The Platform is the Message

Amelia Davenport and Renato Flores argue that social media cannot be ignored despite its negative effects on modern culture. Instead, the left needs its own approach to social media that takes into account the values encoded into tech platforms.

Technology Frustration and Cyberattack by Nalisda. Sourced from here.

The Social Dilemma is an impressive film on how social media is affecting the way we relate to each other. Combining docudrama and interviews with former social media platform workers, the film is a mashup of the fictionalized story of a social media addict, who becomes radicalized through anti-establishment “fake news” (with no obvious left or right bent), and ends up arrested at a demonstration, and the real stories of Europeans traveling to Syria and Iraq to enlist in ISIS and white Americans joining white supremacist organizations. The film blames the present-day political radicalization on careful design choices in social media platforms which keep us hooked to the apps, and make us vulnerable to this sort of manipulation. However, like many standard left-liberal documentaries (think Michael Moore), the film presents the overview of a significant issue and suggests mild reforms to solve it while ignoring the elephant in the room: capitalism. By focusing on the neuroscience of social media addiction and how apps are designed to maximize engagement, the documentary brushes over the role market imperatives have in structuring and shaping technology to maximize profit1, and ignores the way economic factors are responsible for destroying the social fabric of communities. 

Critiques of ever-increasing alienation due to the trajectory of bourgeois mass society stretch from the beginning of the communist movement through the work of critics like Theodor Adorno, Thorstein Veblen, and Guy Debord. As Marx said in The Communist Manifesto:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. […] In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage laborers.

The capitalist process of creative destruction is not a new thing, nor are the feelings of alienation from society. One only has to remember that Mark Fisher’s portrait of a broken society in Capitalist Realism was written in 2009, before smartphones were as extensively used as today.

Richard Seymour critiques The Social Dilemma in a review aptly titled “No, Social Media Isn’t Destroying Civilization.” As Seymour points out, The Social Dilemma repeatedly fails to address capitalism and instead focuses on an epiphenomenon: the role of social media in the increasing amounts of people radicalized through the internet. It ignores the role of US imperialism, much more important than the internet in creating ISIS. The documentary’s failings are even starker with racism—social media did not create white supremacy. Racism is as American as apple pie. Even if white supremacists find each other on social media, the wide-spread economic ruin of the Rust Belt and decline in the living standards of the white petty bourgeoisie after NAFTA has more to do with Trump’s election than Facebook ads and groups. 

This does not mean that we should ignore the problems of social media. In his review, Seymour rightly tackles the gaps and the catastrophist outlook of the documentary, but undersells the ways social media is actually affecting our society. Seymour is not in an easy position: he balances on a tightrope between acknowledging the massive power of social media and denying that it is uniquely responsible for the current moment. But ultimately he ends up overcorrecting against the documentary’s pessimistic assessment of social media. Seymour is correct that the neuroscience of the documentary about the way social media has addicted us is too simplistic and neuro-reductionist, but he does not sufficiently acknowledge that Facebook and friends have managed to addict us in a way that is unhealthy, and operate to maximize the profit advertisers can obtain from our interactions. They spend enormous sums on behavioral research for that purpose. We can always imagine better AI algorithms that will work for our benefit and mental wellbeing; under capitalism, this can at best be apps that help our mental health and overall wellbeing2 as long as we do not threaten, or even talk about the C-word

To elucidate this, we can contrast Facebook with programs oriented for the corporate world for which you are paying for the software. These are qualitatively different from those whose business model is maximizing engagement. For example, Microsoft Teams incorporates features to encourage wellbeing and an “adequate” work-life balance by adding meditation to your schedule. It is not hard to imagine how a benign corporate social media that prioritizes wellbeing will end up being nothing other than self-help apps encouraging us to do yoga and to eat healthy while hiding the destructive role of capitalism.3 Indeed, most of these apps are already available in your app store, with a price tag. While capitalism still drives immiseration regardless of our technological platforms, some technologies remain decidedly worse than others in their social effects. 

Seymour ends his review with the question: “where is the communist program for the social industry?” Not only is this question hard to answer (and attempts at such, like nationalization of the data centers, have already been proposed4), but it is a higher-order question than what is needed right now. We are far from being able to affect those decisions. It is a bit like deciding how you’re going to spend lottery winnings on a ticket you just purchased. What activists must be asking right now is “what is the social industry, or even social media, strategy of our organizing?” because it is clear that social media drastically affects the way we understand organizing, the way we develop trust in our organizing, or even who gets the largest platform in an organizational debate. We must reckon with the fact that whether we want it or not, social media plays a disproportionate role in our organizing. Parties currently relate to this either by ignoring it, or by enforcing strict social media discipline5, and these cannot be good answers to the dilemma.

Whereas individuals can choose to unplug, our organizing will never be able to fully escape social media. We can decide to not partake, but that doesn’t stop others. The time to come to terms with this harsh reality is long overdue. We are no longer living in the times of the Bolsheviks: the difficulties of getting the message out is not just censorship, but also our signal being drowned in the noise of the hot take economy. It is easier to generate attention by calling Holocaust victims “Karens” than it is by writing lengthy critiques of the concept of race. And a second difficulty appears: are we on social media for the “social” part or for the “media” part? How much of our ego goes into making sure that it is our take that is liked, retweeted and shared, rather than the other person’s or groups’ takes? Even with the best of intentions, it is difficult to not feel good from social validation and watching our follower count or page likes go up.

The Platform and the Party

Turning back to the immediate implications of social media for communist organizing one question stands out: “should a party impose a social media discipline on their members?” It is easy to agree that some discipline is necessary: racism, sexism and any other form of discrimination should get you expelled. Likewise, an informal intervention may be needed if a comrade is having a Twitter meltdown. But the question of precisely how much intra- and inter-organization debate should be allowed on social media is not an easy one to answer. Sometimes debates happen on Facebook groups or on Twitter because there is no other platform to have them. These are responses to organizational failures and the feeling of a lack of democracy. In this case, this is a symptom of an organizational disease, and should not be seen as a lack of discipline so much as an uncontrolled explosion due to inadequate communication channels. But other times, party members simply are not happy when a party decides against them and then take to social media to protest this, or even to sabotage the decision. For instance, the infamous letter calling for DSA members to phonebank for Biden despite the National Convention and the National Political Committee of DSA deciding against a Biden endorsement. In this case the unaccountability and uncontrollability of social media following comes to the forefront. 

Social media appears to flatten power structures, but what it really does is mask them. DSA-adjacent celebrities, such as AOC, have over ten times the amount of Twitter followers than the organization itself. This sets a clear boundary for accountability. Indeed, platform abuse was what caused the introduction of “democratic centralism”6 in the German Socialist Party of yesteryear. Democratic centralism entailed that the votes, and even the speeches members of parliament gave, had to be decided on by the party as a whole. This was a means to ensure that the party controls their elected officials, rather than the opposite. The current structure of DSA prevents this accountability through democratic centralism from happening. The only event which can take place is a public repudiation, similar to the Chicago DSA’s disavowal of their elected alderman Andre Vazquez for voting for a right-wing city budget. While a positive development, it is very unclear that this has a medium- or long-term influence that is larger than the revoking of an endorsement for re-election by a similarly-sized NGO. The current individualistic electoral system is not well suited for these kinds of collective discipline. Vazquez cannot be expelled from a parliamentary fraction or removed from his seat. 

Aside from politician-celebrities, social media influences our organizing in undesirable ways. Even if a large social media base does not account for a large popular base, there are still real-life ripples every time a social media celebrity decides to make others hear their opinion. Charismatic people, or even just conventionally attractive people end up having large platforms to disseminate their thoughts about what is to be done, often causing wastes of time and resources. An example of someone who has a large Twitter following due to her charisma and past involvement in politics is Briahna Joy Gray, the former advisor to the Sanders campaign. Gray, among other media celebrities launched a #ForceTheVote campaign, which attempted to pressure progressive Democratic legislators to withhold their vote for Pelosi as House Speaker unless she would accept bringing Medicare for All to a floor vote. The campaign went nowhere despite producing vigorous debates online for a few days; it lacked a real popular base beyond social media presence. Online platforms do not often translate to on-the-ground organizing and power.

The Medium is the Message 

Founding father of Media Studies Marshall McLuhan argued that to understand communication, rather than focusing on particular content being transmitted, we should focus on the medium through which it occurs. He summarized this succinctly with the catch-phrase “the medium is the message.” For McLuhan, “media” is not simply audio-visual transmissions like newspapers, television or radio and communication goes beyond language. All technologies are media in McLuhan’s account because at their root they serve to extend some capacity of humanity to effect change in the environment and/or receive sensory stimulation:

“Any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body.”7

For instance, the transition from rail to highways as modes of transportation had profound impacts on the structure of cities, logistics networks, and broader human activities like recreation independent of what any given train or car was doing on its network. And it’s not just our social structures, but our bodies that adjust to the stimulation of our technologies. The blue light from electronic screens disrupts sleep patterns, while the consumption of convenience food is linked to heart disease and other health risks, and on a more profound level, as the Greek philosopher Plato bemoaned, our transition to written language led to a loss of our ability to remember nearly as much information as oral cultures. Moreover, every message, be it linguistic or economic, is itself a medium. A car and a train themselves are media transmitting passengers to their destinations who themselves, in the exercise of their social roles for business or pleasure, transmit messages to their destinations. Likewise, a historical television program transmits the message of a script that transmits a lesson of history which itself serves to transmit a particular moral or emotional sentiment to the general public. Media are like nested matryoshka dolls.

From Mcluhan’s ‘The Medium is the Massage”

This especially applies to social media platforms. Off the bat, Twitter messages have a maximum of 280 characters, are evaluated by the likes of a public network, and are very rapid to send. This has a profound impact on the way the medium structures social engagement through it. Most debates will be primarily performed through rapid hits, searching the approval of the public rather than making a convincing argument. In that respect, Facebook provides a marginally better platform for debate, with unlimited length messages—and slightly more secluded commentary, but we are still judged by a large public, in real-time, and performing the debate for the audience. Moreover, Facebook comes with its own drawbacks because of the way its system of invite-only or join-request-based groups work, which create isolated bubbles often characterized by not only group-think but bizarre power dynamics and moderator cliques. What Facebook cares about is that you are engaged; being engaged because you are angry, depressed and seeking validation, or fulfilling yourself through meaningful engagement all look exactly the same to their algorithms. The same way treating disease rather than the symptoms can be seen as unprofitable for medical companies, as long as the tools of social media are dominated by the profit motive, they will maximize the profit of the company, and not necessarily the welfare of the users. Because these platforms condition what sort of media content is enacted through them, they will inevitably shape our habits of thought outside their domain. Thinking about intellectual content in the form of “takes” positions all viewpoints in relation to clout seeking and personal validation and it is increasingly common to see this terminology replace the notion of a political “line” outside decrepit sects.   

Tinder might be a clearer example. What is Tinder’s service, or Tinder’s product? If Tinder were optimized to find us an adequate life companion, or at least someone to walk with us for a bit, people would use Tinder for one or two weeks, and then log off, depleting the user base. This would hurt the company. It is in Tinder’s interest to keep us logged on, replying to messages and matches, so we keep on paying our account, keep on watching the ads, and keep on giving away our data. So then, from a financial perspective it makes sense for Tinder to produce matches who provide only temporary relief from loneliness, instead of finding someone who would make us leave the app maybe not forever, but at least for a while. 

On Tinder, at least one knows what they hope to get. What do we hope to get from social media aside from social-ness? With social isolation especially exacerbated in the age of a pandemic, the social media giants seek to capitalize on this. Facebook naturally tends to show people who think like us, to maximize interactions. This is where Seymour’s critique of The Social Dilemma, which focuses mainly on the power of capital, is incomplete. Social media does produce dopamine and other chemicals which give us a psychological addiction and keep us on the platform. Even avoiding vulgar materialism, it would be foolish to deny the fact that our central nervous system structures how we engage with reality. It’s not just a neutral medium. Psychedelic drugs, workplace stress, physical health, and meditation practices attest to this in their own ways. But through increased technical understanding of the regularities in the material cognitive processes in our brains, and the ability to artificially process and filter information through computers, our central nervous system itself has been extended. As McLuhan says, 

The electric media are the telegraph, radio, films, telephone, computer and television, all of which have not only extended a single sense or function as the old mechanical media did—i.e., the wheel as an extension of the foot, clothing as an extension of the skin, the phonetic alphabet as an extension of the eye—but have enhanced and externalized our entire central nervous systems, thus transforming all aspects of our social and psychic existence.8

Our smartphones filter spam calls, our thermostats adjust the temperature, and the weather channel tells you to prepare for snow next week. In some ways, this development of an extended, collective, electronic nervous system has cost the broad masses its antiquated faculties of self-reliance and the same concern for privacy that historically dominated the highly literate specialists and the bourgeoisie. But is this such a loss? 

McLuhan notes that this new electronic way of living is much more suited to formerly marginalized cultures with strong memories and legacies of tribal existence, not the white bourgeoisie and upper-stratum of workers who financed it. Communities that had to maintain strong ties and forms of resilience in the face of colonial genocide, or forged through the hardship of the proletarian condition, are more aligned with technological logics that emphasize contextual awareness, socialness, and generalized rather than specialized knowledge. Where yesterday’s actuaries and skilled craftsmen are dinosaurs in the face of automation, a day laborer who runs several independent side hustles is more likely to have the flexibility needed to survive in an economy whose rate of change is constantly accelerating. But it isn’t the street-smart entrepreneur who is most resilient, but those who can develop strong community networks of mutual support and solidarity. The hierarchical and individualist culture of the machine age is unsuited to the conditions of life that our technologies have created when it takes Venmo micro-donations from one’s social circle to meet the rent, and a tenant union to keep the rent from rising higher. In the spirit of socialist architect and futurist Buckminster Fuller, McLuhan remarked, “There are no passengers on spaceship earth. We are all crew.”

Singing Sea Shanties on Neurath’s Boat

The present socialization methods are a contrast to those that dominated the past, but a close comparison can help us bridge the gap and develop our program. Recently on Tiktok, hundreds of videos have been uploaded of people joining in the singing of sea shanties. Passionate yet wholesome, the shared activity shines out like a beacon amid the darkness of plague and civil discord. Sparked by a viral video of a postal worker singing the song “Wellerman,” whose name’s meaning has been lost to history, a glimpse of what a healthier culture might look like flashes on our screens. But unlike earlier viral videos, this one involves widespread social participation. With Tiktok’s duet feature, people can join in song across the gaps social distancing demands. 

The social context which produced sea shanties could hardly appear farther from our own: an age of heroic and well-sinewed men setting off on daring struggles with the elements and Nature in pursuit of fortune. It is an era characterized by images of widows staring longingly from the shore, great storms, and drink-sodden invalids telling tall tales to any who would listen. A time when men had no choice but to risk their lives so that their children might eat. 

But is that time actually so different from our own? For all our attempts to smooth out the difficulties of life through technology, anxieties and uncertainty still beset us. Today, every time you go to work, buy a coffee, or visit with a friend, you take a calculated risk that a chain of events may result in killing you, a grandparent, or a partner. But even absent the plague, we simply tune out the 3,700 auto fatalities a day as we commute to work. “It won’t be me,” we tell ourselves, if we think about it at all. We live our lives in the face of tornadoes, floods, landslides, and other man-accelerated disasters because we must. Are the meatpackers who face a roughly 25% injury rate any less brave than the whalers or herring fishermen of old? Are retail workers who live in fear of assault by customers or mass shootings? 

And yet, as much as things have remained the same, what has changed is the increased atomization and alienation of people from one another. The pandemic has only cast existing trends in sharper relief. Where the whalers had camaraderie and brotherhood, today we have parasocial relationships with twitter celebrities and podcasters. The bourgeois culture our schools and institutions force us into is incompatible with the real demands of the new techno-economic reality we face. And this has real implications for social struggle to improve conditions. As Max Dewes put it in a recent article for Organizing.work:

But all of the knowledge in the world can’t change the fact that the single hardest part of any campaign is talking to your coworkers. Almost every shortcut and miscalibration in organizing pivots around the universal truth that most workers would rather personally and publicly challenge Sundar Pichai or the President of the United States than ask Meng from accounting to have an emotional conversation about his issues at work, and pitch him on acting collectively on the job.

Where a crew of sailors might turn mutinous and maroon their tyrant captain on a rocky outcropping, today we are anxious not to hurt the feelings of our employers. Where discipline on a ship was enforced with the lash, and in the factory with the boss’s cane, today we live in enlightened times where a supervisor’s well-timed tantrum does the trick. 

There was a time when the class line was more clear. Organized workers could exert discipline of their own. Scabs feared for their lives, and employers knew that driving the workers too hard would have direct consequences. But the police and national guard were always available to crack heads if workers stepped too far out of line. Organized workers had a culture apart from and subordinated to the dominant bourgeois culture of the men of letters and it played out in a low-grade struggle that involved violence in both directions. 

Binding workers together and reinforcing a shared collectivity was a culture distinct from bourgeois high society and from the mass culture that united the classes. Songs sung to keep the pace at work, at the bar, and in the union hall created a shared language that reinforced an identity opposed to the boss. The Industrial Workers of the World’s Little Red Songbook acted like a passport to a world of shared meaning for those who were tired of lies told from the pulpits of corrupt preachers and in the pages of the newspapers. Visual art, poetry, novels, and plays written to advance working-class values could be found across the world and across nations. Works like Takiji Kobayashi’s Kanikosen (The Crab Cannery Ship), Robert Tressell’s The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists, Daniel Alomía Robles’ El cóndor pasa (The Condor Passes), and Bertolt Brecht’s Mother Courage and Her Children expressed the political subjectivity of the oppressed. 

But not all working-class culture was political in character. Much dealt with the tragedies and sorrows of the lived reality of the times like many blues and country songs, spoke of imagined better futures, or recorded memories outside the official histories of polite society. This is where sea shanties largely sat. Singing them was a means for workers in maritime communities to enact their identities and participate in something far beyond themselves. The act of shared singing provided shared structure and narrative to the otherwise disconnected and traumatic experiences of lives on the periphery of society. The singing created a reality where sense could be made of the uncertainty of life. Is it any wonder people today have rediscovered the medium?

In his discussion of human knowledge and the nature of scientific knowledge, Austrian philosopher of science, Otto Neurath, used the metaphor of a boat to explain progress: 

We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.9

Standing on existing scientific knowledge as a platform, researchers could replace parts of the general body of theory as they were shown inadequate or incompatible with current understanding. But the reconstruction necessarily takes as elements ideas and notions from the past, even as it seemingly discards the outdated. 

This is also true with culture. There is no absolute foundation upon which a new culture can be constructed; it will necessarily be made from elements of the old. But as the ways of living and narrative structures created by capitalist mass cultural institutions like individualism, blind faith in the salvific power of scientific progress, and the civic institutions of western democracy are increasingly recognized as rotten to the core, they will be organically replaced by whatever is at hand. Even as we have to isolate through the plague, we also have to come together to survive the growing challenges and threats ecological and economic changes pose to all but the most privileged. Collective forms of cultural expression like sea shanties are a spontaneous expression of this. Socialist political art and media are a conscious attempt to address it. Both can play a mutual reinforcing role. 

Even as revolutionaries focus on building direct power against the bosses in organizational and strategic terms, time and resources have to be set aside for the culture that creates political subjectivity. Whether it’s something fun like sea shanties, rap music, video game tournaments, fiction reading circles, or shared meals and recipe swapping, we have to do more than just give it space. This does not mean creating a prescriptive or top-down model of culture that excludes any “problematic” elements. Such a project is impossible beyond its undesirability. But we don’t have to be passive or tail organic cultural development either. If there’s something that needs to be said or a social need unfulfilled, revolutionaries can make conscious interventions. Our revolutionary forebears were not austere killjoys. Part and parcel with revolutions were the creation of traditions like the Soviet Haggadah, a set of prayers created by communist Jews in Russia, songs like “The East is Red” sung during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and many others. 

The Social Dilemma‘s tepid reformism is a dead-end for communists, as is pretending these platforms are neutral and play no role in shaping messages. Taking note from McLuhan, we can’t simply take the existing social media and feed in communist politics and working-class culture. But that does not mean we can’t or shouldn’t engage with it. What is important is first recognizing how the technical frameworks shape the message and then adjusting our engagement accordingly. We must note that how our organizations structure their interaction with social media is more important than any particular content they post. Instead of planning and coordinating our organizations through Facebook, Google Apps, and Zoom, we can look to other platforms such as those developed by Common Knowledge. We can develop user-friendly protocols for operational security that minimize electronic records altogether or use burner flip phones and text messages, and we can develop robust policies for the behavior of organizational officers on public social media. The bourgeoisie is not all-powerful, and while their engineers do design their platforms for maximizing profit, the dynamics of social media in the real world are too complex for them to ever fully control. But the same goes for our movement too. 

The traditions of dead generations may weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living, but it’s a dream workers can take control of and remake according to our own purposes. The power to do so is in your hands!

Lenin and Art by Lunacharsky

In honor of Lenin on the anniversary of his death, we publish this short essay by Lunacharsky on Lenin’s views regarding art. This text was originally published in “Khudozhnik i Zritel” (Artist and Audience), issues 2-3, March-April 1924, and has been translated by Reuben Woolley. Introduction by Cliff Connolly. The original source of the translation can be found here.

Lunacharsky, third from left, with Lenin, 1920

In the days following Lenin’s death in late January 1924, the Soviet Union was flooded with artistic and literary works commemorating the fallen revolutionary. In his poem The Komsomol Song, Mayakovsky wrote the now-famous words: “Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin is to live forever.” The city of Petrograd was renamed in Lenin’s honor, and the new Leningrad Gublit published a propaganda broadsheet with the poem A Drop of Ilych’s Blood. As the verses suggested, the departed leader continued to give inspiration to millions even in death; a drop of his blood in every communist’s veins. This was the environment that gave birth to the following work from Lunacharsky. 

People were hungry for reminiscence to soothe their loss, and Lunacharsky delivered. A longtime Bolshevik and accomplished writer, he was made head of the People’s Commissariat for Education after the October 1917 revolution. In this position, he helped establish the Bolshoi Drama Theatre, protected historic cultural sites, oversaw public art exhibitions and experiments, and facilitated a drastic increase in Russia’s literacy rate. He had a unique perspective on Lenin, being sometimes in agreement with and other times in opposition to the latter’s policy ideas (although the disagreements were always comradely in nature). He also frequently served as an intermediary between Lenin and the art world, often taking measures to safeguard artistic institutions that Lenin was harshly critical of. 

One such institution was that of Proletkult, a federated collective of avant-garde artists working mainly in drama, literature, and the visual arts. Over half a million members participated in its studios, clubs, and factory circles. The controversial organization sought to prefigure a purely proletarian culture untainted by capitalism, and produce works that would reflect this aesthetic. While Lunacharsky was a huge proponent and succeeded in acquiring state funding for Proletkult projects, others took issue with its founding ethos. Lenin in particular was concerned that it amounted to no more than a group of “bourgeois intellectuals” trying to create a culture from thin air and impose it on the working class. 

Throughout this memoir of his time with Lenin, Lunacharsky paints a picture of a man with a passionate yet strangely distant relationship to art. Lenin loves music, but “it upsets him.” Lenin loves art history, but cannot devote enough time to it to form an opinion. Lenin has trouble funding an opulent theatre when there are run-down schools but refuses to close it. On matters of sculpture, Lenin defers to the judgment of others and then is elated to hear their learned conclusions match his insufficiently educated opinion. Overall, this is totally in line with the character of a disciplined revolutionary who avoids speaking on topics he hasn’t thoroughly investigated. The resulting quirks are entertaining and were precisely what a nation in mourning needed in the wake of a popular leader’s death. 

It’s worth noting that the author did not originally intend this piece for publication, and didn’t bother editing closely after writing the piece essentially in note-form. The tone and pacing is somewhat strange in the original Russian, and this is exacerbated by its translation into another language. While not a perfect piece of prose, it still holds a great deal of merit and is well worth a read. Thanks to Lunachasky’s written memories, we know Lenin truly lived. In reading these words almost a hundred years after they were written, we see that Lenin lives. In our daily work as communist militants and organizers, we ensure that Lenin is to live forever.


Lenin and Art by Anatoly Lunacharksy (1924)

Lenin had very little time during his life to devote any concerted attention to art, and so he had always considered himself profane on the subject; he disliked making statements about art, as he always found dilettantism alien and hateful. His tastes, nevertheless, were strongly defined. He loved the Russian classics, realism in literature, portraiture, and so on.

Back in 1905, during the first revolution, he once had to spend the night at the flat of comrade D. I. Leshchenko, where, as it happened, there was a complete collection of Knackfuss’ publications, dedicated to the world’s greatest artists. The next morning, Vladimir Ilyich said to me: “What an engaging topic the history of art is. There is so much work here for a communist to do. I couldn’t get to sleep until morning, and spent the whole time looking through book after book. It tormented me to realize that I have not had the time to work at all with art, and will never have such time in the future.” I remember these words of Ilyich’s extremely distinctly.

I had to meet with him several times after the revolution to take part in various juries on artistic matters. In one such case, for example, I remember him calling for me, then he, Kamenev and I went to an exhibition of designs for statues to replace the figure of Alexander III, which had been torn from its luxurious plinth besides the temple of Christ the Savior. Vladimir Ilyich surveyed all of the statues with a strongly critical eye. He didn’t like a single one. He stood particularly intrigued in front of a design of the futurist school, but when asked for his opinion, said: “I can’t understand anything here, ask Lunacharsky.” Upon hearing me state that I could not see a single worthy piece, he looked elated, and said: “my, I thought that you were going to put any old futuristic scarecrow up there.”

Another time, the question at hand was a memorial for Karl Marx. The renowned sculptor M.1 showed particular obstinacy in the matter. He presented a design for a grand statue: “Karl Marx, standing atop four elephants.” Such an unexpected subject struck us all as bizarre, Vladimir Ilyich very much included. The artist began reworking his memorial, eventually doing so three times, not wishing to relinquish his victory in the competition on any grounds whatsoever. When the jury, under my chairmanship, finally rejected his design and settled on a collective piece by a group under the leadership of Aleshin, sculptor M. burst into the office of Vladimir Ilyich and complained to him directly. Vladimir Ilyich took his complaint to heart, and called me directly to summon a new jury. He said that he would come personally to view the Aleshin design alongside the design of sculptor M. And so he came. The Aleshin design was found to be perfectly satisfactory, sculptor M.’s design was rejected.

At the 1st of May celebration of the same year, in the same place that the construction of the Marx memorial had been proposed, the Aleshin group built a small-scale model of their piece. Vladimir Ilyich travelled there especially. He walked around the memorial several times, asked how large it was going to be, and eventually gave his approval, but not before saying: “Anatoly Vasilievich [Lunacharsky – trans.], instruct the artist specifically that the head must come out similar enough, that one gets the same impression of Karl Marx that one would get from his best portraits; the likeness here is somewhat diminished.”

Back in 1918 Vladimir Ilyich called me and said that we must propel art forwards as an agitational material, and with this in mind he laid out two projects. Firstly, in his opinion, we had to decorate buildings, fences, and other such places where there are usually posters with grand revolutionary slogans. He immediately suggested some such slogans himself.

This project was taken up wholeheartedly by comrade Brikhnichev, when he was in charge of the Gomel Department for People’s Education. I later saw that Gomel was absolutely covered in such slogans, all containing worthy ideas. Every single mirror in one grand old restaurant in particular, which had by then been transformed into an educational institute, was now covered in aphorisms penned by comrade Brikhnichev.  

In Moscow and Petrograd, not only did this not catch on in such a grandiose manner, but not even according to Ilyich’s initial vision.

The second project concerned the placement of temporary alabaster statues of great revolutionaries on an unusually large scale, across both Petersburg and Moscow. Both cities responded eagerly to my suggestion that they put Ilyich’s idea into practice, suggesting even that each statue should have a ceremonial opening with a speech about the revolutionary in question, and that underneath each statue they would place explanatory plaques. Vladimir Ilyich termed this “monumental propaganda.”

In Petrograd this “monumental propaganda” was relatively successful. The first such statue was of Radishchev, designed by Leonid Shervud. A copy of it was erected in Moscow. Unfortunately, the Petrograd statue broke and was not replaced. Generally speaking, the majority of the wonderful Petersburg statues didn’t hold out, on account of their brittle material, but I remember some fine figures: busts of Garibaldi, Shevchenko, Dobroliubov, Herzen, and several others. Left-deviationist statues came out worse. For example, upon the unveiling of a cubist rendition of the head of Perovskaya, some just recoiled in shock, and Z. Lilina demanded in no uncertain terms that the statue be taken down immediately. I remember just as clearly that many found the statue of Chernyshevsky exceedingly ornate. Best of all was the statue of Lassale. This work, erected outside the former city Duma, remains there to this day. It’s like it was cut from bronze. The full-size statue of Marx, made by the sculptor Matveev, was also extremely successful. Sadly, it broke and has been replaced in the same spot – that is, next to the Smolny Institute – by a bronze bust of Marx in a more or less regular style, without Matveev’s original sculptural rendering. 

In Moscow, where the statues could be seen at once by Vladimir Ilyich, they were not such a success. Marx and Engels were depicted in some sort of basin and earned themselves the nickname “the bearded swimmers”. The Sculptor K.2, however, managed to outdo everyone. For a long time, people and horses, walking and driving down Myasnitskaya, would glance fearfully at some enraged figure, who had been boarded up out of precaution. This was the respected artist’s depiction of Bakunin. If I’m not mistaken, the statue was immediately destroyed by anarchists upon its unveiling; despite all their progressiveness, they didn’t wish to suffer such harsh sculptural “mockery” of their great leader’s memory.

Generally speaking, there were very few successful statues in Moscow. Arguably better than most was the statue of the poet Nikitin. I don’t know if Vladimir Ilyich looked at them in any detail, but either way he told me, with some dissatisfaction, that nothing had come of monumental propaganda. I responded with reference to the experience in Petrograd and the report of Zinoviev. Vladimir Ilyich shook his head doubtfully and said “what, you’re telling me that every single talent gathered themselves in Petrograd, and Moscow is entirely worthless?” Indeed, I couldn’t explain to him such a strange occurrence.

He was distinctly doubtful of the memorial plaque for Konenkov. He didn’t consider it very convincing. Konenkov himself, incidentally, called this work his “imaginary-realist plaque”, not without a touch of sardonicism. I also remember the artist Altman gifting Vladimir Ilyich a bas-relief depicting Khalturin. Vladimir Ilyich liked the bas-relief very much, but he asked me, did this work not strike me as futuristic? His opinions regarding futurism were entirely negative. I wasn’t present for his conversation in Vkhutemas, whose accommodation he once visited, if I’m not mistaken because some young relative of his was living there.3 I was later told of the long conversation between him and, of course, the left-wing ‘Vkhutemastsy’. Vladimir Ilyich wrote them off, laughing a little condescendingly, but then stated that he wouldn’t personally take up the task of talking seriously on such matters, as he felt himself to be insufficiently competent. The youths themselves he found to be very nice, and their communist disposition pleased him.

Vladimir Ilyich rarely managed to enjoy art during the final period of his life. He went to the theatre a few times, seemingly exclusively the Khudozhestvenny, which he valued very highly. Plays in that theatre would invariably leave a wonderful impression on him.

Vladimir Ilyich had a strong love for music, but it would upset him. At one point I had impressive concerts arranged in my apartment. Shalyapin sang, Meichik,  Romanovsky, the Stradivarius quartet, Kusevitsky on the contrabass and several others all played. I invited Vladimir Ilyich repeatedly, but he was always busy. One time he said to me directly: “of course it’s wonderful to listen to music, but you know, it upsets me. I somehow find it hard to bear.” I remember that comrade Tsiurupa, who managed to get Vladimir Ilyich to come twice to his home concerts with that same pianist Romanovsky, also told me that Vladimir Ilyich had enjoyed the music very much, but was visibly agitated. 

I will add that Vladimir Ilyich was very irritated by the Bolshoi Theatre. I had to indicate to him several times that the Bolshoi cost us comparatively little, but nevertheless, at his insistence, its grant was reduced. Vladimir Ilyich was led in this by two considerations. One of them he admitted upfront: “I find it uncomfortable,” he said, “that we sustain such a luxurious theatre for great amounts of money, when we lack the resources to sustain even the simplest of village schools”. The other consideration was elaborated when I disputed his attack on the Bolshoi Theatre during a meeting. I pointed out the theatre’s undeniable cultural significance. Upon hearing this, Vladimir Ilyich wryly squinted at me, and said: “But regardless, it is a remnant of landlord culture, no one could possibly argue otherwise.”4

This is not to say that Vladimir Ilyich was entirely inimical to the culture of the past. He found the entire pompous-gentry tone of opera to be specifically landlord-like. On the whole he valued the visual art of the past, especially Russian realism (including, for example, the Peredvizhniki), very highly indeed.

1920 Bolshevik poster, reads “Citizens, preserve monuments of art”

Thus ends the factual information that I am able to offer the reader from my memories of Ilyich. But I will remind you that Vladimir Ilyich at no point used his aesthetic sympathies or antipathies to form any of his most fundamental ideas.

Comrades with an interest in art will remember the address to the Central Committee on questions of art which was quite sharply directed against futurism. I am no more familiar with this topic than others are, but I think it was one in which Vladimir Ilyich saw himself as having a genuine and serious contribution to make.5

At the same time, and entirely mistakenly, Vladimir Ilyich considered me not quite a supporter of futurism, but not quite entirely pandering to his own view either, and probably as a result he did not consult me before the publication of the Central Committee rescript, through which he intended to correct my stance.

Vladimir Ilyich also diverged from me quite sharply in relation to Proletkult. On one occasion, he even strongly scolded me. I’ll state first of all that Vladimir Ilyich absolutely did not deny the significance of workers’ circles for the production of writers and artists from a proletarian background, and promoted their national unification as a desirable aim, but he was very afraid of the feeble attempts of Proletkult to produce alongside this a proletarian science, as well as proletarian culture on a much larger scale. This, firstly, seemed to him a completely untimely task for which they lacked the capabilities; secondly, he thought that such ideas, which were of course still underdeveloped, distanced the proletariat from study, and from embracing the fundamentals of already-developed science and culture; thirdly, Vladimir Ilyich was evidently nervous to make sure that there was not, stirring in Proletkult, the beginnings of some kind of political heresy. He was considerably displeased, for example, with the large role played in Proletkult at the time by A. A. Bogdanov.

During the time of the Proletkult congress, which I believe was in 1920, he instructed me to travel there and state, in no uncertain terms, that Proletkult should be placed under the leadership of Narkompros, consider itself a Narkompros organisation, and so on. In short, Vladimir Ilyich wanted us to pull Proletkult in line with the state, at the same time as he took measures to pull it in line with the party. The speech that I gave at the congress I then made sure to edit in an evasive and appeasing manner. It didn’t seem right for me to come in with some sort of attack, upsetting the workers who had decided to gather together. This speech was shown to Vladimir Ilyich in an even softer revision. He called me to his office, and gave me a good dressing down. Later, Proletkult was restructured in accordance with Vladimir Ilyich’s orders. I repeat, he never so much as thought of its abolishment. On the contrary, he had great sympathy for its purely artistic aims.

The new artistic and literary formations that came into being during the revolution, for the most part, evaded Vladimir Ilyich’s attention. He simply had no time to devote to them. All the same, I can say that he definitely did not appreciate Mayakovsky’s 150,000,000. He found the book to be overly flowery and pretentious. One can’t help but regret that he was no longer able to pass judgement on the other, more insightful transformations in revolutionary literature that came later.

Everyone is well aware of the enormous interest Vladimir Ilyich had in cinematography.

Different Horizons of Science Fiction under Socialism with Virginia Conn

Rudy and Medway are joined by recently graduated Dr. Virginia Conn to discuss her research on science fiction in the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and China. We discuss what the purpose of science fiction under socialism is, the continuities and ruptures of science fiction in the People’s Republic of China during its diverse political periods, how the new Soviet citizen contrasted with the Chinese new citizen, the figure of Bogdanov within Russian Cosmism, how the particularities of the GDR reflected in its Science Fiction, and how many male-written stories in socialist science fiction both succeed and fail in capturing the intricacies of gender and social reproduction.

Read Virginia’s article “Economic Circulations: Blood-Based Systems of Value in Alexander Bogdanov’s Red Star” here.

Workers and Writers: The Communist Novel in Britain

The history of the British communist novel is ultimately the story of the political degeneration of the Communist Party of Great Britain. By Lawrence Parker. 

English Communists marching in London. 1936.

In 1939, Frank Griffin’s1 novel October Day recorded the events of the Battle of Cable Street in 1936, where British fascist leader Oswald Mosley planned to march through the East End before being repelled by a counter-demonstration organized by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and others in the labor movement. 

One of the characters in the book is an unemployed laborer called Slesser, unwilling to take a job with the local council because of his refusal to join a trade union. After an argument with his wife, he gets sucked into the vortex of the anti-Mosley demonstration, marching and fighting alongside CPGB members before becoming involved in incidents with fascists after the demonstration when being mistaken for a Jew. Griffin’s book is fast-paced, knockabout stuff and it doesn’t go deeply into the modulations of working-class consciousness. But we are left with a strange denouement. By the end of the book, Slesser has reversed his previous outlook on life: “‘I’ve been a bloody fool! I ought to have joined the union years ago. Everybody ought to join a union. Don’t you see?’ he asked passionately. ‘We must all stand together. All us working folks must be organised. That’s the only way we’ll ever fight the bosses, that’s the only way we’ll ever get the rich off our backs.’”2

So, after one day, the anti-union Slesser seems on his way to becoming a communist sympathizer. He has simply been processed by the experience of the demonstration and militant action, buoyed along by events that he initially had very little understanding of; enough that he fairly immediately sloughs off his previous world view. This is mechanistic in the extreme and a mystical, not rational, view of the formation of working-class consciousness. One has to ask whether a character with views such as Slesser would have even gone to Cable Street or, if he had, whether he would have been marching on the fascist side. But Griffin ultimately allows no mediatory role to his character’s consciousness and his views are simply a matter of chance as to where he ended up on the day.

Some of the character dynamics of this novel illustrate the broader tragedy of the CPGB, formed 100 years ago: the manner in which it viewed the British proletariat as an agent of history, its potential increasingly diminished in the ideology of the party down the years.3 This was not solely due to Stalinism; some of it goes back to the conceptions of the early Comintern. One of the means of gauging this collapse in expectations is imaginative, through a selection of the novels that CPGB members wrote about the party and the proletariat. Given that this picture of the British working class was a ‘perfected,’ fictional one, it is a useful means to assess how the party ideally (or not so ‘ideally’ as it turns out) thought about its constituents.4 

Decline of a political culture

Although subsequently developed into a peculiar aesthetic by party writers, such a culture was rooted in the failure of the CPGB as a political project in the 1920s and 1930s. The full background is an article in itself, but we can offer some pointers to what happened. If one considers the National Left-Wing Movement (NLWM) and the Sunday Worker newspaper, projects initiated by the CPGB in the mid-1920s to win the rank and file of the British Labour Party to communist ideas, one is struck by the relatively sophisticated political culture that underpinned such initiatives. One could find the working-class readership of the Sunday Worker debating all manner of political and cultural matters in its pages; non-communist members of the NLWM arguing with CPGB members over their interpretation of Lenin’s theory of Labourism; and, after the dissolution of the NLWM by the CPGB in 1929, arguing with the CPGB over the decision. Thus, the programme of the NLWM sought to differentiate the organization from more run-of-the-mill reformist Labour lefts by introducing advanced anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, and anti-monarchist demands, which, of course, relied on a certain conception of its audience as the advanced part of the proletarian class.5 But such a culture was not set in aspic, and because the CPGB was a product of the early Comintern it also denied the internal right to form factions. This had the effect, when it was in the wider labor movement, of an opportunistic tendency to close ranks with other non-communist sections. The differentiation, or ‘unity in diversity’ that it denied to itself internally could thus not be properly advanced externally, without radically undermining the party’s internal regime in the long run.6 

By the time the CPGB had started to develop the politics of the Third Period in late 1928 and 1929, the political programme of the NLWM was seen as something to be junked, a barrier to engaging with the working class. Rather, despite the radical verbiage one associates with this juncture in Comintern politics, solace was to be sought in developing ‘immediate’ demands deemed more appealing to workers.7 Despite the shift in rhetoric, this perspective of a politically stunted and simplistic proletariat was carried over into the Popular Front. By January 1936 a leading party member could state: “What are the issues around which unity can be achieved? We are not thinking in terms of a cut-and-dried programme, but those immediate and sometimes changing issues affecting the daily lives of the workers, small shopkeepers and professional people: wages, salaries, hours, conditions, taxation, democratic rights, armament expenditure, the threat of war, etc.”8 

This programmatic perspective bred a certain limited view of the proletarians it was meant to address. In other words, more simplistic and immediate programmes meant thinking of proletarians in a simplistic manner, including in the realm of art. Critics included Bertolt Brecht, who castigated these “so-called poetical forms”, in his famous 1930s critique of Georg Lukács. Brecht derided the representation of ‘the people’ “in a superstitious fashion” that“endow[s] the people with unchanging characteristics, hallowed traditions, art forms, habits and customs” such that “a remarkable unity appears between tormentors and tormented…”9 But this was clearly also a political problem lodged in the development of the Comintern throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, one can discern a coded political critique in Brecht’s complaint: “There will always be people of culture, connoisseurs of art, who will interject: ‘Ordinary people do not understand that.’”10 Brecht drew on his own artistic experience to state “one need not be afraid to produce daring, unusual things for the proletariat so long as they deal with its real situation”.11 ‘Ordinary people do not understand that’ has become the stock refrain of most contemporary Stalinist and Trotskyist groups when political or aesthetic issues are being discussed that clash with their truncated politics. In so doing, they are tiny caricatures of the earlier decomposition of organizations such as the CPGB. 

In 1950, the CPGB’s Daily Worker featured a ‘debate’ on poetry in which one reader responded with the fatal words: “For the working class, things are and always have been fairly simple – for the class-conscious workers, extremely so.”12 This is simply a superstition, or even prejudice, on the lines laid out by Brecht. It absolutely jars with many autobiographies of working-class autodidact CPGB members who joined the party not only because of immediate issues such as poverty but often due to a thirst for knowledge and a discerning attitude towards the political and social forms taken by the proletarian movement as a whole. Raphael Samuel argues: “Many, it seems, came into the [CPGB] through reading, sometimes under the guidance of older workers, sometimes by themselves.”13 So, when communist politics were refracted through this fatalist superstition that non-communist workers could only be approached through so-called immediate issues, unmediated by the intellectual life of proletarians, the CPGB partly ran up against its own experiences, which led to a particularly schizophrenic ideological existence.  

Supporters of Communist candidate J. R. Campbell marching through Woodford in Essex in 1951

Problems of the British communist novel

Some in the CPGB had a strong inkling that this hadn’t produced strong fictional writing. Writing in April 1962, Margot Heinemann,14 at that point one of the CPGB’s more successful novelists, analyzed how anti-working-class sentiment had found its way into the British communist novel: 

The convention that most ‘ordinary’ people are completely without social and political ideas has two sources. Firstly, it is the convention of our rulers, who would like this to be true… Secondly, it is a common sectarian mistake on the part of those who have failed to persuade the workers to adopt the same ideas about reform or socialism as they hold themselves. In this sense communists are not immune from it. The workers in our novels often tend to be quite blank, politically, until they see the light and are changed.15 

Heinemann goes on to make a funny parody of the kind of dialogue this leads to in the communist novel: “‘I never realised till I met you, Jock, that our factory’s just part of something bigger – much bigger. You’ve made me see we can all do something to change things.’” She adds: “Let’s face it, if the lad didn’t know that much before he was something of a sap.”16 

While the description of what had happened to working-class characters in such literary work was acute, the explanation of how this had come about was noticeably abstract in the negative sense. This manner of characterization is implicit in the degeneration of the CPGB’s political culture through the 1920s and 1930s and its low expectations of the British proletariat. Heinemann uses a common trope of the CPGB leadership of the time about this being partly the fault of ‘sectarians,’.There were indeed small groups of ‘proto-Maoist’ activists in the party of the early 1960s: pro-Stalin and, paradoxically, holding some militant revolutionary ideas of one sort or another that this label was meant to describe. However, to blame such people for this view of the working class, when it was lodged in the whole dynamic of the CPGB’s ideological development, was simply a conservative thrust by Heinemann to protect her party and the leadership of which she was a part (as we shall see, this bled over into her art). 

Non-communist proletarians were depicted in CPGB novels ‘naturally’ and ‘realistically,’ often as intrinsically non-political and simplistic; to be marched on and off the stage as the strike or demonstration demanded, with such mass action (rather than any use of political reason or understanding on the part of these proletarians) imbued with almost mythical qualities to resolve contradictions in working-class consciousness and push it towards a communist denouement. Many of the novels by CPGB members did include communist characters, sometimes interesting ones, but the issue was usually the emaciated picture of proletarian culture that such writers drew overall. This left communist characters in a kind of strange artistic limbo, sometimes floating like driftwood in a sea of working-class ‘slum-life’, and led to the party itself complaining that such communist characters were ‘preachy’ and the like.17 In fact, when such characters were composed in front of this unpromising and simplistic backdrop, it would have been very hard for them not to sound ‘preachy’ and alien. 

This immersion in what CPGB writers saw as the main features of working-class life was clearly an attempt to evade ‘subjectivism’: the imposition of any ‘ideal type’ of proletarian consciousness, i.e. a perfected revolutionary world view, onto non-communist working-class characters. Instead, such writers immersed themselves in the tendency of working-class life to reject such forms. This rejection led them to straight back into subjectivism in that their view of a primitive working-class consciousness was just as invented as the ‘ideal type’ they rejected. They thus mirrored what Adorno saw as the error of constructivist art: “They treat as a pure natural force something which is only a human will concealed from itself.”18 For Adorno, the anti-subjectivism of constructivist art led back to another type of subjectivism, which meant that the subject, the creator of the art, overlooked her own presence in its production. CPGB writers concealed from themselves that an ‘objective’ description of a simplified proletariat was in fact their party’s own highly partial expression of the deterioration of its politics in the 1920s and 1930s. But the outcome of this subjectivism was seemingly perverse in that the subjects of this writing (the CPGB’s published and aspiring writers) found themselves cast off and adrift from their own creations, and, as alluded to by Heinemann above, stuck inside endless modulations on the more prosaic features of working-class culture and how their party could relate to it. 

What follows is a compressed and partial analysis of some examples of CPGB novels that follow this course of undermining the potential of proletarian subjectivity. A clear pattern does emerge but I am aware of the danger of such patterns and to that end I have also looked at some British communist novels from the 1960s, when this pattern started to disintegrate and a partially progressive notion of working-class subjectivity (and, concurrently, a more critical view of the CPGB) began to emerge in the work of Margot Heinemann and Edward Upward.19 This late emergence underlined the tragedy inherent in the form that the CPGB novel had taken hitherto.

Harold Heslop, Last Cage Down 

Harold Heslop’s20 novel, Last Cage Down (1935), was a fictional work that explored class struggle in the Durham coalfield. It centers on the conflict between a headstrong and individualist lodge secretary, James Cameron, and a rank-and-file communist miner, Joe Frost, who turns out to be the more farsighted of the two. The book had an interesting reception by the CPGB in 1935, which deemed that it exhibited some of the sectarian politics of the Third Period as opposed to the Popular Front that the party was then embarking on.21 In the Popular Front, in practice, there was a shift from the excoriation of non-communist leaders in favor of more diplomatic relations with such forces. In fact, this was a formalist misreading of the work as a whole, where the steady and more calculating influence of the communist Frost was counterposed to the headstrong weakness of lodge secretary Cameron.22

But the book also partially looked back to the remnants of the critical proletarian culture that the CPGB had once fostered in the 1920s. The communist Joe Frost is talking to a group of miners and a critic of the CPGB speaks. Frost lets him continue but this is the third-person narrator’s view: “Joseph Belmont took the floor. Meet Joe in his thousands all over the working-class world, the little bibber at the fountain of philosophy, who annoys friend and foe, who is libelous of all things with which he does not agree. Young Mister Trotsky.”23 So, critical voices in the working-class world are equated with someone being portrayed in the world communist movement of the time as a traitor. This derogatory view feeds off Heslop’s politically paralyzed view of miners as a group: “The miner in the mass doesn’t worry about Marx, nor does he take extremely kindly to the men who talk about mysteries contained in books.”24 One wonders where this then would leave the communist project given that CPGB members spent large amounts of time unraveling the “mysteries” of esoteric books, and in what particular state of self-loathing such lines left Heslop himself. But the bigger mystery would then be how communists politics can be related to such workers. 

In Heslop’s world, the production of a socialist idol25 such as Georgi Dimitrov, who had been acquitted from the 1933 Leipzig Trial after spurious Nazi accusations of his complicity in starting the Reichstag Fire, was enough to act as a point of revelation whereby communist and non-communist could be enjoined. Frost only had to say the name ‘Dimitrov’ to a group of miners with whom he was discussing what could aid them in struggling against reformism for this to happen: 

And they all became silent. It was a moment when the great heroism of one of the noblest creatures in the world stood amongst them, a moment filled with the sweet poignancy which is the workers’ share of the joy of the earth. In far-away Leipzig, amongst the howling wolves of the world’s worst form of fascism… stood one, a worker, fearless of the headsman’s blade poised above his upturned face… Could it be possible that so great a miracle of heroism existed? Dimitrov lit up their world and sent that great, hopeful shudder thrilling through their spines, and stimulated their love of their own class, their pride in their own class.26

Even in a novel that was able to illustrate some worthwhile notion of proletarian consciousness such fawning prose would be highly suspect. (Dimitrov’s acquittal was, in any case, something of a Comintern-inspired ‘booby prize’ when measured against the catastrophic destruction of the German workers’ movement.) The idea of miners with no communist ideas suddenly lit up by the mere mention of Dimitrov’s name is a mythical and ultimately absurd view of working-class people that sees them as mere dupes of an external mysticism. 

John Sommerfield, May Day

John Sommerfield’s27 May Day (1936) was much more experimental than the previous two works, charting 48 hours in the life of London, culminating in a vast demonstration, led by the CPGB and its slogans: ‘All out on May Day! For a free Soviet Britain!’ The work cuts in around 90 named characters, which leads to an impressive and suspenseful montage of the city’s life. Like a British John Dos Passos, Sommerfield’s modernist technique looks forward, but his view of proletarian consciousness looks backward, to the deformed view that the CPGB had developed since the late 1920s. This then is how Sommerfield describes female factory workers: 

These silly girls with their synthetic Hollywood dreams, their pathetic silk stockings and lipsticks, their foolish strivings to escape from the cramped monotony of their lives, are the raw material of history. When their moment of deep discontent comes to them in a mass, taking form in the words of their class-leaders, then there are revolutions. What happens to the revolutions depends upon other factors – automatic lathes for instance.28 

So here we have raw material to be prodded about, processed; whose discontent comes in a singular moment that can be harnessed by the party. Rational thought seemingly plays little or no part in such processes, except as a reaction to circumstances. Sommerfield repeats this emaciated view of the proletariat in his short chapter ‘The Communist leaflets,’ concluding on the topic: “There should have been more.” Why? Because of the essentially apolitical and deluded nature of the London proletariat, hung up on “dograces and bicycles,” pondering “the forms of horses and boxers and filmstars”, and pumped full of newspapers and speeches in parliament about democracy.29 By that token, the CPGB’s leaflets became merely another quantifiable thing prodding this inert mass into action. They just needed more of them. 

When Sommerfield turns his attention to the qualitative shifts in the consciousness of London proletarians, we are not quite caught up in Heslop’s strange metaphysics, where proletarians are simply lit up by the example of socialist idols, but we are still in a world where the collapse into an agreement with the CPGB is all too straightforward, as shown by the following dialogue: 

“‘That’s what I don’t hold with about the communists,’ said John. ‘They’re always on about Russia – not that I’m against Russia; it’s fine there and good luck to ‘em… But what I want to ‘ear about is how we can get things better ourselves instead of how good they are somewhere else.’

“‘That’s what this feller said though. He said there’s only one way of getting decent conditions for ourselves, to do [the] same as they did in Russia – kick out the bloody bosses and it can’t be done through voting either. ‘E said it was different here to Russia. Course it is, it’s much harder for us to win ‘cos our bosses are so strong. Only once we’ve got power we’d be able to go ahead easily ‘cos everything’s organized already and there ‘r so many factories and everything…’

“‘That’s true… I’m on their side all right, always have been. I never took a’ interest in politics, I always thought the Labour Party’s no bloody good for us…’”30

The objection that Britain wasn’t Russia was one that many CPGB members would have heard, particularly from members of the Labour Party, who used this argument to undercut appeals for revolutionary violence. But in Sommerfield’s dialogue, such an apparent objection is only a mere byway into an agreement with the CPGB. This simplified and schematic view of consciousness was the product of how the CPGB, and Sommerfield, saw the revolutionary process unfolding in Britain. Towards the end of May Day, a communist, James, muses upon the demonstration to come: “I know too that we are setting out on a road whose inevitable end will be a moment when we stand with guns in our hands and thinking the thoughts of death and revolution.”31 But then if strikes and demonstrations do indeed send proletarians out to this inevitable end, it becomes clear why Sommerfield’s essentially irrational picture of working-class consciousness can stand, simply because, in this schema, rational thinking is redundant. It’s okay to picture proletarians as being prey to the charms of dog racing and film stars because the struggle will ultimately decide all.

Arthur Calder-Marshall, Pie in the Sky

This relative decimation of working-class subjectivity reaches a derogatory low point in Arthur Calder-Marshall’s32 Pie in the Sky (1937), which, like May Day, attempts to paint a kaleidoscopic picture of British society using a variety of narrative techniques, with ‘stream of consciousness’ being used alongside more traditional linear sections. In conversation, the communist Turlin says of the working-class masses: “It’s drink or sport with the men and films and men with the women. Who can blame the capitalist for exploiting the working class, while the working class is begging to be exploited?” Turlin further characterizes proletarians as sheep “trotting into the slaughterhouse and holding up their necks for the knife”. This accounts for his partial feelings of helplessness as a communist, “as if we’ll never pull it off”.33 

But then Calder-Marshall is faced with a familiar problem as a communist novelist: how can the party relate to this type of beleaguered consciousness? As with Heslop’s Last Cage Down, we are thrown back into the arms of mysticism, but rather than workers being lit up with the example of socialist idols, in Pie in the Sky, it is the communist who is lit up by the almost unearthly power of workers drawn together in a mass. Turlin speaks to a march about housing conditions: 

It was no longer Turlin on the platform, not the pale man doubting his power. It was no person, but a voice and a fling of arms. He drew from the crowd his power to speak. His words came not from his brain but theirs; his body merely an instrument, a huge mouth. And as if it was their brain and not his, the thoughts were at first rough comparisons. There seemed to be no connection of logic, nothing linking one sentence to the next. But as he proceeded, the pattern began to become plain: like a man struggling to shape his thoughts and shaping them. It began to become plain, the need to fight for the class, because only in mass is the counterweapon to wealth and influence and armed force.34 

Calder-Marshall takes a partial truth, the power of the mass, and turns it into an absolute. But the power of Carlin’s speech does not begin with logic or rationality; the speaker finds his way into it, compelled by the almost supernatural power of the ‘crowd brain’ before him. When the early Comintern was more concerned with emphasizing ‘unity in diversity’ (rather than the type of abstract unity presented by Calder-Marshall), it understood the problems of this type of rhetoric, speeches taking shape on the hoof, as being prey to opportunism and spontaneity.35 By 1937 this type of political culture had been smothered in the CPGB and this imagined somnambulism on the part of communists was seemingly acceptable. Also, one must stress that this submerging of characters into a proletarian crowd only compounds the issue of working-class characterization, given that this unearthly power leads to the notion of an undifferentiated mass, excluding any notion of qualitative difference or ‘unity in diversity’. Communist proletarians were obviously different from non-communist proletarians. But that did not exclude qualitative relations between the two, unlike the strange notion of communists talking through the collective brain of the proletariat.   

Novels of the Popular Front

Our first four examples of British communist novels have been culled from in and around the period of the Popular Front. On the surface, one would have thought this supposedly ‘non-sectarian’ segment of the history of the world communist movement would have led to a richer and more empathetic view of the British working class. This seems to be the assumption of Elinor Taylor’s recent work on the Popular Front novel. She argues, in line with the ‘wisdom’ that the CPGB itself emoted on the subject: “The formal adoption of the Popular Front strategy marked a decisive and dramatic shift from the Comintern’s earlier, ultra-sectarian ‘class against class’ line, which had demonized non-communist elements as ‘social fascists’ and forbade communists from seeking alliances.”36 This positive appreciation of the Popular Front leads Taylor into enthusiastic appreciations of some of the novels that communists produced in this period. 

Regarding May Day, Taylor comes to the opposite conclusion to myself: “In spite of Lukács’s rejection of montage as fragmentary and incoherent formalism, Sommerfield’s montage articulates a model of the relations between the parts and the whole that is essentially congruent with Lukács’s version of totality.”37 In such a view of totality, the parts, the human characters, can play a role in the construction of the ‘whole’ historical process. Lukács thought narrative modes such as montage only offered an essentially fragmented picture of human consciousness, buoyed along by the historical process instead of helping create it. Taylor is right in one sense that the practice of montage does not preclude artists producing a richer picture of reality, and it is true that Sommerfield produces a ‘totality’ of sorts. But May Day’s totality is underpinned by a model of working-class consciousness that is apolitical and irrational, where essentially bovine workers collapse into the arms of the communists under the pressure of the ‘inevitable’ exigencies of the immediate struggle. It would have been a miracle if this had produced the expressive totality pictured by Lukács in works such as The Historical Novel (1936), with richly illustrated and epoch-making characters infusing the historical process with their own sense of rationality and mission. Instead, the proletarian characters in May Day are merely ‘part’ of a dead schema that precludes their rationality from the outset. 

But that should be no surprise. The Popular Front was not premised on any dramatic change in the incremental manner in which the CPGB viewed the process of working-class consciousness. As we have seen in the introduction to this article, this emaciated and apolitical view was also present in the politics of the Third Period and also arguably went back to the circumstances of the CPGB’s foundation and its ban on factions. Organizations that could not allow internal ‘unity in diversity’ were unlikely to be able to extend it externally in the wider labor movement. Hence, the Popular Front, with its emphasis on diplomatic unity between communist and non-communist, and the denial of the means for organizations such as the CPGB to act critically alongside bloc partners, only made explicit tendencies inherent in the Comintern from the outset.38 And it was this tendency to homogeneity that lay at the root of the homogenized picture of the working class that then developed; of a mass that had seemingly no political memory and was precluded from logical thought. Proletarians using their reason and with a political memory that simply couldn’t be collapsed into that of the CPGB would, of course, have the premise of heterogeneity; a real ‘unity in diversity’. 

So, there was no way for these novels to develop any kind of fruitful relationship to ‘the real’, given that their production was so obviously premised on a subjectivized view of the proletariat.39 Such practice had nothing to do, in the cases of Sommerfield or Calder-Marshall in particular, with the use of modernist literary modes such as montage or stream of consciousness. Rather, the lamed and incremental notion of proletarian consciousness, which was the product of the CPGB’s ideology, led such works into the arena of subjectivism. The outcome of this was to foreground the literary experimentation found in May Day and Pie in the Sky and reduce it to a similar synthetic level, choking off any aspiration the authors may have had to represent ‘the real’. In the examples from Heslop and Griffin, their subjectivism, in the relative absence of such experimentation, was merely the herald, in Heslop’s case most obviously, of a rather hysterical propagandism.

Jack Lindsay, Betrayed Spring

Jack Lindsay40 was one of the CPGB’s relatively more heterodox writers and had crossed swords with the party bureaucracy over his idiosyncratic views in the immediate post-war period.41 It is disappointing then to read a novel such as Betrayed Spring (1953), which displays a familiar distorted conception of proletarian consciousness. This novel was part of Lindsay’s ‘British way’ series, essentially a fictional rationalization of the CPGB’s reformist and nationalist British Road to Socialism programme that had been launched in 1951 (although its politics had developed earlier, during the CPGB’s initial support for the post-war Labour administration).

Despite Lindsay’s previous heresies, he does seem to have seen the series as a conscious party enterprise and the front piece lists a number of CPGB names who had advised him. Although Lindsay didn’t tread any new ground in relation to this discussion, Betrayed Spring is pertinent because he spelled out, in an exceptionally clear fictional form, how the CPGB envisaged the development of working-class consciousness. The novel centers on a young working-class woman from London, Phyl, who has been through the experience of the mass squatting movement, attends a demonstration of striking hotel workers in central London:

“She wasn’t sure what the cause was in its full working-out, what the big words implied when the march was ended and the strike was won; but she felt the meaning of it all inside her, in the deep determination and happiness that gripped her, the pride of being there in the defiant march..”42 

So, rationality is placed as the antithesis of the emotional impact of the march, given that Phyl doesn’t apparently understand all of the implications of the cause she is supporting. Again, we have this alienated power of the mass on the move to spark proletarian political virgins into life. This is no accident on the part of Lindsay, and he underlines Phyl’s response as she listens to the speeches at the end of the march: “And once more she felt herself part of this great thing which she only partly understood but which had entered irretrievably into her life.”43 Lindsay also extends this impact to the crowd around Phyl: “… the sunlight was sparkling over the myriad faces, while the voice flowed on, like the truth of struggle suddenly becoming articulate in all the dumb mouths of the world. The world within the world, the ghosts of the future taking body as the familiar comrades of everyday light.”44 

Now, “the truth of struggle suddenly becoming articulate in all the dumb mouths of the world” is pretty prose indeed but its alliance with such a partial and intensely ideological view of the “dumb” working-class being impregnated with external signs, merely foregrounds the retreat of Lindsay’s articulate prose into the realm of a mere literary effect; a reconciliation with an alien ideology. 

Towards the 1960s

With the 1960s looming, there were a number of interlinked factors that made the continued production of decimated working-class subjects in communist novels problematic and old-fashioned. As the CPGB’s Heinemann had noted in the previously quoted article, there were, by the time she wrote the piece in 1962, a group of non-communist writers such as John Braine, Alan Sillitoe, Colin MacInnes and others who had begun to popularise stories of proletarian life (although this type of novel wasn’t a post-war invention). One can’t quite imagine the muscular and engaged working-class characters of authors such as Sillitoe being jolted into life by strikes and demonstrations and swooning into the arms of communists.45 By comparison, proletarian characters in communist novels merely seem pinched and wooden. 

By the early 1960s, the CPGB’s whole Soviet-inspired aesthetic of ‘socialist realism’ was in retreat and had indeed been under attack by CPGB sympathizers such as John Berger in the party’s Artists’ Group since the death of Stalin in 1953.46 Many of the artistic ‘categories’ associated with Stalin’s cultural commissar Andrei Zhdanov were in the process of being emptied out and questioned, and such processes were given added urgency by the events of 1956 when, after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the invasion of Hungary, more communists would question the CPGB’s subservience to concepts of Soviet provenance. This meant that the party’s whole aesthetic, as far as it had one, was up for interrogation. 

But the events of 1956, when the CPGB was wracked by internal crisis as party members faced up to the fact of their organization’s subjection to an anti-working-class dictatorship, also offered a dilemma to communist novelists. If the CPGB was henceforth going to be portrayed in fiction it would be fairly untenable that some notion of this crisis would not appear in such ‘realist’ productions. This pressure can be seen in Herbert Smith’s otherwise unmemorable A Field of Folk (1957). This was fiction largely on the old communist pattern: shop-floor drama in a west London engineering factory providing the basis for the British Road to Socialism. But world political events had now intruded and couldn’t entirely be left behind, even as they were being over-run by events in the factory. A communist character, Tom Barrett, listens to the criticisms of a non-communist, Blackman: 

It’s no good you [Barrett] hammering away at wages and housing and pretending that the political doesn’t exist. You still seem to think our kids haven’t any shoes; your slogans are way back in the ‘thirties. You just refuse to admit that our standard of living’s advanced – and you don’t like mentioning the fact that more of us are worried about what’s happening inside Russia than we are about where the next meal is coming from. The problem’s political, not economic. We’re getting a fairer deal from capitalism – but what sort of deal is socialism giving the Russians? 47

Smith seems to be implying from Blackman’s dialogue that there is now a political problem in an obsessive concentration on shop-floor ‘bread-and-butter’ issues. Non-communist proletarians are quite capable of making political judgments about the Soviet Union and the CPGB had to confront that fact in the aftermath of 1956. In some ways, this reads like a meta-critique that encapsulates the problem of the British communist novel (although surely unconscious). Notice how the acknowledgment of the CPGB’s crisis has been acutely diagnosed by a rational and thinking proletarian: the party crisis necessitates the latter, as there wouldn’t have been such a crisis in 1956 if the CPGB had been faced by an unthinking working-class, ruled by shop-floor spontaneity. 

Margot Heinemann, The Adventurers

Margot Heinemann’s The Adventurers (1960) is meant to be the definitive turning point against the old type of British communist novel. In one rather bold account: “The Adventurers marks the end, in Britain at least, of the confident chase after socialist realism in fiction.”48 It may have been the end of a “confident chase” but it wasn’t quite the end of the chase. One of the key facets of ‘socialist realism’ was the production of cultural works that had some political utility for the communist movement. A careful reading of The Adventurers shows an author inclined towards critical and rational working-class characters dealing with at least some aspects of the CPGB’s problematic history (as partly illustrated by her “Workers and Writers” article from 1962 quoted above), while also being caught in a movement that was defensive of the party. It also has to be said that the book reproduced some awful CPGB tropes that haven’t aged particularly well. 

For a CPGB recovering from the traumas from 1956, a novel that dealt with some of that crisis, while retaining the party’s honor and with a more nuanced sense of working-class characterization, was useful and generally well-received by non-communist reviewers. Not that the CPGB’s leadership, which had come to expect simplistic party novels of the type analyzed above, was completely happy with The Adventurers.49  Nevertheless, the book had a certain utility familiar to ‘socialist realism’. It also pays to remember that Heinemann had no particular record as an oppositionist inside the CPGB in the immediate post-war years and was a trusted member of the party bureaucracy. In the inner-party controversy around the works of Christopher Caudwell of 1950-51, Heinemann was among those on the orthodox wing denouncing the ‘idealism’ of books such as Illusion and Reality.50 

The tropes that Heinemann uses in places are familiar CPGB ones where other trends in the labor movement were simply denigrated. The following example from The Adventurers explores attitudes to the Second World War and the issue of conscription into the mines: “Of course Jack Marvin says why worry, it’s a capitalists’ war anyway. But Marvin is a bit of a spouter and not a very good workman at that, the boys don’t go all that much on Jack.”51 The implication here is that Marvin is a Trotskyist and, naturally, he wouldn’t be a good worker or have any support among the workers because that was a classic CPGB trope about Trotskyists.52 On similar lines, the character Tommy attends the annual Trades Union Congress: “Coming out of the hall the brilliant sunlight hurt your eyes. Tommy pushed through the swarm of literature sellers thronging the approaches – beaky, dark young men with Trotskyist weeklies, ladies with white bobbed hair and pacifist monthlies, men with open shirts and cycle-clips shouting the Daily Worker…”53 In retrospect, this is fairly crude stuff. The “beaky, dark” young Trotskyist men (a trope that recalls an older habit from the Soviet purges of equating opponents with deformed animal life), up against the dynamic, thrusting sellers of the Daily Worker (the CPGB’s paper), with their easy “open shirts” and “cycle-clips”, ready no doubt to pedal quickly down the British Road to Socialism. So, The Adventurers does have an amateurish undertone of familiar political smears. 

Heinemann, however, picked up the direction that Herbert Smith had partly traveled. Dialogue between communists and non-communists did contain an element of conflict that wasn’t easily collapsed into the communist position, despite the author’s obvious predisposition to rationalize the line of the CPGB in places. A good example is given in a conversation between Dan (a non-communist Welsh miner’s son, who goes on to ‘Keir Hardie’ college in Cambridge, and then to a career in journalism) and Richard and Kate (communist Cambridge students). The conversation develops through a discussion of France in 1944 and the reasons why it didn’t have a revolution. Dan largely accepts Richard’s argument that all the French communists could do was “hand over the guns and join the regular armies to finish off Hitler”.54 The conversation then develops through Richard’s line that the US now dominates Europe which Dan disagrees with. The discussion then moves through another point of consensus on the need for the working class to have patience in its struggles before Richard argues that workers are satisfied with so bloody little. To which Dan replies: “They’ve got some things here the Russians haven’t got though… Those Soviet women that married British lads, for instance, and the Russians wouldn’t let them come out here…”55 Richard initially dismisses this argument as a press stunt before stating: “I’m a communist because of what I do know about Britain and France and Spain – not what I don’t know about Russia. If there’d never been a Soviet Union I’d still be a communist.” It is Kate who finishes with the killer line: “That’s what you think… You mightn’t have had the chance.”[Ibid p99.[/note]

In this passage, the working-class character Dan uses his reason to argue against elements of the communist line. The argument passes through points of consensus and conflict. Dan’s suspicion of the CPGB and the Soviet Union is unabated and this feeds into his later development as a journalist, where he eventually collapses into the prevalent Cold War anti-communism of his trade. Nevertheless, it does strike the reader that this conversation is displaced, being more concerned with the CPGB’s crisis after 1956 than with its supposed setting in the 1940s. After the unflattering revelations that appeared in 1956 about the Soviet Union, the CPGB had an official position of stressing that it was an independent British organization, while still being broadly supportive of the Soviet Union and much of its historical record. This is actually reproduced by Richard and Kate: Richard says he is a communist in spite of the Soviet Union, while Kate reminds him that he might owe a lot more to the Soviet Union than he thinks. It was clever of Heinemann to work this in through a point of disagreement, but the end result is a subtle rationalization of the CPGB’s existence and history, developed through unresolved ideological conflicts. 

The book ends in 1956; the communist Richard, who has moved to Wales to become a teacher in adult education, has been hard hit by the events in the world communist movement and has begun to have a crisis of conscience. The visit of the non-communist miner Tommy portrays a proletarian character using his logic and what he has learned about the working-class movement to effectively give a ‘pep talk’ to Richard about his position. Tommy offers a rationalization of the role of the communists in the class struggle: “You say you’ve been wrong, you’ve made mistakes, your party made mistakes, the Russians done some bad things, some stupid things – duw, we’ve all known that a long time. If you and Griff Jones and Dai James [another local communist], ay, and your Russian pals hadn’t been trying so bloody hard to do something, get us somewhere, now, you mightn’t have made so many mistakes.”56

Heinemann has acutely observed the problematic of working-class characters in the British communist novels as it had developed prior to 1956. The Adventurers attempted to deal with that flaw. Its proletarian figures are far from politically blank and the crisis in the CPGB is pictured in a way that does have a bearing on what happened to the party and its members in 1956. However, this is a very formal resolution of the problem: these characters are developed among situations and arguments where their undoubted intellectual coherence is used to offer a pathway towards rationalization of the CPGB and its associated mythology. The Adventurers overthrows one of the forms of ‘socialist realism’ – proletarians as dull, insensitive lumps, waiting to be jolted into life by external circumstances – in the cause of reinstating its more fundamental cause: political utility to the party. 

Edward Upward, In the thirties; The rotten elements

A much more satisfying attempt to overcome the limitations of the British communist novel came in the form of Edward Upward’s In the Thirties (1962) and The Rotten Elements (1969), the first two volumes of ‘The spiral ascent’ trilogy.57 Perhaps to some, Upward would have been an unlikely source of such rehabilitation, given his privileged middle-class background, attendance at Corpus Christi College Cambridge, and his association with Christopher Isherwood and WH Auden. Such an impression might be compounded by the nature of ‘The spiral ascent’ where a fictionalized Upward (Alan Sebrill) relinquishes the ‘poetic life’ and joins the CPGB (as did Upward in the early 1930s) and then struggles to relate his poetry to the life of a party militant. But Upward and his wife Hilda (fictionalized in the books as Elsie Sebrill) had left the CPGB in 1948 after a factional struggle in which both had claimed that the party was ‘revisionist’ and ‘reformist’ due to its support for the British Labour government elected in 1945 and its apparent disregard for Lenin’s teachings on the state.58 So, Upward had no external limitations on any critique of the CPGB (although the party and its comrades are generally treated sympathetically in the pages of In the Thirties). This, and a constantly questioning prose, opened up space for a treatment of the CPGB’s working-class cadres that accords much more with what we actually know of them from autobiographies and other sources, treating them as a kind of intellectualized ‘vanguard’ of their class. 

This is made clear by Upward when Alan Sebrill makes his first contact with the party, eventually helping a working-class comrade, Wally, with some election leafleting. Wally remembers his last job as a commissionaire at a cinema: “While I was there I first met a young chap from Cambridge – Symington his name was – who got me interested in philosophy.”59 Wally says he’s read some of Feuerbach and Dietzgen with Symington’s help: “I’ve tried Hegel too, but couldn’t get far, not even with help. Now I’m reading Adoratsky on dialectical materialism. Pretty good.”60 Wally agrees with Alan’s high opinion of Plekhanov’s Fundamental Problems of Marxism: “That’s a grand book… though they say now it has its faults. But that, with Lenin’s Materialism and empirio-criticism – well, you couldn’t find a better introduction anywhere to dialectical materialism.”61 This particular character isn’t whitewashed by Upward. In another scene, a meeting dealing with the disciplining of a comrade who has started to criticize the Soviet Union, Wally is shown as someone also capable of spouting the worst kind of CPGB dogma. After stating that he’s heard the comrade, Bainton, speaking elsewhere, Wally proclaims: “It was Trotskyite filth. The sort of lies about the Soviet Union that even the capitalist press might find too smelly to serve up. No party member who’d heard it could have had any doubts that Bainton… had gone right over to the other side. But perhaps that’s nothing to be surprised at, considering Bainton’s petit-bourgeois origin.”62

This raises up a delicate dialectic between the good and bad intellectual potentialities of this working-class character, which Upward puts like this: “Wally spoke with an intensity which Alan at first regarded as out of character but which on second thoughts he recognised as arising from the very essence of the man, from the central principle without which Wally’s other and gentler characteristics could not have continued to exist.”63 

A similar process occurs in The Rotten Elements, where a CPGB factory worker, Bert Alldiss, speaks at borough meeting at which Elsie Sebrill has told the gathering why she doesn’t agree with the party’s support for the post-war Labour government and why it shouldn’t support the reformist government’s production drive. Alldiss suggests that the situation has changed from war-time (when the CPGB also supported a production drive), because the British government no longer wants an alliance with the Soviet Union and wonders “what the old style Marxists would have thought of this idea of socialism through exports.”64 Alldiss does qualify his opposition: “Unless we step up production the whole nation will be in the soup, workers as well as bosses. I can’t see how Elsie can get round that.”65 Upward records Alan Sebrill’s inner reaction to the intervention: “As [Bert] sat down, an admiration for him was strengthened in Alan, and a conviction that his good sense and honesty would never allow him to accept trickery from any party leader, if only he could be brought to recognise that it was trickery. But the recognition might take time, since he was less strong on theory than on practice, and since the leadership’s line – just because it was opportunist – appeared plausible enough in Britain’s immediate economic situation.”66 Upward is fully alive to the potential of working-class communists to rationalize their own political positions and that of the party, even if that potential isn’t always realized. 

In ‘The Spiral Ascent’, Upward’s work also had definite experimental qualities, in particular, slowing down the narrative to a snail’s pace, taking objects out of normal ‘circulation’ and fixing them with a probing objective eye that means they take on stranger forms that their literal description. Such an approach is a challenge to works such as Lukács’s “Narrate or Describe?” (1936), which stresses the humanizing advantage of narration over the dead weight of ‘objective description.’ Upward attacks that stance from an alternative angle, pointing tentatively to how such objects are debased in more prosaic human circulation. For example, this is how an increasingly paranoid Sebrill reacts to his assessment that a party comrade, Les Gatten, is a police spy: “Feeling was abruptly brought to life in Alan. Like someone who coming into a kitchen sees a joint of cooked meat on a white dish in the middle of a table and sees also on the same dish and in contact with the meat something which is not meat, greenish-grey, part liquid, part solid, and which he instantly knows to be dog’s vomit, though it does not make him begin to retch until his mind has willy-nilly formed an idea of what the solid (fishy, spool-shaped, shaggily stringy) might have been before the dog’s stomach rejected it – Alan did not feel nausea until after he had comprehended fully what Gatten was.”67

However, unlike the examples in this article by Sommerfield and Calder-Marshall, the experimentation in Upward is not simply foregrounded and revealed as a formal subjectivism alongside obviously subjective accounts of working-class consciousness that can only advance by increments. Rather, the precise, observational qualities employed by these two works feed off the rationality and critical nature of the books’ characters, which is a much more plausible intellectual account of how people became communists and fought as communists; the experimentation on show is thus a diverse facet of the books’ total effect. 

Aftermath

Upward was long out of the CPGB by the time these works had appeared, and it was too late for the party itself to resolve any of its literary problems. Lawrence and Wishart, the CPGB publisher, stopped producing novels by party members in the early 1960s. (By the 1980s, it was reissuing older party novels by figures such as Heslop and Sommerfield from the 1930s and such works had a certain cult appeal on the left.) The aesthetic issues of the party’s final decades need a lot more work in terms of investigation. The CPGB produced a statement in 1967 entitled ‘Questions of ideology and culture’ that saw the organization adopt a laissez-faire attitude to the arts and declined any kind of role in leading and directing artists.68 Broadly, the CPGB’s left opposed this shift in favor of older conceptions of vanguardism in the arts, but neither wing was in any real position to do anything given that the corrosion of the CPGB’s aesthetic was infused with the collapse of its political culture. The party did enjoy something of an ‘Indian summer’ in the late 1960s and 1970s due to its relative strength in the trade union movement. But this movement was politically weak. In the words of John McIlroy: “The picture suggested [from CPGB reports] was not a national community of political branches, but rather a shallower, personalized network of trade union militants – individuals or handfuls – largely concerned with industrial issues, sometimes with limited attachment to the CP and ‘deep-seated caution in showing the face of the party’.”69 These groupings were not enough to save the CPGB from decline or winking out of existence in 1991 and neither were they the cause of any radical re-casting of the British communist novel. Such shadowy networks were pictured in action in Herbert Smith’s A Morning to Remember (1962), set in a London power station. But the novel makes the CPGB effectively invisible in the workplace, in line with developing communist tactics to influence, not dominate, the trade unions. On one level, this did solve the issue of developing working-class subjectivity in that the relation to the communists was pushed into the background, while proletarian characters were still trapped in the ‘immediacy’ of the shop floor, waiting for a spark (in this case, a workplace emergency) to bring them to life. 

The collapse of the CPGB’s political culture in the 1920s and 1930s and its associated mandate to mold the most advanced part of the British working class thus cast a very long artistic shadow. To have a Marxist organization that was even capable of sustaining a literary culture, however debased, now seems an almost impossible dream 100 years after the party’s foundation. But, despite the undoubted achievement in bringing proletarian voices into the literary world, the British communist novel can only ultimately be treated as an index of its political and cultural disintegration.

The Invisible Landscape: Tracing the Spiritualist Utopianism of Nineteenth-Century America

Edmund Berger explores the hidden history of Utopian Socialism and its close relationship with cultures of esoteric spirituality in the nineteenth-century United States. 

Robert Owen’s New Harmony, Indiana

Take the highway east from Cincinnati, Ohio, and in no time the city with its lights and skyscrapers will fade in the rearview mirror, the dense concrete world giving way to the sporadic outcroppings of suburban life and then the wide openness of the American rural landscape. Lanes will be subtracted one by one until only two remain, one going in each direction, and to the north will be small rolling hills and to the south, snaking along the road, the waters of the Ohio River. Around forty miles or so and one will pass through a small town – an “unincorporated community”, as the US census puts it – with the curious name of ‘Utopia’. Blink and you’ll miss it: a few houses, a gas station, a historical marker. Get out and walk around and you might come across a hole in the group lined with ancient cut rocks; it’s the entrance to an underground church, one of the last traces indicating that Utopia was a major crossroads in what we might describe as America’s invisible landscape.

I have to confess to having pilfered this term from elsewhere. It’s actually the name of a book, published in 1975, by famed psychonauts Terence and Dennis McKenna. They use it to describe “an alien dimension all around us” that we can obtain glimpses of, if only obliquely, through tools such as mystical practices and the use of hallucinogenic drugs.1 This seems like a far cry from somewhere like Utopia, Ohio – but it seems appropriate to me on several levels. On one level, it’s because the history that produced Utopia is utterly alien to the experience of American life as we know it today, and actively challenges many of the core presuppositions that are currently baked into the construct of American identity. On another level, this alien world comes far closer to the turbulent slipspace that the McKenna brothers moved in: interweaving zones of fantastical possibilities encounters with spirits and an active eschatological element.

Something that becomes quickly recognizable about the invisible landscape is the elusiveness of a starting point. Unfolding across time and space in a way that denies a clear historical shape, it remains impervious to a fixed narrative. It is instead a bewildering strand of minor histories and counter-histories, unexpected slippages and surprising convergences – but if one is to pick a spot to act as an anchor, and for us here Utopia is just such a spot, then certain lines become clearer. From this forgotten location in Ohio, we unwind, as one is oft to do in tracking American history, back to the mythologized Old World – and in this case, France, and in particular, to the figure of Charles Fourier.

Fourier wore many paradoxical hats: he was a revolutionary who disdained the French revolution, a mystic committed to secularism, and a perverse sociologist who offered a utopian vision of socialism based on the idea of harmonic balance, liberated libidos, and the transvaluation of the toil of labor into play. According to Herbert Marcuse, Fourier’s labyrinthine output was a prefiguration of the unruly imagination of the surrealists – and it was this unruly imagination, he suggested, that in turn anticipated a communistic world to come.2 But whereas Marcuse was writing right at the transition from the 1950s to the 60s, seeing this Fourierist future coming into view in the collision of a then-embryonic counterculture and rampant industrial automation, Fourier himself organized his socialism from a complex cosmology. This entailed the existence of a dozen passions that ruled across several scales, ranging from the planets themselves down to individual humans. From the passions, a varied typology emerged based on the various attractions and repulsions of these passions.

A truly harmonious society, one in line with the agenda of a designer-God, could emerge in the proper balancing of the passions – and to this end, Fourier proposed what he called associations. Each association would have a limited number of people which he determined via his kabbalistic grid of typologies and were to be organized in large mansion-houses that he dubbed phalansteries (a combination of the French words for ‘phalanx’ and ‘monastery’). The phalanstery was to be self-operating, but only partially autonomous. At the summit of this grand social order existed a World Congress of Phalanxes, capable of coordinating between the various communities.

Fourierism arrived in America by way of a young writer and socialist by the name of Albert Brisbane. A New Yorker by birth, he had traveled to Europe to study philosophy, and through a circuitous route found himself under the direct tutelage of Fourier. At the end of the 1830s he was back in the States, where he promoted Fourierist thought via several organs: through the New York Tribune (whose founder, Horace Greenley, he had converted to Fourierism), with the creation of a Fourierist Society, authorship several books such as 1840s The Social Destiny of Man, and a periodical called The Phalanx. Fourierist thought was on the move, soon spreading outwards from New York and towards the west, where it set in motion a series of experiments in communal living organized around the principle of the phalansteries. Over thirty such experiments occurred during the movement’s peak in the 1840s, and a series of ‘Industrial Congresses’ were held to coordinate efforts between the nascent associations. This was not, however, the only outlet for the Fourierist wave. As Carl Guarneri charts in his masterful The Utopian Alternative: Fourierism in Nineteenth-Century America, there was a deeper-rooted integration of independent Fourierists, “[n]ondenominational utopian socialist churches”, “cooperative stores and urban communes” and the rising labor movement.3

Utopia’s origins lay precisely in the momentous push of the America Fourierist movement. In 1844, a group of citizens from Cincinnati arrived in this isolated spot of land to construct the Clermont Phalanx (named for the county that Utopia is located within). With the purchasing of 1140 acres of land, the great – and short-lived – experiment began:

Agriculture was to be the principle occupation of the association, although the various trades – blacksmithing, shoemaking, carpentry, brushmaking, and some of the lighter trades – were encouraged, and shops provided for those who were so engaged. Each member was assigned some congenial occupation by the council, and was expected to labor cheerfully to increase the common wealth.4

The mansion-house that Fourier envisioned was built, realized as a large two-story building sporting some thirty rooms. The efforts were, however, unrealized; like so many of the experiments in associationism that took place in that decade, the Clermont Phalanx would crumble within a few years. With mounting debt, a series of interpersonal disputes that erupted into lawsuits, and crops ruined by the Ohio River’s floods, the Phalanx closed up shop in 1846, and the land was split among three different parties. A small portion went to a local farmer, a portion that would eventually become Utopia proper went to another group of socialist, and a third, closer to the banks of the Ohio, to a group of spiritualists.

The people who founded Utopia have an interesting history in their own right. Among their ranks was an individual by the name of Josiah Warren, who earlier had been a member of a commune in Indiana called New Harmony. This was an experiment in collective living staged by the British socialist reformer Robert Owen, whose ideas were making a similar transit across the American landscape, though having predated the Fouriests by some years. Following his stint in New Harmony, Warren had gone to Cincinnati and opened the ‘Time Store’ – a general store that only dealt in a new form of money, a kind of labor note attached to the time that it took to produce the good in question. At some point, he returned to New Harmony to open a second Time Store, while also developing a philosophy of “equitable commerce” and “individual sovereignty”.5 Utopia, assembled not only from the ruins of the Clermont Phalanx but also from some of its members, was intended to be a prolonged experiment in these principles.

Not all of the individuals turned up in Utopia. Others shuffled to the south to join up with the spiritualist commune, which was led by a rather nomadic character by the name of John O. Wattles. Wattles was no stranger to communal efforts: he had previously been involved in establishing a collective in Logan County, Ohio, known as the Prairie Home Community. Like the Clermont Phalanx, it was an attempt at establishing a Fourierist association – but it was also a hotbed for a whole host of odd beliefs and esoteric sciences, with one visitor later recounting that he was “surprised to hear rude-looking men, almost ragged, plowing, fence-making, and in like employments, converse so freely upon Phrenology, Physiology, Magnetism, Hydropathy…”.6 Given the spiritualist-inclinations of the new group in Clermont County, we can assume that a similarly heady cocktail was swirling in the air.

The Clermont Phalanx had collapsed from internal problems, the spiritualist commune ending in tragedy. For reasons unknown, the group decided to move the Fourierist’s mansion, stone by stone, closer to the river’s edge. Their work was carried out throughout December in the year 1847, as an immense winter storm bore down upon them. The events that followed are recounted in detail in The History of Clermont County:

The rain and snow had been falling for several days, and on the 12th of December the banks of the river were full to overflowing, while the area of the building was steadily filling with water. Notwithstanding these dangerous appearances the moving continued (as the temporary buildings were uncomfortable), even after boats were necessary to reach the new house; but late in the afternoon of December 13th this work was suspended, and as far as is known 34 persons were at time sheltered under the roof of the new building. Among these were a number of new young people, not members of the community, who had been attracted by the moving, and it was proposed to while away the evening with a dance. While this was in progress, about eight o’clock, the walls of the building fell, crushing many to death, and others in the confusion were drowned. Seventeen lives were lost, many being strangers in the neighborhood, having but recently joined the community… This disaster, occurring at night in a terrible storm, struck terror to the hearts of the people, and the history of the community from its inception to its calamitous close is the most tragic event that has even occurred in the county.7

Regardless of the ultimate failure of the Fourierists, or the tragic events that befell the spiritualists, this entire episode illustrates the various threads that weave the fabric of the invisible landscape – namely, this intermingling of, on the one side, a radical sense of politics geared towards the transfiguration of lived experience, and on the other, things that we today would identify as being under the rubric of the ‘occult’. While it might seem like only a coincidence in location, this episode emerges from a wider web of connections and convergences. We’ve already seen that Wattle was involved in the Prairie Home Community, a Fourierist association that blended communal living with the esoteric. He was also involved, however, in a mysterious group in Cincinnati called the Spiritual Brotherhood, and it was from here that the plans to start the doomed community were born. As one writer from the period describes them:

There is a Society in this City [Cincinnati] which goes by the name of Spiritual Brotherhood. It is small, but made up of respectable and intelligent persons, so far as we know. They have held meetings about two years, and they are chiefly distinguished by teaching that man can hold communion with the spirits of another world, if he conform to all the physical and moral laws.8

This Spiritual Brotherhood remains little-known, and documentation surrounding their activities is scarce, but from what can be gleamed it becomes clear that they were quite active in not only local but national politics. One associate of the Brotherhood happened to be Warren Chase, a leading Fourierist, and president of a phalanx in Ceresco, Wisconsin. He certainly had an eye towards the spiritual and the occult. Even before arriving in Ceresco he undertook studies into the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg and examined Mesmerism, the therapeutic art of ‘animal magnetism’ that was believed to open conduits that allowed communication with the dead. These activities prompted him to organize a spiritualist study group at Ceresco that was in direct contact with the Brotherhood.9

This wasn’t the extent of Chase’s activities: he was a delegate to the conventions of the National Reform Association (NRA), an early advocate of land reform (based on the principle of “Equal Right to Land”), women’s suffrage and abolitionism, and later appears as having been involved the series of National Industrial Congresses that the NRA organized across the 1840s and 50s. In 1849, when the Congress began to organize its annual gathering, it was determined that Cincinnati would serve as an excellent location – and the Spiritual Brotherhood stepped up to act as the organizer.10


Grasping the odd nature of this series sort of convergences requires broadening our view of this invisible landscape a bit and look at spiritualism more directly. Popular histories tend to trace spiritualism to the revolutionary year of 1848, although the location was not a tumultuous European landscape haunted by the specter of communism, but the quiet town of Hydesville, New York. This is where two young sisters by the name of Maggie and Kate Fox allegedly made contact with a spirit that they nicknamed “Mr. Splitfoot”. They communicated with Mr. Splitfoot – later ‘identified’ as a murdered peddler named Charles B. Rosna – by interpreting ‘rappings’ or knocks on the wooden walls and floorboards as responses to questions posed by curious onlookers. The Fox sisters were soon veritable celebrities and could be found hosting public séances and the like to demonstrate their powers as mediums.

There’s a direct line between the Fox sisters and the uptake of spiritualism by communitarian socialists and radical reformers.11 Amy and Isaac Post were close friends of the Fox family, and as radical Quakers, were actively involved in early abolitionist and women’s suffrage movements. The Quakers already had a deep history of Christian mysticism.  Stretching back to the late 1700s, there was a consistent involvement in various forms of folk magic and divination, much to the dismay of the society’s leadership. Through the Posts, belief in and practice of spiritualism spread rapidly through the Quakers, and beyond them, to the various radical reformist movements with which they were intertwined.

This is one path that spiritualism took, but there are others. In the volume of his History of Spiritualism, Arthur Conan Doyle suggests an earlier genesis of spiritualism, having tracked it back to the writings and experiences of Emanuel Swedenborg in the mid-1700s. A scientist, theologian and mystic, Swedenborg professed the ability to not only speak to the spirits of the departed but also to have actually traveled to their world beyond ours, which “consisted of a number of different spheres representing the various shades of luminosity and happiness, each of us going to that which our spiritual condition has fitted for us”.12 There’s a clear correspondence between these proto-spiritualist practices and ‘theory of correspondences’ that marked Swedenborg’s overarching theological cosmology, where there exist a series of planes, ranging from the spiritual to the material, through which God’s love flows. But what’s more is the existence of direct parallels between objects and forces in these planes: “…the sun in our natural world is a reflection of the sun in the spiritual world. By observing the way the heat and light of our sun interact with nature as we experience it through our senses, we can start to understand how love and wisdom work in the world of our inner spirit”.13

Swedenborgianism became an active force in America, with a church dedicated to his doctrines opening in Baltimore in 1793. The influence of this doctrine, however, spread further than just distinctly Swedenborgian churches, with ripples being felt in Quaker communities, in the writings of the Transcendentalists, and in the Mormon theology of Joseph Smith. The Rappites, an eschatologically-minded religious group that organized a communal society in Pennsylvania called Harmony, was influenced in no small part by Swedenborg, with founder Johann Georg Rapp having been influenced by the seer (as Swedenborg was often called) and other Christian mystics such as Jakob Bohme. The Rappites, in turn, helped form the very infrastructure of American communitarian socialism: it was the land and buildings of their second community in the state of Indiana, named New Harmony, that was sold to Robert Owen to carry out his own communistic experiment (as we’ve already seen, this is where the journey of Josiah Warren, the ostensible founder of Utopia, Ohio, began). To add extra dimensions to this already complicated web, when Owen arrived in Cincinnati in 1824, he found that a local community of Swedenborgians were “the only ones prepared to understand and put into practice his socialistic theories, many of which seemed closely akin to the ‘Heavenly Teachings’”.

Swedenborg’s theology, with its hermetic architecture and movement towards spiritualism, also mingled freely with the inner-workings of the American Fourierists. Ralph Waldo Emerson – who, while not a Fourierist, was familiar with them (and eventually came to regard them critically) – once wrote that “[o]ne could not but be struck with strange coincidence betwist Fourier and Swedenborg”; according to Carl Guarneri, this observation planted the seeds of the idea of compatibility between the two in the minds of Christian Fourierists.14 Several works on this topic soon followed, bearing meandering titles and even more meandering prose. One such work was Charles Hempel’s The True Organization of the New Church, as Indicated in the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg and Demonstrated by Charles Fourier, published in 1848. For Hempel, Fourier and Swedenborg were but two sides of the same coin. “The doctrine of these two great men cannot remain separated”, he wrote. “Their union constitutes the union of Science and Religion”.15

A practitioner of mesmerism using animal magnetism on a woman who responds with convulsions. Wood engraving. Mesmer, Franz Anton 1734-1815.

One final strand leading into spiritualism that is worth baring mention of is that of Mesmerism, a therapeutic practice based on the principles of “animal magnetism” that, whilst having its origins in an attempt at Enlightenment science, quickly became integrated into occult and religious tendencies. Mesmerism takes us back to France, to 1778, when “Franz Anton Mesmer arrived in Paris and proclaimed his discovery of a superfine fluid that penetrated and surrounded all bodies”.16 Operating from the basis of Newtonian physics – but smuggling in through the backdoor the “doctrine of cosmic fluid” that can be tracked across the Hermetic continuum running Paracelsus down through Robert Fludd – Mesmer determined that this fluid was, in fact, the force that explained gravity.17 As gravity works across all spheres of existence, from the motion of the planets to those of individual bodies, he soon drew a connection between the movements of this supposed fluid and physical and psychic ailments.

“Mesmerism”, as it came to be called, involved the use of magnets to manipulate the superfine fluid within the body to cure it. Using a wand, a practitioner would ‘direct’ the fluid. Confirmation came, for Mesmer, not in the proof of the fluid’s existence, but in the trances, fits, and convulsions that his patients often underwent. Nonetheless, the scientific community of Paris regarded Mesmer’s work as fraudulent pseudoscience, and he remained consistently barred to the margins. It was here, however, that Mesmerism was taken up by a variety of cultural movements, many of them mystical in nature. According to Nicholas Goodrich-Clarke, a large Swedenborgian institution in Stockholm took a deep interest in Mesmerism and viewed the odd babblings that the patients often engaged in during their trance states as communication with the dead.18 Jean-Baptiste Willermoz, a figure immersed in the world of Masonry, Rosicrucianism, and alchemy, went further and experimented with Mesmerism in hopes that it would unveil the divine, pure condition that marked human life before the Fall. Others still utilized Mesmerism as a means to induce automatic writing, which was often regarded, particularly by figures like Willermoz, as the communication with the souls of the dead or with angels.

Curiously, Mesmerism seems to have borne some influence on Fourier. Both worked off the assumption that they were continuing Newton’s work, and each posed some sort of cosmological force: the ‘superfine fluid’ for Mesmer and the twelve passions for Fourier. Both alluded to notions of ‘universal harmony’ – and it was in the pages of a journal led by Pierre Ballanche, a mystic and counterrevolutionary figure who was actively engaged in Mesmerism, that Fourier first debuted his system.19

Mesmerism arrived in America during the early 1830s by way of one Charles Poyen, who right from the start was integrating the practices of animal magnetism with reformist movements like abolitionism.20 He was, in some sense, laying the direct groundwork for the spiritualism that would explode in the wake of the Fox sister’s supposed communication with the dead; as Emma Britten, writing in 1870, described,

In all principle cities of the Union, gentlemen distinguished for their literary abilities, progressive opinions, or prominence in public affairs, have graduated from the study of the study of magnetism and clairvoyance to become adherents to the cause of Spiritualism, whilst many of the best mediums – especially the trance speakers and magnetic operators – have taken their first degree in Spiritualism, president in 1825 as experimentalists in the phenomena of mesmerism.21

A particularly poignant convergence of various threads takes place in the experience of Anna Parsons, a practitioner of what was known as ‘psychometrics’ or ‘soul measuring’. It was a direct outgrowth from spiritualism: the psychometrist worked on the magnetic and electrical impulses that were seen as flowing through the individual, but whereas mesmerism was initially intended (but by no means limited to) therapeutic practices, psychometry’s goal was “the development and exercise of the divine faculties in man”.22 Parsons, as it happened, practiced psychometry from her station in Brook Farm – a communal experiment that was located just outside of Boston, Massachusetts that had come to be organized as a Fourierist association.23 There, her psychometric practices slid directly into spiritualism. In one notable experience, she encountered the spirit of Fourier himself and reportedly carried out a conversation with him.24

Other leading Fourierists who were engaged with mesmerism, psychometry, and spiritualism were Thomas and Mary Gove Nichols. Thomas Nichols himself had been the student of Charles Poyen and had demonstrated aptitude in the mesmeric art by healing his mentor, while his wife, Mary, was an active medium and involved in hydropathy, or as it is more commonly known today, ‘water-cures’ (it is worth pointing out that the two were married in a Swedenborgian ceremony).25 The two had lived for a time in an experimental community in New York called Modern Times, which had been founded by Josiah and his friend Stephen Pearl Andrews26, before relocating to Cincinnati, where they became immersed in the circles linking together spiritualism and radical reformism – namely, women’s suffrage. Between 1856 and 1857 they moved north to a small town in Ohio called Yellow Springs and set up a community of their own dedicated to hydropathy called the Memnonia Institute. Memnonia was cast in a millenarian shade; the Nichols held that the project of their Institute would aid in the realization of a “Harmonic Society on Earth”.27 This is a clue to profoundly Fouriest orientation of the Memnonia Institute, and indeed, the two chose April 7th, 1857 – Fourier’s birthday – as the date for the project’s formal opening.

What cuts across this different threads – communal experimentation, (mystical) Christianity, radical reformist politics, and spiritualism – is, at the base, the belief that a new epoch was dawning, and that these elements and their interweaving made up the fabric of this emergent world. Joseph Rodes Buchanan, an ardent promoter of spiritualism and psychometry, described mesmeric practices as a component in the emergence of a  ‘new civilization’. Many of the Christian sects that took up spiritualist beliefs in this period descended from the Radical Reformation in Europe, which saw the parallel emergence of a host of eschatological expectations. Flowing across to the Atlantic to the Americas, this seeded the activities of groups like the Rappites, and before them the Society of the Woman in the Wilderness (a quasi-monastic communitarian experiment that portended the Second Coming in the year 1694) and the Ephrata Cloister (somewhat of a split from the Society of the Woman in the Wilderness that integrated itself with the Seventh-Day Adventists, producing a mystical heralding of an imminent ‘Eternal Sabbath’ that would see the “whole Restauration of all things”).28 Even the secular Robert Owen readily adopted a millenarian tone. In an 1825 speech to American politicians – including President John Quincy Adams – he described how the emerging communal experiments were “commenc[ing] a new empire of peace and goodwill to men… the state of virtue, intelligence, enjoyment, and happiness which has been foretold by the sages of the past would at some point become the lot of the human race”.29

As we saw above, Fourierists like the Nichols also slotted into this continuum via their rhetoric of a new ‘harmonic age’, but this tendency was overt even decades before the founding of the Memnomia Institute. Consider the following from the minutes of the 1844 General of the Friends of Association in the United, recorded and published in an issue of The Phalanx:

It would be doing injustice to this occasion, not to open our discussion of the Principles of Social Reorganization, by an expression of feelings with which we have come up, from far and near, to this assembly. It is but giving voice to to what is working in the hearts of those now present, and thousands whose sympathies are at this moment with us over our whole land, to say, this is a Religious Meeting. Our end is to God’s will, not our own; to obey the command of Providence, not to follow the leadings of human fancies. We stand today as we believe amid the dawn of a New Era of Humanity…30

In many respects, the slow creep of millenarianist thought reverberates across the whole of the American experiment. The New World has always been understood not only in terms of space, but in terms of time, and especially in a New Time that breaks with everything that came before. Around the time of his third voyage, Christopher Columbus penned his Book of Prophecies, which foretold a series of events that set in motion the Second Coming. He readily adopted the classic idea of the ‘world-emperor’ or the ‘last king’ whose reign would immediately presage Christ’s return, and in his monarchist backers he thought he had identified exactly who would play this role. Moving in similar waters was John Dee and his eschatological vision of a world empire that came before the Biblical apocalypse. The New World was central to this vision: believing that the mythological King Arthur and the Welsh prince Madoc had visited the Americas, Dee held that Britain maintained a spiritual right to the land. As Jason Louv points out, the similarities between Columbus and Dee are not mere coincidences – Dee’s schemes for the future were but a Protestantization of the Catholic traditions that Columbus was drawing upon.31 But while many of the utopian socialist and associationist currents sketched above drew from similar sources, they lacked the distinct monarchist and even aristocratic character that a Columbus or a Dee posited. Their millenarianism was often what we might today describe as exhibiting a populist orientation.

Millenarianism is a concept that is regarded with considerable disrepute. Besides the common images that it brings to mind – doomsday cultists, survivalist fringe, the specter of violence and dire prophecies of imminent catastrophe – there are the arguments put forward by people like Norman Cohn. In The Pursuit of the Millennium, Cohn argues that millenarian groups, particularly those that made up the actively revolutionary side of the Radical Reformation, are the direct antecedents to the slew of totalitarians that shaped the course of the twentieth century. From Thomas Muntzer, whose oft-cited declaration of omnia sunt communia! has been identified by some as the prefiguration of communism, we arrive at the Stalins and the Hitlers.32

It was the Situationists, who can be regarded as something like second or third cousins of our American utopians – they were resolutely Marxist, but remained perpetually haunted by the ghost of Fourier – who took measures to flip Cohn’s script. In Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle and Raoul Vaneigem’s The Movement of the Free Spirit (a work that, it must be said, was penned after his expulsion from the Situationist International, yet remains continuous with his earlier concerns), the revolutionary dimensions of millenarian thought is re-affirmed. For Debord, the inversion of Cohn took place through the classic Marxist analysis of Christianity that originated with Engels and Kautsky which held that the revolutionary strains of religion were expressions of class struggle in a period in which ‘class consciousness’ as such could not be articulated.33 Vaneigem, on the other hand, slips more towards the surrealist debt that Debord hoped to hold at bay. “The most radical element of the movement of the Free Spirit”, he wrote, “had to do with an alchemy of individual fulfillment, in which the creation of a superior state (the all-important ‘perfection’) was achieved by a gradual relinquishment of the economy’s hold over individuals”.34

There is a remarkable correspondence between the Situationists and the line coursing through Marcuse’s work that we cited out the outset, and it makes sense: the constellation of Fourier, surrealism, and Marx is common to each. “Imagination is about to reclaim its rights”, wrote Marcuse, filtering the great discovery of the surrealists through Freud.35 This is the same as what Vaneigem called the poetry of revolution, an alchemical art that transforms the “basest metals of daily life into gold”.36 It too, therefore, shares the suppressed millenarian position, being a politics that aims above all else at a profound and sweeping transfiguration. But while there is a future orientation, it also appears, ever so uncannily, as a strange echo of a succession of moments in the past, not in Europe, but in nineteenth-century America, where imagination did indeed strain to reclaim its rights in the form of strange sciences, mystical religion, and a struggle to live a utopian life. Sometimes it ended in tragedy, like the spirituals who fell to the Ohio River’s currents, and most of the time is simply crumbled away. Yet the imprint still remains.

All that is left of these moments now are just echoes, the ghostly sound of this other, alien landscape whispering across time and space. Echoes reverberating out from scattered traces tucked away in the cracks and crevices of an America now consolidated and fixed in its aimless spiral – and yet, at the same time, they are cracks and crevices, obscured by-ways and old roads, that sit plainly in sight if one only knows where to look.

Crossing the Line: Habitus and Misrecognition in Bong Joon-Ho’s Parasite

K.T. Jamieson analyzes the dynamics of class in Bong Joon-Ho’s Parasite through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory. Contains spoilers. 

At the 92nd Annual Academy Awards, South Korea received its first-ever best director award for Bong Joon-Ho’s Parasite. Partisan observers in the Tarantino (Once Upon a Time in Hollywood), Todd Philips (Joker), and Sam Mendes (1917) camps squabbled online over which was snubbed more, although Mendes absolutely deserved it the least.1 Besides this was the usual gnashing of teeth from boomer uncles on social media (including the boomer-in-chief) over the fact that it’s a foreign film with subtitles since reading is the last thing they want to do at the Imax. And Bong’s brief acceptance speech wasn’t even in English, but in some strange moon language which gave them horrible flashbacks to the time their hip nephew made them order bibimbap from a food truck.

Yet in that minute-and-a-half, Bong thanked no fewer than four American directors and referenced a fifth (Tobe Hooper of Texas Chainsaw Massacre); in particular, he referenced Scorcese and his admonition that ‘the personal is the most creative’. Was this ironic self-effacement? Or is it a tacit admission that, like the genetically-modified pigs in Okja, everything in cinema starts and ends in America?

The truth is that this award was a long time coming. Since The Host, all of Bong’s major releases have featured English-language roles, most prominently in 2013’s Snowpiercer, which raked in a respectable combined profit (box office and VOD) of more than 10 million dollars in the US.2 2017’s Okja was also mostly in English and distributed directly by Netflix, a fact that was roundly booed during its Cannes premiere. As Steven Yeun’s character, a bumbling animal-rights activist, quips in Okja: translation is sacred.

Parasite, however, dispenses with literal translation, as it is entirely in Korean. Yet there is still something in the nature of translation when it comes to communicating the struggles and tribulations of Korean class society to American audiences who have barely begun to realize they live in a (class) society at all. How, as Bong quotes from Scorcese, can the personal be creative, if the personal is stamped by particular conditions, penned within local and national boundaries? A minor factor that explains Bong’s American success is his style, which is best summarized as unobtrusive. His shots are medium-length, his compositions and framing are merely adequate, his dialogue is witty but not challenging; there is nothing at a formal level that approaches the inaccessibility of art film, which American moviegoers have come to associate with foreign imports. But this is overshadowed as an explanation by the blunt reality that the laws of motion which dominate our working lives, that is, our actual lives, are already universal in the form of value. As Bong puts it pithily:

“I tried to express a sentiment specific to Korean culture, [but] all the responses from different audiences were pretty much the same. Essentially, we all live in the same country, called Capitalism.”

Yet this statement can also be read ironically, as a confession of frustration. Given that class occupies its foreground, nobody deserves points for recognizing that Parasite is in some way about capitalism. Yet this doesn’t stop legions of hacks, mostly American, hailing this insight with all the naive enthusiasm of a child with a cereal box decoder ring.

The most obnoxious of them are, of course, the right-wing, who treat the film’s anti-capitalism with more vulgarity than the most online anti-revisionist. One sullenly complains that it depicts “seething hatred among the poor for the evil, haughty and surely stupid rich”, a contradiction since “South Korea is a champion importer” whose rising tide has lifted all boats. Equally clueless and absurd is their insistence that the ending is supposed to be a cathartic wrap-up in a morality play, in which individual acts of good and evil are tallied and totaled on both sides: “I didn’t find the killing by the poor father of the rich one in Parasite at all justified; the rich folks there seemed mostly morally blameless, while the poor ones commit many wrongs”, says one idiot cited by National Review.

The left is often only slightly better. A recent Jacobin review does laudably provide context specific to the Korean struggle but lamely concludes, as all Jacobin articles do, that it’s about income inequality and neoliberalism. From the decolonization perspective is a better, but still narrowly didactic, interpretation through the lens of military occupation and repressed indigeneity. The liberal rag The Nation, meanwhile, complains that the film is not didactic enough, taking us “not to the ledge of class war but to a shrug over inequality”, laughably asserting that Bong is not bothered by poverty but merely wants “our social arrangements to feel a bit kinder”.

Faced with this discourse, it is tempting to focus instead on Bong’s craft, stripped down to its scaffolding, where the political can be ignored. There is much to admire here: his Rube Goldberg-esque plot construction, which ratchets the tension as it grows more sprawling, complex, and prone to failure (rivaling here another contemporary release, Uncut Gems); his ability to balance wit with violence, like a humbler and less annoying Tarantino; the compelling rhymes and parallels inserted into every layer, which reward multiple viewings. After all, like all good art, there are many threads to pull on.

But despite all the reviews, the ceaseless analysis, and the decoder-critics, there are still some threads to pull on as regards class and capitalism. And while Bong himself freely admits that Parasite reflects ‘almost a pessimistic reality’, his protagonists do retain a stubborn sense of agency. They are not doomed insects trapped in amber, caught within static structures beyond their control. We can see that at multiple junctures, things could have gone differently; but we also see that they, the Kim family, are keenly perceptive of the social world around them. While they do not have anything resembling class consciousness, they can navigate the cultural emanations of class like a web, manipulating them to ensnare and feed off the more fortunate, and this too is an act of resistance (though not a revolution). They instinctively sense how expression, consumption and aesthetic preference exhibit a classification that can be mimicked. This suggests a practical, if semi-conscious, awareness on their part that the distinction of taste and cultural judgment sprouts, in the last instance, from the division of labor. In other words, they grasp what Pierre Bourdieu, French social theorist, calls the ‘reality of the representation’ and the ‘objectivity of the subjective’. For Bourdieu, ‘class is defined as much by its being-perceived and by its being, by its consumption … as much as by its position in the relations of production’3 without denying the obvious link between the two.  

Bourdieu in 1969

If the Kims are practical Bourdieuians, then turning to the man himself and his theories may allow us to squeeze further insights from an already over-analyzed film. Bourdieu is best-known for his landmark 1979 investigation of French social attitudes, translated into English as Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Here he attempts, through a combination of data-driven inference and theoretical reflection, to trace the manner in which aesthetic preferences both shape and are shaped by class position, in a kind of feedback loop. Mobility within a class structure, Bourdieu believes, is not a simple matter of relation to the means of production; it is also a relation to consumption, and what one consumes becomes part of the cost of reproducing one’s class, as well as a signal of that class to others.

Important to this work are the concepts of habitus, misrecognition, and field. Habitus is the obligate reproduction of the day-to-day in which the “work of acquisition is work on oneself”.4 Bourdieu, influenced by Heidegger, sees habitus as a ‘mode of being’ localized to a certain class. However, this mode of being is not authentic but is rather a form of misrecognition, a reification of purely mental attitudes. It systematically produces a class lifestyle, the ingrained and habitual practices of those inhabiting a given role within class society, but also a principle of definition-by-difference. Each habitus generates its own identity through its relation to other practices, and Bourdieu is especially interested in aesthetic preferences and cultural consumption as the arena in which the habitus negotiates its position relative to others. Bourdieu terms this competitive setting a ‘field’, as in ‘the field of cultural reproduction’, and within each field there are agents (and their habitus) engaged in a struggle for dominance of position.   

Within the field of cultural reproduction, signaled preferences become channels through which cultural capital is delivered as real capital. In his words, practices of a habitus become “sign-systems that are socially qualified … the dialectic of conditions and habitus is the basis of an alchemy which transforms the distribution of capital … into a … distribution of symbolic capital, legitimate capital, whose objective truth is misrecognized.”5 With a bit of ‘translation’ into the Korean context, and an update for the 21st century, the insights and conclusions of this study remain applicable. Of course, because Parasite is a work of fiction, and especially because of Bong’s magical realism there is a hyper-reality in its expression, but for this same reason, it is more obvious.

Although it is often assumed that the Kims and the Parks are straightforwardly representative of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the picture is more complicated.

The Kim family forms part of the proletariat, of course, but more specifically they are that fraction of the proletariat which struggles to find a buyer of their labor power – the reserve army of labor (or, if this condition persists, surplus population). This is not the first time Bong has focused on this subclass, which is becoming increasingly relevant as core economies automate productive labor, or simply shift it from north to south, to subcontractors and subsidiaries in the great shell game of the world market, as John Smith details in his excellent work Imperialism in the 21st Century. The protagonists of 2013’s Snowpiercer are redundant and immiserated stowaways in the rear car of an autonomous train, a clear metaphor for automation anxieties. However, just as full automation is impossible under capitalism, this train secretly relies on the manual labor of the kidnapped children of these lumpen passengers.

The Kims – mom, dad, son, and daughter – are all unemployed, having to ‘borrow’ everything from wifi hotspots to fumigation. Ki-taek, the father, had a string of valet jobs for several failed small restaurants, a reminder that the small ownership class is being squeezed out by monopolization, sweeping their employees into a common misery. The son, Ki-Woo, aspires to become a college graduate, having taken – and presumably failed – college entrance exams four times. The South Korean university system, as in America, acts like a pachinko machine in which class position is shuffled around until, for the lucky ones, a promise of acceptance into higher ranks is granted in the form of certification. In fact, for most it is also a promise of future exploitation, to be paid for in the form of present domination by creditors who now lean on students to repay their loans as quickly as possible.

As in America, cast-off proletarians survive by resorting to gig jobs. They scrape together a few bucks by folding pizza boxes, and when a supervisor comes to collect, Ki-Woo manipulates her into providing him with another employee’s job, setting the stage for the intra-class conflict later in the film. However, he never takes it – Ki-Woo’s graduate friend, Min, comes to offer another gig job, tutoring the high school daughter of a wealthy family – the Parks – whom he plans to marry once she enters college. This is the first domino in the Kims’ doomed chameleon strategy to infiltrate and take over the domestic functions of the Park family.

The Park family is wealthy, but not bourgeois in the full sense. They represent, rather, a new managerial class aligned with so-called information capital, a form of intellectual rent collected on patents and technology skills. The captains of these firms like to think of themselves as entrepreneurs ‘disrupting’ various industries, in so doing creating the conditions of unemployment and omnipresent gig work which the Kim family lives under. The patriarch of the Park family, Dong-ik, is a well-off executive at one of these firms. In a brief scene we glimpse an award he received for ‘Best Use of Emerging/New Technology’ (granted by one Kevin Wiltshire whose Anglo name is no coincidence – in fact, ‘Kevin’ is the name Ki-Woo assumes as the Park’s tutor). Next to it is an article clipping which reveals that Dong-ik, credited as ‘Nathan’, is the inventor of a ‘hybrid module map’ which is a kind of virtual reality navigation system for the city of New York. Mrs. Park, Yeon-gyo, is a useless appendage of the household, described as ‘simple’ and unable to clean, cook, or even look after the children. Her son Da-song is a kind of pampered indigo child whom Yeon-gyo is convinced harbors brilliant talents, while daughter Da-hye is mostly ignored and left alone.

Additionally, there is the Parks’ erstwhile housekeeper, Moon-gwang, and her husband Geun-sae. When Moon-gwang returns while the Park family is on a camping trip, we find she has been secretly providing for her husband Geun-sae, who has secluded himself in an underground emergency bunker in order to avoid loan sharks. It turns out that these debts were incurred after his cake shop went bankrupt, the same cake shop which employed Ki-taek as a valet. We can say that their sadistic rage toward the Kims reflects feelings of stolen legitimacy. Moon-gwang truly was a professional housekeeper, having served two prestigious families, and never ‘crossed the line’ in Dong-ik’s words. Though literally an ‘underground man’, Geun-sae never ceases to identify with the Park family, and especially Dong-ik. This adoration, like the messages he blinks in morse code with electrical switches, is always one-way. His split personality, self-defeating and suppliant, yet capable of explosive cruelty, is classically fascist – the mindset of the defeated and deranked middle class.

Returning to Bourdieu, we find that one way in which cultural capital is transformed into material profits is through what he calls the ‘institutionalizing’ of cultural capital. This happens when cultural capital becomes embodied in the form of qualifications, such as a university degree; these qualifications entitle the bearer to exchange it for monetary value, but their exact value fluctuates with changing conditions. If there is a glut of certifications, particularly for fields which are out-of-sync with structural allocations of labor, such as an overwhelming increase of humanities graduates, they become devalued. Not only this, but before they can be exchanged, the bearer must ‘prove’ and legitimate their value. This phenomenon is recognized in the competition for prestige among universities. In South Korea, the state’s close relationship with the bourgeoisie of countries in the Western core, particularly America, means that degrees from universities in these countries embody a higher relative cultural capital. Relatedly, proficiency in the English language, and familiarity with the customs and culture of English-speaking Western nations, is a way of ‘proving’ the value of this institutionalized cultural capital.

Despite their friendship, Ki-woo’s relation to his graduate friend Min is not one of peerage, but of misrecognized subordination and supplication. It is Min, not Ki-woo, who feels authorized to shoo a drunk pissing next to the Kims’ apartment (symbolically situated below street level). Ki-woo pleads helplessly with the drunk, but Min directly addresses him as an ‘asshole’ and a ‘punk’, shoving him out of the way and prompting Ki-woo’s father to remark that college students ‘have a real vigor to them’. It is Min who provides Ki-woo with his tutoring gig, and it is significant that the subject is English.

It is also Min who gifts the Kim family with the aptly-named scholar’s rock, which symbolizes the dependency of the Kim family – their survival, like that of all proletarians without class consciousness, is their oppression. When Ki-woo prepares for his interview ‘earned’ by lowering the value of another pizza employee in the eyes of a supervisor, his mom is shown polishing this same scholar’s rock. He describes the stone as ‘clinging’ to him, following him, and once Ki-woo’s position with the Park family is secure, It is wielded as a weapon against Geun-sae, who then turns it against him in a reversal of fortune. After the birthday disaster, when he is no longer able to pose as a graduate, we see the stone for the final time when he returns it to a riverbed.

In order to ‘prove’ their worth to the Park family, Ki-jung not only forges a university degree, but she and Ki-woo forge the social identity, the habitus, of Western-educated Korean PMC. They are now graduates of Western universities – Southern Illinois, Oxford – and assume Anglo names – Kevin, Jessica. ‘Kevin’ tutors English, while ‘Jessica’ poses as an art therapist, camouflaging herself with the pretentious airs of a liberal arts student.

The Kims are not the only bearers of this credentialized cultural capital. As mentioned, the Park father proudly displays his company’s awards on his walls. His company, Another Brick Inc, alludes to the dad-rock staple ‘Another Brick in the Wall’ by Pink Floyd, a protest (albeit cheesy) against rigidly hierarchical British schooling. It may also evoke interchangeability; says Bourdieu: “By conferring institutional recognition on the cultural capital possessed by any given agent, [this] … qualification also makes it possible to compare qualification holders and even to exchange them (by substituting one for another in succession).”6

Returning to the scholar’s rock, we can also interpret this object as symbolizing what Bourdieu calls objectified cultural capital. Because whole persons, with their habitus, are not transmissible as such, their cultural capital attaches to items of consumption – especially cultural goods such as paintings, writings, movies, architecture, and the like. Thus embodied capital becomes objectified capital. This is especially important among buffer classes, such as managers and professionals, and those occupying key positions in social reproduction, such as teachers, therapists, and bureaucrats. The owners of the means of production do not themselves require this cultural capital, having total possession of the real article, but the various classes employed in this production must again ‘prove’ their access to some form of capital in order to be sorted and slotted into the dominant roles within it. This forms what Bourdieu calls the field of cultural production, an arena of class struggle in which “agents wield strengths and obtain profits proportionate to their mastery of this objectified capital, and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital”.7

The Kims and the Parks have a starkly contrasting relation to these symbolic objects of cultural capital. Again, we can take the example of the scholar’s rock, which has a dual function. On the one hand, it is a superstitious charm, functioning ideologically within traditional Korean culture to mystify the real conditions of class mobility by appealing to belief in forces of good and bad fortune. This function within folk belief is likely the most familiar to the Kim family, and they generally treat it as such. Yet it is also an art object, a focus for aesthetic contemplation, and as such, it is an object of cultural capital. Sensing this in preparation for his increased status – his adjusted habitus – Ki-woo alludes to this function when he declares it to be ‘so metaphorical!’ He repeats this phrase in the presence of mother Park, Yeon-gyo, when she proudly exhibits her son’s abstract painting.

This demonstrates a growing awareness within Ki-woo of the distinctions which legitimate objects of cultural capital as such. In his study of French attitudes toward culture, Bourdieu observes “the tendency of the most deprived respondents to disguise their ignorance or indifference and to pay homage to the cultural legitimacy which the interviewer possesses, in their eyes”. 8The working-class aesthetic is, he says, a dominated aesthetic, but nevertheless one which is “obliged to define itself in terms of the dominant aesthetics”. If in France the dominant aesthetics is one of Kantian detachment, Bourdieu found that French workers granted a ‘purely verbal recognition’ of objects intended in this way as ‘pure’ art, acknowledging their legitimacy. When presented with photographs, his working-class participants explained them in terms of their intended audience and social use, rather than in the elevated and disinterested language of the upper classes. In other words, they had a practical knack for knowing what cultural objects appealed to whom and why, even when they are the excluded audience.

This bifurcation, an understanding from ‘below’ of what is for those ‘above’, is what enables the Kim family to ‘fake it ‘til they make it’ and assimilate into the Park household. There is nothing but insincere opportunism in Ki-woo’s appreciation of the scholar’s rock, or of the abstract painting. The same can be said of Ki-jung’s reaction when Yeon-gyo describes her son as ‘Basquiat-esque’. When the Kims design a business card for ‘The Care Premium’, a make-believe VIP service, to encourage the Parks to hire Chung-sook as a replacement maid, they know exactly how it should look: austere and minimalist. Yet their bluff is not quite complete. Moon-gwang, the former maid who was passed down like an heirloom from former owner and home designer Namgoong, notices they have no appreciation for the home’s sleek modernist interior, insulting them as ‘neanderthals’. (It is no surprise that Namgoong himself left for Paris).

For their part, the Park family, although undoubtedly wealthy, are not quite in full possession of the dominant aesthetic, due to the cultural effects of imperialism, though their reverence for it is fully sincere. They pepper their conversations with poorly-pronounced English phrases, in much the same way that mangled French passes through the lips of hapless Americans in the presence of those they are eager to impress. Almost all of their bearings on what passes for culture are derived second-hand from Western sources, down to the toys Da-woo plays with; stereotypical Native American accouterments, stamped with a seal of quality – made in the US (not China!). Bourdieu: “The petit-bourgeois … bows, just in case, to everything which looks as if it might be culture and uncritically venerates the traditions of the past. This pure but empty goodwill which, for lack of the guidelines of principles needed to apply it, does not know which way to turn, exposes the petit-bourgeois to cultural allodoxia, that is, all the mistaken identifications and false recognitions which betray the gap between acknowledgment and knowledge.” 9 We might add that, in South Korea, the petit-bourgeois bow also to everything Western.

Dong-ik, the Park breadwinner, is indeed a petit-bourgeois in this sense. He is an executive, but not an owner, and his family occupies a strata that is closer to the upper-middle than the very top. His relation to his domestic servants is one of anxiety, fearing that through over-intimacy and impropriety they may blur the boundaries which define them, or in his words ‘crossing the line’. To maintain this distinction, he doubles down on misrecognized differences – that is, those emerging from a kind of cultural false consciousness.

The Park family exemplify the ‘new petty-bourgeois’ moreso than the bourgeois proper

One of these is hygiene and in particular the sense of smell. This assertion of difference is by no means conscious and intentional, any more than turning one’s nose up at a bad scent. Bourdieu writes that “even when it is [not] inspired by the conscious concern to stand aloof from working-class laxity, every petit-bourgeois profession of rigor, every eulogy of the clean, sober and neat, contains a tacit reference to uncleanness, in words or things, to intemperance and improvidence”.10 Uncleanness has a special valence in South Korea, which has inherited a disdainful association between manual labor and filthiness from its Confucian neighbor. One scholar, in a study of South Korea’s urban middle class, that this association has been termed ‘3-D disease’, the ‘avoidance of manual labor … [because it is] dangerous, dirty and difficult’.11

This explains why Dong-ik’s wife performs almost no household chores, delegating even the simple task of grocery shopping to the Kim family. But it is the association with dirtiness that Bong brings to the foreground. To the Parks, the Kims all have a similar odor, compared to an old radish, a boiled rag, or more revealingly, the ‘special smell’ of those who ride the subway. Of course the Kim apartment is genuinely disgusting, and the Kims recognize it as the ‘semi-basement smell’. But it is not the smell itself which bothers the Parks; it is rather that this smell is a reminder of the Kims’ class origins, one which moreover does not obey boundaries. It ‘crosses the line’, wafting from Ki-taek to Dong-ik in the back seat. When Ki-jung leaves her panties in the back seat, leading Dong-ik to assume that his former chauffeur was having a drug-fueled sexcapade, that too was ‘crossing the line’. He is no puritan, as we can see when he later recreates this scene with his wife. “A young guy’s sex life is his own business”, he says; but why his car, in the back seat, where he sits? As an aside, it is notable that Dong-ik does not assume like most would, that panties left in the back seat of his car – with suspicion of drug involvement no less – might indicate sexual assault. Instead, he is disturbed by the possibility of drug evidence being found in his property, and his driver’s impropriety.

This male chauvinism is also a feature of the relations within the Park household and in particular the disparate treatment of Da-hye and Da-song. All the Park family’s hopes and aspirations are concentrated in Da-song, the wunderkind whose creative genius is midwifed into being by Ki-jung. It is Da-song who gets first dibs on a plate of ram-don, and when he refuses it is offered in order of importance, first to the dad and then to the mom, who finishes it off to Da-hye’s indignation. Da-song’s traumas, not hers, are worth shelling out for Ki-jung’s ‘therapy’, although Da-hye’s loneliness is evident in the alacrity with which she romantically bonds to her tutors. She is left inside the home while Da-song’s elaborate birthday celebration unfolds on the back lawn. Simply put, the family resources – both symbolic and actual capital – are spent on the son, at the expense of the daughter. This limiting, says Bourdieu, is done to ‘conform to the dominant representation of legitimate fertility […] procreation subordinated to the imperatives of social reproduction.’ 12 In South Korea, as in many Asian societies, there is a systematic preference for the male heir, and one suspects that the Parks would opt for selective abortion if their income did not afford them relative tolerance.

That they do not raise this male heir with tyrannical strictness is also, Bourdieu asserts, a characteristic of the ‘new petit-bourgeoisie’. The Parks are modern enough – that is, liberated enough – to adopt a therapeutic ethic toward Da-song, which ‘credits the child with a good nature which must be accepted as such, with its legitimate pleasure needs’. 13 This ethic moreover is a product that supplies the need for a class of specialists, and hence an opportunity for an ersatz ‘art therapist’ like Ki-jung.

Bong’s choice of title has driven the literal-minded to ask who the ‘parasite’ is. It is a silly question, but most are satisfied to name the Kims, the easy and obvious answer. If we assume subjectivist and idealist notions of free will, then this carries with it a kind of moral accusation; if we deny any contingency at all, then the relation between the Kims and the Parks is a permanently inscribed feature of social structures, and we have no right to complain. Bong, given his at least passing familiarity with Marxism, probably does not intend either horn of this false dilemma.

For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production is ‘organized around oppositions which reproduce the structure of the dominant class’, with the polarities dominant/dominated defining the other, unconsciously, through the judgment of taste.14The outcome of this struggle is a social map for which the division of labor is the territory. To navigate such a map, to organize its signs and symbols, is to also reinforce and invoke the very principle of its navigability. Such is the habitus, which is ‘not only a structuring structure … but a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes’.15

Thus we can see that the film’s pair of opposites, host/parasite, when placed into this context, are homologous to dominant/dominated. So long as the dominated does not break with misrecognition, and thereby becomes revolutionary, it can only survive and reproduce by defining itself through difference according to the schema already elaborated by the dominant, in this way upholding it. The Parks must find strangers to provide labor for their household economy because avoiding such labor is part of the cost of reproducing their class; thus the host is compelled to provide sites of attachment for their parasites. Neither Yeon-gyo nor Dong-ik provide the meals, the cleaning, the art therapy. Their judgment of taste is transparent to the Kims’ habitus, because it is legitimated by it; hence the host makes itself available to the parasite. So long as it does not ‘cross the line’, it goes unnoticed.

In fact, because both ‘host’ and ‘parasite’, as ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’, exist in a relationship of interdependency, their struggle tends toward reconciliation. Hence Ti-gaek ends the film not in victory but in repentance and seclusion, while Ki-woo dreams of ransoming his father by becoming a bourgeois. Parasite is neither pessimistic, nor optimistic, but in its own way realistic. As E.P. Thompson writes in The Making of the English Working Class, “Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition”.16 Complaints that Bong does not demonstrate the possibility of class consciousness are equally as unfounded as those that claim he asserts it too much. It is a clever satire, an absurd fable, but it does not give us answers, nor does it tell us there are none to be found. It only reminds us that we are all players on the field. How to abolish the field altogether is another matter entirely.

 

 

 

 

An Accumulation of Affect

Discourse related to the concept of emotional labor can highlight the way capitalism distorts our humanity or merely naturalize capitalism, argues Richard Hunsinger. 

I spend most of my days at a front desk, staring at a window with a grate over it. I watch the light change as the hours crawl. The room is an icebox, but since I am the first face anyone sees, I must be warm. My work can be summed up as an extra layer of emails that others must go through for scheduling with my superiors, processing payments, and ordering food and arranging rooms for meetings. I smooth out the tasks that others formerly had to do themselves. This role is designed to maximize the efficiency of the office functions of the organization. I have nearly perfected the process for email responses and calendar surveys, and reliably make payments on time. In down moments, I read the news or talk to people on Twitter. The 9-5 consistency and the chance to have the most pay I have ever been offered was something I knew I wanted, at least to avoid the precarity of other jobs. But between this schedule and living on the other side of town for lower rent, I’ve been kept from time with friends. The internet is often where I feel closest to anyone. I have never uploaded a picture to my work email because I am not there. 

Here and there, complications come up that ruffle the smoothness expected from my performance. Sometimes there is not enough food at meetings. People might want hotel rooms booked for a large group with less than a week in advance to a popular location, and to add extra people at the actual last minute. Often I am sent payment information with incorrect routing numbers, delaying the transaction. Important people show up for meetings hidden from my calendars, asking about details not shared with me. When they sense my confusion, their brows furrow. I smile and think of something charming to say, hoping to see the tension in their facial muscles relax. When these moments happen, I do what I can to assuage concern and I keep things going. 

The other day, this did not go as planned and food went pretty quickly. Someone important commented on my unsanitary handling of food. Others sat where it had been served, and getting more in the room ended up being difficult, so it was a distraction. My boss called me in for a meeting, asked what I thought went wrong, and gave me more precise directions on how to avoid this in the future. A professional development class is suggested. I am asked if I think this job is still a good fit for me. I think they are trying to see if I would quit on my own. There is a brief and quick flash of what I think is fear, as I immediately think of my rent, cost of food, other job prospects. That I am burdened with knowing these difficulties, while the present moment depends on me not betraying this, brings a lump to my throat, and I feel the pressure behind my eyes. Is this really about to make me cry? I hold it back, I smile, I assure them that I want to be successful. I take the notes down, I listen to suggestions for how I can order food better. I think about going home, and the next 5 hours until my partner gets home and I can see her again.

I realize that I am expected to perform an emotional ideal much of the time at my work. This has been true for all of my working life. This is not a unique experience in the life of the collective worker today and has given rise to a growing discourse on the subject of emotional labor. It spills out into new avenues of discussion of what exactly it comprises, and where the line between our exploitation and our personal lives exactly lies. In this discourse, it is not at all unusual to come across a wide range of positions, experiences, and reactions. Some attribute the discourse on emotional labor to an ideological basis, that this is simply a form of liberalism gone amok. There are those who see this as a symptom of the most recent, cogent reformation of capitalism’s development, neoliberalism and see it as a totality of marketizing emotional relations between social peers. This appears more accurate, yet more often than not glosses over exactly why the exploitation of labor now increasingly relies upon an assurance of the emotional presentation of the worker, and worse tends to display a tenuous grasp on what “neoliberalism” means except as a bogeyman for today’s ills. 

What I seek to achieve here is a grounding of emotional labor as such within the context of Marxist political economy. We must see the discourse surrounding this phenomenon as a process in motion interrelated with the development of labor’s exploitation in an economy that has seen a dramatic rise in its consumer service sector. This acts as an arena of exploitation where the laborer’s access to the wage is increasingly under the watchful eye of every consumer and supervisor. From this, we can see what the growth of emotional labor as a discursive regime reveals to us about the state of alienation in the development of capitalism of late.

We have to begin this analysis with the understanding that, as proletarians and wage-workers in a capitalist mode of production, we have nothing to offer in order to reproduce ourselves except our capacity to sell labor-power as a commodity to the capitalist. This labor-power, as a commodity, must possess both a use-value for its buyer and an exchange-value for its seller. The use-value here is the capacity to perform a given amount of labor within a given amount of time. We must do this in order to earn our wage, the exchange-value for labor-power expressed as a price. We do this in order to use said wage to purchase our means of subsistence, sold to us in commodity form. The key here is that, for the proletariat in a society where the capitalist mode of production prevails, a basic survival and a guarantee of some quality of life depends upon the capacity to sell labor-power and to find a buyer. We must search for a master even if there exists no desire for such. 

To this end, what is to be understood of the exploitation of emotional labor as pertains to the working life of wage laborers? Emotional labor is a term coined by Arlie Russell Hochschild, to give a name to the experience of the worker in managing, and through this, suppressing, their expressions and behavior in order to fulfill the emotional demands of a job. Hochschild finds three common elements to employment that require the use of emotional labor by the worker: “First, they require face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with the public. Second, they require the worker to produce an emotional state in another person — gratitude or fear, for example. Third, they allow the employer, through training and supervision, to exercise a degree of control over the emotional activities of employees.”1 

These can be seen every day in almost any job that requires some form of interaction between the worker and a consumer or superior. The use-value of labor-power as a commodity in these jobs is reliant upon the capacity of the worker to both give an emotional performance and induce a specific affect in those they engage throughout. The worker is alienated not only from their labor-power, but also from their genuine emotional expression. We need not look far to find examples in gig economy jobs, work supposedly “autonomized” by a decentralized coordination of services via app, many of which impose a customer ratings system for every transaction made.

This is made even more clear when taking into account the rapid growth of employment in the service sector, encompassing a wide variety of professions and requiring constant interaction with the public as consumers. The growth of employment in service-based industries is far outpacing that of employment in direct manufacturing and production in the United States, and is expected to keep doing so over the course of the next decade.2 The stability of the wage in US capitalism of today, and thus the use-value of labor-power, is increasingly reliant on a capacity of the worker to perform an emotional labor in transactions: satisfy the boss and constantly ease the conscience of the customer, thus reifying the commodity in its exchange, transforming it into money, and allowing for capital’s reproduction to proceed accordingly. Though in Hochschild’s original research, published in the early 1980s, she found a prevalence for this type of employment in the clerical office and retail-oriented work of what then constituted the so-called middle classes, she offers a prescient observation for the future of this phenomenon: 

“If jobs that call for emotional labor grow and expand with the spread of automation and the decline of unskilled labor — as some analysts believe they will — this general social track may spread much further across other social classes. If this happens, the emotional system itself — emotion work, feeling rules, and social exchange, as they come into play in a ‘personal control system’ — will grow in importance as a way through which people are persuaded and controlled both on the job and off. If, on the other hand, automation and the decline of unskilled labor leads to a decline in emotional labor, as machines replace the personal delivery of services, then this general social track may come to be replaced by another that trains people to be controlled in more impersonal ways.”3 

The US economic situation of today is one of a rapidly deindustrializing imperial core. As a site of capital-intensive production that has shed living labor from its processes and automated many jobs out of existence, US development to date has given rise to a growing relative surplus population whose primary objective as a labor force is the circulation and consumption of commodities through sale and purchase. The privileged position of the US as a site to capture extracted surplus value from more labor-intensive production chains in global peripheries no longer supports the buffer from class struggle that the construction of a middle class once provided. As capital accumulation has intensified and reached new limits that pose as barriers to capital’s expanded reproduction, more avenues for circulation must be opened up. Over the past 40 years, during what can be understood as the neoliberal regime of accumulation, even the imperial core has seen the slashing and gutting of social support services from governments. This has led to increased privatization of that which used to sustain a state-supported social reproduction of the workforce and a degree of class mobility in the so-called middle classes. This onset of privatization and the accompanying deregulation of the financial industry that aided it can be seen as a period where capital accumulation outstripped the limits on profitability imposed by state-supported services towards social reproduction, as the organization of capital and labor underwent structural transformations on a global scale.4

It is important to contextualize this historically. The very reason that we see growing awareness of the exploitation of emotional labor, the fundamental coercion of this performance, is structured by the wage relation in this specific historical trajectory. This moment brings us upon convergence between, on the one hand, a stagnant, deindustrializing manufacturing sector placing the US proletariat more and more into jobs involving interpersonal social interactions, and, on the other, an era where the social reproduction of the proletariat as a workforce has increasingly failed. The expectation of emotional performance in the work environment, as well as the increased dominance of working life over personal life to accommodate for decades of suppressed wage growth to maintain profitability5, has led to an exhaustion of emotional capacity in personal life. The awareness of this has become a defining characteristic to the way that we understand alienation in capitalist society today.

At the base of all processes of capital accumulation is a separation, as in Marx’s “primitive accumulation” and Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession,” that acts to form the constitutive social relation between classes of production for exchange that is capital. In the instance of the worker’s emotional capacity as use-value of the commodity labor-power, a further separation is occurring. No longer is it simply the alienation of the worker from their labor-power, but now from emotional expression in this capacity as worker. Affect is commodified, and its appropriation as such here is with the intent to subvert the emotional capacity of the worker to the aims of capital. But as stated above, in the context of this period of capitalism’s countertendencies to declining profitability deployed with an intensifying aggression, we are approaching a severe limit to capital’s reproduction process. To this end, the commodity of labor-power, now as a commodified capacity to provide emotional labor in working life, is pushed to a limit in accordance with the demands of capital’s continued reproduction, and only moves to continually reach beyond that limit as capital stands on the verge of another crisis once again. We, as an increasingly debt-encumbered proletariat, sense this crisis every day. Every day at work is another day we must bear a false smile and perform positive emotional well-being if we are to stave off the looming threats of eviction, starvation, and immiseration that losing our job entails. The alienation of ourselves from autonomy over our emotions as the use-value of emotional labor is thus not only for the benefit of any given customer, but for the stability of the whole of capitalist society.

This brings us to Hochschild’s ominous foretelling of a “personal control system” above, as we have seen this degree of social alienation drastically restructure social life today. Susan Willis posits in discussing the political economy of domestic labor, in the example of the use-value of the married mother at home that in this instance does not fold the laundry, “it is only the failure to create use-value that can be made visible.”6 For the use-value of emotional labor, it is vital that the veneer of the laborer’s emotional state exists for the smooth realization of commodity value in exchange, and thus accumulation, to proceed uninterrupted. The failure to provide this exposes a dissatisfaction that reveals that the worker’s emotional performance is just that, a performance, and exposes all to the coercive regimes of personal control that we are all subject to under a life structured by the need to work for a wage. To this end, we find ourselves simultaneously existing at the other end of Hochschild’s prediction, where now a growing number of service-related jobs are also being automated out of existence. We need look no further than the growth of cashier-less lines at grocery stores and commodities delivered by Amazon drones. These systems themselves will never be free of human labor, though they certainly train us to internalize the fact that under the domination of the class relation of capital all human life is effectively disposable. The exploitation of living labor is merely a problem of geographic reorganization to areas where another section of the proletariat will bear the burdens of production.

We are now faced with a situation where, on the one hand, we are under the duress of an increasingly alienated and impoverished social life. This is carried out in exploitation of increasing intensity that pits us smiling, unwillingly, in front of any passing stranger that wishes to make a purchase. We are thus less emotionally reliable than any machine that may take our place. On the other hand, capital can not exist without our pliable consent to its processes and must sustain us. But this is now only possible in an environment where we are increasingly deprived of the time for the most emotionally fulfilling, deeply personal moments necessary for our own reproduction. The immobility of this immanent contradiction to capital’s expanded reproduction has driven us to a new discursive terrain for emotional labor, as we are increasingly aware of the contradiction and its effects.

There is the understanding that emotional labor, as contextualized within the working environment, is coercion of sentiment from the worker to induce a specific emotional affect in the consumer. This is fundamentally different from the role emotion plays for us in daily life, untethered to the demands of a job. To a social life amongst people outside of work, the use of our emotions is to be of authentic expression, fundamental to all communication. The labor of emotion in a context free of the wage-relation is not inherently a coerced act but part of our metabolism with ourselves and each other in social life for our own ends, for both pleasure and pain alike. To experience this as alienated labor for the drive of capital is to subvert this to the demands of the economic dictums of a mode of production that sells us back to each other in dead, objectified forms.

There is also the reaction of those who see emotional labor as coercion in life outside of the wage: the application of an awareness of the exploitation of emotional labor as a process to be mediated through an exchange where one previously did not exist. This has resulted in the notorious phrase “venmo me for my emotional labor,” a phrase that today is not always clearly situated in a space of either sincerity or irony. Phrases like “venmo me for my emotional labor” tend to draw severe ire in many online circles, and I can be sure many reading this have witnessed and participated in moments where they’ve seen this phrase used. The phenomenon to which this is a reaction to is certainly real. As seen above, it is also clearly rooted in a material situation of the prevalence of the exploitation of emotional labor. However, the application of the framework of emotional labor to interpersonal communication outside of waged work, if it aims to be a position that seeks to challenge oppression, does so by further naturalizing capitalist social relations, and thus fails. 

It is certainly healthy and important to have emotional boundaries and to operate on the basis of consensual interaction in social life, but to do so by formalizing the emotional and making further transactional interpersonal experience amongst each other is to reify the customer-worker dynamic that prevails under wage labor. In the more vulgar iterations of this, we may see demands of monetary compensation for emotional labor. To seek to address emotional labor in this manner is to take up a rigidly economic line of reasoning that abandons the possibility of redeeming the social significance of the emancipatory use of our emotions for ourselves and each other while in the process merely affirming exchange-value as the basis for struggle and the measure of all value. There is no possibility here beyond a grafting of our exploited life onto the social, and falls prey to the same misgivings of those that call for the payment of labor its “full value” in the wage; a far cry from the emancipation of labor and the self-abolition of the proletariat, leading only to momentary placation until the next wage battle.

The quickness to invoke the issue of interpersonal emotional labor is, however, part of our collective rage at present — the era of human feeling being ripped from its bearers so we can buy and sell commodities more efficiently as the ship goes down once again. The displacement of this rage onto each other can appear a sound move, as such action amongst our own class is less prone to incur a retaliation that may have an immediate effect on needs such as food and shelter.  It is the condition of having to sell one’s labor for a wage to purchase these means of subsistence that stands as the primary cause of our emotional exhaustion. The hegemony of work-life prevents us from critiquing these conditions deeply; from realizing that the wage is a scam for a rote labor of performative friendliness, politeness, denial of our free-time, emotionally taxing work-relations of sociability, or, at worst, dealing with the verbally abusive treatment common to the service industry. It is all incredibly draining, and it is no wonder that this current discursive trend exists. Insisting on a transaction to mediate emotional support might be the most revealing symptom of the domination of capitalist social relations. But bearing resentment towards friends needing emotional support should be recognized as a symptom of this. It obscures the origin of our dissatisfaction in the domination of our lives by the irrational demands of capital. If you’re looking for a target for the rage, take on the boss, the landlord, the capitalist, and abolish their class, for it is only through this conquest and transcendence of the capital relation that we may see the end of this exploitation of our emotional labor.

Revolutionary Reels: Soviet Propaganda Film and the Russian Revolution

Shalon Van Tine provides an overview of Soviet Film and its development in relation to the politics of the USSR and Bolshevik Revolution. 

The Rise of Soviet Film

In 1896, the Lumière brothers visited Saint Petersburg to present their collection of moving pictures to a small Russian audience, marking the first viewing of film in Russia.1 The first film to be made in Russia was during the same year: a filming of the coronation of what would be Russia’s last monarch, Tsar Nicholas II.2 It would take nearly a decade for Russia to have its own film studio, and the advent of World War I slowed the influx of foreign cinema, leaving Russia to launch its own film industry instead of relying predominantly on foreign film distributors.3 Once established, Russia’s film industry grew, and, by 1914, about half of Russia’s urban population regularly attended the movies.4 

However, the Bolsheviks would revolutionize Russian cinema as leaders recognized the potential of film propaganda as a way to influence the political and social attitudes of the people.5 Vladimir Lenin clearly understood the power of film, as he stated, “Of all the arts, for us, cinema is most important.”6 The Bolsheviks nationalized the film industry in 1919, giving the People’s Commissariat for Education control over film production, with a mandate to use cinema to promote the Communist cause at home and abroad.

Before delving into Soviet film in particular it is crucial to first understand why film stood out as a key propaganda tool in the early twentieth century. Film was a new medium. While propagandistic images had been used in various ways throughout history, moving images offered something fresh. One of the most well-known tales in film history about the impact of film on early viewers is that, upon watching Lumière’s Arrival of the Train, audiences shrieked in horror at the train coming directly towards them from the background of the image.7 Even though this story may have been embellished, early audiences were intrigued by film’s ability to animate real-life imagery. Thus, film offered unprecedented realism beyond the traditional effect of pamphlets, posters, and even photography. Furthermore, since a majority of Russia’s population were illiterate peasants, film could reach a widespread audience who would not have responded as well to written propaganda.8

The Bolsheviks focused their film industry on promoting specific communist themes among the Russian people and around the world. Different times meant different goals. During the years from the 1917 Revolution to the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, Soviet propaganda adjusted to reflect the needs of the party in three periods: the Revolution, the Civil War, and New Economic Policy (NEP) (1917–1927); Stalinization, modernization, and the Great Purges (1927–1938); and the prewar, World War II, and postwar years (1938–1953). Over the course of these periods, Soviet film focused successively on the following key objectives: enshrining the ideals of the Revolution; solidifying the Bolsheviks’ version of history and justifying Bolshevik leadership; promoting international revolution and calling on workers everywhere to unite against their oppressors; demonstrating the power of the people working together; elucidating the concept of the “New Soviet Person” and of the cultural revolution; showing the ongoing struggle against class enemies; promoting the controversial policy and methods of collectivization; demonstrating how industrialization would improve the lives of ordinary people while bringing society closer to the communist ideal; and celebrating Stalin as the strong leader of the Russian people and justifying questionable means to protect the people from enemies foreign and domestic. In short, Soviet film propaganda evolved in both content and style to reflect the changing political goals of the party during these periods. 

Soviet Film Propaganda during the Revolution, the Civil War, and NEP

The tumultuous period from 1917 to 1927 began with a Tsar who ruled over the Russian Empire and ended with a Communist Party leader who exercised unrivaled control over the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). During this time, the Bolsheviks grew from being one of many political parties agitating for revolution into the only party—the Communist Party—which would wield power until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.9 These years would shape Soviet leadership and would see the development of a new, impactful style of propaganda film: Soviet montage.10 The radical filmmakers of these years would advance an innovative film style to capture the spirit of a revolutionary age.

The February Revolution of 1917 saw the collapse of the Tsarist government, which was replaced by the Provisional Government, in which power was shared between various political factions, chiefly through the bourgeois-dominated legislature, the Duma, and the councils of workers and soldiers, the Soviets.11 Alexander Kerensky, one of the leaders in the Duma who supported the February Revolution, rose to prominence in the Provisional Government and, after the July Days, became the effective head of state. The Provisional Government sought to balance the interests of competing factions of Russian society until elections for a constituent assembly could be held. In the meantime, it continued to honor Russia’s war commitment to the Allied Powers, seen by many workers and soldiers as a betrayal of the February Revolution, which had been precipitated largely by the fury of the hungry women of Petrograd who had had enough of the horror of World War I. 12 The Bolsheviks, who early in 1917 were just one of a variety of socialist workers’ parties, adopted the slogan “peace, land, and bread,” and by autumn 1917, they gained the majority in the Petrograd Soviet. The Bolsheviks argued for an end to dual power, embodied in the slogan “all power to the Soviets,” and they organized Petrograd workers to seize power from the Provisional Government in the October Revolution of 1917.13 The Bolsheviks declared the Soviets to be the sole organ of power, and thus began the Soviet Union, marking the first time in history that workers seized and held power for themselves. This momentous event would be celebrated in many Soviet films—first from the Bolshevik point of view, later with a Stalinist interpretation.

The Bolsheviks ended Russian involvement in World War I with a treaty in March 1918, but the fight to consolidate Soviet power had just begun. The Civil War broke out between the White Army of anti-communists and the Red Army of the Bolsheviks and their allies, such as the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, whose members would later be either absorbed or purged.14 In 1923, after years of fighting, social and economic upheaval, famine, brutal tactics to crush counterrevolution, conscription, nationalization of industries, crop seizures, and millions dead, the Bolsheviks achieved a ruinous, costly victory, and the future of Soviet communism and of all that they had fought for was far from certain. Lenin instituted the New Economic Policy (NEP), a “strategic retreat” from many of the communist policies of the Civil War and a partial, temporary reinstitution of a market economy.15 NEP probably saved the Soviet Union from economic disaster and allowed the Bolsheviks—renamed the Communist Party in 1918—to solidify their control.

During the 1920s, the Communist Party launched a great propaganda campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Russian people—and to stir workers throughout the world to revolution.16 Lenin, the preeminent leader of the Bolsheviks, died in 1924, and party leaders contended to fill the power vacuum. Stalin consolidated power within the party bureaucracy, and, by 1927, emerged as the head of the party. Stalin’s rivals, chief among them Leon Trotsky, were purged from the party, and their roles in history were often diminished or distorted in Stalinist propaganda.17 But in the years before Stalin crushed all opposition and stifled both political and creative freedom, groundbreaking master filmmakers, such as Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, and Vsevolod Pudovkin, invented an exciting Soviet cinema unlike anything produced in the world thus far. In the first Soviet decade, these innovators brought to the silver screen—and, thereby, to the world—the spirit of the Revolution and a vision of its fruits.

Sergei Eisenstein changed the way filmmakers edited film, and, in doing so, increased the excitement and effectiveness of propaganda film. Eisenstein was influenced by some of his Soviet contemporaries who were experimenting with film montage, which he referred to as the “dialectical process that creates a third meaning out of the original two meanings of the adjacent shots.”18 While there was some disagreement among Soviet filmmakers as to the most effective way to use montage, Eisenstein developed his own theories that proved to have an authoritative impact on propaganda films. His expert use of montage in Strike (1925) and Battleship Potemkin (1925) illustrated the powerful role that film could play in communicating the theory and ideals of the Revolution.

In Battleship Potemkin, Eisenstein created a dramatized version of the mutiny that occurred on the Russian battleship Potemkin during the 1905 revolution, engaging the viewer’s sympathies with exaggerated characters (one might call them “Marxist archetypes”).19 The film starts by setting the stage for revolt. In the “Men and Maggots” scene, Eisenstein introduces his viewers to his rapid style of cutting from image to image. The film shifts between shots of the distressed sailors and the spoiled meat to the maggots and the conniving expressions of the evil leaders.20 With this tactic, Eisenstein accomplishes two important things: he wins the viewer’s loyalty to the sailors and he establishes the Tsarist leaders as a force that must be eliminated. Eisenstein displays his montage techniques again during the “Drama on the Quarter Deck” scene when he cuts quickly from the commander’s orders to kill the sailors, to the faces of the distraught sailors, and then to the action shots of the chaos.21 With this style of fast-paced editing between images, Eisenstein establishes a sense of expressive panic and disorder to communicate his themes on both an intellectual and a gut level. Louis Giannetti notes on Eisenstein’s editing that “Eisenstein believed that the essence of existence is constant change. He believed that nature’s eternal fluctuation is dialectical—the result of the conflict and synthesis of opposites.”22 

The most effective and famous scene in Battleship Potemkin is the “Odessa Steps” sequence, in which soldiers march down the steps in an inhuman, almost robotic display of oppression, slaughtering droves of innocent people and culminating in a bloody massacre.23 One of the most powerful series of images is the distinction between the machine-like, faceless Cossacks pitted against the helpless Russian people, such as the mother holding the child walking up the steps towards the soldiers in a desperate, doomed plea for mercy. Eisenstein mastered the editing and the sound precisely so that the viewer felt a sense of panic and fear while being fed such formidable imagery.24 Battleship Potemkin became the film to capture the spirit of the Revolution—not just in Russia in 1905 or in 1917, but the universal Revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, international and timeless. To Russians it was a call to embrace the vision of communism; to workers around the world it was a call to follow the example of their brothers and sisters in Russia.

After the Bolsheviks’ costly victory in the devastating Civil War, they had to deal with the reality that the country faced severe social and economic problems.25 Russian society was fragmented, and the Bolsheviks needed to demonstrate the power of the people working together rather than through individual action. The portrayal of collective action—a cornerstone of communist ideology—is evident in many of the propaganda films of the 1920s. Eisenstein’s Strike begins with a quotation from Lenin: “The strength of the working class is organization. Without organization of the masses, the proletarian is nothing. Organized it is everything. Being organized means unity of action, unity of practical activity.”26 The film shows a workers’ strike in pre-Revolutionary Russia and the violent suppression of the strike by the capitalists, famously illustrated through Eisenstein’s montage of murdered workers and slaughtered cows.27 Throughout the film, the workers are shown working together in groups, not as individuals—so much so that individuals are hard to tell apart and receive almost no unique characterization. Strike served a couple purposes at the time. First, it called on workers worldwide to unite to throw off the yokes of their oppressors. Even though the Russian Revolution had already happened, the Soviet Union still had to promote unity among the proletariat. Second, it promoted a “continuing revolution,” that is, the expansion of an international proletarian brotherhood, rather than the “socialism in one country” of later years.28

The Bolsheviks needed to address another concern: justifying their continued leadership. The death of Lenin caused the Bolsheviks to worry about the exhaustion of the revolution, so they felt the need to continue to take advantage of the power of propaganda to keep those fires burning.29 These fears were tackled in both Vsevolod Pudovkin’s The End of St. Petersburg (1927) and Eisenstein and Grigori Aleksandrov’s October: Ten Days the Shook the World (1928). Both films were released near the ten-year anniversary of the Revolution, hence their propagandistic portrayal of the historical events and the Communist Party’s declaration that the films were intended to honor “the Bolshevik completion of the Russian Revolution.”30 In The End of St. Petersburg, audiences were reminded of the suffering of the Russian people before the October Revolution and the need for the Bolsheviks’ bold leadership.31 In October, Eisenstein and Aleksandrov place the Bolsheviks in the highest regard, showing them as righteous revolutionaries with the people’s mandate to overthrow the Provisional Government.32 Several scenes in October, particularly scenes involving crowds, are so realistic that they appear almost like documentary footage, blurring the line between history and propaganda.33 

In addition to casting the Bolsheviks as the heroic leaders of the proletariat, October is also a noteworthy example of rewriting history to portray Lenin, Stalin, and Stalin’s allies in a positive light while portraying Stalin’s enemies in a negative light. When filming began in early 1927, Trotsky was still a leader of the Communist Party, though he was already at odds with Stalin. By December 1927, at the Fifteenth Party Congress, Trotsky and his faction had been purged from the party.34 Stalin then stepped up his campaign to discredit Trotsky—not only by branding him a traitor in the present but also by falsely diminishing Trotsky’s important role in the October Revolution and in the Civil War. When it was not possible to eliminate Trotsky’s role entirely, he was instead made to look foolish, inept, or even traitorous in the retelling of historical events. At Stalin’s insistence, October had to be recut to remove most of Trotsky’s role in the portrayal of the October Revolution.35 Only one scene with Trotsky remains: at a meeting of the Bolsheviks, Trotsky is shown opposing Lenin’s brave plans to seize power in the name of the proletariat. Additionally, October emphasizes the role of individual leaders far more than the earlier Strike and Battleship Potemkin, marking the beginning of the shift from celebrating collective action to celebrating the great leader. Lenin becomes memorialized as almost godlike, and Stalin is cast as his chosen successor.

October displays yet again Eisenstein’s successful use of montage and powerful symbolism. An early sequence depicts the people tearing down a statue of the Tsar—his head topples, then the orb and scepter, then the arms, and then the whole statue falls. Later, when Kerensky’s imperial ambitions threaten the revolution, Eisenstein cuts to the statue sequence in reverse—the Tsar, piece by piece, flies back onto his pedestal.36 These images are quickly intercut with intertitles expressing the imminent need to save the Revolution from traitorous reactionaries.

Kerensky’s place in history is certainly open to debate. One could argue that Kerensky was an honest caretaker in a tight spot doing his best to balance the interests of many different groups in Russian society during a time of tremendous uncertainty. The Provisional Government was only supposed to be a temporary custodian until elections could be held for the constituent assembly in November 1917.37 Those elections were held, and while the Bolsheviks won 25 percent of the popular vote, they placed second to the Socialist Revolutionaries who got 40 percent of the vote.38 To the Bolsheviks in 1917, as well as to Stalin in 1927, Kerensky’s role was necessarily fixed as a villain—a traitor to the February Revolution who sided with the Western imperialist powers against the suffering people of Russia—and the only legitimate election was through the workers’ and soldiers’ Soviets, which had, in October 1917, chosen the Bolsheviks to lead the workers’ seizure of state power. 

Clearly, from the point of view of the party in 1927, these events required some finessing. The Bolsheviks could contend with some justification to be the representative of the urban proletariat by October 1917, and they chiefly relied on this constituency for their claim to power.39 Still, the Bolsheviks would look much better cast as heroic saviors of the people’s Revolution from the betrayal of a new Tsar (or a new Napoleon) than as one political party among many who seized an opportunity. To that end, the story of the Great October Socialist Revolution had to be told as the triumph of the people—led by the Bolsheviks—over the monarchical aspirations of a traitor—Kerensky. 

October demonstrated the Bolshevik fear that their Revolution would lead to a new Napoleon. In the film, the audience is shown flashes of Napoleon’s statue with cuts to Kerensky contemplating over a chessboard. Later, a similar scene cuts between images of Napoleon to Kerensky standing in a Napoleonic pose.40 The Bolsheviks had long been concerned that, after a successful revolution, a Napoleon-like leader might arise:

They had learned the lessons of history and had no intention of letting the Russian Revolution degenerate as the French Revolution had done when Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself Emperor. Bonapartism—the transformation of a revolutionary war leader into a dictator—was a danger that was often discussed in the Bolshevik Party… It was assumed that any potential Bonaparte would be a charismatic figure, capable of stirring oratory and grandiose visions and probably wearing a military uniform.41

The message of this sequence in October is clear and compelling: Kerensky was a would-be Bonaparte, and allowing him to remain in power would have been to surrender the promise of the February Revolution. Concurrent propaganda painted Trotsky in a similar light. Ironically, it was not Kerensky, Trotsky, or any other leader who became the dreaded Napoleon, but Stalin himself (an identity cemented in George Orwell’s Animal Farm)—which made it all the more essential to paint Kerensky in that role.42 

Soviet Film Propaganda during Stalin’s Revolution and the Great Purges

The years from 1927 to 1938 saw Stalin wield near-absolute power over the Soviet Union. To maintain control and crush dissent—real or imagined—millions of citizens were executed or sent to the Gulag where many died, and any group within the Communist Party which looked like it might form a faction was purged.43 Fear of attack from the West spread, and hoped-for revolutions in Germany and other Western nations failed. Stalin, therefore, shifted rhetoric and policy from the traditional Marxist aim of international proletarian revolution to “socialism in one country,” which bore a striking resemblance to nationalism, a very un-Marxist concept.44 In effect, this meant less talk about workers throughout the world and more talk of the Russian people—and of their heroic leader. The cult of personality around Stalin grew, and propagandists analogized to great leaders from Russia’s past, like Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible. If Stalin’s measures were iron-fisted, it was because Mother Russia was threatened by invasion, by spies, and by other class enemies.

The Soviet Union recognized that it was isolated, and that, if the communist ideal was to be achieved, the Russian people would have to do it themselves. The wave of European proletarian revolutions they had hoped for had not occurred. Modernization was a precondition for communism and necessary for defense against invasion, and, in 1928, Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan made modernization the Soviet Union’s top priority.45 There were three key components to this drive: collectivization, industrialization, and the cultural revolution.46 Collectivization meant modernization of agriculture. Peasant farmers were forced to reorganize their farms into kolkhoz (collective farms).47 Industrialization meant building many new factories, increasing output, and bringing backward agricultural practices into the machine age.48 The USSR wanted to beat the capitalist West at what the West did best, and the USSR knew this would require a herculean effort. Finally, if the Soviet people were to transform their nation and its production, they would also need to transform themselves. Illiterate workers and superstitious peasants would need to improve themselves: they must strive to achieve the ideal of the “New Soviet Person.”49 Propaganda was essential to show that these three aspects of modernization would improve life immediately (many films from this era include scenes simply showing machines at work, with a celebratory atmosphere) and would help to usher in the new age of communism.

Before Stalin took full control of the party, many Soviet propaganda films dealt with the themes of continuing the ideals of the Revolution, unifying the people, and preserving Bolshevik leadership. Films such as Vsevolod Pudovkin’s Mother (1926), Dziga Vertov’s Forward, Soviet (1926), Esfir Shub’s The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty (1927), and Alexander Dovzhenko’s Zvenigora (1928) all reminded the audience that the revolution was necessary and justified in order to continue towards the goal of communism.50 Some of these themes would continue into the Stalin years, but the focus shifted towards ideas about the “New Soviet Person,” the cultural revolution, and the continued fight against class enemies.51

This persistent battle against class enemies was evidenced in the propaganda films that emerged in the early years of Stalin’s leadership, most notably in Pudovkin’s Storm Over Asia (1928), which takes place in Mongolia circa 1918–20, and involves a struggle between indigenous Mongols—the oppressed people with whom the audience is meant to identify—and two class enemies: British imperialists and capitalists, and Buddhist priests and other Mongol elites. These class enemies work together to exploit the honest and noble people of the eastern steppe.52 In Storm Over Asia, Pudovkin promotes several themes of Soviet propaganda: the continuing, international spirit of the Revolution; the ongoing struggle against various class enemies, at home and abroad; and the need for modernization to lift the people out of the darkness of superstition and religion.

Two scenes mocking religion and priests are worth noting. Early in the film, a Buddhist priest says prayers over a sick man in a humble hut. The priest employs various superstitious trinkets and noisemakers to heal the sick man—not medicine, just idle noise. In thanks for this dubious service, a family member offers the priest a fur as a “gift for the temple.” When the priest decides that the gift is not valuable enough, he seizes a second fur. The son of the family (the main character in the film) tackles the priest, who ends up running away like a thief caught in the act and lucky to get away with his own hide.

Later in the film, there is a compelling sequence cutting between two scenes: preparations for a Buddhist festival and a British commandant and his wife dressing up to meet the Grand Lama at that festival. The festival shows priests dressing up in colorful, shiny, and “primitive” outfits; meanwhile, the proud British commandant dresses in his fancy and medal-clad uniform, his wife in a gown and jewels. Both sets of costumes require the assistance of servants. Intertitles are unnecessary: the message is clear that both the religious elites and the Western capitalists are class enemies, oppressors of the unpretentious, working people. As the British join the festival and make a grand entrance into the temple, Western pomp meets Eastern pomp, both meant to disgust the viewer. There is a moment of surprise when the Grand Lama—hailed as wise and revered by the priests—is revealed to be a baby sitting on a throne. A priest explains that, “Though the Great One does not speak, still he sees all, hears all, knows all.”53 The British commandant hesitates for a moment, and then bows solemnly. Again, the message is clear: the Western capitalists will play along with superstitious nonsense if their collaborators require it.

One of the most effective uses of montage in Storm Over Asia occurs in a key scene in which a British fur trader cheats the main character, a poor Mongol. A brawl ensues, and it ends with the Mongol pulling out a knife and cutting the dishonest trader’s hand. The Mongol runs off. The British fur trader holds up his bloody hand, which is followed by an intertitle reading, “Avenge the white man’s blood!”54 Pudovkin rapidly cuts between close-ups of the bloody hand, images of capitalists shouting for vengeance, and troops marching in. As the Mongols flee, Pudovkin shows a row of riflemen, weapons aimed, advancing on the people who flee before them. In the end, the British commandant announces, “If within twenty-four hours the criminal is not surrendered the entire population will be fined and punished by example.”55 The sequence ends on another shot of the soldiers aiming their rifles, preparing to fire. Taken literally, the sequence presents a choppy narrative, but it is meant as a visual argument demonstrating the arrogance and racism of the Western capitalists who “buy cheap and sell dear” and the ruthlessness of “those who guard the interests of capitalism.”56  

The fruits of modernization, and especially of collectivization, is the main theme of Eisenstein and Aleksandrov’s The General Line (1929). The film also tackles the need for the New Soviet Person to cast off the superstitions and backwardness of the old days. In The General Line, poor peasants with small farms are shown struggling due to drought. The peasants follow gaudy Orthodox priests, idols in hand, in a procession up to a hilltop. There the priests pray to heaven, asking for rain, while the peasants grovel in the dirt.57 Eisenstein cuts between the people groveling and sheep—thirsty sheep, panting mindlessly. The people catch a brief glimpse of hope when they see a cloud, but, alas, there is no rain, because the priests are frauds (and, of course, they are also exploitative class enemies).58 In the next scene, the peasant farmers have formed a dairy collective, and a new, shiny machine has arrived which efficiently churns milk into butter. The people are skeptical: they have been fooled before. They watch the machine work. An intertitle asks, “deception or progress?”59 As the machine churns, the people see that it works, and they rejoice in their newfound prosperity. Much of the rest of the film celebrates the workings of a collective farm with similarly happy results. Production of The General Line began before Trotsky was purged from the party, and so the film was reedited to eliminate any references to him. It was released under the appropriate title The Old and the New.60

The reality of collectivization fell far short of what was promised to the peasants, and it was a disastrous failure, largely responsible for famine and the deaths of millions.61 These embarrassing failures of the Communist Party’s policy made its defense in propaganda that much more important. Dovzhenko’s Earth (1930) celebrates life, death, the harvest, the power of the people working collectively, and the coming of the new world promised by the Revolution, all with striking visual poetry. It shows the clash of old and new—oxen versus tractor, class structure versus communism, religion versus atheism, and the individual versus the collective.62 The past is frequently contrasted with the imagined future, a future in which the proletariat’s work, joined with the power of the machine, would bring prosperity. Unlike the harsh reality of collectivization in the present, this beautiful film was intended to reassure the people of the new future that collectivization would (supposedly) soon bring them.

The key to the cultural revolution was the development of the New Soviet Person—a person who had shaken off the shackles of the old world (such as religion, superstition, and traditional bourgeois social values) and who embraced the new, modernized Soviet world. As Sheila Fitzpatrick explains:

The kind of renunciation that most interested Soviet authorities was when priests renounced the cloth. Such renunciation, if done publicly, provided dramatic support for the Soviet position that religion was a fraud that had been discredited by modern science. Signed announcements that a priest was renouncing the cloth “in response to socialist construction” appeared from time to time as letters to the editor of the local press during the Cultural Revolution.63

Whether such renunciations were real or coerced by Stalin’s operatives, they were useful in promoting the break with old values. These anti-religious themes are on display in films like Storm Over Asia, The General Line, Earth, and also in Eisenstein’s Bezhin Meadow (1937). In the film, a farmer, angry at the government, attempts to destroy the crops, and his son tries to stop him to protect the Soviet state.64 The father, an enemy of the state, is often shown alongside religious icons. Eisenstein provides a contrast between religion and modernization, between the old world and the new. The son is a prime example of the New Soviet Person: someone born into a new generation and free from the baggage of the old regime. These themes are also explored in Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera (1929), which has no narrative plot, but instead employs modernist themes of speed and movement, and documents the Soviet world of the new generation—a place where the confinements of the old world had withered away and industrialization had created a new, promising life.65

Soviet Film Propaganda in the Prewar, World War II, and Postwar Years

The period from 1938 to 1953 was, of course, defined by World War II—or, as it is known in Russia, the Great Patriotic War. The Nazi invasion devastated the USSR, which suffered more casualties than any other European country.66 Relations between the Soviet Union and the West improved temporarily as they joined against their common enemies, the Axis Powers. Film propaganda from these years focused on the war—as it did in other countries as well—and on Stalin himself, the great leader. Soviet films from the 1940s bear little resemblance to the brilliant montage of the 1920s. Different messages called for different film methods: instead of quick cuts, swift movement, and groups in action, these later films have longer takes showing brave individuals holding the line. The evolution of the work of the preeminent Soviet filmmaker, Sergei Eisenstein, demonstrates this shift: Strike and Battleship Potemkin (both 1925) focus on groups—the proletariat collectively is the protagonist—while Alexander Nevsky (1938) and Ivan the Terrible, Part I (1944) focus on individuals—one strong ruler is the protagonist.67 With these films, international socialism has been replaced by nationalism and totalitarianism. Gone is the battle cry “workers of the world, unite”; it is replaced with a call to follow the great leader Stalin and to defend Mother Russia against Western invaders. German soldiers are no longer class brothers—they are Teutonic Knights, come to pillage Russia.

Was the Revolution now complete, as Stalin claimed, or had it been betrayed, as Trotsky, Orwell, and others believed? If a filmmaker wanted his work to be seen, he had better take Stalin’s side, and make sure that any hint of criticism was very cleverly veiled. For example, whether or not Eisenstein intended Ivan the Terrible, Part II (1946) as a criticism, it was perceived as such, and it was not released until 1958. Not until the thaw following the death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev’s policy of destalinization would filmmakers, as well as musicians, writers, and other artists, find a little more freedom of expression.

Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky (1938), a great historical epic, depicts the thirteenth-century battle on the frozen lake, in which Alexander Nevsky led the Russians against the invading Teutonic Knights.68 Released in 1938, as Hitler was swallowing up Austria and the Sudetenland, it is no mistake that Eisenstein’s subject was a great Russian victory over German invaders. The film even ends with an explicit declaration that any who would attack Russia will be defeated, the warning painted across a vast throng of Russian soldiers. One of the Germans in the film even wears a design that highly suggests the swastika. The film was very successful in the Soviet Union, but Stalin pulled it from circulation in 1939 when he signed his pact with Hitler. Two years later, when Hitler invaded Russia, Alexander Nevsky went back into widespread circulation.

Alexander Nevsky is quite different from Eisenstein’s 1920s films. First, there is a shift in story-telling: whereas Strike, Battleship Potemkin, and October feature the proletariat collectively as the main character, in this film, Alexander Nevsky is the hero. The common people are still featured, but they support the great leader and follow his commands. This, of course, echoes the rise of Stalin as dictator. Second, gone is the fast-cutting of Eisenstein’s signature montage. This is at least partly due to Stalin’s insistence that the arts be accessible to the common public. Eisenstein had been severely criticized for being too artsy in his previously aborted film, Bezhin Meadow. For this film, Eisenstein was closely watched, and any “formalist” excursions were reined in by Communist officials. 

Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible is a two-part historical film about Ivan IV of Russia. Stalin commissioned the film because it emphasizes a single, strong leader: a Tsar from Russia’s autocratic history. “Socialism in one country,” effectively a nationalistic ideology, had completely replaced the international ideology of Marxism. Like Stalin, Ivan is an iron-fisted ruler only because he must be for the good of the Russian people. Russia is surrounded by foreign enemies, and is threatened from within by spies and scheming Boyars.69 At one point Ivan leaves Moscow, only to return when the people beg him to come back. The point is clear: in times of crisis, a strong leader is needed, and ruthless tactics are justified to protect the country and its people from enemies.70 

Part I won critical acclaim—even winning the Stalin Prize—but Part II was suppressed, and was only released after Stalin’s death during the Khrushchev thaw.71 Did Eisenstein depict Ivan as too terrible? Was there too much religious iconography? Was Eisenstein dabbling in too much experimental “formalism,” rendering his work unsuitable for the masses? It is unclear why Part II was suppressed, and also what Eisenstein’s true political views were. Regardless, both the content and the method of film had evolved dramatically from 1925 to 1946 to suit the changing needs of the Communist Party.

The Legacy of Revolutionary Soviet Film

During the Khrushchev thaw, censorship in the Soviet Union was relaxed somewhat, and Russian filmmakers had more freedom in their cinematic expression.72  Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev eased travel restrictions and created cultural festivals that allowed an influx of diverse works from writers, artists, and filmmakers to come into the Soviet Union. 73 Thus, Soviet cinema took new forms. For instance, Mikhail Kalatozov’s 1957 film The Cranes Are Flying tells a story of the Great Patriotic War, but instead of the prior patriotic Soviet take, the movie depicts the psychological damage of the war on the Soviet people, especially women.74 Similarly, Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1962 film Ivan’s Childhood also deals with the effects of World War II on the mind of a child.75 Soviet filmmaker Sergei Parajanov embraced this new artistic freedom in The Color of Pomegranates (1969), a picture that focuses on the life of a poet almost exclusively through experimental imagery.76 This period demonstrated the diversity of Soviet filmmakers, who began to focus on the personal and the psychological rather than the collective and the political.

While the films during the thaw went a variety of new directions, during the years from the 1917 Revolution to the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet film propaganda evolved in both substance and form to reflect the changing goals of the Communist Party. Soviet film went through three major periods during those years: The Revolution through the end of NEP, Stalin’s Revolution and modernization, and the Great Patriotic War years. The Communist Party focused on fundamental themes including memorializing the Revolution, rallying the international proletariat, celebrating Bolshevik leadership, uniting the people, promoting the politics of the cultural revolution, and justifying Stalin’s leadership and methods. Through the vivid power of film, great filmmakers promoted the changing policies of the Communist Party to audiences across Russia and throughout the world.77 

 

A Fight on Two Fronts: On Jean-Luc Godard’s La Chinoise

Doug Enaa Greene and Shalon van Tine discuss Jean-Luc Godard’s 1967 film La Chinoise in its historical context. 

Jean-Luc Godard’s La Chinoise (1967) is not an ordinary film. On the surface, La Chinoise seems simple enough: it tells the story of French students in the 1960s who form a Maoist collective, live together, have political discussions, and eventually turn to revolutionary violence. However, the film is difficult to follow since it not only lacks a coherent narrative structure, but the viewer is bombarded with slogans, images, and ideas on everything from popular culture to revolutionary politics. Anyone who attempts to analyze their meaning will easily feel buried by all the sights and sounds that Godard packs into it. Considering the chaotic nature of La Chinoise, the slogan found at the beginning — “We should replace vague ideas with clear images” — may well appear out of place, if not ironic.1

However, this slogan encapsulates what Godard attempted to achieve in La Chinoise. Godard wanted to overcome the distortions of bourgeois ideology that prevents the viewer from seeing the world as it truly is. To achieve this aim, he wanted film to be a medium of revolution. That meant he could not rely on the way film had customarily been produced, which was usually formulaic and promoted passivity instead of rebellion. In contrast to traditional cinema, Godard wanted to create a revolutionary art form that would break with bourgeois conventions and serve as a call to arms.

He accomplished this goal by drawing upon two major sources. The first source was German playwright Bertolt Brecht and his theory of “epic theater,” a method of political theater that forces the audience to actively engage with the ideas presented to them as opposed to passively consuming them. For Brecht, the theater should be an effective tool for getting viewers to see the world as it really is, as riven by class struggle. The second source was Maoism, which gained popularity among French intellectuals during the 1960s and appeared to advance a revolutionary alternative to the stagnation found in Soviet communism. It was the impact of Maoism in the radical imagination that offered Godard an appreciation of Third World revolutionary struggles, a sophisticated theory of ideology and conjuncture mediated through the work of philosopher Louis Althusser, and the need to politicize culture in service of the revolutionary cause. While his earlier films began to toy with some of these concepts, it is in La Chinoise that Godard’s vital mix of Brechtian aesthetics and Maoist ideas is most fully realized. 

Becoming Godard

Godard’s personal development contributed to his interaction with film later in his life. He grew up in a cultured home where reading literature aloud was a normal form of entertainment.2 As a child, he rarely went to the movies. Rather, he preferred to read philosophy, cultural theory, and the classics.3 His first attachment to cinema came from French intellectual André Malraux’s essay “Sketch for a Psychology of the Moving Pictures,” which made connections for him between film, literature, and theater.4 When Godard attended university, he studied under Brice Parain, a French philosopher whose work revolved around linguistics, communism, and existentialism.5 Later, Godard moved into the world of cinema, first as critic, and then as director. Godard would eventually quote Malraux and Parain’s ideas about the linguistic and political possibilities of film in one of his earliest essays “Towards a Political Cinema.”6 It comes as no surprise, then, that Godard’s philosophical and literary training prepared him for a whole new approach to film.

Along with his contemporaries, Godard was one of the key innovators of the French New Wave, a film movement that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. New Wave directors strayed from traditional film form by experimenting with editing and narrative techniques, giving homage to classic cinema, and using film for social commentary, especially as it applied to the younger generation.7 Many of the New Wave directors were intellectually tied to Cahiers du Cinéma, one of the first journals to analyze film as a serious art form. These filmmakers would later channel their theories and appreciation of cinema into their own movies.8 

In 1960, Godard released his first film, Breathless (À bout de souffle).9 Breathless is most remembered for its use of jump cuts, an editing technique where two shots are filmed from slightly different positions, giving the viewer a fragmented sense of time.10 Long before figures like filmmaker Quentin Tarantino referenced pop culture in his movies, Godard initiated this practice, paying tribute to Hollywood and classical music in all his early films. Godard also relied upon character asides, where characters break the fourth wall and speak directly to the audience.11 This theater technique forces the viewer to participate in the action within the film rather than passively observe it. 

Godard continued to challenge cinematic conventions with his early films, eventually incorporating more experimental techniques into his movies that gave him his signature style. As he became more politically involved, he looked to cultural theorists for aesthetic inspiration and attempted to renovate the language of cinema altogether.12

The Language of Cinema

As film director François Truffaut said, “There is cinema before Godard and cinema after Godard.”13 Before Godard, cinema had a traditional language and narrative structure that moviegoers had come to expect. Godard revolutionized filmmaking by upending the traditional storytelling techniques and cinematic language in the hopes of transforming film into a revolutionary art form.

By the 1960s, Godard believed that the majority of films were formulaic products that promoted consumerism and complacency, not revolutionary consciousness. In making this assessment, he was influenced by the ideas of Frankfurt School theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s analyses of the culture industry. Adorno and Horkheimer argued: 

Culture today is infecting everything with sameness. Film, radio, and magazines form a system. Each branch of culture is unanimous within itself and all are unanimous together. Even the aesthetic manifestations of political opposites proclaim the same inflexible rhythm… All mass culture under monopoly is identical… Films and radio no longer need to present themselves as art. The truth that they are nothing but business is used as an ideology to legitimize the trash they intentionally produce.14

Often misunderstood as elitist or pessimistic, Adorno and Horkheimer criticized the ways that the culture industry mass-produced entertainment products for the sole purpose of profit. Mainly, they aspired to understand why the oppressiveness of capitalism did not spur revolution as Marxists before them had hoped. As they argued, the culture industry purposely suppresses people’s inclination to revolt by ensuring they have plenty of consumable products that are both easily pleasurable and familiar. After all, the culture industry is a business—a profit-motivated behemoth—so all products are designed with the intent to maintain the status quo, not stimulate revolutionary thinking.

Regarding Hollywood directors, Adorno and Horkheimer quipped, “Published figures for their directors’ incomes quell any doubts about the social necessity of their finished products.”15 Agreeing with this analysis, Godard accused the film industry of being “capitalism in its purest form,” and he argued that there was “only one solution, and that is to turn one’s back on American cinema.”16 Godard wished to counter this psychological hold by the film industry (or as he called it, “The Hollywood Machine”) with a new cinema that was innovative, challenging, and hopefully, revolutionary.17 To do so, he needed to change the very language of cinema itself.

Godard eventually began referring to his movies as “essays,” saying, “I don’t really like telling a story. I prefer a kind of tapestry, a background on which I can embroider my own ideas.”18 Engaging with the semioticians Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, Godard saw film as a sign system, or as film critic James Hoberman claimed, Godard was “the first filmmaker to perceive film history as a text.”19 This approach is evidenced in the ways that he spliced images with intertitles and dialogue as if he was making a philosophical argument rather than telling a story. However, Godard took issue with some of the prevailing structuralist views on cinema, considering them too rigidly focused on universal symbolism. In one heated debate about semiotics within film, Godard yelled at Barthes, declaiming “We are the children of the language of cinema. Our parents are Griffith, Hawks, Dreyer, Bazin, and Langlois, but not you!”, and questioning whether one can “address structures without sounds and images”.20

In contrast to the films produced by the culture industry, Godard resisted the traditional film language by creating mostly plotless films with emotionless characters, often breaking the fourth wall to conduct a political rant or in dialogue that would be interrupted by the intrusion of unrelated images or voice-over commentaries.21 As film professor Louis Giannetti describes, these tactics remind the viewer that the film is “ideologically weighted” and that the audience “should think rather than feel, analyze the events objectively rather than enter them vicariously.”22 These methods allowed Godard to consider his films as treatises—not just as artistic creations, but as mediums for conveying a grab-bag of aesthetic and theoretical ideas. As English film theorist Peter Wollen explains:

There is no pure cinema, grounded in a single essence, hermetically sealed from contamination. This explains the value of a director like Jean-Luc Godard, who is unafraid to mix Hollywood with Kant and Hegel, Eisensteinian montage with Rossellinian realism, words with images, professional actors with historical people, Lumière with Méliès, the documentary with the iconographic. More than anybody else, Godard has realized the fantastic possibilities of the cinema as a medium of communication and expression. In his hands, as in Peirce’s perfect sign, the cinema has become an almost equal amalgam of the symbolic, the iconic, and the indexical.23

For Godard, the language of cinema could be used as a powerful tool to get across ideological concepts that were more difficult to convey in an established, linear format. The epitome of this shift is seen in La Chinoise, which makes the case against the conventions of bourgeois culture and in favor of a revolutionary culture though dramatic visual fashion. 

For instance, in the film’s second act, Guillaume, one of the militants, stands in front of a chalkboard. On the board are scribbled a couple dozen names of philosophers, writers, filmmakers, and artists. In the background, Kirilov, another militant, lectures on the purpose of art for the communist cause while Guillaume erases each their names one by one: Voltaire, Cocteau, Goethe—each eliminated leaving only one name: Brecht. Kirilov argues that the last century of artistic production has shifted from the creation of art-for-art’s-sake to “art as its own science.”24 Using poet Vladimir Mayakovsky and filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein as examples of those “fighting for a definition of socialist art,” Kirilov asserts that art is no longer merely an attempt to represent reality, but is rather a social and political force that creates or reveals reality, or, as he puts it, “art doesn’t reproduce the visible—it makes visible.”25 

A key premise in Kirilov’s argument is that art is language that effects change or uncovers hidden truths. Those who resist this notion do so under the false pretense that the language of art is incomprehensible. Yet he points out that it is actually society itself that is “hermitic and closed up,” and that traditional political discourse is “the poorest of languages as possible.”26 Drawing upon the ideas presented in The Order of Things, Godard uses Kirilov’s lesson to expound on philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of the episteme, the body of thought that shapes the knowledge of an era. For Foucault, standard language is wrapped up in the classical episteme, where ideas are subject to taxonomical representations. But the modern episteme embodies new linguistic conventions that transcend older paradigms.27

Take the end of Kirilov’s lecture, for instance. He notes how the formalists demand specific techniques that adhere to long-held artistic rules: “Use only three colors. The three primary colors: blue, yellow, and red. Perfectly pure and perfectly balanced.”28 Godard uses these primary colors heavily in the film, but they are displayed in an ironically unbalanced way as if to blatantly ridicule traditional aesthetic form. Kirilov continues, saying that the aesthetic image is untrustworthy, that one must consider “the position of the seeing eye, the object seen, and the source of light” when evaluating a visual idea.29 Godard, through Kirilov, is applying semiotic language to artistic analysis. Godard focuses not just on the artwork itself, but he also places equal importance on perception. In other words, aesthetic analysis cannot be limited to the art object itself, but must include the perspective of the viewer. And in true Maoist fashion, Kirilov concludes his lecture by paraphrasing the Great Helmsman: “In literature and in art, we must fight on two fronts.”30

The types of arguments made throughout La Chinoise could not be conveyed as effectively through a standard style of filming, which was committed to upholding the dominant ideology. Instead, Godard manipulated the language of cinema to challenge the prerogatives of bourgeois ideology and promote socialist politics.  

Brecht and Socialist Theater 

Politics have always played a role in the theater, but political theater took new form in the twentieth century. Rather than simply remaining an outlet for social commentary, theater became a medium for political action. Communist revolution spurred agitprop within the arts, but this style often made characters flat and unrealistic. Brecht instead created a sophisticated political theater (which he deemed “dialectical theater”) that conveyed Marxist ideas and forced the audience to face the realities presented to them.31 As he noted:

Socialist Realism means realistically reproducing the way people live together by artistic means from a socialist point of view. It is reproduced in such a way as to promote insight into society’s mechanisms and motivate socialist actions. In the case of Socialist Realism, a large part of the pleasure that all art must inspire is pleasure at the possibility of society’s mastering human fate. A Socialist Realist work of art lays bare the dialectical laws of movement of the social mechanism, whose revelation makes the mastering of human fate easier. It provokes pleasure in their recognition and observation. A Socialist Realist work of art shows characters and events as historical and alterable, and as contradictory. This entails a great change; a serious effort has to be made to find new means of representation. A Socialist Realist work of art is based on a working-class viewpoint and appeals to all people of goodwill. It shows them the aims and outlook of the working class, which is trying to raise human productivity to a tremendous extent by transforming society and abolishing exploitation.32

Brecht felt that the classical view of theater as catharsis left the audience complacent and indolent. He wanted the audience to think critically about exploitation, oppression, and class struggle. As opposed to the dramatic techniques of the past, epic theater reminded the viewer that the play is merely a representation of reality rather than reality itself, and thus the reality presented could be changed, making theater a catalyst for revolutionary action.

Godard was strongly influenced by Brecht’s theories and used them in his films, particularly his concept of verfremdungseffekt, or the alienation effect. Brecht described the alienation effect as performing “in such a way that the audience was hindered from simply identifying itself with the characters in the play,” and that the viewer’s “acceptance or rejection of their actions and utterances was meant to take place on a conscious plane, instead of, as hitherto, in the audience’s subconscious.”33

Godard employs the alienation effect frequently in La Chinoise by making his characters speak directly to the audience and juxtaposing seemingly unrelated imagery side-by-side. Take the scene in which Guillaume, after arguing that revolutionaries need “sincerity and violence,” looks directly at the camera and says, “You’re getting a kick out of this. Like I’m joking for the film because of all the technicians here. But that’s not it. It’s not because of a camera. I’m sincere.”34 Guillaume continues to address the viewer by explaining what “socialist theater” is by telling a story about Chinese students protesting in Moscow. In this story, one student approached the Western reporters with his face covered in bandages, yelling, “Look what they did to me! Look what the dirty revisionists did!” When the students removed the bandage, the reporters eagerly awaited a cut-up face of which to take sensationalist photos. But when the bandages were removed and the student’s face was fine, the reporters became angry saying, “This Chinaman’s a fake! He’s a clown! What is this?!” But the reporters did not realize the significance of the demonstration. Guillaume explains: “They hadn’t understood. They didn’t realize it was theater. Real theater. Reflection on reality. Like Brecht or Shakespeare.”35

Godard also applied Brecht’s theories on theater by either confronting the audience directly or interrupting the natural narrative flow. In one instance, Godard turns the camera directly on the viewer, creating an uneasy sense of self-reflexivity as if it is the viewer who is being filmed and questioned. As writer Susan Sontag claimed, this tactic was Godard’s way of “effectively bridging the difference between first-person and third-person narration.”36 Additionally, most scenes in La Chinoise layer seemingly unrelated images on top of one another, forcing the audience to critically examine their meaning. For example, one scene shows a decrepit Christ statue against the recurring motif of a shelf displaying Mao’s Little Red Books while a disembodied voice pleas, “God, why have you forsaken me?” only to be answered by another faceless voice: “Because I don’t exist.”37 In another instance, Guillaume lectures on the importance of “seeing the inherent contradictions” in analyses of the revolutionary situation, while the camera focuses on Véronique, copy of Peking Information in hand, against a background of fashion magazine advertisements. This tactic of juxtaposing rebellious youth against culture industry images was used frequently by Godard as a way to demonstrate the contradictory nature of student activists during the 1960s — or as he called them, “the children of Marx and Coca-Cola.”38

Another technique Brecht used was interrupting his plays with seemingly unconnected songs or stage directions. Godard took up this approach as well, often placing intertitles or music unexpectedly in the middle of scenes. Consider the scene where Véronique intensely studies Maoist theory as the radio plays a satirical pop song with the lyrics “Johnson giggles and me I wiggle Mao Mao,” or the way that Godard inserts a Baroque concerto in between discussions about revolutionizing old art forms.39 Brecht and Godard both understood the power of contrast in political imagery, and they compelled their audiences to find connections amidst the contradictions. 

Consider too the various scenes within the film where Véronique and Yvonne act out skits about American imperialism or the Vietnam War. These miniature plays-within-a-play at once parody both the contemporary events being acted out and the actions of the characters themselves. These scenes were also Godard’s way of employing the Brechtian technique of spass, literally translated as “fun.”40 By including comedic bits in between serious political rhetoric, making sense of the commentary is left up to the audience. In other words, Godard makes the audience work for their understanding of the ideas rather than passively absorbing them. 

Godard’s attempt to make La Chinoise his version of socialist theater is most realized in the larger story itself. The film is loosely based on Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Demons, which follows five disgruntled radicals who plot to overthrow the Russian regime through insurrectionary violence. The radicals hold meetings to flesh out their various ideological positions, yet these gatherings often turn into pissing contests or merely the recitation of empty platitudes.41 Dostoevsky suggests that the radicals are idealistic and hubristic, and that revolution will inevitably fail. 

It is curious, then, that Godard would choose this story as the basis for La Chinoise. Dostoevsky’s critiques stemmed from a conservative position, yet Godard was a staunch Marxist (from 1968 onward) and a strong supporter of revolutionary student movements. Throughout the film, the characters are portrayed as being serious in their objectives but also childish in their approach. One could deduce that Godard intended this foundational storyline as a warning: revolution is indeed necessary, but it requires discipline and maturity. 

Godard’s innovations in cinema reflected his desire to make the screen a vehicle for socialist politics. As his personal politics continued to move leftward, his filmmaking became increasingly political as well. For Godard, the cinema was more than just an art form—it was becoming for him a mode for revolutionary action.

Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win

a. Power to the Imagination

It was not just Brecht who informed Godard’s ideas, but those of Mao. Like the characters in La Chinoise, Godard was caught up in a Maoist revolutionary fever that was shared by many French intellectuals and students during the 1960s.42 Godard’s Maoist commitment went beyond cinema. Three years after the film was released, Godard was involved in the French Maoist movement. When the Maoist publication La Cause du Peuple was banned by the French government and its editors in the spring of 1970, Godard helped to collate the paper while the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre took over as editor. Godard was willing to risk arrest in service of the revolutionary cause. 


According to Maoist philosopher Alain Badiou, this period was a “red decade” that

stemmed from the intellectual effect of the Sino–Soviet ideological conflict and the Cultural Revolution, and was followed decisively by the events of May 1968 and their aftermath. Its watchwords were those of Maoism: direct joining of forces by intellectuals and mass workers; ‘it is correct to revolt’; ‘down with the bourgeois university’; ‘down with the PCF revisionists’; creations of autonomous organisations in the factories against the official unions; defensive revolutionary violence in the streets against the police; elections, betrayal; and so on. Everyday life was entirely politicised; daily activism was the done thing.43

Indeed, revolution truly seemed to be in the air.

However, in an ironic twist, this new French adherence to Maoism and the Chinese Revolution was coupled with a profound ignorance of its practice in the East. When it came to the reality of Maoism in China, most French radicals preferred viewing the experience through rose-colored glasses.44 As historian Richard Wolin observed, for French radicals, “Cultural Revolutionary China became a projection screen, a Rorschach test, for their innermost radical political hopes and fantasies, which in de Gaulle’s France had been deprived of a real-world outlet. China became the embodiment of a ‘radiant utopian future.’”45 

In other words, for many French leftists, the importance of Maoism was its myth. For example, the Maoist activist Emmanuel Terray recognizes that his comrades embraced a myth, but does not disavow his political past:

I was like many others a fervent partisan—from France—of the Cultural Revolution. But I don’t consider this to be a regrettable youthful error about which it would be better to be silent today, or, on the other hand, to make an ostentatious confession. I know today, of course, that the Cultural Revolution we dreamt about and that inspired part of our political practice didn’t have much in common with the Cultural Revolution as it was lived out in China. And yet I am not ready to put my former admiration into the category of a mental aberration. In fact, the symbolic power of Maoist China operated in Europe at the end of the sixties independently of Chinese reality as such. “Our” Cultural Revolution was very far from that, but it had the weight and the consistency of those collective representations that sociology and anthropology have studied for so long.46

Similar to Terray and other French Maoists, Godard’s Maoism was not so much about the reality on the ground in China, but rather acted as a mobilizing myth to inspire and formulate a new revolutionary, democratic, and egalitarian politics.

b. The Stormcenters of Revolution

By the mid-1960s, it is no accident that Godard looked to Mao Zedong, the Chinese Revolution, and the Third World as a source of inspiration. For a generation of young revolutionaries, like the Maoists portrayed in La Chinoise, the Algerian War was a watershed event that proved both the French Communist Party and the USSR were insufficiently anti-imperialist.

From 1954 to 1962, France fought a brutal war against the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, which was characterized by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the widespread use of torture by the French Army.47 The war brought down the Fourth Republic, led to the return of Charles de Gaulle to power, and brought France to the brink of civil war. According to Marie-Noelle Thibault: 

The Algerian War opened the eyes of a whole generation and was largely responsible for molding it. The deep horror felt at the atrocities of the colonial war led us to a simple fact: democracies are imperialist countries too. The most important feature [was that] political action, including support for national liberation struggles, was conceived of as a mass movement.48 

No doubt the Algerian War shaped the anti-imperialist worldview of future Maoist cadre.

The Maoists would have been familiar with the behavior of the French Communist Party (PCF) during the war. When the war began, the PCF offered only tepid solidarity to Algeria, preferring a negotiated settlement and condemning the actions of the FLN as terrorism. Two years later, the PCF voted in favor of granting emergency powers to the government, which allowed France to send troops to Algeria. Eventually, the PCF came around to supporting Algerian independence, but their support was lukewarm and half-hearted at best. The PCF position on Algeria gave the Maoists in La Chinoise plenty of ammunition for denouncing the party as revisionist.

This gulf between the PCF and the French Maoists is vividly on display in La Chinoise. When Henri defends the PCF line of a peaceful transition to socialism and defense of the USSR, he is denounced and heckled by his comrades as a counterrevolutionary and a revisionist. Eventually, Henri is driven from their cell. To the Maoists, there could be no peaceful coexistence under the same roof between revolutionaries and revisionists. They remembered how the PCF and USSR failed to support the struggle in Algeria and to intervene in the then- ongoing Vietnam conflict.

The PCF’s caution on Algeria opened up space for a new generation of leftists or “gauchists” to lead opposition to the war. These gauchists ranged from future Maoists, Trotskyists, and independent leftists such as Sartre and Francis Jeanson (who played himself in La Chinoise, debating political violence with Véronique, acted by real-life student Anne Wiazemsky). These gauchists encouraged draft resistance in the French army, passed out leaflets in support of the FLN, and conducted mass demonstrations that were met with violence. Some, such as Jeanson and the Trotskyists, went further by smuggling arms and funds to the FLN.49 To the PCF, the leftists’ actions were beyond the pale, and the party 

rejected the “harmful” attitudes of gauchiste [leftist] elements who had preached insubordination, desertion, and rejection of the very fundamentals of the national community and the national interest of the working class in peace. Their irresponsible actions, the party argued in 1962 and in 1968, had only served to assist the policies and the provocations of the Gaullist regime and the ultras.50 

During the Cultural Revolution, when Mao asked where the capitalist roaders were located, he answered: in the Communist Party. Many French Maoists saw this warning confirmed in the PCF’s behavior,  as they played an increasingly bourgeois role (whether during the Algerian War, or in 1968, when the party stood with the French state against a student-worker general strike).

Unlike the PCF, who saw themselves as French communists and defenders of the republican tradition, the reality of the Algerian War spotlighted for the far left the hypocrisy between France’s official humanist and universalist proclamations of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and the reality of colonialism. As Sartre eloquently put it in his preface to Frantz Fanon’s Wretch of the Earth:

First, we must face that unexpected revelation, the strip-tease of our humanism. There you can see it, quite naked, and it’s not a pretty sight. It was nothing but an ideology of lies, a perfect justification for pillage; its honeyed words, its affectation of sensibility were only alibis for our aggressions. A fine sight they are too, the believers in non-violence, saying that they are neither executioners nor victims. Very well then; if you’re not victims when the government which you’ve voted for, when the army in which your younger brothers are serving without hesitation or remorse have undertaken race murder, you are, without a shadow of doubt, executioners. And if you chose to be victims and to risk being put in prison for a day or two, you are simply choosing to pull your irons out of the fire. But you will not be able to pull them out; they’ll have to stay there till the end. Try to understand this at any rate: if violence began this very evening and if exploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth, perhaps the slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But if the whole regime, even your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by a thousand-year-old oppression, your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppressors.51

Once the Algerian war ended, this experience shaped a new generation of leftists (including future Maoists) in understanding the connection between anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. By the mid-1960s, the Third World appeared to many leftists to be a “storm center of revolution” with anti-imperialist movements, often led by Marxists, leading struggles in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. To the Maoists in La Chinoise, the following expression of Mao would have seemed a simple statement of fact: 

There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying: “Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind.” I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.52

Vietnam was like Algeria—a small David defying the American imperialist Goliath. The victory of the Vietnamese could only enhance the prospects for world revolution, so their struggle, like that of Algeria, must be supported. In La Chinoise, the Maoists recognized the progressive character of the Vietnamese struggle by repeating a quotation from Mao: “All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars.”53

In the film, the characters note the different response of the Soviet Union and China to the Vietnam War. In this disparity, the Maoists believe they see what separates the real communists from the revisionists. As Guillaume notes in a lecture devoted to the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union is not supporting the Vietnamese, but is more interested in making deals with the United States. He believes this proves that 

there are two types of communisms. A dangerous one, and one not dangerous. A communism Johnson must fight, and one he holds out his hands to. And why is one of them no longer dangerous? Because it has changed. The Americans haven’t. They’re an imperialist power. Since they haven’t changed, then it’s the others who’ve changed. The Russians and their friends have become revisionists that the Americans can get on with, while the real communists that haven’t changed need to be kicked in the face. That’s what Vietnam’s about. Whether intentionally or not, both the Russians and Americans are fighting the real communists, in China. That’s the general conclusion.54

While Vietnam, like Cuba, was a source of inspiration and action for sixties leftists, they remained firmly allied to Moscow. By contrast, China and Maoism openly challenged the Soviet Union for leadership over the international communist movement by presenting a revolutionary alternative. In contrast to the Soviet line of upholding the international status quo, the Chinese preached that there could be no “peaceful coexistence with imperialism” (though in actuality, Chinese foreign policy was more characterized by cynical realpolitik):

It is one thing to practice peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. It is absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practicing peaceful coexistence to touch even a hair of each other’s social system. The class struggle, the struggle for national liberation and the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries are quite another. thing. They are all bitter, life-and-death revolutionary struggles which aim at changing the social system. Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country.55

The appeal of Maoism was not only that Mao was anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, but because the Chinese Revolution appeared to offer a living example of renewing communism compared to the exhausted Soviet model. Maoism also offered a coherent worldview that linked anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism, showing that all are involved in the same struggle against imperialism, whether in France, Algeria, or Vietnam.

The Maoist call for revolutionary struggle against imperialism—as opposed to cutting deals—found receptive ears among communists throughout the world, including the students in La Chinoise. In fact, the response of French leftists to the Vietnam War appeared to follow the same pattern as during the Algerian War. The PCF anti-war group Mouvement de la Paix presented uninspiring slogans of “Peace in Vietnam,” while conducting no militant work in the factories, the schools, or the streets. It seemed more concerned with maintaining its respectable image and winning votes than effectively opposing the Vietnam War. By contrast, the Maoist UJC (M-L), who organized around Comite Vietnam de base, openly called for “FNL Vaincra” (“Victory for the Vietnamese Liberation Front”). More than their respective slogans, the Maoist anti-war movement conducted a very different politics than the PCF by undertaking direct action and organizing not only on the campuses, but in the streets, outside the factories, and in immigrant neighborhoods.56

In the film, there is a sharp contrast between the Soviet and Maoist positions on Vietnam. While Guillaume delivers his lecture, Yvonne is dressed as a bloodied Vietnamese peasant who is being attacked by toy American planes. She cries out in despair for help to the USSR: “Help, help, Mr. Kosygin!” (Aleksej Kosygin was then one of the leaders of the Soviet Union). No help comes. By contrast, the Maoist position is dramatically symbolized by throwing dozens of Red Books to knock over a toy American tank.57

c. The Althusser Encounter

It was not just Third World Revolution and China’s challenge to Soviet hegemony among communists that Godard portrayed in La Chinoise. He was also interested in the revolutionary and intellectual fervent that was beginning to be felt among French students in the shape of Maoism. La Chinoise foretold the student radicalism and Maoism that was brewing before the explosion of May 1968, only a year after the film’s release.58

In 1966, Anne Wiazemsky (the actress who played Véronique and Godard’s romantic interest at the time) was a student at Nanterre, which was located in a working-class neighborhood that was a hotbed of leftist activism. Godard met Véronique’s leftist friends and professors (including Francis Jeanson, who subsequently appeared as himself in La Chinoise), but he wanted to meet the most dynamic of them, who were cloistered around the Maoist journal Cahiers Marxistes-Léninistes (featured prominently in the film), located at the prestigious École normale supérieure (ENS).

A contact was arranged with Godard by Yvonne Baby (her father was a leading Communist Party member expelled for Maoism), a film critic at Le Monde. One of Baby’s colleagues was Jean-Pierre Gorin, a literary critic who happened to have gone to school with the student Maoists. Upon meeting Gorin, Godard informed him that he wished to make a film on the French Maoists. Gorin seemed interested enough, and he began meeting regularly with Godard. Later, Gorin introduced Godard to the Maoists at ENS. Among their leaders was Robert Linhart, who had been expelled from the communist student group and was a former student of Louis Althusser.59

Louis Althusser was a Communist Party member, a quiet critic of the party line, and a professor at ENS. He published For Marx and Reading Capital in 1965, propelling him into intellectual stardom. While Althusser was a leading communist theorist, he was also a subdued critic of the party’s reformist line and a Maoist sympathizer. Godard himself took Althusser’s ideas seriously since they informed the worldview of the Maoist militants at the center of La Chinoise. As a result, La Chinoise’s Maoism possesses a distinctive Althusserian tinge, placing emphasis on the necessity of ideological and theoretical struggle.

Partway through the film, the young Maoists gather for a forum on the “Prospects for the European left.” Presiding over the event is a guest speaker named Omar Diop, the only authentic Maoist revolutionary to appear in La Chinoise. Diop would later work closely with May ‘68 student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and eventually was arrested and probably murdered by the Senegalese authorities in May 1973. 

In the scene, Omar stands by the lectern and addresses the Maoists. He says that that the death of Stalin 

has given us the right to make a precise accounting of what we possess, to call by their correct names both our riches and our predicament, to think and argue out loud about our problems, and to engage in the rigors of real research. This moment has allowed us to emerge from our theoretical provincialism, to recognize and engage with the existence of others outside ourselves. And on connecting with this outer world, to begin to see ourselves better. It has allowed us to develop an honest self-appraisal by laying bare where we stand in regard to the knowledge and ignorance of Marxism. Any questions?60

Omar’s speech is, in fact, a close paraphrase from Althusser’s introduction to For Marx.61 The death of Stalin and his subsequent denunciation by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 had caused a crisis in the international communist movement.62 Althusser argued that Stalin had “snuffed out not only thousands upon thousands of lives, but also, for a long time, if not forever, the theoretical existence of a whole series of major problems,” eliminating “from the field of Marxist research and discovery questions that fell by rights to the province of Marxism.”63 

According to Althusser, bourgeois ideologies like humanism filled the theoretical void that remained after the death of Stalin. By adopting humanism, Althusser argued that communists were 

following the Social-Democrats and even religious thinkers (who used to have an almost guaranteed monopoly in these things) in the practice of exploiting the works of Marx’s youth in order to draw out of them an ideology of Man, Liberty, Alienation, Transcendence, etc.—without asking whether the system of these notions was idealist or materialist, whether this ideology was petty-bourgeois or proletarian.64

The political effect of theoretical humanism among Marxists was the promotion of the peaceful transition to socialism, which justified class collaboration and a rapprochement with social democracy. This theoretical humanism was something eagerly embraced by the PCF since it provided a justification for their reformist politics (and ferociously rejected by the Maoists in La Chinoise).

Contrary to the PCF, Althusser argued that Marxists who were beholden to humanism were incapable of providing a viable scientific basis for Marxism. Althusser believed that it was the mission of Marxists such as himself to provide that theoretical and scientific foundation. One source that Althusser utilized in that task was Mao’s writings on dialectics, especially the distinction between primary and secondary contradictions, found in his 1937 work, On Contradiction.65 Here, Mao argued that every situation is characterized by many contradictions, but that at any time, “there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.”66 Under capitalism, the principal contradiction in capitalism is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and other contradictions, such as between imperialism and colonized peoples, were secondary. Furthermore, the proletariat was the principal aspect of the contradiction, which would eventually triumph over the bourgeoisie. However, since reality is dynamic, contradictions develop unevenly and dynamically, and thus contradictions and their aspects often shifted, rather than being pinned in place. In connection with this Mao emphasized that 

at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role… Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to funding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved.67

The concrete lesson that Althusser drew from Maoist dialectics was the need for a conjunctural analysis, defined as the present moment that is made up of a combination of the social contradictions and the balance of class forces. According to Althusser, an investigation of a conjuncture needs to take into “account of all the determinations, all the existing concrete circumstances, making an inventory, a detailed breakdown and comparison of them.”68 A conjunctural analysis is an inventory of the relations between classes, social contradictions, and the role of the state. However, a conjunctural analysis not a neutral research project, but according to Louis Althusser, it “poses the political problem and indicates its historical solution, ipso facto rendering it a political objective, a practical task.”69 Mao and Althusser’s theory of contradictions and their mobile nature meant careful investigation was needed to determine when to act and what appropriate strategies were to be pursued. As Véronique, Henri, Guillaume explain to Yvonne: 

Because an analysis of a specific situation, as Lenin says, is the essential… the soul of Marxism… It’s seeing the inherent contradictions… Because things are complicated by determining factors. Yes, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin teach us to carefully study the situation very conscientiously. Starting from objective reality, not from our subjective desires… We must examine the different aspects, not just one.70

The Maoists of La Chinoise share Althusser’s rejection of the PCF, coupled with the conviction that Marxism should be understood as a practice—a guide to action and not a dogma. While their approach to investigation is often stilted and repeated by rote, the young revolutionaries are faithful to the Maoist approach of investigation. They draw truth from facts, replace vague ideas with clear images, discover the link between things and phenomena, ask what the relation is between different contradictions, discuss the weight of internal and external factors, and analyze the relation between objective and subjective factors in order to make a conjunctural analysis to advance the revolutionary cause. As Guillaume says while aiming his arrow: “How to unite Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of revolution? There’s a well-known saying: It’s like shooting at a target. Just like aiming at the target, Marxism-Leninism must aim at revolution.”71

d. Politicization of Culture

Throughout La Chinoise, Godard defends the view that a socialist revolution in an age of mass culture and capitalist affluence requires the politicization of culture. Naturally, Godard turns to Mao Zedong, who was concerned with the role of cultural politics in raising political consciousness amongst the masses. According to Mao, intellectuals and youth must politicize culture both before and after the revolution — particularly after, when a cultural revolution is needed against the compulsion of bourgeois culture which, if left unchecked, can lead to capitalist restoration.

The foundation of Mao’s views on culture can be found in On Contradiction, particularly his understanding of the different contradictions. Following his theory of shifting contradictions, Mao argued against the reigning Stalinist orthodoxy and mechanical materialism that reduced culture to the economic base. Instead, Mao argued that true Marxism recognized that the ideological superstructure could play a paramount role in impacting the economic base: “But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions… the creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role.”72 According to Mao’s Marxism, it was indeed possible for culture to take precedence over economics.

Mao fleshed out his cultural views during the 1942 Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art. Here, he argued against “art for art’s sake,” and instead opted for the politicization of culture, suggesting that intellectuals must use it as a weapon against the bourgeoisie:

If we had no literature and art even in the broadest and most ordinary sense, we could not carry on the revolutionary movement and win victory. Failure to recognize this is wrong. Furthermore, when we say that literature and art are subordinate to politics, we mean class politics, the politics of the masses, not the politics of a few so-called statesmen. Politics, whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, is the struggle of class against class, not the activity of a few individuals. The revolutionary struggle on the ideological and artistic fronts must be subordinate to the political struggle because only through politics can the needs of the class and the masses find expression in concentrated form.73

It cannot be emphasized enough that, for Mao, the politicization of culture was considered essential for a communist victory. So how were intellectuals to play their proper role in the class struggle? For one, intellectuals need to shed their traditional habits of subservience to the ideas of the ruling class and stand with the people. However, it was not enough for intellectuals to merely speak about popular struggles, but in order to effectively convey those struggles, they had to adopt new forms of expression by making their ideas accessible. 

In order to accomplish this goal, intellectuals and cultural workers could not just represent the masses in art and literature. They had to take an active part in their struggles by living among them. According to Mao, intellectuals must embrace a “mass style” and learn 

the thoughts and feelings of our writers and artists should be fused with those of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. To achieve this fusion, they should conscientiously learn the language of the masses. How can you talk of literary and artistic creation if you find the very language of the masses largely incomprehensible?… If our writers and artists who come from the intelligentsia want their works to be well received by the masses, they must change and remould their thinking and their feelings. Without such a change, without such remoulding, they can do nothing well and will be misfits.74

This was precisely what happened during the Yenan period when intellectuals flocked to the communist base area in order to fight and work alongside millions of ordinary people against the Japanese and for a new society. This was a clear example of the fusion of large segments of Chinese intelligentsia with the masses, an intelligentsia who were traditionally elitist, prided themselves on not performing manual labor, and disdained the peasantry (since entering communist-held territory meant risking imprisonment and death). While Mao’s theory of subordinating culture to politics can easily lead to abuse (as ended up being the case), there can be no doubt that it was effective as a tool of mass mobilization during the Chinese Revolution.75

The Maoist understanding of culture and intellectualism is prevalent throughout La Chinoise, most symbolically in the name of the Maoist collective: Aden Arabie. The name of the collective was taken from the title of the most famous novel by communist Paul Nizan. Aden, Arabie is a semi-autobiographical story of a man who attempts to escape the suffocation of bourgeois life in France by traveling to the Middle East. Instead of liberation, he discovers that oppression exists there too. Ultimately there was no escape from the forces that crush humanity, but they must be fought without mercy or pity. As Nizan himself said: 

There is nothing noble about this war. The adversaries in it are not equals: it is a struggle in which you will despise your enemies, you who want to be men. Will you be forever sitting at your catechism? You will have to refuse them a glass of water when they are dying: they pay notaries and priests to attend them in death… I will no longer be afraid to hate. I will no longer be ashamed to be fanatic. I owe them the worst: they all but destroyed me.76

Nizan understood the reality of class struggle, and that one had to firmly choose sides and see that commitment through to the end. 

For Maoists, Nizan was a kindred spirit since he was someone who took up his pen in the service of the revolution.77 As Sartre noted: 

But now was the time to slash. It would be up to other men to sew the pieces together again. His was the pleasure of cheerfully ripping everything to shreds for the good of humanity. Everything suddenly took on weight, even words. He distrusted words, because they served bad masters, but everything changed when he was able to turn them against the enemy.78 

Nizan’s works were largely forgotten after his death, but they were rescued from oblivion in 1960 when Aden, Arabie was republished with an explosive preface by Sartre, selling twenty-four thousand copies upon its release.79 Sartre’s preface not only lifted Nizan’s reputation from purgatory, but presented an image of a rebellious, potent, and ferocious figure—all very in tune with the times. “[Nizan] issued a call to arms, to hatred. Class against class. With a patient and mortal enemy there can be no compromise: kill or be killed, there is nothing in between.”80

e. Proletarianizing the Intellectuals 

Like Nizan, the majority of the Maoists in La Chinoise come from intellectual and affluent backgrounds. Véronique is a philosophy student at the University of Paris-Nanterre and her boyfriend Guillaume is an actor. Serge Kirilov is a painter. Only two have proletarian credentials: Henri is a chemist, and his partner Yvonne is a young woman from the countryside. However, the cells largely live as bourgeois bohemians in an apartment borrowed from Véronique’s bourgeois relatives for the summer of 1967.

The characters spend their days studying Marxist texts, delivering lectures to each other, and figuring out how they can apply Maoism in order to make revolution. The atmosphere in the cell has an almost surreal quality; mornings are spent doing calisthenics to the chants of Maoist slogans, and revolutionary culture is calmly discussed in the evening while sipping tea from fine china. Classes and discussions are regularly held with guest speakers on a variety of topics, not unlike a revolutionary university. Although much of this display is comical and satirical, Godard’s portrayal of the Maoist cell is one of youthful rebels excited by the discovery of Marxist ideas and wedded to a newfound stridency that marked the times.

However, Aden Arabie is not a model of egalitarian relations. Despite the Maoist dictum that “women hold up half the sky,” Yvonne functions largely as the group’s maid. She brings her comrades tea, cleans the windows, and polishes their shoes. Yvonne even prostitutes on the side when the others cannot bring in money. While Véronique and Guillaume have a relatively sophisticated understanding of Maoist theory, Yvonne struggles with comprehending theory to a much greater extent than her comrades. Yvonne is isolated from the others during lectures and discussions, often residing in the background where she does menial chores that occupy her attention. For all of Aden Arabie’s calls about solidarity with the working class, the irony is that they are unable to connect with their own working-class roommate.

Despite the Maoists’ claim to be promoting a working-class culture that breaks with old values, their erstwhile comrade Henri still retains his bourgeois tastes (as demonstrated by his love of the Nicholas Ray film Johnny Guitar). Henri is the most pragmatic member of the group, the only cell member to vote against the creation of a new organization dedicated exclusively to combat through armed struggle and terror. This causes Henri to leave by himself, failing to take Yvonne with him. After leaving Aden Arabie, Godard spends a long time interviewing Henri, who makes many artful comments on the group as “too fanatical” and lacking concern with more practical issues (something expressed visually by him buttering his toast).81 Considering his pragmatic nature, Henri plans to join the French Communist Party once he has work in Besancon, or maybe East Germany. Henri’s character demonstrates the gap between the abstract rhetoric of Maoists and the concrete needs of non-revolutionary workers. Coincidentally, Henri himself resembles Ivan Shatov in Demons, whose character also deserted his leftist ideals.

It would be easy to ascribe the failure of the Aden Arabie cell as the fault of patronizing intellectuals unconcerned with the needs of the working class. An easy solution would be to say that the Maoists simply needed to dispense with intellectuals in favor of workers. However, all revolutionary movements need intellectuals—people with skills and training to develop a comprehensive critical analysis of a complex society and what its transformation entails. 

Acknowledging this role for intellectuals is not denying agency from the oppressed, but rather, it recognizes that they play a vital role in constituting a fully formed collective revolutionary subject. Whether Marx, Lenin, or the Maoists of Aden Arabie, history has shown that intellectuals from the petty-bourgeois and even the ruling class can devote themselves to the cause of the oppressed, and they are critical to the initial formation of revolutionary organizations. For intellectuals who join the revolutionary movement, their choice entails enormous self-sacrifice and they must commit “class suicide” if they are to stay faithful to the goal of liberating working class. This requires a mutually transformative process of fusion of the ideas from the revolutionary intelligentsia with the working-class movement. The failed attempts do not negate this necessary step. Véronique herself recognizes her estrangement from the workers and the need to overcome it going forward: “I know I am cut off from the workers. After all, my family are bankers. I’ve always lived with them. None of that’s very clear. That’s exactly why I keep on studying to understand first and then to change, and then formulate a theory.”82

While Godard’s La Chinoise was hailed for prophesying the burgeoning French Maoist movement that came into its own during the early 1970s, he was wrong in seeing a turn to armed struggle as the natural outcome of this radicalism (as did occur elsewhere in the sixties). After the student protests of 1968, thousands of student Maoists abandoned the universities and libraries and went to work with immigrants, shantytown dwellers, and rank-and-file factory workers. Their proletarianization became a rite of passage and self-sacrifice whereby Maoists could prove their revolutionary credentials, shed their bourgeois origins, and gain acceptance by the people. Maoist missionaries who had never previously performed manual labor had a difficult time adjusting to their new roles as workers. If revolutionary politics is to prove long-lasting, then this required undertaking the long and patient work of “educating the educators” and going to the people.83

However, the strategy that the Aden Arabie cadre formulate is not to proletarianize themselves, but to close the universities through terror. Their armed actions resemble more individualistic acts of desperation than mass struggle called for by their own theory. A lengthy scene between Véronique (who is actually receiving her lines from Godard through an earpiece) and Francis Jeanson shows that the Maoists have no coherent strategy—their violence is divorced from the masses of working people, and they are attempting to invent a revolution through an act of will. Jeanson rightfully predicts their outcome: “You’re heading towards a dead-end.”84 In fact, that is precisely what happens. The assassination of the commissar leads to the death of an innocent bystander and causes their comrade Kirilov to take his own life. In the end, the armed campaign ends in a fiasco.

The ending of the film presents an ambiguous message. While Aden Arabie dissolves and the Maoists go their separate ways, revolutionary politics are not necessarily abandoned. As Véronique says: “A struggle for me and some comrades. On the other hand, I was wrong. I thought I’d made a leap forward. And I realized I’d made only the first timid step of a long march.”85 As evidenced by real life as much as in La Chinoise, the challenge of proletarianizing intellectuals, building a mass base, and finding the appropriate tactics for revolution is easier said than done.

f. Cultural Revolution

For Mao, the political role of culture only increased after the communist seizure of power in 1949. Mao argued that even though the old ruling classes were overthrown, the contradictions of socialism gave rise to new bourgeois elements. Despite the seizure of power and the establishment of a new economic base, class struggle continued:

In China, although socialist transformation has in the main been completed as regards the system of ownership, and although the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remolding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. Class struggle is by no means over… The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is not really settled yet.86

Following his earlier writings, Mao argued that the superstructure did not automatically change in response to the base, but there was a considerable lag as the old culture hangs on.

As time wore on, Mao recognized that those in the Chinese party and state who sought a return to capitalism needed to be combated. This culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (as it was officially known), which launched in May 1966. The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was described in its opening manifesto as follows:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic “authorities” and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.87

The Cultural Revolution was the culmination of Mao’s politicization of culture. The struggle on the cultural front would prove decisive in the proletariat’s battle against revisionism, and it would keep China on the socialist road.

Communists in France took note. Althusser, writing an anonymous article in Maoist Cahiers Marxistes-Léniniste (displayed prominently in La Chinoise) in November/December 1966 claimed that the Cultural Revolution was an “unprecedented” and “exceptional historical fact” that demanded a deep reflection on “Marxist theoretical principles.”88 Several years later, Althusser would go so far as to claim that the Cultural Revolution overcame the exhaustion of the Soviet model because it was 

the only historically existing (left) “critique” of the fundamentals of the “Stalinian deviation” to be found—and which, moreover, is contemporary with this very deviation, and thus for the most part precedes the Twentieth Congress—is a concrete critique, one which exists in the facts, in the struggle, in the line, in the practices, their principles and their forms, of the Chinese Revolution. A silent critique, which speaks through its actions, the result of the political and ideological struggles of the Revolution, from the Long March to the Cultural Revolution and its results.89

Indeed, the impact of the Cultural Revolution was felt far beyond China, something acknowledged in La Chinoise by Véronique, who quoted Althusser: “Exporting cultural revolt is impossible, as it belongs to China. But the theoretical lessons belong to all.”90

When it came to carrying out the Cultural Revolution, Althusser argued that students played a vanguard role:  

At the same time, the C.C.P. declares that these are mass youth organizations, principally urban youth, therefore made up for the most part of high school and university students, and that they are currently the vanguard of the movement. It is a factual state of affairs, but its political importance is clear. On the one hand, in fact, the teaching system in place for the education of the youth (we should not forget that school deeply marks men, even during periods of historical mutation), was in China a bastion of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois ideology. On the other hand, the youth, which has not experienced revolutionary struggles and wars, constitutes, in a socialist country, a very delicate matter, a place where the future is in large part played out.91

The appeal of the vanguard role of students held an obvious appeal to not only Chinese Red Guards, but Althusser’s disciples and the Maoists of Aden Arabie.

According to Althusser, what was unprecedented about the Cultural Revolution was its recognition that “the ideological can become the strategic point at which everything gets decided. It is, then, in the ideological sphere that the crossroads is located. The future depends on the ideological. It is in the ideological class struggle that the fate (progress or regression) of a socialist country is played out.”92 For Althusser, the Cultural Revolution showed that “class struggle can continue quite virulently at the political level, and above all the ideological level, long after the more or less complete suppression of the economic bases of the property-owning classes in a socialist country.”93

Therefore, it is fitting that the one act of violence that the Maoists do carry out is Véronique’s farcical assassination of the Soviet Minister of Culture, Mikhail Sholokhov (author of And Quiet Flows the Don and winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize in Literature). Sholokhov is an ideal target for those who think culture is a revolutionary weapon, since he represents a form of artistic revisionism which the Maoists believe needs to be smashed.

It is true that Maoism led the militants in La Chinoise into a cul-de-sac of Blanquist adventurism and burnout, but it also provided a revolutionary alternative to the PCF, offering a theoretical justification for students playing the vanguard role in the class struggle, as well as the necessity of ideological struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideas and the promotion of revolutionary culture. 

The Future Is Bright, the Road Is Torturous  

Ironically, the Maoist students who inspired La Chinoise despised it. The Maoists thought Godard made them look foolish and stupid. Some believed that Godard was little better than a police agent and threatened to hold a “people’s tribunal” for him. One militant said that Godard “exploited a need for romanticism. He described a fanatical little group that has nothing Marxist-Leninist about it, which could be anarchist or fascist… It’s a film about bourgeois youth who have adopted a new disguise.”94 During May 1968, radical graffiti mocked Godard as “le plus con des suisses pro-Chinois” (translation: the biggest ass among the Swiss pro-Chinese).95

Godard deserved better. While La Chinoise did poke fun of Maoism as radical chic and satirize revolutionary ideology as another fashion to be consumed, the film itself was a serious experiment at creating a new art form and grappling with how to make revolution. In a 1967 interview, Godard explained his motivations in producing La Chinoise:

Why La Chinoise? Because everywhere people are speaking about China. Whether it’s a question of oil, the housing crisis, or education, there is always the Chinese example. China proposes solutions that are unique… What distinguishes the Chinese Revolution and is also emblematic of the Cultural Revolution is Youth: the moral and scientific quest, free from prejudices. One can’t approve of all its forms… but this unprecedented cultural fact demands a minimum of attention, respect, and friendship.96

Arguably, Maoism and the Cultural Revolution did not provide the answers that Godard believed they did. However, the questions raised by Godard on art and communist politics are far from superficial, but remain ones with which every artist and revolutionary must grapple with. 

Leon Trotsky and Cultural Revolution

Doug Enaa Greene argues that in Trotsky’s work a theory of cultural revolution can be found, one which differs from Mao Zedong’s that was developed in the context of the Russian Revolution and its struggle against bureaucracy. 

The argument that a “cultural revolution” is a necessary part of a socialist revolution is generally associated with Mao Zedong and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that he initiated in China. However, Leon Trotsky, in a vastly different way than Mao, stated that Russia needed a cultural revolution. According to Trotsky, a cultural revolution was needed along with industrialization to construct socialism. Trotsky’s industrialization plan for Russia would increase the social weight of the proletariat. A cultural revolution would raise the masses’ cultural level by eradicating mass illiteracy and superstition and change their habits and customs, which would make the working class fit to rule society.

The Heritage of Underdevelopment

According to Marx, socialism would develop first in industrialized capitalist countries with their vast productive powers and rich cultural heritage that the working class would use to build a new order. Contrary to Marx, the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in a backward country, which complicated matters in regards to cultural transformation. Although the major urban centers were “islands of capitalism” with a high concentration of workers in modern factories, large portions of the countryside were just emerging from feudalism. As the Bolsheviks recognized, Russia did not possess the material and cultural conditions needed to overcome capitalism on its own. Both Lenin and Trotsky believed that one of the tasks of the new Soviet republic was to begin the process of creating them. However, the low levels of culture, technical skill, etc., for most of the population along with the isolation of the revolution meant that options were limited.

For Lenin, questions of culture and ideology were intimately connected with the goals of communism – how to overcome the legacy of capitalism and class society. According to Georg Lukács, Lenin’s cultural strategy had three goals:

To abolish the difference between village and city, to abolish the difference between physical and intellectual labour, and to restore the meaningfulness and autonomous nature of labour. Here, too, economic construction and cultural revolution appear inseparable. The electrification of the village, the mechanisation of agricultural production, and such like, directly serve purely economic goals: increased production. However, this increase is not achievable by means other than continuously raising the cultural level of the village; so, too, it requires that agricultural production draw ever closer to the principles of planned factory-production, to principles supported by the latest achievements of science, which master nature ever more thoroughly, and which demand of the labour-force scientific capabilities.1

Lenin’s vision, shared by Trotsky, was that the working class had to not only master the achievements and culture of bourgeois society but overcome their limitations in the construction of socialism. The development of a socialist planned economy coincided with not only economic modernization, but also cultural transformation. Modernization and the increase of productive forces were not seen as ends in themselves – this would merely reinforce the inequalities of capitalism – but were part of an all-around transformation of the conditions of life.

Trotsky and the Proletkult

The Russian Revolution not only brought the working class power, but unleashed great artistic and cultural creativity. Among the changes there were assaults on the traditional family, divorce was made easy, women expanded their horizons, social privilege was rejected, new laws put national equality in place of Great Russian chauvinism (anti-Semitism was outlawed). There was social experimentation in everything from factory organization to education. The Revolution saw the flowering of the artistic avant-garde, as can be seen in the symbolic image of the “Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge” or the emblem of the hammer and sickle that are powerful representations to convey the values of the revolutionary cause to communists, artists, and workers. Lastly, there was the Proletkult, a movement of Bolshevik intellectuals, artists and workers inspired by the ideas Alexander Bogdanov and Anatoly Lunacharsky, who rejected class culture and wanted to create a culture, science, and art based on the values of internationalism, materialism, and atheism. A new proletarian culture, stripped of bourgeois influences, would be the basis of modern socialist society.

Lenin did not think very highly of the Proletkult movement, stating:

Proletarian culture is not something that suddenly springs from nobody knows where, and is not invented by people who set up as specialists in proletarian culture. Proletarian culture is the regular development of those stores of knowledge which mankind has worked out for itself under the yoke of capitalist society, of feudal society, of bureaucratic society.2

Lenin’s negative view of the Proletkult movement was shared by Trotsky, who argued that

It is fundamentally incorrect to contrast bourgeois culture and bourgeois art with proletarian culture and proletarian art. The latter will never exist, because the proletarian regime is temporary and transient. The historic significance and the moral grandeur of the proletarian revolution consist in the fact that it is laying the foundations of a culture which is above classes and which will be the first culture that is truly human.3 

According to Trotsky, every class creates its own art and culture, but bourgeois culture developed in a protracted period of several centuries before taking power, while the proletariat did not develop its own culture before the revolution. Furthermore, a proletarian dictatorship was transitory (lasting years or decades) and during that time, the attention of the working class would mainly be absorbed in fierce political struggles. There would be no development of a distinctive proletarian culture, since the dictatorship of the proletariat leads to the end of class distinctions and the creation of a universal human culture. Considering the backwardness of the Russian proletariat in regards to culture, Trotsky said they needed to critically appropriate, absorb and assimilate the old culture. According to Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky said the working class

ought to view the cultural legacy dialectically and see its historically formed contradictions. The achievements of civilization had so far served a double purpose: they had assisted man in gaining knowledge and control of nature and in developing his own capacities; but they had also served to perpetuate society’s division into classes and man’s exploitation by man. Consequently, some elements of the heritage were of universal significance and validity while others were bound up with obsolete or obsolescent social systems. The communist approach to the cultural legacy should therefore be selective.4

Cover of Furnace, an official organ of Proletkult, designed by Aleksandr Zugrin

Economic Development and Cultural Revolution

Trotsky’s conception of a cultural revolution involved the proletariat eliminating illiteracy, superstition and raising their cultural level, so they would be fit to rule. However, Russian backwardness meant that different and contradictory conceptions of the world coexisted together among the people, even among communists:

A man is a sound communist devoted to the cause, but women are for him just “females,” not to be taken seriously in any way. Or it happens that an otherwise reliable communist, when discussing nationalistic matters, starts talking hopelessly reactionary stuff. To account for that we must remember that different parts of the human consciousness do not change and develop simultaneously and on parallel lines. There is a certain economy in the process. Human psychology is very conservative by nature, and the change due to the demands and the push of life affects in the first place those parts of the mind which are directly concerned in the case.5

A resolute struggle was needed to raise the cultural level of the proletariat and peasantry so they wouldn’t reproduce systems of oppression and domination under a socialist veneer. The battle against backward ideas and attitudes was not simply a struggle for ideas, habits, and attitudes needed to be connected with uprooting the material conditions that engendered them.

Socialism would overcome those conditions by creating modern industry, improving the standard of living and increasing the weight of the proletariat in Soviet society: “The decisive factor in appraising the movement of our country forward along the road of socialist reconstruction, must be the growth of our productive forces and the dominance of the socialist elements over the capitalist—together with an improvement of all the conditions of existence of the working class.”6 At the same time, the bureaucracy who ruled had to be combated and the workers needed to be in firm control of the Soviets, trade unions and the Party. Although Trotsky did not believe that the USSR would be secure until the worldwide victory of socialism, they had a task to hold out until they could receive aid from revolutions abroad. Ultimately, the worldwide victory of socialism, the development of industry and culture would free the proletariat from the shackles of feudalism, make them fit to rule.

Trotsky’s ideas on cultural revolution and developing industry formed a single integrated strategic vision:

even the slightest successes in the sphere of morals, by raising the cultural level of the working man and woman, enhance our capacity for rationalizing production, and promoting socialist accumulation. This again gives us the possibility of making fresh conquests in the sphere of morals. Thus a dialectical dependence exists between the two spheres.7

A cultural revolution could not be delayed until the productive forces were already developed but needed to be done simultaneously, otherwise, old customs, relations, habits of Russian backwardness would engulf the revolution.

Soviet underdevelopment meant the bureaucratization of the party and state were real and pressing problems. There was a tendency among the bureaucracy to protect its monopoly to information from the working class. As Marx said, the bureaucracy “is a hierarchy of knowledge.”8 The Soviet bureaucrats did not want the masses involved in the life of the country:

What is the use, they say, of wasting time in discussions? Let the authorities start running communal kitchens, creches, laundries, hostels, etc. Bureaucratic dullards usually add (or rather imply, or say in whispers—they prefer that to open speech): “It is all words, and nothing more.” The bureaucrat hopes…that when we get rich, we shall, without further words, present the proletariat with cultured conditions of life as with a sort of birthday gift. No need, say such critics, to carry on propaganda for socialist conditions among the masses—the process of labour itself creates “a sense of socialness.”9

Trotsky said this problem would not be solved by replacing the “bad” bureaucrats with “good” ones, but the working class taking charge in the construction of socialism.

Trotsky’s approach to the bureaucracy was guided by several considerations:

1) The party and state could not possibly know everything. Bureaucrats tend to be inert and distrust initiative, but socialism requires the masses taking conscious leadership to solve the problems of economic development and cultural change.

2) Socialist consciousness will not emerge in a spontaneous way. Although the “state can organize conditions of life down to the last cell of the community,” but unless the workers themselves were involved in the process, then “no serious and radical changes can possibly be achieved in economic conditions and home life.”10 Whereas the previous generation of workers learned communism through class struggle and revolution, the next generation will learn “in the elements of construction, the elements of the construction of everyday life. The formulas of our program are, in principle, true. But we must continually prove them, renew them, make them concrete in living experience, and spread them in a wider sphere.”11 While the state will play a major role in constructing socialism, the masses had to be the guiding force: “The proletarian state is the structural timber, not the structure itself. The importance of a revolutionary government in a period of transition is immeasurable… It does not mean that all work of building will be performed by the state.”12

3) The course of socialist development meant that change could not from enlightened bureaucrats, but through coordination of local needs within an overall plan. Ultimately, socialism requires revolutionary practice by the working class and not administration by bureaucrats.

Although the party needed to promote their own cultural workers (artists, writers, etc), this did not mean that the party had a monopoly on knowledge. A cultural revolution needed pluralism and competing currents of artistic and literary schools – save for those who were openly and unambiguously counterrevolutionary. While the party should provide guidance in the realm of culture, it should not enforce a state-led cultural revolution. According to Trotsky: “The state is an organ of coercion and for Marxists in positions of power these may be a temptation to simplify cultural and educational work among the masses by using the approach of ‘Here is the truth – down on your knees to it !”13

Trotsky rejected the claims of the Proletkult that Marxism was a universal system which provided a master key for every problem. According to him,

The Marxian method affords an opportunity to estimate the development of the new art, to trace all its sources, to help the most progressive tendencies by a critical illumination of the road, but it does not do more than that. Art must make its own way and by its own means. The Marxian methods are not the same as the artistic. …The domain of art is not one in which the Party is called upon to command. It can and must protect and help it, but it can only lead it indirectly….And at any rate, the Party cannot and will not take the position of a literary circle which is struggling and merely competing with other literary circles.14

Trotsky’s plan for a cultural revolution and economic development was to realize the communist dream where “free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”15 A communist society would mean a transformation in the arts where “technique will become a more powerful inspiration for artistic work, and later on the contradiction itself between technique and nature will be solved in a higher synthesis.” Art and culture would be cleansed of the inequities of class society and flourish under communism. People would finally be free to develop their capabilities to the fullest. In a lyrical passage, Trotsky described the untold possibilities of cultural development under communism:

It is difficult to predict the extent of self-government which the man of the future may reach or the heights to which he may carry his technique. Social construction and psychophysical self-education will become two aspects of one and the same process. All the arts—literature, drama, painting, music, and architecture will lend this process beautiful form. More correctly, the shell in which the cultural construction and self-education of Communist man will be enclosed, will develop all the vital elements of contemporary art to the highest point. Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser, and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise.16

Construction on White (Robot), by Aleksandr Rodchenko 1920

Trotsky and Mao

At the 1942 Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, Mao rejected Trotsky’s approach to culture as one of “dualism” or “pluralism” which confined the party’s leadership extended to “politics,” while art remained “bourgeois” (a mischaracterization of Trotsky’s position):   

Party work in literature and art occupies a definite and assigned position in Party revolutionary work as a whole and is subordinated to the revolutionary tasks set by the Party in a given revolutionary period. Opposition to this arrangement is certain to lead to dualism or pluralism, and in essence amounts to “politics–Marxist, art—bourgeois”…17

For Mao, art and culture needed to be subordinate to the requirements of politics, since they

are part of the whole revolutionary cause, they are cogs and wheels in it, and though in comparison with certain other and more important parts they may be less significant and less urgent and may occupy a secondary position, nevertheless, they are indispensable cogs and wheels in the whole machine, an indispensable part of the entire revolutionary cause. If we had no literature and art even in the broadest and most ordinary sense, we could not carry on the revolutionary movement and win victory. Failure to recognize this is wrong. Furthermore, when we say that literature and art are subordinate to politics, we mean class politics, the politics of the masses, not the politics of a few so-called statesmen.18

While art and culture had previously served the bourgeoisie, now Mao said both would serve the proletariat.

Since art and culture were stamped by class and politics, reactionary ideas needed to be struggled against. Like Trotsky, Mao does not believe the working class should reject art from previous epochs, stating

We should take over the rich legacy and the good traditions in literature and art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign countries, but the aim must still be to serve the masses of the people. Nor do we refuse to utilize the literary and artistic forms of the past, but in our hands these old forms, remoulded and infused with new content, also become something revolutionary in the service of the people.19

It was the task of revolutionary artists, cultural workers, and intellectuals to take the stand of the working class and the masses, not those of the elite. Art had to be produced for the masses and taken up by them as a weapon of struggle. In order for writers and artists to accomplish this, their primary task was to know the people (their daily lives, “common sense,” feelings, struggles, etc) and develop the cultural forms created by the people and tease out the elements of “good sense.” Art and culture must reflect the problems and aspirations of ordinary people and not the aspirations of the old ruling classes. Mao’s conception of culture was successfully able to mobilize millions to take the fight against the Japanese and the People’s Liberation.

There was a potential for abuse in Mao’s conception of culture, which can mean cultural control by the party – who could determine what was or was not revolutionary. In contrast, Trotsky granted a greater scope for culture outside of the control of the party (save for openly counterrevolutionary voices).

Mao’s theory behind the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was that a series of cultural revolutions were necessary to “continue the revolution” since bourgeois survivals remained in both the economy and the superstructure that conflicted with new political, cultural and ideological ideas. According to Mao, the superstructure did not automatically change in response to developments in the base, rather there was a lag as the old culture lingered. A conscious effort is needed through mass campaigns and action. If a conscious effort is made to change the superstructure, this would in turn spur development of the economic base as encapsulated in the slogan “grasp revolution, promote production.”

Since the People’s Republic was a transitional society, the birthmarks of capitalism continued to exist and were reproduced – such as the law of value, disparities in decision-making, inequality, access to resources, education, culture, and the persistence of patriarchy which encouraged a breach between the party and the masses. Mao feared that these tendencies would lead to the growth of capitalist restorationist elements within both the party and state.

The Cultural Revolution rejected the premise of developing the productive forces and recognized that the class struggle continued under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only the continuing revolutionizing of the productive relations would increase the control of the masses in society, overcoming capitalist economic relations and the ideological and political relations which reproduce them, in order to continue on the socialist road.

The Cultural Revolution was launched in May 1966 a call to the masses, inside and outside of the party, to overthrow the “capitalist roaders” in the party and state, and root out old ideas and culture:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic “authorities” and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.20

The Maoist vision of Cultural Revolution was voluntaristic and idealistic with an under-estimation of the weight of economic factors. While socialists need to reject economism, this doesn’t mean socialism can be built by political will regardless of unfavorable conditions. The ultimate criteria for determining the capitalist or socialist character of a society was whether or not it followed the correct political line (in this case, Mao Zedong Thought). This can lead to declaring that the class character of the party and socialism have little to do with the working class, but that socialism is solely determined solely by ideology and political line.

The Soviet Cultural Front

Although Trotsky was ousted from power, at beginning of the Five Year Plans, the USSR did embark on its own cultural revolution. The Soviet cultural revolution opened vast avenues of educational and cultural mobility for the working class throughout society. According to the historian Sheila Fitzpatrick, the purpose of the cultural revolution was “both asserting party control over cultural life and opening up the administrative and professional elite to a new cohort of young Communists and workers.”21 Although the Soviets had a long-standing policy of placing workers into administrative positions, this was done on an unprecedented scale during the cultural revolution. According to Fitzpatrick: “Of the 861,000 persons classified as ‘leading cadres and specialists’ in the Soviet Union at the end of 1933, over 140,000- more than one in six had been blue-collar workers only five years earlier. But this was only the tip of the iceberg. The total number of workers moving into white-collar jobs during the First Five-Year Plan was probably at least one and a half million.”22  Furthermore, the numbers of workers receiving higher education swelled: “About 150,000 workers and Communists entered higher education during the First Five-Year Plan, most of them studying engineering since technical expertise rather than Marxist social science was now regarded as the best qualification for leadership in an industrializing society.”23 These newly educated workers and administrators rejected the claims of bourgeois experts to leadership in production, leading them to view some elements in the party “as protectors of the bourgeois intelligentsia, over-reliant on the advice of non-party experts, complacent about the influence of experts and former Tsarist officials within the government bureaucracy, and prone to infection by ‘rotten liberalism’ and bourgeois values.”24 The Soviet cultural revolution (whatever its limitations) struggled against bourgeois values, intellectuals, culture, elitism and bureaucracy in all aspects of society. The cultural revolution fired the imaginations of young party members and workers who were encouraged to attack any manifestation of liberalism or capitalism, “but at the same time they were instinctively hostile to most existing authorities and institutions, which they suspected of bureaucratic and ‘objectively counter-revolutionary’ tendencies.”25 Many of the cultural revolution’s initiatives were spontaneous and outside of party control, but their ideas “were also taken seriously, receiving wide publicity and also, in many cases, substantial funding from various government agencies and other official bodies.”26

Despite the great advancements in education and upward mobility for the Soviet working class during the 1930s, the same period also saw the growth of the bureaucracy and a “cult of personality” surrounding Stalin. In the USSR, the traditions of Marxism mixed uneasily with those of Tsarism and Greek Orthodoxy. As time passed, the structure of the Communist Party and society more and more resembled the spirit of the Orthodox Church with its dogmas, orthodoxy, heresies, and inquisitions (most grossly on display during the Purge Trials). Furthermore, the social weight of the peasantry and backwardness took their revenge as beliefs in “primitive magic” found expression in the party and state. According to Deutscher, primitive magic was common amongst the peasantry and “expressed man’s helplessness amid the forces of nature which he had not yet learned to control; and that, on the whole, modern technology and organization are its deadliest enemies. On the technological level of the wooden plough primitive magic flourishes.”27 Initially, the Bolsheviks spoke a language of reason to the peasantry, but as the revolution’s emancipatory energies were exhausted, the party “lost the sense of its own elevation above its native environment, once it had become aware that it could only fall back on that environment and dig itself in, it began to descend to the level of primitive magic, and to appeal to the people in the language of that magic.”28 Nothing exemplifies the Soviet embrace of primitive magic more than the cult of personality surrounding Stalin, who was seen as the all-knowing and all-wise leader. In the later Stalin years, rampant chauvinism was fostered in the USSR “to convince the Soviet people that the Russians, and the Russians alone, had been the initiators of all the epoch-making ideas and of all the modern technical discoveries…[which] goes back to that remote epoch when the tribe cultivated a belief in its own mysterious powers which set it apart from and above all other tribes.”29

By the time of the Great Purges, the sheer weight of Russian backwardness and isolation took their toll as the cultural revolution and emancipatory initiatives were rolled back. In their place, the Soviets reasserted old moral and cultural values, a need for order, authority and social hierarchy, promotion of the traditional family and increasingly, Russian nationalism. The USSR shed its iconoclasm in the cultural sphere and promoted “Socialist Realism” which glorified the achievements of the Soviet state and society. According to the Marxist cultural critic Ernest Fischer, Socialist Realism was a “tendency to control the arts, to administer and manipulate them, to drive out the spirit of criticism and free imagination, and to transform artists into officials, into illustrators of resolutions.”30 Trotsky viewed Socialist Realism as a symptom of Thermidorian decline, disillusionment, and a move towards conservative uniformity:

The style of present-day official Soviet painting is called “socialist realism.” The name itself has evidently been invented by some high functionary in the department of the arts. This “realism” consists in the imitation of provincial daguerreotypes of the third quarter of the last century; the “socialist” character apparently consists in representing, in the manner of pretentious photography, events which never took place. It is impossible to read Soviet verse and prose without physical disgust, mixed with horror, or to look at reproductions of paintings and sculpture in which functionaries armed with pens, brushes, and scissors, under the supervision of functionaries armed with Mausers, glorify the “great” and “brilliant” leaders, actually devoid of the least spark of genius or greatness. The art of the Stalinist period will remain as the frankest expression of the profound decline of the proletarian revolution.31

Conclusion

Trotsky’s vision of a cultural revolution, just like that of industrialization, was connected with questions of working-class emancipation and socialism. Economic development would increase the proletariat’s social weight in society. The proletariat would need to assert their own interests by controlling both the party and state (meaning both had to be democratized). To enable the working class to rule, the USSR had to build a modern society with education, social provisions, and raise the standard of living. Therefore, a cultural revolution was necessary to raise the spiritual and cultural level of the working class so they could consciously create socialism.