A Twelve-Step Program for Democrat Addiction

Jonah Martell lays out a twelve-step program for the Democratic Socialists of America to pursue a path of independent working-class politics. 

Civil War-era Cartoon, 1863. The Union fights off the teacherous Copperheads: Democrats who demanded immediate peace with the Confederacy.

Cheer up, comrades! It has been a sorrowful year for all of us, but the whole world has taken a beating—we’re hardly special. We will always have choices to make, strategies to explore, and opportunities to pursue. In this piece, I will do my best to illuminate some of them. 

We can transform our political prospects. But first we will have to transform ourselves. It is pointless to “keep fighting the good fight” if that means pounding on the same brick wall forever. We must rethink old assumptions and learn some new tricks. If we retreat into isolated local projects or blindly “follow the leader,” we set the stage for another defeat. 

Remember the Sanders campaign? Those months seem like a distant memory now. Bernie Sanders played by the rules of the Democratic Party, and those rules squashed him. Yet we have the power to write our own rulebook—not just by breaking with the Democrats, but by inventing a completely new way of doing politics. It is time to move past the obvious insights. Democrats suck; they are treating progressives unfairly; it is still a relief that Trump got fired. To do better next time, we must ask ourselves more difficult questions. The first one is very simple: who is “we?”

Who Are You?

Nearly every political argument invokes a “we,” a common group that should mobilize around something. Although this is useful for persuasive purposes, it can also muddy the waters. In the real world, there is never just one “we” that any of us belong to—no single collective agent. Readers of this article are presumably part of many “we’s.” 

Several examples come to mind. There is the George Floyd protest movement. There is also Bernie World: the massive network of people who supported the Sanders campaign. And many of us feel a certain kinship with all left-leaning people in America—with our friends who want some kind of welfare state, even if they lack an explicit political ideology.

Then there is a much smaller “we”: the American socialist movement. People who own the word “socialism” and take it seriously, without needing a “democratic” disclaimer in front (most of us are even fine with the c-word). We clump around explicitly socialist organizations—most often the Democratic Socialists of America—and we use the dictionary definitions. We actually want common ownership of the means of production and a new political system to make it possible. 

Socialists are a small but growing minority of the U.S. population. How should socialists handle being in a minority? One option is to embrace it, to turn inward and form angry little echo chambers that achieve nothing. Another is to bow to outside forces, watering down our beliefs in the name of “progressive coalition-building.” Both of these solutions fall short. There is nothing wrong with being in a minority, especially when your side has unique insights on how society works. What’s important is to be an outward-looking minority—a minority with a genuine desire for growth and a clearheaded awareness of its surroundings.

Where Are We?

One tempting idea is that the American Left is finished. With Trump out of office, the masses will become complacent, apathy will reign, and there will be no more appetite for political change. In such bleak times, this pessimism is understandable, but it’s also wrong.

“Don’t underestimate Joe’s capacity to fuck things up.” —President Barack Obama

Total nihilism about our prospects puts far too much faith in Joe Biden and the Democratic Party. The crisis in this country runs deeper than Trump. It began before Trump and will continue long after him. The public may want a return to normalcy, but that is just a short-term impulse. Biden’s party will be governing in the middle of a global pandemic and an economic recession. To govern alone, they will have to pull off an extraordinary political surgery: winning a Senate majority of one, voting unanimously to reform the filibuster, adding new states, and then packing the Supreme Court to keep their legislation viable.

Judging by their track record, are the Democrats up to this task? Are they capable of such ruthless political discipline? And even if they do accomplish it, will their leadership be ready to push through major reforms to help America’s struggling working class?

Perhaps Obama could make a few phone calls and threaten a drone strike on Joe Manchin. Otherwise, they will be governing at the feet of Mitch McConnell. Remember him, the Kentucky boy who looks like a turtle? That’s the man who will be holding Joe Biden accountable, not progressives. The GOP controls the Senate. It now controls the Supreme Court. It has ample weapons to impose a wingnut regime on America without Trump in office. Perhaps that is why they are refusing to wage an all-out war over Biden’s victory.

There will be no “bipartisan” healing, only stagnation and decay. When discontent resurfaces, multiple forces on the Left (not to mention the Right) will pounce to take advantage of it. One force to be reckoned with is Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and the rest of the left-wing Democrats in Congress. Because they will be locked out of Biden’s administration, they have nowhere to go but the pulpit. Their party is already eager to marginalize them, and they know the score. The planet is burning. Millions of us have no healthcare in the middle of a pandemic. Roe v. Wade may well be overturned, making abortion illegal for millions overnight and sparking massive upheaval. Every social gain of the past fifty years stands at the mercy of the Supreme Court.

Left-wing Democrats will have to change their strategy. Will they do so effectively? No one knows, and ordinary rank and file socialists should not rely on it. They are embedded in a coalition that prevents them from building a viable constituency. Our responsibility is to develop a more independent approach to politics, with or without their help.

To understand why, let us talk about redbaiting. It worked this year, both on the Left and the liberals (particularly in Miami). Socialism has a powerful appeal among downwardly mobile young people who escaped their elders’ Cold War indoctrination. For a majority of Americans, however, it remains a dirty word.  The Democrats stoked that base when they tarred Bernie as a shill for Castro. Then Trump took up where they left off, tarring Biden as a shill for Bernie, AOC, and a communist plot to destroy America. He and his party made a bet that even the most ridiculous lies would send the Right marching off to Valhalla. They bet right.

Thanks in part to red-baiting (not to mention race-baiting, jingoism, coddling evangelicals, and actually running an energetic campaign), Trump’s coalition turned out with millions more than they had in 2016. The Democrats lost seats in the House and didn’t win the Senate. Now the neoliberals are furiously blaming the Left. Representative Abigail Spanberger (D-Va.) has been particularly frustrated with her neoliberal colleagues for not repressing us hard enough. In a conference call shortly after Election Day, the former CIA officer had this to say:

“We have to commit to not saying the words “defund the police” ever again,” she said. “We have to not use the words ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ ever again.”

She may well be right. Censoring those slogans would be a smart tactical move for her party (not ours). But the Representative forgets three things:

1)  Socialists are here to stay and will not be shutting up.

2)  Left Democrats like Bernie worked tirelessly to turn out their constituencies for Biden. Despite the Right’s hatred of them, they played a crucial role in Biden’s victory.  

3)  Red-baiting targeted the Establishment’s weaknesses—not just ours.

That third point is counterintuitive, so it deserves some further context. Once again, the Democrats nominated an establishment candidate who set popular expectations as low as he possibly could. Why not fill the empty vessel? It made perfect sense for Trump and his allies to turn boring Joe Biden into a sinister communist puppet. The move served three basic purposes: stoke their right-wing base, pit the Democrats against their progressive wing, and avoid having to debate Biden directly because Donald Trump is an idiot. 

Debating Boogeyman Bernie was easy enough, but had Real Bernie been the nominee, the dynamic would have changed in some very interesting ways. Sanders excels at something that is invaluable for all political leaders: incisive messaging. Instead of promising nothing, he would have countered Trump’s red-baiting head-on by aggressively selling his ideas: “You’re damn right I support Medicare for All and let me tell you why!” Whatever the results on Election Day, his base would have emerged with hardened convictions and itching for a fight. 

A moot point of course: the Bernie constituency did not harden. Instead, it was defeated, co-opted, and now discarded, left to wallow in uncertainty about its future. Bernie lost because the Establishment rigged the primary—not with mail-in ballots and computer hacks, but with fear: fear of losing to Trump. Fear that Bernie accepted from the outset by promising his loyalty to any nominee and justifying his entire campaign by claiming to be America’s Best Trump Remover. Biden crushed that sales pitch the moment he cruised in with an orchestrated wave of big-name endorsements, signaling to all uncertain voters that the party apparatus was his. How could an open hijacker like Bernie be the Unity Candidate? The loyal crew rallied behind its captain and threw the pirate overboard.

Sold one-by-one, his policies were wildly popular, but bundling them together with a big red bow was too hard a sell for Democratic voters who feared Trump above all else. When Bernie lost the primary, he lost his podium as well. He spent the rest of the election shunted off in a corner, working quietly for Biden’s coalition to “save America” from total meltdown. There was nowhere left to go on the path he had set for himself.

How did that coalition treat him? Bernie wanted Medicare for All. The DNC Platform Committee would not even accept a universal program for children. In 1998, Bill Clinton called for lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 55. In 2020, Biden said “lower it to 60,” framing it as a generous concession to Bernie’s eager young whippersnappers. When Bernie delegates pushed for a move back to Clinton’s original proposal, the Committee shot that down too.

Medicare is for Seniors Only, and Biden has been quite firm on that principle. Nor was his public option a genuine concession. His campaign was happy to paste it on the website, but Biden played it down the instant Trump held his feet to the fire, claiming that it would only be a Medicaid-style program for the destitute.1

The American Left is being buried in coalitions that treat us like dirt. We beg them, appease them, and submit to their abuse. Then they still fail, despite all our efforts to prevent it, and each failure deepens our dependency on them. For decades, we have been hopelessly addicted to Democrats.

Let 2020 be the final relapse. We must be our own captains and build our own ship: a self-assured, self-reliant movement with no divided loyalties. A fearless movement powered by millions who cannot be cowed or manipulated. Millions who know exactly what we stand for; who are sold on both our policies and the big red bow that ties them together.

An independent, socialist, working-class party.

Who Will Build the Ship?

Such tired old words! They are usually where reflection ends, because they are infinitely harder to make real.

Will the Squad build the Ship? Will Omar, Tlaib, Pressley, Ocasio-Cortez, and the rest who won their primaries this year form a Democratic Socialist Party? Before socialists rush to take orders from them, the Squad’s track record deserves a partial review. They have:

    • Firmly backed Medicare for All (all of them).
    • Voted for a $2.7 trillion-dollar Pentagon budget (AOC, Tlaib).
    • Endorsed Bernie Sanders (AOC, Omar, Tlaib).
    • Endorsed Elizabeth Warren (Pressley).
    • Held a sit-in at Nancy Pelosi’s office (AOC).
    • Called Nancy Pelosi “Mama Bear” (AOC).
    • Called for defunding the police (AOC).
    • Held a photo-op with the NYPD (AOC).
    • Fired her chief of staff for annoying Democrats (AOC).
    • Slammed the Democratic Party as incompetent (AOC).

Suspend all moral judgments. Just ask from a distance: are these the actions of a disciplined socialist movement with a clear political strategy? Or are they the actions of a loose, informal circle of left-wing Democrats?

It is the latter, of course. Just like Bernie, members of the Squad are grappling with divided loyalties, balancing their genuine desire for progress with their obligations to a party that wants none of it. There has been much talk in DSA of launching a “dirty break”: having socialists run within Democratic primaries and one day splitting off to form a party of their own. But there is no evidence that anyone in the Squad has ambitions to do this. Unlike Bernie, they have spent their entire political careers working within the Democratic Party. Even if they do have secret plans, ordinary socialists are not privy to them and will have no say in how they play out.

DSA has thoroughly confused itself by viewing the Squad as its rightful leaders. A clear majority of DSA members want to chart a course away from the Democrats, but the Squad’s theory of change is based on “winning the soul” of their party. This is quite different from our mission to build an independent socialist movement.

If the Squad will not build the ship, then what about organized labor? If we stay patient and work hard within the unions, could they eventually toughen up to create an American Labor Party? Perhapsbut they will have us waiting for quite a while. For over eighty years the U.S. labor movement has functioned as an appendage of the Democratic Party. It has millions of members, but they are demoralized, dominated by stagnant leadership, and suffering from decades of decline. The Left certainly needs to rebuild labor, but trying to do so as isolated individuals is a vain abdication of responsibility. The Democrats have the labor movement in a political stranglehold, and to break it we must create a political alternative. Many times in history, it has been a left party that organizes and revitalizes the unions, rather than the other way around. Nor are labor-based parties guaranteed to be friendly to socialists—the purge of Jeremy Corbyn and the British Labour Left should give pause to would-be American Laborites. Enough waiting based on hypotheticals. The time for independent politics is now.

If we need an independent party now, then what should it look like? One option is to cast the net as wide as we possibly can. Throw the s-word out and join with every left-leaning person we can find to form a broad-based progressive party. The party could appeal on just a few policies that are already highly popular, like Medicare for All, and de-emphasize other issues that “divide us.”

It’s a tempting idea. Ditching socialism could take the heat off our backs and make growth much easier in the short term. There is already an organization that is trying to do this: the Movement for a People’s Party. Led by former Bernie staffer Nick Brana, it is determined to set up a “new nationally-viable progressive party.” It has recruited tens of thousands of supporters and an impressive lineup of high-profile speakers, from Marianne Williamson to Jesse Ventura. Running on a platform loosely modeled on that of Bernie’s 2016 campaign, it hopes to flip congressional seats in 2022 and win the presidency in 2024.

Although MPP’s ambition is admirable, the recent track record of “left populism” does not bode well for them. Populist coalitions boom and bust; they rise to power only to implement austerity; they speak in simplistic terms of “the People” and “the Elite” that impede more sophisticated class-based analyses. Their frantic rush for the presidency is quite unwise, as is their desire to conjure up an instant majority. Socialists would do well to remember the fate of America’s original Populist Party: cooptation in 1896 by a Democratic presidential candidate who adopted their demand for free coinage of silver.

Marxist political strategist Mike Macnair describes this impatient approach to politics as “conning the working class into power.” Karl Marx had similar warnings to his contemporaries in 1850:

[The faction opposing us regards] not the real conditions but a mere effort of will as the driving force of the revolution. Whereas we say to the workers: ‘You will have to go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil wars and national struggles not only to bring about a change in society but also to change yourselves, and prepare yourselves for the exercise of political power.’

Socialists should be gearing up for this long-term political struggle. We see the obstacles in front of us in a way that catch-all “progressives” cannot. Progressives hold a powerless but accepted niche within the American political system. It is easy for them to cheerfully dream of “taking back our democracy” and “advancing the American experiment.” Socialists have much weaker roots. Constantly derided as un-American, they are driven to question the dominant culture and the entire political system.

This political system is explicitly designed to “restrain the democratic spirit.” The president is not elected by popular vote. The Senate, with total control over cabinet and judicial appointments, vastly overrepresents conservative white voters, and its members serve staggered six-year terms. This is to say nothing of the Supreme Court, whose members serve for life and claim the right to strike down any legislation as they see fit.

The add-ons are helpful as well. Ballot access laws prop up an artificial two-party system, barring all third parties from meaningfully contesting elections. Millions of felons are disenfranchised. Gerrymandering and voter suppression are rampant. Virtually all elections are in single-member districts—winner-take-all.

“But the Founding Fathers intended it this way!” the conservatives screech when pressed for any progressive reform. “You can’t just change it on a whim!”

Meanwhile, they impose their own changes. They pack the courts, purge the voter rolls, and impose right-wing minority rule on the entire country. The Democratic Party will continue to submit to it for years to come because it is equally loyal to this tired Old Regime.

What is needed is not just a break with the Democrats, but a complete break in our way of conceptualizing political power. Will socialists continue to campaign for catch-all progressives, for left Democrats and marginal third parties? Or will we introduce something completely new and unprecedented to American politics—something that challenges not just the rules but the institutions that make them?

There will be no victory for the Left within the established constitutional order. It was designed to keep uppity leftists out of power. Conservatives know this full well. We will never win if we play by their rules. Our job is to develop a coherent strategy to attack their deliberately incoherent political system. A strategy based on incisive messaging, political independence, and a national struggle for power.

Just to be clear: from this point on, when I say “we” I mean DSA. For all its flaws, it is the flagship organization for American socialists. Where its competitors have three or four-digit memberships, its rolls will soon break 100,000. It is the ideal place to hammer out some kind of future for ourselves. 

No individual can do it alone. But just to get the ball rolling, I would propose the following:

A TWELVE STEP PROGRAM FOR SOCIALISTS

(To Break Our Addiction to Democrats) 

1)  Declare political independence.

Remember what Joe Biden said at the first debate to counter Trump’s idiotic redbaiting. He said “I am the Democratic Party.”Don’t hate him! It was true, and it was actually quite clever of Joe. He was leading a messy coalition and he stepped up to assert responsibility for it. With those words, he wiped out the Bernie movement and made it crystal clear what the Democratic Party is about.

Now, remember how Bernie countered his own redbaiters when his campaign was just getting started. He gave a speech about “what democratic socialism means to me.” Do you see the difference here? One man is speaking assertively about an entire political coalition. The other is speaking on behalf of himself to humanize the s-word and make it less intimidating. But in doing so, he is stripping it of any standardized definition.

Is socialism an organized political movement or is it a slogan, a vague personal philosophy? Right now it is mostly the latter in the United States. Popular understandings of the term range from “equality” to “government ownership” to “talking to people, being social … getting along with people.”

If socialism is no more than a slogan, perhaps we should simply abandon it. The entire point of sloganeering is to popularize unpopular ideas. When the slogan alienates people and has no substance, it is useless. 

It’s not quite that simple, of course. As conservatives love to say, we can’t erase our past, and picking a feel-good label for ourselves will not necessarily protect us. The Right will always be pinning the red bow on anything left of Mussolini. Just ask Podemos (and Joe Biden)!

Moreover, socialism is useful because it appeals to a critical target audience: young, downwardly mobile, working-class people who are already skeptical of American capitalism. Anyone can claim to be a progressive, from Maoists to Nancy Pelosi. Socialism is a knife that cuts us apart from the crowd; it has already captured the public’s attention. We just need to make sure that we cut ourselves into an organized political constituency and not a rebellious fashion trend.

DSA should act less like Bernie and more like Joe. It should step up and say, “DSA is the Socialist Movement.” When asked what socialism is, it should give a coherent definition. I will not presume to have a full answer here, but we should be clear that socialism is a mission to bring freedom and democracy to the working class—and that mission will require regime change. Moreover, because most self-professed socialists in America are also communists, perhaps we should be more straightforward about that when asked. A classless, stateless, communist society is our end goal—give or take a few generations.

That is how DSA should define itself publicly. It should also change the way it describes itself to members. It could put out a statement, even if it is completely internal, announcing that DSA considers itself an independent socialist party and expects members to conduct themselves accordingly. It will not have legal status as a party, but that doesn’t matter. Many American socialists, from Seth Ackerman to Howie Hawkins, have acknowledged the need for flexibility on this question. Because state governments dictate the structure of legally recognized parties, we should simply reject their regulatory frameworks and define for ourselves what a party is. Given the public’s understandable impulse to dismiss conventional third parties, we could continue to refer to ourselves officially as “DSA,” “the Socialist Movement,” or anything similar. Our actions will cement our political independence, not the formality of sticking the p-word in our official title.

There is nothing particularly misleading about this (if leaving out the p-word is opportunistic, then so was Rosa Luxemburg’s party). From a Marxist perspective, a communist party is a movement—a structured, organized, revolutionary political movement.2  Framing the party in these terms is therefore perfectly honest and acceptable. It would also subvert the shallow liberal conception of movements as flash mobs and Twitter hashtags. 

All of these maneuvers may seem pretentious and overbearing, but they are necessary. The Right and Center have no qualms about defining socialism for the public. They define it as “misery and destitution.” Nor are the Left Democrats afraid to advance vague, meandering definitions that leave the Right howling and the fence-sitters completely unconvinced. 

The momentum is with DSA. Even Trotskyist sects acknowledge this by routinely imploring DSA to form a new party that they can “affiliate” with. We have the power to step up and assert collective responsibility for the American socialist movement. It’s us, the Right, or the wavering politicians. Let there be no more talk about “What Democratic Socialism Means to Me.” From now on, the phrase should be “What the Socialist Movement Demands.”

2) Hold annual conventions.

This is a short point. For years DSA has held conventions on a biannual basis. Today that will not be enough. The United States has become rather unstable; conditions can change in a heartbeat and we will have to adapt to them quickly. To keep up with the pace of events, we should hold conventions every year, constantly reevaluating our platform and strategy.

3) Form statewide organizations.

What is the mourning cry of a defeated progressive? It’s this:

“Oh well. I’ll just get involved in local politics. That’s where the real change happens anyway.”

A noble thought; every one of us has had it at some point. Unfortunately, it reflects an unconscious peasant mentality. Giving up on large-scale political change, the progressive returns to their village to do what little they can.

“I would never challenge His Majesty the King. Better to cultivate my little garden.”

A garden is not an island. American cities have more autonomy than their counterparts in many other countries, but that is not saying much. State and federal policies shape every aspect of local government. They prohibit cities from requiring paid sick leave for workers. They require them to accept fracking within their boundaries. They force towns to base their speed limits on pre-existing traffic flows, ratcheting up car speeds and slaughtering pedestrians. 

When we confine ourselves to local politics, we become functionaries of the capitalist state. We also play into the reactionary old American idea that all problems are best solved locally, that large-scale social programs can never be trusted. We must build an opposition to the capitalist state at every level, and that means creating strong regional organizations. A DSA caucus called the Collective Power Network raised this point quite effectively in 2019. What they forgot to fully address is the appropriate scale for these regional entities: the state level. The Republicans and Democrats have their state parties. So should we. 

“But that’s modeling ourselves on the bourgeois state!” cry the anarchists. 

No, it is laying siege to the state. Our state chapters will run on simple majoritarian lines; they will not have Senates and Supreme Courts and Governors with veto power. What they will have is the capacity to run statewide campaigns and contest state policies that impact the lives of working-class people. They will also encourage local chapters to collaborate, improve outreach outside the big cities, and alleviate some of the burden on the national organization—which has been charged with the impossible task of managing 235 locals.

Admittedly, there are some sparsely populated states with very few DSA chapters, and in these areas statewide organization could be impractical, at least in the short term. A United Dakota, North and South, might make sense for DSA’s purposes. Fusing states for tactical reasons is perfectly acceptable; the only inadvisable move would be creating regions that cut states into multiple pieces, preventing unified statewide campaigns.

Although a national organizing drive would be invaluable, DSA’s local groups can take the initiative right now. There is already an easy, underutilized process to integrate DSA chapters. According to DSA’s constitution, just two or more locals may petition to form a statewide organization, pending approval by the National Political Committee and a majority of locals within the state. A similar process is available for locals seeking to form regional organizations. 

4) Nurture a committed membership base.

What does it mean to be a DSA member? One impulse is to make it an extremely demanding, prestigious title—the Navy SEALs of activism. In his classic text on Marxist strategy What Is to Be Done?, Vladimir Lenin called for a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries. Should American socialists aim for the same thing?

No, because for Lenin, ruthless discipline was a necessary evil, not a virtue. Russian revolutionaries operated in a Tsarist police state where the slightest misstep invited discovery, police raids, and mass arrests. The United States is in many ways shockingly repressive, but it is not a tsarist autocracy. In our context, socialists have much more to learn from socialist parties outside the Russian Empire that maintained more open membership structures. They cultivated mass movements—millions strong—to build a vibrant oppositional culture against capitalism. They offered social services, opened libraries and grocery stores, set up cycling clubs, choir societies, picnics and social outings. Germany and Austria offer intriguing historical examples. Today, Bolivian socialists are doing similar inspirational work.

But we don’t just have to look abroad. There are non-socialist, all-American organizations in the United States that show us what dedicated membership looks like. In 2015 the National Rifle Association had 5 million dues-paying members, and nearly 15 million Americans identified with the organization whether they paid dues or not. It cultivates group identity with a wide array of community services—including an official magazine, concealed carry insurance, firearms training for millions, and opportunities to join its 125,000-strong army of training instructors. 

Yes, the NRA is a reactionary, racist organization, riddled with corruption and now in decline. We still have much to learn from it (not to mention the churches that, for better or worse, provide millions of Americans with social services and community life). There is thrilling potential for secular left-wing institution-building, from tenant unions and worker centers to art circles and sports clubs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, hiking clubs and other outdoor activities could be a particularly powerful social service, breaking people out of their isolation and alleviating mental health burdens. 

These ideas go beyond feel-good charity work. They are structured party programs, designed to build a massive support base that can be deployed for confrontational political action. They will cost quite a bit of cash.

This brings us to a crucially important, non-negotiable element of dedicated membership: monthly dues. Dues are the life-blood of a mass movement; they foster group identity, incentivize recruitment, and provide the party with a steady, predictable stream of revenue.

But what about low-income, working-class people? Couldn’t dues make the movement inaccessible to them?

Quite the opposite. Dues can be tapered based on income, and studies show that the poor give a greater portion of their income to charity than the rich. Asking people to pay a steady monthly fee is much more reasonable than bombarding them with fundraising emails that endlessly scream “give, give, give!” Nor is volunteer work a more accessible basis for membership than dues. Time is money, and every hour that a person spends with us is an hour that they could have spent working an extra shift or taking care of their children.

Dues allow us to make reasonable asks of others and avoid activist burnout. We don’t guilt-trip the single parent working two jobs or the exhausted volunteer with mental health burdens. We say: “Don’t worry. Take a break as long as you need to. Just help us stay afloat and keep paying your dues.” There will always be varying levels of involvement, and not all of us will be red Navy SEALs. Anyone who supports our mission, votes for our candidates, and pays their dues deserves to be called a member of the Socialist Movement.

We must still take measures to promote membership engagement. Only active members should get a vote in party affairs, and we should encourage all members to come to at least a few key events every year. All chapters need a point person to welcome newcomers and help them forge connections with other members, preventing locals from becoming insular social clubs. We will offer engaging, freewheeling education groups to introduce new members to our politics. All of this is necessary to make ourselves an “outward-looking minority.”

A key task for DSA will be to reevaluate and standardize its dues structure and perhaps ask a little more of its members. DSA membership is worth more than the current 67-cent monthly minimum. Rather than dismantling dues, as some anarchist-leaning caucuses have suggested, we must embrace and celebrate them as the foundation of a self-reliant movement.

5) Adopt a nationwide political platform.

DSA is currently working on a platform to synthesize its political demands. This is a very exciting development and an important step to assert ourselves as a distinct force in American politics. We should develop a truly revolutionary program that, if fully implemented, would hand power to our country’s working class and place society on a socialist transition out of capitalism. We must repeal every law that props up the two-party cartel and eliminate every institution that denies us an authentic majoritarian democracy. Abolish the Senate, abolish the Electoral College, and smash the Supreme Court—send Brett Kavanaugh and all his colleagues packing. 

So that working people can fully participate in political life, we should also demand unimpeded labor rights, a massive reduction in working hours, and a comprehensive welfare state that would make Scandinavians blush. Create programs to reduce the power of bureaucrats and give ordinary workers administrative skills; promote worker self-management in all industries. Place the commanding heights of the economy under public ownership and rapidly phase out fossil fuel production. Dismantle the repressive arms of the state: abolish the military and policing as we know it and replace both with a democratically-accountable popular militia. This last point will be challenging yet still indispensable. We must transform the empty demand for “police abolition” into appealing slogans and substantive policy proposals. 

We have our work cut out for us: we must develop a comprehensive program and find ways to promote it to a mass audience. Even so, we will not be working in isolation. We can learn from the history of past revolutions and from the platforms of our predecessors in socialist parties across the world. 

Is this project too arrogant? Will we alienate ordinary people if we draft a comprehensive platform instead of a short list of popular demands? If we treat the platform as an inalterable holy text, then yes. If we leave it open to regular revision and use it as part of our political education process, then no. The intuitive red-meat demands are indispensable: we should certainly continue to advance Medicare for All and other programs that improve the quality of life for the working class. But we will never achieve those demands unless we attack the political order that is making them unachievable. Our platform must point towards a break with the capitalist state and fight for an authentic working-class democracy. We need to build a constituency that believes in the legitimacy of that fight. A “political revolution” will not be enough to defeat America’s reactionary Old Regime. No, that will require a break of epoch-making proportions, a world-historic social revolution.

6) Run dedicated organizers for office.

Many “revolutionary” organizations have an impulse to steer clear of electoral politics. Stumping for office might seem to legitimize a system we want to overturn, so why do it?

The obvious answer is that the state has tremendous power and it already has legitimacy for most people. It will be here for quite a while. Retreating from the political arena does nothing to stop that. More importantly, electoral work done right can erode the legitimacy of the system and help us win the support of millions. Electoral campaigns can be used as a bully pulpit to attack the system and demand a new political order. Lenin did this, the German socialists did this, and so can we.   

Electoral politics can also embolden and merge with the combative worker and tenant struggles that often capture leftists’ attention. Bernie Sanders taught us that when he personally manned picket lines, and West Virginia teachers showed it when they drew inspiration from Bernie to go on strike.

What we need to avoid is getting sucked into another abusive coalition like Bernie. The key to this is recognizing the Democratic Party as the irredeemable zombie that it is. Bernie tried to heal the zombie and he got bitten hard. Instead of collaborating with the neoliberals, we should strive for total independence and self-sufficiency in our electoral bids. DSA could train and run gifted organizers who promise to coordinate their campaigns, accept the party platform, and vote as one bloc when elected. Candidates would be entirely free to personally disagree with elements of the platform and push for changes through internal party discussion. In the halls of power, however, they would be expected to act as one team, with accountability to the entire membership movement.

We see a preview of this approach in New York, where DSA recently ran a victorious slate of insurgent socialist candidates. If we hardened and expanded this approach nationwide, it would put us to the left of even the Squad–whose members have hesitated to endorse other primary challengers after winning office themselves. 

We would not align with the Democrats. Instead, wherever they won office, our candidates would form an independent socialist caucus. Both parties would be welcome to meet with us to discuss policy–at the opposite end of a long negotiating table. 

This approach would not win us much love from either side. Legislative committee appointments would be sparing or nonexistent, but that is okay. Establishment politicians may hammer us as useless backbenchers, but we would simply counter by pointing out how useless they are, listing off all the ways they have betrayed their constituents in the past. We would make use of our extra free time by serving as relentless advocates for the communities that they have ignored, publicizing socialist policy proposals, providing constituent services, and assisting local organizing projects. To show their dedication, our elected officials would refuse to take more than a typical working-class salary and donate the rest to our community programs. 

The value of electoral work done right cannot be understated. Many “revolutionary” leftists begrudgingly accept its necessity as a type of “propaganda,” but what passes for propaganda on the Left is often just obnoxious megaphone yammering. It would be better to describe it as a form of organizing, as outreach to carve out a constituency that believes in our cause. 

One popular idea in DSA is that candidates should always “run to win.” It is correct that we should be running professional campaigns, with talented candidates who truly want to come out victorious. If we finish with single-digit results, that is probably a sign that we ran our campaign poorly and need to reevaluate our strategy. However, it’s important to remember that the path to victory can be longer than one election cycle, and an honorable defeat can still build the movement. Cori Bush did not win her initial campaign in 2018, but now she is headed to Congress to join the Squad. Nor did Bernie Sanders win his first independent House bid in 1988–that took a second try in 1990. If we abandon every “loser” the moment they fall short, we may end up discarding capable leaders who still have future potential.

In the long run, our goal should be to run candidates for every office possible, even where we cannot win. This boosts our visibility as a national political movement and will help us extend our presence outside the large urban centers. Like Bernie, we must eagerly engage with rural, small-town, and Republican-leaning voters. If we abstain for fear of losing, we will never be able to build a truly national constituency.

7) Stop endorsing outside the party.

Once we have a training program for this new approach to electoral work, we must wind down the faucet of endorsements. DSA should focus all of its energy, messaging, and resources on promoting its own candidates: active, committed members who promise to uphold the platform. The only exception would be strategic collaboration with candidates from other independent left parties. Electoral pacts to avoid competition in certain districts may occasionally be necessary.

Cutting off endorsements may seem like a sectarian move, but it is perfectly reasonable. AOC and other Squad members are sparing with their primary endorsements; they have not mounted a massive assault against their Democratic colleagues. They have pragmatic obligations to attend to, and so do we. We should pour all our energy into cultivating talented candidates who are embedded in our organization and committed to building an independent movement. When we endorse candidates who are not directly accountable to our membership, we muddy the waters on what DSA stands for.

None of this means that we will run around viciously denouncing left Democrats and other progressive candidates. They are not responsible for this crisis. We will sometimes criticize their political strategy, but our fiery speeches will be reserved for the ghouls who actually hold the cards: Biden, McConnell, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and so on. When our rabble-rousing socialist backbenchers take up their seats, they may want to collaborate with the major parties from time to time, and left Democrats could end up playing a valuable role as mediators. And who knows? Some of them may be impressed by our new brand of politics and join our ranks. The goal is not to be sectarian. We are just stepping up to become self-reliant, to make our own independent mark on the world.

8) Choose ballot lines at the state level.

Should we keep running our candidates in Democratic primaries, or should we rush to set up our own ballot lines?

Every state has its unique convoluted rules, so there’s no easy answer to this question. That’s the point. Our system is designed to encourage incoherent thinking, to fragment and divide power to make majoritarian politics impossible. When future schoolteachers describe the decline and fall of the United States, they will point to its divided political system, the fifty jurisdictions marked out on a map. The children will laugh out loud and ask how it lasted so long.

The states have had third parties running like gerbils on a wheel, focusing all their energy on petition gathering and hopeless presidential campaigns (required to secure ballot access). Even staunch third party advocates like Hawkins know that it’s time to break the wheel and try something new. Perhaps we should ditch the ballot access crusades and just run nominal independents. That would allow us to stop running top-heavy presidential tickets, to be more discriminating about which elections we target. An interesting map comes together with a glance at state ballot access laws for House candidates:

Source: https://ballotpedia.org/Main_Page

Green states are reasonably friendly to independent bids. They require the same number of petition signatures as major-party candidates. Or, if the requirement is unequal, the total number of signatures needed is still 1,000 or fewer. Red states have clearly unequal requirements, although they are not necessarily insurmountable. Blue states have very different procedures for major party and independent candidates and are difficult to compare directly.

It’s clear that there are weak spots. California, Texas, and Florida all have equitable access for independents. Why run Democrats for the House in any of those easy states? 

Once we have dedicated state-level organizations, they will be able to make these judgment calls decisively. In New Jersey, where only 100 signatures are required for independent House bids and party machines brazenly rig their primaries, “clean break now” is an excellent approach. 

In Georgia, the rules for independents are extremely inhospitable and primaries are open to voters from any party. There, it would make sense to antagonize the Democrats with a large slate of DSA primary insurgents. For the sake of clear messaging, ballot line choices should generally be consistent across the entire state. We would confuse primary voters if we ran an independent in one congressional district, a Democrat in the one next door, and a Republican for a county office that overlaps both districts.

Even when we run in a party primary, we should still run our candidates on the DSA platform and be committed to political independence. The line could be this: “I’m running as a Democrat. It was the only way to get on the ballot. Once I’m elected, I’ll renounce my party affiliation and serve with the Socialist Independents.”

Off they will go to join the rest of our rabble-rousing backbenchers. Under this framework, the “dirty break” is no longer some vague goal that we banish to the distant future. It is something that we do every time we win an election, enraging both capitalist parties. Call it the filthy break – perhaps we will even run Socialist Republicans in Montana! Eventually, both parties should be expected to crack down and pass laws to close up their primaries. Hopefully, we will already have a mass constituency by that point. 

Right now, DSA prioritizes Democratic bids and neglects independent campaigns. That order should be reversed. Clean independent bids should always be prioritized, wherever we can realistically get a couple strong campaigns on the ballot. They establish our independence and make it clear to the public that we are not Democrats—that we are out to break the two-party system.

“But you’ll never win as an independent!” some will protest. “I did!” Bernie Sanders would have replied in 1990. It’s an uphill battle, but not an impossible one.

Vote-splitting is another valid concern. Unfortunately, it is a fact of life in any winner-take-all election. It happens in Democratic primaries (peace among worlds, Liz!). Even the fear of vote-splitting can do great damage to insurgent primary campaigns. NYC-DSA learned that the hard way when self-appointed socialist kingmaker Sean McElwee released a poll to deliberately tank Samelys López’s congressional bid, claiming that she would split the vote and put a conservative Democrat in office.

Vote-splitting will happen, and we will have to find ways to reduce the public’s fear of it. Establishing ourselves as a viable force worth splitting the vote for will be one important step. We will have to pick our campaigns carefully in the beginning to build capacity and establish a political foothold. But from the very outset, we must make it clear that we are intent on further expansion. The Socialist Movement has the right to run its candidates across the board, just like any other political party.

9) Target the House of Representatives.

What made the Bernie movement so powerful, so terrifying, so utterly invigorating for its participants? It was a national struggle for power.

That point deserves to be repeated: participation in the Bernie movement was participation in a national struggle for power. In the campaign’s words, it was a mission to “defeat Donald Trump and transform America.”

America alienates the U.S. left. We are not nationalists; we are not patriots. We reject much of the dominant culture. This makes it difficult for us to conceive of politics as a nationally coordinated struggle. It is much easier to think in terms of local organizing or international solidarity. Both are crucial projects. The working class has no country; the socialist movement must be international, and our work is hopeless without effective local organizers on the ground. 

But the best thing we can do for our local organizers is to integrate them into a coordinated movement for transformative change. The best thing that we can do to foster internationalism is build a real, unified revolutionary organization in America, a powerful socialist movement that can give inspiration to others around the world. 

If we play our hand well, our next national struggle will be different from Bernie’s in some important ways. We will be more ambitious, more independent, and less deferential to established institutions. Instead of trying to redeem the Democratic Party, we will oppose it head-on alongside the GOP. Instead of seeking a “political revolution” within the capitalist state, we will call for a world-historic revolution and a new political order: an authentic working-class democracy. How can we integrate our union work, tenant struggles, and electoral campaigns into this grand vision? Do we run another presidential campaign?

Not in 2024. Barring something completely unforeseen, we will not have the numbers, organization, and high-profile leaders necessary to mount an interesting presidential bid. We would waste precious volunteer hours collecting signatures and then come out with 1% of the vote. It would be hopping right back on the gerbil wheel. Once we have a larger base, we can contest the presidency (on a platform of abolishing the presidency by revolution).

But our main target should be the House of Representatives. It is a federal institution, elected every two years in local districts that are small enough for us to realistically target. We can run a National Slate of candidates, from Washington to Florida, from Michigan to Maine, and talk it up in our stump speeches. We can use the House as a national soapbox to publicize our demands. We will be speaking to America coast-to-coast, raising our public profile and giving a boost to all of our state and local candidates. The House is the most important electoral institution for us to contest in the years to come.

We can begin in the urban deep blue districts that Democrats have dominated, plus some red district bids to expand our repertoire. This will offer political choice to one-party districts that have had none for years, giving us a chance to establish viability. Then, as quickly as we can, we should strive to contest all 434 congressional seats, forcing a messy national referendum on our political demands every two years.

The next three points could be among the most important demands.

10) Organize for electoral reform.

We must demand an end to the two-party system. We should fight for easy ballot access for all political parties, ranked-choice voting and multi-member electoral districts, proportional representation in Congress, and anything else that gives working-class people more choice at the ballot box. In the wake of the 2020 Census and the GOP’s electoral fraud witch-hunt, a new wave of gerrymandering and voter suppression will be arriving very soon. In this political climate, our campaigns for electoral reform should be connected to wider efforts to protect voting rights, such as citizen redistricting panels and automatic voter registration.  

We must integrate these demands and advance them with incisive slogans, playing on popular antipathy to entrenched politicians and the two-party system. Many states have ballot initiative processes that we could use to our advantage, mobilizing voters to pass electoral reforms at the ballot box. Such campaigns have already been mounted by nonpartisan groups, successfully in Michigan, Maine, and Alaska (and unsuccessfully in Massachusetts). Although petition circulation requirements are often arduous, a volunteer-powered mass movement may well be able to blast through the obstacles.

Source: https://ballotpedia.org/States_with_initiative_or_referendum

Electoral reform campaigns are one more way to establish our political independence. They will also help us establish that socialists are champions of a richer democracy (and that the capitalist parties are not!).

11) Shoot down war budgets.

The U.S. spends more on its military than the next ten countries combined. Trillion-dollar slush funds, poured into graft, arms manufacturers, right-wing dictatorships, and bloody imperialistic ventures all over the world. That is no secret; it is common knowledge to tens of millions of Americans.

We cut ourselves apart through total noncooperation. We should refuse to vote for any spending bill that pours one more penny into the bloated military, police departments, or any other repressive capitalist institution.

If we do this, will we cause endless government shutdowns? Unlikely. The Republicans and Democrats will pass their “bipartisan” budgets right over our heads. Drop a heavy boulder into a creek, and the water finds its way around it. But it gives us something to stand on to capture public attention, to erode the legitimacy of an institution that Americans are taught to view as sacrosanct.

12) Demand a new constitution.

What is a demand that would truly set us apart, that would bring the Right’s worst nightmares to life?

Demand a New Union. A new constitution, developed by mass popular participation. Not an Article V convention. No state-by-state ratification. An accessible process that everyone within the borders of the United States can contribute to, combining grassroots direct democracy with a National Constituent Assembly. The final ratification would be by national referenduma simple majority vote.

In a free society, everyone gets a say in the social contract that they live under. That is not what happened when the current constitution was written. Women had no say; black people had no say; working-class people had no say. We demand that the living, breathing people of the United States be given the right to determine its future. We demand a constitution that guarantees real democracy, majority rule, housing, healthcareeconomic rights. 

We will be quite clear about the additional reforms that we would advocate throughout the process: abolish the Senate, abolish the presidency, abolish the Supreme Court. All power to an expanded, improved, democratized House of Representatives.

“We demand that Congress initiate this process, but if it does not, the people have a right to do so themselves.”

There is a legitimate argument to be made that the Constitution can be legally amended by referendum. This deserves an article of its own, and we should certainly invoke constitutional law as needed. Of course, none of our opponents will take our arguments too seriously. Revolutions make their own laws, and what we demand is nothing less than a world-historic revolution against the forces of Old America.

Let the Trumpers fume over the socialist plot to destroy the Constitution. Let the liberals lecture us about the dangers of norm erosion. Obama can start an NGO to educate young people about the beauty of our institutions and the farsighted wisdom of our Founding Fathers. We alienate most people at first, but we strike a chord with a sizable minority. And every year, we build it out, leaning into every crisis, growing, until finally something snaps.

That is the last point. To recap all twelve:

    1. Declare political independence.
    2. Hold annual conventions.
    3. Form statewide organizations.
    4. Cultivate a committed membership base. 
    5. Adopt a nationwide political platform.
    6. Run dedicated organizers for office.
    7. Stop endorsing outside the party.
    8. Choose ballot lines at the state level.
    9. Target the House of Representatives.
    10.  Agitate for electoral reform.
    11.  Shoot down war budgets.
    12.  Demand a new constitution.

Perhaps these suggestions are unrealistic. They may demand too much of a small organization like DSA; they may overestimate the potential of the era we are living in. But even if we try them and fail, at least we will fail on our own terms, in a more instructive way than ever before. Progressive reform movements rise and fall, both inside and outside the Democratic Party. For decades they have led us to defeat, cooptation, and humiliation. Many generations of the American Left have grown exhausted with this ritual, but instead of building a real alternative, the disenchanted vent their frustration with performative action. Endless rallies, megaphone chants, and radical posturing take us nowhere. Localist organizing projects “feel good,” but they completely lose sight of the national struggle for power.

“And you ought to be careful of them, they’ll overthrow you too.”
–Trump to Biden on the Left

What we need are performative restraint and political aggression. Independent politics is not a distant end goal; it is not something we earn after working hard enough for the Democratic coalition. It is the heart of the socialist project, the foundation of effective revolutionary struggle, and something that we ought to start doing right now. The time has come to forge a new strategy that draws on the best of the Bernie campaign and everything that came before it. A fearless strategy, hardheaded yet still principled, that never loses sight of the real end goal: a world-historic, working-class revolution in the USA.

And the goal of this piece is to contribute some starting points. 

Structuring the Party: The Case of the DSA

Diego AM explores the organization conundrums of the modern left, looking at the Democratic Socialists of America and the alternatives proposed by base-builders and Maoists. 

The number of people who realize there are inherent flaws in capitalism is increasing every day. These people generally have good intentions, but might not know where to start. They are faced with a choice: join a group that already exists, or start your own group. The latter solution I will not talk about, because there is nothing that suggests to me that new groups will not end up replicating the same problems as the existing groups, unless the plan has been well studied and thought out for years like, for example, Marxist Center. Therefore, this article will speak about the actually existing organizations and their problems.

Sophia Burns provided the first shots for a materialistic analysis of the existing US left. While she has moved from her starting position, her analysis is still very valuable. It asks the correct questions: we should look at what people do rather than what they say they believe in doing. Ideology matters less than towards what we orient and how we organize. One of the main problems with the current US left is its organizational shape. Cybernetician and organizational consultant Stafford Beer once declared that the greatest threat to all we hold dear is our inability to change the way our societal institutions worked, treating them as static, and advocating for methods to reduce complexity which worked in bygone eras. While this seems exaggerated when staring at the consequences of Covid-19 and climate change it is worth taking his diagnosis seriously when assessing the structure of the organizations in today’s left. 

The pressing problem is that we are trapped in a false dichotomy of centralization against decentralization. And most groups are situated on one or the other pole. For example, the US sects, regardless of tendency, are stuck in the centralism pole of democratic centralism. They form rigid centers, from which order and directives flow. This center has a stronghold on the party, and can barely be challenged. This results in the ossification of the leadership and an inability to absorb criticism. These factors can lead to a lack of real democracy even if everything is voted on. That is because people who join these groups either assimilate to the groupthink directed by the center or if they are unable to assimilate, eventually leave or are made to leave. Sometimes, a cluster of people opposed to the center can bond, and articulate criticism against this center. The process that usually follows is an attempt to provide an alternative pole of leadership through a faction, followed by a fightback from the center. This ends up generating a split rather than an adequate response or a sharing of power. The new party originating from the split usually takes up the organizational method from the parent organization without much questioning, which replicates the problems further down the line. 

Witnessing this process can leave many with burnout and a lingering mistrust for any form of central authority, particularly in the form of a party. Others can become extremely skeptical of authority just by operating in today’s society, where bosses and parents often demand absolute authority and compliance and see no liberation through a rigid party structure. These kinds of people want to be in organizations that are decentralized and horizontal, the other pole of the dichotomy. The advantages of horizontalism seem obvious: in theory no one has more power over others. However, uncodified power just leads to informal power structures, as famously pointed out by Jo Freeman’s Tyranny of Structurelessness, and familiar to anyone who has spent time in these horizontal groups. Horizontal organizations often operate informally and are based on friendship rather than comradeship (I will get to this difference later). Splits do not happen officially, but people can simply walk away and choose another group of friends, and start a different horizontal affinity group. In principle, there is nothing wrong with keeping these horizontalist organizations small if the goals are limited: anarchist affinity groups perform valuable work as street medics or arranging food handouts, jail support, and addiction support, to name a few issues. However, these groups cannot hope to significantly challenge the established order with their numbers and the organization. 

We need large-scale coordination to defeat an enemy that organizes at that level. Otherwise, we will be crushed because the enemy will have the ability to refocus resources across a much larger landscape. We need large organizations coordinated at several levels. And neither type of organization discussed above can grow much without being severely compromised, people come in and out all the time, and either leave individually when burned out or in mass to form a new organization. To avoid this, we have to understand that the solution is not to choose a healthy middle because this is bound to collapse into one of the poles if not supported by a well-designed organizational structure. If we do not take this challenge seriously, the same problems will continue appearing, and this will compromise any attempt at building socialism. These dynamics have historically set a soft limit on the size of leftist organizations in the US since the downfall of the CPUSA. While this is not the only factor driving the US left powerless, it is definitely one worth paying serious attention to. 

In this piece, I will attempt to analyze the current structure of the Democratic Socialists of America, and why it has recently beat the soft size limit by a combination of its organizational model and happenstance. This is followed by a discussion on the inevitable problems that arise out of its organizational model. Then I will discuss the base-building and “mass line” solutions to party organization and how they are insufficient. Finally, I will add my own suggestions for how to build a party that can continue to operate effectively and grow even as the growth of membership reveals more problems.  

The growth of the DSA

The DSA has grown immensely in these last years mainly from the young, dissatisfied, and largely white, leftovers of the Bernie campaign. Much of its growth can be attributed to chance: it is the first organization many hear about, be it either because it comes up first when you search for “democratic socialism” on Google, the publicity generated by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s unexpected win, or just because your friend or a certain online semi-celebrity is in it. But even if it is the first organization people hear about, the whole of this growth cannot be fully attributed to this. 

To tease out the structural causes of DSA’s growth, it is worth contrasting DSA with Socialist Alternative. SA won a Seattle City Council seat with the open-socialist Kshama Sawant, and as a result it gained nation-wide publicity. The reelection of Sawant, as well as the campaigns around a minimum wage of $15/hour in Seattle brought it even more publicity. And while the general level of radicalism was another, there is still something to be said on why the DSA structure was more receptive to mass growth than SA’s. The obvious thing to look at is DSA’s conception of itself as a “big tent” for socialists, compared with SA’s commitment to post-Trotskyism. However, this cannot be the reason: Socialist Alternative’s politics are very dilute on their main communications, and it had very lax criteria for membership until recently. Indeed, SA and DSA attempt to recruit from the same pool of newly radicalized people with similar messaging.

The large difference is not so much in ideas as in operation. While SA runs the usual sect organizational model with a strong center, DSA’s “center”, for lack of a better term, is very diffuse, and there is no prescription for operation. What I refer to here as the center is not the National Political Committee (NPC), as it is the general guidelines for operation. What you do, how much you commit, and what you believe in is up to you. Contrast this with joining SA, or any other sect like the Party for Socialism and Liberation, where you would soon find yourself in a study group that would make you assimilate into their political line, and at the same time you would be cajoled into further recruiting members, selling newspapers or any other tool from the limited sect arsenal. However, when joining DSA, not only do you have the freedom of political line, which means anarchists coexist with social welfarists, but you also have the freedom of action, which means you can do whatever you want: union work, mutual aid or canvassing for a local or state election. If one is to unite (whatever that means) wide sections of the left like the DSA is hoping to do, then prescribing what members have to do is anathema. And this has worked. This diffuse center has permitted DSA to surpass the growth of other sects, because it acts majorly like a collection of locals, and the locals sometimes act as a collection of working groups. The diffuse center means that both the national DSA and its locals will be able to survive entryism which intends on splitting off a core, splits due to political or organizational differences (even if at some level entire locals can and have been lost, like the North Atlanta DSA chapter) and other problems sects are vulnerable to. 

The problem of structure

The organizational structure of a group has been too often tied to its politics (i.e. democratic centralism for Trotskists/Marxist-Leninists, horizontalism for anarchists). But even if they usually come together, there is room for decoupling. This does not happen much: organizational critiques are painted as unprincipled, which is partly true– too often they are thinly concealed wagers for power with an implicit message of “I can run things better than you”. This has resulted in persistent organizational models that originate from a type of democratic centralism arising during a brutal Civil War which required an overbalancing towards the center. 

But right now we are not in a Civil War. This long-running mistake should be amended if we are to build a structure that is operative and can present a serious challenge to the established order. The DSA’s response of letting local chapters possess the autonomy to run things as they please is an overcorrection that goes beyond what is necessary. The lack of a coherent center means that anybody can attempt to run as a member of DSA, and contest for its endorsement. Endorsements are often left to a vote by the locals, without definite criteria. Down the line, this leads to unaccountability. It is not only that a superstar such as AOC is completely unaccountable to DSA; this problem extends to any local member who has no real reason to follow guidelines from the organization after being elected. 

Because of this, DSA in effect functions more like a horizontal collective than a socialist party. This comes with all the problems known as the tyranny of structurelessness: the lack of structure on paper just means that there is an unacknowledged structure and unacknowledged channels for leveraging influence in the shape of passing resolutions or directing chapter money towards certain projects. And while anarchist affinity groups almost never exceed dozens of people, DSA members are faced with this problem in an organization that operates at a very different scale, in the tens of thousands of members nationally, and within chapters which are composed of thousands of members.

Of course, DSA has a national organization that provides vertical integration through dues, newspapers, national mailing lists and even a forum. But this is not what is important. To understand how the center operates, we must answer the question: if DSA is multi-tendency and in practice functions closer to a horizontal quasi-anarchist collective than a socialist party, why does it seem so wrapped up in electoral and reformist approaches? Why is it seen from the outside as a platform for progressive Democrats to be elected, even if the actual work on the ground is much broader? The answer to this question is that the most important of the vertical integrators are the electoral campaigns, especially those at the national level. This is what determines how the organization as a whole is seen from the outside, regardless of the work done at the local level. 

DSA’s growth is driven by electoral campaigns that get widespread attention. Events like the election of AOC to congress shows that socialism (with an asterisk) can win victories. This shared image has allowed, and still allows, the DSA to attract groups like the leftovers of the Bernie campaign better than any other group. The caucuses responsible for pushing the national Medicare4All campaign and the second Bernie endorsement know, either consciously or unconsciously, that this is what defines the DSA’s center, and not the mutual aid groups or the brake light clinics. To continue modeling DSA on that image, they attempt to use low-hanging national campaigns as a way to enforce some coherence on the national organization. Those who disagree with this approach often find themselves unable to communicate their disagreement because the proper formal channels simply do not exist, and they have little say in the informal channels focused on electoral campaigns. They end up misdiagnosing DSA’s electoral focus as a lack of democracy, a wide gap between leadership and rank-and-file.  And due to the lack of proper “vertical” communication and decision channels, members who do not agree with electoral approaches are left only with a direct confrontation to the superior organizational level. 

The real problem is that there is no real way to dissipate entropy. Mild conflicts arising from the diversity of membership cannot be solved, and the entropy increase has to go somewhere. In this case, the rise of the Build caucus is a symptom of this discontent and entropy accumulation. But the Build approach did not propose anything new except accentuating these problems by decentralizing further. This would do nothing to dissipate the entropy but instead would result in a progressively more chaotic organization. Build, or more explicitly anarchist caucuses such as the Libertarian Socialist Caucus, never managed to articulate an alternative vision for DSA’s center. This means that they were unable to challenge the national image of DSA provided by the electoralists. But ironically, even if the electoralists appear to have the upper hand, they have been unable to impose their vision on the members because of DSA’s horizontalism. There is no mandate to do certain kinds of work, another consequence of the lack of actual vertical integration. Which leaves DSA in an organizational conundrum that must be resolved.

All this is pointing towards a solution. What is needed is an adequate organizational balance that satisfies the criteria of local autonomy. Autonomy, unlike complete decentralization, is always relative, and never really absolute. In the large country of the United States it is useless to insist on a single tactic or approach. The autonomy of locals, and the autonomy of working groups, will generate a diversity of solutions to the problems of socialist construction the center could never come up with. Many heads are better than a single one, because they can see and hear much more, and can come up with many more ideas. However, these “heads” have to understand that they are embedded in the wider organizational task of socialist construction. In the absence of guidelines, autonomy becomes decentralization and functional units can lose their purpose. A local, or a working group, could easily dissipate after it frustrates itself. Even worse, it could become a self-sustained group that no longer tries to work towards the national or international goals of socialist construction and repeatedly pulls its resources for minor campaigns that do not look at a large goal on the horizon. 

To avoid this, the center must provide strategic guidelines for the locals in a general sense, and the locals must provide some more detailed guidance to the working groups to act. Otherwise, working groups would start acting as affinity groups, which eventually will dissipate as they find themselves ineffective to make dents into the system, or worse, keep running and consuming resources and people while failing to achieve quixotic ends. The same could happen with the locals, becoming too enmeshed with their area of existence to look to their neighbors or to remember that the goal of socialism escapes the city level.

Fighting for a socialist center: The Maoist and the base-building critiques

The guidance of the actually existing, diffuse center is insufficient. It is often disoriented, directed towards campaigns that are taken up without sufficient thought on how they can be conducted or how the end goal fits in the broader strategy. The most outstanding example of the lack of direction combined with wishful thinking are the two Jacobin articles by Dustin Guastella: “After the Nevada blowout, it’s Bernie’s party now” after Sanders’ Nevada victory, followed by a capitulation three weeks after called “Where do we go after last night’s defeat?”. In its current post-Bernie shape, with approaches such as the “Rank and File Strategy”, it is hardly better. It shows little promise, as it attempts to replicate a few labor successes without attempting an in-depth analysis of what made them successful, which geographical areas and which jobs to focus on, and many other variables socialists should focus on to replicate them. What remains in practice is a vague “join a unionized job” directive, as unsatisfactory as the Medicare for All push. It significantly fails at the organizational level: a large organization as DSA could perfectly pull resources into a few strategic areas to make a large impact.

A big reason why the current national caucuses are unable to articulate a strategy is because of where their ideas originate from. More often than not, caucuses like Bread & Roses have not sufficiently broken with ideas originating from expired US sects that are simply not viable in the current political and economic landscape. Sophia Burns’ criticism of the left as too white and too petit-bourgeois (and sometimes too male) strikes home here. If the DSA at large suffers from these sins, these caucuses augment them even more. Because of this, it is worth taking seriously the base-building critique. In my interpretation, this critique says that the left needs to consciously change its composition by choosing work that will bring in the dispossessed. This will help change its character by making it more tied to day-to-day struggles, and at the same time provide us with worker power which can actually stop the capitalist gears.

The base-building critique is hardly novel. As theorized by Kautsky and taken up by Lenin, the socialist movement is a merger of the workers’ movement and the socialist intelligentsia. When socialist parties are no longer embedded in the struggles of the working class, they cease to be vehicles for class struggle. Trotsky, for example, was adamant in his prescriptions to the U.S. Socialist Workers Party that they must recruit more workers to ensure that the political line remains Marxist. The fact that this needed to be pointed out is a testament to how far the current left is from its origins, and how it needs to “remerge” with the working-class movement to achieve its goals.

I choose to interpret the base-building critique as a critique of the actually existing left and its composition. Because of this, it is hardly a complete program, a long-term strategy, or an organizing method. It is just a statement of what is needed to recover the worker component of the socialist merger. We could also take base-building further than this, and it slowly becomes something akin to the Maoist “mass line”. Indeed, it could seem like the Maoist “mass line” is a superior version of base-building. In some ways, this is true: it is more of a complete program than base-building, as it also provides guidelines for a strategy (take the people’s ideas and reformulate them in Marxist terms) and an organizational model (from the people to the people). However, I see this as an illegitimate extension of the base-building critique, and Maoists again commit the sin of tying politics and organizational models too close together. 

The best rationale for the mass line is provided by J. Moufawad-Paul in his book Continuity and Rupture. By mixing with the masses, the party cadres change themselves, and as a consequence, the party changes. The party program has to become a reflection of the demands of the masses, filtered and articulated using the party’s language. This opens another can of worms: the party must rise above the masses to translate their demands, but the party itself must be embedded and become part of the masses. It introduces a delicate “dialectical” balance to solve the problems of party bureaucratization, which has historically not worked. The cultural revolution in China was supposed to be the best example of this: by going to the people, and learning from them, cadres would be changed, and this way counter-revolutionary thought, or bourgeois ideas, would be wiped out. But as any reader of history knows, after the Cultural Revolution came the victory of “the capitalist roaders”. And Nepal does not show much promise either for the “proletarian line”, as the two-line struggle also ended up in a victory of the bourgeois forces. The mass line was never able to prevent what it was supposed to avoid, the triumph of capitalist ideas. 

By failing to conduct thorough organizational study and insufficiently distinguishing between how things are supposed to work and how they actually work, the stronger versions of the mass line fall into a voluntaristic idealism where correct ideas alone will achieve correct results if we just were to struggle hard enough. But we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, we should take what we can use and supplement it with adequate organizational science. A cultural revolution in US society is still necessary after the social revolution even if base-building and the weaker versions of the mass line do not provide an infallible solution for strategy and organization. We should look at these critiques as a way to ground the struggle around a working-class program. Indeed, all of DSA’s problems would not be solved by making Micah Utrecht and Bhaskar Sunkara distribute food in the Bronx, even if it might make them relate better to the actual working class and formulate better political demands. 

Where to go from here?

To reiterate the theme of this article, what is needed is not only an adequate center with a clear communist program, but also a proper organizational model which will fight for this program.

For the first, I would propose a unifying center of programmatic cohesion rather than commitment to this or that branch of revolutionary Marxism. A program should be understood in the sense of something you can accept for the basic conditions under which you would take power. This is different from historical or theoretical agreement, or a current strategy such as “get union jobs” or ”support Bernie Sanders for president”. Accepting the program means you may disagree with some or many points but are willing to put yourself behind it as the overall expression of the movement’s aims. A program should direct the elemental energy of the masses, recently seen in the protests around the killing of George Floyd, into a purpose. Otherwise, this energy is dissipated like steam, failing to turn the engine of revolution.

I am unsure whether the DSA with its current form and class composition would be able to provide an adequate minimum/maximum communist program in the Macnairist model. One of the main reasons behind this is its current class composition: it seems to me that the majority of the organization’s current members would accept the taking of power under aims which would be at best social-democratic and insufficiently anti-imperialist and anti-racist, rather than communist. But this does not mean that for now, we cannot take this model, while we consciously work to make DSA reflect the composition of the working-class. Using the Marxist Center as a model, there should still be minimal points of unity that everyone agrees to. This would serve as a guideline for the organization, and based on this program, short- and long-terms strategic guidelines should be developed. These would be communicated to the lower levels, where flexibility on their implementation should be allowed, which can harness the inherently better ability of the lower levels to adapt to their local circumstances and best knowledge of how to use the resources which they have available. 

For the second, serious organizational changes must be made to integrate properly all levels of the DSA hierarchy. The principles listed at the end of The Tyranny of Structurelessness must be studied over and over again. But this is not enough, Jo Freeman understood things must evolve as a trial-and-error. Furthermore, as a national organization, DSA has structures at several hierarchical levels: national, locals, working groups, and members. All of these must communicate with each other appropriately. While I do not have the answers to exactly how this should be done, we must take immense care in developing them adequately. First of all, it must be understood that if accountable communication channels and codified power is not provided, this will arise in an informal unaccountable manner. While the internet has made mass communication available, it is not always the case that this is an advantage. Members must not feel that they need to vent on Twitter or other social media. People who spend more time on the internet tend to have a disproportionate influence on the conversation, compared to those who spend time doing the actual work on the ground and probably have more to contribute. The ability of social media to give unchecked social power to certain people, as well as the inability to contrast facts on the ground with overblown publicity, has to be reckoned with. 

An alternative to this would be providing a place to have a serious discussion and reevaluation of tactics, on time-scales faster than two-year national conventions. This would provide not only a feedback mechanism for the center to adapt its directives, but can also help generate horizontal communication channels across which locals share their experiences and learn from each other. This currently happens in social media for several reasons: ease of access, availability of readers… But an easily solvable one is that there is no place to do this officially. As long as this is not provided, informal horizontal communications will arise which are unaccountable (and often damaging) to the organization. An alternative solution such as bi-monthly members bulletins at national and local levels, which limit the amount of information and make sure that it is trusted, can be such an avenue. 

These prescriptions are very general and open to debate. The organizational ones will require constant evaluation to check if they are solving the problems designed to solve. But I believe that they point in the direction of what is needed to construct a proper vehicle for fighting. The final idea I believe must be digested is an understanding that we are comrades and not friends. We have responsibilities to each other because we committed to a larger movement, not because we like each other. It is fine to disagree on the details, and this should not be taken personally. We stand together because we accept the broader goals of the movement. We do not have to share hobbies or feel affinity towards each other. We have to trust each other and know that we play on the same team. In that spirit, I provide this piece as a good faith attempt to solve some of the problems I see around me.

For the Unity of Marxists with the Dispossessed: The Bolsheviks and the State, 1912-1917

 A reply by Medway Baker to Sophia Burns’  article For the Unity of Marxists, or the Unity of the Dispossessed?.    

In a previous article, Comrade Sophia Burns argued for the “unity of the dispossessed,” in opposition to the “unity of Marxists” proposed by Comrades Rosa Janis and Parker McQueeney. She correctly exposes the largely petit-bourgeois makeup of the contemporary left, critiques its culture of protest (which, as she notes, often does little to build up an organised revolutionary force, but rather “attract[s] dissident anger and channel[s] it harmlessly into the ground”), and identifies that Marxists must “gain experience with class struggle, gradually cultivate a base among the dispossessed, and eventually begin to develop the necessary forces to establish revolutionary sovereignty.” However, she goes too far in her identification of what constitutes collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Burns is correct that the goal of any Marxist minimum programme must be “not [to] join[] the official political realm but [to] creat[e] an entirely new one, an insurrectionary proletarian state”. But even as she advocates for the overthrow of the state and the establishment of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, she rejects key lessons of the Bolshevik experience, both before the establishment of “dual power” and after. When she insists on “not lobbying [the government], participating in its elections… or… protesting it”, Burns leaves to us only a single tactic: the formation of “struggle committees” for the fulfillment of the workers’ demands in their struggles against the bosses and the landlords. Presumably these “struggle committees” are to form the nucleus of the future workers’ state. 

This tactical orientation leaves something to be desired, even by Burns’ own admission. “Something more is needed,” she says. “I don’t know what it is. It’ll take a lot of experimentation and, likely, plenty of failures to figure it out.” This is a respectable position to hold, and she is on the right track. She correctly identifies the need for “mass organizations with communist leadership actively destabilizing the liberal order” and “developing the organizational capacity to govern.” As I have argued in the past, it is necessary to form a workers’ party with a revolutionary programme, which will train the proletariat in self-governance through the formation of counter-hegemonic, democratic proletarian civic institutions. These institutions, administered and staffed by the proletariat, must substitute the functions of the bourgeois state following the seizure of power. Burns is not hostile to party-building—indeed, she admits that it “will likely be necessary”—but her conception of this is not comprehensive. 

In How Do You Do Politics? Burns shows the beginnings of the path forward. Although I have some misgivings about her overall thesis, her tactical orientation of directly engaging with workers in the class struggle is correct. But what comes after? Where do we go once we’ve begun to build up this organic base among the workers? 

In accordance with Burns’ own advocacy of “‘dual power’ the way Lenin meant it”, we will explore the ways in which the Bolsheviks built up their mass base among the proletariat. Contrary to Burns’ insistence that the revolutionary movement must boycott all engagement with the bourgeois state, I will argue that such engagement was crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October 1917. The Bolsheviks did not only engage in elections to the soviets—the “insurrectionary proletarian state”, as Burns puts it—but they also made demands of the Provisional Government, called for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and participated in bourgeois elections to the Constituent Assembly and the municipal Dumas. Even before the February Revolution, they participated in elections to the tsarist Duma, which was hardly representative and had no real legislative power. We will also examine the notion of “dual power” in the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary strategy in 1917, in order to provide context for these discussions. 

It is true that many attempts by modern-day Marxists to engage in elections are frankly opportunistic, and fail to advance the revolutionary cause. However, as this foray into Russian revolutionary history will reveal, boycotting elections (and other forms of engagement with the state) on principle would be a grave mistake. Although Cosmonaut has published examinations of communist electoral tactics in the past, this remains a very muddled issue for the left, and Burns’ needed intervention provides an opportunity to clarify how communists should orient ourselves vis-à-vis the state. For the moment, the Marxist left in most of the Global North remains too weak to engage in successful electoral tactics on any significant scale, but if we are to engage in party-building, we must be clear about what we plan to do with the party once it has been formed. It is impossible to formulate short-term tactics without a long-term strategy; hopefully, this examination of the Bolshevik strategy can help to inform Marxist revolutionary strategy today. 

Last session of the third Duma, October 15, 1911.

Before the Revolution: The Duma

The trial has unfolded a picture of revolutionary Social-Democracy taking advantage of parliamentarism, the like of which has not been witnessed in international Socialism. This example will, more than all speeches, appeal to the minds and hearts of the proletarian masses; it will, more than any arguments, repudiate the legalist-opportunists and anarchist phrase-mongers…. There was a Workers’ Party in Russia whose deputies neither shone with fine rhetoric, nor had “access” to the bourgeois intellectual drawing rooms, nor possessed the business-like efficiency of a ‘European’ lawyer and parliamentarian, but excelled in maintaining connections with the working masses, in ardent work among those masses, in carrying out the small, unpretentious, difficult, thankless and unusually dangerous functions of illegal propagandists and organisers…. The ‘Pravdist’ papers and the ‘Muranov type’ of work have brought about the unity of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia…. It is with this section that we must work. It is its unity that must be defended against social-chauvinism. It is along this road that the labour movement of Russia can develop towards social revolution.

— V. I. Lenin, 19151

The State Duma was hardly a democratic body. It had no true legislative power and absolutely no power over the executive. The Russian workers had little faith in it. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks chose to participate in the elections, even though they knew they would be totally unable to effect any kind of legislative change towards socialism in doing so. Today, in an age of polarisation between electoral opportunism and abstentionism, this may seem strange. If the Bolsheviks had no illusions in the State Duma, and they were committed to effecting revolutionary change, why would they waste their time with sham elections? 

Before answering this question, we should note that the Bolsheviks were not opposed a priori to a boycott of the Duma. In fact, Lenin proposed just this in 1905, when, in response to the great revolutionary upheaval that had taken hold of Russia, the Tsar’s government proposed the convocation of a Duma which would take on a merely advisory role. Nevertheless, Lenin was opposed to “mere passive abstention from voting,” insisting that a boycott of the elections must be an “active boycott”, which “should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth.”2 It is clear from this formulation that the active boycott tactic can only be applied under the conditions of a mass revolutionary upsurge, and requires the existence of a mass workers’ party. 

Lenin would elaborate on this theme two years later, reflecting on the experience of the 1905 revolution. This time, however, he argued against a boycott of the Duma—not on the basis that the Duma had become any more democratic than before, but on the basis that the situation was no longer conducive to an insurrection: 

The Social-Democrat who takes a Marxist stand draws his conclusions about the boycott not from the degree of reactionariness of one or another institution, but from the existence of those special conditions of struggle that, as the experience of the Russian revolution has now shown, make it possible to apply the specific method known as boycott.3

Further, 

All boycott is a struggle, not within the framework of a given institution, but against its emergence, or, to put it more broadly, against it becoming operative. Therefore, those who… opposed the boycott on the general grounds that it was necessary for a Marxist to make use of representative institutions, thereby only revealed absurd doctrinairism… Unquestionably, a Marxist should make use of representative institutions. Does that imply that a Marxist cannot, under certain conditions, stand for a struggle not within the framework of a given institution but against that institution being brought into existence? No, it does not, because this general argument applies only to those cases where there is no room for a struggle to prevent such an institution from coming into being. The boycott is a controversial question precisely because it is a question of whether there is room for a struggle to prevent the emergence of such institutions…. 

… [T]he boycott is a means of struggle aimed directly at overthrowing the old regime, or, at the worst, i.e., when the assault is not strong enough for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be unable to set up that institution, unable to make it operate. Consequently, to be successful the boycott requires a direct struggle against the old regime, an uprising against it and mass disobedience to it in a large number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the conditions for preparing an uprising). Boycott is a refusal to recognise the old regime, a refusal, of course, not in words, but in deeds, i.e., it is something that finds expression not only in cries or the slogans of organisations, but in a definite movement of the mass of the people, who systematically defy the laws of the old regime, systematically set up new institutions, which, though unlawful, actually exist, and so on and so forth. The connection between boycott and the broad revolutionary upswing is thus obvious: boycott is the most decisive means of struggle, which rejects not the form of organisation of the given institution, but its very existence. Boycott is a declaration of open war against the old regime, a direct attack upon it. Unless there is a broad revolutionary upswing, unless there is mass unrest which overflows, as it were, the bounds of the old legality, there can be no question of the boycott succeeding.4

In Lenin’s formulation, it is thus necessary to use the state institutions to the benefit of the revolutionary movement when opposing the state outright is impossible; to boycott these institutions, without having the ability to truly contest their legitimacy, is to spurn a potentially useful avenue of propaganda and revolutionary work. While it could be argued that this formulation is incorrect or no longer applicable, we must understand this context if we are to understand the Bolsheviks’ use of election campaigns and the Duma rostrum. 

With this in mind, we can return to the question of how participation in the Duma could benefit the revolutionary movement. The writings of Alexei Badayev, a factory worker and a Bolshevik deputy to the Duma from 1912 to 1914, offer a great deal of insight into this matter: 

The Fourth Duma was to follow in the footsteps of the Third. The electoral law remained the same, and therefore the majority in the new Duma was bound to be as Black Hundred as before. There was no doubt that the activities of the Fourth Duma would also be directed against the workers and that its legislation would be of no use either to the workers or the peasantry. 

In spite of these considerations the Social-Democratic Party decided to take an active part in the elections as it had done in those for the Second and Third Dumas. The experience of the preceding years had shown the great importance of an election campaign from the standpoint of agitation, and the important role played by Social-Democratic fractions in the Duma. Our fractions, while refusing to take part in the so-called ‘positive’ work of legislation, used the Duma rostrum for revolutionary agitation. The work of the Social-Democratic fractions outside the Duma was still more important; they were becoming the organising centres of Party work in Russia. Therefore our Party decided that active participation in the campaign was necessary.5

Indeed, the election campaign was a great opportunity for the elaboration of the party’s tactics and the development of the workers’ class-consciousness. Although the tsarist police did their utmost to prevent public meetings during the campaigns, debates in Pravda and Luch (the Mensheviks’ newspaper) were widely read by workers and served to clarify the programme of revolutionary social democracy. This helped set the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary platform (centred around the slogans of a democratic republic, an eight-hour workday, and the confiscation of the landlords’ estates, to which the rest of the minimum programme for workers’ power was to be linked) apart from the opportunistic and legalistic slogans of the Mensheviks (which failed to challenge the tsarist, feudal order in a revolutionary manner).6 The election campaign spurred the Bolsheviks to forge true programmatic unity and then helped them to win the proletariat to this programme. Throughout the campaign, the Bolsheviks and their supporters among the working class were subjected to considerable police repression, and while this disrupted a great deal of potentially valuable propaganda work, it also strengthened the solidarity of the workers. 

The most egregious example of such repression is perhaps the invalidation of the election results from 29 factories and mills throughout St. Petersburg, disqualifying their delegates from participating in the electoral college that would choose electors who would go on, along with the electors of the other classes of St. Petersburg, to select a deputy from among themselves.7 

The disqualification of the delegates triggered a militant reaction by the workers of St. Petersburg: more than 70,000 workers would go out on strike, including many of those whose delegates had not been disqualified. No economic demands were presented; the core of the strike was centered around the right to vote. The workers made a great show of unity and discipline and were able to win their demands: not only were new elections to be held, but many factories and mills which had previously been unable to participate in the elections were to be included.8 It was a great victory for the working class, which exemplifies the value of engaging in political struggles against the state, both through elections and in the streets. The electoral and street actions reinforced each other and pushed the class struggle beyond simple economistic demands to a question of state power. The crucial factor is the presentation of concrete demands on a class basis, demands that expose the fundamental opposition between the exploiters and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled. This type of engagement with the state is hardly comparable to the opportunistic election campaigns and liberal activist culture to which so much of the modern left is wedded. 

The election campaign was conducted upon a revolutionary, class basis, which united workers around the struggle for their political rights and the Bolshevik programme. The campaign forced the distinctions between the revolutionary Bolsheviks and the “legalist-opportunist” Mensheviks out into the open, for all the workers to see. It mobilised the forces of labour against the ruling class in a tangible way that clearly raised the workers’ class consciousness. Following the second round of elections, the workers voted to bind their delegates to a set of instructions drafted by the Bolsheviks, which laid out the role of the deputies as specifically revolutionary:

The Duma tribune is, under the present conditions, one of the best means for enlightening and organising the broad masses of the proletariat. 

It is for this very purpose that we are sending our deputy into the Duma, and we charge him and the whole Social-Democratic fraction of the Fourth Duma to make widely known our demands from the Duma tribune, and not to play at legislation in the State Duma…. 

We want to hear the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic fraction ring out loudly from the Duma tribune proclaiming the final goal of the proletariat…. We call upon the Social-Democratic- fraction of the Fourth Duma, in its work on the basis of the above slogans, to act in unity and with its ranks closed.

Let it gather its strength from constant contact with the broad masses. 

Let it march shoulder to shoulder with the political organisation of the working class of Russia.9

The Bolshevik deputies elected to the Duma held to this promise. “During my daily visits to the Pravda offices,” Badayev recalls, “I met the representatives of labour organisations and became acquainted with the moods of the workers. Workers came there from all the city districts and related what had taken place at factories and works, and how the legal and illegal organisations were functioning. Conversations and meetings with the representatives of the revolutionary workers supplied me with a vast amount of material for my future activity in the Duma.”10 

Once within the halls of Tauride Palace, where the Duma sat, the Social-Democratic fraction declared its irreconcilable opposition to the legislative work of the body from day one. They refused to participate in electing the chairman of the Duma, as “the chairman of such a Duma would systematically attack members of the Social-Democratic fraction, whenever the latter spoke from the Duma rostrum in defence of the interests of the masses…. You are welcome to choose a chairman acceptable to the majority; we shall use the rostrum in the interests of the people.”11 In Badayev’s words: 

… [W]e demonstrated, on the first day of the Fourth Duma, that there could be no question of ‘parliamentary’ work for us, that the working class only used the Duma for the greater consolidation and strengthening of the revolutionary struggle in the country. A similar attitude determined the nature of our relations with the Duma majority. No joint work, but a sustained struggle against the Rights, the Octobrists and the Cadets, and their exposure in the eyes of the workers; this was the task of the workers’ deputies in the Duma of the landlords and nobles.12

Another example of the mutual reinforcement of mass action and activities in the Duma came only a short while later. The metalworkers’ union—one of the most advanced workers’ organisations in Russia, with which the party had conducted a great deal of work—was subjected, like all Russian trade unions, to periodic suppressions, forcing it to refound itself under a new name each time. In late 1912, once again, the police shut down the union and worked to prevent its refoundation. In the process, both the police and the municipal government violated the 1906 law that accorded some meager protections to the unions. 

The Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of these illegal proceedings to register an interpellation. This process was always convoluted, and the government did all it could to limit speeches and debate. Nevertheless, the Social-Democratic fraction took advantage of whatever parts of the bureaucratic procedure they could. In particular, they were allowed to make speeches to argue for the urgency of a matter, which would have to be accepted in order for the interpellation to be made. Although the urgency of those matters raised by the Social-Democrats was consistently denied, the fraction frequently used these speeches to denounce the government and call for revolution. In this particular instance, on December 14, the interpellation was accompanied by a one-day strike of the St. Petersburg workers, who held public meetings to pass resolutions of protest against the suppression of the trade unions, and in support of the Social-Democratic fraction’s interpellation. 

What the Social-Democrats had planned as a one-day strike continued the next day, and expanded to include even more workers than the day before. Some of the “unreliable” workers were fired, and this only triggered a third day of strikes, demanding their reinstatement. The Social-Democratic fraction remained at the centre of workers’ struggles during these days. They remained in constant contact with the strikers, helped to coordinate funds and develop slogans, and served as negotiators with the authorities. The workers of the whole city supported, in words and in deeds, the plight of the dismissed workers, and the strike ultimately lasted over two weeks.13

By 1914, the Bolsheviks were a truly mass workers’ party, despite their conditions of illegality. But with the outbreak of the war, this work all came to an end. Patriotic sentiments were running high: pro-war demonstrators marched through the streets, praising the Tsar and beating passers-by who failed to meet the correct standards of nationalist fervour; workers’ organisations were suppressed, and patriotic onlookers aided the police in clashes with strikers and anti-war demonstrators.14

The Bolsheviks declared “War against War”15, and walked out of the Duma rather than participate in the vote for war credits. The Bolshevik deputies were soon arrested, in violation of their parliamentary immunity. The workers protested but were too weak to secure the freedom of the deputies. The party was crippled by the destruction of this centre of revolutionary work, along with the destruction of so many other organising centres. The proletariat won only a single victory in this regard: the government, fearing a backlash in the case that they were to execute the deputies, turned the case over from the military to the civilian courts. 16

Even this was an opportunity for propaganda among the workers, and the party and the deputies seized upon it. The trial was highly publicised by the Bolshevik press, and the deputies defended their revolutionary work with zeal. They insisted that the Russian workers would remember this repression of their chosen representatives, and foretold that they would “not remain long in exile but [would] soon return in triumph.”17 

And so, in 1917, they did. 

From the First Revolution to the Second: Dual Power

The deputies, alongside the rest of the Bolshevik party, returned from exile following the overthrow of the Tsar in February. The bourgeoisie had formed a Provisional Government; the workers and soldiers had formed the soviets. The former represented the bourgeois republic; the latter, the workers’ and peasants’ republic. Lenin described this situation using the term “dual power.” Let us examine what he meant by this, and what political conclusions he drew from this analysis. 

According to the old way of thinking, the rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be followed by the rule of the proletariat and the peasantry, by their dictatorship. 

In real life, however, things have already turned out differently; there has been an extremely original, novel and unprecedented interlacing of the one with the other. We have side by side, existing together, simultaneously, both the rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) and a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which is voluntarily ceding power to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily making itself an appendage of the bourgeoisie.

For it must not be forgotten that actually, in Petrograd, the power is in the hands of the workers and soldiers; the new government is not using and cannot use violence against them, because there is no police, no army standing apart from the people, no officialdom standing all-powerful above the people. 

… [F]reely elected soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies are freely joining the second, parallel government, and are freely supplementing, developing and completing it. And, just as freely, they are surrendering power to the bourgeoisie…18

It is important to note that “power” (vlast) refers specifically to the sovereign state authority. This is a key point: the existence of more than one vlast is necessarily a contradiction in terms because by definition there can only be one sovereign authority in a single state. “Dual power”, then, is a situation in which the narod (the workers and peasants, analogous to Burns’ use of “the dispossessed”) and the bourgeoisie each has an embryonic vlast, the former (the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies) being unwilling to establish a “firm vlast”, and the latter (the Provisional Government) being unable to establish one. In effect, then, there is no true vlast under these conditions. The necessary outcome of this situation is, therefore, the end of dual power, and the establishment of a firm vlast around a single class pole: either that of the bourgeoisie (in the form of the Provisional Government) or that of the narod (in the form of the soviets).19  Lenin summarised this situation thus: 

The bourgeoisie stands for the undivided power (vlast) of the bourgeoisie. 

The class-conscious workers stand for the undivided power (vlast) of the Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’, Peasants’, and Soldiers’ Deputies—for undivided power (vlast) made possible not by adventurist acts, but by clarifying proletarian minds, by emancipating them from the influence of the bourgeoisie20

We must ably, carefully, clear people’s minds and lead the proletariat and poor peasantry forward, away from ‘dual power’ towards the full power of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.21

Soviet power came into existence in February; October was merely the point at which it ceased to tolerate the Provisional Government, ending the period of “dual power.” To speak, then, of dual power as an aim of the revolutionary movement is to fundamentally misunderstand the lessons of October. In the Bolsheviks’ view, dual power was never an aim but an unexpected obstacle—an aberrant result of the peculiar conditions of the Russian Revolution—which was to be overcome. 

Even so, the Bolsheviks were not opposed to the convention of the Constituent Assembly; in fact, they often criticised the Provisional Government for delaying the elections to it. One of the first demands of the Bolsheviks following the February Revolution was “to convene a Constituent Assembly as speedily as possible” (alongside the establishment of the soviet vlast).22 Lenin noted upon his return to Russia, 

I attacked the Provisional Government for not having appointed an early date, or any date at all, for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and for confining itself to promises. I argued that without the Soviets  of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies the convocation of the Constituent Assembly is not guaranteed and its success is impossible.23

Even beyond this, the Bolsheviks participated in the municipal Duma elections in the summer of 1917, much in the same way they used the prewar Duma elections. In particular, they took advantage of the campaign to make a series of demands of the Provisional Government—demands which they knew the government could not meet. “Unless these demands are met,” Pravda proclaimed, “unless a fight is waged for these demands, not a single serious municipal reform and no democratization of municipal affairs is conceivable.”24 These demands were explicitly connected to the transfer of power to the narod. Although the municipal Dumas were not class organs—they did not represent the “insurrectionary state”—the election campaigns were used by the Bolsheviks to agitate for the takeover of the full vlast by the insurrectionary state, as well as to measure the balance of class forces.25 They heartily urged the workers and soldiers to vote, in such forceful terms as: “You, and you alone, comrades, will be to blame if you do not make full use of this right [to vote]…. [B]e capable now of battling for your interests by voting for our Party!”26 

Making demands of the Provisional Government was a key tactic of the Bolshevik party during the revolutionary period. Although in April there was a debate between Lenin and the other Bolsheviks over the issue of “kontrol”, that is, supervision of the Provisional Government by the Soviet, Lars Lih chalks this up to essentially a misunderstanding between Lenin and the Petrograd Bolsheviks, which was resolved by the end of April in a manner that satisfied both camps. The crux of the debate was over the role of kontrol in the revolution: while the moderate socialists proposed kontrol as a means of maintaining the vlast of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks proposed it as a means of exposing the Provisional Government as incapable of carrying out the revolution “to the end.”27 

This tactic of making demands, in order to expose the Provisional Government’s counterrevolutionary nature, was used to great effect throughout 1917. The Bolsheviks maintained in their propaganda that the Provisional Government, to the extent that it carried out revolutionary measures against tsarism, only did so under pressure from the workers and soldiers, and its ultimate counterrevolutionary nature would inevitably lead to a confrontation between revolutionary democracy (i.e. the narod) and the bourgeoisie. Hence, demands for a democratic republic, an end to the war, redistribution of the land, the publication and annulment of the secret treaties, etc. were not made under the pretense that the Provisional Government would or could carry these out. Stalin wrote in August: 

The Party declares that unless these demands are realized it will be impossible to save the revolution, which for half a year now has been stifling in the clutches of war and general disruption. 

The Party declares that the only possible way of securing these demands is to break with the capitalists, completely liquidate the bourgeois counter-revolution, and transfer power in the country to the revolutionary workers, peasants, and soldiers. 

That is the only means of saving the country and the revolution from collapse.28

This method must be clearly delineated from that of making demands in a way that obscures the necessity of taking power. Revolution is not a secondary concern in this type of propaganda, but placed front and centre. Demands are formulated specifically in connection with overthrowing the bourgeoisie: “All propaganda, agitation and the organisation of the millions must immediately be directed towards [transferring power to the soviets].”29

This way of making demands of the bourgeois state is far from the usual, liberal-democratic practice of lobbying. These demands, backed up by organising the proletariat through the Bolshevik type of electoral work and street actions, can be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of the revolution. It is true that none of these methods individually can accomplish revolution, but that goes just as much for organising workers in “struggle committees” as it does for electoral participation, making demands of the government, or participating in street protests. Ultimately, the Bolsheviks used all four of these tools to win the confidence of the dispossessed and take power in October. 

Bolshevik Central Committee on the eve of the revolution.

Conclusion

Burns is correct to call for Marxists to focus on organising the proletariat, and she is equally correct to identify erroneous, opportunistic and petit-bourgeois activist tendencies in the contemporary left. However, her solution falls short: her tactical inflexibility leads her to reject participation in elections or making demands of the bourgeois state out of hand—tactics which, as we have shown above, were crucial to the Bolshevik victory in October. 

Comrades Janis and McQueeney are correct to call for programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists, and they are correct to identify DSA as one possible avenue through which to fight for this unity. The task of Marxists in DSA is not only to organise the working class, but also to fight for a revolutionary programme, and to elaborate on the tactics that may assist organising efforts. While there is an influential opportunistic tendency in DSA that insists on tailing the Democratic Party (either temporarily or indefinitely), this is not the only possible electoral tactic. This opportunism must be fought against, in favour of a class-independent electoral tactic; one that, like the Bolsheviks’, serves to heighten the consciousness of the proletariat, to rally their numbers to the revolutionary programme, and above all to support DSA’s organising work. The specifics of this tactic must be left up to the revolutionary Marxists in DSA, who will need to deliberate among themselves, examine the objective conditions, and engage in debate with both opportunists and abstentionists in order to formulate a revolutionary orientation to bourgeois elections suitable to 21st-century American conditions. That said, the core of this tactic must consist of: 

    1. An immediate break with the Democratic Party and all other bourgeois parties, 
    2. Using electoral and parliamentary work above all to support the task of organising the proletariat, rather than for its own sake, and 
    3. Irreconcilable opposition to the American state, its military and police, and taking advantage of every opportunity to obstruct its functioning. 

It is possible that the best electoral tactic for the present moment is to temporarily refrain from electoral work in favour of organising the working class. It is also possible that the best electoral tactic will involve participation in elections at various levels of government in different degrees. A discussion of these details is well beyond the scope of this essay, but it is urgent that such discussions take place, that revolutionary Marxists in DSA begin to forge programmatic unity, and that the struggle is taken up against opportunist collaboration with the bourgeois state. 

Comrade Burns asks us: “For the unity of Marxists, or the unity of the dispossessed?” This question, although thought-provoking in a necessary way, sets up a false dichotomy. For the Bolsheviks, there was never a question of one or the other. They saw the programmatic unity of revolutionary Marxists as bringing about the unity of the dispossessed around the programme of revolution; and this unity of the dispossessed, in turn, empowered the party of revolution, transforming it from a circle of intellectuals into a potent weapon of the class struggle. The revolution was made possible, not by one or the other, but by both: the unity of Marxists with the dispossessed, the unity of the revolutionary programme with the workers’ movement. This is the lesson of the October Revolution; this is the lesson that we must remember, as the left vacillates between opportunism and impotency if we are to recreate a revolutionary movement, if we are to win power, if we are to achieve communism. 

For the Unity of Marxists: A Response to Fog & Storm

Rosa Janis and Parker McQueeney respond to “DSA Convention: Fog & Storm,” arguing that the approach the authors argue for de-emphasizes issues of political struggle. 

The intent of this article is to engage in a good-faith critique of another that was published recently by Cosmonaut, “DSA National Convention: Fog and Storm “by Gabriel Pierre & Miah Simone. In writing this we hope not only to create a polite dialogue on tactics and ideology but to lay out a “Macnairist” position for the future of the DSA. We only begrudgingly label ourselves, along with others on the editorial board of Cosmonaut, as Macnairist because we derive our politics from the work of the British Marxist Mike Macnair, particularly the politics laid out in his book Revolutionary Strategy. However, the task we set out for ourselves is not simply to follow the word of Macnair but to adopt the theoretical developments of his work in the context of the particularities of the United States. This involves working within the DSA and other organizations like Marxist Center to unite Marxists around a clear minimum-maximum program to form a mass party-movement. Standing in the way of this goal is petty factionalism which turns what should be even-handed discussions of issues into an all-out sectarian brawl. The article that we are responding to is tainted by that obfuscating brawl in its analysis of DSA, using a faulty typology to argue in favor of the political line of the DSA Build caucus (though they claim to not be caucus) as an opposition to the Bread and Roses caucus. This is not to say that the Bread and Roses caucus is not guilty of any errors or wrongdoing, There is, however, no meaningful reason to privilege Build over Bread and Roses.

The Problem of Typology

Gabriel Pierre & Miah Simone open their article by describing the way in which the struggles within the DSA are usually framed: the narrative of centralizers (Bread and Roses) vs decentralizers (the Libertarian Socialist Caucus and Build DSA). While being somewhat accurate, this framing ignores the strategic differences between these factions. They view the factions from the perspective of what they actually do rather than focusing on their ideological divides to categorize them, which on paper sounds like a good idea. The problem is the typology they use, which is that the US Left supposedly has only four tendencies (lifted from Sophia Burns). This typology is incredibly limiting and they do not apply it accurately. The tendencies go as follows:

Government Socialists — Government socialists are pragmatic above all else. They exist either explicitly within the “grassroots progressive” Democratic Party faction, or else as local-level political players within its broad sphere of influence. While they disagree about the ultimate goal of the reforms they pursue (some want outright communism at some unspecified future point, while others think a Sweden-style system is enough), they are united in their policy-focused, realpolitik approach. Winnable reform fights are their bread and butter. They would rather impact policy by “getting their hands dirty” than retain “ideological purity” at the cost of actual influence. 

Protest Militants —These view government socialists with contempt, seeing little difference between them and the outright liberals with whom they collaborate. Protest militants tend to stay away from policy campaigns and electoral since in their view, protest and “power in the streets” is what really matters.

Expressive Hobbyists — Many expressive hobbyists attend the same demonstrations as protest militants, but for them, the point isn’t exciting “revolutionary” confrontation. Rather, they’re the alphabet-soup sects that bring their own signs and start their own chants to “raise consciousness.” They hold academic conferences to talk about the latest developments in radical theory, form endless study circles, and start online journals to read each other’s analysis. Different sub-tendencies prefer social-media arguing and meme-making, seeking faculty or progressive-media jobs, selling newspapers at whatever protest is in the news this week, or making zines with their friends.

Base-Builders — Base-builders start by recognizing that in the US, the working class exists in economic terms, but does not exist as what Marx called a “class-for-itself”: a class organized through its own infrastructure of institutions, capable of consciously contesting with other classes for social power. Because such an organized base for mass socialism is absent, base-builders think the top leftist priority should be to establish one. 

The first major problem with this typology is that it is completely ahistorical in terms of understanding how leftist organizations functioned during the 20th century. While it may be true now that plenty of leftist organizations are limited in their capacities to the point where they are limited to only one of these tactics, in the 20th century every successful mass organization from the early German Social Democratic Party to the Black Panther Party pursued multiple routes of organizing at the same time. The German SPD engaged in elections and pushed for democratic reforms while creating newspapers, schools, cultural and athletic clubs. The Black Panther Party pursued what could be called base-building in the form of their Serve the People programs, yet they still ran candidates for local offices and taught theory to people through their regular publications. No successful mass party could ever possibly fit within one category of this typology as it is merely describing all the functions that are necessary and developed simultaneously with each other (propaganda, engaging in the battle of democracy, “base building” etc). 

The second problem with the four tendencies typology is that there is no meaningful distinction between the practices of “community organizers” (which would fall under the category of ‘protest militants’) and the actual practices of “base-builders” beyond radical posturing. In fact, even liberal activist NGOs seek to organize poor people into a mass base through things such things as tenant unions, community organizations, etc. Red Guards Austin attempted to do the kind of organizing that is described by Sophia Burns as unique to the “base building” tendency while still being “protest militants.” To pretend that base-building is a new tendency rather than common practice among leftists of almost all shapes and sizes is fundamentally absurd. 

There’s an overarching reason for “base-building” not being a real tendency on the left. That is that, for all the pretenses of it being a meaningful strategy for the left, it has no real strategy. Base-builders do not lay out a path for taking power but focus on what is essential community organizing because they are desperate to avoid the real ideological differences among them: the divide between anarchists, communists, and socialists and their approaches to the political program. In her essay, Burns, along with many other (but not all) theorists of base-building, seeks to sidestep any questions of the political program, the road to power, and post-revolutionary society in order to pursue unity in practice. While being fine in the short-term, this will lead to major conflicts and disunity in the future when the mass base for socialism exists but is rendered completely befuddled as to what to do with their newfound strength. Even though Burns has abandoned the framework that she initially set out in her essay “What is the Left?”, the authors of “Fog and Storm” still use the typology of “Four Tendencies.” Many who initially embraced the idea of base-building as a tendency have given up on it as well, as people to the right of them (such as DSA Build) have adopted the framework.

An Error of Analysis

As alluded to earlier, Pierre & Simone do not accurately apply Sophia Burns’s flawed typology to DSA internal conflict, which on the surface appears to describe the rift between the Bread & Roses caucus and Build DSA (the Libertarian Socialist Caucus gets lost in the shuffle as they are barely talked about in the article). Since The B&R caucus is focused on electoral strategy, in particular that of the “dirty break” with the Democratic Party to split the party into a new labor party through the weaponization of the Bernie Sanders campaign, this would fit them into the category of government socialists, as Pierre & Simone say in the article, while Build DSA is founded on the principles of base building, fitting them into the base building category. While the description of Bread & Roses as government socialists is a definite fit, if we follow Sophia Burns typology (as Pierre & Simone do), Build DSA fails to fit into the category of base-builders on closer inspection. To quote from the Build DSA website:

“For generations, activists pitted tactics like direct action against tactics like electoral politics. For so long, activists in the street wouldn’t and couldn’t work with politicians in the halls of institutional power. We must work with both. We must see tactics in context and decide when and how to deploy each. Electoral victories are not an end unto themselves. Those victories must serve the movement. Direct action shouldn’t happen in a vacuum or for its own sake, independent of larger goals or a broader strategy. The working class isn’t identical to the labor movement. We must keep one foot in the institutions, one foot in the streets.”

This makes DSA Build a combination between protest militants and government socialists as ‘direct action’ is used to spur on reform; if we are following Burns’ typology we would label them militant reformists. This also goes back to the more significant weakness of Burns’s typology: trying to ignore ideological differences in favor of practical differences. This is an inaccurate understanding of the relation between theory and practice, due to the fact that it does not take into account how theoretical differences would inform practice and vice versa. As a result, DSA Build goes in the direction of becoming an ideologically incoherent mishmash of liberal activism and reformism because there is no one thinking about programmatic strategy. 

Some of Build’s proposals mentioned in Pierre & Simone’s article that failed had the stated goal of moving the DSA’s “…composition to more closely mirror the composition of the class as a whole – which includes many oppressed and marginalized peoples” included a by-law change (“Nobody too Poor for DSA”) that would essentially abolish dues. While supposedly aiming to be inclusive, this was another tactic to limit the funds of DSA as a national organization, but perhaps a much worse effect of it would be to get rid of the pre-party, membership-driven form that DSA is struggling to grow into. Dues are a method of giving the rank-and-file of an organization material ownership and investment in the organization. It is ironic that the people pushing for dues abolition were the group accusing the other side of wanting to turn DSA into an “NGO-style organization” since this is basically what it would become without dues from rank-and-file members. In DSA, dues are already extremely low, and monthly dues are optional with most members contributing low annual dues. If anything, DSA’s dues should be higher, monthly, and mandatory. It is, of course, true that people who cannot afford a monthly five or ten-dollar buy-in to DSA should be able to join DSA. The solution to this is making dues sponsorship (which already exists) more streamlined and easy to access. There will never be a dearth of comrades willing to pitch in a few bucks to swell the ranks of an organization.

While the decentralist coalition viewed itself as a ‘left opposition’ on identity and electoral issues, in truth it was nothing of the sort.  It may be true that many in DSA who consider themselves communists (who are only against centralization under the hegemonic ‘social-democratic’ politics of Bread and Roses) are members or sympathizers of Build, the coalition is not politically coherent and, in classic popular front style, the politics of the more radical are subsumed by those on their right. In a way, the soft-Maoist and anarcho-liberal combination of Build is reminiscent of the 1980s rainbow coalition. On some issues, the decentralist coalition found itself sharply to the right of its opponents. One such example was the ‘candidate litmus test’ resolution, which would have implemented a democratic socialist minimum program that candidates at any level would have to adhere to. This resolution failed; Build whipped against it and no doubt its communist members voted it down because it was a ‘centralizing’ and ‘electoral’ resolution, despite the fact that it actually limited the ability of DSA to endorse bourgeois liberal Democrats.   

On the other hand, the reputation of Bread & Roses in the decentralist camp and on the wider left isn’t necessarily wrongly deserved. Bread & Roses represents the dominant ideas of DSA as a whole, and the writers and editors of Jacobin seem broadly aligned with the caucus, as well as older socialists who have recently come to DSA from third camp Trotskyist (Draperist) groups like the ISO and Solidarity. Some of these members spoke up against the Cuba solidarity resolution, for example, as a result of this ideological heritage. Because their primary goal is to win the left-wing of the Sanders movement to democratic socialism, over the last few years Jacobin and its milieu has mostly oriented towards dedicated liberals rather than towards the socialist left and the working class. Obviously this has had an adverse effect on their political content. While Bread & Roses clearly states they desire a ‘dirty break’ with the Democratic Party towards a democratic socialist/labor party, there is no real blueprint or discipline on a strategy for political class independence, and moreover, they view the ‘ballot line issue’ as essentially unimportant.   

The Way Forward 

While their analysis of the situation may be incorrect, there are points that are worth noting in Pierre & Simone’s article. We agree that progress has been made by the DSA to address the issues of imperialism and settler colonialism, and should be defended by Marxists within the DSA. We also agree that attempts to circumvent democratic procedure by any faction is opportunistic, even if we are not “decentralizers”, and further agree that any meaningful mass organization should not be reduced to that of a theory-sect, which means allowing for a wide range of factions to exist and debate inside the mass organization. We follow a “Macnairist” commitment to programmatic unity, which differs from theoretical unity in that programmatic unity is based around a series of concrete political demands that establishes the basis for both the dictatorship of the proletariat and the upper phase of communism in a clear program. This is counterposed to having organizational unity based along the lines of theory (metaphysics, methodology, or various political-economic theories that fall under the category of Marxism). In favoring programmatic unity over theoretical unity, we allow for the party to have a functional internal democracy with open factions and debates existing within as opposed to theory-sects which seek to impose a one-size-fits-all view of the world as the basis for a revolutionary movement. 

To elaborate on the last point, programmatic unity is the joining of Marxists around a clear set of demands that establish the dictatorship of the proletariat (or socialist republic, cooperative commonwealth, etc.) in the minimum form and communism in the maximum form which will be the framework of a mass party. We hope to achieve this end by engaging in polemics with other Marxists, winning comrades to our position and working with other theoretical camps of Marxists who still disagree with us on specifics towards the creation of an independent mass socialist party. This is how the original socialist mass movements formed out of the swamp of early socialist sects. Seeing as we are essentially forced to start over with the breakdown of the workers’ movement through the detour of the short 20th century, we must wade through the swamp and drag each other, as comrades, towards the shore of Marxist programmatic unity.

DSA National Convention: Fog & Storm

Gabriel Pierre & Miah Simone report on the 2019 DSA convention. Response from members of the editorial board of Cosmonaut here

The Democratic Socialists of America 2019 National Convention — aside from its size and historic importance in the context of a renewing socialist movement fraught with contradictions — was unique in a way not often covered in the copious amount of digital ink spilled over its proceedings since August 4. Amidst factional maneuvering and weaponized proceduralism, the actual political stakes themselves (and the strategic implications following) were often lost in the fog. On a surface level, it is exceedingly difficult to see what substantive differences among the caucus and non-caucus formations could possibly justify the level of veiled and open hostility. Much of the pre-convention discourse was indeed personalized and held in spaces obscured from the broader membership. But strategic decisions about how to build socialist power — and what constitutes power to begin with — have real-world consequences. Different class forces, particularly the ideas of the so-called middle-class petty bourgeoisie, find a reflection in socialist formations.

Since political lines of demarcation were so unclear, analysis of tendency has largely been grouped into two broad camps of ‘centralizers’ and ‘decentralizers’ — see for example Eric Blanc in The Nation1 or Tatiana Cozzarelli in Left Voice.2 Certainly it’s fair to say that Bread and Roses favors a stronger national center with campaigning priorities determined by that center and passed along to the chapter level, while something like the Libertarian Socialist Caucus would favor ground-level autonomy. But collapsing all of this into two camps both flattens tactics (the balance between ‘center’ and ‘local’ being subject to change based on task and circumstances) and buries the conflict over strategic outlook that is key to understanding what happened. Resolutions taking up the structure and internal organization of the DSA took up the most time on the convention floor. As we attempt to consolidate ourselves into something fit for purpose, the question is posed: do we need a member-driven radical organizing center rooted in the diverse working-class, or something along the lines of a hybrid between the top-down NGO model and social movement pressure group?

It’s interesting to observe the composition of these two groupings: the ‘centralizers’ are based in older chapters in major urban centers, backed by Jacobin, and joined by layers of comrades from the former International Socialist Organization. Their main focus was on getting as much support for the Bernie 2020 campaign as possible, shooting down anything which could remotely threaten the national’s intervention in the campaign (either explicitly or implicitly by drawing finite resources away from that project.) Their secondary focus was ramming through their Rank-and-File strategy3 resolution, despite the vast majority of newer members being in areas without unions or with anemic and bureaucratic locals. The question of whether the regeneration of the extant labor movement could coexist with conscious campaigning to organize the unorganized outside of historic trade unionist bastions or — as posited by the Rank-and-File strategy — whether these unions had to be radicalized as a precondition for the former loomed large through the weekend. In the end, R&F passed a floor vote alongside commitments to ‘organize the unorganized,’ including reforming the Democratic Socialist Labor Commission to facilitate that end.

The ‘decentralizers’ are largely from new chapters and Organizing Committees, many in rural and small city-based areas that formed after the Sanders or Ocasio-Cortez levies. Many work in areas that have had no socialist history for half a century or more (if it all). There’s also a not-insignificant minority among big city comrades, who have seen firsthand the practice of the ‘centralizers.’4 Frequently, often indirectly influenced by the Marxist Center movement, the main focus was in acquiring resources for these new comrades to build organization among these unorganized and inexperienced members of our class.

If we accept the division of the left into four tendencies divided by practice rather than stated ideology5, we see that floor debates mapped (admittedly roughly) to divisions between the ‘government socialist’ and ‘base builder’ approach. Resolution 57, granting coordinated support to the tenant organizing projects many chapters are already involved in, could have serious implications for organizing the class in the arena of social reproduction if followed through on. Resolutions to systematize and expand childwatch in DSA spaces and form a nationwide marshaling program are both worthwhile in their own right and important in creating operationally secure structures and opening the organization beyond layers of radicalized and childless white men. Surely we can all agree on the need for a socialist organization’s composition to more closely mirror the composition of the class as a whole, which includes many oppressed and marginalized peoples. But several measures with this need in mind were roundly defeated. A resolution granting institutional support to make our spaces accessible to comrades with disabilities, ‘Pass the Hat’ (which proposed a monthly stipend to chapters to stimulate our growth in rural and suburban/small city areas where far-right ideas march inexorably against a materially outmatched left), another redistributive dues measure, and the fairly self-explanatory ‘Nobody is too Poor for DSA’ (which made it easier for active comrades to acquire dues waivers) all failed to carry. 

This seeming contradiction makes sense if the overriding objective is to elect left candidates to office and that objective is cast against building vehicles of independent working-class power. While the ‘realignment strategy’ appears now to be on its deathbed, measures like the ‘class struggle elections candidate pipeline’ replicate the problem of applying our finite resources to elect office-holders without meaningful accountability to the movement that elevated them.

Outside of explicitly structural issues, Resolution 9 to create a National Antifascist Working Group and the ‘anti-imperialist package’ resolution bundling Cuba solidarity, recommitment to the BDS campaign, and commitment to decolonization of the US Empire carried after an extended floor debate — both by a wire-thin margin. The closeness of the votes here reveal divergent perspectives: anti-imperialist practice is absolutely necessary if we see working people in the United States as one part of the world working class, but a potentially embarrassing liability if the outlook is to establish a social democratic reform regime premised on the super-exploitation of the neocolonial world and internally colonized people. That these passionately defended resolutions did pass is a testament to our ability to at least begin challenging the cult of US nationalism that permeates all social life in the world’s imperial hegemon.

It’s difficult to predict the future without a crystal ball. If the elections to the National Political Committee are any indication, the DSA is moving in a broadly leftward direction, with around half of the incoming NPC placed somewhere left of the DSA center. This trend will surely continue if the ‘decentralizers’ or base builders continue their growth on the frontier of the working classes. And more than adding up the sum total of votes for this or that measure, the process of creating political clarity in practice can’t be understated.

As the third largest socialist organization in U.S. history, coming forward after a period of general defeat for left-wing and working class struggles around the world, it seems only natural that the Democratic Socialists of America is an arena where contradictory perspectives are worked out — we are learning how to fight again. With the climate crisis accelerating social breakdown and the rise of the extreme right, we need to learn quickly. Although serious differences in outlook so often remain obscured, DSA remains a source of hope for the liberation struggle against all forms of oppression and domination to be reforged.

The Democratic Socialist Cul-de-sac: A Critical Look at The Socialist Manifesto

Doug Enaa Greene reviews The Socialist Manifesto by Bhaskar Sunkara (New York: Basic Books, 2019). Rather than an innovative take on socialist politics for the 21st century, The Socialist Manifesto is just the same old reformism that has been a dead-end for the left. 

The Socialist Manifesto: not a worthy replacement of the Communist one

 

Writing in the preface to the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto, Frederick Engels explained why he and Marx did not call their pamphlet the “Socialist Manifesto.” According to Engels, socialism was identified with utopian dreamers and reformers “who wanted to eliminate social abuses through their various universal panaceas and all kinds of patch-work, without hurting capital and profit in the least.” In contrast to socialists, communists were considered dangerous to the ruling class since they stood for working-class revolution and the “radical reconstruction of society” that would end all exploitation and oppression. In other words, Marx and Engels were completely justified in shying away from this “socialism.” Perhaps not realizing this, Bhaskar Sunkara, founder and editor of Jacobin Magazine and a prominent member of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), has written The Socialist Manifesto as a primer on the history of socialism and how we can achieve it today.

Sunkara’s proposed socialist strategy is a democratic one conducted primarily through elections. A great deal of the book is spent discussing historical examples of socialists who have undertaken this road, such as the social democratic parties that made up the Second International. In discussing the early socialist parties, such as the German Social Democratic Party, Sunkara locates the key tension between their vision, which hoped for a radical transformation of society and winning immediate reforms. Sunkara says that social democracy’s strategy of incremental reform appeared sound since winning these increased party membership and led to greater votes on election day. Furthermore, social democratic party officials and bureaucrats had a vested interest in reforms, because they now possessed vested interests in the existing order that would be jeopardized if there was a revolution. The end result of this strategy was social democracy’s betrayal of internationalist principles and support for the slaughter of the First World War.

Sunkara argues that what happened in 1914 was not the inevitable result of reformism; it could have been avoided with “institutional measures” to make the party bureaucracy more accountable to the rank-and-file (78). However, The Socialist Manifesto avoids any serious discussion of the root causes of the Second International’s degeneration, such as imperialism, the conservative role of the labor aristocracy, and the abandonment of Marxist theory in favor of “practical results.” As a result, Sunkara avoids seriously examining difficult and uncomfortable questions about his strategy.

In looking to positive examples of democratic socialism, Sunkara spends a great deal of time on post-1945 Swedish social democracy, which he claims was “the most humane social system ever constructed” (14). The Socialist Manifesto claims that Sweden went further than any social democracy in directly attacking capitalism when it attempted to implement the Meidner Plan in the mid-1970s. The Meidner Plan proposed the gradual socialization of the Swedish economy through compelling corporations to continually issue new stock that would then be transferred to workers’ funds controlled by Swedish labor unions. Gradually the unions, and by extension their members, would gain control of the nation’s means of production. However, the Plan was watered down when it was eventually introduced, and capital ultimately defeated it altogether. Sunkara says that the failure of the Meidner Plan reveals the main dilemmas of social democracy, which relies upon winning elections and delivering results, economic expansion, and partnership with capitalists willing to compromise on major reforms. All of this means that social democracy’s reforms are precarious and in danger of being rolled back (123-124). Despite this, Sunkara maintains that “the road to a socialism beyond capitalism goes through the struggle for reforms and social democracy, that it is not a different path altogether” (30).

Still, this raises the question of how can democratic socialists can avoid the failures of Sweden and other social democratic endeavors. Sunkara offers a number of remedies. For one, he recognizes that once social democrats are elected, they will face the same challenges and pressures as their predecessors, since passing reforms require maintaining business confidence and profits. As Sunkara notes, social democrats for the most part have been willing to cave into business pressure and abandon their reform programs. His solution is for extra-parliamentary movements to hold reformers’ feet to the fire (a somewhat weary and shopworn mantra of social democrats) in order to force capital to make concessions. Sunkara says that a serious democratic socialist experiment must understand that the capitalist class will “do everything to stop us” through capital strikes and withholding investment.


Even though Sunkara says “history matters” (236), he ignores the history which disproves his democratic socialist strategy, namely the Chilean road to socialism. The election of Salvador Allende  in 1970 on the program of a parliamentary road to socialism represented a far more radical endeavor than the Meidner Plan. It included nationalization of copper mines owned by powerful US corporations, land expropriations and redistribution, and nationalization of banks, among other policies. In line with Sunkara’s strategy, Allende’s government won at the ballot box and was supported by popular and radical movements in the streets, and support for Allende’s party even increased in the off-year elections. Ultimately, the Chilean road to socialism failed. It was undermined by capital strikes, sabotage from American imperialism, and, finally, its violent overthrow by the military coup of 1973.

The failure of Salvador Allende proves a simple truth that Sunkara refuses to recognize — the nature of power. In capitalist society, the state, especially the military, remains an instrument of class domination that must be smashed by the organized and armed working class. If the power and privileges of the capitalist class are threatened in a substantial way, as they were in Chile, capital will respond with brutal force no matter how ‘legal’ and ‘peaceful’ socialists are. Ultimately, the peaceful road is not peaceful at all, but results in a bloodbath for the unarmed working class in the face of capitalist resistance. Therefore, it is necessary to smash the bourgeois state along with its police, army, and the whole repressive apparatus, and replace it with instruments of popular power in order to suppress the resistance of the capitalist class and open the way to socialism. Nothing The Socialist Manifesto proposes confronts this reality; rather Sunkara’s program only paves the way to future defeats.

The Socialist Manifesto does not limit its discussion of history to social democracy. It also looks at revolutionary experiments in Russia and the third world. Despite his rejection of the revolutionary road, Sunkara does not condemn the Russian Revolution outright. Rather, he spends many pages challenging the crude anticommunist narrative of 1917 and the notion that Leninism simply led to Stalinist totalitarianism. Sunkara emphasizes that Lenin’s revolutionary strategy did not lead to Stalinism; it was, in fact, based on orthodox social democracy: “But it wasn’t a blueprint for a radically different party; rather, these were tactics needed for a movement barred from the legal organizing and parliamentary work pursued by its counterparts elsewhere. Once tsarism was overthrown, backward Russia and its small working class could develop along Western lines and push the struggle further” (83). The Bolshevik’s social democratic origins meant that they were a lively and democratic party rooted in the working class. This changed with the outbreak of World War One and the revolutions of 1917 when the Bolsheviks broke with social democracy and seized power. Still, Sunkara rejects the simple narrative that the Bolsheviks staged a coup in 1917. Instead, he argues that while it was “certainly not as spontaneous as the February Revolution, October represented a genuine popular revolution led by industrial workers, allied with elements of the peasantry” (93).

After taking power, the Bolsheviks, according to Sunkara, struggled to build a new order while facing economic breakdown, foreign intervention, and civil war. This unprecedented situation led Lenin to centralize power and resort to red terror in a desperate struggle against counterrevolutionaries. While Sunkara does not believe red terror was inherent in Bolshevism, he does fault Lenin for squelching democracy and open debate in Russia (98).

In contrast to other democratic socialists, Sunkara does not casually dismiss the Russian Revolution as totalitarian from the beginning. Rather, he wants to remember the grandeur, power, and heroic vision of 1917. And yet, The Socialist Manifesto sees no other outcome for the Bolsheviks other than Stalinism because “materially, Russia wasn’t ripe for socialism” (88). Sunkara believes that due to the unfavorable objective circumstances and the fact that they had no other model to rely upon, the Bolsheviks had no real options, but he concludes that their model, which was “built from errors and excesses, forged in the worst of conditions, came to be synonymous with the socialist ideal itself” (103-104). He sees no alternative path offered by any of the other Bolsheviks. Trotsky himself is acknowledged as “Stalinism’s greatest critic” but one who “couldn’t admit that any part of the system he so despised had its genesis in the early repression that he himself had helped engineer.” (101). As a result, the emergence of Stalinism as a “horrific totalitarian regime unlike any the world had ever seen” was the inevitable, albeit tragic outcome, of Russian backwardness (102). In the last instance, Sunkara’s remembrance for 1917 is that of tragedy, with the attitude that its revolutionary ideas have no relevance for today.

Revolutions in China, Cuba, and Vietnam fare little better in Sunkara’s estimation. He acknowledges that it was Leninism, not social democracy, that appealed to the third world since it emphasized anti-imperialism and the needs of the peasant majority. Following the argument of DSA founder Michael Harrington, Sunkara argues that because the third world lacked the preconditions of socialism, Marxists were forced to rely upon “substitute proletariats” such as peasants in order to lay the foundation of capitalist modernity. As a result, the Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions came from above and “ruled over and on behalf of the oppressed, not through them” (131). However, Steve Cushion’s A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerillas’ Victory shows, contrary to Sunkara’s claim, that there was working class involvement throughout the course of the Cuban Revolution and it cannot be reduced to a revolution from above. There is no consideration of the possibility of peasants as revolutionary subjects, which would require a far deeper engagement with the dynamics of the Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese Revolutions than Sunkara is prepared to do. Rather, The Socialist Manifesto concludes that third world revolutions vindicate the claim that socialism requires an advanced productive base in order to prevail, otherwise the result is authoritarian collectivism.

The Cuban Revolution involved mass working-class involvement contrary to mythology

This argument is premised on a rigid stagist reading of Marx’s work, not to mention a serious misreading of history. That is something Marx himself rejected in his later writings on the Russian commune. There, Marx was far more open to the possibilities of socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries as opposed to the necessity of all nations following the historical path laid out by Western Europe. And for someone schooled in Trotsky’s writings, Sunkara does not even discuss his theory of permanent revolution, which argued that revolution could occur in the capitalist periphery before the center. Trotsky argued emphatically against a simple stagist path: “To imagine that the dictatorship of the proletariat is in some way automatically dependent on the technical development and resources of a country is a prejudice of ‘economic’ materialism simplified to absurdity. This point of view has nothing in common with Marxism.” The revolutions in the third world confirmed the theory of permanent revolution, since the masses in the third world did not wait idly by with folded arms for the development of capitalism. Rather, they carried out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution and went further by taking the socialist road. And despite the mistakes, limitations, and setbacks of revolutions in China, Cuba, and Vietnam, they did more to advance the cause of socialism than the social democracies of Western Europe, which all made their peace with imperialism.

Based on his understanding of history, what concretely does Sunkara propose for American socialists? He argues that socialists must take account of the particular American conditions, namely the two-party system, that make forming an independent socialist party so difficult. While not rejecting the formation of a socialist party as a distant goal, Sunkara believes it is necessary to operate inside the Democratic Party for the foreseeable future. Unlike Michael Harrington, Sunkara does not consider realigning the Democrats to be a realistic strategy. Rather, he says that due to the loose nature of the Democrats they are vulnerable to “the electoral equivalent of a guerrilla insurgency” (232). He points to the example of Bernie Sanders and his 2016 election campaign that fought against the Democratic Party machine: “Sanders believed that the path to reform was through confrontation with elites….[He] gave American socialism a lifeline by returning it to its roots: class struggle and a class base” (201). For Sunkara, Bernie Sanders represented a real alternative program and his campaign created a new political constituency of “Berniecrats” who are fighting against inequality. The Socialist Manifesto argues that socialists must build upon the Sanders’ campaign by constructing their own alternative narrative in order to win elections and pass sweeping reforms.

Sunkara’s argument downplays the power of the Democratic Party and its ability to co-opt social movements and present itself as a party of the people while serving the interests of liberal capitalism. Furthermore, his argument that Bernie Sanders represented a watershed moment in American politics is based on myth-making and ignoring his actual record. While it may have been the case that Sanders was a “class struggle social democrat” in his youth, that has not been the case for many decades. As Murray Bookchin and Alexander Cockburn have observed, Sanders is very much a career politician and a Democrat in all but name. Sanders consistently supports and funds imperialist wars and apartheid Israel and does not advocate a socialist program, but one of New Deal liberalism, as he himself has recently admitted. In contrast to Sunkara, socialists must recognize the limitations of Sanders and the Democratic Party and clearly demarcate ourselves by creating independent organizations and presenting a revolutionary alternative. 

It is to Bhaskar Sunkara’s credit that The Socialist Manifesto is an easy read. No doubt, Sunkara’s work will appeal to a wide audience, especially those who want a primer on the ideas and strategy of democratic socialism. However, a real discussion on socialism begins with the acknowledgement that it has not been democratic socialism, but only revolutionary communism that has breached the walls of capitalism. That means a sober look on the organizations, methods, and means necessary to make that revolution a possibility, not repeating the failed strategies of reformism. This is something The Socialist Manifesto does not do, meaning that it provides little value to understanding what is needed to achieve socialism.

Michael Harrington and His Afterlives

Doug Enaa Greene gives an overview and critique of the political journey of Michael Harrington, founder of the Democratic Socialist of America, and his influence on reformist socialism to this day. 

Michael Harrington: still an influence in the reformist left

Michael Harrington (1928-1989) was the most important advocate for democratic socialism in the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century. He is widely, and deservedly, recognized for writing The Other America, a seminal exposé of poverty in the United States. However, Michael Harrington was not simply a public intellectual but a political activist who developed a vision to make democratic socialism into a major force in American life. His strategy was to realign the Democratic Party by driving out the business interests and transform it into a social democratic party. This new party of the people would then not only represent the interests of the vast majority and pass genuine reforms, but begin the transition to democratic socialism. Michael Harrington’s politics and vision have outlived him and they remain the “common sense” of much of the American left, shaping debates in the organization he founded, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). 

Life of Michael Harrington

Despite later being hailed as the “Man Who Discovered Poverty,” Michael Harrington’s beginnings were anything but impoverished. He was born into a well-off Irish-American and Catholic family in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 28, 1928. When he was growing up, the terms Catholic, Irish, and Democrat were practically synonymous. His immediate and extended family were just as devoted Democrats as they were faithful Catholics and culturally Irish. Despite a brief lapse into revolutionary radicalism in the mid-1950s, Michael himself would maintain his allegiance to the Democratic Party for most of his life.

However, it was the Catholic Church far more than his Irish heritage that shaped Michael Harrington’s early worldview. For both religious and financial reasons, Michael’s family wanted him to receive a rigorous Jesuit education. He attended local Jesuit schools and later attended Holy Cross College in the 1940s, where he distinguished himself as a brilliant student. Michael absorbed the Jesuits’ lessons that “ideas have consequences, that philosophy is the record of an ongoing debate over the most important issues before mankind.”1 Even after Michael left the Church, a Jesuit spirit remained in his later Marxist writings. In his youth, his social and economic ideas were in line with Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, which condemned unbridled capitalism and displayed concern for the condition of the working class.

After graduating second in his class at Holy Cross in 1948, Michael went to Yale Law School. His father hoped that he would pursue a career in law, but Michael had dreams of becoming a poet. After less than a year at Yale, he was accepted into the University of Chicago’s program for English literature. During his time in Chicago, Michael was drawn to the city’s Bohemian culture where “everyone… had a poem or play or novel in the works.”2 Amongst these free spirits, he read voraciously in order to grasp ideas and their implications. He also experienced his first crisis of faith and no longer accepted that people could be condemned to hell no matter the offense. This caused the edifice of his Jesuit worldview to collapse. When Michael graduated with a Master’s degree in 1949, he not only lacked his religious belief but was now completely unsure about his future. So he returned home to Saint Louis, where he worked as a social worker in impoverished sections of the city. It was during this time of seeing poverty that he had a revelation:

One rainy day I went into an old, decaying building. The cooking smells and the stench from the broken, stopped-up toilets and the murmurous cranky sound of the people were a revelation. It was my moment on the road to Damascus. Suddenly the abstract and statistical and aesthetic outrages I had reacted to at Yale and Chicago became real and personal and insistent. A few hours later, riding the Grand Avenue streetcar, I realized that somehow I must spend the rest of my life trying to obliterate that kind of house and to work with the people who lived there.3

He was now determined to do something to fight poverty. However, he did not yet know what. In December 1949, he moved to Greenwich Village in New York City; Bohemia still beckoned him. While in Greenwich Village, he was exposed to left-wing politics. At one of the many jobs he worked, he recalled that “bosses and the workers discussed the Russian Revolution at lunch break.”4 He still took little interest in those debates, but was starting to pay attention.

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, he experienced another crisis of faith and became a conscientious objector and rejoined the Catholic Church. His reconversion occurred after reading Pascal and Kierkegaard: “I no longer felt that I could prove my faith, but now I was willing to make a wager, a doubting and even desperate wager, on it: Credo quia absurdum. I believe because it is absurd.”5 He decided to put his faith into action. From 1951 to 1953, Michael was a part of Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker Movement, which was one of the most vibrant expressions of left-wing Catholicism in the United States. As Michael later observed: “it was as far Left as you could go within the Church.”6 The Catholic Worker Movement acted to improve the lives of the poor, preached absolute pacifism, and urged its adherents to “live in accordance with the justice and charity of Jesus Christ.”7

Harrington’s start as a labor organizer was in the Catholic Worker Movement

Michael Harrington not only worked in the soup kitchens and lived his faith, but wrote and edited for the Catholic Worker on labor struggles and poverty in America. He started making public speeches and developed connections to the literary world and the anti-communist left. Then, in 1952, he met Bogdan Denitch, a member of the Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL), who saw Michael as a promising recruit. Denitch’s instincts were correct: Michael joined the YPSL and left both the Catholic Worker and the Church itself. This time his break with organized religion was permanent.

Almost from the moment that he joined the YPSL, Michael was fighting the Socialist Party leadership. Due to the Cold War, the Socialist Party and its leader, Norman Thomas, accepted prevailing anticommunist consensus and supported the Korean War. Michael Harrington and the YPSL opposed Thomas and began working with Max Shachtman’s Independent Socialist League (ISL), which opposed the Korean War. Michael and the YPSL severed ties with the parent body and fused with the ISL in February 1954 to create the Young Socialist League (YSL).

Michael proved to be a major asset for Max Shachtman and the ISL. He wrote and edited for a number of socialist papers on a vast range of topics. In his capacity as an organizer, he traveled widely across the United States to different college campuses to speak and establish contacts. Max Shachtman himself—a former communist and Trotskyist—ended up becoming Michael’s most important political mentor. This influence was something that Harrington acknowledged after he had broken with Shachtman in later years. In the dedication to the 1970 work Socialism, he wrote: “Even though I have some serious disagreements with him on issues of socialist strategy, I am permanently and deeply indebted to Max Shachtman, who first introduced me to the vision of democratic Marxism and whose theory of bureaucratic collectivism is so important to my analysis.”8 Harrington took from Shachtman a deep-rooted anticommunism grounded in the belief that the Soviet Union was a bureaucratic collectivist evil empire. He also adopted Shachtman’s politics in other respects: an adaptation to social democracy, alliances with the labor bureaucracy, and support for “realignment” in the Democratic Party. This is not to say that his politics were completely identical to those of Max Shachtman: he was able to expand and develop Shachtman’s ideas and diverged with him on secondary issues when necessary.

During the Red Scare era, life on the socialist left was largely confined to small groups on the margins of politics. Michael Harrington wanted to change that. He became open to collaboration with liberals in pursuit of progressive causes. However, Michael believed that this common work would only be effective if socialists had an organization of their own. An opportunity came to regroup the American left in 1956 after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech and the near total collapse of the Communist Party USA. Suddenly a new political space on the left opened up, and both the ISL and the Socialist Party hoped to take advantage of it. Realizing their mutual goals, the ISL and Socialist Party fused in 1958. Considering that the Socialist Party was practically moribund, ISL members such as Max Shachtman and Michael Harrington quickly assumed positions of prominence in the organization. The merger left Michael Harrington hopeful that the left finally had its own organization and would soon place its mark on American politics.

As part of a new strategy for socialists, Michael Harrington was no longer concerned with the revolutionary seizure of power, but with pragmatic and “realistic” questions about using the existing institutions to effect change. To that end, he argued that the left needed to support progressives in the Democratic Party to achieve reforms. He also argued that left-leaning members of the labor bureaucracy such as Walter Reuther were not obstacles to the development of class consciousness, but were allies of the left. According to Michael Harrington, the “Reutherites were the genuine, and utterly sincere and militant, Left-wing of American society.”9

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Michael Harrington also played an active role in the Civil Rights Movement, where he worked closely with important figures like Bayard Rustin. Rustin was a major organizer for the Montgomery Bus Boycott and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr’s March on Washington. Harrington and Rustin shared Shachtman’s vision of allying the Civil Rights Movement with organized labor and the Democrats to create a new majority. As part of this work, Michael wanted to keep the Civil Rights Movement on a moderate course and worked to exclude communists from organizations such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

It was in 1962 that Michael Harrington first rose to national fame with the publication of The Other America. Even though he wrote dozens of articles and published fourteen books on a diverse array of subjects, his name is synonymous with just this one. The Other America was a groundbreaking and moving exposé of poverty in the United States of America. It established Michael’s reputation as a respected intellectual and advocate for the poor. The Other America stirred the conscience of people from all walks of life by revealing the grinding poverty that existed in the richest country in the world. As Martin Luther King Jr once jokingly said to him: “You know, we didn’t know we were poor until we read your book.”10 The Other America’s impact extended beyond the circles of idealistic students into the corridors of power when it caught the attention of President Kennedy who planned to launch a “War on Poverty.” After Kennedy’s death, President Johnson carried on his legacy by expanding the welfare state with his vision of the Great Society. Michael Harrington himself served as an adviser to President Johnson in developing the Great Society programs.

Harrington’s The Other America was influential on “war on poverty” programs in the 1960s

While Michael supported the Great Society, he believed that welfare state could not overcome the contradictions of capitalism: “Capitalism ‘socializes’ private priorities and is institutionally opposed to any redistribution of the relative shares of wealth. This is related to its propensity for crisis and, ultimately, its self-destruction. In this context, the welfare state is seen as an ambiguous and transitional phenomenon, the temporary salvation of the system, but also the portent of its end.”11 As we shall discuss later, Michael Harrington believed that it was necessary to go past the welfare state.

As student radicalism emerged, Michael Harrington was hopeful about its prospects to revitalize the American left, provided that it received proper guidance from him. To that end, he served as a mentor to the young radicals of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in developing the Port Huron Statement. The Port Huron Statement was one of the defining documents of sixties radicalism. According to Kirkpatrick Sale, it not only provided coherence to a new generation of students, but “it gave to those dissatisfied with their nation an analysis by which to dissect it, to those pressing instinctively for change a vision of what to work for, to those feeling within themselves the need to act a strategy by which to become effective. No ideology can do more.”12 Michael Harrington’s ideas are quite visible throughout the Port Huron Statement in stressing the necessity of the student movement allying with the civil rights movement and labor unions, realigning the Democratic Party and supporting liberals, and rejecting communism.

However, the Port Huron Statement also condemned American imperialism for instigating the Cold War and rejected visceral anti-communism. Michael Harrington found this abhorrent and was enraged. He had the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), SDS’s parent organization, cut off funding to the youth affiliate and changed the SDS office door locks to keep the radicals out. Later, Michael Harrington and the LID board interrogated the SDS radicals in a mini-show trial for being soft on communism. Eventually cooler heads prevailed and a break between LID and SDS was avoided.

For the rest of his life, Michael Harrington regretted what happened and believed that the clash was due to a misunderstanding between two different generations. While Michael acknowledged his lack of diplomacy in handling SDS, he did not believe he was wrong on the larger political issues at stake: “But if I am quite ready to acknowledge my personal failings in this unhappy history, I am not at all prepared to concede political error on all points in the dispute.”13 Michael admitted that even if he had been more tactful with SDS, it would not have made a difference in the long run: “the conflict was, I think inevitable, and had I acted on the basis of better information, more maturity, and a greater understanding of the differences at stake, that I would only have postponed the day of reckoning.”14 Ultimately, Michael Harrington’s problem with SDS and the New Left was not just that they were “soft on communism,” but that they rejected the moderation and liberalism that were central to his politics. Eventually, the conflict between him and the radicals came to a head with the Vietnam War.

When the Johnson Administration escalated American involvement in Vietnam, SDS played an active role in opposing it. Like SDS, Michael Harrington opposed the war, but the main dividing line between them was over how to oppose it. Michael wanted to keep his lines of communication open with the White House and liberal Democrats because he believed they were vital allies when it came to domestic reform. To Michael, Democratic support for the war was a tragic error and not the symptom of anything deeper. He refused to target the Democrats as complicit in the war because that could only alienate them. To that end, Michael argued that the antiwar movement needed to be kept within proper limits and stay respectable. He therefore opposed militant action, the participation of communists, breaking the law, or anything that would actually end the war. Only when the Democrats were not the ones conducting the war after 1968 and large swaths of the public and the establishment saw it as unwinnable did Michael come out against it, while his allies like Max Shachtman backed the war to the bitter end.

Over the course of the 1960s, Michael Harrington’s relations with Max Shachtman became strained due to a number of issues, leading to a split. Aside from differences over Vietnam, Michael remained steadfast in supporting the original vision of Realignment by supporting progressives in the Democratic Party and labor bureaucracy, and he was committed to winning over moderates in the New Left. By contrast, Shachtman uncritically supported the AFL-CIO leadership, opposed the New Left tout court and backed the most right-wing Democrats because they were reliably anticommunist. The factional fight between Shachtman and Harrington tore the Socialist Party apart. In 1973, Michael Harrington finally resigned from the party.

After leaving the Socialist Party, Michael founded a new socialist organization – the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC). DSOC had a solid base of support among progressives in the labor bureaucracy. Its strategy was to support realignment in the Democratic Party to push it to the left. To that end, Michael Harrington and DSOC supported the Democratic Agenda, a New Deal-style program that was supported by Jimmy Carter in 1976. When Carter was elected, Michael Harrington believed that the Democrats would carry out sweeping reforms similar to FDR or LBJ. Instead, he felt betrayed when the Carter Administration enacted austerity measures and ignored the program of the Democratic Agenda.

Over the course of the 1970s, DSOC grew and began working with like-minded socialist groups such as the New American Movement (NAM). Eventually, NAM and DSOC merged and created the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) in 1982 with Michael Harrington as its preeminent leader. The Reagan years saw crushing defeats on organized labor, attacks on the legacy of the New Deal, and an escalation of the Cold War. To oust Reagan, Michael Harrington and his allies in the labor bureaucracy eschewed any form of independent socialist politics or militancy from below, and instead placed their faith in the Democratic Party. This meant that the DSA stayed aloof from Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, which was probably the most serious Realignment effort in decades, by backing the conservative Walter Mondale. When Reagan secured a smashing victory in 1984, the lesser-evil strategy of “Anybody but Reagan” was shown to be a dismal failure. In a postmortem of the democratic socialist 1984 electoral strategy, Alexander Cockburn concluded:

They must now be footsoldiers in a campaign whose captains are implacably antagonistic to the principles of their constituencies…So in control are the Democratic ‘pragmatists’ as the pollsters and pundits call them, the ones who argue for party unity at the expense of movement and who propose that the way to beat Reaganism is to denounce its excesses while accepting its premises. The pathos of their opportunism lies in its shortsightedness. As every tactician can attest, the key to defeating Reagan is turnout. But turnout has political content and context. People will not simply vote for Anybody But Reagan; they want somebody who speaks to their interests, who promises them more than they’ve got and who offers them hope.15

It was mere days after Reagan’s reelection that Michael Harrington discovered a bump in his throat, which was later determined to be cancer. After a series of operations and surgeries, it appeared that his cancer was gone. By 1987, Michael’s doctors told him that he had an inoperable tumor, and he was was given two years to live. During those last years, he continued his political and intellectual work. He finished his second memoir, The Long-Distance Runner, and a testament, Socialism: Past and Future. Still, his condition deteriorated and he quietly passed away on July 31, 1989.

Harrington would support conservative Democrat Walter Mondale in the 1984 election.

The Limits of Democratic Socialism

From the 1960s until the end of his life, Michael Harrington developed a sophisticated theory of “Democratic Marxism” that he hoped that it would serve as both the ideology and political strategy for democratic socialists and the American labor bureaucracy. Michael believed that the tenets of “Democratic Marxism” would enable socialism to break out of its political isolation, create a new political majority and lead to the creation of democratic socialism. “Democratic Marxism” was all-encompassing, touching on areas ranging from philosophy to imperialism, but here we will discuss merely two of its aspects: Realignment and the Transition to Socialism.

A. Realignment

While Michael Harrington did not originate the idea of Realignment, he did develop it into a full-blown strategy for not only transforming American politics, but as a necessary part of a socialist transition. According to Harrington, realignment was “the only place where a beginning can be made” and he fervently believed that without it, all socialist efforts would ultimately fail.16 He claimed that the Realignment strategy was based on a Marxist analysis of the changing class nature of American society. He believed that after World War II the social weight of the organized working class had declined. If there was going to be a majority for socialism in America, then the working class couldn’t rely only on themselves; it needed allies. As he argued: “There is no single, ‘natural’ majority in the United States which can be mobilized behind a series of defined policies and programs. Rather, there are several potential majorities at any given time and which one will actually emerge depends on a whole range of factors.”17

Michael Harrington argued that the most important ally of the working class was located in the “new class” of scientists, technicians, teachers, and professionals in the public sector of society.18 The emergence of the new class was a sign that the capitalist economy was “inexorably moving toward collective forms of social life.”19 In the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe, this collectivist trend took the shape of the new tyranny of “bureaucratic collectivism.” On the other hand, in the United States and Western Europe, collectivism took the form of the welfare state where “markets give way to political decisions… [and] bureaucrats, both private and public, become much more important than entrepreneurs or stockholders.”20 Harrington concluded that society faced the choice of two possible futures: “these extensions of Shachtman’s theories have led me to a basic proposition: that the  future is not going to be a choice between capitalism, Communism, and socialism, but between bureaucratic collectivism, advantageous to both executives and commissars, and democratic collectivism, i.e. socialism.”21 This was Michael Harrington’s updated version of Rosa Luxemburg’s warning of “socialism or barbarism.”

For Michael Harrington, the issue was not about reversing these collective trends, which he accepted as a given, but whether the future would be democratic or totalitarian. For Michael, the key factor determining the future lay in the contradictory nature of the new class. In the new class, there was the potential for anti-democratic forces prevailing: “With so much economic, political and, social power concentrating in computerized industry, the question arises, who will do the programming? Who will control the machines that establish human destiny in this century? And there is clearly the possibility that a technological elite, perhaps even a benevolent elite, could take on this function.”22 On the other hand, the new class “by education and work experience…is predisposed toward planning. It could be an ally of the poor and the organized workers—or their sophisticated enemy. In other words, an unprecedented social and political variable seems to be taking shape in America.”23 For example, the expansion of education was necessary to teach the “new class” of planners and bureaucrats to create new opportunities for social advancement and prestige as part of the established order. However, Harrington argued that students were not destined to “act bureaucratically and use sophisticated means to keep the black and poor in their proper place.”24 As the 1960s student movements demonstrated, “a school is a dangerous place, for it exposes people to ideas…Increasing education, all the data indicates, means greater political involvement.”25 This all meant the future political allegiance of the new class was open.

Therefore, the possibility existed of the working class allying with the new class, along with blacks and the poor (Harrington would later include groups such as feminists, peace activists, and environmentalists in this coalition) to build a new majority or the “conscience constituency.”26 Harrington believed it was only this new majority that could bring real democratic socialist change to America.  Eventually, he believed that the components of the new majority would seek political expression. Rather than creating a new third party, Harrington believed it was necessary to realign the Democrats. He argued that the Democrats were a site of struggle for socialists since they not only contained segregationists and capitalists, but also held the allegiance of labor unions, blacks, and progressive sections of the new class. In other words, he claimed there was a contradiction within the Democratic Party between its social base and its racist and capitalist leadership. According to the Socialist Party Platform of 1968: “That the most progressive elements in American life thus belong in the same Party as the most reactionary is one of the most outrageous contradictions in the society. But it is not enough simply to denounce the scandal. We must abolish it.”27 Michael Harrington was emphatic that socialist work within the Democratic Party “does not constitute a commitment either to its program or leadership…So the democratic Left does not work in the Democratic Party in order to maintain that institution but to transform it.”28 In 1973, he succinctly described the realignment strategy as “the left wing of realism” because it was only there that the “mass forces for social change are assembled; it is there that the possibility exists for creating a new first party in America.”29

Despite the rise of the new class, Michael Harrington believed that the AFL-CIO remained the leading force of Realignment and the new majority. While American labor unions had avoided independent political action in the shape of a labor or socialist party like their European counterparts, he argued that they had actually created one in all but name. In fact, Michael Harrington asserted that the socialism of the American labor movement was actually unknown to most: “there is a social democracy in the United States, but most scholars have not noticed it. It is our invisible mass movement.”30 Therefore, he concluded that labor unions were not just another interest group in the Democratic Party, but they “had clearly made an on-going, class-based political commitment and constituted a tendency—a labor party of sorts—within the Democratic Party.”31

Michael Harrington argued that the first step of Realignment “will not be revolution or even a sudden dramatic lurch to the socialist left. It will be the emergence of a revived liberalism—taking that term to mean the reform of the system within the system—which will of necessity, be much more socialistic even though it will not, in all probability, be socialist.”32 With a new, robust liberalism as the short-term goal for Realignment, this naturally meant socialists should look to liberals as natural allies. Therefore, the Realignment strategy required patience and playing a long game, but the promised result was the creation of a left-liberal, if not social democratic, party that would take over the Democratic Party and lay the foundations for democratic socialism.

For all its theoretical sophistication, Michael Harrington’s Realignment strategy rested on a number of faulty assumptions. Firstly, his contention that the Democratic Party was open to being “captured” by socialist forces was misguided. This position assumed that the Democrats were a loose coalition of diverse interest groups such as labor and capital who were more or less equally balanced. In fact, the Democrats are a capitalist-controlled party representing the interests of more liberal elements among the ruling class. While Michael Harrington is certainly correct that the Democrats do traditionally command the support of a progressive and working-class constituency, this does not make the Democrats the “party of the people.”33 In fact, labor unions and other progressive groups hold no power in the Democratic Party due to overwhelming capitalist control. Capitalist hegemony in the Democrats allows them to thwart any internal challenge or to co-opt them as the need arises. This is a reality that Michael Harrington never understood.

Secondly, the liberal-labor alliance needed for Realignment was an illusion of Harrington’s own imagination. As Kim Moody observed: “Post-World War II liberalism, although embraced by much of the union leadership, was mostly a middle-class phenomenon…As a political current, it never challenged the corporate or private form of property in the means of production, while it rapidly abandoned such New Deal-expanding programs as a national health care system by the early 1950s.”34 In other words, liberals were not reliable allies of socialists, but were their enemies. To win the support of liberals, Harrington argued that socialists needed to practice moderation and play according to the rules set by the Democratic Party. Since the Realignment strategy saw the Democratic Party as the only political arena for socialists, this led socialists to accept the logic of lesser-evilism and supporting any Democrat, no matter how right-wing, which ultimately thwarted the goals of the entire strategy.

Lastly, the Realignment strategy was doomed because it refused to develop an independent socialist organization. On paper, the Socialist Party viewed themselves as playing a unique role in Realignment as “an independent organization, free of any compromising ties with the old party machines. It can and it will play the role of the most courageous and intransigent force for realignment.”35 In practice, however, this was never something carried out. As Christopher Lasch argued,

[Harrington] is correct in saying that there are no new social forces automatically evolving toward socialism (which is what “democratic planning” comes down to). Presumably this means that radical change can only take place if a new political organization, explicitly committed to radical change, wills it to take place. But Harrington backs off from this conclusion. Instead he seems to predicate his strategy on the wistful hope that socialism will somehow take over the Democratic party without anyone realizing what is happening. He admits that “there is obvious danger when those committed to a new morality thus maneuver on the basis of the old hypocrisies.” But there is no choice, because radicals cannot create a new movement “by fiat.” It is tempting, Harrington says, to think that the best strategy for the Left might be to “start a party of its own.” But this course would not work unless there were already an “actual disaffection of great masses of people from the Democratic Party.36

In the end, Michael Harrington forgot the cardinal lesson of Lenin that “in its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organization.”37 Without political independence, there was no room for socialists to develop strategies and actions to advance the interests of the working class. Instead, Realignment forced socialists to maintain good relations with liberals in the hopes of reform at the expense of revolutionary militancy from below. The natural end of Realignment and Harrington’s democratic socialism was the transformation of leftists into the most loyal servants of the Democratic Party.

Harrington debates Trotskyist Peter Camejo on Jimmy Carter at Queens College, 1976

B. Popular Front without Stalinism

Instead of through a violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, Michael Harrington believed that socialism could be achieved peacefully through an electoral majority. In formulating a democratic strategy, he drew upon the work of the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, whom he called “one of the most fascinating thinkers in the history of Marxism.”38

Michael Harrington argued that socialists needed to create a counter-hegemonic bloc that comprised a majority of the population, who would have a vested interest in a new order. This counter-hegemonic bloc would win support by promoting a “practical program in a language of sincere and genuine idealism. A politics without poetry will simply not be able to bring together all the different and sometimes antagonistic forces essential to a new majority for a new program.”39 Harrington argued that the Gramscian “intellectual and moral reform” that socialists needed to undertake involved building upon American traditions, particular Jeffersonian republicanism with its ideals of moral virtue and citizenship: “But I do not think that the Left can afford to leave the civic emotions to the Right. In a profound sense, that is our heritage more than theirs.”40 The promotion of a new republican ethic would not only Americanize socialism but enlighten people and mobilize them for social change.

For a democratic transition to socialism to be possible, socialists must be able to capture the existing state apparatus from the bourgeoisie. Building on the work of the Marxist theorist Nicos Poulantzas, Harrington argued that the capitalist state was “relatively autonomous” and not the instrument of any single class.41 He claimed that the classical Marxist position on the state—that it is a machinery of repression in the hands of the dominant class, designed to preserve capitalist rule and existing property relations—was false since it was “tied to the base-superstructure model of society and is flawed for that reason. It metaphorically imagines the government as an inert thing that has no life of its own and is wielded by the ‘real’ powers residing in the economic base.”42 Furthermore, he argued that in capitalist society there was no ruling class, merely competing blocs of classes. Due to the great wealth of the bourgeoisie, they naturally exercised greater power in the state than the working class.43 If socialists could mobilize their counter-hegemonic bloc, then they could win concessions from the state and gradually tilt the state to favor working class interests.

As part of his strategy, Michael Harrington said socialists must utilize the state bureaucracy and undertake a transitional program of structural reforms. He argued that socialists could not dispense with existing bureaucracy since it was essential to the functioning of a modern economy. The problem lay not with bureaucracy per se, but with bad bureaucrats. To serve as a check against bad bureaucrats, he envisioned some form of grassroots control alongside more responsible bureaucrats: “bureaucracy is itself a weapon to be used against bureaucracy.”44 The structural reforms that he advocated were the socialization of investment; the progressive socialization of corporate property; later, the socialization of private property itself; and finally using taxes as an instrument of socialist change. He believed that this transitional program could be undertaken without any cataclysmic changes since he did not expect violent resistance from the bourgeoisie. Looking to the example of social democratic Sweden, Michael Harrington argued that “it is now possible to have a relatively painless transition to socialization if socialists will only learn how to encourage the ‘euthanasia of the rentiers.’”45 In looking to a positive model for this strategy, Michael Harrington defended the Communist Party’s popular front. As he said in a 1976 debate with Peter Camejo:

My policy is very much like the Communist policy in the 1930s. You bet your life it is. I’m an opponent of communist dictatorship and totalitarianism. But while the Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers Party were getting absolutely nowhere because they counterposed themselves to the workers who wanted to vote for Roosevelt, the Communist party of the 1930s was building the biggest, largest movement calling itself socialist in the United States since the days of Gene Debs, and winning leadership in a third of the unions of the CIO.46

In other words, he believed in a popular front without Stalinism.47 However, Michael Harrington’s idealization of the popular front is based on a profound misreading of history. During the 1930s, the CPUSA did have a visible presence in unions, black freedom struggles, and anti-fascist coalitions, but this did not come about due to the popular front strategy, but in spite of it. The major successes of the CPUSA in organizing workers occurred before the popular front was implemented when the party experimented with militant united front tactics and still maintained its revolutionary identity. After adopting the popular front strategy, the CPUSA retreated from all that and, in the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, the Communists ceased all their criticism of the labor bureaucracy, the Roosevelt administration, and liberal organizations. Over the course of the 1930s, the class character of the CPUSA changed as its members took up positions within the labor bureaucracy and clamped down on working class militancy. According to Charlie Post:

Popular Frontism transformed the CP from the main current promoting self-organization, militant action and political independence among workers, African Americans and other oppressed groups into the emerging CIO’s bureaucracy’s ‘point men’ in their drive to ‘tame’ worker and popular militancy and to cement their partnership with the Roosevelt administration.48

As a result of the popular front, the CPUSA retreated from its advocacy of communist revolution and ended up as the “left-wing” of the Democrats and the New Deal. The “hidden secret” of why the anticommunist Michael Harrington idealized the popular front was not because it was proof that socialism had mass influence or spoke the language of ordinary people. Rather, he liked the popular front because it was when the communists ceased to be revolutionary and gave up on militant action, self-organization of the working class, and “sectarian” political independence in order to become loyal allies of the labor bureaucracy and liberals. In other words, it was when communists acted like Michael Harrington’s ideal of a democratic socialist.

Furthermore, Michael Harrington’s popular frontist strategy depends on a fundamental misunderstanding of the state. He is unable to recognize the realities of the state’s dependency on both the existing bureaucracy and the needs of profitability. The ability of socialist governments to deliver the type of structural reforms that Harrington advocates such as higher wages and an expanded welfare state depends on higher taxes on capital, both of which ultimately depend upon profitability. If a socialist government seriously pursued structural reforms, then this would threaten the flow of profits and spark resistance from the existing bureaucracy. This means that there are definite limits on the ability of the capitalist state—even if its governing personnel are principled and dedicated socialists—to implement reforms.49

Harrington also forgets that a socialist majority in parliament does not equal state power. Rather, the real power in the state resides in its unelected institutions—the military, state bureaucracy, courts—all of which will resist structural reforms and a democratic road to socialism with whatever means are at their disposal. This was shown both when Spain’s popular front government and Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile were violently overthrown in military coups wholeheartedly supported by the bourgeoisie. The reality that no ruling class willingly surrenders its privileges and power was precisely why Marx and Engels said a violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat was a necessary strategy for revolutionaries. This is something that Michael Harrington refused to acknowledge. All he can offer is moral appeals to the ruling class and faith that they will play fair with socialists, despite all evidence to the contrary.

 

Legacy

Since the 2016 election and the campaign of Bernie Sanders, DSA has grown to 55,000 members and become the largest nominally socialist organization in America in over 60 years. The revitalized DSA has seen chapters spring up across the country and its members involved in activities from labor strikes to fixing brake lights to election campaigns (notably the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez to Congress in 2018). It stands to reason that Michael Harrington would be pleased with DSA’s growth, but would he still recognize the organization? In some symbolic ways, DSA has moved away from his legacy in a manner that would have horrified Michael Harrington. There are now Marxist study groups who openly talk about Lenin and Trotsky. At its 2017 convention, DSA severed its longstanding ties to the Socialist International and endorsed the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement to end international support for Israel’s oppression of Palestinians.50 Support at the convention for breaking with the Democrats attracted a substantial minority inside DSA. Does all this mean that DSA is abandoning the politics of Michael Harrington and embarking on a new course? In point of fact, Michael Harrington’s strategy of Realignment and a democratic transition to socialism remain hegemonic inside DSA.

DSA member Maurice Isserman, a biographer of Michael Harrington, has argued that DSA is growing precisely by supporting Democratic candidates such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Cynthia Nixon: “The two of them did immeasurably more to popularize democratic socialism by acting as the left wing of the possible than any number of purist third-party campaigns, or electoral abstinence, could ever have accomplished.”51 Isserman argues that those who propose breaking with the Democratic Party are “left sectarians” who embrace “whatever policy and doctrine seems to promise the greatest personal sense of moral purity.”52

Isserman himself is a member of the North Star Caucus, one of the many caucuses that have sprouted up in the DSA. Many of the signatories of the North Star Caucus represent the Harringtonite “Old Guard,” who were active in DSOC, NAM, and the labor bureaucracy. The North Star Caucus believes the main goal of the DSA is to defeat the Republicans by supporting the Democratic Party.53 To accomplish this, the North Star Caucus believes that the Democratic Party needs to be Realigned.54 Supporters of the North Star Caucus such as George Fish explicitly draw inspiration from Michael Harrington’s political vision and understanding of socialism. According to Fish, “Harringtonism is the guiding ideology of democratic socialism in the US” which is characterized by socialism that “fights for free, honest and open elections for achieving socialism based on democratic self-determination and for transformative change for the here and now” as opposed to totalitarian Marxism-Leninism and Trotskyism.55 Secondly, Fish says Michael Harrington was “correct in seeing the locus for socialist struggle within the Democratic Party, and constituting DSA as the left wing of the Democratic Party,” which he believes was vindicated by the DSA’s growth after their involvement in the Bernie Sanders campaign.56

While the North Star Caucus are champions of a Realignment strategy in almost identical terms to Michael Harrington, others such as Seth Ackerman have attempted to update the strategy for the twenty-first century. Like Harrington and the North Star, Ackerman acknowledges that the Democratic Party is undemocratic, lacks a coherent program, and that the party leadership is unaccountable to its membership. Instead of simply uncritically supporting all Democrats like the North Star Caucus, Ackerman proposes that the DSA utilize the Democratic Party by running their own candidates on its ballot line. For Ackerman, supporting the Democratic Party ballot line is not a question of principle, but a “secondary issue” and should be utilized “on a case-by-case basis and on pragmatic grounds.”57 In order for a DSA member to run as a Democrat, Ackerman claims they must adhere to a “democratic socialist” program and be accountable to DSA. In effect, DSA Democrats would function as “a party within a party.” According to Ackerman, his proposal would enable

the Left organize to the point that it can strategically and consciously exploit the gaps in the coherence of the system in order to create the equivalent of a political party in the key respects: a membership-run organization with its own name, its own logo, its own identity and therefore its own platform, and its own ideology.58

For all its sophistication, Ackerman’s updated Realignment strategy comes up against the same roadblocks as Harrington’s original strategy and offers no solution to overcome them.

Whatever their differences, all of the factions in DSA remain formally committed to a democratic socialist road to power. For instance, Jacobin editor Bhaskar Sunkara and leading DSA member Joseph Schwartz favor a strategy that Michael Harrington would have felt quite comfortable with. Sunkara and Schwartz are in favor of an expanded welfare state on the Nordic model, but recognize that “social democracy is good, but not good enough.”59 Like Harrington, they argue that capitalism undermines social democracy in the long run:

Even if we wanted to stop at socialism within capitalism, it’s not clear that we could.

Since the early 1970s, the height of Western social democracy, corporate elites have abandoned the postwar “class compromise” and sought to radically restrict the scope of economic regulation. What capitalists grudgingly accepted during an exceptional period of postwar growth and rising profits, they would no longer.60

In line with Michael Harrington’s strategy, they advocate building a new majority where socialists “must be both tribunes for socialism and [its] best organizers” along the model of the Communist Party’s Popular Front:

Still, the Popular Front was the last time socialism had any mass presence in the United States — in part because, in its own way, the Communists rooted their struggles for democracy within US political culture while trying to build a truly multiracial working-class movement.61

According to Sunkara and Schwartz, a new popular front would have a broad base of support necessary to implement  “non-reformist reforms” that would weaken capitalism and increase the power of the working class, ultimately leading to socialism. Similar to Michael Harrington, the exact mechanisms of Sunkara and Schwartz’s socialist transition remain unclear.

A much more developed strategy of the “democratic road to socialism” has been developed by the sociologist Vivek Chibber. Strangely, Chibber says that the left should look to the early years of the Bolshevik Party as an example of “a mass cadre-based party with a centralized leadership and internal coherence” that is rooted in working-class communities.62 However, Chibber does not advocate a revolutionary insurrection on the Bolshevik model since he claims it is no longer viable due to the overwhelming armed power of the state. Like Sunkara and Schwartz, Chibber argues that the left needs to pursue a strategy of “non-reformist reforms” that “should have the dual effect of making future organizing easier, and also constraining the power of capital to undermine them down the road.”63 In the distant future, Chibber believes that socialism will require a “final break” with capitalism, but what that means is left unspecified and vague. For now, Chibber advocates the creation of a reformist Bolshevik Party, and a gradualist strategy.

While the name Michael Harrington is unknown to most of the DSA’s new members, his ideas continue to shape the contours of the debates on Realignment, reforms, and democratic socialism. Some such as the North Star Caucus remain unreconstructed Harringtonites, while Ackerman, Sunkara, Schwartz, and Chibber have attempted to make those ideas relevant to the present. Still, none of the Harringtonites have seriously confronted the limitations of Michael Harrington’s strategy or how to overcome them. The growth of the DSA’s membership opens up the possibility that the organization may decide on a different course than the one envisioned by Michael Harrington. However, at the time of this writing, the future course of the DSA and Michael Harrington’s essay remains open.

Conclusion

Michael Harrington’s hope was to make democratic socialism a force to be reckoned with in the United States. Whatever his socialist desires may have been, Michael Harrington ultimately reconciled himself to acting as the “loyal opposition” to the powers that be. His realignment strategy meant that he prized tactics of moderation and compromise for fear of alienating potential allies. Realignment was based on a flawed characterization of the Democratic Party as a coalition of equal interest blocs as opposed to a capitalist controlled party, which meant any attempt to “capture” the party was doomed in advance. The requirements of Realignment required kowtowing to liberal prejudices, prizing loyalty to American institutions, and an unquestioning reformist vision. As his conduct proved during the Vietnam War, Michael Harrington’s whole strategy acted as a brake and a roadblock to revolutionary action. Still, Michael Harrington’s ideas shape debates in the DSA and the wider left. Ultimately, if the American left is serious about fighting for socialism, then they will have to abandon Michael Harrington’s politics for those of revolutionary communism.


To Shalon, you mean the world to me.

Doug is currently working on a book on the life of Michael Harrington. His writings can be found here.

 

What’s At Stake in the Democratic Socialists of America?

Jean Allen discusses the factional infighting in the DSA and it what it says about the organization at large. 

On Friday February 8 the steering committee and the organizational structure committee of Philly DSA unveiled their proposed bylaws for the chapter. These bylaws, if passed, would lead to a radical restructuring of the chapter and a leadership elected every 2 years with a limited ability for recall; this would effectively be the only decision-making body in the organization. Members would be able to advise the leadership during the bimonthly meetings, but would not be able to create new campaigns on their own initiative and have to work through the existing committees, which they would need to ask to join. Later this spring that structure was approved at a controversial general meeting.

This has formed a part of the latest chapter of national DSA drama, which moves fast and often feels easy to shake off if you aren’t in one of the ‘problem chapters’ which generate so much of the organization’s discourse. In fact, as I write this, the events in Philadelphia have made Spring’s image so toxic that the caucus split on March 17. This event has put DSA politics, which for the last year has largely been merely one of opposition to Spring (née Momentum), into a state of flux.

The Organizational Dispute

The most obvious document to look at for Spring’s organizational vision is their article “For a Democratic and Effective DSA,” particularly the segment “Legitimate Representation is Direct Democracy’s Cool Cousin”:

“General meetings should be held only as frequently as necessary, as they require a good deal of preparation and energy that should be spent primarily on external organizing. Depending on the chapter, the appropriate frequency will vary from once a month to quarterly.

An agenda should be set by the chapter’s elected leadership ahead of time. … It should be up to the steering committee to use its judgment in determining which agenda items should be prioritized at general meetings, but members can and should be able to request that items be placed on the agenda — and should be able to amend the agenda at the start of the meeting by majority vote if necessary.”

This comes bookended by a large amount of concern regarding how radical democracy creates unaccountable rule by those most “in the know.” It is an odd form of doublethink to propose that, in the name of democracy, all decisions be made within heavily regulated general meetings which are only held as frequently as necessary, with necessity, of course, being decided by the leadership. This new ‘managed’ organization is a break from the usual working-group-centric model, where people have some degree of autonomy and can freely associate with projects they find interesting. While this model allows for far more individual agency, there’s some validity to the argument that it is less formally democratic because the decision of individual members to work isn’t ‘exposed’ to formal accountability. But one can make a chapter’s priorities ‘democratic’ without this form of supervision, which is, in fact, the limitation of member agency within the smallest and most managed possible spaces. Furthermore, creating unnecessary levels of bureaucracy is not necessarily supportive of an effective organization, especially given how swiftly things can move and how necessary member buy-in is for new projects. This form, which was argued for in The Call and has become reality in Philadelphia, can easily be seen as anti-democratic while justified as its opposite.

To go further than this, this top-down organizational form has been argued for since the end of Occupy Wall Street and its connected movements. Throughout Europe, left populism came as a reaction to the kind of horizontalist structures that existed during the movements of the squares, offshoots of the Occupy movement. Left populism’s thinkers and politicians argued that to become an effective movement they would have to shed the localized and horizontalist activism of the past and move towards a new kind of organizing which would focus on envisioning the future and controlling the discourse. Doing this would require breaking with some of the sacred ideological cows of the Left, but more importantly, it required a break with the organized left as it previously existed. Over this decade, from Greece to Spain to France and Italy, this new movement manifested itself in new parties which broke from the old, both in terms of the literal old guard of European social democracy-turned-liberalism, but also of the older activist groups which culminated in the movements of the squares.

Since at least 2013, Jacobin magazine has lauded this new populism. They ran articles by the leaders of Syriza, Podemos, and France Insoumise. They spoke to the theory that underpinned those parties, and they excitedly spoke of the revolution that seemed right around the corner the moment that these parties would win.

Except they didn’t. Granted, Syriza had to deal with the whole EU when it began opposing austerity, but this should have been predicted. Across the rest of Europe, the left is losing steam. Podemos went from a trajectory towards one of the two largest parties towards a precipitous decline. France Insoumise was not able to break out of the far left, Corbyn’s Labour has been stuck just below a victory, and across Europe, the willingness to sacrifice the left’s sacred cows seems more like an excuse to give up internationalism and support for migrants to little or no advantage.

Beyond the strategic mistakes the European left has made in its acceptance of nationalism and carceral borders, a large part of its lost momentum has to do with the way the left has narrowed over the course of the last decade. Throughout Europe, the growth of left-populist parties has occurred on the backs of other movements, and in each case these parties have demobilized their predecessors, from the winding down of the councils in Spain to the increasing disconnect between Greek street movements and the Syriza government. This sublimation is concerning, because it means that the failure of the parties to win in elections isn’t just one setback in a wider struggle; it’s a failure in the struggle as a whole.

These are not just abstract problems happening somewhere else. They are not mistakes which will be self-corrected if left alone. It is the product of a totalizing logic which opposes itself to the rest of the organized left. If the main goal of the left is to offer discursive interventions towards altering the common sense, and to use these counter-hegemonic discourses to win state power, then other formations, using different means towards similar ends but perhaps not speaking the same language or using the same words as the think tank socialists, are not allies to be embraced but enemies which can throw the whole movement ‘off message.’ For instance, attempts to push the language of Medicare For All in directions which are more inclusive of disabled people have been perceived by some as poisoning the well, pushing M4A into a direction which (although more anticapitalist) would be less palatable to the voting public. As such, these disability advocates have been straightforwardly treated as enemies to the cause, rather than people who are working from their own experiences who have the capacity to push the conversation on Medicare For All into a broader direction which questions the logic of capitalism.

It was understandable that through the long reaction of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and with the overall silence of the Left that US leftists would look internationally for inspiration. As the Pink Tide steadily ebbed, it was natural that Leftists would look to Europe for examples of a comparatively successful Left. Yet in repeating the strategies of European leftism in the last decade without a glance at the dangers inherent in those strategies, the Left, and Spring in particular, leads us down a dangerous path.

Will we repeat or learn from the failures of the European Left?

 

The Structural Problems

The issue is that on a deep level Spring caucus is right: there is a fundamental flaw in DSA’s structure which came from our massive expansion, overloading an organizational structure built to sustain small chapters that mostly exist as a social space for groups of less than ten activists rather than mass organizations. Building around cities rather than specific projects, workplaces, or neighborhoods, meant that when thousands of members joined, the organization de facto drifted towards the form that’s been used to organize large numbers of activists for the last four decades: the activist network.

The activist network is typically a group of some hundred people connected by an ideological belief in social justice in a specific city arranged into different projects or subcommittees, and aimed at advocacy or activism about a particular issue (note: when I say ‘advocacy’ I mean a broad term involving directly pushing for a specific law or bill; when I say ‘activism’ I mean protests, rallies, and events which might have vaguer relationships with specific policies), often through giving support to a recently created struggle. Because these groups were basically created to make the most of a situation where one has more resources than manpower, these groups would do their best to mediate and use popular movements outside of them to pressure for more radical or more feasible reforms from the state, depending on the group. They would engage in activities which would either require small moments of hyper-organized action such as a protest or a march, or activities which would require a small amount of manpower over a larger period to time, like writing letters to the editor, training the leaders of emerging movements, lobbying politicians, or doing work to spread knowledge of an event or action.

These activities need to be done, and groups of this sort fill an important niche in the Left. But this fundamentally managerial and mediatory role with regards to their unorganized constituents ends up creating problematic behaviors which worsen the more that activism predominates as the only activity on the Left. This managerial role can’t be held by everyone, and thus puts a limit on the degree to which struggles can expand and increasingly do so in a way that is self-replicating over time. These groups exist essentially to be support networks for the spontaneous risings of groups poorer and more oppressed than them, and in support to funnel their efforts towards the channels this group has access to, and this is the beginning and end of their activities and self-justification, often requiring the creation of movements that have no presence at all outside the activist subculture in order to justify themselves.

This structural tendency is worsened by the demographics of such groups, which tend to be alienated college graduates who connect to each other as a subculture of individuals interested in similar histories and ideas rather than as people working towards their material interests within the same workplace, building, or neighborhood. Because of this subcultural aspect (and in a way similar to a snake eating its own tail), when these groups organize around material interests that they share with their constituents, it is often as college students or within college campuses, and often these material interests are still sublimated under a desire to expand one’s activism by expanding one’s subculture through ideological agitation, rather than using said ideology to provide us with our goals and practices.

The DSA suffers from much of these problems on both the structural and demographic level as essentially being a progressive advocacy group which differentiates itself by being composed of self-identified socialists. While this is an unquestionable advance in the politics of the progressive advocacy groups composed of nothing much at all, this still provides the DSA with the problem of not having an easy path towards sustainable membership growth. As of right now, the main reason people have joined the DSA is because they find themselves interested in socialism, either because of events that happen primarily in a few major metropolitan areas or because they’ve been gradually finding themselves more attached to the policy goals of DSA-aligned politicians. Since they are not coming to their DSA locals because of things those DSA locals did, finding a place for these new members becomes problematic because in many cases it might not be immediately clear how their interests can be implemented, and in many other cases (interest in policy rather than practices), it simply isn’t immediately possible to put these into practice except through the mediation of electoral politics. And so many of the people who come to our events once or twice or maybe even spend their money to join us end up being a part of a large and utterly inactive periphery, thus replicating the structural problems the activist network has. Those who remain to become the core are often already linked to existing activist networks, which replicates the demographic problem.

The only reason the DSA hasn’t already fully developed in this direction is because of the occasional actions of members which point in other directions, such as mutual aid events, neighborhood activism, or forms of reproductive unionism. These actions should be lauded, but they are increasingly coming up against the limits of the DSA’s structural and demographic problems, which is that your average chapter outside of a few major areas is far too geographically dispersed to not adopt the kinds of methods seen in activist networks. Actual mutual aid done in a consistent way requires labor and resources which dispersed networks have a hard time providing, and neighborhood activism can’t really be done when hardly any members are concentrated in one neighborhood. So long as new members mostly come from things the chapter is not directly involved in doing but rather in interest with the subculture the chapter is a part of, this tendency will worsen until it is truly self-reinforcing; there is a good chance that this is already the case. We can already see one of the symptoms of this in a collective, if the largely unspoken, assumption that the working class is an outside entity that we need to organize. But whether the trend is permanent or not, the fact is that the DSA has historically been a progressive advocacy group which calls itself socialist, and despite a fragmentation caused by the massive addition of new members, it is on track to become that again.

This is the problem that the Spring caucus sought to solve through formalization. Rather than being an advocacy network on the verge of exhausting itself, the idea is to shear off those elements which are causing burnout, accept a smaller active membership, and become an advocacy group. This perspective does not just come from an ideological perspective originating in Europe, but is also a response to a real problem the DSA is going through right now, and we ignore this at our peril.

Counter Practices

But what follows seems to be the mainstream response from those who would oppose the Spring caucus. Perhaps it has to do with fears of being called entryists, perhaps it has to do with the fragmentation of the Marxist and Anarchist lefts over the last few decades which few seem interested in mending, but the ‘DSA left’ overwhelmingly does not seem to have the same feelings about ownership of the organization, nor does it seem anywhere as willing to engage in political struggles with Spring. Instead we’ve seen, e.g. from the Socialist Majority caucus, an argument of ‘live and let live,’ and a connected argument of avoiding the problems that exist at the national level by investing all power to local chapters. We see the argument that the DSA can continue to be both an organization based around fighting specific campaigns for policy goals, while also being a base building organization which does deeper canvassing, perhaps in support of internal development or in support of these advocacy campaigns, while remaining an internally coherent organization which won’t suffer from burnout.

This ignores the fundamental problem that the political splits in DSA are about, and how this problem exists in every chapter in the organization: Why, outside of a vague political sentiment or a belief in an organization that we could be, would anyone become an active member in our organization? If we do some advocacy work, some activist work, and some base building work, then what we are committing to is being an organization which does the same work a variety of other, better funded, and more experienced organizations do in a less extensive and focused way. Even in small cities it’s not especially difficult to get involved in an activist organization with a large number of self-identified socialists.

What is needed here isn’t just continuing the practical fragmentation DSA is going through. This won’t be effective for two different reasons: one, for the reasons I have described, but even ignoring that, even taking this ‘live and let live’ attitude on its own terms as an attempt to wrest control over our organization from a dangerous faction, this platform doesn’t work. The difference between an organization which works towards discrete policy goals and one which works to elect specific politicians is not much of a difference at all, and it’s still working by the same logic Socialist Majority nominally opposes, where the DSA acts as a mediator for movements assumed to be outside of it, rather than incubating those movements ourselves.

What is needed is more than live and let live, what we need is, to quote Srnicek, a counter-hegemonic argument, and to go further, a counter-hegemonic practice that can create an organization which moves past the limits of advocacy-activism. I mentioned counter-practices in passing in What to do as a Leftist Intellectual, but now is well past time to explain the concept.

A counter-hegemonic practice is not just doing one thing as opposed to something else; it is a practice which can recontextualize all other practices around itself and build a new organizational hegemony around the goals of said practice. As an example, many advocacy groups, including the Medicare For All campaign, have potlucks to draw people to their meetings, but those potlucks are not the center of their practices. They are done in the name of a particular goal which doesn’t necessarily end in a revolutionary potluck destroying capitalism and building a potluck society. In Spring’s conception of the DSA, the main practice is taking state power through election campaigns and by creating a space for socialism in the midst of the governmental-policy complex. Socialist Majority counterposes that with a call for pluralism, but a pluralism without a focus will just kick the can down the road and continue the DSA’s position as a group which tries to do both the work of an Our Revolution advocacy group and the work of an activist group without having the funding or the time to do either. What we need is a strategy which retains the DSA’s existence as a group which brings a variety of strategies and tendencies together, which can also combat both the mono-politics posed by Spring caucus and the degrading trends which every chapter faces.

Base-building

Over the course of the last three years, an alternative has presented itself and been popularized in many corners of the Left. The base building tendency (also called the dual power tendency) has gained traction due to the incisive critiques that proponents such as Sophia Burns, Tim Horras, and the Marxist Center as a whole have put forth regarding the practices of activism and advocacy. The idea of base building as just the extension of things that many successful organizers and organizations do anyways has caught on as an alternative to what many see as chasing our tail.

But this is the problem, not with the strategy itself but with the popularized version of it. How can base building be both a systemic alternative to activism and something which organizations do all the time? The popularized idea of base building, which combines focusing on specific campaigns while developing a base through mutual aid, is indeed just community organizing under another name. This idea of base building as an easy thing has been combined with an idea of mutual aid as being inherently anti-electoral and having its own good politics associated with it to form the bedrock of a certain segment of the DSA left, including the defunct Refoundation caucus.

The flaw with this idea is that structures and organizing forms do not have a content of their own, and supporting them in the abstract just leads to, at best, winning in the abstract. Mutual aid is not inherently anti-electoral and indeed does not have an inherent politics of its own: it has been pursued (in varied forms) by churches, charity groups, and liberal NGOs towards different ends. It is not a magic weapon which will imbue our movement with inherent goodness when used; it is just a technique like any other. Organizations are defined not just by the techniques they use, but by the relationship of these techniques to their broader goals. If members of the DSA call for mutual aid to pull in working-class constituencies and retain them in our organization without merging this technical call with a broader critique and counter-strategy, what we often see as the response is one of mutual aid events or an increasing number of social events which don’t fundamentally change the organization but rather serve as add-ons to existing strategies.

Without a long term goal, an intent to ‘organize the unorganized’ as Tim Horras says, these strategies can (and often have been) integrated into typical activism or typical advocacy. Without a broader project these strategies will turn to dust in the wind, or to be captured either by cranks who want a high horse to affiliate themselves with, or be incorporated into the exact kinds of projects base building was set up to avoid.

If base building is to be a systemic alternative to electoralism or activism, it needs to be more than a hollow technique we project ourselves onto. It needs to include medium and longer-term goals and needs to be feasibly scalable such that any chapter can begin this kind of work. This question of medium and long term goals brings up a question which members of Marxist Center have been asking since before their Unity Conventions: base building for what?

This question brings us into a new territory and finally an answer. The problem has been that the American landscape is littered with the ruins of dead radicalisms that have calcified into institutions by and for capitalism. This has happened not just ideologically but structurally, as groups of demobilized and alienated activists became dependent on funding. Breaking from these formations doesn’t just require being apart from them, but building new institutions by and for the working class that are structured and fight struggles in different ways. As Marx noted, without an independent political party the working class is forced to channel itself through bourgeois parties which it does not and can never truly control. This is true in the American context politically, but it is now also true at all other levels of engagement. The press is by and large the property of a handful of billionaires who decide on the press’s content, the major unions have been business unions since at least the 1950s, mutual aid has primarily existed through churches if not through an edifice of charitable organizations funded by billionaires in a way that wouldn’t be unfamiliar to Victorians, and academies are only ‘radical’ in the frenzied minds of movement conservatives. Finally, at the political level, leaving aside my criticisms of advocacy and activist groups, American cities have been single-party states for so long that they have reverted to the machine politics of old. This structure cannot be defeated with mere ideas or arguments or with some clever trick, and thinking that the magic word of socialism will defend us from cooptation will doom us to the same fate as our predecessors.

So base building would be the preliminary aspect of a strategy aimed at creating institutions of and for the working class which form an alternative to those institutions which currently exist in our cities. In the long term, if we build these independent institutions, we will have built the component parts of a party which, as the culmination of our work, will finally allow socialists and the working class to work within the political sphere in a truly independent way. This is all well and good in the abstract, but how can this be applied to the DSA’s current situation? What campaigns can this strategy be used towards?

In Marxist Center chapters the answer has been reproductive unionism. As opposed to typical unionism that organizes as the point of production (the workplace), reproductive unionism organizes at the multitude of points at which the working class reproduces itself. This includes but is not limited to tenants unions and organizing around utilities consumption. These pathways are far less cluttered with older organizations and building a tenants union or fighting utilities companies can create these organizations while continuing DSA’s plurality. Multiple different practices will be needed to succeed in these goals, from canvassing to journalistic work to agitation to advocacy work to union-style organizing. Each of these practices and struggles can also create possibilities for building lasting institutions while building our capacity to fight for reforms in a sustainable way.

Since such a strategy does not require that one political line be publicly held in order to build support for a program or candidate, this would avoid the limited and autocratic structures Spring suggests, and with a specific goal and a focus on both unorganized people and on areas where other activist groups aren’t working, we’ll avoid the redundant strategies put forward by the Socialist Majority.

Conclusion

The beauty of the Democratic Socialists of America since its rise has been its place as a staging ground for the transformation of theoretical tendencies into practices, its location as a multi-tendency organization, and its sheer size, dwarfing anything else which calls itself the US organized left. Combined, they have created an organization which has allowed the complete recasting of the Left’s fragmentation into practical terms. This has created a new and volatile politics which, due to its state of emergence, leads to often seemingly contradictory positions being held within one organization or one person. But this is for the best. The differences of the previous eras are not completely irrelevant, but they have been narrowed down by decades of Leftist failure that by now they can be largely summed up to doing the same things, holding different signs at the same corners, and hawking different books with the same content. For all its faults, the DSA has acted as a laboratory of the Left, with the conflicting strategies allowing us to know how they work. Important projects like Build, which focus on creating practical knowledge gleaned from a sharp analysis of projects chapters have undertaken, could not have existed in the United States a few years ago, and indeed does not exist in countries which have gone through similar situations as the United States has but have not developed the diverse kind of left which allows for actual strategic thinking. The DSA, Marxist Center, and Symbiosis are all of massive importance in figuring out what our politics mean in a period when our powerlessness is no longer an excuse for impotence.

At the same time, the DSA is hamstrung by inherited tactics and a structure which made sense at a time when we were an organization of a few thousand rather than a few tens of thousands. The lack of regional organizations, a clear inside/outside distinction, or even clear roles within the organization have created their own pathologies. Without mediating regional structures or clear roles it is impossible to enforce any condition or rule, since all you can do at best is rely on interpersonal relationships with the leadership of various chapters to enforce any given rule. Looking at the same structure from the bottom up leads to even worse problems, with support from the national largely being dependent on, again, interpersonal relationships with those who have personally committed to campaigns. Without an inside/outside distinction members are never able to really trust each other, as the continual leaking of information shows, and members can never truly break from agitating or propagandizing to analysis. The forum has not served this function because at this point the organizational pathology has truly set in, and without trust we again see interpersonal cliques emerge as the only sustainable organizing subgroup. This is an objectively regressive trend that will limit our ability to move past our transitory phase into a sustainable mass organization. With that said, it should be clear that what is at stake if we remain on this path is not a mere transformation of slogans, but the squandering of the chance we have at transcending the differences of the past. 

To answer a criticism I imagine this article will bring, this problem cannot be solved with a split. For one, the problems I have described are systemic to the DSA, and without a massive restructuring, any new group is not going to avoid them. For another, DSA’s internal politics are not even conducive to a split right now, with most of the new caucuses either being politically ephemeral or barely extant at the chapter level. Because of these factors, the main danger for our organization is not a split along ideological lines but an increasing burnout we can’t even put a finger on and backsliding into the forms of the last decade as we transform back into a rhizome of overworked cliques.

There is still, regardless, hope. Perhaps it’s a hope borne out of a lack of alternatives, or perhaps it’s a hope borne from just how much things have changed in the last three years. The Left in America has spent nearly fifty years in such a state of isolation that merely referring to yourself as what you are, a radical, a revolutionary, a socialist, was enough to make you impossibly beyond the pale. In such a state we developed a belief that came from this isolation, that socialism, revolution, etc., were magic words which represented our isolation, that giving up those words would make our beliefs easily transmittable and, on the other side, that the use of such words would guarantee an organization a license to good politics and protect us from cooptation.

Things have changed massively in only a few years, yet many of us still cling to these beliefs, that with a mere word we can arrange ourselves on the right side of the story, that with mere words affixed to old and tired practices we can somehow elevate them. History has not borne out either of these beliefs. Now, with tens of thousands working in the organized Left openly as socialists and millions more who identify with the term, it is clear that merely saying the word is not enough. The task for socialists now is to discover what socialism practically means in our age, to create an organization which is socialist in action and not merely in name. To do so will require harder analysis than we have done, massive recalibrations of our organization, and a great deal of work. I’m not going to pretend that it will be easy. But if we wanted an easy path, we would not have become socialists.

I’d like to thank my comrades in Rochester DSA, in Red Bloom, and in the New York State Organizing committee, without whom I wouldn’t have developed these thoughts.

 

No Bernie

One of the major political questions facing the Democratic Socialists of America in the near future is how to relate to Bernie Sanders’ recently announced 2020 presidential campaign. Already, a vocal and well-connected group of DSA members have put out arguments for a full endorsement and strong involvement in such a campaign. Central NJ DSA member Patrick Gibson provides an alternative view, arguing that the organization should not tie itself to a leader it cannot meaningfully influence or discipline.

Most of the pieces encouraging a DSA endorsement of Bernie Sanders in 2020 are quick to admit that his politics are not socialist politics. We want to abolish capitalism, to do that we’ll need a revolution, and clearly Bernie doesn’t support either of those things. Many of his policy positions are far better than those which any other liberal politician has on offer, but at the root of things Bernie’s policies are about getting friendlier managers in charge of capitalism, not abolishing the system itself.

Nevertheless, the argument goes, the DSA should endorse Bernie. Perhaps the argument is that although Bernie’s policies are obviously not socialist, they still represent a vast improvement for working people and that this is worth supporting its own right. Others see a Sanders campaign as the path to further membership growth, noting the relationship between the 2016 primary and the organization’s explosion in rolls. The most sophisticated arguments acknowledge that, while Sanders’ politics fall far short of the social revolution we need, his campaign and his foregrounding of class politics will develop the class consciousness of the proletariat in the United States, putting us one step closer to being able to build a mass socialist party.

Any of these arguments about the historical importance of the Sanders campaign may be correct, but none of them are a good reason for endorsement.

Don’t get me wrong—I hope that Bernie will be elected next year. I will register, briefly, as a Democrat, just to vote for him in the primary. But individual voting choices are different from organizational choices. We’re a socialist organization. We shouldn’t be endorsing somebody who is not a socialist.

To begin with, we shouldn’t endorse anybody just on the basis of harm reduction. Endorsing the viable candidate who would be best for the US working class would have led us to endorse Hillary Clinton in 2016. Nor should we be making our endorsement decisions merely on the basis of the development of class consciousness. If we take this idea to its logical conclusion, we’d be rooting for any number of politically polarizing but decidedly awful events that move masses of people to question the foundations of our political system. The development of class consciousness is a beautiful thing, but it cannot be an endorsement criterion on its own.

By the same token, we shouldn’t endorse Bernie simply because our alignment with his campaign would lead to even further membership growth.

Consider the best-case scenario: Bernie wins. A man we endorsed, a man who calls himself a “democratic socialist,” a man who elicits a familiar fondness with his iconic polemics against “the millionaires and the billionaires,” is now the President of the United States. He is now our most visible spokesperson.

DSA is formally a democratic organization. There is no political barrier to entry. You pay $27 and you can vote. And now our chief recruiter, the man who tells the world what we’re about, the man who determines the political character of the influx we hope for, is not a socialist, is not under our discipline, and seems actively disinterested in DSA. He voted for SESTA/FOSTA, calls open borders a “Koch Brothers proposal,” and has publicly argued against BDS, just to name a few of his chauvinistic tendencies, with his stance on BDS directly running against a policy which was supported by our organization at its last convention. He is running in the Democratic primary, caucuses with Democrats in Congress, and is intentionally left unchallenged by the Democratic establishment in his home state.

Those who argue in favor of a Sanders endorsement propose that we publicly and explicitly tie our political character to a liberal politician in the interest of short-term gain. This is liberalism at worst, and opportunism at best.

Spring Caucus/The Call, the most organized proponent of this strategy, claim to repudiate the Harringtonism of the old DSA. But their approach, constantly pushing just at the leftmost boundary of current US electoral politics, does not differ in any material sense from Harrington’s “left wing of the possible.” They recognize revolution as an eventual historical necessity but believe the road there must necessarily go through a social-democratic party. In seeing Sanders as the next step toward the construction of such a party, they hope to reproduce the exact sort of party that has historically served to quash revolutionary movements, not birth them.

Eugene Debs argued against this sort of opportunism over 100 years ago in an essay entitled “Danger Ahead”. Debs warns against the temptation to dilute socialist politics in the interest of near-term electoral growth:

To my mind the working class character and the revolutionary integrity of the Socialist Party are of first importance. All the votes of the people would do us no good if our party ceased to be a revolutionary party, or only incidentally so, while yielding more and more to the pressure to modify the principles and program of the party for the sake of swelling the vote and hastening the day of its expected triumph. […]

These votes do not express socialism and in the next ensuing election are quite as apt to be turned against us, and it is better that they be not cast for the Socialist Party, registering a degree of progress the party is not entitled to and indicating a political position the party is unable to sustain.

We should be wary of the danger ahead in a Bernie 2020 endorsement. Bernie’s politics are not socialist politics; his campaign will build class consciousness whether we endorse him or not; and indeed, his campaign will build class consciousness through the activity of many DSA members, who are likely to campaign anyway, just without an official DSA imprimatur.

We have goals that go beyond mere Nordic social imperialism: we should aim for DSA to become one of the founding elements of a mass revolutionary party in the United States.

As socialists, we must take revolution as our mission. We understand that this will require the simultaneous and collective action of tens of millions of people who currently hold no revolutionary consciousness at all, and as such it may be a long way off. But revolution remains our guiding principle. We must build the institutions that are capable of introducing revolutionary socialist politics to our fellow workers, of bringing broader and broader layers of our fellow workers into militant class struggle, and eventually of serving as the infrastructure of our collective liberation.

An endorsement of Bernie Sanders would do just the opposite, serving to drag our organization’s politics rightward at a time when they are rapidly maturing. It may help to put us in a position of greater class leadership; it would also leave us pointing in precisely the wrong direction.

I will be running to attend the 2019 DSA convention as a voting delegate on behalf of Central Jersey DSA. If elected by my chapter, I’ll vote against a Sanders endorsement.

What do the Democratic Socialists of America stand for politically?

The typical medium through which political organizations have presented their vision of social change is the political program or platform. Despite lacking an official platform, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) has endorsed candidates that do have official platforms. DT Seel, using a method of induction based on the content of these platforms, proposes what the DSA’s program would be if based on the politics of its endorsed candidates. This ‘inductive program’ is then examined and put under critique. 

From ‘Rosa Luxemburg’, 1986 film directed by Margarethe Von Trotta.

DSA is notorious for lacking an official platform, which is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength in that it allows fellow travelers to project their own images and understandings of socialism onto the organization. However, it also means that there is little shared understanding of what socialism is, and what needs to be done to get there. This is also reflected in DSAs extreme decentralization. Each chapter is an island unto itself, organized and run on whatever the dominant strain of left politics is in each locale. Some are organized and run by social democrats, some by communists, some by anarchists, and so on and so on. The resolutions passed at DSA’s convention (which I attended as a YDSA member) also provide little guidance, as several of the policy position passed have been brushed to the side by endorsed candidates (the endorsement of BDS and prison abolitionism to be specific). This understandably makes it quite difficult to discern what kind of political change DSA as a whole is working towards creating. Can we still figure out what DSA’s program is even within this heterogenous, often contradictory mass? I believe so.

The strategy I have taken to figure out DSA’s program is induction: drawing general principles from many specific examples. In this case, I have pulled together what I will call “DSA’s inductive program” by reading as many DSA endorsed candidates platforms as possible and drawing out common elements and themes. These candidates don’t have the same platform by any means but the platforms as a whole bear a family resemblance that lets us build a more-or-less representative whole. This, of course, won’t be an accurate representation of the politics of individual DSA members, but it is reflective of what the organization looks like from the outside. Even though many chapters do serious on the ground base-building work (especially in tenant and labor organizing), the sorts of stories that thrust DSA onto the public stage are about DSA’s electoral efforts. Julia Salazar and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez brought previously unheard of exposure to the DSA, and unless interested people find and churn through the dense web of online DSA discussion (it’s fair to say most do not) electoral campaigns are going to produce the common image of the organization.

In terms of method, I searched social media and DSA chapter websites for candidate endorsements since the Trump bump (2017-now), and cataloged the candidate name, what political position they ran for, which chapters endorsed them, and whether they won their election (a large proportion of those candidates who made it through primaries in 2018 are up for election on today, 11/6/18). Most of these candidates were running for office in local, county, and state government, though there were 16 candidates running for both houses of Congress. Their geographic spread did not mimic the population density of DSA (for instance, the New York City chapter has endorsed 6 candidates and the Southern Maine Chapter has endorsed 9), but the candidates endorsed by larger chapters (Cynthia Nixon, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Marc Erlich, etc.) tend to get more attention in the press and on social media. This is all to say, there are some issues with this approach but it is well suited for a first approximation. You can find my data set here (please take notice of the notes to the right of the first two rows).

After I collected this data I read all the platforms I could find and attempted to synthesize common points, planks, and themes into a single program. This is what is meant by “DSA Inductive Program”. Though there were some contradictory points (especially on economic policy and rent control), the platforms were overall very similar in tone and theme. The main difference between each was the political focus: some candidates were more focused on health care, others on housing, others still on environmental issues, and so on and so on. In the Inductive Program, this results in a program that is the average of all those combined.

Many individual platforms were much stronger or weaker than the Inductive program below. For instance, compare that of James Thompson (a Democratic candidate for Congress from Kansas) to the platform put forward by Cliff Willmeng (a Green candidate for County Executive from Colorado. Thompson does not call himself a socialist and makes constant appeals to both nationalism and the interests of the capitalist class throughout out his platform (which contains mostly liberal-progressive measures). Cliff Willmeng on the other hand clearly identifies as a working-class socialist, and moreover states that “working people don’t need representation. We need to be building power and representing ourselves”. He uses his electoral campaign to put socialism and class struggle on the table, an effort that should be replicated as far and wide as possible. The goal of all our efforts should be to unite working people as an international class. We should thus evaluate electoral campaigns and the candidates themselves on this criteria: to what extent they are using their campaign to unite and strengthen the class as a whole. Electoral campaigns that serve to strengthen the position of liberal parties or the capitalist class are not victories, even if the winning candidate is a card-carrying socialist.

Before moving on to the program, it should be noted that we do not aim to imply that there should be no flexibility in adapting a program to local conditions. Adaptability to local conditions is essential for any successful campaign, electoral or not. What is of primary concern for working class people of Los Angeles is not the same as in New York or Durham. One group of folks might be in the midst of gentrification and seeking strategies to fight back against predatory landlords and developers, another might be trying to save a rural hospital from closure, and another might be trying to unionize their local logistics depot. It is true, as the saying goes, that we have to meet people where they’re at, but we also have to be able to move them to better politics. All of us started with a mass of contradictory liberal and reactionary ideas, but through the writing and teaching of others developed more sophisticated liberatory politics. The key is to connect all these local concerns and struggles to a broader framework of international socialism. If the socialist movement isn’t using electoral campaigns to advance socialist politics, then what exactly is it doing? All this being said, it is time to unveil the DSA Inductive Program:

Jobs and Economy

  • The minimum wage should be a living wage of $15 or more (on essentially every platform)  
  • Protect and expand the right to unionize
  • Enact a job guarantee
  • Abolish right to work
  • Enact just-cause termination protection
  • Provide support for the transition to and creation of cooperatives
  • Create municipal banks
  • Create grants and support structures to encourage family owned business, small businesses, and entrepreneurs
  • Subsidize entrepreneurship and new businesses
  • Encourage consumers to support local and small businesses over large corporations

Housing

  • Create land trusts and cooperative housing associations
  • Enact rent control (some candidates, e.g. Danielle Meitiv, oppose this)
  • Enact just-cause eviction protection
  • Limit short-term rentals (i.e. Airbnb) through taxation or law
  • Protect collective bargaining for tenants
  • Enact a progressive property tax
  • No sale of public land for housing development without a commitment to build affordable or mixed-income housing
  • Housing development should be led by communities instead of developers
  • Enact a vacancy fee for housing

Healthcare

  • Build a single-payer healthcare system (on virtually every platform)
  • Mandate paid sick leave
  • Expand Medicaid access
  • Expand accessibility services for seniors and people with disabilities
  • Strengthen and protect Social Security
  • Treat generic drug manufacturers like utilities
  • Treat the opiate crisis as a public health problem, expand access to Narcan
  • Build more healthcare facilities in rural areas, protect existing healthcare (including mental health) facilities from being shut down
  • Spend more on preventative medicine

Transit

  • Expand public transit, including bus rapid transit systems
  • Build bike lanes
  • Build light, commuter, and passenger rail
  • Make transit more accessible
  • Modernize America’s infrastructure
  • Encourage the transition to green transit

Good Government

  • Create transparent accountable local, state, and federal voting systems
  • Shift to participatory budgeting where applicable
  • Digitize budgets for great citizen involvement and oversight
  • Build open data programs
  • Shift to ranked-choice voting
  • Shift to automatic voter registration
  • Shift to public campaign financing
  • Corporate money out of politics/No more lobbyist contributions/End Citizens United
  • Enact term limits
  • End gerrymandering
  • Create a more progressive tax structure

Environment and Green Issues

  • Transition to 100% green energy
  • Make a Green New Deal
  • Create municipal solar programs
  • Create stronger protection of natural resources
  • Phase out government owned gas vehicles in favor of electric vehicles
  • Divest from fossil fuel companies

Civil Rights and Equality

  • End the school-to-prison pipeline
  • Create citizens review commissions with subpoena and disciplinary power over the police
  • Funding, support, and protection for gender transitioning
  • Adhere to racial, gender, and sexuality equality frameworks
  • Make pregnancy and reproductive health a protected class
  • Protect abortion rights, make sure abortion is free and on demand
  • Enact laws guaranteeing equal pay
  • Abolish ICE, end state and local collaboration with ICE in the interim
  • Enact various gun control laws

Education

  • Fully fund K12 education
  • Create early childhood education programs
  • Make public colleges and universities tuition free
  • Support #RedforEd
  • Increase teacher pay, increase school funding as a whole
  • Increase the power of teachers to collectively bargain
  • Increase funding for STEM education
  • Limit or block charter school expansion

Imperialism

  • End reckless wars
  • Support the self-determination of Puerto Rico
  • Support the self-determination of Indigenous peoples in the United States

All in all, this program is not very different from a typical progressive-liberal platform in the Democratic Party. For example, compare this to Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren’s platforms, or Indivisible-endorsed candidates such as Jess King or Anthony Flaccavento. This is not surprising, given that out of 125 candidates in partisan races, 102 of them were running as Democrats.

A program is not a wishlist of things that would be nice to have. It is a road map to building class power and to eventually overcoming the rule of the capitalists. It must provide the working class with a policy independent from capitalist parties like the Democratic Party. We will be resolutely clear on this point, that the Democratic Party is not a Labor or Social-Democratic party in decay, nor is it a neutral hollow shell to be filled with whatever left-wing politics are in vogue at the moment. The Democratic Party is a capitalist party whose rational actor strategy is to triangulate between the left and the right, to mediate and defuse upsurges in social and class unrest in for the capitalist class. I will not belabor this point, other than to say that as it was for the Populists, the Farmer-Labor movement, the CIO, the Civil Rights movement, and the CPUSA, the Democratic Party is still a force of conservatism. For an expanded analysis of this topic, see Robert Brenner’s “The Paradox of Social Democracy”.

Nonetheless, this inductive program based on DSA election campaigns is still worth considering as a minimum program for building the socialist movement rather than as a full plan for transition to socialism. It is particularly strong on the environment, tenants rights, and healthcare. These seem to be the areas where there is the most consensus inside the DSA. Very few people will argue against Medicare for All (except to argue it doesn’t go far enough), or tenant organizing, or the various green transition politics that have become common sense.

However, its silences and weaknesses are what is truly glaring. Though support does exist for some anti-imperialist stances, it is often couched in the discourse of strengthening America, supporting veterans, or opposing “unnecessary wars”. Few candidates go so far as to put forward an internationalist position, and none directly question the existence of the US Military itself. Most of the federal candidates sidestep the issue altogether or leave their position as a few short sentences about the treatment of veterans. The socialist movement is an internationalist movement, and the working class has no country. If DSA takes these principles seriously, then the lack of focus on imperialism and militarism is a large oversight.

The structure of the federal government is also a moot point in these platforms and the inductive program. Where it does come up, it is usually in the form of “good government” reforms reminiscent of the sewer socialists (or, as said before, plain old fashion liberals). While gerrymandering is tackled as an obvious anti-democratic practice, the structures of the government that allow the capitalist class to impose its will are left alone. There is still a lot to learn from the program of the old Socialist Party on this front. The abolition of the imperial executive, the abolition of bicameralism, the direct proportional election of all offices, the end of the dictatorship of the supreme court, and the national enactment of referenda and initiatives are a few (of many possible) easy targets. We should not lose sight of the fact that the US Government was built to stifle the politics of the working class. It was created to be a slow, conservative force in society. Enacting single-payer health care or free college tuition is all well and good, but we will not be able to protect those victories or advance further in the framework of the nation-state, and this nation-state in particular. We can’t lose sight of the fact that the US Government will never bring us socialism, even as we struggle to pare away its most poisonous elements.

The focus on appealing to small business owners, local businesses, and entrepreneurs is also troubling. Most of these platforms have one or another plank about subsidizing or encouraging these businesses, which is especially concerning given how few candidates have clear and open identification as socialists. These pro-business positions sit uncomfortably with planks in favor of fight for $15, support for stronger unions, and support for more labor rights. Small business owners are often the vanguard of reactionary economic positions, they are the lower strata of the capitalist class that fears it will lose its property and be converted into workers, having to get a job just like the rest of us. It’s a banality to support small business owners and entrepreneurs in America, but it’s a curious position for socialist candidates to take: it puts them at the intersection of contradictory class interests. The small business owners you subsidize and promote one week will be the donors to right-to-work campaigns, to politicians who seek to block a $15 minimum wage, to all manner of union-busting politicos and PACs. The interests of the capitalist class and the working class are opposed, to support even the lowest strata of capitalists is to undercut your own struggle for socialism.

That brings me to my last point of criticism of the program: the sparsity of labor politics. Few candidates put forward specific proposals for strengthening labor unions, though many make statements in favor of labor in principle. In particular, support for #RedForEd, anti-right to work policies, and expanded bargaining rights for teachers unions are high points of many of these platforms. Likewise, the support for workers cooperatives is a welcome development. It needs to be said that they are not a solution to capitalism nor do they create islands independent of market forces, but they are still, like labor unions, important for the self-development and defense of the working class.

Nonetheless, it is surprising that little attention was paid to, for instance, Taft-Hartley (which, it is worth noting, was passed by the Democratic Party to reduce the chance of working class insurgency against the Dems). Taft-Hartley still provides the state and the capitalists with some of their most potent anti-union tools. The legalization of solidarity and political striking, card check, and the repeal of its right to work measures should be top priorities for socialist politicians. Likewise, measures should be taken to protect the right to strike (including wildcat strike) in general. While there are some promising elements in individual platforms (Sarah Smith, in particular, has strong positions on worker’s rights and unions broadly), there is a lot of room for improvement on this, especially given the importance of labor to the socialist movement and the emphasis some sections of DSA have put on a rank and file strategy.

Many of the issues that are reflected in the weakness of this program are produced in part by the structural location of DSA: its international context, its internal communication and power structures, and its relationship to the Democratic Party. The DSA has weak connections to other socialist formations throughout the world, having left the (corrupt and outdated) Socialist International. This has left DSA without formal affiliation with any international grouping of socialist organizations. This allows the DSA to take a more inward-facing view, rather than looking at itself as a component piece of an international whole. Where international affiliations do exist, they are generally the productions of personal relationships or professional networking. There are few opportunities to interact with other socialists from around the world, and programs such as member exchanges are seemingly non-existent (or are not disclosed to the rank and file).

The internal structures of DSA also preclude a great deal of political development. While the federated structure allows for a great deal of experimentation and sensitivity to local conditions, it also makes it difficult to spread information quickly and effectively or make democratic decisions as a whole body. There also seems to be no full account of the candidates endorsed by DSA, except for documents compiled unofficially by individual members. Lessons that are learned in one chapter are unlikely without great effort to be internalized by the organization as a whole.

Candidates who lose their elections are effectively given a damnatio memoriae, their names struck from DSA press and social media and are rarely thought of again. The speed with which DSA members quit talking about Jabari Brisport and Kaniela Ing within its online forums is still incredible to me. Lessons gleaned from their campaigns and painful failures that need to not be replicated are not communicated to the organization as a whole. Furthermore, because of the decentralization of the organization, large chapters (such as New York City, Philly, and East Bay) have oversized sway over the way DSA presents itself to the greater world, and what sorts of projects the organization as a whole work on.

A recent example of this is the endorsement of Cynthia Nixon. In this case, the endorsement of a candidate by one (albeit enormous) chapter resulted in outsiders believing that the organization as a whole endorsed this candidate when it emphatically did not. The correct balance between centralization and decentralization has yet to be reached in DSA. This results in large chapters (or dominant factions within those chapters) dominating the organization as a whole without any greater accountability, to the detriment of both their smaller neighbors and the DSA as a whole.

The relationship to the Democratic Party and electoral politics as a whole produces distorting effects in the DSA. Electoral politics should be viewed, with an enormous grain of salt, as a reflection of the success of socialists in organizing broader society. DSA victories alongside victories of a broader liberal-progressive range of candidates may indicate that DSA is surfing the waves made by deeper social forces rather than tapping into a resurgent desire for socialist politics in particular. There is no way to know in the short term, so it is important not to conflate the success of DSA candidates at the ballot box with the success of socialist politics or the working class, especially when the meaning of “electoral success” has been so theoretically underdeveloped.

Electoral “success” is not power in and of itself—we must have the power to enact and defend a socialist program. If we are riding a momentary wave with little substantial independent power to back us up, anything enacted will be swept away by the later upsurges of liberals and reactionaries. In order to guarantee we have stable, lasting power we need not view contesting elections as our primary task, but as flowing naturally from building independent working class power. All roads to power are difficult, treacherous and uncertain, but we need to build a social base to even begin thinking about seriously taking part in the political sphere. Thankfully, many DSA chapters are already doing good work in this regard, especially the tenant organizing of Portland and Los Angeles DSA, to give a specific example.

Lastly, it is worth thinking about the social position and incentives presented to DSA endorsed candidates themselves. For newly minted socialist politicians in the Democratic Party, there are powerful incentives to move to the right, triangulate against the DSA, and pick up a new social base with a few stacks of cash along the way. Without an independent socialist political infrastructure, candidates will be dependent on staffers and analysts wholly ingrained in the present system of governance. DSA does not currently have the capacity to provide for all the funding, staffing, and policy needs of an entire substratum of new Democratic Party politicians. It almost certainly lacks the strength to keep these politicians from drifting rightwards, especially given the relative power of the DSA versus the core of the Democratic Party bureaucracy and its power base. This kind of organizing must go far deeper than elections in order to be effective: it involves building a whole political structure and bringing up our own candidates through it.

There have been many internal discussions in the DSA about the concept of accountability, but the fact remains that until DSA builds a party infrastructure all of its own, its candidates will be accountable to outside interests rather than the socialist movement itself. It’s a basic fact of dropping individuals into long-standing deeply entrenched institutions. There are very few who can keep their principles during the long march through the institution. This dependence on the wider liberal-progressive political apparatus also limits the ability of the candidates to pursue unconventional strategies and tactics. They will be expected to fill a traditional role and will be unable to pursue obstructionist, abstentionist (refusing to fill seats), and propagandistic strategies as the case may call for. In an age of alienation, disenchantment, and political cynicism it is crucial to not limit our options to the ones that the liberal order has already deemed acceptable: it may be just as necessary for socialists to be anti-politicians in anti-political situations as it is to push labor politics during times of heightened class struggle or a national health service when capitalist health care is obviously failing.

We can learn many lessons on this from the old socialist movement who, in contrast to crude economistic histories, built vibrant, flexible organizational ecologies. The old workers’ movement built trade unions, but it also built tenants unions, media organizations, mutual aid societies, socialist gyms and fitness clubs, collective child care associations, etc. We aren’t just building new labor unions and parties that appeal to narrow economic reason, we are building a whole social apparatus and culture that enables its participants to see beyond the constraints imposed on them by capitalism. It gives them the chance see the morning sun of socialism rising above the dark horizon. Our program must appeal to people’s sense of interest, but our organizations must give them a reason to fight for it.

The problem of the socialist program is a complex one. The programs of the early socialist parties were developed and sharpened after decades of struggle and were adopted as new lessons were learned. We are living in the shadow of the failure of 20th-century socialism, so it is not surprising that we have a spectral socialism with as many contradictions and half-measures as signposts to the future. These are all problems that will be sorted out in the course of the struggle, in the course of debate, and in the course of experiment. This is a time of revolutionary patience. We are at the beginning of a new journey, we must carry on the lessons of those who went before us but we must also make our own path. In this spirit, the upsurge of socialist politics, even limited and contradictory socialist politics, is a heartening and welcome development as it gives us a new footing to rebuild the socialist movement here and now.

“Our demands most moderate are—
We only want the earth!”
—James Connolly, 1907