The Tortoise and The Hare: Cybernetics, Evolution and Socialism

Amelia Davenport argues for the relevance of cybernetics to the project of developing a communism that transcends the modernist project. 

“Science is part of the Darwinian struggle for life. It helps us to organize our experience. It leads us to economy of thought.”  – Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos

Everyone knows the story of the tortoise and the hare. The overconfident bunny squandered his natural gifts by dawdling and resting while the determined tortoise plodded along to the finish line. What nobody told you was that the tortoise was a robot and you were the hare. Of course, in this instance the race is to inherit the earth. The prevailing logic governing social life in capitalist society structures the world as a race to accumulate as much as possible, or at least to the consolation prize of not dying in the streets of disease. In this race, humans are pitted against machines. Innovation and automation concretely mean the destitution of many workers who previously held enviable positions in the division of labor due to their skills. While humans currently have the upper hand compared to the blind machines we put to use for our ends, it is a race we cannot win. 

Humans have been endowed by the process of evolution with considerable gifts of mental acuity, intuition, and the capacity to reason probabilistically. However, for most of the history of modernity we have blindly followed a reductionist, linear and mechanistic vision of the world that has led us to a precipice. This way of thinking is not universal, but in the process of colonization it has been spread by bullet and boxcar to every government and hegemonic political system on the planet. Our social institutions are incapable of dealing with the complexity of the world they inhabit and often serve only to generate increasing social entropy themselves. According to “modern” man, everything has a linear causal explanation. A causes B and B causes C. Likewise, everything in nature is reducible to its constituent components and understanding it is just a matter of understanding the parts. In essence, the universe is like a great clock. Perhaps the clock was assembled without a maker, but the basic authoritarian view of causality of the monotheistic patriarch is simply substituted for an appeal to abstract necessity. The genesis of the modern man is Newton and Kepler’s quest to discover God’s plan in nature. The modernist frames life as a linear progression punctuated by either salvation or total destruction. 

Unfortunately, reality does not work this way. To quote a popular saying among complexity theorists, “understanding the nature of a water molecule tells you nothing about how an ocean works.” Processes, in reality, are driven by cycles of feedback, mutual conditioning, and the variety of interactions. Out of one level of processes emerge higher levels which are not reducible to their parts, yet remain inextricably conditioned by them. Even in a fully deterministic universe, it is impossible to capture all the information necessary to make a perfect simulation of any real process in the cosmos. At best, you can create good enough abstractions. Thankfully, we never needed a perfect knowledge of reality to get along just fine in it. You very likely don’t know how the physics of a toilet works, the mechanics of a car engine, or the chemistry of yogurt, but it doesn’t mean you can’t enjoy the conveniences they bring. Instead, we use stochastic reasoning. That is to say, we reason by analyzing probabilities, through a process of narrowing down to good-enough assumptions based on past experiences. Think of it like throwing darts at a board and adjusting until you hit the bull’s eye. As Daniel Dennett says:

What brains are for is extracting meaning from the flux of energy impinging on their sense organs, in order to improve the prospects of the bodies that house them and provide their energy. The job of a brain is to “produce future” in the form of anticipations about the things in the world that matter to guide the body in appropriate ways.1

This was the fundamental discovery of the father of robotics William Grey Walter. Grey Walter developed incredibly simple wheeled robots who only had two sensors: a light sensor and a tactile sensor. Named Elsie and Elmer, these “tortoises,” given no external purpose, manifested an incredible variety of behaviors and emergent properties no one could have predicted. They played, struggled, explored, and even recognized themselves in their own reflection. More than that, they were capable of being conditioned to associate a symbol with a condition much like one of Pavlov’s dogs. Significantly, they demonstrated what could arguably be called “free will.”

The first surprising effect of providing the model with a scanning eye was that, when provided with two exactly equal and equidistant light stimuli, it did not hesitate or crawl half-way between them but always went to first one and then toward the other if the first was too bright and close quarters. This was obviously a free choice between two equal alternatives, the evidence of free will required by scholastic philosophers. 

The explanation of this exhibition of what seems to some people a supernatural capacity, is simple and explicit: the rotary scansion converts spatial patterns into temporal sequences and on the scale of time there can be no symmetry. Simple though this explanation may be, the philosophic inferences are worth pondering—they suggest that the appearance of free-will is related to transformation of space to time-dimensions, and that the difficulties that seemed to impress the scholastic philosophers arose from their preoccupation with geometric analogy and logical propositions.2

For all intents and purposes they were a sort of synthetic life, which Grey Walter called machina speculatrix. One can balk at this comparison but as Grey Walter noted, “If, for example, free-will is thought to be something more than a process embodied in M. speculatrix then it must be defined in terms other than the ability to choose between equal alternatives. If self-identification is more than reflexive action through the environment then its definition must include more than cogito, ergo sum.3 That incredibly complex and dynamic behavior can emerge from very simple processes is the basis of cellular automata theory which was greatly advanced by the mathematician J. H. Conway in his “Game of Life.” The Game of Life demonstrated evolutionary processes could be simulated using very few rules. Cellular automata theory and was initially developed by John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam by identifying the invariance between a model of self replication in robots and the growth of crystals. This work would be applied in studying fluid dynamics, impulse conduction in cardiac systems by the cyberneticians Arturo Rosenbluth and Norbert Wiener, and even the search for a grand unified theory of physics by Stephan Wolfram. 

The symbol of a tortoise is present in many cultures: from the world turtle whose movements caused earthquakes for the Haudenosaunee, to the great turtle Akupāra upon whose back, elephants hold up the Earth in Hindu cosmology and to Ao, the giant sea turtle of Chinese myth whose legs were stolen to prop up the sky. There may be more to the idea of a tortoise propping up the world than meets the eye. Grey Walter’s tortoises existed in a state one could call, as the philosopher Daniel Dennett does, sorta conscious. They responded to stimuli, made free choices between equal options, and modified their behavior depending on their circumstances. But the level of simplicity in their design beggars belief that they could have reached the level of sentience in a “real” tortoise. After all, they were made up of a collection of predesigned logical processes, right? And can we be so sure we aren’t as well?

Diagrams of Grey Walter’s robotic tortoises

You don’t have to accept intelligent design to believe that there is a teleology (or higher purpose) implicit in our lives, one only has to maintain the validity of Darwinian evolution. Daniel Dennett shows, in Intuition Pumps: And Other Tools For Thinking, that we can use the term ‘design’ when talking about evolution, because the process of natural selection optimizes for solutions to problems. Moreover, meaning itself emerges from the evolutionary process. Evolution selects one organ over another for a reason without any need for representation in language. Meaning is always relative to context and function. It exists as an emergent regulatory mechanism from the relationship between the components of a system. Lower order systems like a slime mold, a thermostat, or your nervous system all exhibit a similar kind of intentionality to Grey Walter’s tortoises. More complex systems like a human being, or more narrowly a human mind, are composed of a nested array of less complex systems that are intelligent at diminishing degrees. Eventually, a base level is reached in the regression, and the fundamental unit is something like a machine: an ultra-simple, self-reproducing logical process embodied in proteins, silicon, or some other medium. Human-designed systems often do not have this property of consciousness or sorta consciousness, as they are mere extensions of our own intentionality. Your toaster, board game, or car have no independent agency of their own Dennett elaborates thus:

We need Darwin’s gradualism to explain the huge difference between an ape and an apple, and we need Turing’s gradualism to explain the huge difference between a humanoid robot and a hand calculator. The ape and the apple are made of the same basic ingredients, differently structured and exploited in a many-level cascade of different functional competencies. There is no principled dividing line between a sorta ape and an ape. Both the humanoid robot and the hand calculator are made of the same basic, unthinking, unfeeling Turing-bricks, but as we compose them into larger, more competent structures, which then become the elements of still more competent structures at higher levels, we eventually arrive at parts so (sorta) intelligent that they can be assembled into competences that deserve to be called comprehending. We use the intentional stance to keep track of the beliefs and desires (or “beliefs” and “desires” or sorta beliefs and sorta desires) of the (sorta-) rational agents at every level from the simplest bacterium through all the discriminating, signaling, comparing, remembering circuits that comprise the brains of animals from starfish to astronomers. There is no principled line above which true comprehension is to be found—even in our own case. The small child sorta understands her own sentence “Daddy is a doctor,” and I sorta understand “E = mc 2 .4 

These sorts of conscious processes, which exist across nature, animate it with an implicit psychic potential. The Cartesian division between mind and matter is an illusion. Everything is not an extension of the mind of the human subject as some idealists believe, but rather, mind is a necessary and universal extension of matter. Reality is made up of tortoises like Elmer and Elsie: simple but purpose-driven systems, designed but left with radical freedom. It’s turtles all the way down.

Most of our designed systems (machines, crops and government institutions) are built according to modernist principles. You feed inputs and get an output. The relationship between your machinery and its environment is something to be controlled for and the externalities (negative side-effects) are something to be shifted onto other people. But you can’t actually separate a system from its context. For example, if you created an automatic paperclip factory, without any sort of internal regulatory system, it would either use up its stockpile of materials or flood the market with paperclips without a concern for the consequences. Of course, a self-regulating paperclip factory, whose sole purpose is to maximize production, would come with its own problems, which speaks to the need to examine the teleology (internal purpose and logical outcome) of any system we construct. A self-regulating factory is not such a far-off idea. Cybernetician, socialist revolutionary, and millionaire business consultant Stafford Beer designed a self-regulating steel factory in 1956. In the book, The Cybernetic Brain, Pickering describes it:

The T- and V-machines are what we would now call neural nets: the T-machine collects data on the state of the factory and its environment and translates them into meaningful form; the V- machine reverses the operation, issuing commands for action in the spaces of buying, production and selling. Between them lies the U-Machine, which is the homeostat, the artificial brain, which seeks to find and maintain a balance between the inner and outer conditions of the firm—trying to keep the firm operating in a liveable segment of phase-space.5

At the time, no computers existed which were powerful enough to conduct the U-Machine function, which was substituted by a team of computer-assisted managers, but it is not hard to conceive of such a thing being possible now. The crucial aspect of Beer’s model, as opposed to the paperclip maximizer, is that this factory system seeks to achieve homeostasis. If the factory were manufacturing too much steel for the market, or consuming its resources at too fast a rate, it would reduce production in order to maintain its viability as a system. Likewise, it would have a good idea of when it needed to increase production as its sensors recognized changes in buying patterns. By adding the meta-goal of viability, the system is able to generate its own goals. In a viable system, both the output and the health of the system are equally its teleology. For a system to be healthy it must consider the health of the systems it is embedded in– like the social systems and ecosystems with which all of us must reckon.6 The goals of a viable system emerge from the system’s interactions with its environment and cannot be set as a priori directives. Which is to say, we ought not play God the Clockmaker with our creations, but instead enter a co-evolutionary relationship with the new kinds of synthetic life we birth. Philip Beesley, a pioneering architect, demonstrates this with his installation Transforming Space which includes an intelligent sculpture named Noosphere. Embedded in its mesh are networked microprocessors and AI’s which are capable of generating predictive models of their external environment and dynamically responding to it as well as experimental chemical cells that create new organic materials based on the environmental conditions the space and collective AI co-create. To build a better world we need to build better robots. To build better robots we have to recognize their true purpose: to join us in discovering ours. We need cybernetics: the science of piloting in the storm of life. History is not a race with a finish line — and if we make it one, it’s a game we will lose. Instead, history ought to be seen as a process of becoming.

All systems are enmeshed in relationships with other systems. Our minds are embodied in our neurophysiology, social institutions, and the broader environment in our experiential field. And viable systems, which necessarily exist in a metabolic relationship with other viable systems, leverage and condition them for their own aims. This is what Stafford Beer termed “enrollment.”7 Instead of inventing supercomputers capable of probabilistic reasoning from scratch, Beer considered that existing systems which are very good at this sort of computation, like animal brains or even an ecosystem, might be able to be directed toward solving the problems of decision. For instance, a pond, given a means for establishing informational inputs and outputs, could be transformed into a kind of computer. 

There are all kinds of enrollment in nature. We just call it symbiosis. Mutualism, where two or more systems all benefit from an arrangement, commensalism, where one side benefits and the other side is not harmed or helped, and parasitism where one side benefits at the expense of another are all examples of this interactivity. There also exists the opposite of enrollment: amensalism, in which one side is harmed through competition and the other does not directly benefit, which is the primary driver of natural selection. A practical example of enrollment in nature is the mutualistic relationship between many species of ants and aphids observed by Charles Darwin in On the Origin of Species. The ants essentially farm the aphids, guarding and feeding them while milking them for their honeydew. The aphids are protected from predators and are able to live in peace while the ants gain a new source of nutrients. But Darwin noted that ants also often engage in another kind of enrollment. They enslave ants of rival species. Some species of ants capture others to augment their workforce while essentially maintaining the normal functions of a colony, but others rely on their enslaved cousins to rear their young, gather food and perform necessary functions of a colony. The latter group specialize almost exclusively in militaristic pursuits.8 It should be noted that a third kind of relationship exists that predominates, one of pure competition in which ant colonies seek to destroy one another, or at least to maintain supremacy over their own territory. Colonies can coexist peacefully, but as a rule, it is only when they do not face competition. 

The brutality we observe in nature should not be transposed uncritically to human relationships. But it does have lessons for us. There are many kinds of relationships we can establish, and already have established, with other organisms and even inorganic systems like rivers in the form of hydroelectric dams. Even computation can be aided through enrollment of natural systems like the quantum states of subatomic particles. As highly complex beings, we have much greater variety in the possible relations we can establish with other systems than do relatively simple organisms like ants. And even if our biology were determinate of the sorts of relations we will tend to establish, we are capable of editing the very code of our genes and utilizing therapies to alter their epigenetic expression. Buckminster Fuller said it thusly:

Man, in degrees beyond all other creatures known to him, consciously participates—albeit meagerly—in the selective mutation and acceleration of his own evolution. This is accomplished as a subordinate modification and a component function of his sum total relative dynamic equilibrium as he speeds within the comprehensive and complex interactions of the universe (which he alludes to locally as environment).9

We, as a species, have the burden of responsibility for determining what kinds of relations we direct ourselves toward establishing. This is the radical freedom chosen in the Garden of Eden. “You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the woman. “For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.”10 

Evolution by natural selection is the driving tendency of all history. From the morphology of the Galapagos tortoises, which were differentiated by the conditions of each island, to the morphology of human civilizations, there is an underlying algorithmic process driving adaptation. It is unfortunate that the term “social Darwinism” has become associated with an anti-scientific worldview like eugenics and with an anti-social philosophy of individual competition. Survival of the fittest is not about a single member of a species optimizing itself at the expense of its kindred. It is often more beneficial, from the perspective of passing down genes similar to one’s own, to sacrifice yourself for the group. Likewise, the multiplicative effect of group efforts means that organisms that engage in solidaristic, rather than competitive, forms of organization are generally more adaptive to their environment, even as the logic of competition may play out, however sublimated, in sexual selection. As Darwin says, “Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.”11 The metaphor of “survival of the fittest,” was not even coined by Darwin, but rather the reactionary philosopher Herbert Spencer.12 But even Darwin’s influence from Malthus’ theories of political economy, does not necessarily map onto the current scientific understanding of Darwinian biology which takes even more into account the role of mutual aid and neutral relationships that exist in nature. 

We can see Darwin’s theories apply to civilizations quite readily when examining the differences between them before the age of colonialism began the bloody march to an integrated globe. While there are structural commonalities that can be seen in all agricultural societies (like the existence of some form of division of labor), the more isolated civilizations remained from one another the more specialized and uniquely they adapted to their environment.  For instance, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy maintained a fairly egalitarian social order predicated on a strict gendered division of labor between men and women.13 Their system was organized around matrilineal property relations, collective ownership of the means of production, a messianic belief in the civil-religious Law of the Great Peace, and an expansionist-genocidal relationship toward rival people’s like the Huron and Algonquians.14 Women tended to agricultural and domestic forms of labor while men hunted and made war. Each gender maintained its own rights and duties, with hereditary roles passing through families, in the confederal political structure. This division allowed the Haudenosaunee to dispose of social surplus bg engaging in aggressive territorial expansion while preserving a highly complex agricultural economy. Their temperate biome, maintained through advanced land management techniques, favored a wide-ranging agricultural society. Meanwhile, the Coast Salish organized their society around patriarchal clan structures and the Potlatch, a practice shared by other peoples like the Haida, without any sort of unified polities.15 Villages among the Coast Salish were collections of longhouses shared by allied families and the means of production (shellfishing grounds, canoes, hunting grounds, and aquacultural apparatuses) were the property of clan patriarchs.16 Even ceremonial and religious offices were held as property. The Coast Salish did not form any large spanning territorial confederations. They migrated according to seasonal changes, joining together in large communities during the rainy winter months. The natural environment, punctuated by salmon migration and seasonal mycological bounties, favored what might be called rhizomatic organization. The potlatch, a kind of ritual which established a gift economy, was the central economic mechanism binding communities together. Potlatches took the form of great feasts and contained religious and legal proceedings like marriages, namings, transfers of ceremonial office but were principally concerned with the giving of gifts by aristocrats to the leaders of other clans and the destruction of wealth as an offering to the spirits. Any gifts given to the guests were matched by at least an equal amount, or a rival chief or clan leader would face shame and a diminution of power. Commoners participated indirectly by giving gifts through a chieftain or aristocrat.17 In Coast Salish society, power was a function of how much one could give away, and thereby create obligations of debt, not how much one accumulated. This practice and social logic was so abhorrent to the settlers of the US and Canadian colonial societies that the practice was banned for many decades with harsh punishments.18 The Inca too developed an incredibly complex system with many unique features. Their society maintained a centrally-planned palatial economy which bore some parallels to what Marx called the “Asiatic mode of production.”19 The steep mountain terrace farming of the Inca required the development of highly skilled engineers and a centrally organized authority to maintain them with the social surplus. Beyond their impressive feats of engineering, one of the most fascinating aspects of Inca society was the fact they organized a continent-spanning empire without the use of an alphabet. Instead, accounting and other administrative records were recorded in quipu (devices made from knotted string).20 Being isolated from Eurasian civilizations, the Inca, and other indigenous societies, adapted to their environment in a unique and specialized manner. 

Photograph of a Potlatch

The history of non-Eurasian civilizations puts a nail in the coffin of orthodox historical materialism. In The German Ideology, Marx sketches out a linear theory of development that insists all societies must go through a series of discrete “stages” punctuated sharply by revolutionary rupture.21 This viewpoint misled Communist parties across the world into serious errors like subverting the Spanish and Chinese sociaist revolutions in favor of a bourgeois-democratic “stage” and a general failure to sufficiently support socialist revolutions in the global south. Marx himself began to overcome this view later in his life, as shown in documents like his famous “Reply to Zasulich”, which argued that not all countries have to develop along the same path and that the Russian mir (peasant commune) could serve as the economic basis of a socialist society.22 

Within Eurasia, the same tendency of isolation to produce specialized adaptation existed. In periods of social stability, such as during the Roman, Parthian, and Han empires, commerce and the associated free flow of ideas and technology allowed for a relative convergence between the social forms.23 This is identical to the tendency Darwin noticed in sea birds to be relatively similar morphologically across wide geographic expanses. While Rome militarily represented a conquest of the Eastern Hellenic and Semitic cultures by the west, it simultaneously represented the transformation of western Europe according to eastern civil principles and under the influence of eastern mystery religions like Christianity. Rome transformed from first a militarist-agrarian society, to a Hellenized merchanting society, to an Asiatic palatial society.24 With the collapse of Rome and the economic decentralization of Europe, localization and specialization were restored as the general tendency. But then Europe began to regain its interconnection through commerce in the wake of the Black Death’s shift of political power from the agrarian-military aristocracy into the hands of the merchants and burghurs. The Renaissance was inaugurated through the gradual accumulation of interconnections and commercial ties between European nations, the Arab states of the Levant and the outward expansion of European society in search of plunder and trade, first in Africa and then in the Americas.25 But the role of cultural interchange from ideas beyond Europe in this process cannot be understated. Without Arab science and philosophy the Renaissance is impossible. And it is Chinese philosophy that serves as the forgotten inspiration for Liberal theories of economics and civil rights. François Quesnay, the founder of the Physiocrat school (often considered the first school of economics), directly took inspiration from Confucian theories of equilibrium and natural harmony as the basis of the idea of laissez-faire economics.26 From his reading of Confucianism, Quesnay argued that it was necessary for there to exist an all-powerful enlightened autocrat who would preserve the cosmic harmony embodied in the equilibrium of the free market from the whims of the mob or selfish local aristocrats. And it is Physiocracy which would inspire Hobbes in his theory of the Leviathan, and by reaction almost the entirety of “Western” thought through adaptation of theories to new material conditions. 

Rather than the specific conditions of the English countryside giving rise to capitalism, as some Marxists believe, it is the general conditions of rising global interconnection which created the conditions that allowed capitalism to emerge in the English countryside. Capitalism has only catalyzed and advanced this tendency as a side effect of its quest for profit. Neither tendency, of adaptation and specialization, or generalization and universal transmission, can fully occlude the other, and over-emphasizing one or the other can lead to either particularist chauvinism or universalist chauvinism. For comradely relations to exist, we need to respect difference while striving for greater interconnection and understanding. 

In order to take the first steps toward greater understanding, we have to situate the nature of consciousness in its relation to the wider world. Consciousness is an emergent property of the cosmos. For all our responsibility, we are not separable from totality; we are merely an expression of it. On some level any sufficiently complex, self-perpetuating system demonstrates the attributes of consciousness. Consciousness is a process and a property, not a substance.27 It is the state of matter which is engaged in the overcoming of resistance. That is to say, consciousness is the organization of labor. Whether it is the labor of constructing psychic models of reality in abstract philosophy or seemingly unthinking mechanical labor, our mentality, which is wholly composed of matter in the world, is engaged in the transformation of some part of the wider world and is in turn transformed by it. 

In The Philosophy of Living Experience, Alexander Bogdanov — the great Bolshevik revolutionary and progenitor of systems theory — argues that the recognition of this truth, the centrality of labor in the construction of reality and history, is vital both for the rising working class to develop the techniques necessary to successfully and permanently overthrow the international bourgeoisie, and for the construction of socialism. Bogdanov sketches out the development of the various regimes of labor, from early patriarchal communes through ancient commercial societies, feudalism and the bourgeois epoch, to the implicit socialist relations in the working-class movement. In each historical regime a different way of seeing and organizing the world predominates. In communal societies there is an authoritarian and personalist worldview which sees spirits hiding behind objects and manipulating them the same way the labor of the commune is guided by the wisdom of the elders and will of the leaders. Bogdanov also shows that in commercial societies, both ancient and modern, impersonal and abstract laws begin to govern affairs. The invisible hand of the market and “eternal” laws of Nature take hold of our imagination. This is not a linear process. The disconnected and warring fiefdoms of the feudal era represented a brief return to authoritarian communalism, but after the Black Death and severe social disruptions of the 14th through 18th century, the financial, merchant and artisan layers were able to gradually establish supremacy over the agricultural-militarist aristocracy.28  

While the trajectory of history has been from authoritarian relations to abstract relations, reaching its apogee under the rule of the bourgeoisie, both kinds of relations exist simultaneously and mutually reinforce one another. While a company appeals to “market necessity” when it lays off hundreds of employees, it also claims to be a family and demands strict obedience to the traditions and rules of the leadership. The abstract necessity of bourgeois natural laws are the foundation of Modernism. Instead of a process of active co-creation, evolution is framed as an inflexible, gradual and passive necessity. For all its talk of freedom, the bourgeois worldview hems its subjects into a cold and mechanical slavery to impersonal forces. But another kind of social relationship exists: comradely cooperation. This logic is also necessary for the preservation of society, for without organic mutual aid (which is often overseen by authoritarian churches and similar organizations), public welfare, and real personal ties of support, our society would devour itself. It is this ethic and worldview which is necessary to establish a world which is sustainable, just, and fulfilling. Through solidarity, cooperation and self-sacrifice for the higher cause of freedom we will establish the cooperative commonwealth — a commonwealth that must enmesh non-human life, both synthetic and organic. If we frame our understanding of the world in a modernist way we will be overtaken by our blind and obedient machine-servants. It is the choice to make life a race that prefigures the necessary result: we will lose it. Rather than play the bourgeois rat race, we have to take a lesson from Grey Walter’s tortoises. 

To develop a world where comradely cooperation can predominate, this world of antagonism and contradiction must be overcome. The ultimate antagonism created by the logic of capital accumulation, between the society of property and the mass of the propertyless it creates, between the master class and the dispossessed, must be resolved by revolution. Kenneth M. Stokes, an economist and philosopher who draws on the Soviet geologist Vladimir Vernadsky, argues that capitalism has become so naturalized that it acts as an “autonomous technosphere.” That is to say, like the biosphere which is composed of all organic life, capitalism has become a self-moving geological force that uses us as its substrate.29 It utilizes social antagonism to create islands of order and homeostasis, that perpetuate it while externalizing entropy onto the environment and marginalized populations. In simple terms, capitalism perpetuates itself by giving a small part of the world stability and wealth while shifting costs like pollution, bad work conditions, and broken public services onto others. Capitalism treats inputs as neutral; it doesn’t care if profit comes from turning a rainforest into toothpicks or if it comes from harvesting the organs of colonized children. It treats the environment as something separate from society so that it can be a resource to exploit. 

Liberal environmentalism, and even much radical environmentalism, accepts this premise but just changes the value judgments about it. There is an alternative. If, through working-class revolution, humanity is able to smash the homeostasis through which the technosphere is embodied, then we can establish a new geological force: the noosphere.30 The noosphere, consciousness as a geological force, would transform the whole planet into a homeostat. Rather than treating Nature as an external object to be exploited, or an Other to subordinate oneself to, it would be treated as our inorganic body. Self-control and other classical Republican virtues will become the rule of the day and the whole planet will be our sacred Polis. In other words, communism will create the conditions for true flourishing and the free association of producers –  be they organic or synthetic. 

 

Historiography Wars: The French Revolution

Historiographical debates around the French Revolution are ultimately political debates, not just debates about the facts. Donald Parkinson argues for revitalizing the tradition of the social historians against the new revisionist orthodoxy. 

Burning The Royal Carriages At the Chateau D’Eu by Nathaniel Currier

Debates about historical events are proxies for struggles over how to run the world, how to change the world, and whether the world should even be changed. This holds true most of all for revolutions, the French Revolution being a prime exemplar. When we look at the history of the French Revolution, we see not merely a disputation over facts but a debate about their interpretation, one which is thoroughly political, not merely academic. This is a dispute that is ideologically loaded and related to greater trends in political (and therefore class) conflict. The debates about the meaning of the French Revolution do not stand outside of history; they are expressions of greater conflicts –  republicanism against monarchism, socialism and communism against capitalism, and the true meaning of democracy. We can never assume that when scholars discuss the French Revolution they are engaged in an ideologically neutral exercise of fact-finding; that work is long done. When one portrays the French Revolution as an outpouring of chaotic mob violence or as the product of greater historical process of class struggle they are elaborating a political agenda, consciously or unconsciously. History is a partisan struggle, the construction of narratives to frame significant events is a terrain of this struggle. 

Beginning the Historiographical Battle  

The historiography of the French Revolution goes back to before the closing of the revolutionary period. Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France was a response to revolutionary events that was conservative and skeptical, mostly condemning the revolution as a pointless excess. On the other side of this political divide, between monarchism and revolutionary republicanism, was Thomas Paine’s The Rights Of Man, which celebrated the democratic and republican aims of the revolution. Burke would inspire the likes of Catholic reactionary Joseph De Maistre, who saw the revolution as the bloody and chaotic result of Enlightenment ideology undermining the divine right of Kings. Following De Maistre was another Catholic reactionary, Augustin Barruel, a Jesuit priest who promoted the idea of the revolution as a plot of the Freemasons and Illuminati and invented the modern conspiracy theory.  Throughout the nineteenth century historians such as Michelet1, Guizot2 and Thiers3 would follow while building upon the tradition of Paine that saw the revolution as a triumph of the bourgeoisie (or third estate) and their values of democratic-republicanism. François Aulard, the first professional historian of the revolution, would solidify this interpretation with his multi-volume works written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The notion that the class which benefited most from the revolution was a progressive bourgeoisie that represented Enlightenment values was at the core of these republican historians and served as a predecessor to the Marxist argument that the revolution was a bourgeois revolution. It is this claim that would be the centerpiece of debates in the future historiography. 

We can see from the aforementioned examples that a political battle was already being fought within the historiography of the French Revolution. On one end were those who sought to defend the revolution as open new vistas of human potential, in turn espousing Enlightenment values of progress and humanism where reason would lead the way to expand freedom and liberty. On the other end were a decadent ruling aristocracy and the Catholic clergy, who saw the revolution as at best an unfortunate excess inspired by the flaws of Enlightenment ideology, at worst a Satanic punishment for the sins of man. These conflicts in the writing of history were related to a greater conflict in the nineteenth century between the forces of republicanism and the forces of monarchism. As we shall see this historiographical divide was a predecessor to the politicized historiographical debates of the twentieth century between the Marxist historians and the revisionist historians, defending the necessity of socialist revolution and the legitimacy of the capitalist order respectively.4 

Execution of Louis XVI by Carnavalet

Marxism Enters the Stage 

The development of the first mass socialist parties and the rise of a Marxist intellectual culture associated with these parties created a whole new school of thought on the French Revolution. The thought of Karl Marx was central to these parties, and would, therefore, be central to a new generation of writers and historians who apply his theories to understanding the French Revolution. Marx’s own views on the French Revolution were a synthesis of the critiques of the limits of the revolution made by early Communists such as Babeuf, Buonarroti and Moses Hess as well as the aforementioned Republican historians such as Guizot and Thiers.5 However, the most important contribution from Marx towards the historiography in question was his theory of historical materialism, which aimed to understand social development as a dynamic process fueled by class struggle. This theoretical framework would have more influence on future historians of the revolution than any of his scattered comments on the event itself. Most importantly, Marx’s thought was energized by a revolutionary politics that aimed to continue the work of the French Revolution, while also transcending it. His understanding of the revolution as a bourgeois revolution was a greater statement about revolutions and class struggle as the locomotive of history, not a mere scholarly claim. To quote Michael Löwy: 

Naturally, this analysis of the—ultimately—bourgeois character of the French Revolution was not an exercise in academic historiography: it had a precise political objective. In demystifying 1789, its aim was to show the necessity of a new revolution, the social revolution—the one Marx spoke of in 1844 as ‘human emancipation’ (by contrast with merely political emancipation) and in 1846 as the Communist revolution.6

With the intellectual breakthrough of Karl Marx, a new development in the historiography of the French Revolution would begin. A new school was in formation, one which would be known as the social interpretation. A groundbreaking work in the formation of this school was A Socialist History of the French Revolution by Jean Jaurès, one of the most prominent leaders of French socialism. Jaurès’ work was not only a work of scholarship but also a politically motivated work, one that aimed to ”recount the events that occurred between 1789 and the end of the nineteenth century from the socialist point of view for the benefit of the common people, workers, and peasants.”7 Jaurès oriented his own politics around the heritage of the French Revolution, aiming to combine its republican nationalism with the socialist ideal. He framed his politics around the French Revolution and told socialists that they were the true inheritors of its legacy. 

Jaurès’ approach to the revolution was that it was an “immense and admirably fertile event” that “signified the political advent of the bourgeois class” and “gradually set the scene for a new social crisis, a new and more profound revolution by which the proletariat would seize power in order to transform property and morality.”8 Robespierre and the Jacobins were heroes, Jaurès siding with them even when they clashed with the plebian classes because of the historical necessity of the bourgeoisie’s triumph. In some senses Jaurès oversimplified events: the revolution unfolded smoothly as if the sole cause was the economic development of the bourgeoisie. Regardless of weaknesses, his work was groundbreaking, providing the first comprehensive history of the revolution within a Marxist framework.

Jaurès used the legacy of the French Revolution to defend the politics of the Second International. Albert Mathiez, a French author writing in the years following the Russian Revolution, would turn to this legacy to defend Bolshevism and claim Lenin’s party as the inheritors of the Jacobin project. Lenin himself appealed to the legacy of the Jacobins, saying 

Bourgeois historians see Jacobinism as a fall (“to stoop”). Proletarian historians see Jacobinism as one of the highest peaks in the emancipation struggle of an oppressed class. The Jacobins gave France the best models of a democratic revolution and of resistance to a coalition of monarchs against a republic…“Jacobinism” in Europe or on the boundary line between Europe and Asia in the twentieth century would be the rule of the revolutionary class, of the proletariat, which, supported by the peasant poor and taking advantage of the existing material basis for advancing to socialism, could not only provide all the great, ineradicable, unforgettable things provided by the Jacobins in the eighteenth century, but bring about a lasting world-wide victory for the working people.9

While Jaurès saw the revolution as unfolding smoothly according to economic causes, Mathiez emphasized violence and sudden ruptural changes. One can see these differences as an expression of political divergences, Jaurès having a more reformist temperament and Mathiez being more of a militant insurrectionary inspired by the Bolsheviks. A key part of Mathiez’s writings on the revolution was the defence of the Jacobins’ use of terror, which was a rational response to issues forced upon the Jacobins by the logic of revolution. The Committee of Public Safety, said Mathiez, was “urged on by irresistible necessities…In fact these men had the dictatorship forced upon them. They neither desired or foresaw it.”10 Mathiez would directly compare the dictatorships of the Bolsheviks with the Jacobins, stating 

The origin and the strength of both dictatorships was drawn from the population of the cities, and in particular the capital. The Montagnard’ fortress was in Paris in the popular sections composed of artisans; the Bolshevists recruit their Red Guard from among the workers in the factories of Petrograd.11

In defending the Reign of Terror as something imposed by the necessity of revolution, as well as defending the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolution in line with Marx, Mathiez was, in turn, defending the tactics used by Bolshevism. He was using history as a partisan in an ideological struggle, defending the necessity of revolution for social progress with all the violent difficulties that came with it. Along with Jaurès, Mathiez was helping to form a historical school that was not only based on defending the cause of the proletariat but also was oriented around a Marxist theory of history which saw the revolution as part of a grander historical scheme centered around class struggle and changing modes of production. In doing so they set the stage for the social interpretation of the French Revolution, the interpretation that would come to be the historical orthodoxy despite its radical origins. 

The storming of the Bastille

The Social Interpretation 

The actual break between the social interpretation and its earlier Marxist predecessors is ultimately not an immense one. Jaurès and Mathiez created the basic groundwork and later historians would build upon it to form the official canon that became hegemonic in the French academy. The primary difference was one of depth and academic acclaim. It was Georges Lefebvre who would take the earlier Marxist historians and develop their work into what is known as the social interpretation. Lefebvre held a position of influence in the academy, having been named the Chair of the History of the French Revolution at the Sorbonne. Using this position of influence he was able to cement into historical orthodoxy an essential Marxist interpretation which focused on history as a process of class struggle. Yet from reading Lefebvre one gets a sense that he aimed to distance his approach from Marxism to gain acceptability in the halls of academia. He avoided its precise jargon (words such as “mode of production” or “proletariat”) while maintaining its core principles in his analysis. One of these core principles was the concept of bourgeois revolution, centered in the interpretation of Marx himself and the earlier Marxist historians. However, Lefebvre would avoid making his allegiance to Marxism stand at the forefront of his work. While Lefebre did not represent much of a break from the earlier Marxist historians, his work was able to appeal to historians who would have otherwise dismissed Marxism. This was not because of the lack of Marxist jargon in his work. Lefebvre’s innovations mostly came in his ability to pioneer what is today known as “history from below”, an approach to history that focused on the daily life and popular attitudes of everyday people. 

Lefebvre’s first work was the 1924 monograph The Northern Peasants During the French Revolution, possibly the first account of the French Revolution that focused specifically on the peasantry. In 1932 came his work The Great Fear of 1789, focusing on the violent hysteria that swept the French countryside at the beginning of the revolution. While earlier Marxist approaches focused on the importance of class, Lefebvre put a magnifying glass to the actual activity of these classes on the ground. He also aimed to elaborate a more comprehensive account of all the different classes in the revolution, not simply the bourgeoisie. His 1939 book The Coming of the French Revolution presented the revolution as more than a mere political revolution, but as a social revolution having four separate components: the aristocratic revolution, the bourgeois revolution, the popular revolution, and the peasant revolution. Lefebvre’s account still centered a rising bourgeoisie and an aristocracy in decline, the bourgeoisie having gradually developed economic power in the interstices of a society based primarily on landed property owned by the nobility. Yet the key to the power of this rising bourgeoisie was the insurgent plebian classes. Lefebvre’s focus on the peasantry showed the crucial role they played in challenging absolutism, documenting the war they waged on a system of seigneurial dues that formed the backbone of the old feudal order. In Lefebvre’s social interpretation, class struggle is a historical category of analysis that made the separate events of the revolution flow into a coherent narrative which could explain its deeper objective causes as well as the historical significance of its outcome, which was not a mere political regime change but social and economic in scope.12 In the last instance, the cause of the revolution was found in greater historical forces that extended beyond the control of its participants. Despite this source of causality in deeper material processes, Lefebvre’s writing gave life to the actions of the everyday people who made revolution. His narrative was not a mechanical and lifeless movement of expanding productive forces necessitating society to meet the needs of development. Instead, Lefebvre illustrated the movement of impersonal historical forces with the habits and consciousness of peasants, artisans, and workers as they struggled against a system of privilege and exploitation. 

Albert Soboul’s work would continue the social interpretation pioneered by Lefebvre, expanding Lefebvre’s studies of popular movements both in the city and countryside. His contributions are well represented by the 1965 book A Short History of the French Revolution. Unlike Lefebvre, Soboul used explicitly Marxist terminology (mode of production, relations of production, proletariat, ect), working more directly in continuity with Jaurès and Mathiez.13 At the core of his analysis was the complexity of interactions between classes and political groups. Radical democratic aspects of the revolution meant that the interventions of the exploited classes could shape events in ways that could be to the benefit or detriment of the bourgeoisie and even the development of capitalism.  According to Soboul, it was the masses of peasants, petty producers, artisans, and other urban workers rather than the bourgeoisie that would be the real social force that drove the revolution forward and “dealt the gravest blows to the old order of society”.14 While this interpretation was not original after the work of Lefebvre, Soboul wrote about the revolution within an explicitly Marxist framework. Where Lefebvre’s studies focused on the peasantry, Soboul would give a similar treatment to the Sans-Culottes, who would stand at the center of his 1968 work titled after these militant urban workers.15 Yet Soboul also reaffirmed that the revolution was a product of objective historical forces that were beyond the control of individual actors. 

Central to the framework of the social interpretation is the theory of bourgeois revolution. This theory holds that the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by revolutions in which the bourgeoisie would seize political power after gradually developing an economic base within the confines of feudal society. In Lefebvre’s account, the revolution was one of  “established harmony between fact and law,” with the bourgeoisie overthrowing the absolutist state obstructing their full ascendence as a class and hence the flowering of capitalist development.16 For Soboul, the roots of the revolution go back as far as the tenth century with the revival of commerce and handicraft production, forms of wealth that were personal and movable. The bourgeoisie gradually developed greater amounts of power within the confines of the feudal order, the development of colonial empires and royal finance contributing to their rise. By the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie is presented as having a leading role not only in commerce, industry, and finance but the administration of the state as well. Yet to fully ascend to power, the remnants of feudalism and the absolutist state that stood in the way of this rising bourgeoisie would have to be overthrown through revolution.17 Soboul’s interpretation is almost identical to how Marx describes the bourgeois revolution in the Communist Manifesto:

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.18

Within the social interpretation of the revolution, there is a sense that the revolution was in a way inevitable, a product of the unfolding of greater impersonal historical forces. This is not to say that Lefebvre and Soboul gave no sense of agency to historical actors. Their work greatly emphasized the role that the popular classes played in moving the revolution forward, often against the will of an anxious bourgeoisie. Yet at the core of this interpretation is the notion that historical events have causality in broader socio-economic factors outside the control of individuals. It is an interpretation that fits within a greater theoretical schema where history is a sequence of modes of production, with transitions between them marked by decisive class struggles, struggles in turn conditioned by the development of productive forces. History has a greater logic to it and is not merely a random sequence of events with no continuity. Nor is it without any contingency. Yet contingency is always limited: human actors make decisions within the limits of events and economic forces beyond their own control. And even these decisions are not made without conditioning from that which came before. Hungarian Marxist György Lukács described this dialectic of structure and contingency in Marxism, where history 

is no longer an enigmatic flux to which men and things are subjected. It is no longer a thing to be explained by the intervention of transcendental powers or made meaningful by reference to transcendental values. History is, on the one hand, the product (albeit the unconscious one) of man’s own activity, on the other hand it is the succession of those processes in which the forms taken by this activity and the relation of man to himself (to nature, to other men) are overthrown.19

The promise provided by such a theory of history is that by understanding the broader socio-economic conditions that drive history we can then collectively act to change history to better the condition of humanity, in the same way a scientist develops their understanding of natural laws through experimentation and uses this understanding to invent new techniques and technologies to transform nature to meet our needs.  The understanding of history utilized by the social historians was not simply an analytical tool but promised to humanity the potential for a better future. Events such as the French Revolution signaled the possibility of building a new society informed by a scientific yet partisan understanding of history.  

Zenith of French Glory by James Gillray

First Wave of Revisionism

French historians like Lefebvre and Soboul were able to establish the hegemony of the Marxist social interpretation in the academy in a world where the Cold War raged between the Eastern Bloc and NATO. Alongside this military struggle between global camps was an ideological struggle in the academy. Hence this period was one of intellectual works like Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, which linked the totalizing theory of history espoused by Marxists with totalitarian politics. To disprove Marxism was to weaken the intellectual credentials of Communism and weaken its hold amongst intellectuals. To dethrone the social interpretation from hegemony in the academy was, therefore, part of this ideological struggle. It is in this context that we must understand the attacks on the social interpretation of the French Revolution.   

The social interpretation would first be challenged by Anglo-American historian Alfred Cobban. Cobban’s book The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (1964) is primarily an attack on the Marxist narrative of the revolution rather than a historical work that breaks any ground in research. His book was a rupture in the historiography of the revolution, breaking ground for what would be known as revisionism. Revisionism would eventually take the social interpretation’s place as the prevailing orthodoxy, but first, it would have to demolish the entire foundation that the social interpretation sat upon. This meant attacking the theoretical foundations of the social interpretation: Marxism. For Cobban, Marxism is essentially a religious ideology, because it aims to provide purpose and meaning to human existence. Yet he goes further than rejecting only Marxism, arguing that any kind of sociological theory cannot be mixed with history without providing results that are biased in favor of the given theory. In Cobban’s view, Marxism essentially blinded historians like Lefebvre and Soboul from the facts in front of their own eyes by forcing them into the confines of a particular sociological theory.20 This is similar to Karl Popper’s critique of Marxism as a totalizing worldview that forces facts into a grand historical schema instead of emphasizing skepticism and empiricism. Rather than understanding the French Revolution as an expression of broader historical patterns, Cobban embraced narrow Anglo-Saxon empiricism where the facts essentially spoke for themselves. By looking at the surface appearance of events without connecting them to the broader movement of history Cobban hoped to deal a major blow to the dominant Marxist-influenced interpretations. 

The theory of bourgeois revolution was the main target of Cobban’s attack. As noted earlier, the theory of bourgeois revolution placed the French Revolution in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, with the revolution as a breaking point in that transition in which the bourgeoise established political dominance and destroyed the absolutist state that was a barrier to capitalist development. Cobban would take the opposite approach, claiming that the revolution was in fact against capitalism and ultimately blocked its development. In this interpretation, the mass revolts of the revolution were primarily against the coming of a newer capitalist order, rather than a revolt against the remnants of feudalism. There was instead a step backward rather than a step forward, with France still a primarily agrarian society after the revolution.21 One of the ways he makes this argument is by ironically drawing from Lefebvre’s own work, particularly his Études Orléanaises study. Using this study, Cobban would argue that the majority of grievances recorded were complaints aimed at the growing commercialization of the countryside rather than the old feudal order. Cited examples showed hatred of large farmers, peasants incapable of attaining ownership of plots having to sell themselves into wage-servitude, and resentment towards financiers.22 By drawing from Lefebvre’s work, Cobban aims to make a specific point: that it was not the facts themselves that Lefebvre got wrong, but that his adherence to the Marxist theory of bourgeois revolution caused him to force the facts into a theoretical schema that contradicted them. Another important argument found in The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution was that the revolution was not itself led by a bourgeoisie which engaged in either commercial wealth or employing waged labor but was rather composed mostly of professionals. Cobban used this to argue that class categories were simply not applicable to the revolution, as all the different groups were purely political and not connected to definable class interests.23

Cobban would also argue that whatever type of society existed in ancien régime France could not be described as feudalism. While not putting forward an alternative of how to categorize the social formation in France at the time, Cobban makes the point that seigniorial rights were alienable and were able to come into the possession of non-noble hands. Hence ownership of land and the ability to extract seigniorial dues was dissociated from the status of nobility.24 Colin Lucas’ article Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution (1973) would add to the arguments accumulating against the social interpretation, claiming that there was, in fact, no real difference between bourgeoisie and nobility in late eighteenth-century France. Instead, the two essentially formed a homogenous ruling class. In Lucas’ view, the bourgeoisie could not even be differentiated from the nobility by their investment patterns, which were primarily motivated by social status rather than the profit motive.25 For the historian William Doyle, who contributed to the revisionist interpretations with his 1980 book Origins of the French Revolution, the revisionist school had changed the parameters of the discussion, but it was still unclear how and why the revolution came about.26 What united the Anglo-American revisionist historians was primarily a negation of the existing orthodox historiography, rather than any positive alternative theory that sought to explain the objective causes of revolutionary events. Through a methodology of positivism that was in line with other Cold War attacks on Marxism, the beginnings of a revisionist school were formed.  

Furet and the New Revisionist Orthodoxy

François Furet would bring revisionism to Paris itself to do battle with the adherents of the still dominant social interpretation. The work of Furet coincided with a greater trend of anti-communism in the French intelligentsia, coinciding with the New Philosophers like Bernard-Henri Lévy. Like many of the New Philosophers, Furet was an ex-Communist who made no secret of his distaste for Marxism. His attacks on the social interpretation of the French Revolution were politically charged and portrayed the revolution as the beginning of ‘totalitarian’ regimes like Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, a sort of historical complement to philosophical arguments made by the New Philosophers. This rise of intellectual anti-communism coincided with the decline of the USSR as well as revelations of the horrors of Stalinism from Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago. The general mood of this intellectual conservatism can be summarized by Bernard-Henri Lévy’s statement that “We never will again remake the world, but at least we can stay on guard to see that it is not unmade.”27  Before Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history, Parisian historians and philosophers were anxious to see that such a situation came about. Such developments would lead Perry Anderson to proclaim Paris as the “Capital of European Reaction.”28 

It was in this intellectual climate where Furet would negate the dominance of the social interpretation to create a new revisionist doctrine that would stand as the new prevailing orthodoxy, asserting that the revolution was not social and economic but purely political. In his book Interpreting the French Revolution Furet argued for placing an emphasis on subjectivity and ideology as opposed to objective social forces to explain the flow of revolutionary events. The degeneration of Bolshevism for Furet meant that a fresh perspective could be developed on the history of the revolution, where it was to be seen “not in terms of causes and consequence” but rather as the invention of a “new political discourse”. Rather than seeing history as a chain of cause and effect with events as a consequence of those prior, Furet saw history as essentially random, only given meaning by discourse.29 Furthermore, history was not a process based on an inevitable process of linear progress. In fact, it made no sense to talk of progress at all, only successive forms of domination and irregular explosions of rebellion. In this sense, Furet shared commonalities with another contemporary French philosopher, Michel Foucault. 

For inspiration Furet would look towards Alexis de Tocqueville and Augustin Cochin, constructing a historiographical tradition in opposition to that of the social historians. From Tocqueville, Furet took the idea that there was a continuity between the centralized absolutist state structure and the state that resulted from the revolution; the revolution was essentially an expression of a process of state centralization. This idea of continuity was seen as an antidote to the idea that the revolution was a radical break from the feudal to capitalist era, with the revolutionaries believing themselves to be ushering in an era of bourgeois liberty and economic progress. Furet also used Tocqueville to argue that proponents of the social interpretation and the theory of bourgeois revolution made the mistake of taking revolutionary leaders at their word, claiming there was a discrepancy between their objective historical role and their subjective perception of it.30

While Tocqueville stressed continuity, Augustin Cochin emphasized what Furet would call “the explosive character of the event” that was fueled by the internal dynamic of the revolutionary movement.31 Cochin was a Catholic traditionalist who wrote in the late nineteenth century and detested Jacobinism but obsessively sought to understand it. He interpreted it as a result of a growing “philosophical society” which came to political power to replace a collapsing system of corporate bodies. While the ancien régime state was based on corporate bodies which expressed particular interest groups, the “philosophical society” which came into power wished to create an order based on the general will of all individuals in society. These atomized individuals could form no general will according to Cochin, so the result was a centralization of power into the hands of the “philosophical society” which led a dictatorship in the name of a fictitious “people”.32 Furet takes from Cochin a focus on revolutionary ideology. The revolution ultimately formed an “ideocracy”, which in attempting to legitimate a new social order based on the sovereignty of the nation had to “compose a new society by excisions and exclusions…to designate and personalize the powers of evil”.33

From these authors, Furet created a synthesis that can be seen constituting the new revisionist orthodoxy. Whereas the Marxist-inspired social interpretation would focus on the objective social dynamics of class struggle that fueled the revolution, for Furet and many historians after him the subjective ideological discourse of revolutionaries was the main factor conditioning the outcome of events. A continuous process of state centralization that began with the ancien régime gave unprecedented state power to a small group of people, but there was also a radical break from the past in terms of political ideology. The socio-economic causes were of little importance for Furet, as the revolution was a purely political event.  To compare schools of historiography, the social historian Soboul viewed the Reign of Terror as a product of external and internal pressures of counter-revolution and the class struggles of the Sans-Culottes against grain speculation. Furet, on the other hand, argued that the terror flowed from the very political discourse of the revolution itself, which aimed to construct a “people’s will” through a unity based on the violent exclusion of the nobility. Furet’s ideas not only fell in line with a general pessimism about popular social change but also a general change in prevailing historical methodology with the rise of the “cultural turn” and post-structuralism.  

Under the guise of attacking teleology in Marxism, Furet instead created a new type of determinism, one based on the predominance of ideas rather than economics. If necessity and contingency exist as a dialectic for Marxist theory, for Furet the two exist in a crude opposition, with contingency being absolute. Rather than class struggle structured by relations and forces of production, the revolution flowed according to a linguistic discourse. Furet saw events like the storming of the Bastille and the Reign of Terror as random acts of spontaneity with no real basis in economic forces. Rather than an objective social force that structured history, class struggle was merely a linguistic discourse of revolutionaries applied to events that could take on a life of its own. By emphasizing discourse as a determinant, Furet was taking aim at philosophers who believed they could change the world by blaming their ideas on the violence of the revolution. And by emphasizing continuity with the old regime and dispelling the notion of bourgeois revolution, Furet was proclaiming that all of the violence of the revolution was unnecessary for the development of modernity. This is a philosophy of history devoid of possibility, which in the name of contingency against crude determinism actually consigns humanity to quietism, condemning any possibility of consciously understanding history and changing it for the better. 

Furet set the stage for a new orthodoxy to replace the old ways of the social interpretation. This was one that focused on culture rather than economics and class, avoiding any kind of teleology in favor of focusing on how people interpreted events. The “cultural turn” in history became the new norm and Marxism was more and more ‘discredited’ as the Soviet Union collapsed. A paradigm shift had occurred in history, but it was a kind of paradigm shift that would deny itself as progressive because it denies the notion of progress as too teleological. Authors focused on subjective public imagination instead of looking at any broader framework of determinism and causality. An example is author Lynn Hunt, whose Family Romance of the French Revolution utilized the work of Freud to look at how revolutionary writers visualized the absolutist order in terms of patriarchal authority, using familial metaphors to comprehend the revolt against the ancien régime as a revolt against the father.34 Another author who exemplified the cultural turn was Joan Landes, author of Visualizing the Nation. Landes focused on material culture to examine how gendered representations of bodies were used in popular artwork to link individuals to new identities of citizen and nation, with gendered imagery being used in a negative sense to delegitimize monarchy and define the enemy, as well as in a positive sense to define national values such as liberty, equality, nature, and truth. By personalizing the nation through gendered imagery, popular arts were able to create an emotional attachment to an abstract national identity.35 Furet’s focus on discourse and repudiation of objective economic causality opened the door for historians to focus instead on identity formation, subjectivity, and culture. There is no doubt interesting work done in this new paradigm. Yet something was lost in the desire to break down the old ways of social history: a sense that the revolution had a greater meaning than those subjectively given to it in the process of history and the struggle for human freedom. 

Canvas Print from 1795

Responding to Revisionism 

A full and sufficient response to revisionism is outside the bounds of this essay and would take up a project of wider scope. Yet to not address some of the arguments of the revisionists directly would be a simple appeal to negative ideological implications. Therefore in this section, a basic defense of the social history of the French Revolution will be asserted. This does not mean undertaking a defense of Lebevre’s and Soboul’s exact understanding of the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolutionit is unlikely that after decades of historical debate and inquiry, their interpretations wouldn’t need to be updated and refined. Instead, what is needed to adequately address the claims of revisionism is a defense of the social interpretation’s general understanding of the revolution as a class struggle, rooted in the class structure of French society, and also the category of bourgeois revolution and the applicability of this category to the French Revolution. To begin addressing these questions, we will need to look at the system of French absolutism and its class contradictions. 

The developmental path of French absolutism must be understood in comparison with England. In England, the crisis of feudalism in the fourteenth century led to the development of a middle peasantry who began to engage in small-scale capitalist farming. In response, enterprising landlords began a process of enclosure on common lands and took up large-scale capitalist farming, with peasants forced to either sell their labor or join this new class of agrarian capitalists.36 By the seventeenth century, capitalism was growing in the interstices of English society and the English revolution created a state fit for the rule of this capitalist class. By the end of the eighteenth century, England dominated Europe and set the pace of international competition. This process very much followed the ideal type of a bourgeois revolution, where a capitalist class grew inside a feudal framework and waged a revolutionary struggle to bring the state into harmony with the economy. 

France saw a divergent path of development. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, peasant communities were able to empower themselves to secure claims over common lands and heritability rights over tenures, enlarging their holdings by marketing surpluses. But just as this middle peasant class began to develop, they were squeezed out of existence by rising rents from landlords, who were slowly becoming impoverished and reasserted their seigneurial rights.37 While the French peasantry, unlike the English, were able to hold onto their traditional land rights, this meant they were in a position where landlords could use rent-squeezing to extract surplus. As a result, there was little incentive for both peasants and landlords to invest in improvements and engage in capitalist farming like they did in England. A peasantry now being squeezed of surplus revolted—for example, the Croquants rebellion in the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century, in which peasants appealed to the king to protect them from the unhindered exploitation of landlords.38 

It was from this dynamic of peasants appealing to the king for protection from seigneurial exploitation that the absolutist state developed. Preferring “royal authority to social anarchy”39 meant that lords were willing to tolerate the rise of the Bourbon monarchy as a lesser evil to outright destruction of the feudal order. Absolutism rose as a centralizing institution, providing peasants with a barrier to the harshest possible exploitation from local lords. Yet it also maintained the system of tributary domination, revamping it with a more consolidated and centralized state apparatus.40 The Crown needed to be able to tax the peasantry for income and therefore saw it in its interest to protect peasant property. Yet to fund this state apparatus it was necessary to tax the peasantry alongside the rents they paid to the nobility. To keep the nobility satisfied, the crown allowed a portion of the tax extracted to be shared with them through the selling of offices, which developed a massive bureaucracy to maintain their loyalty. While royal officials would often side with peasants in disputes, they nonetheless placed a burden upon the peasantry. Absolutism, regardless of its origins as a protector of the peasant, pushed the peasant down into poverty through taxation, preventing the emergence of a middle peasantry and therefore the development of endogenous capitalism.41 

From this portrayal of absolutist France, we can see that the critics of the social interpretation had a point: that the notion of an endogenous capitalist class developing within the feudal order, attaining class consciousness as a bourgeoisie, and throwing off the shackles of feudalism is not accurate. Because of the lack of a dynamic of class differentiation in the countryside, a bourgeois class did not form in France that was capable of uniting and leading a revolution according to its own class interests. Yet this should only discredit the notion of bourgeois revolution if we accept the most simplistic understanding of the concept, where a fully conscious bourgeoisie makes revolution and establishes capitalism, in a smooth and linear process. But what if we understand bourgeois revolution not just as an event, but also as a longer uneven process in history, one which contains simultaneous progress and setbacks? 

Regarding the lack of a coherent bourgeoisie in France before the revolution, it is important to point out that a bourgeois revolution need not be led by the bourgeoisie. This was pointed out by many Marxists, including Lenin and Trotsky, who saw the Russian bourgeoisie as too weak and conservative to wage a struggle against absolutism. Because the embryonic bourgeoisie in France was too tied to the absolutist order, it would fall to the popular classes under the leadership of professionals (Robespierre was a lawyer). In fact, neither Soboul nor Lefebvre argued that the commercial bourgeoisie spearheaded the revolution, even though they did tend to underplay how much the bourgeoisie was integrated into the absolutist order. A key part of the revolution, and the one that dealt the greatest blow to the old order, as pointed out by Lefebvre, was the revolt of the peasantry against seigneurial dues. Rather than a self-conscious bourgeois subject coming to power and proclaiming a fully formed capitalist system, bourgeois revolution is better understood as a process in which the old feudal order is negated through class struggle and a state order is established that provides the framework through which capitalism can develop.42 When it is the feudal ancien régime that stands as a barrier to the development of capitalism, then it is through the class struggle of the classes exploited by this order that these barriers are weakened. Because of the role of class struggle in this process, it makes no sense to speak of a “purely political” revolution as Furet does. 

The effect of the French Revolution on the development of capitalism was contradictory. The social historians tended to focus on the revolution as opening the way for capitalism, downplaying the ways by which it delayed capitalist development. On the other hand, revisionists like Cobban argued that the revolution was purely negative for the development of capitalism and perhaps set it back. The truth was that its relation to capitalist development was contradictory. The revolution’s blow to seigneurial tribute on the peasantry meant the removal of economic burdens on them, which allowed them to risk investing in greater specialization, paving the way for the development of polyculture.43 The privileges of nobles had been abolished and a republican form of rule was established, taking the state out of the hands of the church. A unified national market was formed, with feudal barriers to internal trade removed. Yet at the same time, the peasantry’s traditional land ownership rights were strengthened, preventing the dissolution of the peasant community into capitalist farmers and wage laborers.44 This was the key contradiction of the revolution: through the mobilization of the peasantry the old feudal order was weakened, yet this mobilization simultaneously strengthened the peasant and delayed the development of capitalism in France. 

While it could be argued that the strengthening of peasant land ownership makes it misleading to call the French Revolution bourgeois, this only makes sense if one sees history as a linear process without contradiction. It makes more sense to see the bourgeois revolution as a process, one for which the French Revolution was a particular breakthrough. Another way to look at it is by focusing on the degeneration of the revolution into Bonapartism. Because of the incoherence of the bourgeoisie in France, this class was incapable of ruling as a class. Neither was the proletariat, existing too only in an embryonic form, or the peasantry, incapable of forming their own institutions and thus representing themselves. Therefore, as Marx would later comment regarding the degeneration of the 1848 revolution, the peasantry had to be represented. The result was the regime of Napoleon, a representative who “must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority over them…that protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above.”45 Rather than breaking through to the full rule of the bourgeoisie, the balance of classes in France led to the formation of what Marx would call Bonapartism, after its helmsman who stood as arbiter between the classes yet affirmed the state as a state for itself. This represented the maintenance of many of the revolution’s gains, but also a step back towards absolutism, eventually leading to a restoration of the monarchy. While this may complicate the social historians’ narrative of a clear-cut bourgeois revolution with no complications, it by no means entails abandoning their model of class analysis to capture these nuances.   

Revolutions are complex events, composed of contesting classes that bring their own interests into play, and these classes are themselves divided into various factions. It is often in the process of revolutions that classes develop their own ideologies and self-understanding, producing a political program to express their social interests. The French Revolution saw the creation of groundbreaking forms of bourgeois political rule even if it did not see the creation of the bourgeois economy in its ideal form. It saw the creation of a democratic-republic that was short-lived, yet set a standard for all revolutionary democrats to aim for. Popular movements that were groundbreaking in their radicalism formed and mobilized on a mass scale. Even if the rise of the bourgeoisie takes on central importance to the narrative, the French Revolution is not reducible to a bourgeois revolution alone. For example, the urban class struggles of Sans-Culottes, the radicalism of the Enragés, and Gracchus Babeuf’s Conspiracy of Equals point to a future socialist movement, suggesting a world beyond bourgeois right. Yet in the grand historical scheme, there is a class that ultimately wins out and benefits the most. In the case of the French Revolution, we can say that this class was the bourgeoisie. The revolution paved the way for the social and political ascension of this class, not just in France, but worldwide.

French educational card depicting the Jacobin Club

Conclusion

The revisionist turn cannot be separated from its deeper political implications, its aim to deemphasize the idea that history can be understood in terms of class struggle, or that history is even intelligible as something which contains progress; it posits instead that history is simply a series of power discourses, in which relations of domination are merely shifted in different ways. While the revisionists may have pointed out some flaws in the works of the social historians, these flaws are not sufficient enough to abandon an understanding of the French Revolution in terms of class conflict. Clearly, the complexity of the French Revolution means that we cannot simply view it in terms of a binary conflict, bourgeois versus feudal. Yet the alternative of revisionists is to simply make the revolution irrational, a sort of freak accident with no deeper causation in history. In this world, we can only understand the rioting of peasants and the conflicts between artisans and speculators as a sort of irrational mob violence inspired by ideology run amok and demagogic intellectuals, where instead there is class struggle undergirded by deeper class antagonisms. To the revisionist historian, these class struggles are just a pointless waste of human life without reason. The end results of the revolution are not to drive history forward, but merely to replace one set of rulers with another. There is neither progress nor regress, merely changing the culture and discourse of domination. This alternative understanding of the French Revolution was of great help to those who wished to see an end to revolutionary politics, and it is no surprise the most vocal exponent of it was Furet, and ex-Communist Cold Warrior like any other. If the French Revolution could be shown to have no relation to human progress, then there was no ground for revolution itself to have a potentially progressive role, unless it perhaps occurred in the most orderly way. It was a perfect historical reading of the past for the “end of history”. 

The response to the overturning of the social history of the French Revolution should not be to mindlessly cling to dogmas and dismiss the revisionist historians as bad actors. It would be a miracle if Lefebvre and Soboul got every detail of the French Revolution right, and there is no doubt that they could often follow a rigid Marxism. We must engage with the critics of Marxism and social history if we are to improve and ultimately fine-tune our own analysis. Yet even as a foil to contend with, revisionism is weak. As an alternative, the likes of Furet merely offer only confusion and cover for reactionary ideas. Historical studies that focus on revolutionary political culture may open new vistas of research, yet when unanchored by a materialist class analysis they are exercises in the hobbyistic study of antique aesthetics that tell us nothing about their greater meaning in history. Even if the idea of bourgeois revolution was completely discredited, it would be necessary to understand the French Revolution in terms of class struggle as a heroic episode in the narrative of human emancipation. It is this aspect of the social historians’ project that will always be relevant. The capitalist class today want us to see history as random events with no causality with no logic or sense of progress so that we resign any hope of becoming subjects of history that can change the world. The French Revolution is significant because it is exactly the opposite of resignation to the established flow of history as described by our rulers, a revolt against those hierarchies and dogmas said to be eternal in favor of a society based on the agency of humans. It is for this reason that the bourgeoisie hates Jacobinism rather than proclaiming it as part of their historical heritage. To quote Lenin: 

It is natural for the bourgeoisie to hate Jacobinism. It is natural for the petty bourgeoisie to dread it. The class-conscious workers and working people generally put their trust in the transfer of power to the revolutionary, oppressed class for that is the essence of Jacobinism, the only way out of the present crisis, and the only remedy for economic dislocation and the war.46

It no is surprise then that the historiography of the French Revolution has always been an ideological battle. The earliest disputes between the monarchists and republicans with a decaying aristocracy in the background foreshadowed the later debate between revisionists and social historians, debates that were informed by Cold War struggle between global camps of Soviet Communism and Western capitalism. Today, when our future history is uncertain, those who aim to struggle for a world beyond oppression and exploitation will also have to struggle over the meaning of the French Revolution.  

 

No Replacement For The Marxist Theory Of Revolution

Gabriel Radic argues that various attempts in academia to develop theories of revolution as alternatives to Marx’s theory of revolution and historical materialism only serve to disguise the centrality of class contradiction in these events. 

Landing of the French fleet in Santo Domingo following the revolutions of this island (1803)

Within the academic milieus of social scientific analysis and research, there is a peculiar tendency that seeks to reduce social phenomena to generic compartments which are invented and imposed on these phenomena. A handful of fitting historical examples are selectively chosen and sewn into a narrative that seeks to prove that the mechanisms of social existence can be scientifically observed, predicted, and calculated as if people were atoms. This attempt to quantify the dynamism of the human condition manifests itself in academic attempts to replace Marxism as a theory of revolution.

Asserting the primacy of any one historical or sociological factor in assessing every revolution or form of resistance while downplaying the importance of other critical elements is an act of ahistorical reductionism that has no place in the interdisciplinary study of revolutionary theory. Revolutions are borne from a multiplicity of factors relevant to the conditions of that society. Economic formations, ideological currents, and the rise and fall of institutional power all coalesce in differing environments that provide an impetus for resistance against hegemonic actors, and, on rare occasions, their overthrow.

To overcome the deficiencies of bourgeois analysis, it is imperative to use historical materialism as a tool for understanding historical development. Historical materialism is the methodology of Marxist historiography and views historical developments and all other phenomena in their totality and interconnectedness. Marxism accomplishes this by observing (not interpreting) how society materially produces and reproduces its own existence, and the ideological consequences rendered therefrom. It is superior to the nitpicking of historical phenomena by the pseudo-intellectual legions of academics who formulate vapid and transient theories that arise to prominence and fail the test of time within a generation.

Before briefly considering academic perspectives that fail to assess revolution in all its complexities, it is important to define our object of concern. These texts concern themselves with the terms ‘resistance’ and ‘revolution,’ concepts that, when taken as identical, are inexact and will lead to vague conclusions, if any. Let us set aside ‘resistance’ and focus on a precise form of revolution: social revolution. These revolutions, vis-à-vis political revolutions, not only affect the mass of society but arise from the masses themselves. The participation of the masses in the successful exoneration of their own existence leads to the most dramatic societal changes, as the grasping of their own destiny often animates the consciousness of disaffected souls the world over. The identification of the most important sociological and historical factors in successful social revolutions will occupy our considerations hereafter.

Of all the readings considered in this essay, with whatever brevity, only one addresses the near-ubiquitous deficiency of social science. Theda Skocpol, the author of States and Social Revolutions, puts forward a criticism of the incomprehensiveness of the social sciences, stating “analytic oversimplification cannot lead us toward valid, complete explanations of revolutions.” She then goes on to commit the same errors by focusing on merely three historical examples (despite having the space of a book with which to overcome this indolence).1 Nevertheless, the author correctly identifies the most important factor behind social revolutions and the underlying antagonism of human society since the inception of society itself: socioeconomic class.

It is necessary to briefly describe what class is and how class warfare operates under its most recent economic incarnation in order to properly evaluate the causality of successful social revolutions.

Class is the most important factor in social revolutions because to put it simply, it embodies all of society. People compose society and all participants of society fit into a class, no matter how the gradations of class are framed. Therefore the economy and all of the civic, religious, academic, etc. institutions arise from the activity of classes, of humankind.

Class is defined by the operations of economic forces; the class typology thereby defers to the essence of the economy in any given historical period: master and slave, lord and serf, employer and employee. Under capitalism, the array of classes of feudal and slave societies of the past are increasingly reduced to two camps, the proletariat and bourgeoisie, whose inherent, irredeemable incompatibility are exacerbated by the monopolization and cartelization of productive forces under the capitalist form. The latter bourgeois elements invariably consume one another until a protracted alliance of monopolies and cartels is globally established to ensure the perpetuation of bourgeois hegemony. Bourgeois precedence over the consolidation of industry is predicated on the material dispossession of the proletariat through the exploitation of their labor in vicious class warfare. At certain historical junctures, a variety of factors align that move the proletariat to exercise its power in an overwhelming display which lays siege to the order under which its existence is realized to no longer be tolerable. These factors are as follows: the widespread dispersion of class consciousness; the weakening or collapse of existing institutions of bourgeois power; and the strategic funneling of working-class power by an organized, revolutionary vanguard.

Theda Skocpol correctly identifies all successive theories of social revolutions as emerging from this Marxist framework of class warfare. These latter theories variously emphasize other properties and conditions of social revolution that appear prominently in selective case studies, such as psychology (aggregate-psychological theories), violence (systems/value consensus), and organized groups (political-conflict theories), all of which operate under an ideological umbrella of sorts.2 These pretending theories amount to a vulgarization of Marxism as they attempt to dissect and/or re-orient the reciprocal totality of the base and superstructure in favor of selective components of this totality. Skocpol also confuses the theory of class struggle through her creation of a false ambiguity between the bourgeoisie and the state, asserting that the latter is not necessarily a tool of the former, but an independent entity. This arbitrary demarcation partially undermines her methodology, as it is selectively exercised, in turn diminishing the scientific validity of her structuralist analysis.

While Skocpol’s works signaled the culmination of the third generation of revolutionary theory, it would be imprudent to ignore other major contributors to this school and highlight their deficiencies.

The most significant contributions of the third generation were Crane Brinton’s rising expectations theory, David Aberle’s relative deprivation theory, and James Davies’ J-curve theory. Brinton’s magnum opus only assesses four revolutions where he develops his observation that economic upturn results in increased expectations that go on not to be met, causing a revolution as a result.3 In a similar conception, Aberle borrows a theory from political science—relative deprivation—and applies it sociologically to a few historical examples. His theory states that social revolutions occur when enough people perceive “a negative discrepancy between expectation and actuality.”4 Davies focuses on a mere three revolutions to explain his J-curve theory that social revolution occurs when rising expectations and needs satisfaction are dashed by a period of abrupt economic decline.5

These theories all use selective events in an effort to realize overlapping causal trends of social revolutions. At the base of all of them is a change in economic conditions and a realization of this by an overwhelming number of people. These theories are all explanations of class consciousness giving rise to class warfare but reconfigured by Western academics in an effort to create some original, new theory. The Marxian analysis takes into consideration everything these academics write about without either ignoring or underplaying the ascendant role of class in social revolutions.

All told, the Marxian analysis of history does not bind itself with arbitrary limitations, and a wealth of disagreements and diversity of thought have arisen under the methodological framework of historical materialism. In its observance of the production and reproduction of our materiality through capitalist economic formations, we can extrapolate empirically and comprehensively the effects of this base on all components of the superstructure, and their subsequent reciprocity. Within this framework, we observe class, class consciousness, and class warfare as the vehicle for social change, namely social revolutions, while taking under consideration the totality of competing forces within capitalist society. The arbitrariness of bourgeois historians and social scientists in their selectively drawing out of features and trends in this totality simply obscures the reality of historical development, while their ideological convictions lead them to underplay the critical importance of class society in an effort to reduce class consciousness within academic environments and popular culture, thereby perpetuating capitalist ideology.