Escaping the Labour Left ‘Safety Valve’: Towards Dual Power in Britain

Is the UK Labour Party a possible vehicle for working-class emancipation? Alfie Hancox argues in the negative, posing the regroupment of communists independent of the Labour Party as an alternative. 

‘The belief in the effective transformation of the Labour Party into an instrument of socialist policies is the most crippling of all illusions to which socialists in Britain have been prone.’

 Ralph Miliband, ‘Moving On’ (1976)

Regroupment on the left

After five years of being swept up in Corbyn mania, socialists in Britain are faced with a rather dismal balance sheet. In retrospect a defining feature of the Labour left revival was its relentless draining of grassroots activist energies in the service of a permanent campaign footing, along with a collective biting of tongues while Labour councils across the country continued to implement cruel austerity measures. Corbyn’s perpetual compromises, not least on the issues of NATO imperialism and racist immigration controls, were blithely accepted on pragmatic grounds as sacrifices necessary for electoral success. A year has now passed since Labour’s general election defeat and the party’s subsequent reversion to Blairism, but parliamentary maneuvering continues to occupy center stage in socialist discourse. At a time of accelerating inequality which demands working-class unity against the capitalist onslaught, the left remains aimless and fragmented. There’s been worryingly little organized opposition to Tory wage freezes, the crackdown on trade union rights, and cuts to the health and social care sectors, which have had lethal consequences in the viral pandemic context.

There has nevertheless been some shakeup and rethinking within the radical left milieu, facilitated by the exoduses in 2013 in response to sexual violence cover-ups in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Socialist Party (formerly Militant), as well as smaller splits from several nominally-‘Communist’ groups from 2016, in response to extreme anti-LGBTI+ attitudes (especially transphobia), national chauvinism and abuse apologia. The reconfigurations have led to networks of socialists which tend to be younger and socially progressive, committed to organizational democracy, disillusioned with the monomania of electoral ultimatums, and more attuned to the realities of working-class precarity. It is these issues that comprise the most significant fault lines within the left, rather than the old sectarian divisions inherited from the Cold War era. Among the new formations are Revolutionary Socialism in the 21st Century (rs21), formed by ex-members of the SWP, which defines itself as ‘a socialist, feminist and anti-racist organization’; Red Fightback, a non-dogmatic and intersectional communist (‘Marxist-Leninist’) group; and Anti*Capitalist Resistance (a recent merger of Socialist Resistance and Mutiny). There is also a more diffuse extra-parliamentary left including collectives organizing against carceral and border violence, small trade unions representing precarious workers and migrants, and organizations in the autonomist and left-communist traditions like Angry Workers of the World.

In the immediate term, there is thus a need to crystallize through dialogue and pragmatic organizational unity a forward-thinking revolutionary socialist movement, rather than endlessly seeking, from a position of relative weakness, diplomatic fronts with reformist leaders in which political differences are submerged. The last thing that’s needed is more of the ramshackle broad left coalitions (the Socialist Labour Party, Respect, Socialist Alliance, Left Unity etc.) which have invariably sought to ‘replace New Labourism with one or another version of old Labourism.’ Conversely, attempting to construct in splendid isolation new ‘vanguard parties’, based on fetishized notions of ideological unity in lieu of mass roots, will simply reproduce the old harmful patterns of sectarianism, abuse, and political irrelevancy. There may be scope for the progressive socialist networks to coalesce around a minimum revolutionary programme, purposefully differentiated from the moderate state-capitalist policies of the Labour left – i.e., a reassertion of the traditional communist united front approach.

In North America, the Marxist Center ‘base building’ initiative, for all its limitations (some of which are discussed below), has succeeded in bringing together socialists from an unprecedented number of tendencies, and represents ‘a serious commitment to centering revolutionary praxis above leftist infighting and bickering.’ The embryonic British Marxist Centre should aspire to fulfil a similar function. It can draw inspiration from the example of the foundation of the original Communist Party of Great Britain one hundred years ago, which brought together surprisingly divergent forces including syndicalists, ‘left communists’, anti-colonial militants and British Bolsheviks, with the shared aim of approaching a critical mass of committed revolutionaries necessary to have a qualitative impact on the class balance of forces in the country. As Sai Englert stresses in his thoughtful ‘Notes on Organisation’, any attempted construction of a new socialist unity must simultaneously acknowledge ‘that rejecting the old divisions that have plagued the socialist left will not make important political differences disappear … the aim should be to achieve practical unity wherever possible, while maintaining political tension and disagreement.’

We’re at a historical flashpoint with world capitalism slipping ever deeper into systemic crisis, which makes it all the more pressing to re-establish a strategic orientation towards building counter-power and planting deep roots in working-class communities, rather than hedging all our bets on the next election cycle. Conceptual clarity on the specific nature and role of the ‘left-wing’ of reformism is critical, in light of the organizational setbacks that occurred during the Corbyn years. The euphoria at the surprise 2015 breach in the neoliberal status quo meant there was no sober assessment of the politics of the Labour left, and the moderating role it has historically played in relation to working-class struggle. Of specific relevance for the Marxist Centre project, it is also important to avoid the temptation of viewing community organizing as in itself some kind of shortcut out of the pitfalls of gradualism and opportunism. Political lines of demarcation remain necessary to prevent base building from becoming just another avenue of front work for reformist politicians, a problem which has arisen in the US context in relation to the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA).

The terminal sickness of Labourism

Decades of normalized despair under neoliberal hegemony blindsided the extra-parliamentary left to the treachery of social democracy, or what the New Left theorist Ralph Miliband referred to as the ‘sickness of Labourism’.1 As Carson Rainham notes in The Lever, ‘the energy poured into the Labour Party since 2015 by the radical and liberal Left felt necessary but only because it arose from the desperate state of the left-wing politics in Britain which still lacks any semblance of political power or organisational method.’ The ‘cult of non-personality’ that grew around Corbyn obscured how he was propelled to the Labour leadership upon a groundswell of existing anti-austerity sentiment, which was subsequently demobilized by being redirected into electoralism. Even Plan C, a libertarian-communist organization, ended up encouraging its supporters to cast their votes for old Labour-style state ‘socialism’. The myopic obsession with parliamentary activity lingers on, with groups like Socialist Appeal calling for continued agitation inside Labour to get Corbyn reinstated as an MP. The prevailing view that we must abstain from criticizing Corbynism for fear of strengthening the Labour right is precisely the outlook that maintains the British left’s eternal farce, of assuming the end goal of a ‘socialist’ Labour government justifies the most self-defeating means: permanent class collaborationism, equivocations and lesser evil-ism, betrayal of proletarian internationalism, and the erasure of ‘left’ reformists’ longstanding occupation as unwitting agents of the ruling class.

We need to be clear that Labour has never been a ‘centrist’ party like the German Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), straddling a line between reform and revolution. Lenin correctly recognized Labour as a ‘thoroughly bourgeois party, because, although made up of workers, it is led by reactionaries, and the worst kind of reactionaries at that, who act quite in the spirit of the bourgeoisie’. A common mistake among British Marxists is to extrapolate Lenin’s point in “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder about the need for communists to agitate within conservative trade unions – which entails combating ‘spontaneous’ economism and sectionalism – as applicable to engagement with reformist political parties. Trade union officials are at one remove from the immediate class struggle, and under pressure from the rank-and-file can be forced leftwards and sometimes even be brought into confrontation with Labour governments (as during the Winter of Discontent in 1978-9). The Labour Party, however, was from its inception twice removed from struggles at the point of production.2

Strikers during the Winter of Discontent

‘Socialist’ politicians in Labour do not represent the working class; rather they have traditionally attempted to mediate between the conservative trade union bureaucracy and the bourgeois establishment. They remain committed to class compromise under the rubric of ‘national unity’, and do not side with workers against the capitalist state – the ruling-class dictatorship – which is why, despite their frequent radical phraseology and apparent conflict with Labour’s right wing (especially when the party is in opposition), they are routinely complicit in the crushing of independent working-class action. 

The Labour left is loyal firstly to the Labour Party, which is in turn loyal to capitalism. Left Labourites have no coherent ideology of their own; they live ‘in a dream-world in which block vote millions take the place of the flesh and blood millions outside the conference chamber and committee room, in which the radical policy resolution substitutes for the real struggle of class against class.’3 As Mike Macnair puts it: ‘The Labour left, to the extent that it remains within the circle of nationalism, legalism and class-collaboration, is umbilically tied to the right.’ The rapid adaption of the early Labour Party to the disciplinary operations of the bourgeois parliamentary arena effectively defanged an entire generation of radical trade union leaders. Upon being elected as Labour MPs, the Red Clydesiders who had once ‘struck terror in the hearts of the upper class’ displayed ‘but the palest reflection of that earlier militancy.’ Likewise, the Labour MP George Lansbury who made a name for himself in the early 1920s as the hero of municipal socialism, defying the punitive government attacks on poverty relief, had by 1925 put his hopes in electoral action and called off a strike by council workers.4

Marxists defending their political dependence on the Labour Party will inevitably refer to how in 1920 Lenin instructed the newly-formed British Communist Party (CPGB) to attempt to affiliate with Labour. However, this was a strictly tactical gambit, based on Lenin’s (rather questionable) assessment that Labour was still a flexible political federation, in which revolutionaries would retain ‘sufficient freedom to write that certain leaders of the Labour Party are traitors … [and] agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement.’ In the ten decades since Lenin’s death, a defining feature of most ‘revolutionary’ groups in Britain laying claim to Leninist doctrine has been their replacement of Lenin’s tactical formulation with its ensemble of caveats, by a pursuit of strategic alliances with the ‘left-wing’ of (often governing) reformism, in which key political differences are submerged. Lenin had recognized the need to continually expose the brand of opportunists who ‘flaunt before the workers’ high-sounding phrases about recognizing revolution but as far as deeds are concerned go no farther than adopting a purely reformist attitude’; emphasizing how the capitalist class ‘needs hirelings who enjoy the trust of a section of the working class, whitewash and prettify the bourgeoisie with talk about the reformist path being possible, throw dust in the eyes of the people by such talk, and divert the people from revolution’. This duplicity was exemplified by the Labour pioneer (and Corbyn’s idol) Keir Hardie, a self-professed Marxist who could talk left when it suited, for instance claiming his party was ‘revolutionary in the fullest sense of the word’, while simultaneously reassuring the capitalists by stating that ‘it is a degradation of the Socialist movement to drag it down to the level of a mere struggle for supremacy between two contending factions. We don’t want “class conscious” Socialists.’ 

After Lenin’s death in early 1924, Leon Trotsky elaborated the analysis of ‘left-wing’ reformism in his writings on the ‘Problems of the British Labour Movement’ (1925-6). Trotsky was able to pinpoint how Labour lefts ‘reflect the lethargy of the British working class’, converting workers’ emancipatory aspirations into ‘left phrases of opposition’ that place no real obligations on the pro-capitalist reformers. He explained that the Labour left functions as ‘a sort of safety valve for the radical mood of the masses’, by channelling ‘the political feebleness of the awakening masses into an ideological mish-mash. They represent the expression of a shift but also its brake.’ This moderating role was apparent during the climax of interwar class struggle in Britain: the General Strike of 1926, in which several million workers struck for nine days, withstanding acute state repression, only to be sold out by the Labour and Trades Union Council (TUC) leaderships. While communists played a central role in the Councils of Action at the local level, the CPGB, under the direction of the Communist International (Comintern), made a crucial strategic error in failing to expose the reactionary role of the reformist leaders. This was despite the fact that the 1924 Labour administration had paved the way for the ruling-class reaction, by setting in motion the Emergency Powers Act enabling the government to use troops against workers.

The CPGB’s muted criticism of Labour was based on its desire not to alienate TUC and Labour Party ‘lefts’ like George Hicks and Albert Purcell. However, when the Labour Party headquarters spearheaded the anti-communist witch hunts in 1924-5 the foremost left-wing Labour politicians, including Hicks and Purcell, had sided with the right and backed the expulsion of CPGB members, while Lansbury denounced communist sympathizers as ‘wreckers’. It was only in the aftermath of the Strike that the communists issued a declaration pointing out that the left reformists ‘were only with the miners while it was a question of phrases and resolutions … When the crisis came they ran away.’5 The experience demonstrated that Trotsky was correct to recognize that ‘in certain circumstances, the Labour left was actually more dangerous than the out and out imperialists such as [Ramsay] MacDonald and [J.H.] Thomas in that they misled the workers, providing left cover for the right only to betray the workers equally badly when the crunch came.’ Trotsky also predicted that if the Labour left did get into power it would immediately capitulate to the right, and indeed when Lansbury inherited the Labour leadership in 1932 he pursued a policy of ‘MacDonaldism without MacDonald’, and blocked proposals that Labour-controlled councils refuse to enforce the draconian Means Test on unemployment relief.6

It must be said, however, that in subsequent years Trotsky’s analysis of Labour became rather confused. His politics were overdetermined by his break with the Comintern, after which he often mirrored its policy vacillations. During the Third Period (1928-35) when the Comintern’s foreign policy veered sharply to the left, Trotsky lurched in the other direction and eventually began claiming Labour was not a ‘bourgeois labour party’ (as Lenin argued) but ‘a workers’ party’ which should be ‘critically supported’ (including against the Communist Party!) because, unlike the governing Tories, it ‘represented the working class masses’.7 Trotsky also, like Lenin, harboured millenarian expectations that a general crisis of capitalism would engender the rapid demise of reformism, and as early as 1926 he claimed that ‘Much less time will be needed to turn the Labour Party into a revolutionary one than was necessary to create it’ – in hindsight a ludicrous statement that has nevertheless been seized upon by Trotskyist advocates of ‘entryism’ in Labour like Rob Sewell. Typically, the surviving Labourphilic Trotskyist parties today produce very selective agitational materials omitting ‘any of Trotsky’s extremely sharp polemics with his supporters on when to leave reformist organizations and of the opportunism of those who did not.’

The lack of conceptual clarity on the nature of reformism expressed by both the post-Lenin Comintern and Trotsky has contributed to endless confusion about the true role of the Labour left. The existing Communist Party of Britain (a splinter group that survived the original CPGB’s self-liquidation in 1991) laments the historical ‘predominance of the social-democratic trend over the socialist trend’ within Labour, with the latter supposedly being hostile to monopoly capitalism.8 Likewise, Socialist Appeal, a successor to the Militant Tendency, states there are ‘two Labour parties’ and that ‘The Labour Party’s right-wing always considered the Marxist left a threat to their pro-capitalist policies … It is no accident that Stafford Cripps [one of the founders of Tribune] was expelled at the Labour Party conference in 1938, and Aneurin Bevan had the whip withdrawn’. The reality of this supposed ‘Marxist left’ was less than heroic. Immediately after the Second World War the new Labour government-imposed wage constraints and efficiency measures in the nationalised industries, provoking a series of industrial disputes. From 1945-51, Labour declared two states emergency and on 18 different occasions deployed troops to take over strikers’ jobs. In secret, the government also revived the Supply and Transport Organisation, used two decades earlier to undermine the General Strike, with the active involvement of prominent ‘left wingers’ including both Cripps and Bevan, who sat on the Ministerial Emergencies Committee in 1945, and was briefly Minister of Labour in 1951. Even the champion of ‘democratic socialism’, Tony Benn, oversaw the closure of 48 power stations in defiance of the National Union of Mineworkers when he was Energy Minister in 1977-6 (he also signed a deal to extract uranium from apartheid-ruled Namibia).9 When it comes to the treachery of reformists it is useless to talk of ‘betrayal’. As the above historical overview has demonstrated, when it comes down to the crunch even the most ‘left-wing’ Labour leaders will sacrifice the working class on the altar of ‘party unity’ or ‘the national interest’.

Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee, 1945.

Miliband once observed that ‘people on the left who have set out with the intention of transforming the Labour Party have more often than not ended up being transformed by it’. For example, the post-war Communist Party dropped its programme for working-class revolution in favor of seeking ‘progressive’ parliamentary coalitions, and by the 1970s it had relegated its role to that of a think tank for the class-collaborationist policies associated with the Labour left’s ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’. Another extreme example of adaptation to reformism was the entryist Militant Tendency, which pursued a ‘legal revolution’ in the form of full nationalization. Entryism was born in the 1930s as a pragmatic response to the extreme weakness of Trotsky’s supporters vis-à-vis both communist and centrist parties in Europe. It was only meant to be a temporary measure carried out until the Trotskyists found their feet, although a desperate Trotsky certainly exaggerated the prospects for success. In its pursuance of ‘deep entryism’, Militant became politically indistinguishable from the Labour left whose coattails it clung to, and infamously wound up condemning oppressed communities fighting the police and army in the north of Ireland and Britain’s inner cities. As Trotsky put it, ‘even in the minds of “socialists” the fetishism of bourgeois legality [forms] that ideal inner policeman.’ 

A more subtle approach to Labour was pursued by the Socialist Workers Party, which adopted an ‘open party’ perspective that in theory preserved its political independence. However, the SWP’s economistic obsession with ‘workers’ self-activity’, inherited from its early pre-party years, created a tendency to gloss over ‘the political problem of how to break the hold that Labourism has over workers, and implies that bigger and better strikes and demonstrations alone will provide the solution to the question of working-class consciousness.’10 The SWP’s permanent slogan ‘vote Labour without illusions’ is rather more passive than Lenin’s call to support Labour ‘as a rope supports a hanging man’ (or the communist Tommy Jackson’s promise to take Labour leaders by the hand ‘as a preliminary to taking them by the throat’). In practice, the SWP has sought endless broad fronts with Labour lefts (e.g. the Anti-Nazi League and Stop the War Coalition) in which its approach is to ‘fudge differences by diplomatic agreement to windy generalities, [or] self-censor and thereby pretend that there is more agreement than there actually is.’ Donald Parkinson identifies a similar trend in North America in relation to joint campaigns between Leninist groups like the Party for Socialism and Liberation, and the reformist Democratic Socialists. Likewise, one of the founders of the US Marxist Center has complained of a tendency among the affiliated organisations to ‘just focus on local shit’ and avoid political struggle against the hapless left-liberal leaders of the DSA.11 

There is of course still a need for socialists to have some engagement with mass reformist organisations, and we can’t ignore the fact that Labour ‘could recruit hundreds of thousands of working-class members over a period of five years without ever turning these into active members’. But any such engagement must be aimed at crystallizing, not diluting, an unofficial Left Wing movement opposed to the social-democratic opportunism of the scab ‘soft’ left leaders like Corbyn and McDonnell. As Trotsky explained, ‘One must seek a way to the reformist masses not through the favor of their leaders, but against the leaders, because opportunist leaders represent not the masses but merely their backwardness, their servile instincts and, finally, their confusion.’ It is a shame that British Trotskyists have generally failed to heed their prophet’s own sound advice, that: ‘The Communist Party can prepare itself for the leading role only by a ruthless criticism of all the leading staff of the British labour movement and only by a day-to-day exposure of its conservative, anti-proletarian, imperialist, monarchist and lackeyish role in all spheres of social life and the class movement.’

Five wasted years

Since 2015, the left has been hamstrung by its failure to recall the painful lessons learned under old Labour. Corbyn’s ‘radicalism’ was severely overstated by both supporters and detractors, given that Labour had won office on more left-wing platforms in the 1970s. Corbynomics essentially presented a programme for capitalist growth based on technological innovation, with John McDonnell invoking ‘the Entrepreneurial State’ and ‘socialism with an iPad’. McDonnell quickly dropped his initial talk of nationalizing all the main banks, in favor of ‘people’s quantitative easing’ through a single state investment bank which, as Marxist economist Michael Roberts points out, is hardly extreme when there is already a European Investment Bank, a Nordic Investment Bank and many others, ‘all capitalised by states or groups of states for the purpose of financing mandated projects by borrowing in the capital markets’. McDonnell’s industrial strategy took its lead from ‘such uncompromisingly capitalist regimes as Singapore, South Korea, Japan – and most of all, the United States.’12 In any case state ownership does not amount to workers’ control, and neither does putting a few workers on company boards to involve them in the planning of their own exploitation.

Throughout the Labour Party’s history, a reinvigorated left-wing has served the function of successfully drawing disillusioned radicals back into the party’s orbit. To many ‘revolutionary’ socialists, the Labour left appears as a ‘bridge’ to the party’s rank-and-file; but as Miliband wrote the bridge ‘does not, so to speak, open out leftwards but rightwards’. The Bevanite politician Richard Crossman admitted the illusory character of democratic pressure on Labour, explaining how the party ‘required militants, politically conscious socialists to do the work of organizing the constituencies’; hence the utility of a party constitution ‘which maintained their enthusiasm by apparently creating a full party democracy while excluding them from effective power’.13 The same drive to assimilate and defang characterized Corbynism, with its notion of creating a ‘social movement party’ or what McDonnell described as ‘going into government together’. The grassroots anti-austerity campaigns that arose post-2010 were undermined when young socialists once again flocked into a Labour Party intent on implementing cuts at the council level. Corbyn supporters mourning the ‘inexplicable’ defeat of Laura Pidcock, the ‘anti-austerity’ candidate for North West Durham, at the 2019 general election were presumably unaware that as councillor for Northumberland she voted for £36m worth of spending cuts in 2017-20. In the 1980s left-wing Labour councils at least offered some resistance with their policy of ‘three noes’ – no cuts, no rent rises, no rate rises – although they were soon enough called to heel by Neil Kinnock.

Labour appropriates and disposes of activists’ demands as proves convenient: the Labour Campaign for Free Movement poured its efforts into securing a nonbinding resolution and was subsequently ‘betrayed’ by the 2019 manifesto, as was the campaign to get Labour to commit to net-zero carbon emissions by 2030. Corbynism even reinforced the passivity of left-wing trade unions like the FBU, which re-capitulated to their traditional ‘don’t rock the boat and ruin Labour’s electoral chances’ posture. Englert notes that investing all hopes and energies into the Labour left ‘leads activists all around us to pessimisms, demobilization, and/or – much worse – a moralistic sense of superiority that dismisses the very people on which the success of our struggles depends, as inherently reactionary, backward, or unorganizable.’ This accounts for the emotive social media displays of Labour canvassers lashing out at working-class voters in the wake of the December 2019 election.

The idea of a ‘democratic grassroots’ undergirding Corbynism was also frequently overstated. Momentum, led (and to a considerable extent owned) by millionaire-property developer Jon Lansman, was always relatively small, fractured and politically moderate. As Tom Blackburn writes in New Socialist, after ‘four-and-a-half years of acrid civil war, both the structures of the [Labour Party] and the political composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party remain essentially unchanged’; mirroring the failure of Benn’s Campaign for Labour Party Democracy in the 1970s, the error of which was to assume there was ever a possibility of democratization ‘in and against’ the capitalist state machine. As for the post-Lansman factions, they have all fallen into the trap of viewing ‘the causes of defeat in cultural or organizational issues, and refuse to acknowledge the real failure – a series of political errors’. The Forward Momentum splinter has committed to democratising a Labour Party in which the iron grip of Keir Starmer’s right-wing has been consolidated. As Richard Seymour points out, if what these groups want is a genuinely democratic Labour Party ‘they will be trying to bring about something that has never before existed, and which goes against all the dominant tendencies in parliamentary democracy.’14 

Socialist Appeal has boldly proclaimed that ‘Corbyn’s serious mistake was not to move immediately after his election to purge the party of the right-wing Trojan horse in the parliamentary Labour Party’ – as if Corbyn (or any other left Labourite) ever possessed either the means or motivation to do so. Again, this framing is part of the eternal Labour left mythos, just like in 1988 when the Labour leadership contest between Benn and Kinnock (who paved the way for Blairism) was ‘portrayed by the bourgeois press and most of the ostensibly socialist left as a David and Goliath battle for the “socialist soul” of the party’ – upon his narrow defeat Benn and his followers of course immediately called for ‘unity’ with the right. Similar conciliatory attitudes were expressed by left-wing MPs when Corbyn was suspended in October by the Labour leadership, for pointing out the political motives underlying many of the allegations in the EHRC anti-Semitism report. McDonnell called Corbyn’s suspension ‘profoundly wrong’, but cravenly added that ‘my appeal is not the launch of some civil war or for members to leave the party … My appeal is for unity.’ Dianne Abbott likewise affirmed that ‘the priority right now for everyone in our party is to come together’, while another eminent Socialist Campaign Group MP, Nadia Whittome, stated she ‘cannot agree’ with Corbyn’s stance. 

Right-wing witch hunts date from Labour’s earliest days, initially targeting CPGB members. Cripps and Bevan were both kicked out in 1939 for advocating a Popular Front with the communists; however they soon gained readmission after agreeing ‘to refrain from conducting or taking part in campaigns in opposition to the declared policy of the Party.’ In 1961 Michael Foot was expelled from the Parliamentary Labour Party when he rebelled over air force spending, but two decades later, as Labour leader, he embraced NATO and backed Thatcher’s imperialist war in the Falklands. Corbyn himself has now put out a grovelling statement pledging to ‘fully support Keir Starmer’s decision to accept all the EHRC recommendations’ and to ‘do what [he] can to help the Party move on … and unite to oppose and defeat this deeply damaging Conservative government.’ Obviously, even the soft left should be defended against the forces of overt reaction – since as Trotsky noted, the ruling class’s fear is that ‘behind the mock-heroic threats’ of reformist leaders there ‘lies concealed a real danger from the deeply stirring proletarian masses.’ But at the same time we are not obliged to cover for reformists’ opportunist vacillations and self-delusions, which only helps them maintain their parasitic vice over the more politically-conscious sections of the working class.

Shapurji Saklatvala, Communist MP and critic of Labour’s imperialist politics.

All this is not to argue that anti-electoralism should be made into a dogma. Under certain conditions, the parliamentary arena can be weaponized by socialists for agitational purposes, as with Karl Liebknecht’s heroic stand against the imperialist First World War in the German Reichstag; or the fiery House of Commons speeches by the British communist MP Shapurji Saklatvala, condemning Labour’s ‘enlightened’ colonial policy. However in general when it comes to electoral work, the Comintern’s guidelines laid down at its Second Congress remain applicable, namely that communist MPs must ‘subordinate all their parliamentary work to the extra-parliamentary work of their Party’; and must not only expose the bourgeoisie, but also ‘systematically and relentlessly’ expose reformists and centrists – communist MPs are principally agitators ‘in the enemy camp’. The socialist movement firstly needs its own infrastructure and political independence, in order to be able to engage with reformists from a position of relative strength. As Macnair summarises:

‘Marxists, who wish to oppose the present state rather than to manage it loyally, can then only be in partial unity with the loyalist [i.e. reformist] wing of the workers’ movement. We can bloc with them on particular issues. We can and will take membership in parties and organisations they control – and violate their constitutional rules and discipline – in order to fight their politics. But we have to organise ourselves independently of them. That means that we need our own press, finances, leadership committees, conferences, branches and other organisations.’

Counter-power and the long revolution

The revolutionary left in Britain has lost its nerve and its capacity for strategic thinking. 

Intensifying inter-imperialist antagonisms and the climate crisis ensure an existential sense of urgency, but we can’t lose our heads and seek out revolutionary shortcuts, as happened with the Comintern in the turbulent years between the world wars. The economic conditions that enabled the ‘golden era’ of social-democratic ascendency are a relic of the past, but reformist consciousness does not mechanically disappear. Trotsky, in one of his more sober insights, noted of crisis-ridden Britain in the 1930s that ‘the political superstructure of this arch-conservative country extraordinarily lags behind the changes in its economic basis.’ Political tactics must be appropriate to the particular national conjuncture of class struggle. As against the CPGB’s Popular Front policy, Trotsky recognised that pursuing diplomatic unity with ‘progressive’ reformists and liberals as a preventative against fascisation was an absurdity that only weakened the position of the British working class, at a time of sharpening social antagonisms. The arrival of classical fascism is only possible after a ‘decisive victory of the bourgeoisie over the working class’, as in Italy and Germany; but ‘the great struggles in Britain [were] not behind us, rather ahead of us.’ In a context like today in which the fascist danger is ‘still in the third or fourth stage away’, Trotsky rightly argued that:

‘British reformism is the main hindrance now to the liberation [of the British proletariat] … The policy of a united front with reformists is obligatory but it is of necessity limited to partial tasks, especially to defensive struggles. There can be no thought of making the socialist revolution in a united front with reformist organizations. The principal task of a revolutionary party consists in freeing the working class from the influence of reformism.’

This is why uncritically supporting Corbyn at all costs as a path of lesser evil in the face of Tory savagery was self-defeating. Our strategic outlook should be that which would’ve been most appropriate for the CPGB in the post-1926 period of revolutionary downturn, namely a ‘practice based on attempting to build a solid, stable core of revolutionaries with an eye more for the horizon than for the next strike’ (or election cycle).15 Lenin explained how Bolshevik success in toppling Tsardom in 1917 owed to the fact that for many years legal and illegal networks and structures were ‘systematically built up to direct demonstrations and strikes’. The problem is that in Britain today the culture and infrastructure of working-class resistance has been completely hollowed out, and needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. 

The idea of socialists getting rooted in working-class communities is of course not novel. The CPGB in the 1920s-30s managed to establish ‘Little Moscows’ in mining towns such as West Fife, Rhondda and the Vale of Leven: ‘The local Communist parties of these industrial villages were deeply integrated with every aspect of the community’s social life and culture as well as exercising their strengths in the workplace.’16 Agitation around wages, poor relief, and housing was coupled with the creation of red schools, sports leagues, and even music bands. There are a number of avenues today for building ‘dual power’ alongside the existing capitalist state, such as shop-floor committees, mutual aid societies, educational groups, trade and tenant unions, various anti-austerity campaigns, and migrant support networks. It’s also encouraging to see the emergence of new communist publications committed to producing analysis and theory that transcends the ossified twentieth-century dogmas of ‘official’ Marxism-Leninism, including Ebb Magazine, Cosmonaut, and The Lever. Dual power strategy should further address the role of working people’s councils at the district level. The surviving ‘Leninist’ parties in Britain have largely forgotten the need for independent working-class self-organisation capable of displacing the capitalist state machine, amounting to a paradoxical situation of ‘Bolsheviks without soviets’

While the necessarily protracted nature of building counter-power is clear, this does not imply a return to the pre-1917 Kautskyan gradualism that is currently being promoted by Marxist theorists in the DSA including Eric Blanc. For ‘democratic socialists’ like Blanc, the state itself is seen as a zone of class struggle autonomous of capitalism. Teresa Kalisz of Red Bloom, another US Marxist Center affiliate, has also recently advocated a path between social democracy and revolutionary insurrection by drawing on the writings of the late E.O. Wright, who called for socialists to ‘control the capitalist state apparatus (or at least parts of it) and to use that apparatus systematically in the attack on capitalist state power itself.’17 The problem with this argument is that once within the existing state machinery, political organisations (like Labour) are ‘bound by thousands of threads’ to the dictates of capital accumulation and the reactionary governing bureaucracy, as the entire history of democratic socialism in practice has demonstrated. And behind the trappings of bourgeois parliament and the entrenched state bureaucracy as the first line of defense against working-class insurgency, there still stand the forces of the courts, police, and military – ‘the “bodies of armed men” which guarantee the power of the state whichever government is nominally in office.’18 The capitalists will never willingly give up power, and as Sophia Burns puts it socialism ‘isn’t a gradual process where reforms (or mutualist co-ops!) stack on top of each other until one morning, you wake up to find that capitalism is gone.’ There remains the inescapable question of the point of total rupture, or insurrection, beyond dual power to the replacement of the capitalist dictatorship with a workers’ government. 

As capitalist violence is centralized through the state and cannot just be dismantled at the local level, there is still a need for some kind of general revolutionary (i.e. not broad left) organization on a national basis – an independent workers’ party. The American Marxist Center provides a useful model in bringing regionally-dispersed dual power initiatives together in a shared network, and enabling socialists of various leanings to begin to identify strategic points of unity. Ideally the British MC, in addition to foregrounding practical alternatives to parliamentary canvassing, will similarly function as a political centre that encourages dialogue between existing progressive tendencies. There is a pressing need to work towards a new socialist unity in diversity, in contrast to the ideological uniformity of the old sects. As Parkinson and Parker McQueeney have argued in the US context:

‘A party is simply an organization of political actors organized around a certain strategy and vision for change: a program. It is essential that the Marxist Center does not become another micro-sect that clings to a certain theoretical vision of Marxism with a priori shibboleths that define the group’s politics, whether Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist, left-communist, etc. The organization must be internally democratic and oriented towards building working class political power independent from the bourgeois parties. Without this, any debates over the correct political line, while potentially useful intellectual exercises, will be effectively pointless.’

As suggested in the beginning of this article, there is in Britain a socialism that is dying and a socialism that must be reborn. In the first instance, however, this necessary regenerative process can only materialise through the recognition that the bourgeois Labour Party – ‘left’ flank included – never was and never will be anything but a brake on working-class liberation. The rupture in the oppressive logic of capitalist realism which 2015 heralded was of course itself extremely significant, and as the editorial collective of The Lever state:

‘Our task now, is not to let the dreams of emancipation which fuelled the Corbyn movement wither in defeat. We must steel ourselves, and divert these energies into building real counter-power, into long term revolutionary institutions, to re-build a base for an emancipatory politics, and one that can be lead into a revolutionary confrontation with the current system.’

Workers and Writers: The Communist Novel in Britain

The history of the British communist novel is ultimately the story of the political degeneration of the Communist Party of Great Britain. By Lawrence Parker. 

English Communists marching in London. 1936.

In 1939, Frank Griffin’s1 novel October Day recorded the events of the Battle of Cable Street in 1936, where British fascist leader Oswald Mosley planned to march through the East End before being repelled by a counter-demonstration organized by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and others in the labor movement. 

One of the characters in the book is an unemployed laborer called Slesser, unwilling to take a job with the local council because of his refusal to join a trade union. After an argument with his wife, he gets sucked into the vortex of the anti-Mosley demonstration, marching and fighting alongside CPGB members before becoming involved in incidents with fascists after the demonstration when being mistaken for a Jew. Griffin’s book is fast-paced, knockabout stuff and it doesn’t go deeply into the modulations of working-class consciousness. But we are left with a strange denouement. By the end of the book, Slesser has reversed his previous outlook on life: “‘I’ve been a bloody fool! I ought to have joined the union years ago. Everybody ought to join a union. Don’t you see?’ he asked passionately. ‘We must all stand together. All us working folks must be organised. That’s the only way we’ll ever fight the bosses, that’s the only way we’ll ever get the rich off our backs.’”2

So, after one day, the anti-union Slesser seems on his way to becoming a communist sympathizer. He has simply been processed by the experience of the demonstration and militant action, buoyed along by events that he initially had very little understanding of; enough that he fairly immediately sloughs off his previous world view. This is mechanistic in the extreme and a mystical, not rational, view of the formation of working-class consciousness. One has to ask whether a character with views such as Slesser would have even gone to Cable Street or, if he had, whether he would have been marching on the fascist side. But Griffin ultimately allows no mediatory role to his character’s consciousness and his views are simply a matter of chance as to where he ended up on the day.

Some of the character dynamics of this novel illustrate the broader tragedy of the CPGB, formed 100 years ago: the manner in which it viewed the British proletariat as an agent of history, its potential increasingly diminished in the ideology of the party down the years.3 This was not solely due to Stalinism; some of it goes back to the conceptions of the early Comintern. One of the means of gauging this collapse in expectations is imaginative, through a selection of the novels that CPGB members wrote about the party and the proletariat. Given that this picture of the British working class was a ‘perfected,’ fictional one, it is a useful means to assess how the party ideally (or not so ‘ideally’ as it turns out) thought about its constituents.4 

Decline of a political culture

Although subsequently developed into a peculiar aesthetic by party writers, such a culture was rooted in the failure of the CPGB as a political project in the 1920s and 1930s. The full background is an article in itself, but we can offer some pointers to what happened. If one considers the National Left-Wing Movement (NLWM) and the Sunday Worker newspaper, projects initiated by the CPGB in the mid-1920s to win the rank and file of the British Labour Party to communist ideas, one is struck by the relatively sophisticated political culture that underpinned such initiatives. One could find the working-class readership of the Sunday Worker debating all manner of political and cultural matters in its pages; non-communist members of the NLWM arguing with CPGB members over their interpretation of Lenin’s theory of Labourism; and, after the dissolution of the NLWM by the CPGB in 1929, arguing with the CPGB over the decision. Thus, the programme of the NLWM sought to differentiate the organization from more run-of-the-mill reformist Labour lefts by introducing advanced anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, and anti-monarchist demands, which, of course, relied on a certain conception of its audience as the advanced part of the proletarian class.5 But such a culture was not set in aspic, and because the CPGB was a product of the early Comintern it also denied the internal right to form factions. This had the effect, when it was in the wider labor movement, of an opportunistic tendency to close ranks with other non-communist sections. The differentiation, or ‘unity in diversity’ that it denied to itself internally could thus not be properly advanced externally, without radically undermining the party’s internal regime in the long run.6 

By the time the CPGB had started to develop the politics of the Third Period in late 1928 and 1929, the political programme of the NLWM was seen as something to be junked, a barrier to engaging with the working class. Rather, despite the radical verbiage one associates with this juncture in Comintern politics, solace was to be sought in developing ‘immediate’ demands deemed more appealing to workers.7 Despite the shift in rhetoric, this perspective of a politically stunted and simplistic proletariat was carried over into the Popular Front. By January 1936 a leading party member could state: “What are the issues around which unity can be achieved? We are not thinking in terms of a cut-and-dried programme, but those immediate and sometimes changing issues affecting the daily lives of the workers, small shopkeepers and professional people: wages, salaries, hours, conditions, taxation, democratic rights, armament expenditure, the threat of war, etc.”8 

This programmatic perspective bred a certain limited view of the proletarians it was meant to address. In other words, more simplistic and immediate programmes meant thinking of proletarians in a simplistic manner, including in the realm of art. Critics included Bertolt Brecht, who castigated these “so-called poetical forms”, in his famous 1930s critique of Georg Lukács. Brecht derided the representation of ‘the people’ “in a superstitious fashion” that“endow[s] the people with unchanging characteristics, hallowed traditions, art forms, habits and customs” such that “a remarkable unity appears between tormentors and tormented…”9 But this was clearly also a political problem lodged in the development of the Comintern throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, one can discern a coded political critique in Brecht’s complaint: “There will always be people of culture, connoisseurs of art, who will interject: ‘Ordinary people do not understand that.’”10 Brecht drew on his own artistic experience to state “one need not be afraid to produce daring, unusual things for the proletariat so long as they deal with its real situation”.11 ‘Ordinary people do not understand that’ has become the stock refrain of most contemporary Stalinist and Trotskyist groups when political or aesthetic issues are being discussed that clash with their truncated politics. In so doing, they are tiny caricatures of the earlier decomposition of organizations such as the CPGB. 

In 1950, the CPGB’s Daily Worker featured a ‘debate’ on poetry in which one reader responded with the fatal words: “For the working class, things are and always have been fairly simple – for the class-conscious workers, extremely so.”12 This is simply a superstition, or even prejudice, on the lines laid out by Brecht. It absolutely jars with many autobiographies of working-class autodidact CPGB members who joined the party not only because of immediate issues such as poverty but often due to a thirst for knowledge and a discerning attitude towards the political and social forms taken by the proletarian movement as a whole. Raphael Samuel argues: “Many, it seems, came into the [CPGB] through reading, sometimes under the guidance of older workers, sometimes by themselves.”13 So, when communist politics were refracted through this fatalist superstition that non-communist workers could only be approached through so-called immediate issues, unmediated by the intellectual life of proletarians, the CPGB partly ran up against its own experiences, which led to a particularly schizophrenic ideological existence.  

Supporters of Communist candidate J. R. Campbell marching through Woodford in Essex in 1951

Problems of the British communist novel

Some in the CPGB had a strong inkling that this hadn’t produced strong fictional writing. Writing in April 1962, Margot Heinemann,14 at that point one of the CPGB’s more successful novelists, analyzed how anti-working-class sentiment had found its way into the British communist novel: 

The convention that most ‘ordinary’ people are completely without social and political ideas has two sources. Firstly, it is the convention of our rulers, who would like this to be true… Secondly, it is a common sectarian mistake on the part of those who have failed to persuade the workers to adopt the same ideas about reform or socialism as they hold themselves. In this sense communists are not immune from it. The workers in our novels often tend to be quite blank, politically, until they see the light and are changed.15 

Heinemann goes on to make a funny parody of the kind of dialogue this leads to in the communist novel: “‘I never realised till I met you, Jock, that our factory’s just part of something bigger – much bigger. You’ve made me see we can all do something to change things.’” She adds: “Let’s face it, if the lad didn’t know that much before he was something of a sap.”16 

While the description of what had happened to working-class characters in such literary work was acute, the explanation of how this had come about was noticeably abstract in the negative sense. This manner of characterization is implicit in the degeneration of the CPGB’s political culture through the 1920s and 1930s and its low expectations of the British proletariat. Heinemann uses a common trope of the CPGB leadership of the time about this being partly the fault of ‘sectarians,’.There were indeed small groups of ‘proto-Maoist’ activists in the party of the early 1960s: pro-Stalin and, paradoxically, holding some militant revolutionary ideas of one sort or another that this label was meant to describe. However, to blame such people for this view of the working class, when it was lodged in the whole dynamic of the CPGB’s ideological development, was simply a conservative thrust by Heinemann to protect her party and the leadership of which she was a part (as we shall see, this bled over into her art). 

Non-communist proletarians were depicted in CPGB novels ‘naturally’ and ‘realistically,’ often as intrinsically non-political and simplistic; to be marched on and off the stage as the strike or demonstration demanded, with such mass action (rather than any use of political reason or understanding on the part of these proletarians) imbued with almost mythical qualities to resolve contradictions in working-class consciousness and push it towards a communist denouement. Many of the novels by CPGB members did include communist characters, sometimes interesting ones, but the issue was usually the emaciated picture of proletarian culture that such writers drew overall. This left communist characters in a kind of strange artistic limbo, sometimes floating like driftwood in a sea of working-class ‘slum-life’, and led to the party itself complaining that such communist characters were ‘preachy’ and the like.17 In fact, when such characters were composed in front of this unpromising and simplistic backdrop, it would have been very hard for them not to sound ‘preachy’ and alien. 

This immersion in what CPGB writers saw as the main features of working-class life was clearly an attempt to evade ‘subjectivism’: the imposition of any ‘ideal type’ of proletarian consciousness, i.e. a perfected revolutionary world view, onto non-communist working-class characters. Instead, such writers immersed themselves in the tendency of working-class life to reject such forms. This rejection led them to straight back into subjectivism in that their view of a primitive working-class consciousness was just as invented as the ‘ideal type’ they rejected. They thus mirrored what Adorno saw as the error of constructivist art: “They treat as a pure natural force something which is only a human will concealed from itself.”18 For Adorno, the anti-subjectivism of constructivist art led back to another type of subjectivism, which meant that the subject, the creator of the art, overlooked her own presence in its production. CPGB writers concealed from themselves that an ‘objective’ description of a simplified proletariat was in fact their party’s own highly partial expression of the deterioration of its politics in the 1920s and 1930s. But the outcome of this subjectivism was seemingly perverse in that the subjects of this writing (the CPGB’s published and aspiring writers) found themselves cast off and adrift from their own creations, and, as alluded to by Heinemann above, stuck inside endless modulations on the more prosaic features of working-class culture and how their party could relate to it. 

What follows is a compressed and partial analysis of some examples of CPGB novels that follow this course of undermining the potential of proletarian subjectivity. A clear pattern does emerge but I am aware of the danger of such patterns and to that end I have also looked at some British communist novels from the 1960s, when this pattern started to disintegrate and a partially progressive notion of working-class subjectivity (and, concurrently, a more critical view of the CPGB) began to emerge in the work of Margot Heinemann and Edward Upward.19 This late emergence underlined the tragedy inherent in the form that the CPGB novel had taken hitherto.

Harold Heslop, Last Cage Down 

Harold Heslop’s20 novel, Last Cage Down (1935), was a fictional work that explored class struggle in the Durham coalfield. It centers on the conflict between a headstrong and individualist lodge secretary, James Cameron, and a rank-and-file communist miner, Joe Frost, who turns out to be the more farsighted of the two. The book had an interesting reception by the CPGB in 1935, which deemed that it exhibited some of the sectarian politics of the Third Period as opposed to the Popular Front that the party was then embarking on.21 In the Popular Front, in practice, there was a shift from the excoriation of non-communist leaders in favor of more diplomatic relations with such forces. In fact, this was a formalist misreading of the work as a whole, where the steady and more calculating influence of the communist Frost was counterposed to the headstrong weakness of lodge secretary Cameron.22

But the book also partially looked back to the remnants of the critical proletarian culture that the CPGB had once fostered in the 1920s. The communist Joe Frost is talking to a group of miners and a critic of the CPGB speaks. Frost lets him continue but this is the third-person narrator’s view: “Joseph Belmont took the floor. Meet Joe in his thousands all over the working-class world, the little bibber at the fountain of philosophy, who annoys friend and foe, who is libelous of all things with which he does not agree. Young Mister Trotsky.”23 So, critical voices in the working-class world are equated with someone being portrayed in the world communist movement of the time as a traitor. This derogatory view feeds off Heslop’s politically paralyzed view of miners as a group: “The miner in the mass doesn’t worry about Marx, nor does he take extremely kindly to the men who talk about mysteries contained in books.”24 One wonders where this then would leave the communist project given that CPGB members spent large amounts of time unraveling the “mysteries” of esoteric books, and in what particular state of self-loathing such lines left Heslop himself. But the bigger mystery would then be how communists politics can be related to such workers. 

In Heslop’s world, the production of a socialist idol25 such as Georgi Dimitrov, who had been acquitted from the 1933 Leipzig Trial after spurious Nazi accusations of his complicity in starting the Reichstag Fire, was enough to act as a point of revelation whereby communist and non-communist could be enjoined. Frost only had to say the name ‘Dimitrov’ to a group of miners with whom he was discussing what could aid them in struggling against reformism for this to happen: 

And they all became silent. It was a moment when the great heroism of one of the noblest creatures in the world stood amongst them, a moment filled with the sweet poignancy which is the workers’ share of the joy of the earth. In far-away Leipzig, amongst the howling wolves of the world’s worst form of fascism… stood one, a worker, fearless of the headsman’s blade poised above his upturned face… Could it be possible that so great a miracle of heroism existed? Dimitrov lit up their world and sent that great, hopeful shudder thrilling through their spines, and stimulated their love of their own class, their pride in their own class.26

Even in a novel that was able to illustrate some worthwhile notion of proletarian consciousness such fawning prose would be highly suspect. (Dimitrov’s acquittal was, in any case, something of a Comintern-inspired ‘booby prize’ when measured against the catastrophic destruction of the German workers’ movement.) The idea of miners with no communist ideas suddenly lit up by the mere mention of Dimitrov’s name is a mythical and ultimately absurd view of working-class people that sees them as mere dupes of an external mysticism. 

John Sommerfield, May Day

John Sommerfield’s27 May Day (1936) was much more experimental than the previous two works, charting 48 hours in the life of London, culminating in a vast demonstration, led by the CPGB and its slogans: ‘All out on May Day! For a free Soviet Britain!’ The work cuts in around 90 named characters, which leads to an impressive and suspenseful montage of the city’s life. Like a British John Dos Passos, Sommerfield’s modernist technique looks forward, but his view of proletarian consciousness looks backward, to the deformed view that the CPGB had developed since the late 1920s. This then is how Sommerfield describes female factory workers: 

These silly girls with their synthetic Hollywood dreams, their pathetic silk stockings and lipsticks, their foolish strivings to escape from the cramped monotony of their lives, are the raw material of history. When their moment of deep discontent comes to them in a mass, taking form in the words of their class-leaders, then there are revolutions. What happens to the revolutions depends upon other factors – automatic lathes for instance.28 

So here we have raw material to be prodded about, processed; whose discontent comes in a singular moment that can be harnessed by the party. Rational thought seemingly plays little or no part in such processes, except as a reaction to circumstances. Sommerfield repeats this emaciated view of the proletariat in his short chapter ‘The Communist leaflets,’ concluding on the topic: “There should have been more.” Why? Because of the essentially apolitical and deluded nature of the London proletariat, hung up on “dograces and bicycles,” pondering “the forms of horses and boxers and filmstars”, and pumped full of newspapers and speeches in parliament about democracy.29 By that token, the CPGB’s leaflets became merely another quantifiable thing prodding this inert mass into action. They just needed more of them. 

When Sommerfield turns his attention to the qualitative shifts in the consciousness of London proletarians, we are not quite caught up in Heslop’s strange metaphysics, where proletarians are simply lit up by the example of socialist idols, but we are still in a world where the collapse into an agreement with the CPGB is all too straightforward, as shown by the following dialogue: 

“‘That’s what I don’t hold with about the communists,’ said John. ‘They’re always on about Russia – not that I’m against Russia; it’s fine there and good luck to ‘em… But what I want to ‘ear about is how we can get things better ourselves instead of how good they are somewhere else.’

“‘That’s what this feller said though. He said there’s only one way of getting decent conditions for ourselves, to do [the] same as they did in Russia – kick out the bloody bosses and it can’t be done through voting either. ‘E said it was different here to Russia. Course it is, it’s much harder for us to win ‘cos our bosses are so strong. Only once we’ve got power we’d be able to go ahead easily ‘cos everything’s organized already and there ‘r so many factories and everything…’

“‘That’s true… I’m on their side all right, always have been. I never took a’ interest in politics, I always thought the Labour Party’s no bloody good for us…’”30

The objection that Britain wasn’t Russia was one that many CPGB members would have heard, particularly from members of the Labour Party, who used this argument to undercut appeals for revolutionary violence. But in Sommerfield’s dialogue, such an apparent objection is only a mere byway into an agreement with the CPGB. This simplified and schematic view of consciousness was the product of how the CPGB, and Sommerfield, saw the revolutionary process unfolding in Britain. Towards the end of May Day, a communist, James, muses upon the demonstration to come: “I know too that we are setting out on a road whose inevitable end will be a moment when we stand with guns in our hands and thinking the thoughts of death and revolution.”31 But then if strikes and demonstrations do indeed send proletarians out to this inevitable end, it becomes clear why Sommerfield’s essentially irrational picture of working-class consciousness can stand, simply because, in this schema, rational thinking is redundant. It’s okay to picture proletarians as being prey to the charms of dog racing and film stars because the struggle will ultimately decide all.

Arthur Calder-Marshall, Pie in the Sky

This relative decimation of working-class subjectivity reaches a derogatory low point in Arthur Calder-Marshall’s32 Pie in the Sky (1937), which, like May Day, attempts to paint a kaleidoscopic picture of British society using a variety of narrative techniques, with ‘stream of consciousness’ being used alongside more traditional linear sections. In conversation, the communist Turlin says of the working-class masses: “It’s drink or sport with the men and films and men with the women. Who can blame the capitalist for exploiting the working class, while the working class is begging to be exploited?” Turlin further characterizes proletarians as sheep “trotting into the slaughterhouse and holding up their necks for the knife”. This accounts for his partial feelings of helplessness as a communist, “as if we’ll never pull it off”.33 

But then Calder-Marshall is faced with a familiar problem as a communist novelist: how can the party relate to this type of beleaguered consciousness? As with Heslop’s Last Cage Down, we are thrown back into the arms of mysticism, but rather than workers being lit up with the example of socialist idols, in Pie in the Sky, it is the communist who is lit up by the almost unearthly power of workers drawn together in a mass. Turlin speaks to a march about housing conditions: 

It was no longer Turlin on the platform, not the pale man doubting his power. It was no person, but a voice and a fling of arms. He drew from the crowd his power to speak. His words came not from his brain but theirs; his body merely an instrument, a huge mouth. And as if it was their brain and not his, the thoughts were at first rough comparisons. There seemed to be no connection of logic, nothing linking one sentence to the next. But as he proceeded, the pattern began to become plain: like a man struggling to shape his thoughts and shaping them. It began to become plain, the need to fight for the class, because only in mass is the counterweapon to wealth and influence and armed force.34 

Calder-Marshall takes a partial truth, the power of the mass, and turns it into an absolute. But the power of Carlin’s speech does not begin with logic or rationality; the speaker finds his way into it, compelled by the almost supernatural power of the ‘crowd brain’ before him. When the early Comintern was more concerned with emphasizing ‘unity in diversity’ (rather than the type of abstract unity presented by Calder-Marshall), it understood the problems of this type of rhetoric, speeches taking shape on the hoof, as being prey to opportunism and spontaneity.35 By 1937 this type of political culture had been smothered in the CPGB and this imagined somnambulism on the part of communists was seemingly acceptable. Also, one must stress that this submerging of characters into a proletarian crowd only compounds the issue of working-class characterization, given that this unearthly power leads to the notion of an undifferentiated mass, excluding any notion of qualitative difference or ‘unity in diversity’. Communist proletarians were obviously different from non-communist proletarians. But that did not exclude qualitative relations between the two, unlike the strange notion of communists talking through the collective brain of the proletariat.   

Novels of the Popular Front

Our first four examples of British communist novels have been culled from in and around the period of the Popular Front. On the surface, one would have thought this supposedly ‘non-sectarian’ segment of the history of the world communist movement would have led to a richer and more empathetic view of the British working class. This seems to be the assumption of Elinor Taylor’s recent work on the Popular Front novel. She argues, in line with the ‘wisdom’ that the CPGB itself emoted on the subject: “The formal adoption of the Popular Front strategy marked a decisive and dramatic shift from the Comintern’s earlier, ultra-sectarian ‘class against class’ line, which had demonized non-communist elements as ‘social fascists’ and forbade communists from seeking alliances.”36 This positive appreciation of the Popular Front leads Taylor into enthusiastic appreciations of some of the novels that communists produced in this period. 

Regarding May Day, Taylor comes to the opposite conclusion to myself: “In spite of Lukács’s rejection of montage as fragmentary and incoherent formalism, Sommerfield’s montage articulates a model of the relations between the parts and the whole that is essentially congruent with Lukács’s version of totality.”37 In such a view of totality, the parts, the human characters, can play a role in the construction of the ‘whole’ historical process. Lukács thought narrative modes such as montage only offered an essentially fragmented picture of human consciousness, buoyed along by the historical process instead of helping create it. Taylor is right in one sense that the practice of montage does not preclude artists producing a richer picture of reality, and it is true that Sommerfield produces a ‘totality’ of sorts. But May Day’s totality is underpinned by a model of working-class consciousness that is apolitical and irrational, where essentially bovine workers collapse into the arms of the communists under the pressure of the ‘inevitable’ exigencies of the immediate struggle. It would have been a miracle if this had produced the expressive totality pictured by Lukács in works such as The Historical Novel (1936), with richly illustrated and epoch-making characters infusing the historical process with their own sense of rationality and mission. Instead, the proletarian characters in May Day are merely ‘part’ of a dead schema that precludes their rationality from the outset. 

But that should be no surprise. The Popular Front was not premised on any dramatic change in the incremental manner in which the CPGB viewed the process of working-class consciousness. As we have seen in the introduction to this article, this emaciated and apolitical view was also present in the politics of the Third Period and also arguably went back to the circumstances of the CPGB’s foundation and its ban on factions. Organizations that could not allow internal ‘unity in diversity’ were unlikely to be able to extend it externally in the wider labor movement. Hence, the Popular Front, with its emphasis on diplomatic unity between communist and non-communist, and the denial of the means for organizations such as the CPGB to act critically alongside bloc partners, only made explicit tendencies inherent in the Comintern from the outset.38 And it was this tendency to homogeneity that lay at the root of the homogenized picture of the working class that then developed; of a mass that had seemingly no political memory and was precluded from logical thought. Proletarians using their reason and with a political memory that simply couldn’t be collapsed into that of the CPGB would, of course, have the premise of heterogeneity; a real ‘unity in diversity’. 

So, there was no way for these novels to develop any kind of fruitful relationship to ‘the real’, given that their production was so obviously premised on a subjectivized view of the proletariat.39 Such practice had nothing to do, in the cases of Sommerfield or Calder-Marshall in particular, with the use of modernist literary modes such as montage or stream of consciousness. Rather, the lamed and incremental notion of proletarian consciousness, which was the product of the CPGB’s ideology, led such works into the arena of subjectivism. The outcome of this was to foreground the literary experimentation found in May Day and Pie in the Sky and reduce it to a similar synthetic level, choking off any aspiration the authors may have had to represent ‘the real’. In the examples from Heslop and Griffin, their subjectivism, in the relative absence of such experimentation, was merely the herald, in Heslop’s case most obviously, of a rather hysterical propagandism.

Jack Lindsay, Betrayed Spring

Jack Lindsay40 was one of the CPGB’s relatively more heterodox writers and had crossed swords with the party bureaucracy over his idiosyncratic views in the immediate post-war period.41 It is disappointing then to read a novel such as Betrayed Spring (1953), which displays a familiar distorted conception of proletarian consciousness. This novel was part of Lindsay’s ‘British way’ series, essentially a fictional rationalization of the CPGB’s reformist and nationalist British Road to Socialism programme that had been launched in 1951 (although its politics had developed earlier, during the CPGB’s initial support for the post-war Labour administration).

Despite Lindsay’s previous heresies, he does seem to have seen the series as a conscious party enterprise and the front piece lists a number of CPGB names who had advised him. Although Lindsay didn’t tread any new ground in relation to this discussion, Betrayed Spring is pertinent because he spelled out, in an exceptionally clear fictional form, how the CPGB envisaged the development of working-class consciousness. The novel centers on a young working-class woman from London, Phyl, who has been through the experience of the mass squatting movement, attends a demonstration of striking hotel workers in central London:

“She wasn’t sure what the cause was in its full working-out, what the big words implied when the march was ended and the strike was won; but she felt the meaning of it all inside her, in the deep determination and happiness that gripped her, the pride of being there in the defiant march..”42 

So, rationality is placed as the antithesis of the emotional impact of the march, given that Phyl doesn’t apparently understand all of the implications of the cause she is supporting. Again, we have this alienated power of the mass on the move to spark proletarian political virgins into life. This is no accident on the part of Lindsay, and he underlines Phyl’s response as she listens to the speeches at the end of the march: “And once more she felt herself part of this great thing which she only partly understood but which had entered irretrievably into her life.”43 Lindsay also extends this impact to the crowd around Phyl: “… the sunlight was sparkling over the myriad faces, while the voice flowed on, like the truth of struggle suddenly becoming articulate in all the dumb mouths of the world. The world within the world, the ghosts of the future taking body as the familiar comrades of everyday light.”44 

Now, “the truth of struggle suddenly becoming articulate in all the dumb mouths of the world” is pretty prose indeed but its alliance with such a partial and intensely ideological view of the “dumb” working-class being impregnated with external signs, merely foregrounds the retreat of Lindsay’s articulate prose into the realm of a mere literary effect; a reconciliation with an alien ideology. 

Towards the 1960s

With the 1960s looming, there were a number of interlinked factors that made the continued production of decimated working-class subjects in communist novels problematic and old-fashioned. As the CPGB’s Heinemann had noted in the previously quoted article, there were, by the time she wrote the piece in 1962, a group of non-communist writers such as John Braine, Alan Sillitoe, Colin MacInnes and others who had begun to popularise stories of proletarian life (although this type of novel wasn’t a post-war invention). One can’t quite imagine the muscular and engaged working-class characters of authors such as Sillitoe being jolted into life by strikes and demonstrations and swooning into the arms of communists.45 By comparison, proletarian characters in communist novels merely seem pinched and wooden. 

By the early 1960s, the CPGB’s whole Soviet-inspired aesthetic of ‘socialist realism’ was in retreat and had indeed been under attack by CPGB sympathizers such as John Berger in the party’s Artists’ Group since the death of Stalin in 1953.46 Many of the artistic ‘categories’ associated with Stalin’s cultural commissar Andrei Zhdanov were in the process of being emptied out and questioned, and such processes were given added urgency by the events of 1956 when, after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the invasion of Hungary, more communists would question the CPGB’s subservience to concepts of Soviet provenance. This meant that the party’s whole aesthetic, as far as it had one, was up for interrogation. 

But the events of 1956, when the CPGB was wracked by internal crisis as party members faced up to the fact of their organization’s subjection to an anti-working-class dictatorship, also offered a dilemma to communist novelists. If the CPGB was henceforth going to be portrayed in fiction it would be fairly untenable that some notion of this crisis would not appear in such ‘realist’ productions. This pressure can be seen in Herbert Smith’s otherwise unmemorable A Field of Folk (1957). This was fiction largely on the old communist pattern: shop-floor drama in a west London engineering factory providing the basis for the British Road to Socialism. But world political events had now intruded and couldn’t entirely be left behind, even as they were being over-run by events in the factory. A communist character, Tom Barrett, listens to the criticisms of a non-communist, Blackman: 

It’s no good you [Barrett] hammering away at wages and housing and pretending that the political doesn’t exist. You still seem to think our kids haven’t any shoes; your slogans are way back in the ‘thirties. You just refuse to admit that our standard of living’s advanced – and you don’t like mentioning the fact that more of us are worried about what’s happening inside Russia than we are about where the next meal is coming from. The problem’s political, not economic. We’re getting a fairer deal from capitalism – but what sort of deal is socialism giving the Russians? 47

Smith seems to be implying from Blackman’s dialogue that there is now a political problem in an obsessive concentration on shop-floor ‘bread-and-butter’ issues. Non-communist proletarians are quite capable of making political judgments about the Soviet Union and the CPGB had to confront that fact in the aftermath of 1956. In some ways, this reads like a meta-critique that encapsulates the problem of the British communist novel (although surely unconscious). Notice how the acknowledgment of the CPGB’s crisis has been acutely diagnosed by a rational and thinking proletarian: the party crisis necessitates the latter, as there wouldn’t have been such a crisis in 1956 if the CPGB had been faced by an unthinking working-class, ruled by shop-floor spontaneity. 

Margot Heinemann, The Adventurers

Margot Heinemann’s The Adventurers (1960) is meant to be the definitive turning point against the old type of British communist novel. In one rather bold account: “The Adventurers marks the end, in Britain at least, of the confident chase after socialist realism in fiction.”48 It may have been the end of a “confident chase” but it wasn’t quite the end of the chase. One of the key facets of ‘socialist realism’ was the production of cultural works that had some political utility for the communist movement. A careful reading of The Adventurers shows an author inclined towards critical and rational working-class characters dealing with at least some aspects of the CPGB’s problematic history (as partly illustrated by her “Workers and Writers” article from 1962 quoted above), while also being caught in a movement that was defensive of the party. It also has to be said that the book reproduced some awful CPGB tropes that haven’t aged particularly well. 

For a CPGB recovering from the traumas from 1956, a novel that dealt with some of that crisis, while retaining the party’s honor and with a more nuanced sense of working-class characterization, was useful and generally well-received by non-communist reviewers. Not that the CPGB’s leadership, which had come to expect simplistic party novels of the type analyzed above, was completely happy with The Adventurers.49  Nevertheless, the book had a certain utility familiar to ‘socialist realism’. It also pays to remember that Heinemann had no particular record as an oppositionist inside the CPGB in the immediate post-war years and was a trusted member of the party bureaucracy. In the inner-party controversy around the works of Christopher Caudwell of 1950-51, Heinemann was among those on the orthodox wing denouncing the ‘idealism’ of books such as Illusion and Reality.50 

The tropes that Heinemann uses in places are familiar CPGB ones where other trends in the labor movement were simply denigrated. The following example from The Adventurers explores attitudes to the Second World War and the issue of conscription into the mines: “Of course Jack Marvin says why worry, it’s a capitalists’ war anyway. But Marvin is a bit of a spouter and not a very good workman at that, the boys don’t go all that much on Jack.”51 The implication here is that Marvin is a Trotskyist and, naturally, he wouldn’t be a good worker or have any support among the workers because that was a classic CPGB trope about Trotskyists.52 On similar lines, the character Tommy attends the annual Trades Union Congress: “Coming out of the hall the brilliant sunlight hurt your eyes. Tommy pushed through the swarm of literature sellers thronging the approaches – beaky, dark young men with Trotskyist weeklies, ladies with white bobbed hair and pacifist monthlies, men with open shirts and cycle-clips shouting the Daily Worker…”53 In retrospect, this is fairly crude stuff. The “beaky, dark” young Trotskyist men (a trope that recalls an older habit from the Soviet purges of equating opponents with deformed animal life), up against the dynamic, thrusting sellers of the Daily Worker (the CPGB’s paper), with their easy “open shirts” and “cycle-clips”, ready no doubt to pedal quickly down the British Road to Socialism. So, The Adventurers does have an amateurish undertone of familiar political smears. 

Heinemann, however, picked up the direction that Herbert Smith had partly traveled. Dialogue between communists and non-communists did contain an element of conflict that wasn’t easily collapsed into the communist position, despite the author’s obvious predisposition to rationalize the line of the CPGB in places. A good example is given in a conversation between Dan (a non-communist Welsh miner’s son, who goes on to ‘Keir Hardie’ college in Cambridge, and then to a career in journalism) and Richard and Kate (communist Cambridge students). The conversation develops through a discussion of France in 1944 and the reasons why it didn’t have a revolution. Dan largely accepts Richard’s argument that all the French communists could do was “hand over the guns and join the regular armies to finish off Hitler”.54 The conversation then develops through Richard’s line that the US now dominates Europe which Dan disagrees with. The discussion then moves through another point of consensus on the need for the working class to have patience in its struggles before Richard argues that workers are satisfied with so bloody little. To which Dan replies: “They’ve got some things here the Russians haven’t got though… Those Soviet women that married British lads, for instance, and the Russians wouldn’t let them come out here…”55 Richard initially dismisses this argument as a press stunt before stating: “I’m a communist because of what I do know about Britain and France and Spain – not what I don’t know about Russia. If there’d never been a Soviet Union I’d still be a communist.” It is Kate who finishes with the killer line: “That’s what you think… You mightn’t have had the chance.”[Ibid p99.[/note]

In this passage, the working-class character Dan uses his reason to argue against elements of the communist line. The argument passes through points of consensus and conflict. Dan’s suspicion of the CPGB and the Soviet Union is unabated and this feeds into his later development as a journalist, where he eventually collapses into the prevalent Cold War anti-communism of his trade. Nevertheless, it does strike the reader that this conversation is displaced, being more concerned with the CPGB’s crisis after 1956 than with its supposed setting in the 1940s. After the unflattering revelations that appeared in 1956 about the Soviet Union, the CPGB had an official position of stressing that it was an independent British organization, while still being broadly supportive of the Soviet Union and much of its historical record. This is actually reproduced by Richard and Kate: Richard says he is a communist in spite of the Soviet Union, while Kate reminds him that he might owe a lot more to the Soviet Union than he thinks. It was clever of Heinemann to work this in through a point of disagreement, but the end result is a subtle rationalization of the CPGB’s existence and history, developed through unresolved ideological conflicts. 

The book ends in 1956; the communist Richard, who has moved to Wales to become a teacher in adult education, has been hard hit by the events in the world communist movement and has begun to have a crisis of conscience. The visit of the non-communist miner Tommy portrays a proletarian character using his logic and what he has learned about the working-class movement to effectively give a ‘pep talk’ to Richard about his position. Tommy offers a rationalization of the role of the communists in the class struggle: “You say you’ve been wrong, you’ve made mistakes, your party made mistakes, the Russians done some bad things, some stupid things – duw, we’ve all known that a long time. If you and Griff Jones and Dai James [another local communist], ay, and your Russian pals hadn’t been trying so bloody hard to do something, get us somewhere, now, you mightn’t have made so many mistakes.”56

Heinemann has acutely observed the problematic of working-class characters in the British communist novels as it had developed prior to 1956. The Adventurers attempted to deal with that flaw. Its proletarian figures are far from politically blank and the crisis in the CPGB is pictured in a way that does have a bearing on what happened to the party and its members in 1956. However, this is a very formal resolution of the problem: these characters are developed among situations and arguments where their undoubted intellectual coherence is used to offer a pathway towards rationalization of the CPGB and its associated mythology. The Adventurers overthrows one of the forms of ‘socialist realism’ – proletarians as dull, insensitive lumps, waiting to be jolted into life by external circumstances – in the cause of reinstating its more fundamental cause: political utility to the party. 

Edward Upward, In the thirties; The rotten elements

A much more satisfying attempt to overcome the limitations of the British communist novel came in the form of Edward Upward’s In the Thirties (1962) and The Rotten Elements (1969), the first two volumes of ‘The spiral ascent’ trilogy.57 Perhaps to some, Upward would have been an unlikely source of such rehabilitation, given his privileged middle-class background, attendance at Corpus Christi College Cambridge, and his association with Christopher Isherwood and WH Auden. Such an impression might be compounded by the nature of ‘The spiral ascent’ where a fictionalized Upward (Alan Sebrill) relinquishes the ‘poetic life’ and joins the CPGB (as did Upward in the early 1930s) and then struggles to relate his poetry to the life of a party militant. But Upward and his wife Hilda (fictionalized in the books as Elsie Sebrill) had left the CPGB in 1948 after a factional struggle in which both had claimed that the party was ‘revisionist’ and ‘reformist’ due to its support for the British Labour government elected in 1945 and its apparent disregard for Lenin’s teachings on the state.58 So, Upward had no external limitations on any critique of the CPGB (although the party and its comrades are generally treated sympathetically in the pages of In the Thirties). This, and a constantly questioning prose, opened up space for a treatment of the CPGB’s working-class cadres that accords much more with what we actually know of them from autobiographies and other sources, treating them as a kind of intellectualized ‘vanguard’ of their class. 

This is made clear by Upward when Alan Sebrill makes his first contact with the party, eventually helping a working-class comrade, Wally, with some election leafleting. Wally remembers his last job as a commissionaire at a cinema: “While I was there I first met a young chap from Cambridge – Symington his name was – who got me interested in philosophy.”59 Wally says he’s read some of Feuerbach and Dietzgen with Symington’s help: “I’ve tried Hegel too, but couldn’t get far, not even with help. Now I’m reading Adoratsky on dialectical materialism. Pretty good.”60 Wally agrees with Alan’s high opinion of Plekhanov’s Fundamental Problems of Marxism: “That’s a grand book… though they say now it has its faults. But that, with Lenin’s Materialism and empirio-criticism – well, you couldn’t find a better introduction anywhere to dialectical materialism.”61 This particular character isn’t whitewashed by Upward. In another scene, a meeting dealing with the disciplining of a comrade who has started to criticize the Soviet Union, Wally is shown as someone also capable of spouting the worst kind of CPGB dogma. After stating that he’s heard the comrade, Bainton, speaking elsewhere, Wally proclaims: “It was Trotskyite filth. The sort of lies about the Soviet Union that even the capitalist press might find too smelly to serve up. No party member who’d heard it could have had any doubts that Bainton… had gone right over to the other side. But perhaps that’s nothing to be surprised at, considering Bainton’s petit-bourgeois origin.”62

This raises up a delicate dialectic between the good and bad intellectual potentialities of this working-class character, which Upward puts like this: “Wally spoke with an intensity which Alan at first regarded as out of character but which on second thoughts he recognised as arising from the very essence of the man, from the central principle without which Wally’s other and gentler characteristics could not have continued to exist.”63 

A similar process occurs in The Rotten Elements, where a CPGB factory worker, Bert Alldiss, speaks at borough meeting at which Elsie Sebrill has told the gathering why she doesn’t agree with the party’s support for the post-war Labour government and why it shouldn’t support the reformist government’s production drive. Alldiss suggests that the situation has changed from war-time (when the CPGB also supported a production drive), because the British government no longer wants an alliance with the Soviet Union and wonders “what the old style Marxists would have thought of this idea of socialism through exports.”64 Alldiss does qualify his opposition: “Unless we step up production the whole nation will be in the soup, workers as well as bosses. I can’t see how Elsie can get round that.”65 Upward records Alan Sebrill’s inner reaction to the intervention: “As [Bert] sat down, an admiration for him was strengthened in Alan, and a conviction that his good sense and honesty would never allow him to accept trickery from any party leader, if only he could be brought to recognise that it was trickery. But the recognition might take time, since he was less strong on theory than on practice, and since the leadership’s line – just because it was opportunist – appeared plausible enough in Britain’s immediate economic situation.”66 Upward is fully alive to the potential of working-class communists to rationalize their own political positions and that of the party, even if that potential isn’t always realized. 

In ‘The Spiral Ascent’, Upward’s work also had definite experimental qualities, in particular, slowing down the narrative to a snail’s pace, taking objects out of normal ‘circulation’ and fixing them with a probing objective eye that means they take on stranger forms that their literal description. Such an approach is a challenge to works such as Lukács’s “Narrate or Describe?” (1936), which stresses the humanizing advantage of narration over the dead weight of ‘objective description.’ Upward attacks that stance from an alternative angle, pointing tentatively to how such objects are debased in more prosaic human circulation. For example, this is how an increasingly paranoid Sebrill reacts to his assessment that a party comrade, Les Gatten, is a police spy: “Feeling was abruptly brought to life in Alan. Like someone who coming into a kitchen sees a joint of cooked meat on a white dish in the middle of a table and sees also on the same dish and in contact with the meat something which is not meat, greenish-grey, part liquid, part solid, and which he instantly knows to be dog’s vomit, though it does not make him begin to retch until his mind has willy-nilly formed an idea of what the solid (fishy, spool-shaped, shaggily stringy) might have been before the dog’s stomach rejected it – Alan did not feel nausea until after he had comprehended fully what Gatten was.”67

However, unlike the examples in this article by Sommerfield and Calder-Marshall, the experimentation in Upward is not simply foregrounded and revealed as a formal subjectivism alongside obviously subjective accounts of working-class consciousness that can only advance by increments. Rather, the precise, observational qualities employed by these two works feed off the rationality and critical nature of the books’ characters, which is a much more plausible intellectual account of how people became communists and fought as communists; the experimentation on show is thus a diverse facet of the books’ total effect. 

Aftermath

Upward was long out of the CPGB by the time these works had appeared, and it was too late for the party itself to resolve any of its literary problems. Lawrence and Wishart, the CPGB publisher, stopped producing novels by party members in the early 1960s. (By the 1980s, it was reissuing older party novels by figures such as Heslop and Sommerfield from the 1930s and such works had a certain cult appeal on the left.) The aesthetic issues of the party’s final decades need a lot more work in terms of investigation. The CPGB produced a statement in 1967 entitled ‘Questions of ideology and culture’ that saw the organization adopt a laissez-faire attitude to the arts and declined any kind of role in leading and directing artists.68 Broadly, the CPGB’s left opposed this shift in favor of older conceptions of vanguardism in the arts, but neither wing was in any real position to do anything given that the corrosion of the CPGB’s aesthetic was infused with the collapse of its political culture. The party did enjoy something of an ‘Indian summer’ in the late 1960s and 1970s due to its relative strength in the trade union movement. But this movement was politically weak. In the words of John McIlroy: “The picture suggested [from CPGB reports] was not a national community of political branches, but rather a shallower, personalized network of trade union militants – individuals or handfuls – largely concerned with industrial issues, sometimes with limited attachment to the CP and ‘deep-seated caution in showing the face of the party’.”69 These groupings were not enough to save the CPGB from decline or winking out of existence in 1991 and neither were they the cause of any radical re-casting of the British communist novel. Such shadowy networks were pictured in action in Herbert Smith’s A Morning to Remember (1962), set in a London power station. But the novel makes the CPGB effectively invisible in the workplace, in line with developing communist tactics to influence, not dominate, the trade unions. On one level, this did solve the issue of developing working-class subjectivity in that the relation to the communists was pushed into the background, while proletarian characters were still trapped in the ‘immediacy’ of the shop floor, waiting for a spark (in this case, a workplace emergency) to bring them to life. 

The collapse of the CPGB’s political culture in the 1920s and 1930s and its associated mandate to mold the most advanced part of the British working class thus cast a very long artistic shadow. To have a Marxist organization that was even capable of sustaining a literary culture, however debased, now seems an almost impossible dream 100 years after the party’s foundation. But, despite the undoubted achievement in bringing proletarian voices into the literary world, the British communist novel can only ultimately be treated as an index of its political and cultural disintegration.