Colonialism and Anti-Colonialism in the Second International

Karl Marx’s own ambiguous and sometimes contradictory views on colonialism meant that the Second International would debate over the correct view on the matter. Donald Parkinson gives an overview of these debates, arguing that Communists today must unite around a clear anti-colonial and anti-imperialist program. 

Reactionary political cartoon. Reads: “Social-Democracy is against world politics; against colonies, against the army and navy!”

Today, when Marxism seems to be under constant intellectual assault, we hear the claim that Marxism is a Eurocentric ideology, that it is a master narrative of the European world. It could be tempting to simply dismiss this claim on its face. After all, most Marxists today live in the non-European and non-white world, inspired by the role Marxism played in anti-colonial struggles. Yet we should always pay attention to our critics, regardless of how bad-faith they may be. They can help us understand our own blind spots and weaknesses and better understand ourselves. As a result, we should take the question of Eurocentrism seriously and engage in a critical self-reflection of our own ideas. A closer look at both the works of Marx and the history of Marxist politics tells us that there were indeed Eurocentric strains in Marx’s thought. Yet through its capacity to critically assess itself Marxism has, to varying degrees of success, overcome its Eurocentrism to develop a true universalism, against a false universalism that only serves to cover for a deeper European provincialism. 

Marxism developed in Europe as a worldview designed to secure the emancipation of the world from class society. This is the source of internal tension within Marxism: on one end there is the universalist scope of Marxism, an ideology designed to unite all of humanity in a common struggle. On the other end, there is the source of Marxism in the continent of Europe, an ideology that was shaped by the specific processes of capitalist development that propelled Europe into an economic power standing above the rest of the world. It would be foolish to simply dismiss charges that Marxism contains Eurocentric elements that exist in tension with its universalism. There is no better example of these tensions in Marxism than the different views on colonialism within the movement. 

Colonialism in the history of Marxist thought served as a challenge for Marxism to overcome its own Eurocentrism. Within the works of Marx one can find different approaches to colonialism that could be read as apologetic to colonial expansion or firmly opposed to it, supporting the struggles of colonized people against their dispossession. As a result, the followers of Marx who formed the mass parties that came to be known as the Second International did not have a single position on colonialism that they could take from Marx. There was instead a series of often contradictory positions on colonialism within his work that provided justifications both for supporting colonialism and opposing it. There was also a theoretical heritage within Marxism, economistic developmentalism, that would be used to justify colonialism in the name of socialism. 

To better understand these tensions in Marxism, we should examine Marx’s views on colonialism and the first major debates on colonialism in the Second International. These debates are an important part of a greater historical narrative, in which Marxism developed as an ideology in Europe and became the siren song of countless anti-colonial revolts against European domination. Marxism was able to overcome its initial Eurocentrism, but not without a struggle internal to itself and its intellectuals. In better understanding the history of this intellectual struggle, we can better identify the theoretical errors that held Marxism back from becoming a truly universalist worldview, which could serve as a political creed for the emancipation of the world, not only Europe. 

Marx on Colonialism

To begin, it is necessary to look at Marx’s own views on colonialism and their development over his lifespan. Marx’s views on colonialism were never straightforward, and taken as a whole can be seen as inconsistent and contradictory, leaving room for interpretation. It is this openness for interpretation that allowed colonialism to be an open question for his initial followers. Within Marx one can find, on the one hand, a view of economic development and historical progress suggesting that European colonialism was a harbinger of progress, bringing the “uncivilized world” into “civilization” by laying the seeds for capitalist development and therefore proletarian revolution. And on the other hand, one can find in the later works of Marx the beginnings of an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial politics.  

In his well-known Communist Manifesto, written in 1848, Marx comes across as almost a colonial apologist of sorts, pointing to the rise of the capitalist world market as an accomplishment of a historically progressive bourgeoisie, and colonialism as a means through which this world market is established: 

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.1

Referencing “Chinese walls”, Marx strongly suggests that England’s First Opium War against China was in the long run historically necessary and progressive, bringing a “barbarian nation” into “civilization”. For Marx in 1848, colonialism wasn’t so much something to be condemned and battled, as it was part of a historical process through which capitalism would conquer the world and create the necessary pre-conditions for a communist future, with all nations passing through a similar route of development. However, with time, Marx’s views on the matter would develop. 

After moving to London in 1849, Marx would take up a career as a journalist and wrote a series of articles on non-western societies. One of the first of these was the 1853 piece The British Rule in India. In this article, Marx expresses sympathy with the victims of British colonialism in India, while at the same time seeing British imperialism as essentially progressive, claiming that 

“English interference, having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindu spinner and weaver, dissolved these semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by blowing up their economical basis, and thus produced the greatest, to speak the truth the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia.”2 

Marx suggests that through its colonial process, the British are essentially bringing a stagnant and backward society into history, and only through its interference and disruption of this social formation can India become a real actor on the world stage of history. However, this one-sided view would not remain consistent in Marx himself. The conclusion to his 1853 series of articles on India, The Future Results of British Rule in India, would argue for a social revolution in Britain to challenge colonial policy and also point to the possibility of a movement for national independence from British rule. He would also condemn the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization” which “lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked.”3

Marx’s ambiguity here can be seen as a result of what the scholar Erica Benner calls a “two-pronged assault on the conflicting reactions of British MP’s to the government-sponsored annexation of ‘native’ Indian states.”4 On one side of this conflict were reformers who denounced the colonization as a crime pure and simple, while on the other end were those who saw colonialism as a historical necessity. For Marx, the former were ineffectual moralists while the latter simply apologists for bourgeois rule under the guise of patriotism. Marx sought to stake out a position between these two camps. To simply morally condemn colonialism seemed to suggest a return to a mythic pre-contact golden age, while to affirm the right of the Empire to annex India would be justifying naked bourgeois interests. By seeking out a position beyond this binary Marx sought to develop a position that would be able to reap the “benefits” of colonization while still looking beyond it. 

Political cartoon referencing the British-Chinese opium wars.

In the latter years of the 1850’s Marx’s views on colonialism would develop remarkably in contrast to his earlier views. In his 1857-59 series of articles on China and the Second Opium War, any lauding of the progressive effects of colonialism in China is absent. Rather, Marx would focus on heavily condemning French and British colonialism, going so far as to gleefully report the British and French taking 500 casualties and mocking British editorialists who proclaimed their superiority to the Chinese. Marx would also espouse a more anti-colonialist position in his articles on the Indian Revolt of 1857-58, and in a letter to Engels in January, 1858 would tell his close intellectual and political partner that “India is now our best ally.”5

In the course of the 1850s, Marx would move from viewing colonialism as progressive to supporting anti-colonial uprisings. He would likewise support independence for Ireland from Great Britain and Poland from the Russian Empire, agitating for these positions within the First International and the British labor movement. Marx and Engels both would take the position that British workers must support the national liberation of Ireland in order to fight against anti-Irish chauvinism in the labor movement. This was a development from an earlier position that Ireland’s liberation would come through incorporation into a socialist multinational Britain.6 Rather than seeing the separation of Ireland as impossible, it was now inevitable if the unity of the labor movement was to be reached. Only after the separation of Ireland from the British Empire could a multinational socialist state be formed. The merging of nations into a socialist republic would have to occur on the terms of the Irish, not the British:

The first condition for emancipation here – the overthrow of the British landed oligarchy – remains an impossibility, because its bastion here cannot here be stormed so long as it holds its strongly entrenched outpost in Ireland. But once affairs are in the hands of the Irish people itself, once it is made its own legislator and ruler, once it becomes autonomous, the abolition there of the landed aristocracy (to a large extent the persons as the English landlords) will be infinitely easier than here, because in Ireland it is not merely a simple economic question but at the same time a national question, for the landlords there are not, like those in England, the traditional dignitaries and representatives of the nation but its morally hated oppressors.7  

From this one can see the development of the Leninist position of the right of nations to self-determination. This position was able to condemn colonialism forthright, without resorting to a moralistic fetishization of traditional pre-colonial society. Marx linked the liberation of the working class in the metropole with the national liberation of the colony, creating a vision of revolution that put agency in the hands of colonized rather than resigning them to passive objects to be liberated by the working class of the more advanced nations. Engels would continue this thesis after the death of Marx in regards to India and other colonies, stating that the proletariat in the metropole could “force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing.” Socialism could not be brought to colonized people through imperialist bayonets; instead the colonies were to be “led as rapidly as possible to independence.”8

From this evidence it is clear that Marx (and Engels) began with a more ambiguous and even positive view of colonialism, and moved to a more critical view, developing the beginnings of an anti-colonial Marxism. Yet these anti-colonial positions were mostly found in fragments throughout letters rather than systematized in popular agitational material. As a result, when developing a politics based on the views of Marx, his followers could selectively pick out specific passages from his works to bolster positions that were apologetic of colonialism. While we should be critical of such a scholastic approach to politics, there can be no doubt that many of the Marxists of the Second International justified their positions on readings of Marx. 

“Proletarians of all countries unite.” Stage of Second International Conference in Amsterdam, 1904.

Bernstein vs. Bax on Colonialism 

In 1889 the foundation of the Second International saw the beginning of an era of Marxism without Marx, and in 1895 without Engels. The wisdom of the founders would soon no longer be a guiding light for the movement, and a new generation of intellectuals would have to carry the torch. The work of Marx and Engels, while providing a theoretical framework for questions like colonialism and imperialism, hardly provided a full, all-encompassing answer to properly deal with these questions. A single party line that could be applied wasn’t developed. It would be up to debate and deliberation within the union to determine the correct way forward. 

In 1896, a year after the death of Engels, the debate would flare up, the two most prominent voices in the dispute being the German Eduard Bernstein and the British Belfort Bax. These debates were triggered by rising tensions between Armenians and the Sultan’s regime in Turkey, with Germany poised to intervene in the Armenians’ favor. In his 1896 article German Social Democracy and the Turkish Troubles, Bernstein would argue strongly in favor of supporting the Armenians, using the rhetoric of more “advanced” nations having a historic duty to “civilize savages”. His arguments would be hard to distinguish from the rhetoric of the colonialists themselves, claiming:

Africa harbors tribes who claim the right to trade in slaves and who can be prevented from doing so only by the civilized nations of Europe. Their revolts against the latter do not engage our sympathy and will in certain circumstances evoke our active opposition. The same applies to those barbaric and semi barbaric races who make a regular living invading neighboring agricultural peoples, by stealing cattle, ect. Races who are hostile or incapable of civilization cannot claim our sympathy when they revolt against civilization.9

Bernstein would of course aim to give his blatant colonial apologism a humanitarian aspect, adding, “We will condemn and oppose certain methods of subjugating savages.”10 Yet in the end Bernstein upheld that colonialism was progressive and should be supported, that it was part of a historical process in which backwards societies would be brought into civilization. He therefore argues for German support in the cause of the Armenians against Turkey using this line of thought. 

Belfort Bax, an SDF11 theorist who, like Bernstein, was also controversial, would respond to Bernstein with the harshly titled Our German Fabian Convert: or Socialism According to Bernstein. Beginning his response by accusing Bernstein of ‘philistinism’, Bax would go on to attack Bernstein’s arguments on three fronts. The first was that socialism was not the equivalent to what the bourgeois colonialists called civilization but rather its negation, that the “civilization” imposed on colonized populations was nothing of the type socialists should support. 

Portrait of Belfort Bax

In his second point, Bax would argue that while it was correct that capitalism was a precondition for socialism, it was not necessary for capitalism to be spread to every single corner of the earth:

“The existing European races and their offshoots without spreading themselves beyond their present seats, are quite adequate to effect Social Revolution, meanwhile leaving savage and barbaric communities to work out their own social salvation in their own way. The absorption of such communities into the socialistic world-order would then only be a question of time.”12 

This would tie into the third part of Bax’s rebuttal of Bernstein, which was that rather than spreading capitalism to create the preconditions of socialism, colonialism actually gave capitalism a longer lease on life. Capitalist overproduction, an expression of its own internal contradictions, was the motor force behind the drive for capitalist nations to compete for colonial territories and engage in colonial conquests. By opening up new markets for commodities and cheap labor, capitalism would “soften” its internal crisis tendencies, hence delaying the “final crisis” that would allow for its revolutionary destruction. Hence Bax would make the direct opposite argument as Bernstein: rather than supporting colonial ventures, albeit in a “humane” manner, Social Democracy should support all resistance movements against colonialism regardless of how reactionary they may be, as their victory would increase the internal contradictions of capitalism and speed up its demise.

Bernstein’s next response to Bax, Amongst the Philistines: A Rejoinder to Belfort Bax, would primarily repeat his prior arguments: that “savage races” deserve no sympathy from socialists despite the need for condemning the most brutal forms of colonial subjugation. What exact methods of subjugation were acceptable and which weren’t isn’t clarified by Bernstein, the only clear part of this argument being that subjugation was necessary. This time Bernstein would also make references to the works of Marx and Engels, claiming that Bax was an idealist who was ignorant of what their own positions would have been on this matter. This reveals how the contradictory positions on colonialism in the writings of Marx would leave these issues up to open debate.13

The next round of debates between Bax and Bernstein would resume in late 1897, with Bax’s Colonial Policy and Chauvinism. The arguments in this piece show a development in thought in response to the positions of Bernstein, which Bernstein presented as authentically Marxist due to his upholding of capitalism as a progressive force based on free-labor spread through colonialism. Responding to this notion, Bax would argue that the labor regimes in the colonized nations were not in fact progressive regimes based on “free” waged labor, but a system which “combines all the evils of both systems, modern wage-labor and caste-slavery, without possessing the decisive advantage of the latter.”14 He would also claim that the chauvinism associated with the Anglo-Saxon domination which came with colonialism would be an obstacle to a future brotherhood of humanity, by bringing about a world culture dominated by a single ethnic group. This point would be buttressed with a claim that his stance was not merely a moral one based on abstract notions of human rights, but rather one which was based on a concrete strategy to overthrow capitalism.15 Also of importance is to note that Bax would also draw from the writings of Marx and Engels to make these arguments, countering the use of their arguments by Bernstein. 

Bernstein would respond to these arguments with a two-part article, The Struggle of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution. Here he accuses Bax of seeing no deprivations and oppression where capitalism doesn’t exist, essentially holding onto a romantic view of non-capitalist societies. Countering Bax’s argument that the labor regimes introduced in the colonies aren’t progressive and actually based on free labor, Bernstein makes the argument that these initially harsh and un-democratic regimes will naturally evolve into democratic ones as if this tendency is inscribed into capitalism itself. Regardless of the cost, for Bernstein “the savages are better off under European rule.”16

With regards to Bax’s concerns about Anglo-Saxon cultural dominance, Bernstein simply argues that this is countered by France and Germany stepping up to join in as competitors in colonialism. Even if this wasn’t the case, Bernstein sees the cultures victim to colonialism as having no national life of their own, hence being better off assimilated. Not only is this argument obviously chauvinistic in acting as if only Europeans have an authentic culture, but it acts as if the same critique that Bax makes wouldn’t also apply to European dominance and not just Anglo-Saxon dominance.17

Also key to Bernstein’s reply to Bax is his rebuttal of the claim that opposing colonialism will hasten the “final crisis” of capitalism. Bernstein argues against the idea that capitalism will collapse due to its internal crisis tendencies, and argues instead for gradually reforming capitalism to transform it into socialism. It was through this argument that Bernstein would find himself in a political camp that completely diverged from the revolutionary Marxism of the SPD majority, his camp in the party being labelled as “revisionists”.18 Bernstein began from a position of defending colonialism on orthodox Marxist grounds, only to find himself exiting orthodox Marxism in the process. 

Karl Kautsky on Colonialism 

Karl Kautsky, possibly the most well-respected intellectual voice in the Second International, would initially side with Bernstein in the debate, calling Bax an idealist.19 Yet as the debate progressed  Kautsky’s views on colonialism would develop so as to lean more in the direction of Bax’s position in its political conclusion, and point official SPD policy in a more anti-colonial direction. By the time of the 1898 Stuttgart Conference, Kautsky would openly condemn Bernstein’s views. Despite his condemnation of Bernstein, a closer look at Kautsky’s writings on the topic of colonialism reveal a degree of moral ambiguity. 

In his 1898 article Past and Recent Colonial Policy, Kautsky lays out his basic framework for understanding colonialism. His argument rests on two basic claims. The first is that industrial capitalists do not have a material interest in colonialism, and instead favor a policy of free trade referred to as Manchesterism. For Kautsky, Manchesterism is not only based on laissez-faire economic policy but also “preaches peace”.20 To the extent that industrial capitalists are interested in colonialism, it is for export markets, which do not always align with colonial policies. Following this claim, Kautsky makes the argument that the class basis for colonialism is basically pre-capitalist aristocratic elites who form the military/colonial bureaucracy and finance/commercial capital. Colonialism is not a policy of the historically progressive industrial capitalist, but a reactionary and backwards policy based on the interests of classes antagonistic to industrial capital. In Kautsky’s analysis: 

“the same industrial capitalist, who at home will resist any worker protection law without any qualms, and have no compunction about whipping women and children in his bagnio, becomes a philanthropist in the colonies – an energetic foe of the slave trade and slavery.”21 

To explain Germany’s rising interest in imperialism, Kautsky claims that it is to maintain competition with the French and British, whose colonialism is fueled by the pre-capitalist elites and financial capitalists. This argument essentially turns Bernstein’s on its head, countering that colonialism is not a product of capitalism’s progressive tendencies but rather a holdover of reactionary classes. However we can find inconsistent aspects of this argument. For example, he ascribes to settler colonies “based on work” a progressive quality in contrast to colonies based on pure rent extraction. This not only confuses his own argument but reveals moral blindness to the genocidal nature of settler colonialism.22 In 1883 Kautsky would make a similar argument, counterposing the “progressive” and “democratic” colonialism of the USA and England to that of Germany.23 This is in sharp contrast to the arguments made by Bax, which while not purely based on appeals to morality, are strongly based in a moral condemnation of all colonialism. This attitude toward settler-colonialism is also apparent in his 1899 article The War in South Africa, which simultaneously argues for supporting the Boers against the British Empire and asserts, “We, by contrast, condemn modern colonial policy everywhere.”24

Official Resolutions 

The SPD conference in Mainz on September 17-21, 1900 would see the party take up an official resolution on imperialism. Rosa Luxemburg would emerge as a powerful anti-colonial voice, condemning the war against China while urging for active anti-war agitation. The mood of the conference was overall anti-imperialist, with delegates condemning Germany’s intervention in the war against China. Contrary to the views of Bernstein, the resolution passed would state that military conquest was an all-out reactionary policy:

“Social Democracy, as the enemy of any oppression and exploitation of men by men, protests most emphatically against the policy of robbery and conquest. It demands that the desirable and necessary cultural and commercial relations between all peoples of the earth be carried out in such a way that the rights, freedoms and independence of these peoples be respected and protected, and that they be won over for the tasks of modern culture and civilization only by means of education and example. The methods employed at present by the bourgeoisie and the military rulers of all nations are a bloody mockery of culture and civilization.”25

Ultimately it would be the positions more aligned with those of Kautsky and Bax that would win out as the official policy of the SPD. Bernstein would represent a pro-colonialist minority in the party, with some members of the International like Henriette Roland Holst claiming that the mere existence of this minority in the party shouldn’t be tolerated. Days after the Mainz conference the entire International would have a conference in Paris and a similar resolution would be passed, this time with Luxemburg authoring a resolution that not only condemned imperialism but described it as a necessary consequence of capitalism’s newest contradictions.26

The SPD’s Dresden Congress in 1903 and the Sixth International Congress in 1904 would further affirm an anti-imperialist stance. Yet while international congresses were of symbolic importance to the Social Democratic movement (seen as “international workers’ parliaments”), one must take into account the federal structure of the party. Each national party was ultimately autonomous in its decision-making authority, being left to itself to make its own programs and tactical decisions. The congresses were taken seriously by parties but ultimately no central body had the authority to enforce their decisions until the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) was formed at the Paris conference in 1900. Even then, the actual authority of the ISB was ill-defined, and the tendency towards autonomy prevailed. This would mean that parties in the International primarily saw themselves as national parties who served workers on a national basis rather than sections of a single world party.27 The extent to which resolutions would actually be binding on parties was therefore very ambiguous. 

Delegates to the 1910 Stuttgart Conference

Stuttgart Congress

In 1907 the SPD would face a disappointing loss in the electoral campaign known as the Hottentot elections. The Hottentot elections occurred in the context of a pro-colonial nationalist fervor caused by the German colonial war and genocide in South-West Africa, where approximately 65,000 Hereros were massacred in the period from 1904-1908. While the number of eligible voters to the Reichstag election had risen significantly (76.1% in 1903 to 84.7% in 1907), the SPD would lose almost half of its delegates in the Reichstag (81 seats to 43 seats).28 Expecting that more eligible voters would mean more electoral success, the results of this defeat would throw the SPD into a period of doubt and reignite debates over colonial policy. 

According to Carl E. Schorske the districts the SPD had maintained in the elections were primarily the working class dominated ones. The section of the electorate lost was the salaried professionals and small shopkeepers, who had fallen prey to the nationalist fervor of the German campaign in South-West Africa. According to Kautsky, the bourgeoisie had promoted the future colonial state as a more attractive alternative to socialism for these strata, something Social Democracy had greatly underestimated. The right wing of the party would respond by asserting that excessive radicalism had cost them votes; the more left-wing elements would point to the Hottentot election as proving the unreliable nature of this “petty-bourgeois” stratum. The radicals in the party therefore saw this as a reason to increase attacks on nationalism and colonial policy while the rightists saw it as a reason to push for a softer stance on colonial policy.29

Alexander Parvus, belonging to the left-wing of the party, would write an in-depth study of the colonial question in response to the Hottentot failure, Colonies and Capitalism in Twentieth Century. Unlike Kautsky’s 1898 pamphlet, Parvus would place colonialism in the context of the contradictions of the modern capitalist system, with overproduction, the falling rate of profit and the merging of production and exchange in finance capital as the motor force behind colonial policies, rather than pre-capitalist elites.30 He cited the increasing imperialist policies of the British Empire as symptoms of its decline as a hegemonic world power, scrambling to hold onto supremacy as it collapses.31 From this theoretical study, Parvus came to the conclusion that colonial policies are symptoms of the decline of capitalism that will present the proletariat with an opportunity for revolutionary action. No political support for colonial policy of any kind was acceptable in Parvus’ view.32

Following the Hottentot failure was the Stuttgart Conference of 1907. This conference would see the colonialism debates resume, this time with a victory for the right. The conclusions made by Parvus, that colonialism was a symptom of capitalist crisis that must be combated with revolutionary action, would be rejected by the majority of conference delegates. In a shift to the right, Luxemburg’s anti-imperialist resolution from the 1900 congress would be dropped and replaced through a process of contentious debate. 

One of these debates was between two delegates of the German party, Eduard David and George Ledebour. David quotes August Bebel, a highly respected leader of the party, as saying “it makes a big difference how colonial policy is conducted. If representatives of civilized countries come as liberators to the alien peoples in order to bring them the benefits of culture and civilization, then we as Social Democrats will be the first to support such colonizing as a civilizing mission.”33 The fact this quote is from August Bebel, one of the most important leaders of the Social Democratic movement, is revealing. It shows that for many Social Democrats, opposition to colonialism wasn’t opposition to European supremacy and was still premised on the legitimacy of a European civilizing mission. It was merely the methods of colonialism that were opposed, methods that were to be replaced by peaceful ones that would make Europeans welcome missionaries of progress. 

Ledebour would respond by polemicizing against Bebel as well as David, arguing that Bebel’s position asserted the possibility that colonial policy could be anything other than the existing horror and inhumanity that it was. Rather than calling for a more “humane” colonialism, he says that only the resistance of the exploited can lessen the brutalities of colonialism. After Ledebour spoke, a delegate from Belgium, Modeste Terwagne, would argue that if the occupation of the Congo were ended that “industry would be seriously damaged” and that “men utilize all the riches of globe, wherever they may be situated.”34 

Ledebour and a Dutch Socialist, Hendrick van Kol, would draft a resolution in compromise with the socialist colonizers who condemned existing colonial policy while neglecting to condemn colonial policy under capitalism in general. Terwagne would introduce an amendment that affirmed the potential for a socialist colonial policy that acted as a civilizing force, while David would add another amendment saying that “the congress regards the colonial idea as such as an integral part of the socialist movement’s universal goals for civilization.”35  David’s amendments was rejected and Terwagne’s was incorporated in the final draft which was accepted by a majority of the congress: 

“Socialism strives to develop the productive forces of the entire globe and to lead all peoples to the highest form of civilization. The congress therefore does not reject in principle every colonial policy. Under a socialist regime, colonization could be a force for civilization.”36 

While the resolution also contained commitments for parliamentary delegates to “fight against merciless exploitation and bondage” and “advocate reforms to improve the lot of the native peoples” it failed to reject colonialism as such and instead aimed to reform the existing colonial occupations. This turn to the right disgusted Luxemburg, Parvus and Kautsky. However, the turn towards what was essentially a pro-colonial stance was a product of democratic deliberation, a process that could be reversed through open debate. By the end of the conference, Kautsky was able to build up a bloc of support that would defeat the original resolution by a vote of 128 against 108, with 10 abstentions. Replacing the original resolution would be a resolution that would state that the congress “condemns the barbaric methods of capitalist colonization” and claim “the civilizing mission that capitalist society claims to serve is no more than a veil for its lust for conquest and exploitation.”37

While an anti-imperialist motion did pass, 128 against 108 was hardly a vast majority of delegates. Russian Social Democrat Vladimir Lenin believed this to be a sign of growing opportunism within Social Democracy, one that needed to be battled against with vigilance. The Stuttgart conference “strikingly showed up socialist opportunism, which succumbs to bourgeois blandishments” and “revealed a negative feature in the European labour movement, one that can do no little harm to the proletarian cause, and for that reason should receive serious attention.”38 Social Democracy was not guaranteed to stick to a strict anti-imperialist platform, and such a stance would have to be battled for in the halls of congresses and in theoretical debates. 

Debates on colonialism and imperialism would continue in Social Democracy, reaching an apogee when a majority of SPD Reichstag delegates would vote for war credits at the beginning of World War One, followed by the majority of other Second International parties. Ultimately Lenin’s fear of growing opportunism was proven correct. However, while one could assume that the Social Democrats who voiced opposition to colonialism most consistently would be those who vigorously opposed the war, anti-colonialists like Parvus and Belfort Bax would find themselves amongst the ‘social-patriots’ who rallied behind the war. Arguments for supporting the war would vary. In the case of Parvus it was his conclusion that it was necessary to defend the progressive German state against reactionary Czarism that led him to rally behind the Kaiser.39 If support or rejection of WWI was the ‘final test’ for Social Democrats, positions in the debates over colonialism ultimately would not serve as predictors for who would pass. 

1914 edition of German Social-Democratic newspaper Vorwärts. Reads: “Social Democracy and the War! The social-democratic faction allowed the war credits to pass”

Conclusion 

It would take the October Revolution, with its radical approach to the national question and solidarity with the struggles of colonial peoples, to truly establish an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist orthodoxy in Marxism. Lenin’s anti-colonial Marxism would inspire national liberation leaders in the colonies like Ho Chi Minh to align with the International Communist movement and deal a blow to Marxist Eurocentrism. While a blow was dealt, it wasn’t quite fatal, as European chauvinism would still haunt Marxist parties throughout the 20th Century, the most famous example being the French Communist Party’s refusal to support Algerian independence at the most crucial moment. In these instances, Euro-chauvinists were continuing an unfortunate tradition within Marxism that contested for legitimacy in the Second International using the writings of Marx himself.  

The pro-colonial positions found both in Marx and in the Second International have a common theoretical basis that can be identified as Eurocentrism. According to Samir Amin, a key theoretical backdrop to the ideology of Eurocentrism is economism, defined as the view that “economic laws are considered as objective laws imposing themselves on society as forces of nature, or, in other words, as forces outside of the social relationships peculiar to capitalism.”40 Eurocentric economism reifies economic development as an inevitable process that occurs as long as “cultural” factors don’t stand in the way. It sees the uneven development of the world and the backwardness of the periphery as a product of the specific cultures of these societies being inferior to that of Europeans, barriers to economic progress that must be broken down. In contrast, the scientific socialist view sees economic development as a process contested by class struggle and the role of imperialism in reproducing the core/periphery division

In the Eurocentric ideology, the European world is seen as a world of wealth due to its unique culture while the rest of the world is held back by its culture (Asiatic stagnation for example) and only progresses to the extent it copies Europe. History is a progressive march towards modernization, and “it becomes impossible to contemplate any other future for the world other than its progressive Europeanization.”41 The future is shaped and defined by the West, which has everything to teach the rest of the world and nothing to learn from it. As a result, Western capitalism stands as a model for the planet, its mode of development universal for all countries and only held back by internal backwardness when this development fails to take hold. This chauvinist ideology took hold over Bernstein and even Marx at times, seeing the spread of colonialism as a progressive process that would enforce the development of stagnant societies. 

According to the ideology of developmental economism, if not for the backwardness of the non-European world the development of capitalism would ultimately homogenize the world. Four-hundred years of global capitalist development has shown the world still heavily divided, not only between bourgeois and proletariat but between core and periphery nations. Capitalism is dominant in almost every country today, and the uneven development of the world still haunts the periphery. Bernstein’s vision of colonialism bringing capitalist “civilization” to the world has come to pass. Yet imperialism still ravages the world, creating what John Smith calls the super-exploitation of the global south by the developed capitalist nations. Capitalism has spread worldwide, but it has formed a global division of labor where the post-colonial proletariat labors for starvation wages to produce super-profits realized in the imperialist countries. According to Smith,

“…the very processes that produced modern, developed, prosperous capitalism in Europe and North America also produced backwardness, underdevelopment, and poverty in the Global South…the accelerated spread of capitalist social relations among Southern nations has been far more effective in dissolving traditional economies and ties to the land than in absorbing into wage labor those made destitute by the process.”42  

The historical verdict seems to have been made in favor of the arguments of Bax and the anti-imperialists rather than Bernstein. Yet we must not pretend that this debate is merely of historical importance. Today we face an imperialism more based in systematically enforced economic underdevelopment, which is maintained through imperialist police actions. Rather than direct colonialism, it is primarily economic imperialism of the more informal kind that devastates the world. As a result, the defenders of imperialism amongst the left come in different forms than the likes of Bernstein. They are not the colonial apologists of old but advocates of US intervention as progressive in certain situations or those who refuse to be critical of social democrats who vote for imperialist war budgets. There are also those who refuse to take up demands for the deconstruction of settler-colonial states, like the United States, and the national liberation of those still under settler-colonial occupation, in the name of focusing on bread-and-butter demands. As the socialist movement develops, we must learn from the failures of the Second International to clearly establish an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist position in its ranks, which exists not only on paper but in the class awareness of the rank and file. 

 

The Family is Dead, Long Live the Family

With family abolition a controversial topic in the current-day leftist discourse, Alyson Escalante argues for a more nuanced and sensitive approach to the topic by looking at the works of Karl Marx and Alexandra Kollontai while exploring the relation of colonialism to the family. 

It might seem strange that in a time when internal debates within Marxism are largely centered around revolutionary versus electoral strategy that a whole other long-downplayed component of Marxism has begun to enter the mainstream discussion: the abolition of the family. In 1848, Marx himself noted that the proposition of family abolition was particularly scandalous, remarking that “even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.” Perhaps because of the scandalous nature of the topic, Marxists have largely downplayed this aspect of the communist project, with criticism of the family mostly being taken up within the field of feminist theory. 

And yet, in 2019, the question of family abolition re-emerged, with both the left and the right taking up a condemnation of this part of the communist program. In many ways, this re-emergence is due to Sophie Lewis’s 2019 book Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family. This text managed to earn partial condemnation from the left social democrats at Jacobin as well as an intense amount of right-wing ire due to Tucker Carlson’s decision to discuss the piece on his show. Suddenly, the idea of abolishing the family is being taken up in mainstream publications such as Vice, The Atlantic, and Fox News. A debate that communists have long pushed to the sideline is now unfolding outside the scope of our own publications and organizations, and the question we are faced with is how we as communists will respond to and intervene in this debate. 

My primary interest here is to intervene by reframing the debate within the history of Marxism and to attempt to shift the debate from one regarding the normative desirability of family abolition to a debate around the strategic response to capitalism and colonialism’s own destruction of the family. This requires us to return to Marx and Kollontai’s work regarding family abolition to understand the historical conditions in which Marx raises the concept and to examine how those conditions might function to inform this emerging debate today. Furthermore, I suggest that we must also consider the relationship between colonialism and the family in order to develop a proper orientation towards family abolition. I hope to demonstrate that the desirability of family abolition is not a useful framing for the debate, as capitalism and colonialism have already begun to enact historical processes which make this abolition inevitable. The question facing communists today, I propose, is how we respond to this inevitability. 

Marxism and The Family

In order to better understand the debate at hand, I think that it is worth historicizing the relationship between communism and family abolition. In order to do this, I hope to turn to communist theorists of family abolition to uncover a historical understanding of the term that might shed light on its development. 

Perhaps the most famous invocation of family abolition is found in the second chapter of The Communist Manifesto. In this chapter, Marx sheds light on the historical contingency of bourgeois culture, by demonstrating the relatively recent emergence and historically novelty of bourgeois cultural norms, and by insisting that such norms are not extended to the vast majority of people, i.e the workers. When the communists discuss the abolition of class culture, they do not mean an anarchistic destruction of all culture, but of a very distinct and historically contingent form of culture. And yet, for the bourgeoisie, this culture is treated as eternal, grounded in nature itself, such that its abolition is seen as an abolition of culture as such. Marx notes that for the bourgeoisie, “the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture…” because the bourgeoisie has transformed “the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property” into “eternal laws of nature and of reason.” The bourgeoisie has naturalized their culture as the sole legitimate expression of culture. 

In response to the ideological naturalization of bourgeois culture, Marx asserted that this culture has not always existed, emerging as the result of “historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production.” According to Marx, this view repeats the mistaken belief of all prior ruling classes, namely the idea that the social conditions resulting from a given mode of production are eternal, natural, and impossible to undo. This belief is grounded in obvious hypocrisy because the ruling capitalist class must acknowledge that the feudal culture which accompanied the feudal mode of production was not eternal, and was in fact overthrown through the bourgeois revolutions. Given this reality, the bourgeoisie should understand that their own culture is a historically contingent result of a given mode of production that can be transcended and surpassed, just as the feudal and ancient modes of production were transcended and surpassed. 

Furthermore, Marx astutely pointed out that the bourgeois culture which the capitalists seek to defend is one that is exclusive to a relatively small class. For the majority of people living in a capitalist society, the cultural fixtures of bourgeois society are simply inaccessible decadence. The same social formation that the bourgeoisie accredits with the development of great art, music, and cultural expression is a social formation which condemns the majority of the population to squalor and exploitation. Marx insists that culture, the “loss of which [the capitalist] laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.” From this insight, we can see that not only is bourgeois culture historically contingent, but also that it is far from universal within the given historical epoch in which it emerges. 

It is from these premises that Marx shifts abruptly to the discussion of family abolition, beginning by exclaiming (as previously quoted), “Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.” Marx unpacks this infamous proposal by pointing again to the hypocrisy of the capitalists’ claim to be protecting the family from communists who would seek its abolition. He points out this hypocrisy, stating: 

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

Here Marx again points to the apparent lack of universality of the family form, noting that the family form is more or less reserved for the bourgeoisie themselves and that in the daily lives of the proletariat, the family as a meaningful social unit is absent. The capitalists point to the communist call for abolition of the family with horror, while simultaneously developing a socioeconomic system which has already destroyed the very basis of the family for the workers. Marx continues:

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family… becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

Once again, we must note that Marx does not actively defend the abolition of the family as a program here so much as point out that for the proletariat, the family has already been torn apart by the exploitation which is endemic to capitalism. 

Given the historical context of the Communist Manifesto, we must take note of the rhetorical and propagandistic function of Marx’s argument. He does not come out of the gate proposing the abolition of the family as a positive program, but rather begins in an almost defensive manner. Marx is aware that communists have been accused of endorsing abolition of the family, and so begins by dismissing misconceptions and pointing to bourgeois hypocrisy instead of brashly defending a programmatic demand which itself would be potentially alienating to potential comrades who might read the manifesto. The effect of Marx’s own form of argumentation is clever, in that it gestures towards an already-existent family abolition which takes place at the hands of the capitalists. For Marx, the abolition of the family is a process already being undertaken, as the bourgeois family form was never truly extended to the workers. Thus those workers who might be appalled at the idea that the communists want to abolish the family might have their fears assuaged by the claim that the family is already being abolished by the capitalists, while the communists merely recognize this reality and seek to formulate a response to it. In this sense, Marx transforms the primary question from “should the family be abolished” to “given that the family is already being abolished for the workers, how ought we to respond and what forms of care and kinship might we replace this dying family structure with?” This transformation of the question is one that has perhaps been lost in contemporary debates regarding the abolition of the family.

Marx is purposefully somewhat vague in his manifesto. While this may have propagandistic utility, it does make it hard to unpack some of the details regarding the family as a historically contingent and non-universal cultural phenomenon, as well as the details of what abolition of the family might look like in a communist context. Given this ambiguity in Marx’s work, I suggest that we turn to Alexandra Kollontai’s 1920 text Communism and the Family. At the point in her life that this text was published, Kollontai was involved in the founding and administration of the Zhenotdel, a department within the Communist Party focused on addressing the needs of women in the Soviet Union. This positioned her as an authority on questions regarding women’s place within communist society and lends the text a level of credibility in terms of its ability to stand in for the view of organized communists in a given revolutionary era. 

Alexandra Kollontai, left, as People’s Commissar of Social Welfare in the first Soviet government (1917-18)

 

Kollontai opens her text by posing two simple questions, “Will the family continue to exist under communism” and  “Will the family remain in the same form?” Following in Marx’s own footsteps, Kollontai recognizes that these questions are asked by many workers as a result of generalized anxiety regarding what sort of changes communism might usher in. She acknowledges that the concept of doing away with the family is not immediately appealing to the workers, and that it cannot be brashly asserted as a progressive demand absent careful consideration of specific historical trends. She notes that increased ease of divorce within the Soviet Union has added to concerns, and recognizes that many women who see their husbands as “breadwinners” are expressing understandable concerns regarding precarity and economic abandonment. It is important to note that Kollontai does not dismiss these concerns out of hand, recklessly treating them as obvious reactionary sentiments. 

In order to respond to these fears, Kollontai echos Marx by pointing out that capitalism itself has already begun to erode the family. She writes:

There is no point in not facing up to the truth: the old family in which the man was everything and the woman nothing, the typical family where the woman had no will of her own, no time of her own and no money of her own, is changing before our very eyes.

While acknowledging that this change can be scary, she also points out that change is a constant of history, and that social forms are always prone to change, that “we have only to read how people lived in the past to see that everything is subject to change and that no customs, political organizations or moral principles are fixed and inviolable.” She thus calls attention to the historical contingency of the family. The family is not an eternal transhistorical constant, but is a social phenomena which has changed over time based on factors of production and geography. For example, Kollontai points out that remnants of the broader feudal family relations still survived into early capitalism among aspects of the peasants. Furthermore, she notes that within her own time, notions of the family are variable along cultural and national lines, with totally different and polygamous forms of the family existing in some cultures. Given these realities, it would not make much sense to be worried about the fact that the form of the family is changing. Instead of worrying, Kollontai suggests that our task is to: 

decide which aspects of our family system are outdated and to determine what relations, between the men and women… which rights and duties would best harmonise with the conditions of life in the new workers’ Russia.

In this quote, we see a rhetorical move which is quite similar to Marx’s transformation of the core question regarding family abolition. The family is changing, according to Kollontai; that is an inevitable fact of history which results from the contingency of social formation on ever-changing modes of production. Given this inevitability, it is the task of the communists to guide this change away from something destructive and towards something harmonious. 

Again, we must pay attention to the rhetorical function of this text, noting that the term “abolition” does not appear a single time. Instead, an inevitable change is discussed, and an active project of guiding this change is proposed. In this sense, the communist abolition of the family is transformed from an externally imposed top-down process into a process guided by the working class as it determines what new kinship forms might provide for the well-being of all people. There is evident compassion in Kollontai’s writing, which takes the concerns of working women seriously, and Kollontai clearly adapts her rhetoric in response to the seriousness of these concerns. 

Having adequately explained the historical contingency of the family, and more importantly, having demonstrated the active role of working women in building a new better form of familial relations, Kollontai then turns to discuss the non-universal nature of the bourgeois view of the family. She notes that this older understanding of the family fulfilled necessary social functions, writing,

“There was a time when the isolated, firmly-knit family, based on a church wedding, was equally necessary to all its members. If there had been no family, who would have fed, clothed and brought up the children?”

According to Kollontai, one needs to look no further than the horrid state of orphans to see how central the family was to fulfilling real and pressing social demands for care. The family, through an admittedly violent privatization of women’s labor in the household, had met the real needs of society. Despite the fact that this family relation was inherently exploitative towards the domestic labor of women, it did serve a social function. And yet, Kollontai points out that even this exploitative form of the family is no longer guaranteed by capitalism. In fact, it is being undone by it. She writes,

“But over the last hundred years this customary family structure has been falling apart in all the countries where capitalism is dominant and where the number of factories… which employ hired labour is increasing.”

Following Marx, Kollontai points to capitalism’s own destruction of the family among the workers. The incorporation of women into the proletarianized workforce as wage laborers has itself had begun to erode the role of women as housekeepers and caretakers. The economic hardship of capitalism had made the wages of a single proletarian worker per household insufficient and have forced women to enter the market and sell their labor. While Americans tend to think of the phenomena of female proletarianization as relatively progressive and historically recent (often being traced to the Second World War), Kollontai calls attention to how early this process began for many workers around the world, and the destructive impacts it had. She points out that as early as 1914, tens of millions of women were already being forced to enter the workforce. Rather than seeing this as a move towards gender equity, she instead recognizes the destructive aspects of this process, writing: 

What kind of “family life” can there be if the wife and mother is out at work for at least eight hours and, counting the travelling, is away from home for ten hours a day? Her home is neglected; the children grow up without any maternal care, spending most of the time out on the streets, exposed to all the dangers of this environment. The woman who is wife, mother and worker has to expend every ounce of energy to fulfil these roles.

For Kollontai, it is quite clear that capitalism is responsible for the destruction of the family. In this sense, she echoes Marx’s own critique of bourgeois hypocrisy. Furthermore, she acknowledges that capitalism has not offered any real alternative to the family form which it is actively destroying, which leaves us with anarchistic absence of structure in its place. Given this lack of alternative, is it any wonder that workers express fear at the idea of family abolition?

In response to this horrific disintegration of family life, Kollontai does not propose a reactionary return to earlier forms of familial relation. After all, the idyllic vision of the nuclear family as a source of stability and safety amid a chaotic world is one which has always been particular to the ruling class; it has always been denied to the masses for whom the economic precarity of wage labor and the anarchy of the market ensure that such stability is always out of reach. Kollontai rejects the romantic bourgeois view of the family, acknowledging that under capitalism, the family is nothing more than “the primary economic unit of society and the supporter and educator of young children.” The bourgeois reactionaries who clamor for a revival of the family ignore the way that capitalism itself makes their vision of the family impossible. As a materialist and a Marxist, Kollontai cannot embrace this nostalgia and instead must ask what the materialist insight into the economic function of the family means for the future of the family. 

Capitalism has, according to Kollontai, not only eroded the conditions in which the traditional nuclear family could function by forcing women to labor outside of the house; it has also destroyed the economic necessity of women’s labor within the household. She points out that at one point women not only performed the labor of household maintenance and childcare but also played a productive role in their domestic labor. As part of this productive labor, she would be required to “[spin] wool and linen, [weave] cloth and garments, [knit] stockings, [make] lace, [prepare] – as far as her resources permitted – all sorts of pickles, jams and other preserves for winter, and manufacture, her own candles.” Many of these products would actually make their way into local markets, meaning that women would play a broader economic role even while being confined to domestic labor. This productive function has also been destroyed by capitalism, however, as women no longer have the time to produce alongside engaging in wage labor and performing domestic maintenance. This has necessitated a transition from the family as a productive unit to the family as a consumptive unit which simply consumes commodities made available by non-familial modes of production. Women are even being forced to have less and less time to engage in cleaning and child-rearing, as the demand to engage in wage labor increases. Capitalism itself has created a primitive socialization of much of women’s duties, evidenced by the existence of restaurants as a way of feeding one’s family. This primitive socialization, is of course, not particularly liberatory as families are forced to spend their meager wages in order to engage in it. 

Thus, once again, it is not the communists who are destroying the role of the family, it is capitalism. Furthermore, capitalism in the instance of primitive socialization of domestic labor provides a terrible alternative predicated on the exchange of service for money in a market context. It offers no real alternative to the family, only transactional forms of care in place of familial care. Does this liberate women from their domestic burdens? In sense it does, but it also replaces that burden with new capitalist burdens. Given this ambiguity, the question is not whether or not the abolition of the family is a good thing. The abolition of the family, according to both Marx and Kollontai, is an inevitability that has already been taking place for decades at the time of both their writing. Both reject the possibility of going back to some romantic alternative, as this alternative has already been made impossible. The question is then, given this inevitability and the impossibility of a reactionary alternative, what sort of kinship formation ought communists to endorse? 

Kollontai suggests that communism can offer a truly socialized alternative, not based on economic transactions, but based on expanded relations of solidarity and care. If women are already becoming too busy to perform domestic maintenance based labor, communism can socialize that labor in a truly progressive manner. She writes that while “under capitalism only people with well-lined purses can afford to take their meals in restaurants… under communism everyone will be able to eat in the communal kitchens and dining-rooms.” The work of laundry, house cleaning, and other domestic duties can simply be fulfilled by “men and women whose job it is to go round in the morning cleaning rooms.” Furthermore, the education of children (the other remaining task of women) can also be socialized. She notes that even capitalism had created state-run systems of socialized education. Capitalism has prevented this full socialization because “the capitalists are well aware that the old type of family… constitutes the best weapon in the struggle to stifle the desire of the working class for freedom.” Capitalism cannot fully socialize these educational functions but it destroys the ability for the family to meet them at the same time. Communism, on the other hand, can create this full socialization. 

And so Kollontai concludes that the family is going away whether we like it or not. The capitalist mode of production has destroyed its economic function and has offered no real alternative. She writes: 

In place of the old relationship between men and women, a new one is developing: a union of affection and comradeship, a union of two equal members of communist society, both of them free, both of them independent and both of them workers. No more domestic bondage for women. No more inequality within the family… Marriage will be a union of two persons who love and trust each other… Instead of the conjugal slavery of the past, communist society offers women and men a free union which is strong in the comradeship which inspired it. 

This vision is perhaps not what most think of when they imagine the communist abolition of the family. Love, mutual care, and the union of people in a kinship unit still exists but is transformed through the socialization of domestic labor. This change does do away with the idea that one’s responsibility is only to one’s own children, of course, because the care of children becomes a collective responsibility. All children are in a sense part of a new and larger family, what Kollontai refers to as “the great proletarian family” and the “great family of workers.” It is a powerful vision that Kollontai offers here: it is capitalism that would abolish the family and replace it with mere transaction, but it is communism that transforms the family into a truly socialized reality. 

Now, finally having outlined Kollontai’s approach to the question of family abolition, we must ask what is at stake in her rhetorical framing of the question. In response to the workers’ fears regarding family abolition, she recognizes the horrors of capitalism’s erosion of the family. In fact, she diverges from Marx in as much as she refuses to name the communist project as a project of “abolishing” the family. In the face of the capitalist destruction of the role of the family, she simultaneously argues that attempts to hold on to the old family are both doomed and also naturalize women’s subordination, while simultaneously insisting that a new type of family is possible. She does not tell concerned workers that they must suck it up, that their fears are reactionary and that they must embrace a world without the family. Rather, she preserves the language of the family but reinterprets it into a collectivist, that is to say, a communist, version of the family. The old family is dead, capitalism has killed it, and so we have been invited to build and define a new family.

It would be possible to suggest that the language used by Kollontai is merely a semantic matter, but while this may be true on some level, it misses the strategic function of this semantic shift. Kollontai’s choice to preserve the language of the family, while inviting us to radically redefine this family through communist revolution and socialization, is able to assuage the fears of workers for whom the concept of abolishing the family carries understandably concerning connotations. There is a real strategic decision being made here that we ought to learn from today. 

Colonialism and The Family

While Marx and Kollontai demonstrate that the abolition of the family is an inevitable project that has been enacted by capitalism, it is worth expanding the scope of their analysis by examining the relationship between colonialism and the family. An analysis of this relationship is extremely important in our current moment, particularly for communists inside of the United States. A common reply to those who call for the abolition of the family is a sort of indignant frustration with the insensitivity of this suggestion in the face of the contemporary and historical treatment of racialized and colonized families. Many in my organizing circles have responded to this revived debate by asking “how can we possibly call for the abolition of the family in a time when ICE is forcibly tearing families apart?” This question is quite understandable, and it expresses real anxiety grounded in contemporary colonial capitalism’s destruction of the family in particular among colonized communities. 

This question ought to lead us to augment Marx and Kollontai’s analysis with a careful analysis of the colonial project of abolishing the families of colonized people. Marx and Kollontai show how the abolition of the family is a process already being undertaken by capitalism, and we can turn to theorists of colonialism to show how this process is likewise being undertaken by colonial societies. Absent this historicization, we risk advocating a form of Marxist feminism that risks falling into liberal color-blindness which ignores the historical processes which cause colonized people to respond to the proposition of family abolition with scorn and frustration. 

One context in which we must consider the relationship between colonization and the family is within the context of blackness in America. America’s own history of slavery and anti-blackness necessarily require us to consider the way in which black people (and black women in particular) have an experience of the family which diverges from the experiences of the Russian and European proletariat. One author who is particularly useful for considering this experience is Dorothy Roberts, whose text Killing The Black Body provides insight into the way that slavery and its ongoing legacy of anti-blackness has controlled black women’s reproduction and foreclosed access to certain familial relations. 

Roberts begins by asserting that black women’s own status as mothers has been consistently under attack as a result of the exclusion of black women from the category of womanhood. She writes, “from the moment they set foot in this country as slaves, Black women have fallen outside the American ideal of womanhood.” While European ideologies of gender treated women as the fairer sex, understanding women as morally superior (if physically and politically inferior) to men, black women were painted as portrayed as immoral Jezebels. While European women were encouraged to become mothers and raise the next generation of workers and capitalists alike, black women were seen as hypersexual and were condemned for having too many children. The image of a neglectful black mother who has more children than she could care for emerged from slave-era narratives and has been preserved today in the frequently evoked myth of the welfare queen. Not only were black women shamed and attacked for having children of their own, but racist ideology also praised the Mammy figure, “the black female house servant who carried her master’s children.” Thus from the very beginnings of slavery, black women’s relation to the family had been disrupted by slavery. Furthermore, these forms of racial oppression demonstrate the way that the maintenance of the white settler family relied on the labor of black women who were denied a right to their own families. In this sense, the analysis that Roberts puts forward can help us to understand the non-universality of the nuclear family within the context of American colonization and slavery. 

Illustration from Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Slavery systematically undermined the formation of black families.

The horrific story of slavery does not end with a prohibition on black women’s reproduction. Roberts notes that “the ban on importing slaves after 1808 and the steady inflation in their price made enslaved women’s childbearing even more valuable. Female slaves provided their masters with a ready future supply of chattel.” As slavery developed, black women’s reproduction was transformed into a productive process in which a black woman’s children were commodities that could be traded and sold. Given this reality, we can see that even when black women were encouraged to reproduce, such reproduction did not lead to the formation of black families or the establishment of black motherhood, but rather led to the severing of kinship and care relations based on the dictates of the slave market and slave masters. In fact, the babies of slaves were considered to be their master’s property “before the child even took its first breath!” These children were very frequently sold off, separating mother from child. 

Throughout this process, black women engaged in resistance and sought to fight back against this destruction of black kinship. Roberts writes that “they escaped from plantations, feigned illness, endured severe punishment, and fought back rather than submit to slave master’s sexual domination.” Black women had to fight for access to the family in a way that European proletarians could never have understood. Is it any wonder that in light of this struggle, black women might be concerned with communists (especially white communists) promoting a program of family abolition?

Furthermore, the abolition of slavery did not end the colonial destruction of black kinship and the attempts to preclude the existence of black families. Roberts also traces the early movement for birth control’s complicity in the eugenics movement, paying special attention to Margeret Sanger’s concept of family planning as an instance of racist eugenics. Early eugenics projects emerged alongside a theory of race science that emphasized the supposedly dysgenic effects of black reproduction. Robert’s points out that early eugenic experiments in forced sterilization began with the forced “castration of black men as a punishment for crime.”  In the twentieth century, eugenicists began to raise fears about high black birth rates and the possibility of intermarriage between people of different races. These eugenicists proposed and endorsed policies to engage in the forced sterilization of black people. Sanger’s family planning clinics were in fact supported by eugenicists because they believed that increased access to birth control would reduce black fertility rates. Again, we see that even after the formal abolition of slavery, a concerted effort was made to decrease black reproduction and to preclude the existence of black families. 

Roberts also analyzes more recent instances of white supremacist regulation of black reproduction. Roberts examines the case of Darlene Johnson, a black mother who faced trial on child abuse charges for “whipping her six and four-year-old daughters with a belt for smoking cigarettes and poking a hanger in an electrical socket.” Johnson was facing the potential of serious prison time, raising the stakes of the trial. In response to this circumstance, the judge “gave Johnson a choice between a seven-year prison sentence or only one year in prison and three years probation with the condition that she be implanted with Norplant [a hormonal birth control].” This example is part of a broader trend of the courts being used to prevent or punish black motherhood, ultimately culminating in a host of discriminatory policies. Again and again, we see white supremacist society doing all it can to destroy black families. These developments are in many ways concurrent with the development of capitalism, and indicate that the processes by which capitalist development have eroded the family extend beyond the role of wage labor analyzed in Marx and Kollontai’s work. 

The ways in which colonial violence has precluded access to the family form for many people extends beyond the experience of blackness; Native Americans are also subjected to a whole host of acts of violence designed to destroy native kinship relations.  Mary Annette Pember, an Ojibwe woman whose mother was forced to attend a boarding school recounts the way in which “Native families were coerced by the federal government and Catholic Church officials into sending their children to live and attend classes at boarding schools.” Not only did these state-sanctioned boarding schools geographically separate children from their families, but they also undermined kinship relations by pushing cultural assimilation into European norms, and trying to destroy cultural customs and languages which were central to familial bonds. Pember notes that “Students were physically punished for speaking their Native languages. Contact with family and community members was discouraged or forbidden altogether.” 

Writing in American Indian Quarterly, Jane Lawrence’s article “The Indian Health Service and The Sterilization of Native American Women” explores more contemporary acts of violence against native women in order to preclude native motherhood. Lawrence documents a history of forced sterilization of native women, noting that “Native Americans accused the Indian Health Service of sterilizing at least 25% of Native American women who were between the ages of fifteen and forty-four during the 1970s.” This estimate, it turns out, is actually quite conservative, Erin Blakemore noting that the percentage may be as high as 50% of native women. 

These forced sterilizations and the history of boarding schools make up part of a broader move by the settler-colonial society in the US to try to destroy and erode native families. In 2011, NPR reported that “Nearly 700 Native American children in South Dakota are being removed from their homes every year.” Although a 1978 law called The Indian Child Welfare Act requires native children to be placed in the care of relatives or tribal members, NPR found that “32 states are failing to abide by the act in one way or another.” In South Dakota, NPR found that the majority of native children were being placed in non-native homes or group settings. This much more recent example demonstrates the extent to which the genocidal prerogatives of settler-colonialism prioritize the dissolution of native families. 

Another instance that touches on the relationship between colonialism and the family is immigration policy in the United States. In 2019, the practice of family separation came to the forefront of public discourse. Under President Donald Trump, a policy had developed of splitting up families in the deportation process, often deporting the undocumented parents but leaving children behind. This created a large public outcry in the United States. As a result of this practice, a new legal precedent was established for American foster parents to adopt and gain legal guardianship for the children left behind after deportations. Several cases of these adoptions have taken place in the United States, and they have been upheld by various courts. The practice of family separation stands out as a very alarming example of the destruction of families by colonial policies. 

Of course, immigration raises larger questions regarding the dissolution of the family. The desperate conditions in South and Central America which prompt many immigrants to move to the US often separate families, as one member may move for work in order to send money back to family. Additionally,  the historical imposition of the current border between the US and Mexico also separated families who now suddenly found themselves living on opposite signs of an arbitrary line of division.  

All of these examples demonstrate the extent to which colonial and racialized systems of oppression and exploitation have worked to not only destroy families among marginalized communities but to preclude the very possibility of such families existing at all. Within the United States, the story of the eroding of the family extends far beyond the story of the proletarianization of women. There is, quite frankly, more to the story of family abolition than Marx and Kollontai are able to account for. Given this reality, we must ask how these experiences of colonization affect the communist stance regarding family abolition. 

I believe that we should acknowledge that these experiences make it difficult to forward the language of family abolition when explaining communist demands for expanded kinship systems. Given these histories, it is easy to understand why so many have objected to the concept of family abolition on its face. The history of colonialism in America is the history of violently and horrifically destroying the families of the colonized. It is, quite frankly, both insensitive and unstrategic for communists to discuss the abolition of the family in light of these histories. Although that term might have a more technical meaning within communist circles, it does a terrible job of conveying communist goals to those who have experienced particularly horrific violence as a result of colonial policies aimed at dissolving families. Communism is a mass movement that seeks the liberation of the oppressed and exploited. As such, our language must not be isolating or alienating to the most marginalized. Although certain academics might insist on maintaining the use of the term “family abolition” due to its historical legacy, we ought to instead follow in the footsteps of Kollontai by discussing a transformation of the family and the development of a new collective proletarian understanding of the family. This language emphasizes the fact that communists have a positive vision for an alternative to the nuclear family, and seek to build a type of expanded family unit actually worthy of its name. 

While I argue that it is important for us to modify our language, these experiences of colonization cannot lead us to accidentally fall into a defense of the nuclear family. After all, the exclusion of colonized people from participation in the nuclear family is indicative of the historical emergence of the nuclear family as a colonial concept. That is to say that the nuclear family was not only denied to colonized people but was defined in terms of their exclusion and in opposition to alternative non-European forms of kinship. This means that we cannot resolve these ongoing legacies of colonialism through an attempt to expand the European nuclear family to include marginalized people. Such an expansion would not only arguably be impossible given the extent to which exclusion of colonized people is constitutive of the nuclear family, but would not resolve the violence of the capitalist destruction of the family. The family under capitalism is still based on the exploitation of women, still slowly being eroded and replaced with transactional atomized alternatives, and still unsuitable for human harmony and thriving. To simply expand the nuclear family to include colonized people would simply be to assimilate these communities into another violent and exploitative framework. As such, these histories of exclusion do not in fact act as a defense of the necessity of the nuclear family, but instead, act as a profound example of why we need an alternative. Communists can offer such an alternative, and I again argue that we should frame this alternative not as “abolishing the family” but as a positive project of building something better in the face of hundreds of years of capitalism and colonialism doing all they can to abolish the family themselves. 

There are, of course, those elements of the communist left, who might be tempted to incorporate the analysis presented here into a reactionary defense of the family. The “trad-left” podcasters Aimee Terese and Benjamin Studebaker have argued on Twitter that the family ought to be defended because “familial love and loyalty are worth more than money.” They forward a position common among the chauvinist traditional left, which argues that because capitalism has been the main force attacking the family, it is the duty of the left to defend the family from capitalism. As a result of this analysis, they argue that “feminism is a disciplinary technology of the bourgeoisie” which hopes to assist capitalism in the abolition of supposedly natural family relations so that kinship relations might be commoditized. I address this perspective explicitly because I think it is important to make sure that my arguments which seek to complicate discourses of family abolition do not get taken up in defense of such a reactionary position. As Marxists, we understand that we are not required to defend all of the social phenomena which capitalism seeks to dissolve. This is, in fact, a fairly fundamental Marxist insight. For example, capitalism sought to dissolve the conditions of feudal agricultural production in favor of proletarianized urban labor. In response to this, Marxists did not defend the “natural” relations of feudalism “which are worth more than money.” Instead, the Marxist position was to point out that feudalism had to be allowed to fade away, while also pointing out that the abolition of serfdom had not in fact made laborers free, instead replacing one form of subjugation with a new form of wage exploitation and precarity. The logic forwarded by Terese and Studebaker represents a common reactionary impulse among more right-leaning critics of capitalism, an impulse to advocate for a return to pre-capitalist forms of life. Such a position is untenable for Marxists both as an assessment of feudal relations and of the family. Our task is first to point out that the capitalist destruction of the family has done massive damage to many working and colonized people, just as the foreclosure of the commons in the transition away from feudalism created massive suffering among peasants. Our second task is to point out that the solution to this destruction is to create broader forms of solidarity and kinship that are superior to the family order which preceded capitalism. 

The family, despite often offering a real respite for those alienated by capitalism and subjected by colonialism still plays a fundamentally reactionary role. A family system based on blood relations has led to many young LGBT people finding themselves abandoned outside this system. The family has created privatized and uncompensated domestic labor largely pushed onto women. The family has become a symbolic core of reactionary politics in the United States. No defense of the nuclear family can avoid taking on the baggage of the family’s own patriarchal and compulsory heterosexual function. The nuclear family, even when not being destroyed by capitalists, is still a failure for too many people to be worth defending. 

So if we cannot defend the nuclear family, what options are available to us? I argue that if we actually historicize the debate surrounding the abolition of the family within the context of the early communist movement as well as the context of American colonialism and white supremacy, it becomes very clear that communists have a strong case to make that something better than the nuclear family must be developed. We must follow Marx and Kollontai’s framing of the abolition of the family as an inevitable process that has been initiated not by communists, but by the capitalists themselves. We must also go beyond the scope of Marx and Kollontai’s work in order to demonstrate the way that the processes of colonialism have initiated the abolition of family relations among colonized communities in the US and beyond. If we begin our appeal to the people by emphasizing these ongoing processes, we shift the debate from a debate about whether or not we communists ought to abolish the family to a debate about what alternative there is to the decaying and violent colonial nuclear family. The family is dying, and it has been dying for centuries now. In its place capitalism offers no real alternatives. Our job as communists then is not to glibly celebrate the abolition of the family in a way that alienates those suffering most from this abolition. Rather, our job is to offer hope that we can build something better. 

It is worth insisting once again quite explicitly that a shift in language away from an endorsement of abolishing the family must not be accompanied by a shift towards softening our critique of the nuclear family. Kollontai and Marx remain correct that the nuclear family remains a patriarchal institution built to ensure the exploitation of women’s labor and women’s legal subordination to men. The nuclear family has also proven to be an absolute nightmare for those whose families have failed to care for them. I know countless LGBT people who can attest to the violence of the nuclear family after being kicked out of or abused by their families. In his article Faith, Family, and Folk: Against The Trad Left, Donald Parkinson summarizes this well, writing “Not everyone lives in a world where their family is their friend; in many cases, one’s family can be their worst enemy. We can do better than valorizing one form of alienation in response to another.” Parkinson is completely correct that even in our critiques of the sometimes reckless and insensitive language of abolishing the family, we must still avoid slipping into reaction. 

In the end, it is a fine line that we have to walk. On the one hand, we must frame our critiques of the family in a way that the people we hope to organize will find understandable; we must avoid alienating language used either for the sake of academic credibility or an impulse to scandalize. This is a task that those communists who support family abolition have largely failed at. On the other hand, we as communists must remain ruthless critics of all that exists, including the nuclear family. The balancing act demanded of us is not one that is easy to perform. Thankfully, we have the example of those revolutionaries who came before us to provide some guidance. When I read Kollontai, I don’t see someone celebrating the abolition of the family, I see someone advocating for an expanded and new sense of the family in the face of the dying nuclear family. At the very least I see this as a vision for a better society; a society whereas Donald Parkinson puts it, “someone without a family can thrive as well as someone with family intact.” Kollontai’s expanded notion of the great proletarian family provides an example of what such a society would look like. It’s an example in which the dying nuclear family is allowed to pass on and a new form of communist family that extends beyond blood relations can finally, at last, take its place. A transfer of power from an old and corrupt form of kinship to a new and harmonious one can occur.

The family is dead. Long live the family. 

Works Cited

Blakemore, Erin. “The Little-Known History of the Forced Sterilization of …” JSTOR Daily, 2016, daily.jstor.org/the-little-known-history-of-the-forced-sterilization-of-native-american-women/.

Kollontai, Alexandra. “Communism and The Family” Komunistka, 1920

Lawrence, Jane. “The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women.” The American Indian Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, 2000, pp. 400–419., doi:10.1353/aiq.2000.0008.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 1848.

Parkinson, Donald. “Faith, Family and Folk: Against the Trad Left.” Cosmonaut, 28 Dec. 2019, cosmonaut.blog/2019/12/28/faith-family-and-folk-against-the-trad-left/.

Pember, Mary Annette. “Death by Civilization.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 8 Mar. 2019, www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/traumatic-legacy-indian-boarding-schools/584293/.

Roberts, Dorothy E. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty. Vintage Books, 2017.