problem, Witzel is able to argue that the answer was “to make management more efficient and to restore harmony with the workers”.43 In effect, Witzel is able to erase the ideological aspect of both scientific management and the workers’ movements and to present a movement which disempowered workers as the restoration of harmony.

Taylor’s process was to watch a laborer at work, design a better way to do that job, and then to require each and every worker to work at that pace. This disempowered workers in several ways:  

    • It was yet another moment in an ongoing process of deskilling, turning autonomous workers into merely imperfect pseudo-automated machines without knowledge of their subject which could be used without the manager’s assent. 44 
    • It applied the division of labor hierarchically–all thinking to be done about the nature of the job and the task was to be done by management and the consultant (a division shown by consistent comparison of the manager to the ‘brain’ in organic metaphors of management and organizations.45  
    • By arguing that most firms were inefficient and that the “scientific” methods applied by experts were superior to rule of thumb methods, Taylor was implicitly denying the worker’s own experience and knowledge and alienated the worker from their ability to better the work-processes they engaged with on their own terms.

Taylorism and scientific management took its focus, the workplace, and transformed it conceptually from a part of society subject to society’s rules to an area of perpetual exemption, no longer shackled to the magical thinking of the where utter autocracy was allowed to rule under the rubric of efficiency. This allowed one to be simultaneously a democrat in general while being an autocrat in the workplace. The contradiction of capitalist republicanism, while not resolved, was now obfuscated.  

The Dismal Science and the Pathologies of Management

Economics has often been called the dismal science because the needs of ‘science’ requires a perfect seeming model which rests on many assumptions. This is just as true of management: after expressing all of its arguments through algebraic notation and even after constructing highly complicated models meant to create computer simulations, it still deals entirely with the most difficult of variables: unabstracted, individual, human beings, and under a highly mutable criterion: efficiency.46

The first issue of management is that any problem involving the interaction of human beings in the social sphere is a wicked problem, which was defined by C West Churchman as “a class of social system problems which are illformulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing”.47 The number of these problems which appear in the management of people represents an intractable issue to expressing micro-level workplaces formulaically, let alone utilizing those formulas towards any useful end. Wicked problems are highly contextual which interacts badly with scientific management’s claim of ‘one best way’s and universalism.  

The second problem of any scientific management is with the idea of efficiency. Deborah Stone, in her work Policy Paradox, notes that efficiency is an almost completely subjective measure, that is what is efficient for one actor may be inefficient for another.48 Management has simultaneously constructed efficiency as the manager’s efficiency, erasing the perspectives of the infinite other actors whose lives could be ‘more efficient’ at the sacrifice of the manager.  

It is fully possible to create a scientific discipline under these conditions: psychology, philosophy, and history all deal with these problems. However, management has not responded to the problems of unclear criterion and mutable variables by embracing critical methods. Instead, management has leaned harder on scientistic methods, methods that ape the aesthetics of the hard sciences without regard to the differences between studying the interactions of electrons and studying the interactions of people.49 Efficiency has been discussed as if it were an objective physically extant variable rather than a construction that was then reconstructed in a specific way. Over and over again the vacuous baubles of the org chart and process chart have been embraced, leading to expensive reorganizations which do nothing but redraw the chart. Indeed management’s continued embrace of scientistic discussion has led to an overfocus on the organization (which, like efficiency, is treated like an objective physically extant object rather than a construction) leading to a management thought which does not have much to say about work and people–supposedly the two subjects of the discipline.50 And despite all of this faux-scientism, management has become inundated by pseudo-academic gurus who pump out books that tell people that they can take charge in the workplace in X easy steps by the hundreds.51

All of these trends emerge from management’s original sin: that it did not emerge as a way to create knowledge. Instead it emerged in response to two needs: first, the need to create a coherent justification for authoritarianism in the workplace, and second, the anxiety of managers who want easy answers to their immensely difficult problems. Like history during the middle ages, management has become an explicit field based on implicit views that management itself helped create (the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace, the need for ‘objective’ analysis, the specific way that Taylor constructed efficiency). Because management stands on unquestioned concepts, the discipline has found itself riven with pathologies of its own making, finding itself breaking apart even within its own rules.

The pseudo-scientific methods of the gurus are an example of this. While they are decried by management scholars their methods are actually highly similar to Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management. During one of Taylor’s consultations, he asked 12 of the strongest men in a factory to simply ‘work harder’ and then guessed that under this level of work these men could haul 72 tons of steel (which he rounded to 75) instead of 42, and from this concluded that 75 tons of steel as the minimum amount of steel one could haul per day. This is not the seed of a scientific discipline.52

While scientific management has not succeeded in providing answers to the problems of the manager, it has succeeded in building a highly resilient ideology around itself, an ideology that has been based on the aping of scientific methods and the continued arguing of the necessity of an authoritarian figure in the workplace. The result has been the successful depoliticization of Taylorism and the continuation of the ‘gospel of efficiency’ to the degree that people now talk of efficiency as if it were an objective measure. However, the trends which have emerged from management’s original sin have started to become highly problematic, not only for those on the outside of the discipline but for the discipline’s practitioners.

Disciplinization and the ‘silo effect’ is one of the pathologies which has emerged from management’s attempts to don scientific garb. While the splitting up of management into different sub-disciplines has as much to do with the m-form organization (a way of organizing firms wherein each task would have its own department/division, an organizational method which had its roots in the divisional structure of armed forces53 as it does with the academy, the silo effect, which is the complete separation of the management sub-disciplines into their own self contained worlds academically and creating fiefdoms within organizations, is one of management’s major pathologies. This phenomena has two aspects: the academic aspect (the silo effect which occurs in the academy) and the practical aspect (the silo effect that occurs in the workplace). I will explain each in turn.

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management’s origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace, that is a managerial class with a “view from the top” rather than a view from the workplace.54 And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absence – the absence of work and power from management – has exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.  

A look at an example of good organizing, the Valve company, shows why such a sub-disciplinary trend is necessary from a control mindset. In the Valve company, there are no formal control structures, everyone is allowed to move around, and because of this, everyone, from the accountants to the lawyers to the managerial executives, is asked to gain a degree of knowledge in programming, which is the company’s specialty (Valve 2012 39-40).55 Without a rigid command structure originating from an invented concept, Valve requires everyone to have a common language and thus asks for T-shaped people (that is, generalists who also have a specific capability) because commonly held knowledge allows for easier collaboration.56 This syncretic, ‘liberal arts’ viewpoint of management is exactly the opposite of mainstream management teaching and thinking, because management is not concerned with work.

Instead, management takes as its focus the invented concept of the organization and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about. Authoritarianism in the workplace, which was so problematic in the 19th century, has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unexamined.57 Further syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford).58 This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

And yet when management students come to the workplace they find that cooperation is rarely forthcoming. Because management has historically seen all of the things which grease the wheels of cooperation. such as talking and building social relationships within one’s job, as unnecessary and wasteful.59 Furthermore, when cooperation is modeled by management thinkers, it often looks little like what we would think of when we think of cooperation. Works like Bardach’s Developmental Dynamics: Interagency Collaboration as an Emergent Phenomenon places ‘acceptance of leadership’ as one of the key steps/goals of collaboration while simultaneously complaining of agencies which worry about “imperialistically minded agencies [which] might steal a march on them”.60  

This fear of collaboration leading to annexation emerges from management’s lack of focus on the work and on management’s competitive mindset. Because ‘the work’ is seen as comparatively unimportant compared to the need for control, collaboration must be done for some other goal besides merely getting things done. And because competition is seen as more important than cooperation, management often transforms cooperation into a competitive activity. One example is the imperialistic theories which Bardach uses wherein each step is a step towards control. In such an environment there is little reason to cooperate, leading to the silo effect within the workplace.  

But what is tragic about management is that despite the pathologies and its inability to provide technical solutions to wicked problems, its logic has become massively powerful within our body politic. The growing influence of management thinking over politics will be the focus of the next section.

Ever more dismal

While modern-day management has failed in many respects, its promise of technical solutions to wicked problems has made it hugely successful as an intellectual lens. We can see this because even while management academics try to find a new form of management, they wring their hands about the loss of control and the chaos brought by equality. Even Valve, a model of new management, asks ”So if every employee is autonomously making his or her own decisions, how is that not chaos?”.61

Management thinking, despite its flaws and pathologies, has moved out of the workplace to become a part of the contemporary zeitgeist. This has produced two strange juxtapositions. First, while the pre-Industrial world saw business only via analogies to more important institutions (the family, the church), in the modern-day business has become the sole operating lens through which other institutions are viewed. We see government, the arts, nonprofits and even families as analogous to businesses and thus reduce them to a specific kind of economic lens.  

Second, due to this domination, management, which was once used to defend authoritarianism in the workplace, has now become a way to argue for authoritarianism in the body politic. In our modern system, we are such advocates for democratic systems that we are willing to go to war to (supposedly) establish it in other countries while being unwilling to establish democracy in any substantial way domestically. We believe that man is worthy enough to weigh in on matters of national security, the country’s economic system, and even how one’s schools should be run, yet we do not believe that man can be trusted to have a say in the events that go on in their workplace.  The paradox of democratic capitalism which produced management has now been wholly obfuscated by it.

A perfect example of this is the discussion of the role of the president in our political system.  A massive series of worried articles have come out in the last 4 years saying that the job of the president “is to somehow get this dunderheaded Congress, which is mind-bendingly awful, to do the stuff he wants them to do. It’s called leadership”. This scarcely rises to the level of a statement. Through the last 20 years we have seen increasing demands for authoritarianism in the name of efficiency, in the name of the government ‘getting things done’, which are scarcely ever connected to a statement about what things the government ought to do. These vague requests emerge from the powerful yet meaningless demands of management thought and the way that they have mapped onto our politics. Just as management is absolutely sure of the need for an authoritarian manager while having vague answers for what a manager should do in any situation, in politics we know we need an authoritarian president so he can do something instead of listen to parliamentarians bicker over what to do, we just do not have an idea of what exactly we need that authoritarian president to do.

Similarly, so many policy arguments in the public sphere have been reduced to great man-ist arguments. The “Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics”, also known as the “Confidence Fairy Theory”–the idea that “the only thing limiting us [in foreign policy] is a lack of willpower” has been used by conservatives and liberals alike to attack non-managerial approaches to policy.62 Practically, the idea of ‘willpower’ and ‘confidence’ is so vacuous that the idea that it is used in foreign policy talks seriously is almost laughable.  But the ‘willpower’ argument is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in public policy just as scientific management is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in the workplace. In fact, things have devolved. We are so entranced by the power of authoritarian figures that our arguments are reminiscent of the faux psychologists who diagnosed slaves with drapetomania. The confidence argument has been used practically to argue that merely treating foreign rulers with respect–for instance, bowing to a foreign king weakens the confidence other countries have in our power and our will to use that power.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the supposed total victory of democracy over all the tyrants of the world, a new yearning for autocrats is being expressed everywhere, from the fringes of the left to mainstream neoconservatives to libertarianism. This autocratic argument is new: it is not the old feudalistic argument for a person who represents the father of the whole nation. It is instead expressed in the language of Taylor, and the desire to transform our messy and muddled political arguments into the idealized hierarchy envisioned by management. Phrases like “It is for the experts to present the situation in its complexity, and it is for the Master to simplify it to a point of decision” appear even from leftist sources.63 The idea that if only we were more courageous, willful, and authoritarian that we would be able to make the hard decisions easy, that within each wicked problem is a technical answer which we could find if only we had an authoritarian figure with enough willpower, steps from the faith we still have in the system of scientific management. We believe that, like fairies, the manager will only be able to provide us with easy answers if we believe in the system enough.

These emerging trends, which came out of scientific management to become far larger than the factory workplace it originated in, are hugely problematic: the belief in a society of simple and rational answers is so enmeshed that any of its failures are attributed to the failures of individuals. This belief is larger than management and the schisms within the management field: just as positivism is based on a very particular and superficial notion of the hard sciences64, our current management norms are based on a very superficial idea of modern management thinking.  

The line of thinking which I have been discussing is not directly connected to ‘the work’65 but rather to an idealized view of the way that workplaces should work. This is because this line of thinking has always been about control rather than results, and due to this the changes that have occurred within management academia have had little effect on management as it is practiced. In Witzel’s last chapter he does bemoan the disconnect between management and management academia, saying that “management thinking is now the province of the academic”.66This is not, strictly speaking, true: management fads and gurus have in many ways a broader audience than management academia. This is even more problematic than the possibility Witzel (rightly) presents, that management may be obsoleting itself by closing itself to the non-academic world.67 Management academia has a far better ability to turn management into a truly intellectually rigorous field in which the assumptions of management are questioned with the goal of creating more knowledge rather than upholding an ideological framework based on control than the guru cottage industry is. While this is not to say that management academia has served a progressive role, the willingness of management academia to specialize itself into obscurity is highly worrisome.

This gap desperately needs to be breached if management is to become a more rigorous field. But that is not enough. Larger participation in management by different parts of society,including workers, needs to occur both at the practical and academic levels in order to get management focused back on work and interpersonal relations. The larger problematic attitudes of society towards management need to be deconstructed at every level. Simply attacking them in the academy will not be enough. To some degree, the task is obvious. Addleson’s concept of ‘ubuntu’ (that is, connectedness with one’s group) and a more inclusive and democratic view of management is necessary in the context of knowledge work. But while being simple, the task is immensely difficult. Even if we accept that management’s replacement is inevitable, that scientific management gets replaced is not what matters. It is how it is replaced and what replaces it. And I have no answers with regards to that.

Conclusion: The Collective Mind

Much of this essay feels very dated as I write this in the spring of 2020. The dismissive attitude towards any kind of systemization, the confidence in workplace democracy as the only solution needed to these problems, the lauding of Valve of all things, all come off as the writings of a sharp if naive and new leftist writing a college paper in a very conservative institution. In this segment, I will speak to two elements which I was naive about (workplace democracy and the paper’s focus on ideology), before speaking to the ways this article applies to our current situation.

The naive excitement about Valve’s managerial model aged the worst of my concluding statements. The belief that a non-hierarchical corporation was a potential solution to the problems of management thought was not a conclusion I leaped to on behalf of my college, it was, at the time, an earnestly held belief. This belief was misplaced. A company who’s manual might as well be titled ‘ways to create a tyranny of structurelessness’ naturally moved to more hierarchical and frankly abusive management styles as the decade wore on (if, indeed, the original model ever truly existed in the first place).  Furthermore, the idea that workplace democracy would be able to maintain it’s democratic structures within a capitalist system is ludicrous. What we’ve often seen instead are groups that allow workers to enact the same workplace discipline on themselves that a manager normally gives, a discipline that does not just emerge from managing styles but from the needs of the market.

The argument I consistently made through the paper, that management should not be seen as an academic discipline but as a malfunctioning ideology, is one I would maintain. But there is a limitation to this. When I wrote this in 2013 I was in the midst of a painful rebellion from Obama era technocracy towards socialism, and this reaction still held marks of the idealism one can easily find in academia. In focusing on the cultural justifications each mode of production creates for itself I allowed myself to think that this justification was one of the main ‘pillars’ of a mode of production, and if it were only surpassed we would be able to surpass that mode. Such idealism is anathema to the way I think now.  

Feudalism was not primarily a series of ideological constructs but an economic system, and the same is true of management thought’s relationship to capitalist production. But there is a relationship between the superstructure and base, one where both are continually changing. The theme of a justificatory ideology slowly occluding the analytical elements which gave it vitality, leading to encroaching and, over time, fatal pathologies is one I have returned to again and again, with good reason. Management science was not conceived as a way to systematize the experience of workers into a theory of their work, but was rather created with the a priori need to justify autocratic workplace relations, a need which has over time overtaken the discipline’s ability to give knowledge about the subject for which it was created. This remains true whether the statements Taylor made were apocryphal and this brings me to discuss the recent article by my comrade Amelia Davenport.

Comrade Davenport is correct that the rule-by-thumb methods that organizers have developed over the last generation are insufficient to the task of running contemporary political organizations. She is also correct that what must replace that is a rigorous scientific method able to speak across contexts. At this point we part ways. While I cannot speak to Prometheanism, Constructive Socialism or our current ability to surpass scientific socialism (which all sounds nice but goes against my lifelong disinterest in abstractions), I do not think that Taylorism is the means by which we can reach a synthesis of theory and practice. We can see this in the lack of concrete examples in Comrade Davenport’s article. Taylorism confronted the complex problems of managing humans and solved this problem by treating people the same way one would treat machines, allowing engineering principles to be applied to the human body. Even if this narrowly worked within industrial production, it has only proven applicable to later methods of production in the most roundabout and analogical of ways and is not applicable to the variety of activities a political organization finds itself.  

There is another method that we can apply analogically to our situation, which I would argue is a better analogy: the method by which Clausewitz attempted to train officers. Clausewitz correctly stated that war is a simple affair, but that within war, the simplest things are the most complicated. From this, he separated the study of warfare into two forms, the first being the science of war, which consisted of the creation of fortifications, the organization of a barracks, the logistics of war. These are relatively easily taught and, regarding our situation, should be standardized and taught to members in as quick a manner as is feasible so as to keep technical skills from becoming a boundary to participation. The other half of the study of warfare, the art of warfare, was far more difficult as it consisted of one’s ability to make decisions with limited time, limited information, and a large amount of chance involved. This does not mean that it was impossible to become skilled in the art of warfare, but for a long time it was something which could be learned but which, it was suspected, could not be taught.

This did not mean that there were not universal truths in warfare which Clausewitz found in his studies: that defense was a stronger form than offense, albeit one which could not win a war on its own, that warfare has a tendency towards escalation, etc. But this did mean that teaching a capable officer was a different task than teaching a capable engineer. You cannot predict everything that will occur on a battlefield, and seeing things in a mechanistic way where all must do is choose the right course of action as given to you by theory is a sure way to create a disaster. What Clausewitz did, instead, was teach his officers to replicate the decisions of past generals in their heads, without bias towards whether they were ‘right or wrong’, and try to understand why these generals did what they did.  

This is the method we must use to train not just ourselves or those destined for leadership, but our whole organizations. The ability to critically analyze not just our actions but the actions of other groups is how we create nuanced and level headed organizers. But this is not something that can be standardized or mechanistically taught; it requires training one’s judgment, which is inherently a personalized process. This does not mean that it cannot be done.  It would require many of the same things that comrade Davenport lists, but it would also require:

    • The inclusion of a process of operational analysis including both analysis of our material conditions and criticism & self-criticism as often as possible, within group contexts and in writing.
    • The creation of clear lines of communication and information exchange, publishing what can be safely and feasibly publicized, including these operational analyses.
    • A focus on making as many decisions as is feasible democratically and including as many members as is feasible into the process of making decisions.
    • An acceptance that, on the one hand, these democratic decisions are binding, but similarly that the minority viewpoint in each vote is to be respected.

At this point, we need to ask, ‘what is the point of democracy?’. Often we counterpose a positively coded democracy with the autocracy that people experience constantly in their day to day lives. But given the absolute dearth of democratic institutions, if we consign ‘democracy’ to being just ‘good’, we are laying the foundations for democracy’s undermining in practice even if we affirm it in word. Throughout the left, democracy is seen as something ‘nice to do’ if inefficient, a vision of democracy which leads to it being lauded in word and cast aside in practice. In other organizations, formal democracy is seen as the most important decision-making tool, even if that formal democracy impedes on the ability of the organization to act or practically limits the ability of people to interact with the process. Almost everywhere in the left democracy is affirmed at the point of decision and then cast aside when people move to implementation. These can easily lead to a curmudgeonly opinion, which is only outwardly expressed within at the end of a political cycle: that democracy is simply a waste of time, that if it is such a good thing to sit in a meeting hall trading points or order or consensing until our faces turn blue just to decide on the time of an event, that it would be better if we dropped it in the name of efficiency.

I am a member of the Democratic Socialists of America. In left circles, the idea of democratic socialism is often hand-waved as being limited to a project of developing social-democracy in an Anglosphere that has not ever had that uninteresting experience. But through working in this organization for years, I have gained a far greater appreciation for the concept. When I am giving a speech, democratic socialism is about creating a world that is both social and democratic in a world which is utterly undemocratic and anti-social. But going further than that, it also speaks to the fact that as human beings living under capitalism we have not had the experience of working in an organization that is democratically operating towards social ends. The life of the average proletarian is one of being told what to do without being able to respond, towards ends which would likely never exist without a profit motive, without the ability to influence the situation around them let alone change what task they are working towards. Indeed, even at the other end, your average manager may have the ability to make decisions but is still unused to that decision being made collaboratively. We are not used to thinking about the organizations which we operate in, either because we have a one-way relationship with those organizations, or because at the top these organizations are reducible to a handful of people working on a handful of projects, and can be worked within in the same way as any group of competing cliques.  So when we are forced to interact with an organization, where not just us but the people around us all have a say in our decisions, we can be instinctively territorial, we can instinctively form into cliques, we can instinctively think not of the wellbeing of us as a collective but just of ourselves and our projects.

It is the task of all of us within the movement to build a collective mind, produced but not reducible to individuals, trained by but not reducible to our experiences, and we only build it by continually working in a democratic way. This means more than voting or reading consensus on something at the point of decision and then dropping democracy afterward. We need to operate democratically throughout every step of the process, from conceptualization to decision-making to implementation. This is not done out of some bleeding heart sentiment that it would be nice to do. We learn from doing, and the more democratic our processes are, the broader they are, the more people are included in that learning. When we make decisions and implement them in a democratic way, the whole group, not just a handful of staffers, organizers, or cadre, learns how to be more capable.  When we work democratically we all learn about ourselves, our projects, the organizations we work in, the society we live in. The more we work democratically the more capable we are at making new decisions collectively, the more nuanced those decisions become. 

Furthermore, we cannot put this off; we cannot wait for some moment to give us permission to flip the democracy switch. We will never be able to competently make collective decisions until we are asked to, until we try to, until we fail to. By making and learning from these decisions, we are able to better our organization’s ability to make future decisions. By fighting and losing in an internal vote and moving together regardless, we learn that our individual opinions are only important insofar as we work towards them, and strive to be better.  Each time we decide on an action together and implement it together in a broad and democratic way, we teach ourselves and our comrades that our decisions matter.  The dispersal of technical skills is an important aspect of this but it is the easiest one of the problems that face us. Dispersing democratic skills is far more pressing.

This is a problem that Scientific Management is unable to solve: it was never meant to build democratic organizations. Its conception of organizations can only be a top-down decision-making apparatus where a handful of people are given the ability to decide on behalf of their inferiors what work will be done and how that work will be done. It is categorically incapable of treating every element of a process as being guided by human beings possessed of agency because it ascribes humanity solely to the manager.  This does not mean it is unscientific, just as with drapetomania it was an attempt to scientifically process an utterly ideological defense of an authoritarian status quo. This is not some revision that was added later, some fall from grace which occurred after scientific management was co-opted by capital. Nor was it some ideologically neutral technology that the Soviet Union was able to use in a substantively different way than the capitalist world. All of the faults and the degeneration that has come later up to the wholesale acceptance of magical thinking regarding willpower stem from the original sin of management thinking: that it was conceived as a justification for class rule.

Scientific management’s inherent flaws do not mean that we cannot learn from it: nearly every theory has embedded presumptions and flaws. Nor does it mean that we cannot hope to create a scientific theory of organizations that work towards the ends of socialism. But we cannot merely declare such a theory, and any such declaration made out of cobbled together past theories will not stick, because such a theory needs to come wholly through us, through our collective decisions and the new perspectives on old questions that such experience gives us. Just as we can only reflect on our collective decisions by doing them, we can only theorize our experiences by reflecting on them. True systematization, the kind of synthesis of theory and practice comrade Davenport speaks to, is not something we can merely jump to. The movement as a whole needs to be developed, not towards Prometheanism or Constructive Socialism specifically but towards a better understanding of itself and the world around it. Perhaps this will move in the direction comrade Davenport points to, perhaps it will not. It is out of the hands of any one person.

As socialists, our ultimate aim should be for the creation of a more humane and democratic world. To steer us there are the human and hopefully democratic organizations we fight within. While we should strive to liberate our comrades from the prison of rule-by-thumb, we should embrace the humanity of the organizations we fight within. We should strive not just to simplify our methods in such a way that the human element of need be abstracted, but to embrace and empower our humanity. 

What’s At Stake in the Democratic Socialists of America?

Jean Allen discusses the factional infighting in the DSA and it what it says about the organization at large. 

On Friday February 8 the steering committee and the organizational structure committee of Philly DSA unveiled their proposed bylaws for the chapter. These bylaws, if passed, would lead to a radical restructuring of the chapter and a leadership elected every 2 years with a limited ability for recall; this would effectively be the only decision-making body in the organization. Members would be able to advise the leadership during the bimonthly meetings, but would not be able to create new campaigns on their own initiative and have to work through the existing committees, which they would need to ask to join. Later this spring that structure was approved at a controversial general meeting.

This has formed a part of the latest chapter of national DSA drama, which moves fast and often feels easy to shake off if you aren’t in one of the ‘problem chapters’ which generate so much of the organization’s discourse. In fact, as I write this, the events in Philadelphia have made Spring’s image so toxic that the caucus split on March 17. This event has put DSA politics, which for the last year has largely been merely one of opposition to Spring (née Momentum), into a state of flux.

The Organizational Dispute

The most obvious document to look at for Spring’s organizational vision is their article “For a Democratic and Effective DSA,” particularly the segment “Legitimate Representation is Direct Democracy’s Cool Cousin”:

“General meetings should be held only as frequently as necessary, as they require a good deal of preparation and energy that should be spent primarily on external organizing. Depending on the chapter, the appropriate frequency will vary from once a month to quarterly.

An agenda should be set by the chapter’s elected leadership ahead of time. … It should be up to the steering committee to use its judgment in determining which agenda items should be prioritized at general meetings, but members can and should be able to request that items be placed on the agenda — and should be able to amend the agenda at the start of the meeting by majority vote if necessary.”

This comes bookended by a large amount of concern regarding how radical democracy creates unaccountable rule by those most “in the know.” It is an odd form of doublethink to propose that, in the name of democracy, all decisions be made within heavily regulated general meetings which are only held as frequently as necessary, with necessity, of course, being decided by the leadership. This new ‘managed’ organization is a break from the usual working-group-centric model, where people have some degree of autonomy and can freely associate with projects they find interesting. While this model allows for far more individual agency, there’s some validity to the argument that it is less formally democratic because the decision of individual members to work isn’t ‘exposed’ to formal accountability. But one can make a chapter’s priorities ‘democratic’ without this form of supervision, which is, in fact, the limitation of member agency within the smallest and most managed possible spaces. Furthermore, creating unnecessary levels of bureaucracy is not necessarily supportive of an effective organization, especially given how swiftly things can move and how necessary member buy-in is for new projects. This form, which was argued for in The Call and has become reality in Philadelphia, can easily be seen as anti-democratic while justified as its opposite.

To go further than this, this top-down organizational form has been argued for since the end of Occupy Wall Street and its connected movements. Throughout Europe, left populism came as a reaction to the kind of horizontalist structures that existed during the movements of the squares, offshoots of the Occupy movement. Left populism’s thinkers and politicians argued that to become an effective movement they would have to shed the localized and horizontalist activism of the past and move towards a new kind of organizing which would focus on envisioning the future and controlling the discourse. Doing this would require breaking with some of the sacred ideological cows of the Left, but more importantly, it required a break with the organized left as it previously existed. Over this decade, from Greece to Spain to France and Italy, this new movement manifested itself in new parties which broke from the old, both in terms of the literal old guard of European social democracy-turned-liberalism, but also of the older activist groups which culminated in the movements of the squares.

Since at least 2013, Jacobin magazine has lauded this new populism. They ran articles by the leaders of Syriza, Podemos, and France Insoumise. They spoke to the theory that underpinned those parties, and they excitedly spoke of the revolution that seemed right around the corner the moment that these parties would win.

Except they didn’t. Granted, Syriza had to deal with the whole EU when it began opposing austerity, but this should have been predicted. Across the rest of Europe, the left is losing steam. Podemos went from a trajectory towards one of the two largest parties towards a precipitous decline. France Insoumise was not able to break out of the far left, Corbyn’s Labour has been stuck just below a victory, and across Europe, the willingness to sacrifice the left’s sacred cows seems more like an excuse to give up internationalism and support for migrants to little or no advantage.

Beyond the strategic mistakes the European left has made in its acceptance of nationalism and carceral borders, a large part of its lost momentum has to do with the way the left has narrowed over the course of the last decade. Throughout Europe, the growth of left-populist parties has occurred on the backs of other movements, and in each case these parties have demobilized their predecessors, from the winding down of the councils in Spain to the increasing disconnect between Greek street movements and the Syriza government. This sublimation is concerning, because it means that the failure of the parties to win in elections isn’t just one setback in a wider struggle; it’s a failure in the struggle as a whole.

These are not just abstract problems happening somewhere else. They are not mistakes which will be self-corrected if left alone. It is the product of a totalizing logic which opposes itself to the rest of the organized left. If the main goal of the left is to offer discursive interventions towards altering the common sense, and to use these counter-hegemonic discourses to win state power, then other formations, using different means towards similar ends but perhaps not speaking the same language or using the same words as the think tank socialists, are not allies to be embraced but enemies which can throw the whole movement ‘off message.’ For instance, attempts to push the language of Medicare For All in directions which are more inclusive of disabled people have been perceived by some as poisoning the well, pushing M4A into a direction which (although more anticapitalist) would be less palatable to the voting public. As such, these disability advocates have been straightforwardly treated as enemies to the cause, rather than people who are working from their own experiences who have the capacity to push the conversation on Medicare For All into a broader direction which questions the logic of capitalism.

It was understandable that through the long reaction of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and with the overall silence of the Left that US leftists would look internationally for inspiration. As the Pink Tide steadily ebbed, it was natural that Leftists would look to Europe for examples of a comparatively successful Left. Yet in repeating the strategies of European leftism in the last decade without a glance at the dangers inherent in those strategies, the Left, and Spring in particular, leads us down a dangerous path.

Will we repeat or learn from the failures of the European Left?

 

The Structural Problems

The issue is that on a deep level Spring caucus is right: there is a fundamental flaw in DSA’s structure which came from our massive expansion, overloading an organizational structure built to sustain small chapters that mostly exist as a social space for groups of less than ten activists rather than mass organizations. Building around cities rather than specific projects, workplaces, or neighborhoods, meant that when thousands of members joined, the organization de facto drifted towards the form that’s been used to organize large numbers of activists for the last four decades: the activist network.

The activist network is typically a group of some hundred people connected by an ideological belief in social justice in a specific city arranged into different projects or subcommittees, and aimed at advocacy or activism about a particular issue (note: when I say ‘advocacy’ I mean a broad term involving directly pushing for a specific law or bill; when I say ‘activism’ I mean protests, rallies, and events which might have vaguer relationships with specific policies), often through giving support to a recently created struggle. Because these groups were basically created to make the most of a situation where one has more resources than manpower, these groups would do their best to mediate and use popular movements outside of them to pressure for more radical or more feasible reforms from the state, depending on the group. They would engage in activities which would either require small moments of hyper-organized action such as a protest or a march, or activities which would require a small amount of manpower over a larger period to time, like writing letters to the editor, training the leaders of emerging movements, lobbying politicians, or doing work to spread knowledge of an event or action.

These activities need to be done, and groups of this sort fill an important niche in the Left. But this fundamentally managerial and mediatory role with regards to their unorganized constituents ends up creating problematic behaviors which worsen the more that activism predominates as the only activity on the Left. This managerial role can’t be held by everyone, and thus puts a limit on the degree to which struggles can expand and increasingly do so in a way that is self-replicating over time. These groups exist essentially to be support networks for the spontaneous risings of groups poorer and more oppressed than them, and in support to funnel their efforts towards the channels this group has access to, and this is the beginning and end of their activities and self-justification, often requiring the creation of movements that have no presence at all outside the activist subculture in order to justify themselves.

This structural tendency is worsened by the demographics of such groups, which tend to be alienated college graduates who connect to each other as a subculture of individuals interested in similar histories and ideas rather than as people working towards their material interests within the same workplace, building, or neighborhood. Because of this subcultural aspect (and in a way similar to a snake eating its own tail), when these groups organize around material interests that they share with their constituents, it is often as college students or within college campuses, and often these material interests are still sublimated under a desire to expand one’s activism by expanding one’s subculture through ideological agitation, rather than using said ideology to provide us with our goals and practices.

The DSA suffers from much of these problems on both the structural and demographic level as essentially being a progressive advocacy group which differentiates itself by being composed of self-identified socialists. While this is an unquestionable advance in the politics of the progressive advocacy groups composed of nothing much at all, this still provides the DSA with the problem of not having an easy path towards sustainable membership growth. As of right now, the main reason people have joined the DSA is because they find themselves interested in socialism, either because of events that happen primarily in a few major metropolitan areas or because they’ve been gradually finding themselves more attached to the policy goals of DSA-aligned politicians. Since they are not coming to their DSA locals because of things those DSA locals did, finding a place for these new members becomes problematic because in many cases it might not be immediately clear how their interests can be implemented, and in many other cases (interest in policy rather than practices), it simply isn’t immediately possible to put these into practice except through the mediation of electoral politics. And so many of the people who come to our events once or twice or maybe even spend their money to join us end up being a part of a large and utterly inactive periphery, thus replicating the structural problems the activist network has. Those who remain to become the core are often already linked to existing activist networks, which replicates the demographic problem.

The only reason the DSA hasn’t already fully developed in this direction is because of the occasional actions of members which point in other directions, such as mutual aid events, neighborhood activism, or forms of reproductive unionism. These actions should be lauded, but they are increasingly coming up against the limits of the DSA’s structural and demographic problems, which is that your average chapter outside of a few major areas is far too geographically dispersed to not adopt the kinds of methods seen in activist networks. Actual mutual aid done in a consistent way requires labor and resources which dispersed networks have a hard time providing, and neighborhood activism can’t really be done when hardly any members are concentrated in one neighborhood. So long as new members mostly come from things the chapter is not directly involved in doing but rather in interest with the subculture the chapter is a part of, this tendency will worsen until it is truly self-reinforcing; there is a good chance that this is already the case. We can already see one of the symptoms of this in a collective, if the largely unspoken, assumption that the working class is an outside entity that we need to organize. But whether the trend is permanent or not, the fact is that the DSA has historically been a progressive advocacy group which calls itself socialist, and despite a fragmentation caused by the massive addition of new members, it is on track to become that again.

This is the problem that the Spring caucus sought to solve through formalization. Rather than being an advocacy network on the verge of exhausting itself, the idea is to shear off those elements which are causing burnout, accept a smaller active membership, and become an advocacy group. This perspective does not just come from an ideological perspective originating in Europe, but is also a response to a real problem the DSA is going through right now, and we ignore this at our peril.

Counter Practices

But what follows seems to be the mainstream response from those who would oppose the Spring caucus. Perhaps it has to do with fears of being called entryists, perhaps it has to do with the fragmentation of the Marxist and Anarchist lefts over the last few decades which few seem interested in mending, but the ‘DSA left’ overwhelmingly does not seem to have the same feelings about ownership of the organization, nor does it seem anywhere as willing to engage in political struggles with Spring. Instead we’ve seen, e.g. from the Socialist Majority caucus, an argument of ‘live and let live,’ and a connected argument of avoiding the problems that exist at the national level by investing all power to local chapters. We see the argument that the DSA can continue to be both an organization based around fighting specific campaigns for policy goals, while also being a base building organization which does deeper canvassing, perhaps in support of internal development or in support of these advocacy campaigns, while remaining an internally coherent organization which won’t suffer from burnout.

This ignores the fundamental problem that the political splits in DSA are about, and how this problem exists in every chapter in the organization: Why, outside of a vague political sentiment or a belief in an organization that we could be, would anyone become an active member in our organization? If we do some advocacy work, some activist work, and some base building work, then what we are committing to is being an organization which does the same work a variety of other, better funded, and more experienced organizations do in a less extensive and focused way. Even in small cities it’s not especially difficult to get involved in an activist organization with a large number of self-identified socialists.

What is needed here isn’t just continuing the practical fragmentation DSA is going through. This won’t be effective for two different reasons: one, for the reasons I have described, but even ignoring that, even taking this ‘live and let live’ attitude on its own terms as an attempt to wrest control over our organization from a dangerous faction, this platform doesn’t work. The difference between an organization which works towards discrete policy goals and one which works to elect specific politicians is not much of a difference at all, and it’s still working by the same logic Socialist Majority nominally opposes, where the DSA acts as a mediator for movements assumed to be outside of it, rather than incubating those movements ourselves.

What is needed is more than live and let live, what we need is, to quote Srnicek, a counter-hegemonic argument, and to go further, a counter-hegemonic practice that can create an organization which moves past the limits of advocacy-activism. I mentioned counter-practices in passing in What to do as a Leftist Intellectual, but now is well past time to explain the concept.

A counter-hegemonic practice is not just doing one thing as opposed to something else; it is a practice which can recontextualize all other practices around itself and build a new organizational hegemony around the goals of said practice. As an example, many advocacy groups, including the Medicare For All campaign, have potlucks to draw people to their meetings, but those potlucks are not the center of their practices. They are done in the name of a particular goal which doesn’t necessarily end in a revolutionary potluck destroying capitalism and building a potluck society. In Spring’s conception of the DSA, the main practice is taking state power through election campaigns and by creating a space for socialism in the midst of the governmental-policy complex. Socialist Majority counterposes that with a call for pluralism, but a pluralism without a focus will just kick the can down the road and continue the DSA’s position as a group which tries to do both the work of an Our Revolution advocacy group and the work of an activist group without having the funding or the time to do either. What we need is a strategy which retains the DSA’s existence as a group which brings a variety of strategies and tendencies together, which can also combat both the mono-politics posed by Spring caucus and the degrading trends which every chapter faces.

Base-building

Over the course of the last three years, an alternative has presented itself and been popularized in many corners of the Left. The base building tendency (also called the dual power tendency) has gained traction due to the incisive critiques that proponents such as Sophia Burns, Tim Horras, and the Marxist Center as a whole have put forth regarding the practices of activism and advocacy. The idea of base building as just the extension of things that many successful organizers and organizations do anyways has caught on as an alternative to what many see as chasing our tail.

But this is the problem, not with the strategy itself but with the popularized version of it. How can base building be both a systemic alternative to activism and something which organizations do all the time? The popularized idea of base building, which combines focusing on specific campaigns while developing a base through mutual aid, is indeed just community organizing under another name. This idea of base building as an easy thing has been combined with an idea of mutual aid as being inherently anti-electoral and having its own good politics associated with it to form the bedrock of a certain segment of the DSA left, including the defunct Refoundation caucus.

The flaw with this idea is that structures and organizing forms do not have a content of their own, and supporting them in the abstract just leads to, at best, winning in the abstract. Mutual aid is not inherently anti-electoral and indeed does not have an inherent politics of its own: it has been pursued (in varied forms) by churches, charity groups, and liberal NGOs towards different ends. It is not a magic weapon which will imbue our movement with inherent goodness when used; it is just a technique like any other. Organizations are defined not just by the techniques they use, but by the relationship of these techniques to their broader goals. If members of the DSA call for mutual aid to pull in working-class constituencies and retain them in our organization without merging this technical call with a broader critique and counter-strategy, what we often see as the response is one of mutual aid events or an increasing number of social events which don’t fundamentally change the organization but rather serve as add-ons to existing strategies.

Without a long term goal, an intent to ‘organize the unorganized’ as Tim Horras says, these strategies can (and often have been) integrated into typical activism or typical advocacy. Without a broader project these strategies will turn to dust in the wind, or to be captured either by cranks who want a high horse to affiliate themselves with, or be incorporated into the exact kinds of projects base building was set up to avoid.

If base building is to be a systemic alternative to electoralism or activism, it needs to be more than a hollow technique we project ourselves onto. It needs to include medium and longer-term goals and needs to be feasibly scalable such that any chapter can begin this kind of work. This question of medium and long term goals brings up a question which members of Marxist Center have been asking since before their Unity Conventions: base building for what?

This question brings us into a new territory and finally an answer. The problem has been that the American landscape is littered with the ruins of dead radicalisms that have calcified into institutions by and for capitalism. This has happened not just ideologically but structurally, as groups of demobilized and alienated activists became dependent on funding. Breaking from these formations doesn’t just require being apart from them, but building new institutions by and for the working class that are structured and fight struggles in different ways. As Marx noted, without an independent political party the working class is forced to channel itself through bourgeois parties which it does not and can never truly control. This is true in the American context politically, but it is now also true at all other levels of engagement. The press is by and large the property of a handful of billionaires who decide on the press’s content, the major unions have been business unions since at least the 1950s, mutual aid has primarily existed through churches if not through an edifice of charitable organizations funded by billionaires in a way that wouldn’t be unfamiliar to Victorians, and academies are only ‘radical’ in the frenzied minds of movement conservatives. Finally, at the political level, leaving aside my criticisms of advocacy and activist groups, American cities have been single-party states for so long that they have reverted to the machine politics of old. This structure cannot be defeated with mere ideas or arguments or with some clever trick, and thinking that the magic word of socialism will defend us from cooptation will doom us to the same fate as our predecessors.

So base building would be the preliminary aspect of a strategy aimed at creating institutions of and for the working class which form an alternative to those institutions which currently exist in our cities. In the long term, if we build these independent institutions, we will have built the component parts of a party which, as the culmination of our work, will finally allow socialists and the working class to work within the political sphere in a truly independent way. This is all well and good in the abstract, but how can this be applied to the DSA’s current situation? What campaigns can this strategy be used towards?

In Marxist Center chapters the answer has been reproductive unionism. As opposed to typical unionism that organizes as the point of production (the workplace), reproductive unionism organizes at the multitude of points at which the working class reproduces itself. This includes but is not limited to tenants unions and organizing around utilities consumption. These pathways are far less cluttered with older organizations and building a tenants union or fighting utilities companies can create these organizations while continuing DSA’s plurality. Multiple different practices will be needed to succeed in these goals, from canvassing to journalistic work to agitation to advocacy work to union-style organizing. Each of these practices and struggles can also create possibilities for building lasting institutions while building our capacity to fight for reforms in a sustainable way.

Since such a strategy does not require that one political line be publicly held in order to build support for a program or candidate, this would avoid the limited and autocratic structures Spring suggests, and with a specific goal and a focus on both unorganized people and on areas where other activist groups aren’t working, we’ll avoid the redundant strategies put forward by the Socialist Majority.

Conclusion

The beauty of the Democratic Socialists of America since its rise has been its place as a staging ground for the transformation of theoretical tendencies into practices, its location as a multi-tendency organization, and its sheer size, dwarfing anything else which calls itself the US organized left. Combined, they have created an organization which has allowed the complete recasting of the Left’s fragmentation into practical terms. This has created a new and volatile politics which, due to its state of emergence, leads to often seemingly contradictory positions being held within one organization or one person. But this is for the best. The differences of the previous eras are not completely irrelevant, but they have been narrowed down by decades of Leftist failure that by now they can be largely summed up to doing the same things, holding different signs at the same corners, and hawking different books with the same content. For all its faults, the DSA has acted as a laboratory of the Left, with the conflicting strategies allowing us to know how they work. Important projects like Build, which focus on creating practical knowledge gleaned from a sharp analysis of projects chapters have undertaken, could not have existed in the United States a few years ago, and indeed does not exist in countries which have gone through similar situations as the United States has but have not developed the diverse kind of left which allows for actual strategic thinking. The DSA, Marxist Center, and Symbiosis are all of massive importance in figuring out what our politics mean in a period when our powerlessness is no longer an excuse for impotence.

At the same time, the DSA is hamstrung by inherited tactics and a structure which made sense at a time when we were an organization of a few thousand rather than a few tens of thousands. The lack of regional organizations, a clear inside/outside distinction, or even clear roles within the organization have created their own pathologies. Without mediating regional structures or clear roles it is impossible to enforce any condition or rule, since all you can do at best is rely on interpersonal relationships with the leadership of various chapters to enforce any given rule. Looking at the same structure from the bottom up leads to even worse problems, with support from the national largely being dependent on, again, interpersonal relationships with those who have personally committed to campaigns. Without an inside/outside distinction members are never able to really trust each other, as the continual leaking of information shows, and members can never truly break from agitating or propagandizing to analysis. The forum has not served this function because at this point the organizational pathology has truly set in, and without trust we again see interpersonal cliques emerge as the only sustainable organizing subgroup. This is an objectively regressive trend that will limit our ability to move past our transitory phase into a sustainable mass organization. With that said, it should be clear that what is at stake if we remain on this path is not a mere transformation of slogans, but the squandering of the chance we have at transcending the differences of the past. 

To answer a criticism I imagine this article will bring, this problem cannot be solved with a split. For one, the problems I have described are systemic to the DSA, and without a massive restructuring, any new group is not going to avoid them. For another, DSA’s internal politics are not even conducive to a split right now, with most of the new caucuses either being politically ephemeral or barely extant at the chapter level. Because of these factors, the main danger for our organization is not a split along ideological lines but an increasing burnout we can’t even put a finger on and backsliding into the forms of the last decade as we transform back into a rhizome of overworked cliques.

There is still, regardless, hope. Perhaps it’s a hope borne out of a lack of alternatives, or perhaps it’s a hope borne from just how much things have changed in the last three years. The Left in America has spent nearly fifty years in such a state of isolation that merely referring to yourself as what you are, a radical, a revolutionary, a socialist, was enough to make you impossibly beyond the pale. In such a state we developed a belief that came from this isolation, that socialism, revolution, etc., were magic words which represented our isolation, that giving up those words would make our beliefs easily transmittable and, on the other side, that the use of such words would guarantee an organization a license to good politics and protect us from cooptation.

Things have changed massively in only a few years, yet many of us still cling to these beliefs, that with a mere word we can arrange ourselves on the right side of the story, that with mere words affixed to old and tired practices we can somehow elevate them. History has not borne out either of these beliefs. Now, with tens of thousands working in the organized Left openly as socialists and millions more who identify with the term, it is clear that merely saying the word is not enough. The task for socialists now is to discover what socialism practically means in our age, to create an organization which is socialist in action and not merely in name. To do so will require harder analysis than we have done, massive recalibrations of our organization, and a great deal of work. I’m not going to pretend that it will be easy. But if we wanted an easy path, we would not have become socialists.

I’d like to thank my comrades in Rochester DSA, in Red Bloom, and in the New York State Organizing committee, without whom I wouldn’t have developed these thoughts.

 

Against Think-Tank Socialism: a Review of ‘Inventing the Future’

Jean Allen reviews Srnicek & Williams’ ‘Inventing the Future’, which calls for an intellectual counter-hegemony to neoliberalism. Does this proposal for counter-hegemonic institutions really put anything new on the table, or just reflect the prevailing organizational norms of the existing left?

When Inventing the Future came out, it immediately became the target of a series of relatively uninteresting critiques. This wasn’t accidental: the book is very self consciously a gadfly text meant to sting the left into a particular strategy, and it is purposefully oriented in opposition to much of the Left’s practices. This makes it the difficult kind of book where, despite its flaws, the critiques are often worse than the book itself. Despite the small uproar the book created, few of these reviews hit the mark. This problem comes from an utter lack of critical tools available to current socialists which have produced few critiques that are able to take in the entirety of Srnicek & Williams’ argument.

One could separate Inventing the Future into two arguments: first, their practical one, and second, their policy platform. These proposals, including the abolition of work and the furthering of automation (or “Fully Automated Luxury Communism”, or FALC as the meme goes), understandably got most of the attention, alongside their argument that the left should surrender its particularism and return to a universalist and future-oriented viewpoint. Because there has been quite a bit of writing on this aspect of the text, I will bracket it, excepting a discussion of what these arguments meant from a practical standpoint.

In the period when Inventing the Future was written, the Left was at an interregnum. The long wave of direct action based activism, which in the United States started shortly after McCarthyism ended any hope for Communist politics, had been running on fumes through the entirety of the 00s, with some of the most inspired texts of the time acting as a basically total critique of activism as it currently existed (from nihilist communism to communization to the post-left). The frontism and isolated activism of the Bush years were unable to survive into the Obama administration, and along with every other Left in the world the American left was completely incapable of responding to the financial crisis, a failure which brought the beginnings of the newest act of the ongoing rightward shift which has afflicted world politics and which we are currently dealing with the problems of.

Occupy seems to many to be the bright point during this period, the beginning of a new, anti-capitalist politics. But if Inventing the Future is any proof, the ‘new politics’ emerged mostly in negative. Occupy, which was set up by the Adbusters milieu, had a strict opposition to hierarchies, goals, or mediation of any kind, which made it if anything more of a culmination of post-left tendencies around during the 00s than the beginning of something new. And the new socialist groups which emerged immediately after Occupy, from Jacobin to the left accelerationists, were very much formed around a critique of the politics that surrounded Occupy.

Srnicek & Williams characterize these tendencies as ‘folk politics’, a term which includes many of the left’s horizontalist, particularist, and localist aspects under one critique: that they are all products of the left’s inability to look beyond the horizon and theorize what the future should look like. To quote their “#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO“:

We believe the most important division in today’s left is between those that hold to a folk politics of localism, direct action, and relentless horizontalism, and those that outline what must become called an accelerationist politics at ease with a modernity of abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology. The former remains content with establishing small and temporary spaces of non-capitalist social relations, eschewing the real problems entailed in facing foes which are intrinsically non-local, abstract, and rooted deep in our everyday infrastructure. The failure of such politics has been built-in from the very beginning.

There is unquestionably a degree of truth in this critique. As I argued in my review of Kauffman’s Direct Action, the greatest tragedy of the repression that characterized the 90s and 00s is that it led to the Left forgetting its own history—and with that, it lost the context for the strategies and tactics it used. It, therefore, theorized its own weakness by retreating into a series of strategies which justified its own weakness: a fear of cooptation went hand in hand with remaining within one’s cultural milieu, horizontalism was substituted for larger organization building, and a fetishization of powerlessness became an excuse for lack of political ambition.

The alternative that Srnicek & Williams propose is in many ways better than what came before: the post-left era’s distaste with envisioning the future,  the narrowing of its ambitions to promoting simply the possibility of an alternative. A conversation between the primitivist post-left and left-accelerationists needs to happen. Whatever the shortcomings of both tendencies, between the absolute bound of FALC and the absolute limit of primitivism, I think the left can begin to etch out a vision of a better future.

But that ‘better future’ is only significant to us in so far as it provides a map of practices with which to implement that future. Which moves us from the policy platform to their practical program: how do they plan to implement this post-work future? Well, through think tanks, of course.

Yeah.

There are two ways of conceiving this argument, which are associated with ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ definitions of what the authors mean by think tanks. I will address the broad definition quickly because that is relatively easy to do. The broad definition of a leftist think tank includes all leftist activities which work towards changing the ‘common sense’ of society. It would include book clubs, journals, even this blog. This definition has a certain internal consistency, and I would agree with this in an analytical context.

The issue is that if one proposes this as a novel solution to the problems of the left one is quickly confronted by the fact that intellectual projects have been a major aspect of the left since its inception. Occupy, the very object of Srnicek & Williams’ objections, was started by a call to arms from none other than that leftist thinktank, Adbusters. Which may lead to the conclusion that Srnicek & Williams merely want slightly different think tanks proposing slightly different policies more in line with their own, an argument which ignores both a large section of their practical analysis and the tone with which they present their argument. Thus while I would agree that most intellectual activity can be placed under the same banner, it would be disrespectful to Srnicek & Williams to argue that they were avidly and excitedly proposing the creation of something which clearly existed right in front of their faces.

So what is the narrow argument for think tanks? Inventing the Future presents this strategy through an analysis of the rise of neoliberalism and the think tanks and intellectual groups who slowly moved the ‘common sense’ of bureaucrats in various governments until pro-market policies were the only option imaginable within the halls of power. These groups worked over elites in all circles for decades building a ‘counter-hegemonic’ consensus and, over the course of decades, toppled the competing Keynesian consensus. Srnicek & Williams propose that we recreate this strategy in reverse, working to create counter-hegemony and to build a new common sense out of ‘non-reformist reforms’, seemingly common sense goals which are unachievable under capitalism.

This ‘operational’ aspect of Inventing the Future has been seriously under-critiqued (with some notable exceptions), usually being glossed over before turning to what one agrees or disagrees with regarding the book’s programme. Indeed, the sense one gets from many reviews is that these “think tanks” are merely set dressing, a machine that produces the actual ideas up for debate. This is why the book is such a perfect target of an organizational materialist critique because it allows us to place this text in its context and critique it holistically rather than flipping through the practice to yell at the theory.

The unsuitability of a ‘neoliberalism in reverse’ strategy, of creating socialist think tanks that slowly change the status quo, is not limited to the standpoint of future socialist transformation—such a strategy requires utterly different resources than the socialist movement currently has and is likely to have in the years to come. How is one to build a movement to support these discourses and not just come back to the same formation that led to the book’s writing?

This structure is detailed in their last chapter, titled Building Power. In it they critique the limited unity of the whole Movement of Squares era, forced by either proximity or by opposition to tyrannical regimes, and that they should replace this with a ‘populist’ unity which can connect issues of class, race, gender, and sexuality together into a singular logic. This is a perfectly fine concept, but then comes the kicker:

From the anti-globalization movements, to Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, numerous Latin American movements, and Occupy across the Western world, these movements have mobilized large cross-sections of society rather than just particular class interests.

Ignoring that the Marxist in me wants to scream about just how ‘particular’ the class interests of the proletariat are, let’s speak to the way that the left-accelerationist/Jacobin tendency uses this language of left-populism.

Left populism as a discrete strategy dates to the mid-80s when Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. They build on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: that an advanced capitalist state can rule through cultural consent, mediating between different factions within the ruling class and between the ruling class and the middle class. Laclau & Mouffe combined this argument with developments in linguistics to create what they refer to as left populism, post-Marxism, or radical democracy. Through this analysis, they advocate for a strategy wherein the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses—which would not be tethered to those old leftist constructs like the working class or the left-right divide—would be allowed to create a movement which mediates between different groups of the popular classes.

This analysis gained increasing popularity in the Left in the late 00s, coming into force after the Occupy movement with the parties Srnicek & Williams cite, in the Jacobin left in the United States, and in the left-accelerationist tendency that produced Inventing the Future in Britain.

Setting aside the tragic—but no less absolute—failure of Syriza, Podemos seems like a good example of this model in action. The transformation of the party from a body of ‘radical democratic’ councils to a centrally managed electoral party which was really an apparatus of a ‘neo-Leninist communications theory’ seems like the ideal move from folk politics to accelerationist politics as defined in Inventing the Future. And it was seen as such and lauded in other connected milieus as the next big thing after Syriza’s failure against the troika of European and financial interests.

The fact of the matter is that this discursive strategy has failed. Podemos lost much of their momentum after the transition to this more central and ‘normalized’ party, especially after a right-wing party—Ciudadanos—appeared using the same kind of discursive strategies. The party now seems stuck in third place, despite having unified with several other groups since the 2015 elections. Similarly, left-populist movements in the rest of Europe don’t seem to be getting the massive success despite all the old bugbears they drop, up to and including replacing the red flag with the national one and accepting right-wing arguments about migrants and the importance of the nation.

The sad conclusion of this is—even in the ideal state that Srnicek & Williams point to—this discursive strategy of building an intellectual group who has a party does not work. Hegemony is more than a series of common sense ideas, more than can be overcome with any number of memes, jokes, articles or dinner table arguments. It is supported and created by a series of institutions, most of which aren’t democratic. As is clear in the case of Ciudadanos, or more recently with “Abolish ICE”, it is an immensely easy matter for the media to co-opt and defang radical discourses. The discursive strategy proposed by Srnicek & Williams fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem and proposes a solution that is critically incapable of solving it.

Which brings us to a larger question: why was the book’s central argument in favor of an intellectual-activist axis ignored? Why was most of the fervor at Inventing the Future based on its platform rather than its program?

Let us return to the ‘broad definition’ of a think tank, which consists of any kind of intellectual activity, and consider the makeup of the left at the time. In 2013–2014 when Srnicek & Williams were writing Inventing the Future, the Anglophone left could be narrowed down to two kinds of non-party groups: more directly activist groups, and an increasingly large nexus of blogs, Tumblrs, Facebook pages, journals, newspapers, and magazines which all sought to do basically what Srnicek & Williams describe—to change the common sense, to develop a counter-hegemony through their intellectual activity. So this think tanks-as-vanguard ideal represented an agreeable organizational situation for leftist intellectuals. A world where their intellectual work was not only important but gave them leadership over the broader left is really the best endpoint for an intellectual property rentier one can imagine, so it makes sense that the critiques one could see in larger media outlets were not the organizational/strategic argument that “media outlets should be the vanguard of the left”, but what specifically that vanguard should do.

Thus, the failure of criticism that surrounds Inventing the Future implicates not just the left accelerationist/Jacobin tendency, but the whole US left, as being fine with the structure of the thing if prone to quibble over the details. But as I noted, if we accept that the medium-term goal of Inventing the Future is merely to recast the Anglophone left into an intellectual-activist axis in which the intellectuals are in charge, then we return to the precise thing that the book was written against: a magazine calling for action.

This is not to diminish their accomplishments. The tendency which Inventing the Future is a part of has played a part in the greatest expansion of the Anglophone left since the 1970s. I would not even disagree that intellectual and discursive work is going to play an important role if the Left is to continue to work towards socialism. But it cannot be the only work and it cannot be primary. Intellectual work needs to be connected to the organizations of the working class if we want to avoid cooptation and recuperation, to keep pushing forwards. The act of invention, despite the popular myth, does not stop in the garage. It involves steps of engineering, funding, testing and manufacturing, a process which includes far more than just the individual genius who discovers a new technique. Similarly, if we are to win then we cannot be satisfied with merely schematizing the future, but need to build it as well.

Ideal and Real History: L.A. Kauffman’s ‘Direct Action’

Jean Allen reviews L.A. Kauffman’s Direct Action, a history of the protest movements that filled the gap between the New Left and the modern left that are often ignored and forgotten. Allen argues that these movements cannot be understood strictly in terms of their theory, but by grasping the realities that they faced as organizers.

For those of us on the left, the last year has brought a series of strange emotions. We have felt fear at the surge of nationalism, anger at the further retrenching of austerity policies, at the possibility of a war, at the possibility of more deportations, less welfare, a destruction of the environment and of the people. But the last year has also brought an unexpected amount of hope: organizing efforts have begun to come together in an inspiring way, and despite the disappointments of the Sanders campaign, this year has seen what the media is constantly calling the “revival of socialism”.

This is not fully accurate, since we have not seen just the revival of a homogeneous single ‘socialism’. What we have instead seen is the revival of a massive number of competing ‘socialisms’. To quote Endnotes:

One becomes a communist or an anarchist on the basis of the particular thread out of which one weaves one’s banner (and today one often flies these flags, not on the basis of a heartfelt identity, but rather due to the contingencies of friendship). However, in raising whatever banner, revolutionaries fail to see the limits to which the groups they revere were actually responding — that is, precisely what made them a minority formation. Revolutionaries get lost in history, defining themselves by reference to a context of struggle that has no present-day correlate. They draw lines in sand which is no longer there.

That is, the revival of socialism has not just come in the form of a new project; because that project coexists with the rebirth of a dozen old socialisms. It is in this environment that the publishing of L.A. Kauffman’s Direct Action is of particular importance. Because of all the radical histories revived, all of the ‘red threads’ of history which are being picked up, the one radical history which is almost universally derided is the one we immediately came from. This is not accidental: the rise of idiosyncratic leftist sects has happened precisely because of these escapes to the past promise an easy fix to the boring and difficult work of organizing.

This illusion, that the issues of the left have entirely to do with the annoyances of consensus decision making, affinity groups, or spokes councils, and that we could fix them by merely accepting some superior organizational form—or even worse, some obscure historiography—is idealistic crankism at its worst. Yet that idealism has had real effects: the disdain to which the newest generation of leftists have towards many of the struggles from the generation before them, cherry-picking specific movements they like, presuming that the period between the Vietnam War protests and Occupy was a vacuum of radicalism in which very little of value occurred.

Direct Action is a massively ambitious text, aimed at showing the origins and development of strategies and tactics we’ve come to see as the norm and the ways these tactics connected movements we have previously seen as separate. As far as I am aware, it is one of the first texts to deal with this topic in such a systematic way and, for all its flaws, it needs to be lauded. Without texts which contextualize our tactics and strategies, we are left with a kind of idealized history of struggle where practices and movements emerge from the ether. Without knowing the ways that past movements interacted and connected, we are left relearning the past and projecting present biases onto our forebears. We need work like this to illuminate our real history.


The text begins with what is simultaneously an obscure event and one of the largest mobilizations in American history, the May Day protests of the early 1970s. Mobilized to stop the Vietnam War, the movement was mostly composed of counter-cultural hippies and former members of the student movement. While there was some participation from the ‘Old Left’, the protest was most notable as the gathering ground of the white elements of the (then) ‘New Left’. This mobilization was met with escalated violence, as President Nixon brought in the National Guard, the Marines, and even sent in tanks and armored vehicles to oppose a series of long-haired free lovers.

The 1971 May Day protests are a good point to start a text like this, as it comes at the end of a long period in leftist organizing and the beginning of another period—fragmented both in fact and in self-understanding. There was a push towards decentralization and against the idea of mass organization itself, which had been a major goal through the 60s. Shortly before the event, a Bay Area group wrote a text which would come to define the struggles of the 70s and 80s: Anti-MassIn Anti-Mass, the fragmentation of the Left’s unitary goals was a positive rather than a negative, an aspect of the subversion of mass society and the building of something else.

The book illustrated the mood of the times, which brings us back to the opposition between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ histories: the period from the 70s to now is often viewed as merely a series of fragmented movements each aimed at supporting its own particular form of identity politics. These advocates for unity often call for some form of labor universalism, where a reborn union movement allows for a way out of the dismal situation we have now. This is another example of ‘ideal history’: it sees current affairs merely as a series of contemporaneous mistakes in theory, rather than as a situation that has evolved over a generation of organizing. In doing this, this workerist position understates both the difficulty of rebuilding a radical labor movement and the reasons that these identity movements had for working on their own.

Direct Action shows why women, people of color, and gay/lesbian people felt the need to work on their own through this period. For one, many of these movements had a patronizing view of people of color. The Anti-Nuclear Movement’s own guidebooks suggested that the reason for their movement’s blinding whiteness was due to the ignorance of black people of the importance of anti-militarism and the possibilities of nuclear warfare. These patronizing attitudes continued on despite the nominal anti-racism of 80s activism, with white organizations infamously requesting the assistance of black or Latino organizations with actions after they had already been planned.

The status of women within these movements was yet more circumspect. Even in the growing galaxy of black and Latino organizations, women were often treated as mere grunts, if not as sexual objects. In that context, the creation of groups such as the Combahee River Collective made perfect sense. For all the attacks on the ‘particularism’ of the period, what can be seen with a deeper look is not a shallow desire for fragmentation but real disagreements: between the ‘universal’ white man and the difference in his shadow, between the possibilities of industrial growth and the critique of its environmental costs. These differences were—and are—real, and the attempt to do away with them by pretending that they are the creations of mistaken theorists is utterly foolhardy.

Going beyond a discussion of what motivated the identitarian turn, Direct Action turns to discussing the strategies and tactics which came out of—and benefited from—this activist landscape. Affinity groups, once an insurrectionary form used to organize in a way which avoided police infiltration, turned into a way to utilize the diversity of radical spaces. Blockades, which were a major aspect of the early anti-nuclear movement as a nonviolent tactic, were refined through the Earth First! and anti-globalization years, becoming a major tactic of the Black Lives Matter movement.

Kauffman’s book shows one other major theme: the transition of the protest form from being a tactic used in certain situations to being a strategy in and of itself. The major battles of the New Left period occurred in marches and protests, and as early as 1980 there were questions of “who we were doing this for”. This question, asked during a feminist protest of the Pentagon, was answered in a way that would become common through the period into now: “We were doing it for ourselves”. With the slow surrender of the left’s goal of creating a counter-culture—and the slide of the left’s counter-cultural elements into subcultural ones)—this explanation increasingly represented a surrender, an acceptance that the Left was merely one subculture among many. As the 70s turned to the 80s, the Left’s knee-jerk willingness to protest often led it into costly clashes with the police, clashes which would strain the already rough relationship it had with non-white movements.

This focus on the general development of strategies and tactics allows Kauffman to avoid the usual problems of histories of this era, which often replicate the perceived fractured nature of the left by focusing on a single group or cause. This tends to lead to major gaps or abrupt stops when a group is dismantled or a cause takes a lower priority. However, there was far more continuity than fragmentation on the individual level, with the same people moving from cause to cause, developing their tactics with an aim towards building a movement which had a space not just for socialism but for feminism, anti-racism, and LGBT issues.

While they did not succeed, this is no reason to cast this whole generation of radicalism into darkness to not be looked upon or learned from. Despite and because of its failure, the New Left still has many lessons to teach us. These lessons cannot be imparted if we view the period as merely a series of failed experiments or through a series of limited intellectual perspectives. We need to expand our lens both within these groups by looking at them as something more than the struggles of a few individual leaders and intellectuals; and across these groups to understand that the New Left was not the fractured mess it is often depicted, but was rather a continuous period of a group of people who fought for a variety of causes.

Kauffman’s willingness to connect and analyze these ‘gaps’ in our knowledge has its flaws but is a crucial first step towards understanding the period. Direct Action’s flaws just show that we need to look deeper into this period, not just at the level of individual academics studying the thought of individual organizations or intellectuals, but analyzing the continuity between these groups across the whole spectrum of the period.

Any text which strives for greatness is inevitably going to be disappointing to some degree: disappointment comes from the ambition of a text more often than any specific failings. The ambition and realization at the center of Kaufman’s Direct Action—that there is a whole history of the left that has gone without systemic analysis—could never be achieved in any one book, let alone one that’s a lean 256 pages long. The thing that Direct Action left me wishing for in the end was a longer and more comprehensive text. In this, Kauffman achieves what she set out for: piquing interest in a period that remains understudied.

There are points where the gaps are particularly painful, though. For a text that seeks to show that even in the ‘gap years’ between movements there was still organizing being done by a series of people aiming at a fuller emancipatory project, it is painfully telling that the ten years between the anti-Iraq War protests and Occupy pass by in almost as many pages. Even if we accept that nothing was really going on, that ‘nothing’ is still massively significant.

As someone who came into activism at the end of the Bush years, you could feel the effects of that ‘nothing’ everywhere you went. I distinctly remember an utterly normal meeting where my college group was discussing absolutely abstract questions where, nonetheless, fully half of the older members felt the need to take their SIM cards out of their phones for fear of people listening in. Yes, this came partially out of the sense of self-importance activists usually have—but it also came from a paranoia kindled by the very real repression activists suffered during the Bush years. Groups did multiple things to try to ‘get around’ this, from the sense of paranoia I encountered in my time on the student left to attempts to moderate—either in fact or in a false way—through the use of front groups. Or they embraced this creeping sense of nihilism; the 90s and 00s were the heydays of the post-left. Regardless of the individual choices of groups, the repression of the Bush-era worked: both at the level of the base—in that we’re starting from essentially zero with contemporary attempts to organize—and at the level of the superstructure—where leftists are working from an utterly fragmented place. Even in the case of this ‘nothing’ that was the decade between September 11th, 2001 and September 17th, 2011, there are still things we can learn.

Although the text is titled Direct Action and is specifically about the tactics developed around direct actions, the book also opens up a massive space. Just as the direct action movements of the 70s-00s are under-analyzed, the mutual aid and cooperative movements of the same period receive no mention virtually anywhere—only rare sideways glances at them in texts not devoted to the topic. In David Graeber’s book of the same name, Graeber talks about the long and dramatic history of radical spaces and venues in New York City and their attempts to stay open in a rapidly gentrifying city. This history has had real effects but has been virtually destroyed through activist turnover and lack of interest. Nearly every city in the Northeastern United States has some form of a community center which is usually known by locals as a punk venue, and nearly every one of these community centers has either a radical history or is currently staffed by radicals. Yet if you asked those radicals about the history of the center, you can rarely get a straightforward answer. The same can be said for community gardens, a major focus for environmentally-focused groups in the 80s that could lead to conflicts with the nominal landowners or with developers. Those gardens that survived being transformed into luxury apartments are still with us today, and yet the radical history of these spaces we walk by day after day barely receives thought—let alone books.

The text also brings up another fault, this time not so much with the book itself as with the entirety of our studies of the New Left. The amount of nitty-gritty archival work done of these organizations is severely lacking, which is a large part of why the studies of these groups tend to come across as being relatively shallow. Compared to the movements of the last century, which have been sifted through and worked over, the small details of the decision-making processes of these groups are rarely explored—outside of hyper-specific texts like Graeber’s work of the same name. This kind of work is of relatively massive import: I would argue that archiving and secondary analysis of that archiving is one of the most important things that we can do on the left today. These little details are more than just trivia—they’re the foundation of actually building a plausible sense of what we can learn from these movements—how we can replicate the things that worked and avoid the things that didn’t. It’s literally impossible to ask this of the text without it transforming into a 5000-page compendium, but it brings up this frustration never the less.

This complete lack of history cannot be disconnected from—on the one hand—the short lifespans of your average activist organization, and—on the other—the consistent repression that these groups have faced. This lack of history still haunts us. When I said that the Left was starting from zero, that was only halfway right: we are now starting now from less than zero from the Bush years. While I believe the era of activism Direct Action covers has come to a close, we are still working with the tactics inherited from the period. Unlike the period from the 90s to the 00s, we are recycling these tactics without knowing their history.

Precisely because of this, Direct Action is an excellent start at surfacing a deeply under-analyzed history. It succeeds precisely in what it meant to do, with even the frustrations further cementing its importance. At its core, it asks us to direct our attention away from the imagined histories which can so easily be used to bracket the past and to look towards a real history with many lessons yet to give. For that, it deserves none but the highest praise.